IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITY FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN

Republic of South Sudan

UNICEF

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY GAPS ANALYSIS

of

The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MoHADM)

Jesus Cespedes
UNICEF Consultant

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The views herein expressed are those of this writer alone and do not necessarily reflect official policy of UNICEF or the UN.
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Acronyms

Boma – Administrative division, smaller than a Payam
CAP – Consolidated Appeal Process
CBDMC – Community-Based Disaster Management Committee
CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DPPA – Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (Ethiopia)
DRR – Disaster Risk Reduction
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report attempts to provide a picture to the humanitarian stakeholders working in South Sudan of the main challenges and needs of the government humanitarian institutions, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MoHADM). It offers options mapping the way forward on how to improve their capacity to coordinate humanitarian interventions and disaster management.
The government of South Sudan is faced with recurring humanitarian needs and the competing fund-raising requests. This report is expected to be a simple tool that can ease efforts to plan capacity building activities and prioritize fund raising attempts. It also aims at facilitating the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) members and donors’ decision-making process when articulating their support pledges for an improved and more efficient MoHADM and RRC, which will help to reach and direct the aid more effectively to those most in need.

In view of the enormous challenges these two government agencies are facing (financial, human, resources, etc.) in March 2011 the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) agreed on the need to increase its support to RRC and MoHADM. The humanitarian partners highlighted three broad steps needed to develop this coordinated approach to engagement and assistance: a) A strategic analysis of government humanitarian ministry functions; b) Common needs assessment; and c) the development of a common work plan. As a follow up action, UNICEF funded a consultant for a 6 months period tasked to produce, i) a capacity gaps analysis of both institutions, ii) an indicative work plan for the consideration of government, and iii) a funding proposal.

The main findings of this Institutional Capacity Gaps Analysis draw attention to three major areas that need to be dealt with: i) an urgent need to clarify the policy framework and organizational set up, roles, and responsibilities between these two government entities responsible for humanitarian assistance; ii) the inadequacy of human resources base, in terms of numbers, as well as the level of knowledge, experience and skills on disaster management and iii) the limited resources available to carry out their tasks.

After field investigations to identify capacity gaps were completed and tabulation and analysis of needs identified were finalized, the consultant presented to the HCT’s members an abstract of main findings, which included a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis, an overall institutional capacity assessment and the list of needs identified. However, in view of the considerably long list of needs detected, which automatically made not viable for humanitarian partners to be able to embrace all of them, the HCT held a second meeting to discuss and agreed on a capacity building strategy which offers the best delivery mechanism, but only including fewer, most realistic activities feasible to be implemented within the next 12 months.

This strategy is in line with the strategic considerations laid on the South Sudan Development Plan and focuses the support for RRC and MoHADM on three priority work areas: 1) Defining institutional mandates and functions, 2) Communication and information management, and 3) institutional mandates and functions.
Strengthening RRC performance at the state level. The main objectives include: a) RRC State Director offices are equipped with basic office supplies, IT capacity and transportation sufficient to perform their core tasks – to communicate with Headquarters, record humanitarian developments and attend coordination meetings and assessments; b) State Directors and senior Juba-based officials (Director General upwards) receive a basic training package encompassing humanitarian principles, humanitarian coordination and humanitarian reporting.

The envisaged timeframe to initiate activities of this capacity building strategy includes a roll out over 2012, with prioritization given to ensuring basic IT capacity within State Director offices and delivery of a basic training package. The type of support needed contains: i) Survey of minimum office equipment needed in State Director offices; ii) Purchase of laptops and IT training, office space and supplies, and, where proven to be a significant gap that cannot be fulfilled through partner support, transportation; and iii) Development and delivery of the full cost of a basic training package, comprising first stage training and second stage follow up when officials report on their progress.

The report is structures as follows: in chapter 1, the overview of trends on the humanitarian situation in South Sudan and the purpose and the rationale behind this study are introduced with a brief historical background of the RRC and the MoHADM. Chapter 2 introduces the methodology employed during implementation of this assignment and the challenges faced by the writer. Chapter 3 presents the findings of this study, starting with an abstract of the capability assessment and the needs identified. Chapter 4 offers a road map as an optional strategic action plan for the Government’s consideration. Main recommendations and conclusions are included in Chapter 5.

A concluding paragraph stresses the importance of a strong political will and commitment to assume the humanitarian coordination leadership and the commitment from the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) partners to support this capacity building initiative.

The last section of this report contains the Annexes which include information gathered/developed throughout this capacity gaps analysis, and aiming at supporting all humanitarian partners to articulate their follow on plans of support to this capacity building initiative. A funding proposal is submitted as a separate document, forming part of the first South Sudan 2012 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) framework.

**CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION**

1.1. Overview

The humanitarian situation trends in 2011 in South Sudan indicated that circumstances would continue to be very unpredictable for the most vulnerable, mainly children and women. The Referendum was held peacefully, however the uncertainty that surrounded the July

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6 Capacity Building Strategy for the Government of South Sudan’s Humanitarian Institutions, Concept Note, OCHA, October 2011.

7 The **Consolidated Appeals Process** (CAP) is an advocacy tool for humanitarian financing, in which projects managed by the United Nations, NGOs and other stakeholders come together to approach the donor community funding international development activities. It is coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).
Independence of South Sudan; the on-going internal clashes due to inter-tribal differences, and political dissent along ethnic lines which have caused many pockets of internal displacements; the border clashes along the disputed area of Abyei and on-going conflicts in Blue Nile and South Kordofan; the LRA’s operations in southern states; the thousands of Southerners returning from the North and other countries; the on-coming rainy season, etc. were major causes of concern to humanitarian partners. Against this scenario, the national institutional capacity to coordinate humanitarian assistance was recognized as inadequate, and unable to meet its mandate. This study, therefore, is the convergence of two concerns: the certainty of continuation of humanitarian crisis on the post-independence period; and the need to improve the national capacity to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster management.

With these prospects in view, in March 2011 the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) recognized the need to step up support for the RRC and the MoHADM, agencies responsible for the coordination of humanitarian assistance and disaster management, via the adoption of a coordinated multi-agency capacity building strategy which required as an initial working platform an institutional capacity gaps analysis exercise and a needs assessment. Under this context, UNICEF facilitated the recruitment of an Emergency Preparedness and Response consultant, tasked to conduct the capacity gaps analysis exercise, in coordination with the RRC, the MoHADM and in consultation with the HCT.

1.2. Evolution of government humanitarian institutions
The Republic of South Sudan has two institutions responsible for humanitarian assistance and disaster management – the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. A brief history of the evolution of these two organizations is presented below:

The re-initiation of the protracted armed struggle between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Southern Sudan in late 1983 resulted in massive displacement, loss of lives and properties occurring in most areas of Southern Sudan. As the affected population was increasing enormously, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) was created in 1988. After the signature of the tri-partite agreement between the warring parties (SPLA and SAF) and the United Nations in late 1988, which led to the creation of the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the SRRA moved from Addis Ababa to Nairobi, Kenya. Its mandate included: “... Save lives, alleviate suffering and reduce risk to the war affected population; coordinate and facilitate humanitarian assistance”.

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8 Annex 11. Terms of Reference for Emergency Consultant
9 As mentioned, this study goes in line with the South Sudan Development Plan-SSDP (July 2011 to 2013 – Ministry of Finance, RoSS), which includes the Government of South Sudan overarching initial framework for the building of a new nation, in the first three years after independence. In particular and under the cross-cutting issues, building national capacity is highlighted as crucial for all sectors if planned development activities are to be implemented efficiently and effectively. Capacity building is addressed at three levels, by strengthening institutional systems, administrative management and organizational processes. Among the top priorities for aid financing under the Governance pillar, RoSS declares its commitment to support capacity building and to make possible the provision of support to good governance, enabling the existence of more effective government institutions.
10 MoHADM Policy Framework, October 2010.
In 1991 SPLA/M split into two factions. The Nasir Faction based in Nasir and the main stream in Torit. This in turn led the breakaway faction forming its own relief wing known as Relief Association for Southern Sudan (RASS), while the mainstream continued to maintain the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). The Nasir Faction further split into SPLM-United and Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). This move led the SPLM-United formed its own relief wing known as Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association (FRRA). On 6th of January 2002, a merger declaration for reconciliation, peace and unity between SPLM/A and Sudan People’s Democratic Front (SPDF) was signed in Nairobi, Kenya. In the implementation process of the Nairobi Declaration, a merger between SRRA and RASS was signed on 19th December 2002 in Rumbek; forming one humanitarian wing known as Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC). The following year SPLM United rejoined the unity on 30th of October 2003 and FRRA was integrated into SRRC.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9th January 2005 and the subsequent establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), led to the launch of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan which provided and gave powers to the President to form various independent institutions with their structures. On 27th of June 2006, the First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan, transformed SRRC into Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) 11 with a revised mandate: “... Coordination and facilitation of relief assistance, repatriation, resettlement, reintegration and reconstruction activities, mainly for IDPs and Refugees” 12. Since then, the SSRRC was engaged in coordination and facilitation of relief assistance, repatriation, rehabilitation, resettlement, reintegration and reconstruction activities, mainly for Internally Displaced persons (IDPs) and Refugees.

The interim period stipulated in the CPA provided mid-term general elections for Sudan. In April 2010 Sudan General Elections were conducted and SPLM overwhelmingly achieved a landslide victory. As a result, the elected President of Government of South Sudan recognized the importance of looking beyond short term humanitarian assistance, shifting from relief to development. This required formulation of policies to regulate and streamline humanitarian work in Southern Sudan; and also to engage in a wider scope of disaster management, establishment of an early warning system, hazards mitigation, preparedness and swift response to disasters. In order to address the root causes of vulnerability and to mitigate the future risk of disasters far and beyond the operational support which has been handled by the SSRRC, on June 2010 the MoHADM was created with the mandate to oversee all humanitarian work in Southern Sudan 13. While SSRRC remains an independent Commission with all its mandate and functions, it operates in coordination with the Ministry, being the principle implementing body for humanitarian operations in Southern Sudan.

In September 2011, the SSRRC undergoes yet another transformation, changing the name to Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in order to reflect the new name as it is stated in the new interim National Constitution.

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11 Presidential decree no. 146/2006  
12 MoHADM Policy Framework, October 2010, page 6  
CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Approach
The approach adopted by the writer to identify capacity gaps and needs included a quick literature revision, meetings with main stakeholders, consultative workshops and interviews with RRC and MoHADM staffs.

The investigations to determine the capacity gaps and identification of needs were done through direct consultations with staff members of both institutions, working at central, State and County levels. These consultative exercises collected the views of staff as on capacity gaps and needs and were organized jointly by UNICEF and the RRC. Local arrangements were made by the UNICEF field teams staffs, in consultation with RRC field teams at State and County levels.

A total of five workshops were conducted, with the participation of 142 people. The first one took place mid-June in Juba, and included only central level staff of RRC and MoHADM. Subsequently, in August three zonal workshops were carried out in Wau (Northern Bhar El Ghazal State), Malakal (Upper Nile State); and Torit (Eastern Equatoria), with participants from County and State RRC offices (80 county secretaries and the 10 state directors) and three senior government officials from HQ. The final national workshop was held in Juba towards the end of August, with staff at central level plus the RRC State directors, and four staff members from two specialized training institutions with base in Juba, the IIRR and the GATC. These two institutions are specialized in training on, among other topics, Disaster Management and Accountancy. During their presentation, brochures listing all their courses on offer were made available to participants. The IIRR prepared a 12 months training proposal with budget and is available on Annex 3. It contains a very comprehensive training package with a staggered approach. Other training options such as Masters programmes were presented to the audience by the writer (the Masters of Arts on Humanitarian Assistance at Tufts University, the Masters of Public Affairs in Emergency and Disaster Management at Metropolitan College of New York, and the New Jersey Institute of Technology offering an MSc in Emergency Management and Business Continuity. Additionally, a web link is offered on Annex 3, where an on-line Database of Institutions specialized in Training and Capacity Building on Disaster Risk Reduction is made available - link: http://irp-capacitybuilding.delnetitcilo.net/institutions/alpha.

2.2. Objectives of workshops
Objectives of the workshops were as follows:

i) Analysis of the institutional capacity for disaster preparedness and response, at national, state, county, payam, boma and community levels, assessing skills gaps faced, training needs and any other type of needs (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats - SWOT analysis);

14 Annex 11 presents list of persons consulted.
15 IIRR-International Institute for Rural Reconstruction specialized on disaster mgt. training, besides other topics. GATC-Government Accountancy Training Centre, specialized on training in financial mgt., accountancy, petty cash mgt., etc.
ii) Review existing RRC organizational working framework at state and county levels, with particular attention to lines of authority at State and County levels (i.e. Governor and the RRC State Director, and County secretaries);

iii) Identify major international and domestic partners actively engaged in disaster relief, preparedness, and management activities in each State and collect the RRC staff views on how their interactions with these organizations could be improved;

iv) Conceptualization of a revised national disaster management system and a revised institutional organizational structure (Annex 6 presents an optional revised National Disaster Management System and Annex 7 introduces an example for a new national disaster management agency).

2.3. Capacity building components
During field investigations, the identification of gaps and needs was conducted along three capacity building components: i) Resources; 2) Performance and 3) Motivational, moving away from the conventional perception that capacity building only refers to training. Needs identified are listed in full detail in Annex 3, organized in three tables, each one categorized under each of the three capacity components, representing data from 80 county offices, 10 State offices and at central level (Juba). The majority of the itemized needs got priority numbers 1 or 2, as perceived by Government counterparts.

The aggregate SWOT analysis template and the template of overall institutional capacity assessment are found together in Annex 3.

2.4. Data processing
The tabulation of all data gathered were organized into three templates: the SWOT analysis table and the Institutional Capacity Assessment template available in Annex 1, and the Needs identification matrix contained in Annex 2.

The overall institutional capacity assessment of RRC and MoHADM, was produced mainly from the data collected in the SWOT analysis table and from data collected in the Needs Identification matrix. This data helped to fill out the Institutional Capacity assessment template, which forms part of a process or “dimensions of capacity” technique used to measure institutional capacity, developed by OXFAM16. This template is a matrix visually displaying vertically, 7 dimensions or internal capacities of an organization, and horizontally, it captures four elements, i) existing capacity; ii) the future or ideal capacity; iii) the capacity gap; and iv) provides alternative strategies for solution. To assist the understanding of the meaning of the different “dimensions of capacity” considered in this template, the seven capacities are explained as follows:

1. Mission and strategy: includes the role, mandate and definition of services, interactions within the broader system, the measure of performance and the presence of core strategic management capacities.
2. Culture / Structure and Competencies: organizational and management values and style, organizational structures and designs.

3. Processes: supporting systems, such functions as M&E, planning, relationships with other entities, financial and human resource management, research/policy development.
4. Human Resources: staff required for various functions.
5. Financial Resources: required for efficient and effective functioning of the entity.
6. Information resources: and how these are managed to support the mission and strategies
7. Infrastructure: physical assets

All Needs identified during the field workshops have been organized in Annex 2, under three capacity building components: Resources, Performance and Motivational.

Under the Resources component, we have grouped all type of resources which would facilitate achievement of a better organizational capability, such as: Strategy and Policy; Non-structural (design of operational systems, etc.); Structural and Material (hardware, software, connectivity, communication, transportation, office construction and equipment, etc.); Systems and functional (Administration, Financial, Legal systems, Human Resources promotion system, Operational costs system such as Petty cash availability, Mobile phone air time allowance, etc.); Human Resources (new recruitments, trainings).

Under the Performance component we have included all needs/activities which would encourage the learning process of staffs – acquisition of knowledge (access to books, publications, etc. via creation of mini-libraries and on-the-job training) and skills (sponsor specialized training for staffs).

Under the Motivational component we have incorporated activities which motivate staff’s to do their job better and increase morale and institutional loyalty (i.e. corporate flexibility to reward staff via study tours, attendance to international courses, educational opportunities in local and international institutions, etc.).

Through a colour coding system, this list has been further mapped out against the three priority work areas identified in the 2012 Capacity building strategy for the Government of South Sudan’s humanitarian institutions. Thus any of the Needs falling under the Work area 1: Define Institutional mandates and functions are marked by red colour; those under Work area 2: Communication and information management were marked by yellow colour; and for Work area 3: Strengthening RRC performance at State level, a green colour was used.

2.5 Challenges
The writer faced two major challenges while undertaking this assignment:

The first major challenge was the many limitations constraining the institutional capacities of both institutions. The non-availability of an internal and external reporting system (no internet connectivity) and a non-coherent filing system made difficult the compilation of relevant data.

The unforeseen one month postponement of programmed field visits due to government’s staff full involvement into preparations for Independence Day celebrations (9th July, 2011).
CHAPTER 3. FINDINGS

This chapter presents an abstract of main findings, providing firstly a summary description of the overall institutional capacity assessment, followed by a general abstract of needs identified, arranged along the three priority work areas for 2012 capacity building strategy. Annex 1 presents the aggregate SWOT analysis and the comprehensive Institutional Capability Assessment template. Annex 2, contains the full list of Needs identified, categorized by component of capacity in the 10 states, and with priority values ascribed by government staff.

3.1. Overall Capacity Assessment

3.1.1. Mission and strategy:
There is a clear overlapping mission, mandates, roles and responsibilities between RRC and MoHADM; this situation is causing confusion and demoralization among staff and reservations among humanitarian actors. Also, none of the two bodies has components that suit Preparedness and Prevention for Disaster Risk Reduction along the line with the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). There is a need to clearly spell out in the mission statement of each institution the various tasks as well as their focus on coordination of humanitarian assistance and disaster management rather than direct implementers of emergency response operations. Instead, line ministries should be the implementers. A short-term management consultant could be an alternative solution to clarify mission, mandate and work strategy and to improve managerial skills.

3.1.2. Culture / Structure and Competencies:
Organizational and management values and style are hindered by weak leadership and lack of sharing of information, both horizontally and vertically. The existing organizational set up indicates overlapping and duplications\(^\text{17}\). The present national disaster management system is pure relief, driven by the five Rs – Rescue, Relief, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, Repatriation and Reconstruction. Thus, the vital three Ps – Prediction (forecasting), Preparedness and Prevention are entirely missing. A review of current institutional set up and mission and mandate should include the six elements of the Emergency Management Continuum: Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness in pre-disaster phase, and Response, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in post-disaster phase, defining a complete approach to Disaster Management. A proposed solution includes the recruitment of a short-term management consultant to revise institutional framework and review/develop staffing levels and job descriptions.

3.1.3. Processes:
Key supporting systems to enable various organizational processes such as in the areas of information management, Monitoring and Evaluation and logistics management are extremely weak or non-existent. This is preventing ability to coordinate and keep up with events occurring in the wider humanitarian system. There is no strategic planning conducted. Contingency planning does not take place which prevents preparedness capacity in case of a humanitarian crisis. A short-term management consultancy would assist improve institutional internal processes.

\(^\text{17}\) A copy of the current RRC and MoHADM’s organizational set up is available in Annex 8.
3.1.4. Human Resources:
Staffs lack skills to meet roles and responsibilities. Staff numbers do not necessarily reflect the specified roles as per the organizational structure. The Human resources department lacks a policy strategic document for measurement of staff performance and rewards.

The total number of MoHADM and RRC staff is 558. The MoHADM, has 138 staff members and it is present at Juba level only, with the exception of Torit, (Eastern Equatoria State) where there is an appointed State level Minister. The RRC, which is present at Juba, State and County levels, counts a total of 420 staff members. At State level RRC has 6 staff and 3 staff at county level.

The breakdown of RRC staff includes the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme area I) Returnees, Reintegration of IDP’s and Refugees</th>
<th>Total staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Repatriation</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Resettlement and Reintegration</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Reconstruction</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme area II) Relief and Rehabilitation for IDPs and Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-total: 220

Grand total: RRC Staff programme areas I and 2 plus 200 staff not reflected on the breakdown shown above 420

The breakdown for MoHADM’s staff was not made available due to a temporary vacuum created during an unexpected internal re-shuffling of staff which witnessed removal of Mr. Ajang Moyiek Ajang, MoHADM’s Under- Secretary being replaced by Mr. Samuel Loang Mayen, Director of Human Resources Department.

During the consultative workshops, it became clear that, with very few exceptions, most staff has not received any training related to humanitarian law, humanitarian principles, minimum standards on humanitarian interventions, coordination of humanitarian interventions and disaster management, logistics, etc.

3.1.5. Financial Resources:
Budget for RRC and MoHADM are inadequate and extremely limited, both capital and operational budgets, at all levels. Thus, this major factor prevents the appropriate functioning of the two institutions.

The annual budget RRC used to receive from the Central Government was 32 Million Sudanese Pounds (SDG). However, during the last 18 months, RRC had its budget allocation reduced from 32 Million SDG, down to 22 Million (or about 700,000 USD/year or US$ 58,000/month) to

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18 Consultative workshops was one of the methods followed by this writer to identify capacity gaps and needs from staff. RRC County coordinators and State Directors were guided to carry out a SWOT analysis. The methodology used is fully explained in Chapter 3 (page 11)
cover salaries for 420 staff, plus operational costs at central level and the 10 State capitals, plus
80 county offices.

The MoHADM’s annual budget was not possible to obtain due to sudden removal of
MoHADM’s Under Secretary.

3.1.6. Information resources:
Government database situation and the internal information management system, including the
information network among major external humanitarian actors, are very poor or non-existent in
some cases. There is no internet connectivity at central level and no radio communication with
field offices. Most interactions with government counterparts are conducted via mobile phone.
Due to lack of good communication the humanitarian institutions are unable to fulfill
coordination, monitoring and planning roles adequately.

3.1.7. Infrastructure:
At central level, the RRC and MoHADM are sharing the same building. The building is
overcrowded and staff does not have sufficient space. Offices are not available for staff working
at county level. Most of them work from home and attempt to carry out their activities
coordinating with local and international NGOs, as well as local government authorities. At State
level offices lack appropriate furniture and other office equipment (hardware, software, printers,
etc.). It is expected that this capacity gaps analysis report assist government’s efforts to secure
funding and solve these deficiencies.

3.2. Needs identified
This section introduces an indicative abstract of needs identified during the consultative
workshops, broadly presented and not quantified, displayed along the three priority work areas as
per the OCHA 2012 “Capacity Building Strategy” document19. Refer to annex 2 to access full
list of needs.

Work area 1: Defining institutional mandates and functions
Institutional structure and policy framework needs revision; administration and financial system;
Initiate process to streamline Disaster Risk Reduction measures in Annual Work Plans of Line
Ministries and NGOs as per Hyogo Framework for Action – 2005.

Work area 2: Communication and information management
Internet connectivity; Design and establish Disaster Management Information System; Design
and establish a national M&E system; Consolidate National Early Warning System (EWS) where
MoHADM/SSRRC have active role.

Work area 3: Strengthening RRC performance at the state level

19 Annex 10 – Capacity building strategy for the Government of South Sudan’s humanitarian institutions, 2012 –
OCHA policy paper – October 2011.
Structural needs: Hardware, software, internet connectivity, office construction, office furniture and equipment, mobility, telecommunication equipment, power generators and solar; mobility or solar, mobility; operational expenses such as access to per diem, petty cash, phone allowance etc. Human resources: new recruitments, review job descriptions, promotion system, preparation of national training programme, creation of mini-libraries / resource centres.

Broad areas identified for staff training: Basic computer skills, report writing, vulnerability assessment, analysis & mapping; project planning and management, effective logistics operations, Humanitarian law, humanitarian principles, minimum standards on humanitarian interventions (Sphere Project), Disaster Management, financial management, contingency planning, remote sensing and GIS, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Study tours, Diploma courses (1 to 3 months), Diploma courses (6 to 9 months), Masters programme (1 to 18 months), etc.

3.3. Training resources / Relevant Websites

Locally available specialized training options
Additional information on options for specialized training is presented on Annex 3 containing a 12 months training proposal budget prepared by the IIRR. This training proposal contains a staggered approach to training, which avoids one of the most common types of training sessions, the “piece meal”, few days, disconnected delivery of training.

Contact details of the two specialized training institutions locally available in South Sudan, which participated on the last national level consultative workshop, are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-International Institute for Rural Reconstruction (IIRR)</th>
<th>-Government Accountancy Training Centre (GATC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact Address:</td>
<td>The Director (GATC),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirak Abebe Temesgen</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Manager,</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Regional Centre</td>
<td>Contact person:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.O. Box 66873-00800</td>
<td>Michael Palmbach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westlands, Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>Tel. +249-956 00 62 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel. +249-955 07 45 71</td>
<td>Cell: +254-718 517 417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell: +251-811 477 563</td>
<td>Fax: +251-811 477 563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax: +254-718 517 417</td>
<td>E-mail: <a href="mailto:sirak.abebe@yahoo.com">sirak.abebe@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail: <a href="mailto:sirak.abebe@yahoo.com">sirak.abebe@yahoo.com</a></td>
<td>Website: <a href="http://www.iirr.org">www.iirr.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relevant websites links
Data base of Institutions specialized in Training and Capacity Building on Disaster Building on Disaster Risk Reduction in South Africa, India, etc. is available on this link: http://irp-capacitybuilding.delnetcilo.net/institutions/alpha

CHAPTER 4. MAPPING THE WAY AHEAD

4.1 A road map^{20}

^{20} The results and activities expressed on the suggested road map are lined up along the three priority work areas for 2012 to promote basic institutional strengthening in the immediate post-independence period (Annex 10 – Capacity building strategy for government humanitarian institutions, 2012 – OCHA paper).
This section introduces an indicative road map with expected results and activities, attempting to delineate a follow on strategy and tackle the capacity building immediate, medium to long-term issues. These result areas have been aligned and are consistent with the identified three mentioned priority work areas with HCT partners for 2012: 1) Defining institutional mandates and functions, 2) Communication and information management, and 3) Strengthening RRC performance at the state level. Assuming that funding is available, the timeframe for completion of these activities is 2012.

The outlined results and activities are considered a simplified outline of an Action Plan. In Annex 4 includes a more detailed work plan with specific actions that can be used by the Government as guidelines.

**CORE AREA 1: DEFINITION OF INSTITUTIONAL MANDATES AND FUNCTIONS**

**Result 1.** Organizational structure and management procedures of MoHADM & RRC developed, officialized and operationalized, along priorities defined on National DM Policy.

**Activities:**
1.1 Revise, formalize and adopt organizational structure with amended mandates and roles.
1.2 Review and develop job descriptions as per revised organizational structure.
1.3 Recruit short-term management consultant to develop operational procedures including financial management system, internal coordination and communications, human resources policy.

**Timeframe:** Estimated date of completion of these activities - by mid-2012

**Result 2.** Disaster management policy and strategy framework, together with legislation, are in place.

**Activities:**
2.1 Engage short-term consultant to review and finalize DM policy, along the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) and including Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR).
2.2 Lobbying to ensure quick official endorsement of Disaster Management policy.
Initiate process of integration of Disaster Risk Reduction- DRR into national policies and plans with MoHADM and RRC taking leadership role.

**Timeframe:** Estimated completion date – by third quarter of 2012

**CORE AREA 2: DEVELOP CAPACITY TO MANAGE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FUNCTIONS**

**Result 3.** MoHADM & RRC system staffs are appropriately qualified.

**Activities:**
3.1 Recruit short-term consultant to develop training programmed based on initial needs assessment.
3.2 Assess technical expertise and ability of humanitarian partners to contribute to training needs.
3.3 Facilitate training of selected staff through funding for travel, tuition and boarding for training visits.

**Timeframe:** To be rolled out during 2012. Staff training a medium to longer-term process.

**Result 4.** Effective disaster management information, planning and monitoring systems relating to mitigation, preparedness and response, are in place, with focus on prioritized hazards by States.

**Activities:**
- 4.1 Provision of basic resources to ensure communication/connectivity within and wider system.
- 4.2 Recruit short-term consultant to design a DM Information System and train selected staff (TORs on Annex 6)
- 4.3 Training in analysis and report writing.

**Timeframe:** Estimated completion date – by fourth quarter 2012.

**CORE AREA 3: STRENGTHEN RRC PERFORMANCE AT STATE LEVEL**

**Result 5.** Mechanisms to ensure MoHADM and RRC roles in coordinating humanitarian interventions and DM related activities, established and functioning.

**Activities:**
- 5.1 Provide technical support (consultants) needed to support training in emergency preparedness and contingency planning.
- 5.2 Provision of basic resources to ensure communication / connectivity within and with wider system.
- 5.3 Strengthen mechanisms for improved collaboration with HQ, line ministries and within States.

**Timeframe:** Completion date – by fourth quarter 2012.

**4.2. Assumptions**

- A revised institutional structure for the MoHADM and RRC is agreed upon and that there is the political will for its approval, in spite of perceived reluctance of staff for a re-structuring due to fear of losing their jobs.
- The Government leads this initiative with the required support (funds, staff, and supplies).
- International partners will support national authorities; this is a multi-agency approach to disaster management, including the sharing of data and information (at national and regional level) and that the government will join and allow conditions for this to happen.
- A multi-agency supervisory body or committee is agreed to be created to guarantee action accountability and transparency on implementing this multi-agency capacity building initiative. Chairperson may be a government staff or an HCT’s member, on a rotational basis, with regular meetings as deemed needed.

**CHAPTER 5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**
5.1 Recommendations
Recommendations are grouped into three sections: i) a section for the Government; ii) a section for the HCT partners; iii) and a section for UNICEF:

i) **Recommendations for the Government:**

**On Leadership**
Senior management teams of RRC and MoHADM must assume the responsibility to become the leaders on the humanitarian sector for South Sudan. If the “business as usual” approach does not change, we will continue having less than optimal results when organizing and coordinating responses to emergency situations.

**On Institutional reform**
In an effort to highlight the need for an institutional reform, and avoid overlapping and duplication of roles, the writer presented to government staffs examples of national disaster management structures used in 10 different countries. There is a general agreement that the current RRC and MoHADM institutional set up needs to be modified. Three options were discussed as alternatives for an institutional reform: a) the MoHADM becomes part of RRC; b) the RRC becomes part of MoHADM and 3) MoHADM and RRC cease to exist, transforming into a new entity, with revised mandate, roles and responsibilities. The third option is recommended as the best option to adopt.

**On development of Preparedness Plans**
The development of Contingency plans at different levels is at the center of better coordinated humanitarian responses. Up to now, MoHADM and RRC have been working with a reactive type of approach, without development of preparedness plans which have caught them unprepared and unable to respond adequately to crises. Contingency planning will allow staff involved, to foresee in advance potential problems at different levels and adopt strategic measures to reduce them, if not solve them.

ii) **Recommendations for HCT partners:**

**On establishing a mechanism to monitor implementation**
Support the creation of a mechanism to monitor responsibilities during implementation. The aim is to establish a sense of accountability for action and transparency. Thus, the creation of a special supervisory body or committee, composed by government and HCT members should be sought. The general concern among national authorities is that unless this supervisory body is created, no concrete action would take place. Thus, the justification to create this supervisory committee would be to guarantee implementation and follow up on fulfillment of the list of needs identified, and solve the existing capacity gaps in both institutions.

iii) **Recommendation for UNICEF:**

**On internet connectivity**
UNICEF can play a very important supportive role assisting national authorities in achieving faster an improved institutional capacity providing financial support to procure crucial equipment such as the V-SAT in Juba to re-establish internet connectivity.

**On training**

It is suggested to accelerate the acquisition of knowledge and skills on disaster management supporting the proposed study tour to Ethiopia to visit the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency as per TORs in annex 8.

UNICEF can support technical capacity providing training on emergency preparedness and response and on disaster risk reduction. It is suggested to facilitate a short-term consultancy to develop: a) a training programme for national staff located at different levels (Central, State and County levels), adopting a training strategy where a team is created at central level (Training of Trainers), b) initiate the process to streamline DRR information into line ministries annual work plans.

**On establishing systems**

It is highly recommended to support the recruitment of a short-term consultant specialized in information systems and design a Disaster Management Information System (website). TORs available in annex 5.

5.2 Conclusions

There is no end in sight to the incidence of disasters either natural or man-made within the foreseeable future for South Sudan. Humanitarian crises are already looming on the horizon: the Abyei border crisis; the LRA activities, political dissent along ethnic lines, etc. Thus, the importance of achieving an improved capacity in the coordination of humanitarian interventions and disaster management is critical. For this to happen, it will be required a strong political will from the Government to assume commitment for leadership and for change to establish an effective disaster management and emergency response government institution.

This Institutional capacity gaps analysis report is the first step in the long process of building the capacity of the two humanitarian institutions (RRC and MoHADM) and should be used as a planning tool to guide the efforts of the Government and the HCT agencies to develop common action plans and required funding proposals.

It is within the power of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to solve the current overlapping and duplication between the MoHADM and the RRC. A new revised institutional framework could be created, with full agreement of both agencies. The President and the House of Parliament remain the answer and have the power to clarify the roles of the two institutions dealing with Disaster management.

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ANNEX 1: SWOT ANALYSIS AND CAPACITY ASSESSMENT

ANNEX 2: NEEDS IDENTIFIED, CATEGORIZED BY CAPACITY BUILDING COMPONENT
ANNEX 3: IIRR 12 MONTHS TRAINING PROPOSAL WITH BUDGET

ANNEX 4: OPTIONAL INDICATIVE WORK PLAN FOR GOVERNMENT’S CONSIDERATION

ANNEX 5: TORs FOR THE DESIGN OF A DISASTER MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

ANNEX 6: PROPOSED REVISED NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

ANNEX 7: EXAMPLE OF A REVISED NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AGENCY

ANNEX 8: SAMPLE LETTER AND TORs FOR A PROPOSED STUDY TOUR TO ETHIOPIA

ANNEX 9: CAPACITY BUILDING STRATEGY 2012 FOR RRC AND MoHADM

ANNEX 10: LIST OF PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED

ANNEX 11: TORs OF EMERGENCY CONSULTANT