Evaluation of UNICEF’s response to support the influx of refugees from Ukraine
Evaluation of UNICEFs Response to Support the Influx of Refugees from Ukraine Final Report | March 2023 ii Evaluation of UNICEFs Response to Support the Influx of Refugees from Ukraine | Final Report, 2023 The statements in this publication are the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the policies or the views of UNICEF. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of the material do not imply on the part of the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) the expression of any opinion concerning the legal status of any country or territory or its authorities or the delimitations of its frontiers. Cover Photo: UNICEF/UN0599971/Nicodim All images in this report are intended for informational purposes. UNICEF photographs are copyrighted and may not be used for an individuals or organizations promotional activities or in any commercial context. Authors: Julia Betts, Susan Steiner, Gabriele Tani, Arseniy Gurin, and Mariel Leonard. 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Design: Gustavo Ernesto Martnez Crdenas United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) March 2023 Europe and Central Asia Regional Office Route des Morillons 4, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland Phone: +41 22 909 5111 ecaro@unicef.org www.unicef.org/eca Twitter: @unicefeca Facebook: /unicefeca http://www.unicef.org/eca/ iii EVALUATION OF UNICEFS RESPONSE TO SUPPORT THE INFLUX OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE FINAL REPORT | MARCH 2023 iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 1-3 1.1 Purpose and Objectives | 5 1.2 Evaluation Methodology | 6 1.3 Context of the Response | 8 1.4 Characteristics of Refugee-Hosting Countries | 10 1.5 The UNICEF Refugee Response Feb-Dec 2022 | 12 1.6 Management Arrangements and Key Actors | 17 INTRODUCTION | 4-13 2.1 How Well Did UNICEFs Response Meet the Needs and Priorities of Beneficiaries and Stakeholders? | 20 FINDINGS | 14-65 2.2 How Cohesive Was the Response, Internally and Externally? | 40 2.3 How Timely Was the Response, and How Efficiently Were Resources Converted into Results? | 50 2.4 What Results Were Delivered? | 57 2.5 How Sustainable Are the Results? | 67 CONCLUSIONS | 72-75 RECOMMENDATIONS | 76-81 CONTENTS CHARTS Chart 1: Sources of Finance |16 Chart 2: Surge Deployments (Excluding Remote) |24 Chart 3: Surge Support Days by Country |25 Chart 4: Share of Surge Staff from Among ECARO Staff and Nationals |25 Chart 5: Surge Duration Over Time |25 Chart 6: Ukrainian Refugee Needs (Survey Results) |31 Chart 7: Fund Expenditure with Cost Recovery by Sector |38 Chart 8: Fund Expenditures with Cost Recovery by Strategy |39 Chart 9: Growth in Partnerships |42 Chart 10: Partner Perceptions of UNICEFs Support for Programmatic Expansion |42 Chart 11: Partnership Categories February 2022-January 2023 |43 Chart 12: Partnerships Type by Country |44 Chart 13: Municipality and CSO Agreements by Value |44 Chart 14: Partner Perception of UNICEF Added Value |46 Chart 15: Blue Dot Establishment |51 Chart 16: Programmatic Initiation / Augmentation / Expansion |53 Chart 17: Child Protection Activities Timeline |54 Chart 18: Education Activities Timeline |54 Chart 19: Health and Nutrition Activities Timeline |54 Chart 20: Funds Expenditure Across All Eight Countries, February-December 2022 |55 Chart 21: UNICEF Social Media Mentions - Vulnerable Groups |64 Chart 22: Beneficiary Satisfaction with UNICEF Services |66 BOXES Box 1: Core Commitments to Children in Humanitarian Action (the CCCs) |15 Box 2: Unaccompanied and Separated Children |35 Box 3: Cross-Border Concerns: Education |50 Box 4: UNICEF Social Media Messaging and Advocacy on Vulnerability |65 FIGURES Figure 1: UNICEFs Perceived Comparative Advantages |45 Figure 2: Areas of Cohesion/Separation - Ukraine and Regional Refugee Response |49 FLOWCHARTS Flowchart 1: Intervention Logic |7 Flowchart 2: Response Timeline |13 Flowchart 3: Management Arrangements for the Response |18 Flowchart 4: Agreements with National Governments |22 Flowchart 5: Elaborated Intervention Logic (Columns 1 and 2) |22 Flowchart 6: Frequency of Situation Reporting |60 MAPS Map 1: Countries Analysed |8 Map 2: HAC Request per Country |30 Map 3: Blue Dot Establishment |38 Map 4: HAC Utilised Rates per Country |56 TABLES Table 1: Context and Volumes of Refugees |10 Table 2: Hac Appeals |12 Table 3: Multi-Sectoral Response Plan |15 Table 4: Main Donors: Pillar 2 Hac Appeal |16 Table 5: Needs Assessments |28 Table 6: HAC Appeal: Funding Status (as of December 31, 2022) |30 Table 7: Allocations vs. Sectoral Needs |32 Table 8: Programmatic Responses to Identified Vulnerable Groups |33 Table 9: Examples of Capacities Deployed to Support the Wider UN Response |47 Table 10: Comparison of HAC/Indicator Framework Target April September 2022 |59 Table 11: Achievement Against Target, 2022 |62 Table 12: Country Performance as an Average of Individual Target Indicators (2022) |63 Table 13: Humanitarian Advocacy |65 Table 14: Systems Strengthening and Social Cohesion |69 vi ACRONYMS AAP Accountability to Affected Populations ADAP Adolescent Development and Participation API Application Programming Interface CCC Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action CSO Civil Society Organisation ECARO Europe And Central Asia Regional Office EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product HAC Humanitarian Action for Children HPD Humanitarian Programme Document L3 Level 3 (Emergency Procedure) NER Named Entity Recognition NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NLP Natural Language Processing RE Relationship Extraction RRP Refugee Response Plan SA Sentiment Analysis SBC Social and Behavioural Change TOR Terms of Reference TP Topic Classification UASC Unaccompanied and Separated Children UN United Nations UNEG United Nations Evaluation Group UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 1 Executive Summary 1. UNICEF commissioned an independent evaluation of UNICEFs response to the outflow of Ukrainian refugees, February-December 2022. The evaluation addressed the UNICEF response outside, not within, Ukraine, in eight countries: Bulgaria, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. 2. The evaluation covers the period FebruaryDecember 2022. It asked four main questions: i. How well did UNICEFs response meet the needs and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders? ii. How well-aligned were resources UNICEFs response with partner needs? iii. How timely was the response, and how efficiently were resource converted into results? iv. What results were delivered and how sustainable are these results? 3. The evaluation applied an overarching intervention logic for the response, geared to the implementation of UNICEFs Core Commitments to Children in Humanitarian Action (the CCCs). A mixed-method approach was applied including documentary analysis; surveys with affected populations and external stakeholders; interviews and consultations with over 100 stakeholders from inside and outside UNICEF; and country missions to Poland, Romania, and Moldova. A range of evidence products were generated for use by UNICEF stakeholders, including an internal website, which contains the timeline for the response and three briefs which describe the response. FINDINGS Meeting the needs and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders 4. UNICEF adopted a twin-track approach to expanding its country presence, undertaking strategic advocacy and negotiation at national level in parallel with programmatic activity on the ground. Its strategic narrative of the Child Protection dimensions of the crisis was substantively appropriate and strategically shrewd. Internally, the division of leadership role between the Regional Office and the Emergency Operations division suffered from an early lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities, which was resolved after the re-designation of the refugee response to a Level 2 emergency. 5. UNICEF deployed a large-scale surge operation to meet needs. However, this revealed shortcomings in the standard response model, with short-term deployments, handover weaknesses, capacity and knowledge gaps and lack of operations expertise impeding progress. Despite wider data constraints, UNICEF supported needs and other assessments, though these were undertaken only later in the response. Learning, which was experiential, supported knowledge management in the same manner. 6. The response was aligned to needs in broad terms of country and sector allocations. However, vulnerable group recognition and programmatic tailoring took time. The programme has become more diversified and nuanced over time, and UNICEF has been a particularly prominent actor in relation to the 2 sensitive issue of Unaccompanied and Separated Children (UASC). Internal and external cohesion 7. Expanding partnerships to deliver was a steep learning curve, particularly where UNICEF had no prior programmatic presence in the country. UNICEF acted as a generous and supportive facilitator for the wider UN response, with a noted absence of territorialism. It facilitated entry for the UN response in several countries and acted as a strategic co-ordinator in others. Its national systems first model was highly appreciated by national partners. 8. However, balancing no regrets with rigour was challenging, with due diligence for new partnerships not always met, and handover shortcomings. The risk of national resource displacement was insufficiently considered, and the role of National Committees inadequately clarified in the early phase of the response. Some partnerships experienced strain in the final months of 2022, due to lack of clarity on resource availability for 2023. 9. Internal coherence faced challenges, linked to the lack of clarity on strategic leadership. Intra-regional coherence and knowledge transfer has been limited, and connections with the inside Ukraine response patchy, though with strong cross-border collaboration on UASC and education. Timeliness and resource efficiency 10. Overall, the response was timely. Rates of programmatic expansion were notably diverse between established Country Offices and emergency response programmes, given the additional time requirements needed to establish strategic and operational space. Although resources were relatively quick to arrive, the time needed to build up to programmatic readiness in some countries affected the pace at which funding could be committed and utilised. Partners experienced little to no disbursement delays. Results 11. Initial target-setting suffered from data gaps. A process of recalibration of targets provided a reality check of the responses true emphases. Burdens of data reporting were significant on staff in the early stages. 12. Quantitative achievements against targets were strong in SBC/C4D/AAP and Social Protection, with good performance in Child Protection, Health, Programme Strategy and Education. UNICEFs four existing Country Offices saw mostly higher achievement levels of quantitative targets than non-programme countries. Some notable achievements were made through advocacy, including sustaining global attention to the crisis effects on vulnerable children. 13. Attention to equity was stronger than that to gender equality and the empowerment of women, despite previous barriers faced by women and girls in Ukraine. Accountability to affected populations mainly relied on partner systems, with few feedback loops into UNICEFs own planning and programming. Nonetheless, beneficiaries indicated relatively high satisfaction levels with UNICEF interventions. Sustainability 14. The response has adopted a strong nexus focus. The national systems first approach provided a potentially strong sustainability lens, but this was inconsistently applied. The two main risks to sustainability related to partnerships formed in the early stages of the response, which did not always adopt a medium-term view, and UNICEFs inability to extend the same level of financial resourcing into 2023, which risked the continued commitment and goodwill of partners. 15. The issue of sustainability also raises a central conceptual dissonance; namely, the delivery of emergency response, implemented through national systems, and focused (in the sustained phase) on strengthening those systems, requires a different model from the short-term humanitarian instruments which currently govern it. CONCLUSIONS 16. Overall, the evaluation finds that UNICEFs response to the regional refugee crisis was swiftly executed, effective and appropriate for context. Prioritising response delivery through national systems and placing the best interests of [every] child at the 3 heart of the response, helped built its reputation as a principled and impartial actor. 17. UNICEF deployed staff and resources to meet needs, building a narrative with governments of its comparative advantages while engaging programmatically on the ground. It also successfully deployed its powerful communications and advocacy capacities to highlight suffering. The opportunistic/expedient approach to partnerships supported localisation, but shortcomings included unsystematic due diligence; fast turnover in surge deployments; limited overview by the Regional Office of programme development; and sustainability. Overall, UNICEFs response largely met the commitments that the CCCs demand, despite contextual complexities. 18. The response has also highlighted some key dilemmas and institutional fault lines. Operationally, the response generated some valuable lessons, many linked to human resourcing and institutional capacities. Strategically, it has highlighted the conceptual disjunct between the medium-term view needed for a response as delivered through systems, and systems strengthening and the short-term institutional tools available to address it. The wider question arising from this evaluation is, therefore: is there room, and a requirement, for a new model of emergency response, for such contexts? RECOMMENDATIONS CORPORATE REGIONAL 1. Extend links to political and security intelligence systems. 1. At regional level, interpret the CCCs for this context. 2. Review UNICEFs emergency response model for middle- and high-income settings/protracted crises. 2. Generate a clear corporate statement and position on gender in the response. 3. (in line with findings from the Humanitarian Review and COVID-19 Evaluation) Build emergency capacity across UNICEF, including for national staff in contexts with low emergency propensity. 3. (in line with the Humanitarian Review) Centralise lesson learning in the response, building on the co-ordination meetings now being held. 4. Reconfirm and communicate the role of National Committees in emergency response. 4. Build emergency preparedness, geared to an ethos of systems-strengthening into new CPDs as they are developed and approved. 5. Define the UNICEF legacy post-crisis response. 4 CH APTER 1 5 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1 1. Following eight years of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, at dawn on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched a military incursion across the country. The event displaced millions in search of safety, protection, and humanitarian assistance, creating the fastest growing refugee emergency since World War II.1 2. By the end of March 2022, almost four million people, mainly women and children, had fled to neighbouring countries or beyond. As of January 2023, nearly eight million refugees had left Ukraine and entered Europe.2 3. The crisis is highly politically charged. The international community grappled with its political effects, while the humanitarian system launched a massive emergency response. The European Union offered three years of temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees, and countries opened their doors to those in need. 1 2022 Ukraine Situation Regional Refugee Response Plan. March-December 2022. 2 UNHCR Operational Data Portal (29 Nov 2022). https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/92257. Europe in this report applies the definition used by UNHCR, which corresponds to all Europe sub-regions as identified by Eurovoc (European Union, Thesaurus Eurovoc. Volume 2, 4. This report examines how United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) responded to the humanitarian needs created by millions of Ukrainian refugees exiting their country throughout 2022. Written while the crisis is still ongoing, it aims to assess performance, highlight strengths, and identify areas for future improvement. 1.1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 5. This report comprises an independent evaluation of UNICEFs response to the outflow of Ukrainian refugees, February-December 2022. It addresses the UNICEF response outside, not within, Ukraine, in eight countries: Bulgaria, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. It covers the period FebruaryDecember 2022. 6. The evaluation asks four main questions:3 i. How well did UNICEFs response meet the needs and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders? ii. How well-aligned was UNICEFs response with partner needs? iii. How timely was the response, and how efficiently were resource converted into results? iv. What results were delivered and how sustainable are these results? 7. As an issue of principle, this report is focused on the interests, needs and priorities of populations affected by the Ukraine crisis. More directly, its main intended users are the UNICEF Regional Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia; the concerned Country Offices and Refugee Response teams; UNICEF senior management and leadership; and external stakeholders such as governments, United Nations partner agencies, UNICEFs many implementing partners and Executive Board members. Subject-oriented version, Publications Office, 2005), therefore including EU and non-EU countries belonging to Central and Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and Western Europe, plus Trkiye. https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.15306661 7.1194888114.1673958415-612591460.1673352313 3 See Terms of Reference, Annex 1 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/92257 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3dffcfd1-1df5-4047-aae5-5a0c7e21a1e7 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3dffcfd1-1df5-4047-aae5-5a0c7e21a1e7 https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.153066617.1194888114.1673958415-612591460.1673352313 https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.153066617.1194888114.1673958415-612591460.1673352313 6 1.2 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 8. The evaluations full methodology is described in Annex 2. The enquiry was guided by six contextualized criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, impact, and sustainability. Recognising the immense strains on UNICEF at a time of high-intensity strategic and programmatic action, it is designed primarily for utility and future learning. 9. The evaluation applied a context-sensitive model for a complex crisis, which also spoke to the UNICEF operating model and culture. To achieve this, it combined theory-based evaluation with elements of contribution analysis and a utilization-focused approach. It reconstructed an overarching intervention logic for the response (Flowchart 1), geared to the implementation of UNICEFs Core Commitments to Children in Humanitarian Action (the CCCs).4 The intervention logic, alongside the CCCs, provided the guiding frameworks for this report. 10. A key focus of the evaluation was data gathering and generation, which took place as the response evolved. A range of evidence products were generated for use by UNICEF stakeholders, including an internal website, which contains the timeline for the response and three briefs which describe the response. To generate the findings in this report, a mixed-method approach was applied including documentary analysis; surveys with affected populations and external stakeholders; interviews and consultations with over 100 stakeholders from inside and outside UNICEF; and short (3-day) country missions to Poland, Romania, and Moldova. Validation meetings were held with Regional Office and country stakeholders in December 2022 and January 2023. 11. Limitations to the evaluation include: i. Given the programmatic burdens on UNICEF at a time when the emergency response was still ongoing, field missions were necessarily short. Therefore, this evaluation relies heavily on data gathered and analysed, rather than in-depth observations of the response in situ. ii. The evaluation covers only eight countries of the wider number to which Ukrainian refugees have travelled, including Russia. Those included here represent those covered by the main instruments for the response, the multi-agency Regional Refugee Plan and UNICEFs own Humanitarian Appeal for Children (Pillar 2). iii. Given the speed of events, the findings presented here risk swift outdating. This report therefore simply aims to capture the main narrative of the response during February-December 2022. 12. Finally, this is not a country- or programme-specific evaluation. As such it does not provide detailed examination of individual UNICEF country or programmatic responses. Rather, it adopts a regional and strategic approach. Given highly differentiated responses across involved countries in the region, it contextualizes findings, and calibrates them to the strength of the evidence available. 4 UNICEF (2020) Core Commitments to Children in Humanitarian Emergencies. https://www.unicef.org/media/87611/file/Core%20Commitmen ts%20for%20Children%20(English).pdf https://www.unicef.org/media/87611/file/Core%20Commitments%20for%20Children%20(English).pdf https://www.unicef.org/media/87611/file/Core%20Commitments%20for%20Children%20(English).pdf 7 Co nte xt: Hig h In com e Stro ng Go vern ance E U M em bersh ip Multid imensio nal P olitica l Sensitivity D iverse Exp ecta tion Fluid Po pula tion M ove ment Tem po rary P rote ction D irective 8 1.3 CONTEXT OF THE RESPONSE 13. The operating context of the Ukraine refugee crisis is highly complex, and not least its geopolitical dimensions. This report does not repeat descriptions elsewhere,5 but highlights relevant features for this exercise: 14. Initial speed and scale shifting to a pendular crisis. Despite heightening concerns in the weeks prior to the crisis,6 the attacks on Kyiv and elsewhere in late 5 See for example UNICEF Situation Reports: Ukraine Crisis and Refugee Outflow https://www.unicef.org/appeals/ukraine/situation-reports and/or UNHCR: Regional protection profiling and monitoring factsheets https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/97720 February 2022 resulted in an outflow of millions within a short space of time. Later, as people began to move inwards to Ukraine and out again, the crisis became a pendular one. As of January 2023, over 17 million border movements had taken place outwards from Ukraine, and over nine million back into the country.7 However, as of early 2023, attacks on critical infrastructure and economic hardship inhibit returns to Ukraine and risk triggering new displacements. Border crossings in November 2022 indicated an increase of over 105,000 Ukrainian refugees compared to previous months.8 6 See for example https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict- tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine accessed 12.12.2022 7 https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.15306661 7.1194888114.1673958415-612591460.1673352313 8 UNICEF (2022) Ukraine Situation Report: December 2022 https://www.unicef.org/appeals/ukraine/situation-reports https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/97720 https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.153066617.1194888114.1673958415-612591460.1673352313 https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.153066617.1194888114.1673958415-612591460.1673352313 9 15. Strong Child Protection and gender features. The Government of Ukraines martial law that only women and children could leave Ukraine, with men required to support the military effort, has shaped the dynamics of the crisis. Ninety per cent of refugees are women and children, some of whom - even before the conflict - faced heightened multidimensional poverty within Ukraine.9 Childrens healthcare rights, including immunization, were not fully realised, and prior to the crisis, Ukraine had one of the highest numbers of people living with HIV of any country in Europe. Ukraine was facing challenges to reduce the number of children in institutional care prior to the conflict with boarding schools for children with disabilities excluded from de-institutionalisation efforts.10 16. Extreme geopolitical sensitivity and high media profile. The crisis is deeply embedded in international geopolitics, linking territorial concerns with political ideology, economic and political sanctions, food security, energy dependency and cyber warfare concerns.11 Its high profile and continued media presence in media adds to the pressures on the humanitarian response. 17. The role of the European Union. EU member states activated the Temporary Protection Directive on March 4, 2022, for the very first time12 Of the 6.9 million refugees recorded across Europe, 4.9 million13 had registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes as of January 2023.14 The Directives provisions require suitable social provisions for migrants from the crisis, to afford them a standard of living to ensure their health and well-being for the duration of the protection provided, though it does not specify cost implications for member states.15 The EU also leads 9 UNICEF (2021) UNICEF Country Programme Evaluation Report 10 https://unicef.org/ukraine/en/topics/child-protection 11 In 2019, the absolute poverty rate of families with children was 47.3 per cent, compared to 34.3 per cent for families without children. In total, 13.6 per cent of households with children were extremely poor, compared to 8.0 per cent of households without children. See for example https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern- europe/ukraine 12 This stipulates that all member states must grant temporary protection to Ukrainians as well as persons with protection status in Ukraine and their family members who resided in Ukraine before February 24, 2022, Ukraine Situation Regional Refugee Response Plan. March-December 2022. the Testing the Child Guarantee with the Aim of Ending Child Poverty and Social Exclusion for all Children in Europe, a policy instrument which aims to address disadvantage and exclusion in childhood, and in which UNICEF was engaged in several countries prior to the crisis.16 18. Strong solidarity in host countries and from the diaspora. Both within and outside the EU, refugee-hosting countries have shown significant support for and solidarity with the refugees from Ukraine. Governments, civil society organisations, community and religious groups and volunteers have joined forces to provide basic services including accommodation, health, education and child and social protection. The private sector and diaspora have also played a significant role, both providing access to resources and funding the international humanitarian response. 13 Representing nearly 100% of the caseload eligible for Temporary Protection, as the remaining 2 million are understood to be located in the Russian Federation. 14 Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org) 15 Motte-Baumvol, J., Frota MontAlverne, T.C. and Braga Guimares, J. (2022) Extending Social Protection for Migrants under the European Unions Temporary Protection Directive: Lessons from the War in Ukraine Oxford University Comparative Law Forumhttps://ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk/extending-social- protection-for-migrants-under-the-european-unions-temporary- protection-directive-lessons-from-the-war-in-ukraine/#post- 1429-footnote-46 16 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/european- child-guarantee/ https://unicef.org/ukraine/en/topics/child-protection https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.153066617.1194888114.1673958415-612591460.1673352313 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/european-child-guarantee/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/european-child-guarantee/ 10 1.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF REFUGEE-HOSTING COUNTRIES 19. Within the eight countries covered by the evaluation, Poland hosts 64% of the 2.4 million refugees recorded. All eight countries are upper-middle and high-income (Table 1). 20. Despite their relative income status, countries have faced significant challenges in responding to high-volume needs, within short arrival times, particularly given ongoing gaps in their own social systems. Five specific issues include: 21. (i) Social protection challenges. Existing systems in refugee-hosting countries have not always had 17 OECD (2022) Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) 18 Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org) 19 See for example https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/humanitarian- assistance-and-social-protection-linkages-strengthening-shock UN 20See https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/poland- social-protection-country-profile-ukraine-crisis-response 21See https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/moldova- social-protection-country-profile-ukraine-crisis-response capacity to address the needs of a vast and swiftly-arriving refugee population; not least one whose duration of needs is highly unclear.19 Analysis of social protection systems found that in Poland, overall, the system is not fit-for-purpose to address chronic or acute poverty or a sudden surge of beneficiaries20 while Moldova is the least resourced country to incorporate a very large caseload of new entrants into its social protection system.21 Population structures also affect social protection systems; countries such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic have social services focused on the needs of older age groups given ageing populations.22 22. (ii) Healthcare risks. Prior to the crisis, healthcare systems in several countries were struggling, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic. In Slovakia, for instance, hospital doctors in 2022 threatened to resign over salary and working conditions.23 At the same time, the risks of disease outbreak expanded in host countries, given lower 22 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php?title=Population_structure_and_ageing. See also Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 85th Session (14 September-1 October 2020), 86th Session (18 January-5 February 2021), 87th Session (17 May-4 June 2021), 88th Session (6-24 September 2021), 89th Session, 17 January-11 February 2022), 1st January 2022 23 UNICEF (2022) Situation Report: Ukraine, December 2022 Table 1: Context and Volumes of Refugees Country EU member World Bank income categorization Public social spending as % GDP, 202217 Refugees from Ukraine recorded (January 2023)18 Refugees per 100,000 population Poland EU High 22.7 1,563,386 4,142 Czech Republic EU High 22 478,614 4,556 Moldova Non-EU Upper-middle - 102,016 3,901 Bulgaria EU Upper-middle - 50,601 736 Slovakia EU High 19.1 105,732 1,941 Belarus Non-EU Upper-middle - 19,124 205 Hungary EU High 17.2 33,446 344 Romania EU High - 106,987 560 TOTAL 2,440,782 https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.153066617.1194888114.1673958415-612591460.1673352313 https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/humanitarian-assistance-and-social-protection-linkages-strengthening-shock%20UN https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/humanitarian-assistance-and-social-protection-linkages-strengthening-shock%20UN https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/humanitarian-assistance-and-social-protection-linkages-strengthening-shock%20UN https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/poland-social-protection-country-profile-ukraine-crisis-response https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/poland-social-protection-country-profile-ukraine-crisis-response https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/moldova-social-protection-country-profile-ukraine-crisis-response https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/moldova-social-protection-country-profile-ukraine-crisis-response https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_structure_and_ageing https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_structure_and_ageing 11 vaccination rates among Ukrainian refugees, and different national protocols, for measles, polio, and COVID-19.24 Meanwhile, in Poland, a completed vaccine schedule is a condition of entry to education.25 23. (iii) Education systems. The Government of Ukraine initially encouraged refugee children to maintain their engagement with the Ukrainian education system, due to the crisis occurrence during the middle of a school year; the availability of digital infrastructure developed during the COVID-19 pandemic; and certification challenges. Yet neither primary nor secondary systems across the eight countries were set up encompass a large volume of incoming refugee children, particularly those with additional needs, and countries took different approaches to obligatory attendance. Differences in secondary school duration, combined with language barriers, have pushed students back to earlier grades, leading to dropouts.26 Pre-school education and care was already overstretched and/or with inequitable access in countries such as Moldova, Romania and Slovakia.27 24. (iv) De-institutionalisation. By 2022, seven of the eight countries examined here28 had undergone, or were undergoing, a process of de-institutionalisation of children in alignment with EU and international law.29 Consequently, large-scale childrens homes were unavailable. For the nearly 8,000 children30 who had been in institutions inside Ukraine, and were evacuated abroad along with their careers, this posed a major challenge given the Ukrainian governments early position that such 24 2022-HAC-Ukraine-and-Refugee-Outflow-revised-April.pdf (unicef.org) 25 https://www.vaccinestoday.eu/stories/poland-offers-free- vaccination-to-refugees-from-ukraine-but-uptake-remains-low/ 26 UNICEF (2022) Situation Report: Ukraine, December 2022 27 See van Ravens, Aggio, C, Moore, K and Ponguta, A (2017) J, Analytical Review of Governance, Provision and Quality of Early Childhood Education Services at the Local Level in Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS): Country Report for Moldova; https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22598077/slovakia-is-the-worst-in- europe-in-number-of-educated-children-of-preschool-age.html 28 In Belarus, UNICEF reported in 2021 that Despite efforts to reduce the number of children in residential care institutions, 5,881 children lived in residential care institutions in 2020. While there is a national intersectoral working group on de-institutionalization, a comprehensive interagency strategy is children should remain in groups with their Ukrainian carers, and not be split up or hosted separately. 25. (v) Infrastructure. Countries such as Moldova are particularly vulnerable to the targeting of electricity power plants and supply lines in Western and Southern Ukraine. In December 2022, these were causing power outages, requiring the Moldovan government to procure electricity in the open market, contributing to an overall increase in electricity prices. In December 2022, power outages in Ukraine were also affecting online education in host countries for refugees.31 needed to prevent the flow of children going to institutions and to increase return to families for those in institutions. UNICEF Belarus (2022) Country Office Annual Report 2021 29 See for example UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Article 19, which requires States parties to close institutional settings for persons with disabilities and instead ensure their full inclusion and participation in the community. See also: Article 29(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15(4) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and Article 23(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); also, Article 26 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 30 7971 as of 1.10.2022. Source: UNICEF data, made available to the evaluation team 15.12.2022 31 UNICEF (2022) Situation Report: Ukraine, December 2022 https://www.unicef.org/media/118666/file/2022-HAC-Ukraine-and-Refugee-Outflow-revised-April.pdf https://www.unicef.org/media/118666/file/2022-HAC-Ukraine-and-Refugee-Outflow-revised-April.pdf https://www.vaccinestoday.eu/stories/poland-offers-free-vaccination-to-refugees-from-ukraine-but-uptake-remains-low/ https://www.vaccinestoday.eu/stories/poland-offers-free-vaccination-to-refugees-from-ukraine-but-uptake-remains-low/ 12 1.5 THE UNICEF REFUGEE RESPONSE FEBRUARY - DECEMBER 2022 26. When the crisis began, at dawn on 24th February 2022, UNICEF had Country Offices in Moldova, Romania, Belarus, and Bulgaria. It had no programmatic presence at all in Poland where the bulk of refugees were entering Czech Republic or Slovakia, and an administration Global Shared Services Centre in Budapest, Hungary. 27. By 26th February, UNICEF had deployed staff to border areas in Poland, where the majority of refugees were entering. By 1st March, it had established its first Blue Dot a one-stop information shop and safe space at Sighetu Marmaiei, on the Ukraine-Romania
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