UNICEF Haiti
Country Programme Evaluation
1992- mid-1996

Programme choices in political crisis and transition

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Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

The UNICEF experience in Haiti from 1992 to mid 1996 provides numerous lessons learned for the Country Office. More importantly for the organization’s response to crisis globally, it contributes to debate around the following key issues:

- the position of UNICEF as advocate for children in the highly politicized context of international sanctions;
- the potential role for the organization in emerging or fragile democracies through balanced partnership with the State and civil society; and
- UNICEF’s role in building emergency preparedness at the level of community-based organizations.

The evaluation was carried out in August/September 1996 by a three person team (two external consultants and one UNICEF headquarters staff person) with the following objective:

- to assess the strategic programmatic choices taken,
- to assess management decisions taken to enable these choices,
- to assess programme outcome to the extent possible given weak M&E systems
- to identify sustainable elements of programmes during emergency and transition phases.

The evaluation covers the period, from 1992, just after the coup d’etat which ousted President Aristide, through to the return of the constitutional government in September 1994 and almost two years of transition following that to mid-1996. This was a period of repeated upheaval including political violence, though it did not deteriorate to civil war. From 1992 to 1994 there was a ban on contact with the de facto government and an increasingly severe international embargo particularly after the failure of the Governor’s Island Accord (an agreement for the departure of the military government) in October 1993.

Over the period studied, the population was hit by repression and increased violence, increases in prices and a corresponding dwindling of disposable income for commerce, credit and basic services. Real gross national product per capita declined from US$ 370 in 1990, already placing Haiti as the poorest country in the Americas, to US$250 in 1994. The little hard data existing indicates that the impact on women and children was severe. Acute malnutrition in under fives increased. Access to basic services dwindled. Estimates of street children (mostly boys) and children in domestic labour arrangements (mostly girls) increased. School enrolment dropped. While the situation has currently stabilized enough to allow the return of the constitutional governments and subsequent elections considered free and fair, many consider that the crisis is not over. The situation of poor families has not yet recovered.

PROGRAMME OUTCOME AND ACHIEVEMENTS
The evaluation reveals that the UNICEF Haiti County Office (CO) did manage, with a range of partners, to provide essential basic services to the Haitian population during the crisis. This included far reaching benefits for children’s health and nutrition status through immunization and vitamin A distribution. By government estimates the measles immunization increased from 20% in 1992 to 95% in 1995 (children 9 months to 14 years). Support also included crucial water services, particularly in urban slum areas, where climbing prices were threatening poor families’ bare survival. An annual population of 50,000 in Port-au-Prince benefitted from the water services through 1992-1994. Since the crisis, a nation-wide campaign promoting exclusive breast-feeding for ages 0 to 6 months appears to have made significant progress. From 1992 to 1996, the reach of basic services increased as did funding. Resources implemented jumped from US$ 3.2 million in 1992 to US$9.8 million in 1995.

The UNICEF programme also included some relatively small activities in the areas of education and street children as well as advocacy. As the country has moved into tentative transition to democracy following President Aristide’s return in October 1994, UNICEF and its partners have claimed some key achievements in these areas, among them:

• the strengthening of the Haitian Coalition for the Defense of Child Rights (COHADDE), originally formed in 1991;
• ratification of the CRC by parliament following the return of the constitutional government in 1994;
• an all party declaration in favour of child rights in the tense period leading up to the 1995 elections.

Some of these achievements, however, were tempered by what was perceived by many as inadequate follow through in partnership support and advocacy.

Over the period studied, the CO developed a forward looking perspective, adopting a broad partnership strategy, building an approach to working with community-based organizations (CBOs), and even giving attention to more specific programme initiatives which lay the basis for a sustainable response to the emergency. Currently, the programme orientation is promising, though the CO is still struggling to fully control and follow through on these strategies and initiatives.

**KEY LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This experience has provided a number of key lessons allowing the Evaluation Team to make recommendations. The most salient are summarized below:

**Sanctions and politics vs. child rights**

The UNICEF mandate to help women and children gives it a clear moral purpose in times of crisis. However, there was controversy around UNICEF’s actions in Haiti. The UNICEF-commissioned study, carried out by the Harvard Center on Population and Development, showing the detrimental effects of UN sanctions on the well-being of women and children, was perceived by some as supportive of the *de facto* military government (1991-1994). This was true too of UNICEF
programmes. Capacity building components of UNICEF programmes were limited by the definition of humanitarian assistance, as articulated by the OAS. On another level, people criticized UNICEF for its duplicity as an organization which promotes child rights, but which did not take a strong enough stand against UN sanctions and their crippling effects on the poor, among them women and children.

This complex controversy itself demonstrates the political delicacy of UNICEF’s position as protector of child rights. Despite these challenges, UNICEF Haiti maintained a very difficult balance and gained respect as an organization which had been true to its mandate.

Thus, in a political crisis, while the mandate of UNICEF may be difficult to challenge morally, it is bound to be challenged politically. This is particularly true where the UN Security Council is involved and sanctions are imposed on behalf of the international community. Impartiality of the UN is then replaced by a political objective, often ostensibly to protect political and civil rights, which conflicts with the humanitarian concerns for economic and social rights. Where the focus is on child rights, this may be more easily understood as a tension between sustainable long term protection of rights vs. short term protection; the latter may or may not undermine the former. Similarly, ‘neutral’ relief assistance is seen in opposition to politically sensitive capacity building initiatives or community development, even when these are promoted by donors in other fora as important means of increasing cost-effectiveness in emergency response.

In such a situation, UNICEF pursuit of its mandate and moral responsibility to act in favour of women and children can entail bending the rules or establishing careful nuances which might not be widely appreciated, locally, among sister agencies or in international circles.

The delicate political manoeuvring involved is as important as programme design, and is essential to open the way for programmes to move forward at all. This manoeuvring takes place at headquarters, but much more so at the CO level where the nuances must be put into practice. Political manoeuvring must also be supported by advocacy based on solid information on the situation of women and children and the potential or actual impact of international intervention.

In order to defend its mandate and provide international leadership as an advocate of child rights, UNICEF must rely on political savvy as well as strong information and analysis to back such a position.

UNICEF must equip itself to take a transparent and coherent stand in cases of international sanctions, maintaining its leadership in the protection of children and women’s rights, through research on the impact of sanctions and development of mechanisms for the monitoring of such situations. This is consistent with commitments made in the UNICEF

- Furthermore, monitoring must be a central part of UNICEF response to a pending crisis, as a basis for calling attention to vulnerabilities before populations suffer the worst effects of crisis and as a means of prioritizing scarce resources. De-centralized approaches to monitoring, based in local NGOs, community-based organizations and local institutions, are suggested as both more sustainable and stable in situations of fragile States. Such approaches can be fostered within UNICEF service delivery programmes as well as in support to national monitoring activities.

- In complex emergency situations or countries of fragile stability, UNICEF country offices need to engage political advisors to help them negotiate the varied and conflicting political interests.

**Emergency preparedness**

The Haiti experience pointed to issues regarding UNICEF’s preparedness for political crisis. The evaluation revealed that, in the case of Haiti, strong cumulative pressures on the CO to react to the enormous needs in a rapidly deteriorating situation, as well as the lack of a clear direction, lead to a number of ineffective and poorly chosen interventions. Programming did however improve.

- What proved most effective for the CO was a flexible plan for different scenarios within a well-framed programme, appropriate for both crisis and transition to democracy. However, the CO has not revisited preparedness planning as something more than a question of logistical and supply arrangements, despite the very tense current political situation.

- UNICEF regional offices and/or headquarters should be responsible for supporting a process of preparedness planning, or flexible programming for scenarios, in on-going emergencies as well as in countries judged to be in a fragile position. This involves eliminating the distinction between ‘emergency’ and ‘regular’ programmes in the planning process, as well as strengthening analysis of constraints and assumptions.

**Partnerships for preparedness and development**

The decision to take on a broad range of civil society partners in Haiti, which increased in number to over 100 by 1994, was clearly forced by the ban on contacts with the de facto government. It was also prodded by the poor results achieved in 1992, just after the coup d’etat, when UNICEF had acted in isolation from potential partners. The partnerships engaged in after 1993 varied enormously, including international NGOs, national NGOs, local health institutions, churches, associations of CBOs and even one-off contacts for isolated requests of emergency material support. These partnerships allowed the organization to take a balanced position, focusing on the well-being
of children without engaging in a potentially paralyzing political stance. At the same time, the partnerships greatly increased the reach of UNICEF programmes.

➢ The experience points to the stability which a balanced range of partners could provide, and underlines the importance of the balance between State and civil society partnerships as part of emergency preparedness in potential political crisis.

➢ However, the Haiti experience also demonstrates that such a broad partnership strategy places large demands on UNICEF as an organization which considers capacity building a priority strategy. Many partners were too weak to meet UNICEF and other partner’s expectations. At the same time, UNICEF did not fully meet partners expectations in a broad range of support, particularly for the development of the partners themselves, as organizations or institutions. This included support in building managerial and administrative capacities, liaison between State and NGOs, as well as serving as a knowledge centre.

UNICEF’s partnership strategy with NGOs and the State appears to have been largely focused on programme delivery, with short term support to material and logistical capacities, as well as technical training as specifically necessary for programme results. However, the partnership strategy currently offers a great opportunity to contribute to the transition to democracy through more sustained capacity building and empowerment of civil society organizations and local level authorities, facilitating cooperation and coordination between them. Similarly, partnerships with various levels of the State offer UNICEF tremendous opportunities to contribute to the returned constitutional government, promote child rights and foster a working relationship between civil society and government. The greatest opportunity lies in strengthening the coordination and normative role of the State, in order to facilitate its relationships with the myriad volunteer and private actors in the social sector.

◆ UNICEF should consider analysis of potential partners as part of its process of emergency preparedness planning. UNICEF should maintain relations with a broad range of civil society partners as well as traditional State partners where they exist, particularly in situations of political instability.

◆ This should involve a careful match between UNICEF objectives, resources and capacities, the objectives and capacities of potential partners, and a realistic plan for strengthening partner organizations (capacity building and empowerment) as necessary.

Community organizations
As a central part of its partnership strategy, the Country Office gradually evolved an approach for medium-term development of communities, strengthening their capacity to identify needs as well as manage response to those needs. This was proposed as an approach both for development and local level emergency preparedness. This innovative approach was initiated conceptually in 1993,
building on an area-based programme which worked with community-based organizations (CBOs) and groups. In a recent reorientation and refinement of this initiative, the approach has evolved to one which proposes CBOs as the eventual privileged partner for UNICEF programmes in Haiti.

While promising, experience with this approach has demonstrated the need to define a high-impact but feasible niche for UNICEF, particularly as staff still find themselves overloaded with small ad hoc request from CBOs. The Country Office has faced challenges in ensuring quality field support to CBOs. It is also struggling to develop a model for working with CBOs which can be applied on the larger scale required for service delivery programmes such as water and environmental sanitation. Both of these undertakings involve NGO and State partners of UNICEF. Many of UNICEF NGO and State partners still tend to perceive CBOs as passive beneficiaries.

◆ UNICEF Haiti should focus resources on the development, with partners, of a workable model or approach to strengthening CBOs, on a small scale. Such models must take into consider variations which are appropriate for the relatively fast paced expansion of basic service sectors.

◆ Dependent on progress on the above, the Country Office should also work at the level of associations and federations of CBOs, strengthening their role as networks and coordination bodies which can then provide capacity building support and foster the empowerment of CBOs.

◆ Given the central and experimental nature of this approach, an appropriate monitoring and evaluation plan should be developed, including participatory monitoring by CBOs.

Other Recommendations specific to Haiti programmes:

- to clarify targeting strategies, particularly with regard to targeting of the poorest populations, and the corresponding review of women’s credit programmes and cost-recovery strategies;
- to evaluate the outcome of training activities and review training strategies and methodologies accordingly;
- to strengthen monitoring of the situation of women and children, particularly through work with a broad network of local level actors, including NGOs, CBOs, and local authorities.

The UNICEF Haiti Country Office has experimented with a number of innovative options for carrying out its mandate to protect the well-being of women and children in a context of political crisis and complex transition. While these approaches are not altogether successful or fully refined
yet, the choices to take on a broad civil society partnership and develop an approach to working with CBOs have opened the possibilities for UNICEF to foster a stabilizing process. It would be premature to claim any positive impact on democratic participation. However, it is critical that the experience gained thus far not be lost and that the CO continue to focus energies on refining this experience, monitoring and evaluating its progress for dissemination.
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<tr>
<td>ACDI/CIDA</td>
<td>Agence Canadienne du développement International / Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>AFHA</td>
<td>Alliance des femmes haïtiennes (Haitian Women Union-Association)</td>
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<td>ARI</td>
<td>Acute Respiratory Infection</td>
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<td>BI</td>
<td>Bamako Initiative</td>
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<td>CASEC</td>
<td>Conseil d’Administration de la Section Communale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases</td>
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<td>CEDC</td>
<td>Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances</td>
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<td>CIF</td>
<td>Comité inte-agences femmes et développement (Inter-agency committee women and development)</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>UNICEF Country Office</td>
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<td>COHADDE</td>
<td>The Haitian Coalition for the Defense of Children Rights</td>
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<td>CPE</td>
<td>Country Program Evaluation</td>
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<td>CPMP</td>
<td>Country Programme Management Plan</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Country Programme Recommendation</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>EERP</td>
<td>Emergency Economic Recovery Programme</td>
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<td>EMOPS</td>
<td>UNICEF Office of Emergency Programmes</td>
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<td>EPI</td>
<td>Expanded Programme on Immunization</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRIC</td>
<td>Fonds de Roulement pour les Initiatives Communautaires (Working capital for community initiatives)</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter American Development Bank</td>
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<td>Konesans Fanmi</td>
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<td>Haiti - Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
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<td>Management Excellence Programme</td>
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<td>MCH</td>
<td>Maternal Child Health</td>
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<td>MICIVIH</td>
<td>International Civilian Mission to Haiti</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>United Nations Multi-national forces</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>ORS</td>
<td>Oral rehydration salts</td>
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<td>PROMESS</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization for centralized drug distribution, PAHO/WHO supported</td>
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<td>RO</td>
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<td>TBA</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIPP</td>
<td>Visualization in Participatory Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASAMS</td>
<td>Water and sanitation monitoring system</td>
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<td>WES</td>
<td>UNICEF Water and Sanitation Office</td>
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<td>WHO/PAHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization / Pan American Health Organization</td>
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<td>WID</td>
<td>Women in Development</td>
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Preface

Following the September 1991 coup d'etat which ousted President Aristide, Haiti faced a period of intense political crisis. In the years since Aristide's return in September 1994, the country has entered a tentative transition to democracy, with continued political violence and the extended presence of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

For UNICEF, the experience in Haiti, between 1992 and the present, has been one of continued struggle to keep tempo with the rapid changes in the country. It was also an opportunity for innovation. This experience is unique in many ways and important to the organization's learning process for a number of reasons:

- Haiti was a political crisis. Since it did not deteriorate into civil war, it provides the chance to focus on emergency programming without the worst logistical impediments which war brings. It allows a much better focus on the work of political positioning of UNICEF vis-a-vis potential partners, which was to be decisive for programme performance. It raises the question of how UNICEF programmes in favour of women and children can be executed in such a way as to contribute to building democracy, as opposed to merely stabilizing conditions.

- The ban on contact with the de facto government in Haiti between 1992-1994 pushed UNICEF to abandon its traditional relationship with government counterparts and to seek a broader range of partners in civil society -- non-governmental organizations (NGOs), coalitions of NGOs and community-based organizations. This presented UNICEF with a chaotic experience of juggling myriad partnerships and gradually evolving different roles with its partners. This strategy, however, has the potential to provide stability to execute programmes in crisis while contributing to civil society participation in local level management of relief and development.

- The crisis in Haiti also served to underline the politicization of humanitarian assistance under sanctions. It is one among several cases demonstrating the paradoxical position which UNICEF faces, as advocate for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, when severe economic sanctions are imposed by the UN organization, of which it is but one agency. The case of Haiti demonstrates the conflicts between the political objectives of severe sanctions, ostensibly to protect political rights, and the humanitarian concerns of economic and social rights. Similarly it demonstrates the use of sanctions to stagnate capacity building initiatives, and the political sensitivity of even the most basic efforts at more effective and sustainable response to basic needs. The case also provides the experience of one CO in challenging international sanctions with information on the deteriorating situation of women and children.

- Now that the military in Haiti has been removed as the major source of power and the constitutional government has been reinstated, the State and civil society organizations which had been so active during the crisis are negotiating new relations. Correspondingly UNICEF's role is
shifting and opportunities are emerging for the organization to play a crucial facilitating role between State and NGOs, again with the potential to contribute to the building of democracy in Haiti.

In exploring partnerships, UNICEF Haiti has developed, in concept at least, an innovative approach to balancing emergency response to basic needs with long term investment in communities. The CO has set out to provide basic services while striving to build local level capacities to manage internal and external response to their needs, in essence building local level emergency preparedness. The evolution of this approach has not been without its problems, but the experience already holds clear lessons for the organization on a highly complex process.

In addition to the above broader considerations the UNICEF Country Office and it’s partners can claim key achievements both in improving the situation of women and children or advocating on their behalf. These included:

- far reaching benefits for children’s health and nutrition status through measles immunization and vitamin A distribution; by government estimates the former increased from 20% in 1992 to 95% in 1995 (children 9 months to 14 years);
- provision of crucial basic water services, particularly in urban slum areas, where climbing prices were threatening poor families bare survival;
- ratification of the CRC by the returned constitutional government in 1994;
- formation of potentially powerful advocacy groups such as the Haitian Coalition for the Defence of Child Rights (COHADDE)
- wide reaching promotion of exclusive breast-feeding.

This broad mix of programme achievements from service delivery and advocacy work indicate some of the results obtained from the Country Office’s partnership approach. Analysis of programme implementation in this period thus serves to demonstrate the practical challenges and opportunities for carrying out the organization’s mandate in a situation of political conflict.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) for Haiti was carried out between August and September 1996 by a mixed external and UNICEF headquarters team. This corresponded to a mid-point in the current three-year Bridging Programme (1995-1997) which in turn represents a transition phase in UNICEF programming after the 1991-1994 political crisis initiated by the coup d’etat ousting President Aristide. The period covered by the CPE, 1992 to mid-1996, is one of repeated

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1. The Evaluation Team was comprised of one person from UNICEF Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning and two external consultants, each with previous experience with UNICEF.
upheaval and corresponding reorientation of UNICEF programming. As Haiti enters a tentative period of democracy, with continued political violence and the extended presence of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), positioning of UNICEF is critical. The CPE is designed to feed into such strategic positioning as well as the programme preparation phase for the UNICEF Country Programme starting in 1998.

The Haiti experience also raises significant issues which have implications for UNICEF operations in other countries. Among them are the impact of international sanctions on children, the position of UNICEF as advocate of child rights in such a context, the role of UNICEF in emerging or fragile democracies, and the potential for the organization’s partnerships with civil society.

The CPE will thus focus on the experience of the UNICEF Country Office (CO), drawing where possible lessons for the organization as a whole. (Unless otherwise specified, references to UNICEF will focus on the CO.)

1.2 Terms of Reference
The Terms of Reference, included in Appendix A, stated the objective of the CPE as follows:

- to assess the strategic programmatic choices taken,
- to assess the management response to enable implementation of these,
- to make a rapid retrospective assessment of programme outcome in terms of the beneficiary population
- and to make an appraisal of potentially sustainable aspects of approaches introduced during the emergency and early reconstruction phases.

The evaluation of strategic programmatic choices was intended to include an examination of the coherence between the situation analysis, programme objectives, strategies and resource allocation as well as the choice of partners, a central issue in the Haiti programme context.

Assessment of programme outcome was limited by the difficulties which the CO had developing and maintaining monitoring systems. Consequently, a limited qualitative assessment of community- and family-level coping mechanisms was included to provide a different perspective on the appropriateness of programme choices and thus potential outcomes or limitations.

1.3 Methodology
The Evaluation Team employed a variety of methodologies to carry out the CPE. These included:

- a documentary review;
- unstructured individual interviews with a selection of donors as well as with political or executive-level representatives of key UNICEF partners in government, UN agencies, and NGOs;
• semi-structured group and individual interviews with UNICEF staff in the Haiti CO as well as in headquarters and regional offices;²
• workshops with selected NGO and civil service partners, generally at a more technical level, using participatory and visualization techniques.³ (See Appendix B: Summary of Workshops)

In addition, individual and group interviews of key informants in the field -- community leaders, health agents, community-level committee members, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries⁴ -- were carried out in three sites using a variety of Rapid Appraisal Procedures (RAP). These focused on reconstructing family and community coping mechanisms during the crisis in order to determine the potential impact of UNICEF interventions. Field research also served to cross-check information gleaned from management and coordination levels. A more detailed comment on methodology for the field segment of the evaluation, including selection of sites and a framework for interviews, is included in Appendix C. Appendix D contains a synthesis of the analysis of coping strategies.

1.4 Constraints to the CPE
The CPE in UNICEF is defined by an evolving set of guidelines. Two aspects of the model CPE, as per the guidelines, were downplayed in the case of Haiti due to the nature of programming in the period under study. These were assessment of programme impact and cost-effectiveness analysis.

The major constraint for both aspects was the absence of regular monitoring systems. This is discussed in more detail under Chapter 5. The very nature of the programming in Haiti, with the numerous reorientations in response to the shifting political crisis, the sometimes ad hoc nature of the programme response in the worst periods of the crisis, and a relatively low level of preparedness of the CO at the start of the crisis, all posed major challenges to the development and maintenance of good management information systems. Programme or project monitoring reports were understandably difficult to produce regularly. Some key aspects of programme documentation were not maintained. Gaps between proposed strategies and activities in various emergency appeals, programme documents and actual programme execution are traced with considerable difficulty, particularly for 1993 and 1994. Documentation of changes to project plans of action was weak. The general exhaustion evident among staff who lived through the period of political crisis, with all the inherent personal costs, also made it difficult to mobilize an in-depth review of activities carried out three and four years ago.

² Note that interviews are referenced only by date and location, i.e. UNICEF-Haiti or UNICEF-NY in order to avoid singling out individuals.

³ These techniques borrowed from the Visualization in Participatory Planning, VIPP, approach.

⁴ As with UNICEF staff, interviewees in the field are not identified by name. References provide the date and location from interview notes.
A second major constraint, also a factor in monitoring systems, was the sheer number of partnerships engaged in at different times. In the period studied, partnerships with civil society organizations alone jumped in number from less than 20 in 1992 to over 100 in 1994. What is more, in each partnership, UNICEF was far from being the sole source of funding.

Consequently relating programme output or impact to specific UNICEF contributions was often impossible and would have done injustice to the importance of partners’ contribution, a critical factor in programme outcome.

Cost-effectiveness analysis was equally hampered. The identification of other options for comparison and systematic measurement of corresponding costs (to UNICEF, partners and community) for the period of crisis, could not be carried out within the time and budget constraints of the CPE, even for large segments of projects such as immunization and basic drug supply. With more time available, cost-efficiency analysis might have been possible, though only for project implementation with a sample of partners and in selected geographic areas.

Given the limitations on these two angles of evaluation, analysis in this CPE focused on programme choices and output, the latter where sufficient data was available, with a rough qualitative evaluation of the logic and strategic importance of resource allocation.

Finally, an additional practical constraint was the loss of one day of field work in the slums of Port-au-Prince due to threats of insecurity; a tight schedule did not permit returning later. Time spent collecting information in the urban setting was insufficient to produce a coherent picture of coping strategies.

1.5 Conceptual references
The analysis in this CPE is founded on a number of previous conceptual works offering different lenses through which the case of Haiti might be understood. The UNICEF nutrition conceptual framework is useful for its clear causal hierarchy of basic, underlying and structural causes of malnutrition and death among women and children. This serves as a basis for analysing the appropriateness of programme response to key problems in the situation of women and children.5 The focus of this, however, is limited principally to survival issues.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides a broader framework for guiding UNICEF programmes. However, precisely because of the breadth of the CRC, COs must be adept at situation analysis in order to determine priority areas of action based on analysis of needs, potential

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impact and comparative advantage. An additional challenge is to identify strategic actions without undermining a holistic approach to child rights. The Office of Emergency Operations (EMOPS) presented to the UNICEF Executive Board, in 1996, a Conceptual Framework for UNICEF Emergency Interventions which serves to underline the importance of maintaining this holistic approach, engaging in activities which serve to “strengthen the protective role of families and communities” as a means of ensuring the child protection, survival and development outcomes.\(^6\)

UNICEF is especially challenged by the context of political and social tensions in a failed State or a State in crisis as well as one which is in a transition. With regard to the latter, the current UNICEF Representative for Haiti stated the problem as UNICEF “learning to work in a democracy,” learning to deal with other than a centralized State power.\(^7\) The debate over linking emergency relief response to development work provides an useful reference for the case of Haiti. While the links between emergency relief, rehabilitation and development have been increasingly included in international policy literature,\(^8\) the concept of the relief-to-development continuum, where development is focused on re-establishing failed State structures, has also been challenged. The work of Mark Duffield examining international response in so-called complex emergencies, proposes that agencies such as UNICEF support civil and social institutions in their struggle to adapt to political crisis. He also proposes that UNICEF increase its attention to analysis of what he calls political vulnerability.\(^9\) Applied to the context of Haiti, this underscores the range of options in partnerships and the potential role of civil society partners in building communities’ capacity to identify needs as well as pursue the response to those needs.

The question of UNICEF’s role vis-a-vis State and civil society partners builds naturally on the often declared capacity building aspect of the organization’s work. These terms are frequently used for different meaning and activities in development practice are often based on little analysis of capacities. It is useful to highlight the definition provided by senior members of the UNICEF-Haiti CO itself. Capacity building is defined as the provision of technical training, supplies and physical facilities for existing groups to carry out activities. While the actual definition of capacity building is narrow in comparison to others in development literature,\(^10\) it is complemented by the definition

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\(^7\)Group interview, UNICEF-Haiti heads of section and senior management, August 19, 1996.


\(^10\)Definitions vary including support to strengthen a broad range of practical capacities -- managerial, human resources, financial and material -- as well as making reference to organizational identity, decision-making capacities, and the ability to respond to the surrounding environment, all in order to increase the organizations ability.
which the CO uses for empowerment: it is defined as the provision of support intended to allow an organization or community to do things on its own, including management and decision-taking.\textsuperscript{11} The use of these definitions is not suggested for global adoption, but are used in the context of this CPE for ease of reference by the CO. These are useful particularly with reference to the community organization and partnership strategies developed by UNICEF Haití.

Finally, much work has been done analyzing coping strategies in different parts of the world. Coping strategies are understood as the adjustments, in times of stress or crisis, in traditional or typical mechanisms or patterns for securing livelihood. Livelihood is taken to include access to and availability of food and health care as well as more difficult to measure social and cultural needs of the family/community. A distinction is often made between coping strategies equated with insurance mechanisms which serve to protect livelihood, erosive coping mechanisms which are a short-term trade-off against long-term livelihood, and non-coping or destitution.\textsuperscript{12} In the course of the CPE, these concepts were used in carrying out information collection in the field and in understanding potential outcome of programmes, though the actual portrait of coping strategies remained at a broad level of analysis.

1.6 CPE document structure
The document structure is designed to provide an understanding of the context in which UNICEF was operating, the actual programmes developed and their outcome, followed by a more in-depth analysis of factors conditioning programme implementation and the central issue of partnerships.

The six Chapters which follow cover:

- the Haitian context in the period covered by the CPE, including both the major political events and the situation of women and children;
- analysis of key strategic choices taken by the CO which defined UNICEF positioning vis-a-vis its partners;
- a review of programme evolution and outcome over the period studied;
- a review of key challenges in implementation including management response, handling of cross-cutting strategies and activities, and a number of competing priorities.

11 Interview, UNICEF-Haiti, Programme Officer, August 19, 1996.

• analysis of the major UNICEF partnerships, including opportunities for redirection;
• a summary of lessons learned and recommendations.

2.1 Historical Reference Points

The Terms of Reference for this evaluation proposed an interpretive historical framework of four distinct periods. These periods are probably most significant to UNICEF and its State partners as they are marked by major political events which defined the internationally acceptable boundaries of their relationship. These events were: the September 1991 coup d’etat, the July 1993 Governor’s Island Accord, the May 1994 election of a rump parliament and illegal appointment of provisional President, Emile Jonassaint, and the return of President Aristide in October 1994.

To a great extent everyone in Haiti was influenced by these events. What differs is the degree of importance each turning point had for their daily lives and ability to work. Time has also contributed to differing perceptions. Over two years have passed since the return of Arisitide. Those who were interviewed are now selective in how they interpret and remember particular events.

2.1.1 Perspectives on key turning points

In the course of this evaluation, the initial analysis of four periods provided in the Terms of Reference was complemented by a few distinctly different perspectives on the significant turning points. These turning points set different parameters for the analysis of UNICEF programmes.

Rural and urban poor: It was evident from interviews conducted with community members and leaders in urban and rural areas that there were two developments that overshadowed the others: one was the 1991 coup d’etat which was followed by increased violence and population movements, most significantly with people leaving Port-au-Prince for the countryside in search of food and relative security. The other major event was the imposition of the second more strict fuel embargo of October 1993. These two events are remembered by everyone in Haiti as critical.

In rural areas, this second period of embargo is only slightly distinguished from the general problem of increased prices from the time of the coup d’etat. In urban areas interviewees appeared to make greater distinction between periods, being much more affected by peaks of violence and changes in prices produced by the political situation in the capital. The Evaluation Team was left, however, with the impression that for many, the events of the past five years tend to blur with the period prior to the coup d’etat, which was also very harsh for most.14

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13 Displacements also took place between slum neighbourhoods and between rural areas and larger towns outside of Port-au-Prince, with everyone seeking relative safety brought by anonymity.

14 Interviewees in poor neighbourhoods and slums painted a picture of prolonged crisis with differences in degree: periods of acute violence and repression had been experienced across the country since the last years of the Duvalier regime; a drought persisted in the North West Department for 5 years before the coup d’etat, the worst year being 1991.
NGO partners: For UNICEF partners in the NGO community, not surprisingly, experience depended on the size of the organization and its contacts outside of Haiti. All remember the fuel embargo, if not for the dramatic effects on operational capacity, at least for the effects on the population around them. Some smaller organizations noted the decrease of international aid during 1992-1994 that drastically reduced their ability to work. To a lesser extent, some remember the arrival of the new UNICEF Representative in late 1992 as a turning point in their relations with UNICEF which was as important in its own way as some of the larger political events. The return of Aristide has clearly brought significant changes to relationships with many donor agencies, who are now returning their support to State partners. However, NGO partners clearly specified that in mid-1996 the crisis was still not over: the constitutional government may well have been re-established in its place, but the crisis of increased poverty brought on by the embargo persists today.  

UNICEF perspectives: Perceptions of this period vary in UNICEF. The initial four periods of analysis proposed highlight the options for UNICEF in terms of its relationship with the State. At more operational levels within the County Office and at headquarters, the arrival of the new Representative was also a significant event bringing many changes to programme operations. At headquarters, the events leading up to the intervention of international forces in September 1994 were critical, because of the potential transformation of UNICEF operations to respond to a civil war situation. The peaceful outcome of this period defined the status of the Haiti situation within UNICEF: a headquarters staff person qualified it as “a political crisis, not an emergency.”

2.1.2 Summary of Key Periods 1991-1996
The following summary chronology is divided into six periods which the Team feels characterize the most significant changes in programming context, not only considering State partnerships, but also operational and programmatic changes. (A more detailed chronology for the period is contained in Appendix E).

2.1.2a September 1991 to early 1993 -- UNICEF reacting alone
The military coup d'état led by General Raoul Cedras against the constitutionally elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide took place in September 1991. It prompted immediate sanctions by the OAS and United Nations. There was an initial exodus of people from the city of Port-au-Prince which lasted through until roughly February of 1992.

It was a period of isolation for UNICEF due to the organizations perceived allegiance to the de facto government. This perception was further fueled by the outgoing Representative's decision

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15 Workshop with selected UNICEF NGO partners, Port-au-Prince, September 3, 1996.

16 Interview, Officers UNICEF NY, Latin America Desk, NY, September 27, 1996.
in October 1992, to accept a medal from the de facto government, the day before the arrival of his successor. Until early 1993, UNICEF acted alone, distributing supplies on a limited basis. Due to this approach, though the image of UNICEF remained tarnished among potential partners, the organization was highly visible. A number of people remember this as a time when UNICEF was the only UN humanitarian organization ‘on the ground.’

2.1.2b Early 1993 to Mid 1993 -- reorientation & new partnerships
During this period the UN effort to respond to Haiti’s growing crisis was first in evidence. The UN/OAS humanitarian appeal was released in March, the International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was authorized by the UN General Assembly in April, and the UN Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

This was also the period when UNICEF started to rebuild partnerships as well as establish new ones in an effort to improve its response to the growing crisis in Haiti. It was during this time that the organization started to re-establish its credibility. The new strategy adopted, that of working with a range of civil society partners, defined a programmatic and operational structure for UNICEF that prevailed until well after the return of President Aristide in October 1994.

The period was also marked by frequent security problems, infrastructure decay and sagging morale.

2.1.2c July 1993 to October 1993 -- brief opening for the constitutional government
This was the biggest window of opportunity for international humanitarian agencies during the three year crisis period. It came with the Governor’s Island Agreement of early July which stipulated the ultimate departure of the Cedras military government and the return of President Aristide to Haiti by the end of October. Robert Malval was installed as Aristide's Prime Minister by ratification of the Haitian parliament. For a brief period, UNICEF and other agencies had a government with which they could work.

An increased number of international emergency relief organizations came to Haiti during this period and there was an increase of international aid.

At the end of July, a UNICEF sponsored team of public health experts, from Harvard University in the United States, came to study the impact of the embargo on the health of children.

What started as a hopeful period ended in disappointment and tragedy. On October 11, the US vessel, Harlan County, carrying part of the UN military contingent of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), was prevented from landing by the activity of armed civilians. Aristide's justice minister, Guy Malary, was assassinated in Port-au-Prince two days later.

2.1.2d October 1993 to May 1994 -- reimposed embargo
The Harlan County incident was interpreted as non-compliance with the Governor's Island Agreement. By the end of the month, the UN had re-imposed an oil and arms embargo, harsher than the earlier one, as well as introduced a naval blockade.

It was a period of increasing hardship and isolation for aid organizations, and of a rapidly deteriorating quality of life for the majority of Haitians. As a result of the strict embargo on fuel, all commodity prices rose dramatically and were in short supply. Mobility was severely curtailed. In response, the UN/OAS and a number of aid organization partners established a Humanitarian Fuel Programme in February 1994 to provide support to humanitarian activities.\(^ {17}\)

The UN evacuated all but essential staff from October to November 1994. UNICEF's essential staff remained including the Representative, Programme Coordinator, Information/Communications Officer and Health Officer. This was a significant boost to morale for the office's national staff. However, international professional staff movements were limited to Port-au-Prince, with a curfew and mandatory residence in a central hotel which lasted through to March 1994, under the UN phase IV security code.\(^ {18}\) Families were evacuated until Aristide’s return.

The Harvard Study on the impact of the sanctions on children was released days after the reimposition of the embargo and generated considerable controversy.

UNICEF worked with NGO partners on a vaccination campaign despite the lack of involvement of the constitutional government which wished to delay the campaign until Aristide's return.

2.1.2e May 1994 to September 1994 -- preparation for invasion
The crisis deepened. On 11 May 1994, a rump parliament voted in a new illegal government and a provisional President, Emile Jonassaint, to replace President Aristide. In July, the UN Security Council authorized the formation of a multi-national force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to send to Haiti if it proved impossible to dislodge the de facto government by other means. UN peacekeeping personnel left Haiti in stages from June to September and the MICIVIH was officially ejected in mid-July. Commercial flights were suspended in June of 1994 and the naval blockade was reinforced, heightening isolation of those inside Haiti. Embassies began to evacuated their staff.

The UNDP representative in Haiti, also the DHA coordinator, resigned at the end of May 1994. His replacement’s arrival marked a dramatic improvement in inter-agency coordination.

\(^ {17}\) The humanitarian fuel programme (Programme d'assistance en carburant, PAC, humanitaire) was chaired by the Ambassador of the OAS in Haiti, and included, among its members, a representative of the constitutional government. Fuel was limited to uses consistent with the much debated definition of humanitarian assistance.

\(^ {18}\) By contrast no embassy evacuated staff until June 1994 (see 2.1.2e).
While a UN evacuation was not ordered, staff were given the option of leaving if they chose. The resident agencies stayed.

Enduring a period of continued scarcity, isolation and growing anxiety, aid organizations and the Haitian population waited for some resolution of the crisis. While the prospect of the UN military intervention held the promise of ousting the de facto government, most Haitians refer to this as an invasion and even those previously in the Aristide camp perceived this as a betrayal of Haitian sovereignty -- an American-lead invasion harked back to a long occupation of Haiti at the beginning of the century. There was considerable tension on all sides. UNICEF and other organizations prepared contingency plans for a number of scenarios, including extensive violence and the equivalent of war relief emergency measures.

2.1.2f September 1994 to 1995 -- tentative transition
The crisis finally broke with the diplomatic intervention of a US delegation led by former US President Jimmy Carter which convinced the de facto government to peacefully cede power. The subsequent arrival of a Multi-National Force of 20,000 troops on 19 September was peaceful. President Aristide returned on October 15, 1994.

There was still a great deal of tension as people waited for Haiti's reaction to the arrival of foreign troops. Security was still a problem. UNICEF's supply trucks were attacked in the months following Aristide's return. The first few months were complicated by the need for UNICEF and other organizations to adjust their working habits and partnerships to a new political dynamic. More funds became available, but infrastructure was still limited.

By the middle of 1995 the first of a series of national elections took place in June. Amidst an atmosphere of great political tensions, UNICEF managed to gather the full slate of political parties to publicly express their support of child rights.

President Preval assumed power after the December 1995 elections. At the time of this evaluation in August-September 1996, political tensions were high and many references were made to killings of police officers in previous months as well as two political figures in August.

2.2 The Situation of Women and Children
The chronology of political events above outline the context in which the Haitian population saw a marked deterioration in already poor conditions. In 1991, Haiti was the poorest country in the hemisphere. The under five mortality rate in Haiti was among the highest 40 in the world. Of a population of roughly 6 million, it was estimated that 80% were below the poverty line. The coup

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19UN/IDB, UNICEF Haiti and the Emergency Economic Recovery Plan (n.p.), p.4
d'etat brought on a slow strangulation of a weak State, a process characterized as a "structural emergency" by the Country Office.\textsuperscript{20}

The population was hit by repression and increased violence, increases in prices and a corresponding dwindling of disposable income for commerce, credit and basic services. Real gross national product per capita declined from US$ 370 in 1990 to US$250 in 1994.\textsuperscript{21}

The little hard data existing indicates that the impact on women and children was severe. As cited in recent draft updates of the UNICEF Situation Analysis, prevalence of acute malnutrition in under fives increased. (See Figure 1.) Prior to the crisis, a 1990 national survey had suggested some improvement in child nutritional status over 1978 results.\textsuperscript{22}

Micronutrient deficiency was already a significant problem in the population: anemia among women of child-bearing age was roughly around 35\% in 1989; xerophthalmia was considered high in the North West Department; access to sufficient iodine was a concern in the Central Plateau.\textsuperscript{23} The low practice of exclusive breast-feeding for the first six months, currently measured at 0.6\%,\textsuperscript{24} addressed by a national programme only from 1994, was a significant factor in both malnutrition and disease.

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\textsuperscript{20}Interview, Programme Officer, UNICEF-Haiti, August 19, 1996.

\textsuperscript{21}UN/IDB, \textit{UNICEF Haiti and the Emergency Economic Recovery Plan}, p. 4


Figure 1: Prevalence of malnutrition by weight-for-height < -2 Z-scores and age, 1990-1995.

The infant and under five mortality rates were estimated at 74/1000 and 131/1000 live births respectively in a 1994 national survey. This registers a decrease compared to results of the last national survey, in 1987, however due to the timing and methodology of data collection, this decrease cannot be taken to represent trends during the period of the crisis. By contrast the study on the effect of sanctions carried out by the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies pointed to an increased mortality rate for children 1-4 years, based on SCF-US data for a population of 45,000 in Maissaide, Central Plateau. The increase was attributable to a measles outbreak. A measles epidemic lasted from June 1991 until January 1994 throughout Haiti, with case fatality rates for hospitalized under fives ranging from 7% to 12%. With all the expected cautionary notes on the limitations of projections, the Harvard team estimated that, if the 1992-1993 Maissaide experience were projected to the national level, it would represent an excess of 20,000 child deaths and 100,000 cases.

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28 The case fatality rate of 7% was registered by the HUEH and 14% by Albert Schweizer Hospital. In internal UNICEF-Haiti correspondence, ref. number PH17/96/2574.
of moderate and severe malnutrition.\(^{29}\) This was in 1993, before the imposition of the second, more severe embargo.

The estimated maternal mortality was already moderately high for 1987-1989 at 350/1000 livebirths.\(^{30}\) It was estimated at 460/1000 live births in 1994.\(^{31}\)

Prior to the crisis, less than 60% of the population was estimated to have access to medical care.\(^{32}\) Most sources point to considerable decrease in health services coverage during the crisis. While over 50% of health services were estimated to be run by Haitian and international NGOs\(^{33}\), physical infrastructure and equipment of State run services suffered serious deterioration.

Approximately 40% of people in urban areas and 20% of those in rural areas currently have access to safe drinking water. Corresponding access to sanitation facilities is 40% and 13% respectively. Both access to water and its quality worsened during the crisis, particularly in urban areas. In Port-au-Prince, access to safe water is reported to have decreased from 53% in 1991 to 35% in 1994.\(^{34}\)

While availability of basic services such as health, water and education decreased during the crisis, so did cash income and thus the affordability of those services remaining. Health personnel interviewed in this evaluation noted cost of transportation among the critical factors limiting access to health services during the crisis period, in addition to general decrease in income available for health care. It was commonly cited that families would save for a few weeks or would need to borrow money in order to go to a medical consultation, particularly at hospitals and clinics which were more expensive.\(^{35}\) With less disposable income, it is likely that timely referral would have decreased.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 10.


\(^{31}\) Internal UNICEF-Haiti correspondence, ref. number PH17/96/2574.


\(^{34}\) UNICEF, photocopied document, "Summary Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Haiti" (n.d.).

\(^{35}\) Field interviews, Gros Morne, Haiti, August 20-23, 1996.
Cash income was also critical to families’ ability to purchase food, basic goods and inputs for agricultural production. Families most severely affected were landless poor and families where women were involved in no commerce at all or only small-scale trade. Those engaged in trade saw their margin of profit squeezed due to transportation costs and reduced access to credit. Those not engaged in trade were probably not able to pay for basic services before the crisis and saw a decrease in real income. Local day-labour wages stayed much the same in rural areas, and were lower for women than for men. In addition, several interviewees mentioned that with the increased repression came extortion by the Section Chiefs and their affiliates.

Where income proved inadequate, children’s labour often became a vital family coping strategy. The options included increasingly worse conditions for children, involving younger children, and taking children further and further away from the care and support of families. Older boys worked as agricultural day-labourers, as porters in nearby towns or went off to the cities to find what work they could. For older girls, a small proportion could find work in factories, while the majority would seek work as domestic labourers, often paying an intermediary to help find a position. In urban settings, those without some form of income relied on a range of options from bit work as porters (considered the lowest means of earning), to charity, to petty crime to prostitution. Young children, mostly girls, were often placed in a form of domestic service with relatives or contacts where only room and board (sometimes minimal) were provided in payment. These options clearly allow a range of results, from coping to mere survival, where family and individual livelihood is threatened.

These strategies all existed prior to 1992, however, estimates show an increase during the crisis period. Those working with street children noticed a marked increase in the number of boys in the street, many coming in from rural areas. Statistics show an increase over the crisis period in numbers of street children, from an estimated 5000 to 10,000 nation-wide. Child servants are estimated to have increased from 130,000 to almost 200,000.

Correspondingly, enrolment in schools dropped. This was caused by a combination of reduced disposable income, which prevented poor families from paying fees and supplies, as well as

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36 It should be noted that while families surviving through the above-mentioned mechanisms were running out of options, a segment of society was also able to make enormous profit. This contrast was very evident in the busy market town of Gros Morné: throughout the entire embargo it was always possible to get gasoline through a busy black market trade across the border at Ouanaminthe, though the prices were reportedly astronomical. Interviews Gros Morné.

37 Field interviews, Gros Morné, Haiti, August 20-23, 1996.

38 Interview, Staff, COHAN LaKay, Port-au-Prince, September 3, 1996.

39 UNICEF, (photocopied document) "Analyse de la Situation des Femmes et des Enfants" (n.d.).
the atrophy of public education services, though the latter accounted for only 25% of all education services. Insecurity also periodically interrupted schooling.

The situation of women and children in Haiti worsened over the 1991-1994 crisis. For the country as a whole the political crisis brought a process of gradual strangulation, increasing poverty, another stage in more than a decade of upheaval. For children the effects of the crisis were dramatically revealed in rapidly increased risk of malnutrition and disease, particularly until international response became more coordinated and increased in magnitude. Poor families were pushed to adopt strategies which undermined their very capacity as a system for providing care to children. Women were pushed into more difficult working situations. Community support services were reduced.

3. Key Strategic Choices Positioning UNICEF

In responding to the deteriorating situation of women and children, however, UNICEF had to contend with the political facet of the crisis which stretched well beyond the borders of Haiti. During the period under study, UNICEF made a number of strategic choices which the Evaluation Team feels were very significant. These were strategic decisions which shaped the capacity of the organization to respond, but did so through political positioning of the organization vis-a-vis potential partners. This involved weighing opportunities against political and internal organizational necessities. Hindsight has in some cases raised questions regarding the wisdom of these choices. Yet they must also be understood within the complex context within which they were made.

The six key strategic choices analyzed here follow chronological order and provide a broad overview of the direction which the UNICEF CO took over the period studied. This provides a necessary backdrop to understanding programme evolution (Chapter 4) and choice of partners (Chapter 6).

3.1 Building Partnerships (late 1992 and early 1993)
This was the first major objective of the new Representative when she arrived in late 1992. At the time, according to her, building partnerships was more important than what the organization was actually doing. This was a move to mark a separation from the previous Representative who had compromised UNICEF’s image and as a result isolated the organization. Good relationships built up with NGOs during the early to mid-1980s and subsequently lost, had to be started anew. Relations with UN organisations also had to be forged.

As a response to an organizational need this was a necessary and important decision, and there is widespread agreement that the organization succeeded in restoring its credibility. Equally important for programme outcome, UNICEF was able to use its partnerships to support emergency interventions of much greater magnitude than when it had acted in isolation. Many subsequent
programme choices proceeded from this larger decision, though not all of the individual partnerships engaged in appear wisely chosen in hindsight.
The base of civil society partners was one which gave UNICEF the stability to operate in crisis and perhaps a stronger basis for the period of transition. This decision was clearly forced by circumstances which produced a more broader partnership for the CO, than exists in most countries. The experience provides a lesson for the organization globally on the importance of balancing partnership options as part of emergency preparedness in potential political crisis.


UNICEF has been praised by many for focusing on its mandate to help women and children, even by those who saw its humanitarian work as helping the de facto military government. In taking a stand consistent with international sanctions against the de facto government, some UN organizations allowed the political goal of bringing back the constitutional government to blur their commitment to international conventions protecting the civilian population. Having already been criticized for a perceived allegiance between UNICEF and the military government under the previous Representative, his replacement made a diligent effort to avoid a similar fate.

The organization did not escape criticism of its political allegiance. There were members of the constitutional government who regarded any kind of humanitarian aid as a means of giving further credibility to the existence of the de facto military government, and therefore still saw UNICEF as an ally of that government in late 1992 and 1993. UNICEF was criticized by the same group, later, for finding ways around UN imposed sanctions in order to continue humanitarian work. At the same time, the media and NGOs criticized UNICEF’s contradictory positions, on one hand, respecting UN imposed sanctions, with their severe effects on the civilian population, while on the other promoting the CRC and the principle of children first. UNICEF support for the Harvard Study in 1993 (discussed below), and to a lesser extent the statement made by James Grant to the UN Commission on Human Rights, in March 1994, highlighting the negative effects of sanctions for children, were provocation to some and not strong enough for others.

Throughout the period, UNICEF played a delicate balancing act holding unofficial meetings outside government offices with State technicians, while working with Ministers of the constitutional government. The careful and relatively quiet distinction which UNICEF tried to draw, between working with the State and working with the de facto government, was not one necessarily adopted by sister UN agencies.

By the middle of 1996, criticism of UNICEF’s perceived political stand persisted from a small minority; others who had been heatedly critical in the moment gave tempered views respecting UNICEF’s position in honouring its mandate.

At the community level, there was little criticism of UNICEF’s stand. In interviews in two urban slums of Port-au-Prince as well as in rural areas of Meyer and around Gros Morne, the analysis was made that UNICEF had provided affordable water, vaccinations for children, credit for
women and other support, which thus positioned the organization as an ally of the poor.\textsuperscript{40} By extension, some perceived UNICEF to be an ally of the constitutional government. Nonetheless, the actual work which UNICEF engaged in was consistently perceived as “neutral” in the communities.\textsuperscript{41} The notion that providing such services helped to prolong the hold of the \textit{de facto} government and the crisis was discounted.\textsuperscript{42} Many of the urban, and to a lesser extent rural community-based organizations (CBOs) with whom UNICEF collaborated started off as political interest groups. However, it appears that UNICEF did manage to support community level activities to meet basic needs while maintaining an image of neutrality during the \textit{de facto} government of 1992-1994.

In the end, UNICEF's loyalty to its mandate was judged by many to have been one of its greatest achievements during the 1992-94 period. This allowed the organization an identity above partisan interests and enabled it to continue working during highly politicized times without being unnecessarily compromised. UNICEF was taking advantage of perhaps its greatest comparative advantage in such situations, the clear mandate provided by the CRC.

\begin{quote}
Its mandate to help women and children gives it a clear moral purpose in times of crisis. This may be difficult to challenge morally if managed with care but is likely to be challenged politically. That the actions of the CO carried different political connotations provides a good illustration of how delicate a balancing act the office was required to perform. This underlines the perils of politicization of UNICEF work, particularly in such crisis situations, and the political savvyness which the organization must cultivate among its senior management in order to protect its mandate.
\end{quote}

\section*{3.3 Working with Mayors as Partners (1992-1993)}

While UNICEF was prevented by UN sanctions from working directly with the existing military government, it did try to work with the country's mayoral system.

The mayors had been elected with President Aristide and were thus considered as legitimate leaders, separate from the military government. However, municipal officials below the mayors

\textsuperscript{40} Interviews Meyer, August 27-29; Gros Morne, August 20-23, Morne l'Hopital, August 30, 1996.

\textsuperscript{41} Neutrality here can seem quite hazy. The distinction between “operational neutrality” and “neutrality of principle” as presented by African Rights, is not easy. Perceptions point to the latter. UNICEF acted upon a principle of children first, focusing on those actions which its information indicated were a priority, for example, vaccination to stop a measles epidemic. At the same time, in order to follow these actions through, it crossed into some grey areas, working with State technicians (operational neutrality from a political rights perspective). See discussion in Alex de Waal & Rakiya Omaar, \textit{Humanitarianism unbound? Current dilemmas facing multi-mandate relief operations in political emergencies} (London: African Rights, November 1994), p. 24.

\textsuperscript{42} Interviews, Morne L’Hopital, St Jean, September 2, 1996 and August 30, 1996.
were still considered political appointments and so with the elections entirely new teams had often come into office without an accumulated experience in administrative functions. Many mayors reportedly have little understanding at what their role could be in community development.

The mayors were among the first partners UNICEF reached out to when the new representative arrived, in late 1992. Two played a big part in organizing the vaccination campaigns in Port-au-Prince in 1993. While the mayors were perhaps the only choice of government partners at the time -- and important because they had a national network -- there is a general consensus that they were not administratively prepared to do what was asked of them and were unable to supervise activities with any real expertise in areas under their authority.

Thus from a politically strategic point of view, the choice of mayors may have been the only one at the time. However, it would appear that there was a gap between the analysis of the mayors’ capacities and the expectations of the partnership by UNICEF. Clearly the capacity building support provided was unable to bridge that gap.

This underlines the magnitude of the challenge in local capacity building and empowerment, particularly in the context of political crisis. Similarly, it highlights the need for careful and realistic analysis of (or with) partners, as well as follow through with appropriate support, in order for partnerships at this level to be successful. A partnership strategy places large demands on UNICEF as a capacity building organization whether according to its broadest definition (i.e including empowerment) or the narrower focus on technical support and materials supply. This role cannot be underestimated and must be backed by resource allocation. Where this is not possible, UNICEF expectations of partnerships must be reconsidered.

3.4 Challenging the International Embargo -- The Harvard Study (1993)

This was perhaps the most controversial of UNICEF's gambles during the period under study. What originated as an attempt to determine what effect the embargo was having on the health of children in order to guide programming turned into a politically controversial event that had both positive and negative results far exceeding any original expectations. Research for the study was done at the end of July and beginning of August 1993, and the report was officially released in October 1993.

The study, which suggests but does not conclude decisively that the embargo led to an increase in child deaths in Haiti, has been criticized by some health professionals in Haiti of being flawed because it was based on the study of a very small population (45,000). The report is far more cautious in its assessment than subsequent media reports of it and opinions suggest. Interpretation of the report and its eventual impact appear to have been defined by the highly politicized atmosphere at the time.43

43 Child impact assessments where sanctions are applied are called for in the UNICEF Anti-war Agenda and
When the Harvard team arrived in Haiti at the end of July, the Governor's Island agreement had just been signed. It was anticipated that the *de facto* government would cede authority and President Aristide would be back in Haiti by the end of October. The study would thus provide a means of assessing the damage done by the embargo that was lifted at the end of August and, at the same time, would propose a way forward for UNICEF's response. It was less a challenge to an existing embargo than an assessment of an embargo that many thought would have been lifted for good by the time the report was released. However, the picture had changed.

The release of the report coincided with the dramatic events of October 1993. The Harlan County incident and the assassination of President Aristide's justice minister, prompted the re-imposition of the oil embargo and a naval blockade. In this context, the on-going debate over the embargo intensified. With the collapse of the Governor's Island agreement, there was little confidence in any short term solution to Haiti's military and political dilemma. Consequently the constitutional government's call for complete embargo in order to bring down the *de facto* government was further reinforced. In this context any critique of the embargo was bound to be highly inflammatory and potentially taken as a sign of failing support for the constitutional government.

Yet the implications of the Harvard Study were more ominous with this second and far harsher embargo. From the perspective of those who opposed the embargo on moral grounds because of the corrosive effect on lives of the most vulnerable, it could only get worse.

Some critics maintain that UNICEF should never have made the study public at such a politically explosive time, and that its decision to do so made it more difficult for other UN organizations like WHO/PAHO to work with the constitutional government.

Two highly significant developments have been attributed in part to the report's release. One was the Humanitarian Fuel Programme which started in February 1994, an allotment of fuel rationed by international and government representatives for humanitarian purposes. The Programme was critical to maintenance of the international humanitarian effort in Haiti during 1994. The other was a massive infusion of US food aid which reportedly resulted in feeding up to one million people a day.44

It is difficult to assess the release of the Harvard Study as entirely good or entirely bad, but it is possible to say that it was a responsible decision taken in accord with UNICEF's larger strategic

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44 There were also, however, reports of poor targeting of these inputs. Internal UNICEF-Haiti correspondence, 11/11/1996, ref. no. PH17/96/2574
choice to honor its mandate. The decision to release the report in October, just days after the
imposition of a second embargo, is more difficult to judge. On purely moral grounds it was probably
the right thing to do at the time, and there are those, who were not part of the complicated political
dynamic between the UN agencies and either government, who felt that UNICEF should have
protested the embargo even more vigorously than it did. Had the Governor's Island agreement never
collapsed, it is quite possible that the study would have been met by moderate media coverage and
nowhere near the controversy that it ultimately received.

The controversy itself underlined the delicacy of UNICEF’s position as protector of
child rights in a context of international sanctions. It also highlights the extent to which
its leadership will be dependent on strong information and analysis to back such a
position.

3.5 Promoting the CRC:

Ratification & Political Parties’ Declaration (1993 & 1995)

Along with the vaccination campaigns during 1993, two UNICEF-supported events were most
commonly noted by those interviewed for this evaluation. These were the UNICEF-sponsored
gathering of mayors in December 1993 from which was issued a call for the speedy ratification of the
CRC (finally ratified by parliament in December 1994) and the assembly of political party leaders in
support of child welfare at the municipal and legislative elections in June 1995. These were intended
by the CO to raise child rights as a priority in an emerging democracy as well as to contribute to the
process of political reconciliation. Both events were of high political importance and have been
acknowledged as such by a number of those interviewed. However, neither has resulted in enough
perceptible progress for those who reacted with high expectations to the ratification of the CRC.

There is unanimous agreement that Haiti needs laws that identify and protect the rights of
children. There is divided opinion on whether the ratification of the CRC and subsequent gathering
of political parties came at the right time given the country’s uncertain political future and inability to
translate the symbolic promise of the Convention into an actual body of law enforceable by the
national justice system and various social services. By mid-1996, almost two years after the
ratification, very little progress had been made to that end. Child rights were briefly part of political
platforms in 1995, but have been forgotten in political developments since. This is a view that is
afforded only by hindsight. Thus it is not so much a criticism of what UNICEF did at the time.
Rather it reflects a feeling that subsequent events have prevented what were to have been galvanizing
symbolic events from having the impact that they might have had and that UNICEF and concerned
partners hoped they would have.

Despite the perception of some that UNICEF has not followed through sufficiently, a number
of things have been done. UNICEF’s major partner in the promotion of the Convention is
COHADDE, a network of more than 20 Haitian non-governmental organizations that work in child
health, education and welfare and are interested in the Convention because it promises to provide a
legal umbrella for their work. By the middle of 1996, UNICEF was supporting the development of a code of children's rights, and COHADDE was engaged in promoting the Convention in various ways. A Commission on Child Rights, fostered by UNICEF, had been created in the Chamber of Deputies of the Haitian Parliament, but it was too early to detect any real progress.

COHADDE’s directors expressed frustration that they had been unable to prompt much action from government. They noted that the majority of their member organizations still did not really understand what was in the Convention or what various articles implied for Haiti. A few NGO partners working in the area of children's rights have expressed their pessimism, noting that the Convention was itself highly significant, but that the lack of substantial follow up makes them wonder whether UNICEF is really serious about it. CO staff view this as an indication that, while they had achieved progress in follow-up, perhaps sufficient attention had not been given to activities of high visibility.45 One interviewee suggested the importance of mobilizing other international agencies and donors in addition to Haitian political parties in order to maintain pressure for follow-up action.46

In both of these cases, it was demonstrated that such visible symbolic events can raise high expectations among a very broad public. Consequently, there is a danger to focusing attention on UNICEF as a leader where follow-up depends on many more players. There is also a danger in raising expectations that can not be met by any of the parties involved. This points to the importance of matching mobilization with capacity building and empowerment of key strategic partners. It also highlights the importance of linking such events to a sustainable process with broad-based involvement of civil society.47

3.6 CONSOLIDATE PARTNERSHIPS & OPEN DIALOGUE WITH STATE (1995)
Unable to work directly with government ministries as partners during the crisis period, UNICEF had broadened its partnerships with NGOs. In 1995, the organization moved to consolidate these partnerships and at the same time opened collaboration with the ministries of the new government.

45 Group interview, UNICEF-Haiti professional staff, September 11, 1996.

46 Interview, Evans Paul, former Mayor of Port-au-Prince, August 26, 1996.

47 This coincides with recent remarks by former member of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Thomas Hammarburg, on the potential of the reporting process to the Committee as a mechanism for rallying interest and provoking debate. This places importance not on the report, but on the process. Remarks at a meeting with UNICEF staff, November 14, 1996.
This was both a political and a management necessity. UNICEF was spending too much of its time and resources responding to the myriad demands for assistance, the majority leading to ad hoc response rather than steps toward building coherent programs for the future.

UNICEF also needed to support the new government in the fulfillment of its responsibilities for follow-up to the CRC. The government had been severely weakened by the crisis, and had lost the confidence of NGOs and much of the population. This was true despite the fact that there was greater faith in the Preval government elected in 1995 than there had been for any one previously, with the exception of the Aristide government. Taking on this supporting role did not come without problems. Response by the new government on some issues has been slowed by the process of re-establishing itself, which in turn, one way or another, has blocked progress on some activities for UNICEF.

It is perhaps significant of the success of UNICEF in building relationships in both private and public sectors, that now, in the context of transition, UNICEF is seen by NGOs to have a major role to play in bringing NGOs and government together. As there are tensions around the workings of this relationship, this will require a delicate performance by UNICEF. This is a role which UNICEF should cultivate to great advantage, strengthening State structures’ ability to maximize civil society participation for the benefit of women and children.

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48 Workshop with selected UNICEF NGO partners, September 4, 1996.
4. Programme evolution and outcome
The key strategic decisions discussed above, combined with shifts in the political context in Haiti, together formed the parameters within which UNICEF programmes have evolved.

Over the four and a half year period under study, the CO went through five major planning exercises, as well as three joint efforts to produce the *UN/OAS Consolidated Humanitarian Plan of Action*, in March, 1993, as well as the UN/IDB *Emergency Economic Recovery Programme* (EERP), Haiti, and the *Emergency Programme Towards the Alleviation of Poverty: Bridging Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction*, both at the end of 1994 (the latter based very much on the *UNICEF Bridging Programme, 1995-97*). Of the UNICEF planning exercises, only the *Bridging Programme* was carried out with a government counterpart, and even then consultation with the constitutional government through 1994 was very limited. In the course of this process, significant changes were adopted in an attempt to respond to the worsening situation of women and children in Haiti.

This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of UNICEF programme response. It provides a basic descriptive analysis of what UNICEF did as a background for following chapters. This section is divided into two parts. The first presents a synthesis of the UNICEF programme tracing changes in programme orientation through a descriptive analysis of overall and specific programme objectives and strategies. The second part summarizes programme outcome, examining outcome for women and children as well as other key achievements.

(Analysis of various sectoral programmes and a summary of different programming documents is contained in Appendix F. There is some overlap, though more specific details are found in the Appendix, including challenges which the programmes face in the future.)

4.1 Programme Orientation
The number of programming shifts, weak documentation and the weight of external factors affecting programme implementation in Haiti, make it difficult to represent simply what UNICEF set out to do. The actual as opposed to planned evolution of programmes is often apparent only through a juxtaposition of programme proposals and activities undertaken. In some instances intended projects and activities originally proposed were entirely dropped or not followed through on, changing very much the picture of what UNICEF was doing. In general, the selection of programmes and activities by the CO has moved towards a more coherent strategy designed to provide a stable base for programme response in crisis as well as in a context of transition to democracy. This reorientation is still in process.

4.1.1 Overall Objectives
At the beginning of 1992, the thrust of UNICEF programmes was unclear. The 1990-1995 Country Programme was set aside and replaced by the *Special Emergency and Humanitarian Appeal* of February 1992. This included no overall objective. In its absence, there was a ensemble of basic
programme objectives in traditional emergency sectors – health, nutrition, and water and environmental sanitation (WES). These were carried out by the County Office in isolation, through direct delivery, principally of basic drugs.

It was not until after the arrival of a new Representative and Programme Officer that the Outline Emergency Programme was produced in November 1993. In it a clear overall objective was formulated: "to help alleviate human suffering by providing basic services to the target population...". It was at this stage that a two-pronged approach was introduced in programme documents, addressing immediate basic needs “while creating the basis for longer term development in the social sector, especially attempting to increase local communities capacities.”

This balance of emergency and long-term objectives was further developed in documents produced in 1994, which stated objectives as follows:

- To contribute to stopping, and then reversing, the trends towards deterioration in the status of children, through direct sectoral intervention and through advocacy;
- To promote respect for child rights and the Women’s Charter at all levels of society;
- To strengthen the ability of community organizations to, in the short term, respond more adequately to needs of the country’s women and children and develop greater preparedness at the community level, and, in the medium and long term, to develop the ability to identify, analyze and act on community problems, insisting on their right to locally managed services and to democratic participation in society;
- To reinforce local public institutions, thus enabling them to realize their role as effective coordinators of participatory community development.

This latest formulation of the overall objectives provided a clearer framework for UNICEF programme strategies. Strengthening of CBOs was elevated as an objective which defined the orientation of the office, while at the same time was promoted in practical terms through a Community Organization Project. It is referred to as the spearhead of UNICEF programmes in Haiti, designed to provide a stable base for action, even in a context of political instability or crisis. Community-based organizations also represent one of the CO’s key potential partners and are discussed in greater detail under Chapter 6.

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4.1.2 Preparedness Planning

The early absence of objectives and gradual evolution to a coherent overall orientation, are reflective very much of the degree of preparedness of the CO. Despite years of instability preceding the September 1991 coup d’etat, there appears to have been no preparedness planning by the CO going into the crisis. The preparation of the strategy note for the Country Programme Recommendation 1990-1995 (CPR) reportedly included discussion of alternative scenarios in a volatile political context. However, sound analysis was not evident in the CO’s subsequent lack of direction and the radical decision to act in isolation in 1991 and early 1992.

Emergency preparedness planning clearly strengthened in late 1993 and 1994, particularly in preparation for the possible invasion of UN military forces. The 1994 plan which included political analysis of alternative scenarios and an outline of basic response options, including a cholera management plan, was reportedly the first of its kind in UNICEF.

However, since 1994, despite recent unrest and concern outside UNICEF as to the vulnerability of the situation when the UNMIH leaves, the office has not updated more programme specific planning for alternative scenarios. When questioned about preparedness planning, CO staff frequently referred to general exhaustion after the political crisis period and/or demonstrated a strong focus on the gradual strengthening of democracy. The latter was echoed by some members of UNICEF headquarters staff.

It is understandable that, in formal UNICEF programme documents, planning for a worst case scenario of breakdown in democratic order would be a sensitive issue with the newly returned constitutional government. Even the 1994 contingency planning exercise was undertaken with limited staff involvement due to the heightened political tensions and personal stress within the office.

It is also true that the current programme strategy based on strengthening CBOs is designed to eventually facilitate transition to democratic participation in local management as well as preparedness for emergency. The range of NGO partnerships also provide an element of flexibility. However, as is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, in practice, both of these strategies require

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51 The term preparedness planning is used here in a very broad sense, well beyond the limited logistics and supply focus traditionally associated with emergencies. It includes broad programme planning for scenarios, for which each sector may include contingency plans, as well as covering management issues such as security, human resources, office systems, etc. This should ideally include longer term strategies for the best scenarios as well as triggers for identifying transition points for programmes and operations.

52 Interview, Officers, UNICEF NY, Latin America Desk, September 27, 1996.

53 Interview, Former Deputy Director, UNICEF NY, EMOPS, 3 October, 1996.

54 Interview, Officers, UNICEF NY, Latin America Desk, September 27, 1996.
further development. CBOs are reportedly at a very weak level of development.\textsuperscript{55} The different NGO partners offer varying operational potential, particularly in the case of a crisis situation. Limitations for both partnership strategies are equally as valid when considering a response to political crisis or natural disaster. As these partnership strategies point to a fairly sophisticated level of response, beyond supply oriented contingency lists, analysis of options according to different scenarios must also be sophisticated, taking into consideration a realistic assessment of new partners’ capacities.

However, despite the orientation of partnership strategies towards preparedness for sudden changes in the Haiti context, the CO seems prepared, above all, for a continuation of the status quo. The CO risks falling into routines, which leave it ill-prepared for change.

Some mechanism must be found which facilitates the CO to regularly revisit preparedness planning, in a way that is appropriate to high stress political and military emergencies as well as tentative transition to democracy. Emergency preparedness planning, often associated only with logistical preparations, must be translated into flexible planning for different scenarios within a well-framed programme.

4.1.3 Geographic scope
The geographic scope of the programme has largely remained the same throughout this period, balancing national level programme activities with area-based programmes. Since the CPR for 1990-1995, the latter have targeted the urban slums of Port-au-Prince and the south-eastern Leogane and Grand Goave areas. Activities under the Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) Programme were undertaken in the North-West Department, the region most affected by desertification and drought, and generally qualified as the poorest served.\textsuperscript{56} This later became a target area for other basic services. The Appeal, in February, 1992, had proposed a broader scope of action through the appointment of Resident Project Officers in four locations around the country though this was not executed.

During the crisis, under the focus on emergency basic needs, the decision to carry on working in Grand Goave/Leogane might be questioned. Poverty in this area is significantly less extreme than in the North West. The decision appears to be a continuation of a historical presence dating before the 1990-1995 CPR. More recently it is justified as an area with a wealth of CBOs to develop as partners.

\textsuperscript{55}The staff member who prepared the proposal for reorienting the community organization strategy rated most of the community groups at an average of 3 out of 10, with 10 being the equivalent of an organization in the highest phase of development where action in the interest of the broader community can reasonably be undertaken. Interview, Programme Staff, UNICEF-Haiti, August 28, 1996.

\textsuperscript{56}OAS/UN, Consolidated Humanitarian Plan of Action (March 1993).
In actual practice, security and logistical constraints have often been more important in deciding the scope of activities. ‘National’ programmes were quite limited from 1992 to 1994. In the absence of a government counterpart, activity was generally carried out where willing and seemingly reliable partners could be found. In addition, due to insecurity and staff mobility, programme operation was constrained to Port-au-Prince in the period after the Governor’s Island Accord, from October 1993 to April 1994. This also affected rural area based programmes.

4.1.4 Overview of Programme Strategies
The shifts in overall objectives outlined above were echoed by corresponding changes in programme strategies. These changes came about more slowly over the crisis period, often blocked by changes in the Haiti context. The gradual adjustments in programme strategy over the crisis years were then much more formalized by the restructuring of sectoral divisions and reorientation of projects contained in the 1995-1997 Bridging Programme. Table 1 outlines these structural changes. The evolution of each of the major programmes to their current orientation is traced below.

The Health Programme shifted from a vertical programme at the beginning of the crisis to an integrated and decentralized approach to management of child and maternal health and nutrition. This corresponded to a gradual move away from a supply focus, which had included rehabilitation of health facilities and the cold chain, to an increased involvement in training and policy development, particularly with the current promotion of the Bamako Initiative.

In the context of the crisis, UNICEF involvement in AIDS interventions was reduced to the provision of solo-shot syringes. In 1995, AIDS-related training was reintroduced at the primary health care level in area based services. A reproductive health/STDs/AIDS project is currently being implemented in the Far Northwest with plans to train 350 TBAs.

For the Nutrition facet of the Programme, while objectives remained comparable, the orientation and the analysis behind nutrition-related activities changed. Programme documents in 1992 proposed addressing malnutrition through activities related to food supply: community kitchens managed by women’s groups, distribution of food supplements to pre-schools, and broader distribution of food supplements. In 1993, this moved towards a focus on micronutrients, immunization and CDD. From 1994, the promotion of exclusive breastfeeding for children aged 0 to 6 months was added. The

57 Staff mobility was restricted under the phase IV security ranking, as determined by UN security.

58 The annual report suggests that only the latter of these activities was ever executed.
reorientation was based on analysis of available data which showed strongly the importance of
disease and low breast-feeding rates in the nutrition profile of under fives.

During the crisis and still today, there is also strong evidence that food security issues remain
a significant factor in malnutrition (see Appendix D). However, particularly after the October 1993
reinforcement of sanctions and dissemination of the Harvard study discussed in Chapter 3, an influx
of food aid through other organizations justified the UNICEF focus on disease-related factors.
Reportedly from 1995, UNICEF and PAHO/WHO began working with NGOs to improve targeting
of food aid, thus focusing on both facets of the nutrition problem. In area-based programmes,
curative interventions continue in the form of 12-day nutrition education and wet feeding programmes
(foyés de demonstration nutritionelle) organized in communities with the involvement of mothers or
caregivers in food preparation and with close supervision of weight gain.\textsuperscript{59}

Table 1: Changes in Programme Structure 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme structure prior to 1995</th>
<th>Structure in Bridging Programme 1995-97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health/nutrition</td>
<td>Health Nutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· EPI</td>
<td>· Management of the Sick Child</td>
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<tr>
<td>· CDD</td>
<td>· Maternal Health Care</td>
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<tr>
<td>· ARI/AIDS/malaria</td>
<td>· Nutrition</td>
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<td>· Nutrition</td>
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<td>WES</td>
<td>WES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education/Women</td>
<td>Women/Community Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>· Konesans Fanmi</td>
<td>· Strengthening Community Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Adult literacy</td>
<td>· Credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Preschool</td>
<td>· Supporting policy development for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDC</td>
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</table>

The WES Programme has remained with essentially the same overall objectives throughout
the period under study, focusing on increasing access to water and sanitation in rural and urban areas

\textsuperscript{59}Where possible, this also coincided with distribution of Akamil, a food supplement, for dry rations.
through service delivery, particularly support to construction of systems. Interventions differed for rural and urban area-based programmes, the former based on the more typical use of hand-pumps and VIP latrines, the latter involving the construction of water tanks, contracting with water trucks, paving for drainage and distribution of tools for garbage collection and disposal. During the time of the de facto government, WES activities were largely limited to repairs to water systems and direct delivery of water in urban areas in order to maintain levels of access to water.

All area-based programmes involved the formation of community management committees for water resources. The WES staff have begun to strengthen this facet of the programme. 1995 saw the introduction of support to a unit in the Service National d’Eau Potable (SNEP) to ensure training and monitoring of community water management committees. Currently, a new approach, taking from the work in the Community Organization Programme, is being proposed to ensure a greater community commitment and involvement in water projects. At the same time, the WES team has set the stage for a reorientation of UNICEF away from support to infrastructure construction, particularly in sanitation. A proposal has been prepared which underlines the questionable impact which constructing latrines has on hygiene and sanitation conditions.60

The Communication/CRC Programme did not exist in 1992, but was introduced in the Bridging Programme 1995-1997. Two of its projects, CEDC and Konesans Fanmi, existed in the CPR 1990-1995. Konesans Fanmi, the key advocacy and communications programme for parental education on child care, was previously an adjunct to the Education Programme. It has continued throughout the crisis as a vehicle for health education.

Given significant increases in numbers of street children and child domestic labourers during the crisis, one of the survival strategies for poor families, basic services for this group could have been an area for greater focus earlier during the crisis. These activities remained small-scale or corresponded to ad hoc supply requests throughout much of the crisis. While ad hoc response to requests for supplies continues, staff have begun to reorient resources to provide technical training to NGO partners, foster innovative response to identified problems such as child prisoners and foster the development of networks.

The introduction of advocacy activities related to the CRC perhaps provided a clear vehicle and a new orientation for both the CEDC and Konesans Fanmi projects. Advocacy around the CRC had begun before the coup d’état. A group of children supported by COHADDE and UNICEF presented a declaration calling for the early ratification of the CRC to President Aristide in June of 1991. This was followed up more concretely with the assembly of mayors in 1993 and the

ratification of the CRC in 1994 immediately after the return of President Aristide. This has continued with a number of advocacy and capacity building activities as mentioned in Chapter 3.

The Education Programme was originally linked to the Women’s Programme and the advocacy and communications projects Konesans Fanmi. The Bridging Programme indicated a clear refocusing of the Education Programme on two axes: strengthening the quality of primary education and the development of flexible alternative education programmes suitable to increase access to primary education for children in especially difficult circumstances, particularly street children, children in domestic labour and over-age children without education. The latter built on the development of non-formal education initiated in 1993 with a basic study, a seminar and the development of a non-formal education curriculum. These do not appear to have moved very far forward as yet.

In 1995, the Education Programme still included activities in pre-school education and adult literacy training, as defined in the CPR 1990-1995, as well as the sponsoring of school children adopted in 1994. UNICEF support was very much supply oriented and largely unsustainable, without significant contribution to longer term objectives or a clear link to the situation analysis which showed limited access and high inefficiency at the primary school level. Support to pre-school and adult literacy programmes included everything from provision of office supplies, furniture and teaching materials to payment of salaries. In 1994 and 1995 support was provided through Fond de Parrainage National to sponsor over 6000 children to attend primary school (600 in 1994 and 5985 in 1995). While not sustainable, many of these activities were feasible and tangible in the context of the crisis and early transition with new or established partners. It was reported by several UNICEF staff that the sponsoring of school children possibly contributed to building good relations with the elected government at the return of President Aristide, as it was a very visible demonstration of support.61

While the increase in street children and child domestic labourers appears to have provoked the office to carry out studies and begin preparation for education programme design in 1993, little was reported in terms of concrete activities. This would perhaps have been a more appropriate focus for executing even basic supply activities during crisis, than literacy or preschool education.

UNICEF has provided strategically important support to the Ministry of Education on the development of a National Education Plan, which was initiated with the constitutional government even during the crisis period.

The evolution of the **Women’s Programme** is less evident in CO documents produced during the crisis phase as the programme did not fall within the definition of humanitarian assistance. It was originally designed in the *CPR 1990-1995* with a Women in Development (WID) approach typical of UNICEF programming at the time. The Programme was presented in the CPR as having two axes: policy development to foster women’s organizations from national to local levels, as well as specific programme intervention to improve women’s health -- associated mostly with maternal health and to a lesser extent nutrition -- and economic status.\(^{62}\)

Under the first axis, activities have included advocacy for national level policy development as well as fostering the formation of women’s organizations at national and local levels. This included the formation of a consortium of women’s organizations in the *Alliance des Femmes Haïtiennes* (AFHA), bringing together 42 organizations, which eventually floundered. Its failure has been attributed alternately to political infighting or the lack of a commonly perceived *raison d’être*.

As for second axis of practical programme interventions, this has evolved primarily focusing on improving economic status through small income-generating projects, while any objectives of improving women’s health status have been followed through under the Health Programme’s maternal health project (from 1993).

In 1995, a Women’s Empowerment Project and the Community Organization Project were joined together in one Programme. This and the gradual evolution of the Community Organization Project have lead to a reorientation of income-generating micro-projects which now are intended to serve as a stage in strengthening community-based organizations.

The **Community Organization Project**, as mentioned above, was a starting point for an eventual partnership strategy. Working with CBOs had been part of the area-based Programme from the original *CPR 1990-1995*. During the crisis, UNICEF incorporated the community organization approach in the overall objective. By the last stages of the crisis the UNICEF programme strategy had evolved to identify CBOs as potential islands of stability in the midst of a collapsed or ousted State. The objectives suggested a strategy for building anew from the base with short-term possibilities for involvement of communities in humanitarian assistance delivery and eventually for local level preparedness against sudden impacts of crisis.

Within the Community Organization Project, this proposal has been taken a step further within the last year. Staff have mapped out the development stages of CBOs, corresponding to the organization's capacity to respond to individual members' needs, to the needs of the group and eventually to those of the broader community. Staff also refer to an approach balancing work at the level of the small 'base groups' with work strengthening associations and eventually federations of

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CBOs. This approach is intended to build the link between communities and local institutions in the management of local level development.

The Community Organization Project has thus been designed as the link across sectoral projects. It also has adopted a focus on women. This meant working not only with women’s organizations, but with broader community-based organizations in rural and urban areas. By focusing on women's organizations and reinforcing women's place in broader CBOs, this strategy intends to correct a gender imbalance in local participation and decision-making.

While the orientation of the Community Organization Project has become very innovative, developing essentially as a community organization partnership strategy, activities undertaken have been restricted largely to the project level. This is discussed in greater detail under Chapter 6.

Finally, numerous options for monitoring have been included in successive programme documents though little has been realized. There was an additional Planning and Monitoring Project proposed in the Bridging Programme 1995-1997 to strengthen planning and monitoring capacities of local institutions including Municipalities, Haitian NGOs and local organizations and associations. It has not been executed. The consequent weakness in information planning is discussed in Chapter 5.

4.2. PROGRAMME OUTCOME
As outlined in the Introduction, achievements of UNICEF programmes over the period are difficult to measure. In this section, the focus is on outcomes for women and children. It is based on key programme output indicators, cross-checked with information collected in interview in sites. The latter does more to inform us about potential outcomes based on the match between programmes and coping and survival strategies explored. It necessarily focuses on larger segments of UNICEF programmes.

In addition to outcomes for women and children, the CO can also claim key achievements which are related to strategic positioning of the organization and advocacy. Particularly given the politicization of humanitarian assistance at the time, these lay the basis for future benefits for women and children.

4.2.1 Nutrition & Health
Benefits of UNICEF intervention in the area of nutrition are difficult to interpret. Malnutrition increased over the period of the crisis as shown in Section 2.2 Situation of Women and Children. People interviewed by the Evaluation Team in the field repeatedly confirmed trends of increase in malnutrition at the time of the crisis. However, this does not tell us what would have been the case without intervention.
With regard to disease-related malnutrition, the most tangible benefits received by children were vaccination and distribution of vitamin supplements. Measles immunization levels had dropped dramatically in 1992 and a measles epidemic continued through to January 1994. The UNICEF-coordinated immunization campaigns in 1993, 1994-1995, executed in partnership with PAHO and NGOs, as well as with selected mayors offices in the 1993 campaign, did produce results as shown below in Figure 2. Following the crisis, in a five-month campaign from November 1994 to July 1995, 2.78 million children were vaccinated against measles. This was reported by the Ministry of Health to correspond to 95% measles vaccination coverage, though inaccurate population data makes this difficult to confirm.

Parallel to measles vaccination 1.6 million vitamin A supplements were distributed and under fives in the same group were vaccinated against polio.

**Figure 2:** U1 immunization coverage by antigen, 1992-1994.

In addition, coordinated with wide promotion of feeding for children months. This did reach communities. behaviour and children’s nutritional has not yet been though sentinel should provide such future. Some NGO suggests high breastfeeding rates (90%) though actual provided to the Team, and figures

One of the possible constraints to behaviour change and quality child care will be the importance of commercial activities among women and the practice of leaving babies with other

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63 Reference in internal correspondence UNICEF-Haiti, 11 November 1996, ref. no. PH17/96/2574.
mothers. As detailed in Appendix D, commercial activity is the privileged strategy for increasing cash income and is only abandoned when a family no longer has even minimal disposable income.

The outcome of UNICEF investment in basic drugs, including ORS for curative care, may be difficult to judge. UNICEF did maintain drug supplies available, through PROMESS, during the crisis. Problems of affordability of health services have been outlined in Chapter 2. It can be expected that where UNICEF resources focused on delivery of basic drugs through the more expensive hospitals and clinics, fewer people potentially benefitted during the crisis. Poorer families, particularly those where women were no longer able to buy and sell products for commerce, would likely be excluded from such services still today. This is particularly true where the cost of drugs is included in the higher cost for consultation. On the whole however, the cost of drugs distributed through health agents and at rally posts appeared to be generally quite low, though the supplies available to health agents -- mostly ORS and chloroquine -- were reported as irregular.  

UNICEF was also involved to a limited extent in supporting curative feeding programmes. Akamil, a food supplement prepared with WFP supplied ingredients, was produced locally with UNICEF support and distributed under UNICEF management. It was distributed throughout the crisis to health centres and wet-feeding programmes in Port-au-Prince. This continues still today and is extended to other zones where area-based programmes operate -- Grand Goave/Leogane and NW. However, health personnel interviewed in two field sites reported that food supplements often had limited effect on nutrition status of targeted children. They reported that either families shared the food supplement among the whole family or compensated non-targeted family members in distribution of other foods, the malnourished child therefore remaining with the same or similar food intake. This highlights the need for coordination with food distribution programmes.

In 1995, using the model of foyer de demonstration nutritionelle, based in community homes, reportedly 90% of discharged children continued to gain weight two weeks after leaving the programme and 79% continued to do so three months after discharge.

The above mentioned results indicate far reaching benefits for children’s health and nutrition status throughout Haiti through immunization and vitamin A distribution. UNICEF was certainly not sole contributor but was an important catalyst and contributed an important part of the supplies necessary to achieve these results. Other interventions may have produced less clear-cut results. Affordability of health services and drugs must be further investigated.

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64 Observations of the auditors in 1994 still hold true; the same drugs provided free of charge by UNICEF are also sometimes purchased and sold from other sources, with irregular systems of registering different supplies. UNICEF is reportedly in negotiations with PROMESS, the central drug distribution organization supported jointly with PAHO, over these issues.
In the area of nutrition, the challenge for UNICEF will not necessarily be to take on more programmes, but to obtain local analysis of the nutrition profile in the poorest areas, determining the relative importance of food security and disease, and to coordinate interventions with organizations addressing food security where appropriate. (The “food-supported MCH” currently proposed for 1997 could achieve this.)

4.2.2 WES

Calculations for beneficiaries for UNICEF WES activities are complicated by different reporting over the 1992-1995 period and are based on estimates of catchment populations for different water systems. In Port-au-Prince, at least 8 water reservoirs or holding tanks were constructed or rehabilitated between 1992 and 1994. Populations benefitting from water trucked in to 17 slums in Port-au-Prince varied between 50,000 in 1992 and 150,000 in 1994, returning to 50,000 in 1995. This number has reduced since 1995 as management has been transferred to community committees and difficulties in strengthening these committees has lead to irregular service.

Calculations for beneficiary populations in rural areas were not consistently made, though activity levels clearly jumped as funding and mobility improved with the end of the crisis. In 1992, 30 different medium to small-scale water systems were installed or repaired. Over the 1993-1994 period over 20 large water systems or reservoirs and 14 smaller water pumps were repaired or installed. In 1995, over 104 water systems were reported repaired or installed, as well as 3 large systems and 13 mini-adduction systems benefitting roughly 110,000 people.

Of these activities, a good proportion have been shown to produce results. Despite difficulties in strengthening community water management committees, a 1994 evaluation found that 71% of pumps installed since 1983 by the SNEP and NGO partners, were still functioning and 66% of community committees were still in existence.65

Beneficiary populations did perceive benefit from water systems. Interviewees repeatedly reported reduction in disease incidence in Gros Morne/Grand Plaine. It is uncertain whether poorer families were or are excluded from services. During the crisis, in urban zones, financing of water distribution was managed with minimal cost-recovery, keeping prices at pre-crisis levels. In rural zones, where cost recovery was practiced, calculations suggest that for the estimated 70% of families which live on an income of 10 gourdes per day, adequate water could cost 10% of family income. Adjustments were made in cost-recovery systems during the crisis to pardon the cost for poor families, though these were not systematic.

UNICEF investment in sanitation activities has benefitted fewer people. VIPP latrines constructed since 1992, benefit roughly 3,367 families, with an additional 18 communities benefitting communal sanitation constructions undertaken. A recent survey in one rural area revealed among other key findings that 83% of children having access to latrines defecate in the yard or garden. This clearly questions the impact of investment in latrines for sanitation. Possibly more cost-effective was distribution of tools to assist in dealing with garbage and drainage problems in urban slums, where sanitation severely deteriorated during the crisis.

While the outcome of UNICEF sanitation activities can be judged with difficulty, the CO did contribute to providing basic water services. This was particularly evident in urban areas, where climbing prices would have otherwise left families with impossible choices between adequate food and water or displacement from cities. It is not clear, however, to what degree affordability restricted and continues to restrict the benefits of water systems or delivery among poorest families.

4.2.3 Community organization/women
As UNICEF resources dedicated to Community Organization and Women's Programmes were only a small proportion of the total, outcome was correspondingly limited. Work with CBOs was largely focused on providing credit or grants for small income-generating projects, though most of this took place in the early part of the crisis. Between 1990 and October 1994, 48 community organizations were provided with credit though only 6 of those received support after the coup d'état. Work since the crisis has focused more on the reorientation of the community organization programme.

Based on field interviews, the credit for women traders appears to have had a clear role in increasing income and thus protecting food security for families who had sufficient available cash to engage in some minimum level of trade. Trade was a key coping strategy which such families protected.

However, by the design of the credit programme, with the exception of a minority of beneficiaries in Port-au-Prince, those who did not have enough disposable income to engage in trade were excluded. It is not clear what proportion of the population would be excluded from the programme in different regions. The importance of commercial activities to food security among poorest households was clearly observed in the Communal Section of Meyer, in the hills of the Grand Goave/Leogane area, whereas in Gros Morne, just south of North West Department a far

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67 This targeting of credit programmes is entirely consistent with international experience which suggests better success rates where beneficiaries have experience and skill in business.
greater proportion of the population had already abandoned commercial activities for more basic survival strategies. Further research would be required to fully understand limitations on this strategy in urban settings, as well as the effectiveness of credit in the few cases where beneficiaries had not previously been engaged in trade.

The potential exclusion of the poor families without the available cash to trade is of differing relevance depending on the intention behind credit activities: to improve women’s health status through economic advancement as suggested in the 1990-1995 CPR,\textsuperscript{68} to serve in the process of building CBOs,\textsuperscript{69} or to provide economic advancement for women as protection against food insecurity (as might be expected given the situation analysis of women and children in Haiti) or simply as a means of achieving wealth. The ideal target group for credit activities and even the appropriateness of the choice to focus on credit for women, in the context of a crisis or in the current transition period, depends on the objective behind improving economic status.

\textit{Even where credit programmes are used as a stage in strengthening base groups as a process to building CBOs, the effect on participation of the poorer families in eventual CBOs must be carefully studied. It is clear that credit programmes cannot be applied to similar effect in all regions and the CO must obtain adequate information on the population which is potentially excluded. There is also need for a careful analysis and clear decision on the broader issue of targeting the poorest of the poor and correspondingly a decision on the intention and appropriateness of the credit programme.}

4.2.4 Other Key Achievements

There are a number of key achievements of the CO during this period which are less tangible though no less important in the long-term. The most significant of these achievements are the following:

- By the return of Aristide in 1994, the CO had positioned itself as a participant in policy development fora in key sectors including Health, notably on the introduction of the Bamako Initiative, WES through the establishment of community organization unit within the SNEP, and Education where UNICEF was involved in the development of the National Education Plan. Within the Education sector, UNICEF's sponsoring of over 6000 children for at least one year of education (cumulative figures 1994 and 1995) was considered by the CO to have been significant in restoring relations with the Constitutional Government, and allowing the organization to have a positive role for the above mentioned policy development.


\textsuperscript{69}Section Habilitation des Femmes/Organization Communautaire, Proposition de Plan d’Orientation , Projet Femmes/Organization Communautaire Grand-Goave et Port-au-Prince. 1996
· After a difficult start, a recent critical analysis of UNICEF’s community organization project allowed the development of a coherent promising approach to working with CBOs, laying the basis for local level partnerships.

· The CRC was ratified in 1994, among the first acts of the newly returned constitutional government.

· The Haitian Coalition for the Defence of Child Rights (COHADDE), an umbrella organization for the promotion of child rights was formed in 1991. The coalition still requires strengthening, with better focus on action (discussed in Chapter 3).

· The Political Parties Declaration on Child Rights was signed by all but one of the active political parties on May 12, preceding the 1995 elections, following a one-day Symposium to analyze and discuss issues around Child Rights. The timing of the latter has been criticized by some key actors as was discussed in Chapter 3.

While all of the above can be considered achievements, some have had mixed follow through. Nonetheless, each signifies an opening for UNICEF programmes in the phase of transition.
5. Challenges in Implementation

In examining UNICEF programmes in Haiti, a number of key conditioning factors were identified as difficulties or challenges for the CO at different times in the period under study. These are grouped as follows:

- internal management response as a support to programme operations;
- key cross-cutting strategies and activities which also conditioned UNICEF response;
- competing priorities around meeting immediate basic needs.

5.1 MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

In addition to programme design, the actual implementation was conditioned by internal UNICEF decisions on management response. This chapter focuses on how UNICEF’s management at all levels supported programme response to the Haiti Country Office and the emergency in the country.

5.1.1 Fundraising

The funding situation in the first two years following the coup d’etat was difficult. This corresponded to a first period of uncertainty over the position the international community regarding the coup d’etat, followed by the imposition of the first embargo. The OAS and UN prepared a joint appeal in 1993. However, given the strong stand on the embargo, the appeal was quietly circulated and yielded little in the way of money. At that time the CO did receive funds through the Emergency Programme Fund in 1993.

Following the renewed embargo in late 1993 and the release of the Harvard Study, *Sanctions in Haiti* detailing the negative effects of the embargo on the population, more funding was available. The office was later able to host two Good Will Ambassadors -- one Japanese and one American -- the former raising a total of US$2.5 million. Funding jumped from US$3.2 million in 1992 to close to US$12 million in 1996 (Table 2 shows trends through to 1995).

**Table 2: Funding by sector, 1992-1995**

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Health

- Emergency MH927: 354.7 7.4 0 0
- National YH901/1995-YH501: 700.9 1206.5 1055.7 2096.9
- Urban ZH911: 59.3 9 0 0
- Rural ZH921: 97.3 2.2 0 0
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<td><strong>Community organization/advocacy (after 1995 Community organization/women)</strong></td>
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<td>424.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5103.3</td>
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<td>7983.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9773.8</td>
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5.1.2 Staffing structure

In part prompted by funding, staffing levels have varied somewhat throughout the period. After her arrival, the new Representative took advantage of the 1994-1995 biennium global reduction in personnel to downsize the office and, therefore, increase its throughput. The Table 3 gives an indication of staffing levels as requested by the CO, as approved and received (in the 1996-1997 biennium the proposed versus actual situation is given). As can be seen, staffing levels were stable until the 1994-1995 biennium when the Programme staff’s throughput was US $ 459,733 per officer. With increased funding which rose to close to US$ 12 million in 1996, the Program’s throughput per officer is US$ 571,429, an amount exceeding the global norm. A request was made for an increase in the number of Programme staff, but was turned down due to procedural reasons. As a result, the office has had to rely increasingly on temporary staff, even for the Community Organization Project, intended as the spearhead for the office’s work, which has been developed principally by staff on 11-month contracts. Such limitations could threaten this key strategy of the overall programme, for which continuity and sustained effort are required as is further discussed in Chapter 6. Staffing procedures have at least not facilitated a fluid adaptation by the CO to a changing situation.

However, the staffing structure as proposed by the CO in the Country Programme Management Plan, 1995-1997 (CPMP) also reveals certain inconsistencies between human resources allocations and the comparative importance of programme activities (See Figure 2). The document proposed that the entire Women/Community Organization Programme, including the pivotal Community Organization Project along with other national policy level activities, was to be executed by two national project assistants (NOB) under a national project officer at the NOC level. Given the level of innovation and strategic vision required in the Community Organization Project, particularly at the field level, and the problems encountered thus far (as is discussed more in Chapter 6), it is not clear that the proposed structure, currently filled with temporary staff, is adequate.

Similarly, it is also worth noting that the new monitoring and evaluation officer position, filled by an international professional officer (level P3) until 1993, was proposed in 1995-1997 CPMP at the most junior national professional level, NOA. Given the considerable innovation required, particularly in monitoring of the general situation of women and children (see section 5.2.3 of this chapter), it is unlikely that needs would have been met, even had this post been filled.

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70 The request was reportedly turned down because the Haiti CO was not due to present its CPR to the Executive Board before 1997.
Table 3: Staffing levels requested, approved and received, 1990-1997

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<td>Prop'd</td>
<td>Appr'd</td>
<td>Prop'd</td>
<td>Appr'd</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programme &amp; Representation: international posts</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program: national posts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNVs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-total Programme &amp; Representation</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations: UNVs</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-total Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While levels were adequate through the emergency period, the decision not to allocate staff to M&E activities did contribute to the office’s weakness in this area. Subsequently, through a combination of inflexibility of the organization internationally and a possible underestimation by the CO on some human resources demands, the CO currently appears to have less than adequate staffing levels.

5.1.3 Human resources support
Equally as important to human resources capacity of the CO has been the degree of support and motivation by the organization.

While the situation in Haiti did not break down to civil war, CO staff were under constant stress. Political divisions in the country were echoed among national staff. The 1992 Audit Report
underlined major changes necessary in operations. The office was overstaffed initially. Programmes were also in upheaval in 1992 as has been discussed above. Only one international staff member (who arrived at the end of 1993) had any previous emergency experience, and her experience was specific to large-scale natural disaster. Non-essential staff were evacuated in October 1993 for six weeks and families were evacuated for a year. CO staff reported a sense of isolation vis-a-vis UNICEF headquarters and the regional office, having received five visits during the political crisis period prior to the invasion of the US-lead Multi-national Forces (as is discussed in more detail under section 5.1.5).

The CO did undertake a number of activities focusing on countering stress and improving office moral. In 1992, when the Representative arrived, she commissioned a study on the office’s human resources in response to evident tensions. Subsequently office management organized a workshop to help staff manage stress. However, no serious follow-up and counselling could be offered to the staff, with the result that stress in the office reportedly increased.

Staff morale was improved through involvement in preparing the Country Programme Management Plan in November 1994, allowing staff to see with much more transparency what the future held for them. Activities around the Management Excellence Programme (MEP) were also initiated. These have had the tremendous effect of leading staff to hold elections for Staff Organization, defunct for 18 months. For the past year or so, the CO’s management has put in place a Country Management Team approach to solving problems. This has reportedly increased staff morale.

Morale was particularly low for national staff during the crisis. This was attributed to differences in treatment of national and international staff. The CO did manage to provide hazard pay for the national staff, as for international staff. One national officer, whose life was reportedly at risk, was included in the evacuation of international staff members to Dominican Republic in 1994. However, the limitations on evacuation of national staff did leave tensions. Resentment persists today over the differential treatment. This situation is common to that in many COs around the globe and remains a thorny issue.
Figure 3: Organization Chart Proposed in Country Programme Management Plan, 1995-1997.
Morale was particularly low for national staff during the crisis. This was attributed to differences in treatment of national and international staff. The CO did manage to provide hazard pay for the national staff, as for international staff. One national officer, whose life was reportedly at risk, was included in the evacuation of international staff members to Dominican Republic in 1994. However, the limitations on evacuation of national staff did leave tensions. Resentment persists today over the differential treatment. This situation is common to that in many COs around the globe and remains a thorny issue.

Among international staff, it is alarming to note that, while political tensions and some level of uncertainty continue in Haiti, many staff are burned out. This is not only observable, it is freely admitted by some. Yet, plans for rotation of staff do not appear to be underway in headquarters.

UNICEF attention to the human face of its own staff was demonstrated by the CO. This was to some extent limited by international policy. It was also damaged to some extent by poor follow through on the delicate area of stress management. International human resources planning has not been responsive to predictable burn out among CO international staff.

5.1.4 Operations support
In order to meet the operational demands of programmes a number of changes were introduced over the 1992-1996 period. Most of these adjustments were in line with UNICEF emergency guidelines and merit little specific attention. However a few aspects of operational support are noteworthy:

- Financial and administrative procedures were dramatically improved between the 1992 and 1995 audit reports. The initial period from just after the coup d’état to early 1993 in which the costly undertaking of direct delivery of supplies was adopted appears as an aberration.

- Faced with increased scarcity of fuel in 1993 and the renewal of the fuel embargo and impending blockade, UNICEF constructed new facilities to stock vast amounts of fuel. Though the audit in 1995 later pointed to weaknesses in the management of this resource, it was critical in allowing the CO and its partners to continue functioning. This was particularly critical after the humanitarian fuel programme established in February of 1994 under the chair of the Ambassador of the Organization of American States (OAS), which applied a limiting definition of humanitarian assistance excluding some UNICEF programmes.

- Movement of supplies was difficult throughout the crisis. The CO attempted coordination with donors, particularly through USAID-led Humanitarian Assistance Committee, though approximately only one out of every twenty-five requests from UNICEF was acted upon. However, while the formal Committee did not work to UNICEF’s satisfaction, the CO did develop successful direct relationships with the military units from their first arrival in Haiti, benefitting from their logistical and technical support to further programme delivery throughout the country. Experience proved that
it was much more effective to direct requests to individual military units or contingents than to senior more formal levels of command.

- Security at the CO level was managed within the confines of decisions taken by the UN security coordinator. Poor representation of humanitarian agencies by the DHA coordinator, meant poor communication around security indications among UN agencies. This did not put staff members at risk, but often left frustration at directives which appeared unwarranted. For its part, the CO improved communications systems in 1994, as it prepared for the invasion of the UN military forces. A satellite telephone system was installed. The radio communication system was expanded with transponders to increase the signal’s strength throughout the country and direct contact was established with the police. This allowed safe movement of CO staff outside of Port-au-Prince as much as possible.

In general, operations support has improved over the period. The CO was able to balance radically different demands such as supplying scarce fuel and providing a security communications network, allowing the office to function in spite of the blockade.

5.1.5 Relationship between headquarters/regional office and country office

The question of roles and responsibilities of headquarters, the regional and country offices produced the most varied opinions among interviewees. Currently in UNICEF, as was the case throughout the period under study, the division of headquarters and regional support offices is not entirely clear. Even within headquarters, the roles of the regional desks and EMOPS vary depending on the individuals involved for each country.

In the case of Haiti, the Regional Office had little contact with the CO during the crisis period. Based in Bogota, it was too far away from, New York and Washington, the centres of decision-making among the international organizations and agencies. The new Regional Director was named to her post in 1992 and required some time to build up her staff. It was not until four years after the coup d’etat that she managed to visit the CO. Interaction with the regional office has changed recently with 6 missions by technical staff from Bogota to the CO during the first half of 1996.

Different technical assistance came from various sources during the crisis. The Chief of the Latin America Desk visited in November 1993, providing both technical advice and moral support. A senior programme officer from the Desk also visited at the end of 1992 and 1994. The Evaluation and Research Office provided support in initiating the Harvard Study on the impact of sanctions. The Child Rights advisor from the regional office made a two-day visit in 1994. EMOPS became involved around the time of the invasion of the UN multi-national forces (MNF) in September 1994. A rapid response team was identified in preparation for the worst case scenario. Two members of that team actually did go to Haiti, though after the invasion by the MNF in
September 1994, and assisted with a review of all security, logistics provisions and preparedness planning. The CO Representative also received support from the Director of EMOPS who acted as a sounding board on critical political decisions. According to comments by senior staff, the importance of any specific technical advice may have been outweighed by that of the moral support provided at critical moments, as well as the opportunity to clear some of the more difficult decisions the CO had to take, particularly related to political positioning and the international sanctions.

Support and overview of the programming process was provided by the Latin America Desk. Support also came during the worst of the crisis by EMOPS. However, as mentioned previously, the Haiti CO itself was a pioneer in the first form of preparedness planning using multiple scenarios carried out in 1994. It is not clear where leadership on UNICEF programme planning in politically fragile countries such as Haiti currently lies. Different divisions in UNICEF headquarters do not present a unified vision on this. According to current discussions, EMOPS is promoting preparedness planning as a regular part of programme planning in vulnerable countries, based on rapid analysis of probable scenarios, including worst case scenarios, and the programme options for each. (This represents an evolution from earlier emphasis on the more basic contingency plans for logistics and supplies.) The Latin America desk appears to focus more on transition to democracy based on experiences in the region. The different emphases are not by any means mutually exclusive, but they have yet to be married in a consistent approach. (It is not clear how the regional office perceives preparedness planning.) Based on earlier discussions (see 4.1.2), it seems clear that the CO needs an external trigger to maintain preparedness planning. Given the inconsistency of emphasis in headquarters, this is not likely to happen until the CO has reason to call on an already overstretched EMOPS for support, i.e. when crisis has already struck.

Support to the programming process by the Latin America Desk also included work on joint UN funding appeals as well as liaison with UN partners in Washington and New York. The liaison role provided by the Desk was crucial both in the lead up to the invasion by UN military forces as well as during the joint UN/IDB appeal process. The latter required insistent intervention by UNICEF directly with IDB in order to compensate for weak UN coordination at headquarters level. A UNICEF staff member was eventually included in the joint UN/IDB mission to develop the proposal. During the worst of the crisis, it was estimated that 75% of a Desk officer’s time was spent on follow-up for Haiti.

Input to international negotiations processes around the sanctions and eventual invasion by the MNF also involved headquarters. The Executive Director interceded with American former-
President Jimmy Carter, encouraging his involvement in the eventually successful negotiations in 1994 to bring about the peaceful invasion of the MNF.

Following the return to power of the constitutional government, senior level visits of a more formal nature were made by two Deputy Directors, in late 1994 and early 1995. These provided significant symbols of support to the newly returned constitutional government.

As mentioned under discussion of human resources support, headquarters role in international human resources planning was noted for its absence. The vague definition of the relationship between the country and regional offices, and headquarters clearly left a great degree of autonomy to the CO. This has the advantage of allowing flexibility. However, the autonomy of the CO in emergency offices also increases the demand for trained and experienced staff. This places a corresponding burden of responsibility for international staff selection on headquarters. Where highly experienced staff cannot be found, this should translate into a responsibility for technical support and training for both regional offices and headquarters. This did not happen for the Haiti CO.

It is felt, at the level of the CO, that the involvement of UNICEF headquarters and regional office staff in Haiti was limited and that this was attributable to the very nature of the crisis in Haiti. Haiti did not erupt into civil war. Over the same 1991-1994 period, civil war in Sudan and Somalia continued, both leading to the death of UNICEF staff members, Bosnia erupted in 1992 and the Rwanda crisis hit in 1994. Most of headquarters support to Haiti corresponded to the period leading up to the invasion by the MNF in September 1994, when media attention to the crisis peaked and when the crisis seemed at the point of deteriorating to full civil war.

Given the magnitude of some of the major crises with which UNICEF is dealing, there is an obvious need to prioritize headquarters support to COs with emergency programming. The organization depends on a high level of autonomy at the CO level. However, the Haiti experience suggests a number of key areas for headquarters and regional offices involvement:

- direction on preparedness planning in its broadest sense,
- international human resources planning,
- liaison and support in central level negotiations with partners in the international community, including UN sister agencies.

It has also been suggested that, given the damaging effects of prolonged stress on staff and the usefulness to the CO of a fresh external perspective, field visits by technical and senior regional and headquarters staff should be scheduled periodically especially in situations where staff are isolated. This is important to help the CO revisit the situation analysis, but also to improve communications and morale.
5.2 CROSS-CUTTING STRATEGIES/ACTIVITIES

The following section contains an analysis of three key cross-sectoral strategies or activities which conditioned programme outcome. They are: training, gender analysis, and monitoring and evaluation. For each of these, analysis includes an overview of the situation and a conclusion about the effects on programme outcome.

5.2.1 Training

Training has been a central component of UNICEF programmes throughout the crisis. It is to the CO staff’s credit that such activities were implemented even under the restricting definition of humanitarian assistance. Training across WES and Health sectors was coordinated. Parental education under Konesans Fanmi was closely linked to the health programme and is now proposed as vehicle for promotion of the CRC. However, the Evaluation Team noted weaknesses in the outcome of training activities which in turn affect overall outcome. Though not exclusive to the Haiti programme, such problems are critical to achievement of many of the programme objectives and were noted at different levels of training.

In ‘cascade training,’ used to train community agents as educators/trainers for the community, results were limited. Repeatedly in interviews carried out for this evaluation, various community agents (paid by UNICEF or partner organizations) working in water, sanitation and health programmes demonstrated a weak ability to communicate basic cross-cutting messages on water borne diseases, CDD and ORT. Weaknesses in a similar type of cascade training were underlined in an evaluation of the Konesans Fanmi Project in 1994.

Training linked to capacity building and empowerment, also revealed problems. Community agents within the Community Organization Project tended to maintain old-style ‘dirigiste’ relations with community-based organizations. While the problem is currently being addressed within that project, work of the WES sector suggests similar problems. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

There are a number of factors which complicate improvements in training in Haiti. With a decade of changes of government it is not surprising that national policy and curriculum standards for various aspects of health training are non-existent or out of date. Efforts for UNICEF are also complicated by the number of partner organizations in each sector. Throughout the crisis period, and still today, coordination with sectoral partners touches on broad geographic division of labour and more recently policy development issues, but consistency and standardization on training materials and approaches have not been broached. This makes strengthening of cross-sectoral links all the more difficult. Finally, training for capacity building and empowerment requires innovative methodologies and a dramatic re-orientation of trainers towards participatory approaches.

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While UNICEF partners are the ones who actually execute training, it remains a challenge for UNICEF to discover ways to support them, to ensure improved quality of training. Given staff overload and importance of this issue, the CO may require external specialized assistance to analyze training strategies in use and provide direction for improvements.

5.2.2 Gender analysis

A more formal gender analysis was planned for all the sectors in the 1994 *Strategy Note for the 1996-2000 Cooperation Programme*. There is an informal advocacy around the importance of gender within the CO. The office has carried out research on the street children and children in domestic labour, which groups are predominantly boys and girls respectively. This work was the basis for the formulation of the *Bridging Programme* Education Programme. Positive changes in sensitivity to this issue are demonstrated in some programme targets; the WES sector, for example, is working towards a goal of 50% female membership in water management committees. Balanced representation of women in projects, however, is still far from introducing a gender approach.

As community-based organizations are intended to provide the base for all of UNICEF programmes, the focus on women’s participation with the Community Organization Project has the potential to introduce a gender-sensitive approach from the bottom up. However, this will only occur as progress is made in strengthening community-based organizations themselves, to which there are a number of constraints discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

The proposed gender analysis has not been carried out. The CO has financed a detailed life history of a poor Haitian woman, published during the crisis and has produced a number of other publications on the condition of women in Haiti as well as modules documenting discrimination against women in different sectors. Some publications may have been intended for advocacy purposes. However, while analysis could provide basic knowledge of community and family coping strategies and how roles, responsibilities and access to resources are differentiated by factors such as sex, age and position in the family, there is little evidence that information has been used in programme design to facilitate a ‘mainstreaming’ of gender focus. The end goal of adjusting programmes to incorporate gender analysis does not always appear evident in research design, subsequent information analysis or use.

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It does not appear that the Office has the necessary information collection and analysis to promote a strong cross-sectoral gender approach. This is very much linked to weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation.
5.2.3 M&E: Information for decision-making
Programme proposals produced by the CO repeatedly refer to the paucity of information available throughout the period under study. Much of this was due to poor information systems existing in the country before the crisis and was linked to weak government structures and a fragmenting of social services, offered by myriad private and volunteer sector organizations in addition to the State. In the crisis period, however, the pre-existing gap in information for decision-making became more critical, primarily because the situation was worsening so rapidly. Information required was not necessarily sophisticated, but it was still necessary to identify where needs of women and children were greatest -- in terms of location and types of vulnerabilities -- and what resources and constraints existed with which to work. The CO has begun to respond to this problem, but in general faced the crisis period with inadequate information for programme planning purposes as well as for advocacy.

5.2.3a Political positioning
At the level of the Representative, information on political trends was crucial to overall preparedness as well as for careful positioning of the organization and gauging of key strategic decisions. The political context was the primary constraint to UNICEF activities. Contacts were necessary across the political spectrum in order to ensure an early sense of changing trends in the country as well as to identify allies for action. Given the height of personal stress and political tension among CO national staff, this process of information collection and analysis was largely isolated to the senior management level. The importance of this information is born out in the judgements behind the key strategic decisions discussed in Chapter 3.

5.2.3b Information on the situation of women and children
For monitoring the situation of women and children, systems in the country were weak before the crisis. Up until the coup d’etat, UNICEF relied on a Ministry of Health facility-based health information system which brought together data from both the private and public sector services. When all contact with the government was cut after the coup, USAID introduced a sentinel surveillance system based on 32 NGO-supported facilities, providing information on malnutrition, disease as well as market prices. In addition, Albert Schweizer Hospital, SCF-US and a few other partners were able to produce data, for example on the fatality rate for measles or malnutrition rates. These systems were limited to the population having access to health services or to a geographic area of operation, but did provide a general indication of trends.

UNICEF efforts to improve on information available were limited. It did on two occasions foster an informal network with partner NGOs for sharing information including qualitative assessments. These coincided with moments of isolation and reduced mobility for organizations in Port-au-Prince: in 1993, after staff were evacuated, and between July and September 1994, in

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76 Basic assessment approaches do provide a framework for such information collection and analysis.
preparation for the arrival of the international forces. However, this was not kept up as a regular exchange between peaks of the crisis.

The CO also commissioned a number of studies (listed in Appendix F) including the Harvard Study on sanctions, produced in October of 1993, and studies on street children and children in domestic labour arrangements, also in 1993.

However, staff still referred to great difficulties, during the crisis, in finding out what was happening to the population. And while UNICEF staff reported not receiving useful information from NGOs, NGOs in turn mentioned frustration with UNICEF’s lack of follow through on processing and feeding back useful information to guide their programme response.

This was not entirely surprising given resource allocations and priorities in the CO from the beginning of the period under study for this evaluation. Early in the crisis in 1993, a decision was taken by CO senior management not to embark on larger monitoring exercises. The international Monitoring Officer (level P3) who left Haiti on December 1993, and had been involved in the planning of the 1990-1995 CPR, appears not to have been involved in monitoring the situation of women and children or in bringing together information collection on-going among other organizations. There was, after 1993, no M&E staff member who could focus on this work. The decision not to focus on monitoring took place in the context of significant programme and management reorientation by the new Representative as well as massive demands on the CO for action. There was a feeling of being simply too overloaded with work to take on development of monitoring systems.

The decision was taken despite the existence of M&E components in several programming documents, the recommendations on developing an early warning system made in the Harvard Study and the opportunity which the broadened partnership offered for basic coordination in information collection and analysis. None of these opportunities could have been taken without considerable effort. However, the information for decision-making could have been improved by on-going coordination of rough emergency monitoring systems and analysis of trends.

As a result of the weak information collection systems and analysis, UNICEF did not always have the answers it needed during the crisis, to make the decisions it did. This was demonstrated in the early nutrition interventions proposed in 1992 which focused only on food security-related malnutrition, when later analysis clearly demonstrated the significance of exclusive breastfeeding practices and disease as factors in malnutrition. Information gaps have also caused problems in the

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77 Interview, Programme Officer, UNICEF-Haiti, August 19, 1996.

78 Group interview, UNICEF-Haiti professional staff, September 11, 1996.
operational planning for programmes, as revealed by difficulties in targeting the EPI campaigns through schools in 1993 and 1994, when data on schools and their location was very inaccurate. Similarly, given the problems targeting the poorest of the poor, as was raised in the review of programme outcome in health, water and women’s credit (see Chapter 4.2) it is likely that good qualitative information on coping strategies could have better guided programme design.

Since 1995, the CO has begun to address the weakness in monitoring activities. The UNICEF health officer is working with CARE to develop a sentinel surveillance system. Baseline surveys having been carried out in 20 sites in each department, in preparation for selection of a smaller number of sentinel sites. The WES sector is working with PAHO and national counterparts on the implementation of Water and Sanitation Monitoring System (WASAMS). Current studies underway in the health sector in preparation for the introduction of the Bamako Initiative are good examples of research in response to clearly identified information needs for decision-taking.\(^{79}\)

However, UNICEF has still not taken action on the planning and monitoring project proposed in the Bridging Programme 1995-1997. This project was designed to strengthen local level monitoring capacities and planning, involving local authorities, national NGOs and CBOs. It meshes perfectly with UNICEF’s community organization strategy and could have provided an initial base for the sentinel surveys.

5.2.3c Information on programmes

In the absence of M&E staff, it is not surprising that the Haiti CO did not develop an integrated Monitoring and Evaluation and Research Plan. Nonetheless, some programme monitoring and evaluation activities did take place.

A number of evaluations were carried out particularly between 1993 and 1994, in preparation for the Bridging Programme. Some staff appear to maintain fairly detailed tracking systems, though these focus on execution of activities. NGO partners interviewed perceived regular reporting to be a standard part of programmes.\(^{80}\) However, monitoring is associated primarily with field visits and regular meetings with counterparts. There does not appear to be much developed in terms of monitoring of process until recently. The sentinel sites will presumably provide a basis for monitoring change in order to respond to more specific quantitative targets articulated in the Mid-Term Review.

\(^{79}\)UNICEF-Haiti programme staff have commented on difficulties in identifying qualified technical experts to carry out studies adequately. Four studies carried out in 1994 having been rejected for poor quality data collection and/or analysis.

\(^{80}\)Workshop with selected UNICEF partner NGOs, September 4, 1996.
However, equally if not more challenging is the community organizations facet of programming, for which a monitoring and evaluation plan has yet to be developed. Given that work with CBOs is an experimental undertaking, designed to provide a base for all programmes, monitoring should contribute to tracing the course of its development. Consistent with the objectives of the programme, this should ideally include participatory monitoring by CBOs themselves.

The weak monitoring capacities by the CO from the beginning of the crisis were a significant factor in poor emergency preparedness. Despite the difficulties of information collection and analysis in Haiti, like many emergency situations, options for basic monitoring systems could have been developed, particularly taking advantage of the CO’s strategy to develop partnerships. Without adequate staff, however, this gap would have been impossible to overcome. This cost UNICEF in terms of some aspects of programme design, targeting and operation. The office has begun to improve monitoring in general.

The CO should continue with current efforts to improve monitoring particularly looking to its own proposal for Planning and Monitoring in the Bridging Programme, as well as to recommendations for development of early warning systems as made in the Harvard Study. The opportunity exists to build monitoring through a network of local actors including associations of CBOs, NGOs and local authorities to provide a broad monitoring system on the situation of women and children. Such a broad-based process would not only provide information required but could create a forum for debate around child rights issues.81

5.3 Competing Priorities
This section touches on three trends in programme implementation which can each be linked to the demands for response to immediate basic needs. Each one of these trends was conditioned in part by UNICEF internal capacities in programme vision and management as well as by external pressures. These trends can be characterized as an initial reactive emergency response which predominated throughout the crisis period, the difficult move from basic needs response to capacity building which has more recently begun, and the struggle to initiate roots of sustainability in programme response. These need not be competing priorities, but are in general perceived as such, and were generally perceived by CO staff to represent significant challenges in the context of Haiti.

5.3.1 Reactive emergency response
Initially following the coup d'état and even later, despite the introduction in 1993 of longer-term objectives, UNICEF programmes were dominated by a reactive response to the crisis. The positive side to this was the CO’s ability to react quickly to urgent demands. UNICEF was, for example, able to mobilize partners, including the logistical support of the UNMIH and the UN Multi-national Forces, to meet urgent demands to repair a water system providing drinking water to some 50,000

81 Remarks by Thomas Hammarburg at a meeting with UNICEF staff, November 14, 1996.
in provincial city of Hinche. Similarly, UNICEF was able to respond to strategically important questions such as child prisoners, advocating for their release from adult prisons and developing special programmes for child prisoners with partners.\footnote{Interview, Staff, COHAN LaKay, September 3, 1996.}

However, the predominantly reactive mode also had a negative side. This was in part related to the office’s ability to manage its new partnership strategy as analyzed in more detail in Chapter 6. The CO took on activities for which it had little preparation and were thus highly cost-ineffective as was illustrated at the beginning of the crisis when the Country Office was doing direct delivery of basic drugs to health centres.

Some activities undertaken had poor connection to analysis of key problems for women and children, and seemed more linked to a template or routine response. Again in the initial period of the crisis, the proposed response to increased malnutrition focused on income generation when later analysis showed that disease and care-related factors were also very important. Similarly inconsistent was support to pre-school education when poor families were withdrawing children from primary school attendance, unable to pay fees for basic education.

Finally, this tendency to a reactive response also was shown in \textit{ad hoc} activities with little relation to programme strategies. The office responded to requests, for example, for mattresses for a centre for street children and for school materials for an individual rural school. Despite the questionable cost-effectiveness of such actions, there was, during the crisis, and remains today a tendency to support such requests. While these requests are generally small, opportunity-cost of staff time must be considered. The 1995 audit points to the labour intensive and costly small transactions which dominated the CO activities: US $ 4 million were transferred in over 2,700 transactions in 1994.\footnote{Michael Nolan, Internal Auditor, \textit{Audit Report on the Port-au-Prince Country Office, Haiti}, Report No. 95/015, UNICEF, July 1995, p. 23}

There were a number of factors which at different times fostered these reactive responses. Many references were made by programme staff to the pressures felt during the crisis to ‘do something.’ This overwhelming demand, sometimes translated into doing “everything, everywhere.”\footnote{Mbiala Ma-Umba, former Education Officer, UNICEF Haiti, "Working in a Crisis Situation: the Haitian Experience in Basic Education.” Supported by comments during group interview, UNICEF-Haiti professional staff, September 11,1996.} The absence of clear overall objectives in the initial year after the 1991 \textit{coup} certainly did not favour a more focused response. The deluge of requests received from NGOs and community level organizations after the 1993 shift towards broader partnerships, and the initial lack of criteria for
selecting partners, created the huge if not impossible task of sorting requests and determining priorities, even as the CO tried to continue with defined programme priorities. The sheer number of small partners, sometimes for isolated activities, itself increased the risk of small-scale reactive interventions with no relation to a coherent programme. The practical difficulties and political sensitivities around any coherent and coordinated national level activities under *de facto* governments, for which there was only a brief respite from July to October 1993, also favoured small separate interventions. This was seen with the 1993 vaccination campaign. Currently, programme staff refer to an overall inertia, which slows their move from reactive response.\textsuperscript{85}

The cumulative pressures on the CO staff to respond were very strong during the emergency phase. When combined with the lack of a clear direction in the early part of the crisis, well through to 1993, this appears to have lead to a number of ineffective and poorly chosen interventions. It has taken until recently for the CO to reorient activities to its mid- and long-term objectives. While the current programming framework represents a significant recovery from reactive programming in the early stages of the emergency, UNICEF staff are still overloaded with the on-going response to myriad proposals by CBOs and NGOs. This points to the need for greater focus in partnerships, something the CO has begun to introduce. It also highlights the importance of planning in order to keep a focus even in the seeming chaos of political crisis.

### 5.3.2 Basic needs vs. capacity building

The reactive response during the crisis period is very much associated with meeting immediate basic needs. The focus on humanitarian assistance and immediate needs fostered a short-term outlook with a heavy supply focus, despite the CO’s efforts to balance this with a longer term perspective. The transition away from this is slowly taking place.

The pressures to focus on basic needs were in part due to the sheer magnitude of demands. However, much more importantly, there were national and international political pressures on UNICEF and other international assistance bodies, to address only immediate basic needs. Any humanitarian assistance activity which was seen to be shoring up or even replacing public services at the delivery end, was seen to be a support to the *de facto* government.

The joint UN/OAS planning followed this limiting definition of humanitarian assistance. The stated purpose of the joint UN/OAS appeal was to “stanch the process of crisis-accelerated deterioration”. In the context of the reinforced embargo, the humanitarian fuel programme became the ultimate tool of control in the debate over the definition of humanitarian assistance. CO staff

\textsuperscript{85} Group interview, UNICEF Haiti professional staff, September 11, 1996
reported the need for tremendous “bureaucratic gymnastics,” not only in the original planning with the OAS, but in the execution as well, in order to preserve respect for UNICEF’s mandate.86

These pressures pushed the CO towards a traditional sectoral focus -- health, nutrition, WES -- but also limited the very training and capacity building components which make more effective programming. In the WES and Health sectors, funds designated as capacity building in area-based programming received less than 10% of total funds. (See Table 4 below.) The figures likely represent an under-recording because of some inconsistencies in the way funding categories were recorded -- capacity building components are reportedly incorporated in other categories such as advocacy and staff development -- but the focus of funding is generally agreed to be strongly supply oriented with a focus on basic needs as opposed to capacity building.

In as much as was possible, the office tried to continue with activities which did not fit the definition of humanitarian assistance -- education, CEDC, strengthening CBOs. The CEDC, Women, Education and the Community Organization programmes still only represented between 24% of total budget in 1992 and 18% in 1994. (Refer back to Table 2.)

Since the crisis, the transition away from supply-focused basic needs, has been gradual. Many requests continued to be made for help from small NGOs needing the equivalent of emergency supplies or money. Some large supply purchases are not likely to disappear; for example, Haiti is 100% dependent on foreign assistance for vaccines and related basic supplies, and by agreement with PAHO, UNICEF has been responsible for purchasing a large portion of the total. However, in a sector such as WES, where UNICEF resources are comparatively small, there is little strategic or comparative advantage for the organization to be involved in support to construction. There is a desire among staff to move to a stronger advocacy role and to focus efforts on strengthening the community organization facet of WES work -- the support to a new unit within the national counterpart specifically dedicated to strengthening the community management facet of the programme is evidence of this. Similarly, in the Education sector, the Bridging Programme, 1995-1997, pointed much more in the direction of policy and curriculum development. However, the transition is slow.

This illustrates the opposition between basic needs and capacity building often created in emergency programming. While donors are increasingly calling for more cost-effective approaches to emergency response including components of capacity building,87 in the case

86 Group interview, UNICEF Haiti, heads of section and senior management. August 19, 1996.

87 It is not clear what different definitions donors would give to the term “capacity building.”
of Haiti, the highly politicized definition of humanitarian assistance itself encouraged the opposite, a narrow response to immediate basic needs.
Table 4: Allocation of resources in area-based services by category of activity, 1993-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health: All Projects</th>
<th>1993 %</th>
<th>1994 %</th>
<th>1995 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education / Staff Development</td>
<td>101,778</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>94,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Mobilisation / Communication / Advocacy</td>
<td>77,120</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>129,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research / Evaluation / Studies</td>
<td>49,514</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>110,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF Salaries</td>
<td>183,322</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>225,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants / Temporary Assistant</td>
<td>91,608</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>82,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Support</td>
<td>177,693</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>268,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment / Supplies</td>
<td>1,943,060</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,829,770</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2,656,095</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,773,936</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water and Sanitation: All projects</th>
<th>1993 %</th>
<th>1994 %</th>
<th>1995 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education / Staff Development</td>
<td>9,685</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Mobilisation / Communication / Advocacy</td>
<td>4,999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research / Evaluation / Studies</td>
<td>7,500</td>
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<td>5,095</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF Salaries</td>
<td>115,474</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49,529</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultants / Temporary Assistant</td>
<td>365,915</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>334,303</td>
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<td>Programme Support</td>
<td>208,238</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment / Supplies</td>
<td>78,850</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>392,712</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>4,737</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97,404</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>790,661</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>835,842</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Organisation</th>
<th>1993 %</th>
<th>1994 %</th>
<th>1995 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education / Staff Development</td>
<td>27,207</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>64,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Mobilisation / Communication / Advocacy</td>
<td>15,825</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research / Evaluation / Studies</td>
<td>7,359</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF Salaries</td>
<td>119,388</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants / Temporary Assistant</td>
<td>33,181</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Support</td>
<td>28,400</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment / Supplies</td>
<td>49,337</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>260,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>84,427</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>85,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>280,697</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>520,275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.3 Sustainability

This same tension between basic needs and capacity building was not favourable for the sustainability of UNICEF activities. Programme staff readily state that they were not looking to sustainability during the 1992-1994 period. Yet the CO community organization strategy and NGO partnerships do lay the groundwork for building sustainable interventions.

In the face of emergency needs, the CO did take actions which were focused on delivery of assistance to beneficiaries, as opposed to community involvement. This was consciously so in the case of EPI, parallel distribution of vitamin A, and the trucking of water into urban slums. These were justifiable to some extent at the time, given the urgency of the need and the lack of solid links with the community at the time. Early on in the crisis, the context of political violence and mistrust, and the corresponding difficulties in UNICEF’s experience in working at community level, meant that another form of emergency response was not considered feasible.

Nonetheless, some basic services activities were done with a view to future sustainable interventions, either for their attention to decentralized management, cost-recovery or community management. These include:

- working through PROMESS, the drug distribution programme founded by PAHO;
- establishment of complementary decentralized units for distribution of ORS and vaccines (*Unités de services et distribution*);
- fostering primary health care services outreach through health agents (though payment of salaries by UNICEF was not sustainable);
- developing the programme communications support for EPI programmes;
- developing a flexible system for establishing short-term wet feeding programmes involving mothers;
- cost-recovery in rural water services and even building urban water reservoirs in Port-au-Prince with a timed transition to community financial management.

Since the return of the Aristide government the focus on sustainability has increased with the promotion of breastfeeding campaigns and feasibility studies on salt iodization.

*Not all of these initiatives have worked as intended, but in the face of crisis, and despite the pressure to reactive emergency response, the CO was looking ahead and attempting to lay the basis for a sustainable response.*

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88 Interview, UNICEF-Haiti heads of section, August 19, 1996.
By far the most significant contribution to a more sustainable response was the decision to broaden partnerships in civil society and the focus on strengthening CBOs. These are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
6. **Partnerships**

As is mentioned previously, UNICEF took a critical decision to foster and rekindle a broad range of partnerships as an alternative to the banned relations with the State. This decision allowed the organization to operate during the crisis. The actual choice of partners over the period studied has included international agencies, NGOs, CBOs and associations, local authorities and State ministries, some of these having been engaged to a greater or lesser extent. The way in which these partnerships have evolved over the period studied is central to both the effectiveness of UNICEF’s programmes and their sustainability.

This chapter will review the characteristics of partnerships with each of the different groups listed above, including a brief profile, a summary of the partnership’s evolution and an analysis of the challenges encountered and opportunities available.

6.1 **INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES**

During the crisis, the international agencies in Haiti all faced major adjustments in programmes, not the least financially. Following the *coup d’etat*, development assistance was suspended. Despite the influx of humanitarian aid, foreign aid declined, at least for the first two years of the crisis. The UN/OAS Consolidated Humanitarian Plan of Action was delayed until March 1993 and was distributed quietly yielding little in the way of funding for UNICEF. It was not until 1994 that emergency aid began increasing.

All agencies also had to adjust to the complex nature of coordination in a political crisis with the involvement of major international powers. The presence of MICIVIH from mid-1993, and the UNMIH after the invasion, implied an unwieldy scale of inter-agency coordination, combining peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance/development arms of the UN, as well as representatives of the OAS. The restrictive definitions of humanitarian assistance agreed upon in the process of political negotiations added an additional constraint for UN agencies which traditionally held to a principle of “operational neutrality,” not taking a stand in favour of one or other party.\(^9\)

Representation of the humanitarian agencies in coordination with the peace-keeping operations was widely reported as weak up until 1994, with the arrival of Ross Mountain as UNDP Resident Representative and DHA Coordinator. The two previous UNDP Resident Representatives had not taken on an active coordination role. Particularly bad was the period between October 1993 and May 1994, when not one coordination meeting was held with UN humanitarian agencies, despite the high tension following the collapse of the Governor’s Island Accord.

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Joint appeals processes took place in 1993 with UN/OAS, and in 1994 with UN/IDB and DHA. These processes were as much a product of negotiations in Haiti as in Washington and New York. Despite relatively good coordination after May 1994 in Haiti, headquarters level inter-agency coordination still proved weak. During the UN/IDB appeal process, high level intervention by UNICEF headquarters was required directly with the IDB to ensure that the UNICEF perspective was included in the eventual preparation process.

In Haiti, through pointed efforts by the UNICEF staff after 1992, partnerships with sister agencies in Haiti evolved from virtual non-existence to generally good relations of coordination. UNICEF participated in sectoral coordination fora with donors, representatives of the constitutional government and UN sister agencies (partners including PAHO/WHO for health; UNDP, PAHO/WHO for water, UNESCO for education as well as UNFPA, PAHO/WHO, UNDP, UNESCO for the interagency committee for women and development). These coordination fora were largely designed to avoid overlap and duplication of work as well as to promote sharing of information. Technical coordination and exchange took place more informally in some sectors, such as WES, through meetings with only donors and UN agencies. In the health sector, already during the crisis, committees were established by the constitutional government, bringing together international agencies to work on development of national health policy. This was also the case in education. Coordination did not, however, reach the level of common development of strategies and training materials. Since the return of President Aristide, the broad sectoral coordination fora have been replaced by State-led meetings and committees, though these are not systematic.

UNICEF did re-establish relatively good working relations with UN agencies for coordination. It is essential that these strong partnerships at this level continue as UNICEF and the sister agencies support the State in the development of policies and standards.

6.2 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
UNICEF's potential partners among NGOs were far more varied and complex. From the fall of Duvalier, there was a mushrooming of civil society organizations of many different kinds in Haiti. Though the distinctions can sometimes be hazy, these included community level organizations working in the community of their membership, as well as Haitian NGOs carrying out social or economic development projects, with or without formal registration. Of the NGOs, it is reported that between 200 and 400 were estimated to exist in 1989, depending on how NGO was defined.

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90 Comité inter-agences femmes et développement (CIFD)

91 UNICEF, Situation Analysis of Women and Children (Port-au-Prince: March 1994). Registration under the de facto government of 1992-1994 was problematic for the political implications of such recognition. The constitutional government also maintained lists of recognized NGOs, however, the same organizations were not consistently registered across different Ministries.
International NGOs abound in Haiti, their number having increased with the heightening of the crisis in 1993. Most work with fairly small beneficiary populations. SCF-US, one of UNICEF larger NGO partners reaches a population of only 140,000.

Among NGOs, there was and remains a huge variation in levels of organizational development. Some Haitian NGOs had received the benefit of organizational development support from CARE and USAID in the period prior to 1991 and made a group of more reliable partners. The crisis, however, put increased pressure on NGOs of all kinds. Problems mentioned by Haitian NGOs included increased demands from the population, the challenge of developing new programmes to respond to emerging needs, a reduction of their already limited logistical capacities, sometimes drastic decreases in development funding and little in the way of medium to long-term commitment of funds. Others mentioned an influx of resources for which they had little management preparation. Nonetheless, among the great number of NGOs, there were ones which could offer UNICEF the means of reaching women and children. Haitian NGOs also offered a link to the country’s rapidly organizing civil society.

When UNICEF reoriented programme strategies toward broader partnerships in 1993, little appeared in documentation at the time to indicate the direction the CO intended to take. It was taking advantage of a clear opportunity to improve programme delivery. The experiment may have expanded far more than ever foreseen. The total number of partners went from less than 20 to over 100 between 1992 and 1994. Programme staff refer to being inundated with requests from NGOs and CBOs about which, sometimes, they knew little. This has been aggravated since the end of the crisis by the withdrawal of support by USAID to NGOs who now turn to organizations such as UNICEF. However, the CO reportedly has not taken exaggerated risks, generally taking the better known NGOs as partners. Programme implementation increased dramatically from 1993. Currently the office is in a process of consolidating partnerships and reports having a fairly strong idea of the selection it will make, although formalized criteria for selection and consistent analysis do not appear to have been documented.

While the dramatic shift towards a broad partnership strategy allowed the organization to increase implementation dramatically, the experience points to a number of lessons.

In adopting this new partnership strategy, whether recognizing it or not, UNICEF took on an enormous challenge of prioritization. Yet the organization did not have the tools to facilitate this process. Faced with making choices, programme staff began to set their own criteria, though these varied from one section to another. This included time consuming visits to verify NGO partner’s existence and implementation capacity. Criteria for selecting partners mentioned by different staff include:

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92 Interview, representatives UNFPA, CARE, 1996.
• reputation,
• compatibility of their philosophy of sustainable community development,
• compatibility of NGO objectives with UNICEF programme objectives,
• acceptance by communities,
• experience at the community level,
• management capacity, political neutrality,
• cost-efficiency,
• and recognition by the government.

Some partnerships choices were also founded on criteria so simple as the opportunity for visible action. The sponsoring of over 6000 primary school children (1994 and 1995) through the Fond de Parrainage National was perceived by UNICEF staff as important, not so much for the number of children receiving one year of education, as for visible partnership, support to a sector in crisis and contribution to a sense of movement towards stability.  

Sometimes the choice of partner appears to have been pressured by the urgency to get something done. The criteria for selection were more or less defined and were not systematically applied.

While programme staff were able to make rough judgements on the potential contribution of different NGOs to meeting basic needs of the population, the vague criteria for selection of partners made comparative analysis difficult. The CO took on a number of ad hoc partners, providing unsustainable support which is difficult to justify now.

A second lesson derived from NGO partnerships, was the need for definition of expectations in partnership, for both parties. There do exist a number of different partnerships. These differences exist not least in financial arrangements. A number of so-called ‘partners’ were rather beneficiaries of one-off financial support. Other partners act as executing agencies while still others act as conduits, feeding resources to smaller organizations. These differences have been formalized for accountability within UNICEF. Yet, while letters of agreement are generally signed now, and NGOs refer to clarity about their responsibilities in terms of reporting to UNICEF, there is less certainty about the non-material expectations on both sides.

For NGO partners, the support in terms of logistics, supplies and funding is important. However, in the workshop carried out in the course of this evaluation, NGOs voiced expectations of

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94 These include traditional counterparts which execute activities with UNICEF resources, conduits which pass resources on to other organizations, and PROMESS classified on its own. Michael Nolan (Internal Auditor), Audit Report on the Port-au-Prince Country Office, Haiti, July 1995.
support from UNICEF which were much more akin to what the CO terms capacity building. This encompassed technical training (e.g. EPI, CEDC methodologies), management training, sharing of information, and funding of technical staff. Apart from technical training, these expectations are reportedly not being fully met in the current relationship with UNICEF. NGOs, including some of the larger international ones, look to UNICEF as a source of information. They envision a more sustained relationship in which they are strengthened as NGOs, whether it be through UNICEF's experience in other countries or pointed support to the development of their capacities.

For the CO, during the crisis, NGOs provided a means of achieving objectives and realizing activities for the benefit of women and children in the absence of government partners. This applied for advocacy organizations, coordination bodies and those which work directly with communities. With the return of the constitutional government, these same NGOs now represent a stable functional partner to be maintained alongside government partnership. Mention was made by some programme staff of the need to work with partner NGOs to strengthen them as organizations. Other NGOs are perceived as fairly strong independent executing agencies.

However, given that UNICEF has not carried out systematic analysis of the NGOs as organizations, identifying their weaknesses and strengths, these distinctions are not clear at least for the NGOs. Realistic plans to carry out capacity building, even for the sake of improving effectiveness of outcome, are therefore difficult to develop.

The lack of definition of partnerships has also allowed false and unsustainable expectations regarding financial commitment. A number of NGOs were partially or largely dependent upon UNICEF during the period for funding and supplies. UNICEF's move to consolidate was based on the need to move from relationships of dependency to those in which partners had other sources of support and could therefore collaborate with UNICEF on more independent terms. However, the complaint about lack of clarity on funding commitments came from all manner of NGOs, including those which UNICEF wishes to maintain as partners. The head of one of UNICEF's educational NGO partners observed that one of the major lessons of the crisis period for many NGOs was that they would have to have a variety of funding options if they were to survive. UNICEF's lack of transparency with NGOs about funding commitments is a product of its own uncertain financial situation to some extent, but this is a limitation on the development of their partners and the effectiveness of their work. One of the open questions which remains is how the organization can get out of partnerships developed in the crisis period which are no longer appropriate or desirable. As relationships with NGOs are considered partnerships, and where expectations were unclear, it will be a challenge for UNICEF to end them responsibly, facilitating the NGO's move to greater independence.

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95 This is something which preferably would take place with the involvement of NGOs themselves.
Finally, the CO’s experience with NGO partners underlines an opportunity to facilitate greater coordination. NGOs did report experiences in which UNICEF facilitated contacts among NGOs for the purposes of sharing methodologies or technical developments. They also referred to UNICEF’s role in mediating relations with the returned constitutional government. In both of these areas, they saw room for UNICEF to take a more active role of facilitation. Such a role could help improve the work of both NGOs and the State, by countering the fragmenting effects of so many independent providers of basic services in Haiti. This is discussed further with reference to partnerships with the State.

6.3 COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

As mentioned above, the post-Duvalier era saw a boom for local organizations. These included everything from small groups organized around credit schemes, organizations representative of some segment of a community, associations of smaller organizations, as well as much more organized peasant movements. According to a review carried out by the CO, the majority of such organizations in Grand Goave/Leogane and Port-au-Prince were fairly weak, characterized by a heavily dirigiste style of operation, having a vague responsibility to their membership and fostering little participation.96

Most CBOs are or were politically affiliated. Some community level organizations say they moved out of politics after the 1991 coup. Needing to focus on community survival and disheartened with the returned violence, this was a way of protecting the organizations from repression to some extent. The influx of international NGOs or aid agencies providing funding for development activities coincided with this shift.97 Those that were involved with some form of community services, such as water or health services, or economic activity, such as credit organizations, generally did manage to continue functioning despite the repression.98 Working with broadly-oriented CBOs, perceived as political by local representatives of the de facto government, was reportedly much more difficult during the 1992-1994 period.99

Despite these constraints, UNICEF was able to take advantage of an opportunity for more sustainable intervention through community level organizations. As discussed in Chapter 4, UNICEF work with CBOs evolved from a project to an overall objective, eventually to a partnership strategy. It is in its conceptualization highly innovative. As this strategy evolved, actual implementation was


97 Interview Morne l’Hopital, Port-au-Prince, August 30, 1996.

98 Interviews Gros Morne, August 20-23; Morne l’Hopital, Port-au-Prince, August 30, 1996.

99 Group interview, UNICEF-Haiti professional staff, September 11, 1996.
A base of trust for the partnership was established in the early stages of the crisis. UNICEF presence in the field, supporting basic services projects with partner organizations -- international or Haitian NGOs, as well as field staff of State institutions notably in the health sector and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MAS)\(^\text{100}\) -- gave UNICEF credibility and generally allowed it access to a growing network of CBOs. UNICEF had some success with small organizations which responded to the needs of individual members, for example, women's credit groups. From October 1993, UNICEF also made an effort to “train” community groups and committees to manage delivery of basic services in the areas of water, health and nutrition.\(^\text{101}\) The numbers of committees and groups formed between both the WES and Community Organizations/Women’s programmes\(^\text{102}\) have been impressive.

However, actual practice has encountered a number of challenges particularly around the nature and effectiveness of the partnership with CBOs. The problems revealed to the Evaluation Team are as follows:

In its community organization work, mitigated successes have been caused by a weakness in more specialized technical support. Examples include the micro-project of purchasing mules where 20 to 30 of the 60 died and the sewing micro-project which failed to compete with the second-hand clothing market. While feasibility studies and technical follow through may be outside UNICEF’s typical area of expertise, whether this is a responsibility of UNICEF or its partners, such aspects do define the project’s success for individual beneficiaries and thus the development of organizations.

\textit{UNICEF must work towards realistic analysis of partners' and its own capacities and definition of responsibilities, with the possibility of seeking external support on an ad hoc or referral basis from organizations with the appropriate expertise.}

As demonstrated in the 1994 evaluation of the credit programme and the 1995 analysis of UNICEF’s Community Organization Project, the quality of capacity building support to strengthen the local groups itself was weak.\(^\text{103}\) The CO has initiated a response to this. Since early this year in Grand Goave/Leogane area, UNICEF has begun a major effort with partners in SCF-US and MAS

\(^{100}\)In the field, key informants consistently reported their perception that the Ministry of Social Affairs (MAS) staff were neutral and trusted. MAS was a partner of UNICEF in the rural credit programme throughout the crisis.

\(^{101}\)UNICEF, \textit{Strategy Note (March 1994)}.

\(^{102}\)Interview, Officer, UNICEF-Haiti, August 28, 1996. Also note that in the rural water project, a 1994 evaluation showed that 70% of water hand-pump management committees still existed.

to restructure work with CBOs, hiring new staff, training them, and ensuring close follow-up. This work is promising but should include careful analysis and documentation of progress and constraints.

Another challenge is the slow pace at which development of CBOs necessarily proceeds. As the community organization approach is promoted in UNICEF’s sectoral programmes, it becomes clear that this slow pace does not correspond with the speed at which service delivery projects must proceed. This is particularly true given the enormous demands from the population and the corresponding quantified targets and goals in sectors such as WES and health. The result is the formation of numerous community committees which function along old style dirigiste patterns. The head of the WES sector estimated that one-half of the urban water management committees are not operating as expected and expressed a combination of frustration and tenacity in effort to find solutions.

Most of these committees were formed during the crisis period and responded to urgent needs to provide water.

The problem of strengthening existing committees which are weak, is one which will require a highly sophisticated community development expertise. The CO has begun to try to respond to this.

At the time of the evaluation, UNICEF staff were developing an outline of a strategy to strengthen the community organization facet of WES and Health sector work. This will be dependent on a successful model for such capacity building work.

It is not clear how the development of an effective model for strengthening CBOs will evolve. This requires a combination of capacity building work and empowerment as defined by the CO. A successful model, as yet not tested, is necessary for the whole community organization strategy. Furthermore, any models for strengthening CBOs developed under the Community Organization Project must also take into consideration appropriate variations to allow for the faster pace of basic services sectors, particularly if this level of partnership is to be the base for UNICEF work. This will also be a challenge with the proposed introduction of the Bamako Initiative.

Given past difficulties with this programme, UNICEF staff from the Community Organization Project must give adequate follow through to the Grand Goave experience as well as work in other zones and with sectoral programmes. For UNICEF to be seriously involved in the development of a successful community organization strategy, it will likely require more staff capable of combining practical understanding of field work, innovative ideas on capacity building and empowerment, and strategic vision.

104 Working with CBOs has been especially difficult in urban areas, where mobility, greater individualism and a possibly hotter political climate are inherent constraints. Interview, WES Officer, UNICEF-Haiti, September 2, 1996.
It is clearly not feasible for UNICEF to manage a direct relationship with CBOs, if their numbers are to continue increasing as planned, with each one eventually formulating specific service delivery requests. Over 150 small groups have been formed between March and July of this year.\textsuperscript{105} CO staff are already swamped by the number of specific requests by CBOs and NGOs. The CO recognizes the need to define a high-impact but financially affordable niche for itself still within a strategy of strengthening local level organizations for participation in democratic development. This cannot mean direct partnership with CBOs, unless in limited number for the development of replicable tools and methodologies, with NGO and State partners.

The evolution of the community organization strategy itself points to the option of working at the level of associations and federations of CBOs, strengthening their role as networks and coordination bodies, which can then provide capacity building support and foster the empowerment of CBOs. Again, this is dependent on the development of a refined set of tools and methodologies for such work.

Finally, UNICEF’s other partners may also represent a challenge to the community organization strategy. The CO’s current strategy states that CBOs are intended as the eventual privileged partner for UNICEF programmes. This cannot come about until more progress is made on the refinement of a community organization approach. However, it is also significant that in sometimes heated discussion over the issue of partnerships during successive workshops with both UNICEF’s NGO and government contacts, the role of the community organization was never mentioned as a partner, for UNICEF, the NGOs or government.\textsuperscript{106} This suggests that, in the context of a turf battle between NGOs and State, the community is largely viewed as a beneficiary by both, as opposed to as a partner.\textsuperscript{107} This perception may greatly affect the degree to which UNICEF is able to promote its community organization strategy with NGO and State partners.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{It will be important for UNICEF to work with partner organizations to define ways in which to improve their work with CBOs where necessary. As the large donors such as IDB figure more in Haiti, this will be necessary in order to ensure a critical mass of partners who

\textsuperscript{105} Interview, Programme Staff, UNICEF-Haiti, August 28, 1996.

\textsuperscript{106} Workshop with selected UNICEF NGO partners, September 4, 1996. Workshop with selected government partners, September 6, 1996.

\textsuperscript{107} This comment must be qualified. Some of UNICEF’s NGO and State partners have taken a very active role in the development of the community organization approach, including the related tools such as the guide for analysis of CBOs.

\textsuperscript{108} It should also be noted that some of the UNICEF Haiti staff demonstrate a similar perception of CBOs and community members.
understand a common approach to working with CBOs -- an approach adaptable to different community contexts, reliant on capacities developed or existent within partner organizations.

6.4 LOCAL AUTHORITIES

UNICEF’s partnership with the mayors is discussed in Chapter 3. Discussion here focuses more on the Conseil d’Administration de la Section Communale, CASEC, founded as an elected body representing each communal section in the 1986 Haitian Constitution.

Before the crisis, the CASEC were new and fragile bodies, existing without adequate definition of their role. This is not surprising given the turmoil at central levels between 1986 and 1990. Under the de facto government, it was reported that some Section Chiefs, a local representative of the military structure left over from the Duvalier era when they were associated with repression and extortion, had returned to power, overshadowing the CASEC. Representatives of CBOs were targeted by repression and many fled or were put in jail. In this context, the CASEC existed in only skeleton form. This reportedly still holds true today, despite the fact that the Section Chiefs were again chased out with the return of Aristide.

Nonetheless, the 545 CASECs which exist, at least in Constitutional law, are nascent local institutions to which UNICEF could greatly contribute. The Ministry of the Interior is currently preparing training materials for the strengthening of the CASEC. Through a capacity building/empowerment project in local-level monitoring and planning (much as the one initially planned in the 1995-1997 Bridging Programme), UNICEF has the tremendous opportunity to contribute to the returned constitutional government, promote child rights and foster a working relationship between local level government and CBOs. Such potential also lies with the mayors’ offices. In both cases, the challenge will be to define capacity building needs and design a coherent response. (See also 5.2.3)

6.5 STATE MINISTRIES

The central level of the State was severely atrophied by the crisis. While the State had been a weak supplier of services with a similarly weak normative and supervisory role, its capacity to deliver services was severely curtailed by the UN sanctions during the crisis. What little logistical capacity it had was further reduced, technicians at all levels left to join the ranks of newly established NGOs and those who were left behind were often asked to perform functions for which they were not fully qualified. The ban on working with the de facto government left the civil service isolated, circumvented by most international agencies as projects carried on with the NGO sector. Frustration and loss of motivation was high at all levels. In some cases, such as that of the regional projects of Grand Goave and the marginal areas of Port-au-Prince, the perception from civil servants is that UNICEF actually executed projects on its own. There was a general impression by technical level State partners interviewed that, during the crisis, UNICEF and other international agencies took over.
coordination and policy development roles and thus operated through their NGO networks in substitution for the State. The crisis period has left a severely weakened partner. Strengthening of State ministries has been hampered throughout the period under study by frequent changes of leadership in some ministries.

Even during the 1992 -1994 period, however, UNICEF did make some important contributions to State ministries. For example, UNICEF’s collaboration with the Ministry of Education in the development of the National Education Plan supported the constitutional government in its policy-making function. By working with senior health officials under the leadership of the constitutional Minister, the normative role of government was reinforced (for example with regards to CDD). There was also considerable work on the decentralization of health services. Also, though very delicate at the time, work with technicians at the lower of the government throughout the crisis did allow training in technical skills.

Currently State partners are struggling to regain their place amid some tension. NGOs and State feel that they are competing for the same resources.

UNICEF Haiti’s current effort to reorient support away from service delivery is perhaps the best option to help the State rebuild its capacity. Indeed, as NGOs and community organisations continue to be active in the field, the State will require much more support in setting policy, establishing standards, supervising adherence to them, monitoring the evolution of activities undertaken by others and assessing their impact and coverage. UNICEF has an opportunity to reinforce the State’s regulatory and coordination function. This is complementary to partnership opportunities with civil society and local authorities.
7. Summary of Lessons Learned and Recommendations
UNICEF experience in Haiti, 1992-1996, included a number of key achievements. The CO did manage, with a range of partners, to provide essential basic services to the Haitian population during the crisis. This included far reaching benefits for children’s health and nutrition status through immunization and vitamin A distribution. It also included crucial basic water services, particularly in urban slum areas, where climbing prices were threatening poor families’ bare survival.

Over the period studied, the relevance of programming as a whole and the reach of basic services improved. This recovery from reactive programming of little impact in the early stages of the emergency began during the crisis period, 1992-1994. The CO introduced and maintained a forward looking perspective, adopting a broad partnership strategy, building an approach to working with CBOs, and even giving attention to more specific programme initiatives which lay the basis for a sustainable response to the emergency. Currently, the programme orientation is promising, though the CO is still struggling to fully control and follow through on these strategies and initiatives.

Through some of the more difficult aspects of the Haiti experience, significant lessons have emerged. Based on these lessons learned, the Evaluation Team feels that a number of recommendations should be made both for UNICEF globally as well as for the UNICEF Haiti Office. The former are highlighted with shading below.

7.1 Sanctions & Politics vs. Child Rights
The UNICEF mandate to help women and children gives it a clear moral purpose in times of crisis. However, there was controversy around UNICEF’s actions in Haiti. The UNICEF-commissioned study, carried out by the Harvard Center on Population and Development, showing the detrimental effects of UN sanctions on the well-being of women and children was perceived by some as supportive of the de facto military government (1991-1994). This was true too of UNICEF programmes. Capacity building components of UNICEF programmes were limited by the definition of humanitarian assistance, as articulated by the OAS. On another level, people criticized UNICEF for its duplicity as an organization which promotes child rights, but which did not take a strong enough stand against UN sanctions and their crippling effects on the poor, among them women and children. This complex controversy itself demonstrates the political delicacy of UNICEF’s position as protector of child rights. Despite these challenges, UNICEF Haiti maintained a very difficult balance and gained respect as an organization which had been true to its mandate.

Thus, in a political crisis, while the mandate of UNICEF may be difficult to challenge morally, it is bound to be challenged politically. This is particularly true where the UN Security Council is involved and sanctions are imposed on behalf of the international community. Impartiality of the UN is then replaced by a political objective, often ostensibly to protect political rights, which conflicts
with the humanitarian concerns for economic and social rights. Similarly, ‘neutral’ relief assistance is seen in opposition to politically sensitive capacity building initiatives, even when these are promoted by donors in other fora as important means of increasing cost-effectiveness in emergency response.

In such a situation, UNICEF pursuit of its mandate and moral responsibility to act in favour of women and children can entail bending the rules or establishing careful nuances which might not be widely appreciated, locally, among sister agencies or in international circles.

The delicate political manoeuvering involved is as important as programme design, and is essential to open the way for programmes to move forward at all. This manoeuvering takes place at headquarters, but much more so at the CO level where the nuances must be put into practice. This perhaps obvious statement has important implications for the human resources profile at the level of the UNICEF CO where political analysis must be encouraged, as well as for the role of headquarters which must be active in the defense of UNICEF’s position among members of the international community.

Political manoeuvering will include planned advocacy. A crucial advocacy tool, whether for quiet diplomacy or public pronouncements, will be solid information on the situation of women and children and the potential or actual impact of international intervention. This is notoriously difficult to measure, yet UNICEF must strive for sound information as it will undoubtedly have to defend its position. This involves balancing careful methodological choices as well as transparency regarding inherent limitations in information collection, with choices about how and where to make the most effective stand in favour of children and women.

In order to protect its mandate and provide international leadership as an advocate of child rights, UNICEF must rely on political savvy as well as strong information and analysis to back such a position.

**International leadership on sanctions based on knowledge**

UNICEF should position itself so that it is equipped to take a transparent and coherent stand, maintaining its leadership in the protection of children and women’s rights, in cases where sanctions are proposed or eventually applied. This demands an acceleration of research on sanctions and their impact on children and women, as well as the development of practical tools for the measurement of the effects. This is consistent with the UNICEF

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109 Even in contexts where sanctions are not applied, in conflict situations UNICEF must still thread its way through tensions between moral stands on political and civil rights (solidarity with an oppressed population) and on humanitarian grounds (protection of economic & civil rights and child rights, involving possible collusion with illegitimate regimes). Where the focus is on child rights, this may be more easily understood as a tension between sustainable long term protection of rights vs. short term protection; the latter may or may not undermine the former.

**HQ/RO role in representing UNICEF interests**

- In emergency or political crisis contexts, especially where UN coordination becomes an issue, UNICEF HQ and regional offices must work in concert with country offices to ensure representation of UNICEF’s interests at the highest levels of the UN and with the UN Security Coordinator. This role of UN headquarters and regional offices will necessarily vary depending on where the focus of international discussion and decision-making lies. However, there must be clear designation of roles and expectations. This is important to ensure that UNICEF interests are represented in joint UN appeal processes, just as it is important for larger issues such as the nature of sanctions and mitigation of their negative impact on women’s and children’s rights.

**Monitoring at the country level**

- Monitoring must be a central part of UNICEF response to a crisis, as a basis for calling attention to vulnerabilities before populations suffer the worst effects of crisis and as a means of prioritizing scarce resources. This is a tool for allowing the best possible protection of child rights. Where a country office is going into an emergency or political crisis, a strong monitoring and evaluation function should be established as a priority. Monitoring activities should also be a central part of emergency preparedness planning.

- In considering monitoring systems, de-centralized community-based approaches should be privileged where-ever possible; this is true in general for sustainability, but is particularly important in situations of fragile State stability. Such approaches can be fostered within UNICEF service delivery programmes as well as in support to national monitoring activities. Involving a variety of stakeholders in information collection and analysis has the potential to create a broad-based support for child rights.

**Political analysis at the CO level**

- In complex emergency situations or countries of fragile stability, UNICEF country offices need to find political advisors who can help them negotiate the varied and conflicting political interests. This must be a priority since the cost of political naivete or misjudgement can be very high and the work of political navigation through such contexts is a tremendous burden which can subtract attention of senior staff from overall management of office and programmes. It may be necessary to seek such political guidance informally, but it must be recognized as a factor in ensuring maximum effectiveness of UNICEF programmes.
7.2 **Emergency Preparedness**

Related to the above is the question of emergency preparedness. The Haiti experience showed that cumulative pressures on the CO staff to respond can be very strong in a crisis situation. When combined with a lack of a clear programme objective and direction, as was the case in the early part of the crisis in Haiti, this can lead to ineffective and poorly chosen interventions. It has taken until recently for the CO to reorient activities to its mid- and long-term objectives.

*What proved most effective for the CO was the development of a flexible plan for different scenarios within a well-framed programme, appropriate for both crisis and transition to democracy. The most interesting and to a certain extent successful element of this planning was a strategy of fostering broad partnerships, referred to again below.*

*However, it would also appear that, once achieved, preparedness is difficult for a CO to maintain. The human factors at work in a crisis situation -- burn out, a tendency to expect perpetuation of the status quo -- act as a barrier to good preparedness planning. This is true even when high political tension and potential instability seem evident.*

Some mechanism must be found which facilitates the CO to regularly revisit preparedness planning as something far more than a question of logistics and supplies. Emergency preparedness planning must be made appropriate for high stress political and military emergencies as well as tentative transition to democracy.

**Broad preparedness planning not restricted to ‘emergencies’**

- Regional offices and/or headquarters should be responsible for supporting a process of preparedness planning, or flexible programming for scenarios, in on-going emergencies as well as in countries judged to be in fragile position. This involves eliminating the distinction between ‘emergency countries’ and ‘regular programmes’ in the planning process, and strengthening analysis of constraints and assumptions.

7.3 **Human Resources Management**

The UNICEF Haiti experience underlined once again a lesson which has been drawn from numerous emergency experiences in the organization. *Human resources are part of emergency preparedness.* The effects of burn out on preparedness planning are mentioned above.

*Human resources management ‘with a human face’ continues to be a problem despite the predictability of burn out and the extensive literature on the ill effects of stress. Perversely, the organization risks losing staff with valuable emergency experience when it does not respond to these problems promptly (or at all).*
Preparedness of human resources

- Regional offices and headquarters human resources functions should consider and define their role in emergency preparedness of country offices through the placement of experienced staff and support to staff morale. Offices requiring some institutional experience with emergency situations can often be identified. Staff burn-out can be foreseen, and should be monitored and planned around with earlier rotations.

Role of senior regional and headquarters staff

- Senior headquarters and regional offices must consider the importance of their periodic visits, not least for staff moral and guidance.

Stress management

- At the CO level, stress management should be recognized as very important. It requires serious and sustained professional input; a short inadequate intervention may leave the office in a worse situation than had nothing been done at all.

7.4 Partnerships

7.4.1 Partners as part of preparedness

The decision to take on a broad range of civil society partners in Haiti was forced by the ban on contact with the de facto government. The CO had made a strategic error prior to 1992 in isolating potential partners except the State. This error held the office to low levels of execution for two years, a period during which the situation of women and children was rapidly deteriorating. By moving to take on a broad range of civil society partners, UNICEF achieved the operational reach to carry out its programmes during the last two years of the crisis and perhaps achieved a stronger basis for the period of transition.

*The experience provides a lesson for the organization globally on the importance of balancing partnership options as part of emergency preparedness in potential political crisis.*

- UNICEF internationally should consider analysis of potential partners as part of its process of emergency preparedness planning. UNICEF should maintain relations with a broad range of civil society partners as well as traditional State partners where they exist, particularly in situations of political instability.

Applied to the case of Haiti:

- UNICEF needs to balance its support of NGOs and government. This is a good emergency preparedness move. As more pressure builds to give resources to the State, the CO needs
to maintain its commitment to strategically chosen NGO partnerships. Those partnerships may again become critical if another emergency situation arises.

7.4.2 Defining the nature of partnerships

The Haiti experience also demonstrates the challenges which partnerships involve. Challenges were encountered at all levels of national partnerships, with NGOs, CBOs and the State, the central issue being the nature and purpose of the partnership.

A broad partnership strategy places tremendous demands on UNICEF as a capacity building organization according to the broadest definition of this term which includes empowerment. This role cannot be underestimated and must be backed by resource allocation. Even in absence of this, partnership requires serious analysis of operational capacities and limitations. This can prove to be a defining factor in the success of UNICEF advocacy activities, which demand follow through by partners. It also defines realistic expectations on programme execution by partners.

In responding to demands of local NGOs and CBOs, UNICEF runs a great risk of spreading itself too thin and, as in the case of Haiti, failing to respond to strategically important needs of the NGOs. The CO is still struggling with myriad proposals by CBOs and NGOs. This has been a drain on office human resources with sometimes high opportunity cost.

At the same time, UNICEF does have the opportunity to focus support in areas which have the potential to increase programme impact. In addition to technical training, NGOs highlighted opportunities for UNICEF to provide:

- support building NGO managerial capacities,
- support in liaison between NGOs and the State,
- dissemination of lessons learned from other experiences nationally and world wide.

Similarly, partnerships with various levels of the State offer UNICEF tremendous opportunities to contribute to the returned constitutional government, promote child rights and foster a working relationship between civil society and government. The greatest opportunity lies in strengthening the coordination and normative role of the State, in order to facilitate its relationships with the myriad volunteer and private actors in the social sector. The logical focus would be on planning and monitoring roles, as had been articulated in earlier CO programme plans from 1994. This provides opportunities for UNICEF to work with local level government in the form of the CASECs and the mayors, as well as with State ministries.

UNICEF’s partnership strategy with NGOs and the State appears to have been largely focused on programme delivery, with short term support to material and logistical capacities, as well as technical training as specifically necessary for programme results. However, the partnership strategy currently offers a great opportunity to contribute to the transition to democracy through more sustained capacity building and empowerment of civil society.
organizations and local level authorities, facilitating cooperation and coordination between them.

**Analysis of capacities and consolidation of NGO Partners**

UNICEF Haiti must continue to consolidate its relations with NGOs. This should involve a careful match between UNICEF objectives and resources, the objectives and capacities of potential partners and a realistic plan for strengthening partner organizations (capacity building and empowerment) as necessary. This requires a systematic and transparent analysis of potential partners which ideally would be participatory, offering greater clarity around mutual expectations including the factors conditioning partnership.

**UNICEF as a knowledge centre**

UNICEF Haiti should be able to respond to the demands of partners to benefit from UNICEF's international experience. UNICEF should share more information with partners and make an effort to pass on case studies and various other documentation on relevant experiences in other parts of the world. This corresponds to the often mentioned role of UNICEF as a knowledge centre.

**Facilitating the relationship between State and NGOs**

UNICEF should use its image and mandate to bring NGOs and the State together in a constructive dialogue. Both partners have expressed interest in this, and given the current struggle over the relative roles and power of each, this could be a substantial contribution to any kind of democratic development in Haiti.

**Building State capacities**

UNICEF should establish a better balance between service delivery inputs and strengthening of the supervisory, normative and coordination roles of the State. This will help the State to manage the diverse and sometimes fragmented delivery of services through the non-governmental sector, eventually increasing potential impact. The strong leadership by the State in such functions would serve the current context, but would also better prepare civil society and the international community for emergency response. Support to the State in these functions should be coordinated with other international agencies.

**Building local level management and response**

UNICEF should work to reinforce capacities at the level of local authorities and civil society (See 7.5 Community Organizations). The original planning and monitoring project, as articulated in the *Bridging Programme 1995-1997*, focusing on building local capacities to monitor and analyze community’s needs is an example of the kind of work which could be taken on with the CASEC and mayoral administrations.
7.5 COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
UNICEF-Haiti has introduced in concept at least, a potentially innovative approach to emergency preparedness through partnership with CBOs in the context of political crisis. This was inspired by recommendations of Mark Duffield for UNICEF to focus on civil society, enabling them to better respond to political crisis. In Haiti, this is still a new experience, having undergone a significant reorientation in the last year, post crisis. The effort to work with CBOs has been slowed by many practical problems, which centre around defining a realistic role for UNICEF and developing a model which can serve as the base for sectoral programmes. At this point, it would be premature to conclude that the CO’s work had made a positive impact on local level preparedness.

Experience thus far shows that the UNICEF CO does not have the capacity to work directly with CBOs, except in the context of a small pilot experience designed to develop a replicable model. Even in the latter case, it is essential that a realistic analysis of various partners’ capacities be carried out, including those of UNICEF.

Other UNICEF partners, including NGOs and State, tend to refer to CBOs, not as partners, but as beneficiaries. This can also be said of some of the CO staff. It does not appear that adequate attention has been given to the work of transforming organizational values (obviously limited at some point by individual attitudes) which will have an impact on the entire strategy of developing local level capacities or empowerment.

♦ UNICEF should focus resources on working with partners to ensure the development of an effective model for strengthening CBOs (a combination of capacity building work and empowerment as defined by the CO). The Office should consider allocating more human resources to this work.

♦ If CBO partners are to be the base for UNICEF work, development of models for working with them must also take into consideration appropriate variations to allow for the faster pace of basic services sectors.

♦ UNICEF must work towards realistic analysis of partners’ and its own capacities and definition of responsibilities, with the possibility of seeking external support on an ad hoc or referral basis from organizations with the appropriate expertise.

♦ UNICEF should also work at the level of associations and federations of CBOs, strengthening their role as networks and coordination bodies, which can then provide capacity building support and foster the empowerment of CBOs. This is, however, dependent on the development of a refined set of tools and methodologies for such work.

♦ It will be important for UNICEF to work with partner organizations, and to continue work internally across sectors, in order to define ways to improve their work with CBOs where
necessary. As the large donors such as IDB figure more in Haiti, this will be necessary in order to ensure a critical mass of partners who understand a common approach to working with CBOs -- an approach adaptable to different community contexts, reliant on capacities developed or existent within partner organizations.

7.6 OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS SPECIFIC TO HAITI PROGRAMMES
Targeting resources: reaching the poorest of the poor
The Haiti programme outcomes indicate that the CO was not consistently reaching the poorest of the poor. Qualitative information suggests that access to services in health and water were limited due to costs which are unaffordable for poorest families. This applied to the crisis period as well as to today.

Similarly, it is clear that credit programmes cannot be applied to similar effect in all regions and that outside of more productive regions such as Grand Goave/Leogane, a credit programme according to the current model will exclude the poorest families. Credit programmes targeted those women who were traders, thus excluding families which no longer had the available cash to trade. These latter families were generally no longer coping and had fallen into survival strategies and destitution.

However, in programme documentation, apart from broad geographic targeting there appear to have been little in the way of explicit criteria for targeting, particularly with regard to reaching the poorest. It appears that this was justified by the magnitude of needs within the broad geographic areas of operation. Targeting was used primarily to avoid duplication with other organizations.

♦ UNICEF Haiti must urgently clarify its targeting strategies, particularly with regard to targeting of the poorest populations.

♦ Based on these strategies, the women’s credit programme and cost-recovery strategies in health and water programmes must be reviewed.

♦ If the CO attempts to target the poorest of the poor, it will be essential to have not only static quantitative information on poor families such as the current study on health services use and disposable income, but also a qualitative understanding of poor families’ coping mechanisms.

Training
The evaluation pointed to weaknesses in the outcome of training activities executed by UNICEF partners as well as by UNICEF staff. This training is essential to reaching many of the programme objectives.
UNICEF Haiti should evaluate the outcome of training and, if necessary, seek external assistance to improve effectiveness of training methodologies promoted and executed by partner organizations.

Monitoring and evaluation
The during the crisis the CO did not have adequate information for programme decision-making. The collapse of generally weak State information systems and the absence of any structured coordination and sharing of information with other partners, meant that educated guesses had to be taken based on disperse, incomplete and incomparable information sets. Similarly, information collection and analysis was inadequate to ensure a strong cross-sectoral gender approach as proposed in the 1995-1997 programme documents. Despite the importance of the Community Organization Project, a monitoring and evaluation plan has yet to be designed for it.

The CO should continue with current efforts to improve monitoring particularly looking to its own proposal for Planning and Monitoring in the Bridging Programme, as well as to recommendations for development of early warning systems as made in the Harvard Study. The opportunity exists to build monitoring through a network of local actors including associations of CBOs, NGOs and local authorities to provide a broad monitoring system on the situation of women and children.

The CO should develop with partners a monitoring and evaluation plan for the Community Organization Project which allows regular appraisal of the project’s progress. This goes beyond measurement of implementation and should include a system of more in-depth qualitative monitoring which could be based on such approaches as participatory monitoring systems managed by community-based organizations themselves and periodic ‘random’ analysis of CBOs.

In order to carry out the above, the CO requires staff which are equally able to design and/or coordinate qualitative and quantitative information collection which feeds into decision-making. The CO should consider upgrading the proposed M&E position.

The UNICEF Haiti Country Office has experimented with a number of innovative options for carrying out its mandate to protect the well-being of women and children in a context of political crisis and complex transition. While these approaches are not altogether successful or fully refined yet, the choices to take on a broad civil society partnership and develop an approach to working with CBOs have opened the possibilities for UNICEF to foster a stabilizing process. It would be premature to claim any positive impact on democratic participation. However, it is critical that the experience gained thus far not be lost and that the CO continue to focus energies on refining this experience, monitoring and evaluating its progress for dissemination.
Appendix A: Terms of Reference

A.1 Background and Justification

Between 1992-1996, the programming environment in Haiti underwent major changes marked by four distinct periods characterized roughly as follows:

a) In September 1991 there is a coup d’etat, suspension of aid, an OAS and then UN embargo, the effects of which began to be felt in December 1991, influencing programme implementation in 1992. Closure of financial institutions, closure or down-sizing of embassies and bilateral programmes, evacuations and subsequent disfunction of several UN agencies ensue. UNICEF remains operational with ‘essential staff’. UN/OAS resolutions are interpreted to mean no contact with the Haitian state, even at the operational level of public services. Humanitarian services are only allowed to be delivered through private sector and civil society. In June 1992, the government, headed by Marc Bazin, is installed but is not recognised internationally.

b) The July 1993 Governor’s Island Accord sets the stage for President Aristide’s return and General Cedras retirement. In September 1993, the Constitutional government headed by the Aristide-named Prime Minister Malval is installed in Port-au-Prince in very precarious security situation. UNICEF reestablishes relations with the government, particularly the Ministers/ministries of health, education, public works and social affairs. In October 1993, the Accord collapses. UN agencies’ dependents and ‘non-essential staff’ are evacuated. Severe sanctions are imposed, including an embargo on fuel. The Constitutional cabinet resigns and exists simply ‘pour gerer les affaires courantes.’ Ministers remain in their posts, but are paralysed and unable to function. By January 1994, the country is without fuel; as of February a humanitarian fuel programme is launched. The country grinds to a halt.

c) On 11 May 1994, a rump parliament votes in a new illegal government and a provisional President, Emile Jonassaint, to replace President Aristide. The international community responds with far harsher sanctions and now all imports into Haiti, including humanitarian assistance, have to be licensed by the UN Sanctions Committee. The Dominican border is technically ‘sealed’ and all forms of transportation into the country are suspended, leaving Haiti physically totally isolated. A naval blockade enforces the sanctions. An aggressive military invasion is planned for mid-September and is only averted by the eleventh-hour Carter mission which produced the Port-au-Prince Accord.

d) On 19 September 1994, the US led Multinational Force Invades Haiti with 20,000 troops and on 15 October 1994, President Aristide is reinstated to power. The new Prime Minister and Cabinet are installed. International cooperation is re-launched and massive efforts to implement an emergency economic recovery plan begin in 1995, after the plan receives more that US $ 1.2 million in pledges in the January 1995 Paris Round Table.
These changes in the political environment were accompanied by periods of extreme scarcity under the application of international sanctions, dramatic and progressively more difficult to measure increases in human suffering as well as by a dramatic increase in UNICEF programme expenditures from $2.5 million to $8.5 million.

In terms of UNICEF programming, the first three years of this period, 1992-94 cover the core of the emergency period, whereas the period from 1995 to the present represents the transition to a reconstruction/development programme. The Haiti Country Office programming has been forced several times to reorient objectives, strategies and modalities of assistance. Given the frequent readjustments and the particularly challenging programming environment, it is appropriate to carry out a full Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) designed to document lessons learned, feeding into the midterm review for the 1995-97 UNICEF Country Programme and the eventual preparation of the 1998-2001 Country Programme.

A.2 Objectives and Scope
With reference to the four distinct changes in programming context outlined above and taking into consideration the UNICEF policy environment, the objective of the Country Programme Evaluation is:

• to assess the strategic programmatic choices taken,
• to assess the management response to enable implementation of these,
• to make a rapid retrospective assessment of programme outcome in terms of the beneficiary population
• and to make an appraisal of potentially sustainable aspects of approaches introduced during the emergency and early reconstruction phases.

Inter-related criteria for assessment include appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency and cost.

In the course of the analysis outlined above, the evaluation should assess and elaborate upon opportunities for alternative approaches only in so far as they provide guidance in terms of valid processes or actual options feasible for pursuit in future programming.

The review of strategic programmatic choices must include an evaluation of the coherence between objectives adopted (the premises, situation analysis and preparation process upon which they were based), the allocation of resources across sectors and activities, and the selection of partners.

The choice of different partners must be evaluated in terms of effectiveness for coordination of areas of intervention, for advocacy work on behalf of child rights, for programme implementation and for fostering the participation of civil society in emergency activities. The definition of the role of UNICEF in these partnerships and mechanisms for coordination should also be examined. Lessons in this area should be identified with a view to orienting choices for the 1998-2001 Country Programme.
The evaluation of **management response** to enable the implementation of programmes in a constantly changing environment, as mentioned above, must provide analysis of changes in organisational structure and the adaptation of administrative support measures. These must be analysed in terms of their logic and coherence with programmatic choices taken, particularly examining flexibility, capacity to deliver and management of information flow which guides programmatic change. Overall office expenditure flow, throughput by officer, supply lines and stock movements will be among the indicators used to measure appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of management response.

Also included must be a review of policy and technical guidance as well as moral support provided by HQ and TACRO to help the office make the right choices in a highly politicised and unique programming environment. This facet of the evaluation must start from an understanding of policy changes already undertaken during this period and should focus on identifying areas where further policy development is required.

The third level of analysis, **programme outcome** will be a key ingredient for assessing both strategic choices and management response. Where regular information systems allow, the evaluation will encompass an evaluation of impact for the beneficiary population. However, where the rapidly changing situation, insecurity and difficulties in access have not allowed adequate monitoring, this will not be possible. The evaluation must then examine achievements in terms of programme output and process indicators, seeking proxy indicators for coverage where possible. In addition, the evaluation must make at least a limited rapid assessment in qualitative terms of the way in which UNICEF programme initiatives possibly strengthened, capitalized on or hindered community- and family-level coping mechanisms. In addition, all must be viewed in light of cost analysis.

The evaluation must also examine the results of capacity building and empowerment strategies which lay the ground work for **sustainable reconstruction** activities. Again, unless specific indicators and monitoring systems have been pre-established, this will be limited to a rapid qualitative assessment of selected interventions.

### A.3 Methodology

The CPE is to be carried out by a team of 3 evaluators external to the Country Office working closely with the Country Office Steering Committee in order to ensure both objectivity and a process of analysis involving key actors within UNICEF and among partner organisations.

The approach used by the evaluation team will be mixed including:

- Documentary review
- One-on-one interviews
- Workshop consultation and analysis

For field visit (s):
• Key informant interviews
• Focus group interviews
• Direct observations

(Depending on the situation, transect walk, seasonal calendar, community mapping and adapted wealth ranking will be used for initial orientation prior to interviews. Depending on interviewees, a variety of RAP techniques will be used in the interviews.)

Cross-checking will be on-going allowing information from different sources and methods to be compared. In addition to regular cross-checking and discussion of findings within the Evaluation Team, this will also involve frequent feed-back of intermediate findings from outside sources to members of the Country Office staff and the Steering Committee with a view to establishing lessons learned and pushing analysis to a level that is useful to Country Office planning.

Sources of information will include international and Haitian NGOs, parliamentarians, mayors, media directors, constitutional government ministers having some knowledge of, contact or activities with UNICEF during the 1992-95 period; beneficiaries and community-level agents of UNICEF activities; as well as UNICEF headquarters, Regional and Country Office staff.

The evaluation of Country Programme outcomes will require the selection of a sample area based programme as well as a sample site or few sites (depending on mobility in the field). This selection will be made by the Evaluation Steering Committee based on clearly defined criteria ideally providing a representative view of the programming history. These criteria for site selection should include:

• type of UNICEF intervention (sector-specific, integrated)
• the time over which UNICEF intervention in the site has lasted (intervention from before or since crisis period)
• proximity to a UNICEF supply centre
• level of resources allocated
• type of UNICEF partners involved
• degree and type of impact felt by crisis
• population size and profile

Other considerations such as accessibility and transportation logistics will also play a factor.

Similarly the selection of interviewees and participants in workshops must be largely guided by the Evaluation Steering Committee. These will be chosen to represent the different functional types of partnerships: coordination, advocacy, programme implementation and capacity building. The selection will also seek to represent the different types of partners according to pre-defined and stated
characteristics: such as, local authorities, international agencies, national NGOs (large, small, old, new, sectoral focus), international NGOs, etc.

A.4  **EXTERNAL TEAM COMPOSITION**

The team will be comprised of three persons to allow the work to be covered in the short time available. The team members will bring together an understanding of the UNICEF policy environment and programming issues in complex emergencies, experience in open key informant interviews, RAP techniques, as well as gender and cost analysis.
Appendix B: Summary of Workshops NGO & Government Partners

B.1 INTRODUCTION
Two one-day workshops were carried out a selection of UNICEF partners in order to get feed-back on role played by UNICEF and its potential role in the future.

The two workshops were held respectively on 4 September with 15 representatives from 12 NGOs, and on 6 September with 15 civil service partners. These included a mix of current partners and partners during the period of the coup d’etat.

B.2 NGO WORKSHOP
During this workshop, participants were asked to present their analysis of the crisis, identifying the key problems which they were trying to address. Based on this, participants then provided their feed-back on how partnership with UNICEF helped or hindered them in accomplishing their work. This was carried out by focusing on key roles which UNICEF played or could play.

Advocacy
UNICEF was perceived to have respected its mandate during the crisis in spite of the political tensions.

The ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the conference with the mayors and the subsequent declaration by all party leaders were considered among the important successes of UNICEF. Frustration was expressed at the lack of follow-up to these events.

Coordination
This role was seen to include not only bringing partners together, but fostering a harmonization of activities. UNICEF was perceived as having an important role in facilitating contacts between different actors. However, it was felt that UNICEF could expand a number of other aspects of its coordination role:

- Facilitating coordination between NGO and government was highlighted as an important area for future action.
- Encouraging other donors to also coordinate with both government and NGOs.
- Acting as resource center and focal point for information sharing regarding the situation of women and children in Haiti. It was mentioned that UNICEF is requesting information from its partners, but does not analyse or make systematic dissemination of its information. NGOs would like access to lessons learned from UNICEF experiences in other countries.

At the same time, NGOs cautioned that UNICEF had enlarged its field of action beyond its capacity to respond with adequate follow-up. This was attributed to overstretched staff as opposed to
inadequately qualified staff.

**Financial support**
While many organisations reported that UNICEF support enabled them to continue functioning during the worst periods of the crisis, some perceived the organization only as a source of complementary funding.

However, a number of problems were raised regarding the absence of clear criteria for approving or rejecting requests for support to projects and to NGOs, the short term nature of financial commitments by UNICEF, the delays before receiving feedback on requests, and the overall lack of transparency in these processes. Clear guidelines for the submission of projects were suggested to remedy this.

UNICEF was perceived as more flexible in providing financial support than currently. There is currently a concern that UNICEF financial support is now more difficult to obtain than during the crisis, either due to a change in criteria or selection processes or due to the necessity of negotiating also with the government.

**Technical support**
Technical support was associated with providing technical training, financing of technical personnel in NGO projects (this was in isolated cases), sharing of technical information (as mentioned above under coordination) and carrying out research. UNICEF was considered to do only the former well. Problems with UNICEF-supported studies were mentioned. In addition, several NGOs mentioned the need for support in building their own managerial capacities.

**B.3 WORKSHOP WITH CIVIL SERVICE PARTNERS**
Civil servants were invited to analyze the impact of the crisis on the institutions for which they worked and the how this affected in turn the activities they were able to carry out. The effects of the transition were then discussed. Based on this analysis, participants then reported on activities and roles played by UNICEF with State partners at different during the crisis and now in the current transition period. The following roles were highlighted:

- UNICEF played an important role in conceptualizing projects with other donors and international organizations. While some participants felt that officials were excluded of the progress during the crisis, others pointed to the area of Education, in which UNICEF had supported the constitutional government in developing national policy even before the crisis had terminated.

- Participants felt that UNICEF carried out its programmes substituting for the State during the crisis, either executing on its own or through financial support to its network of NGOs; they
saw this has happening despite the fact that UNICEF did not attempt to supplant the State.

- UNICEF fulfills now an important role in supporting technical training.

- UNICEF was perceived to play a strong coordination role during the crisis period, facilitating contacts despite the difficult political context.

- UNICEF was seen as having developed a strong and important role in advocacy, referring to work in communications.

  Discussions highlighted UNICEF’s strength in adapting constantly during the crisis and succeeded in finding ways to respond to the emergencies arisen from it.

  There was a marked breakup between the staff members that indicated that UNICEF collaborated closely with the *de facto* Government and those that insisted the UNICEF only worked with constitutional government. Nevertheless, UNICEF is perceived as an apolitical organization, keeping contacts with people while avoiding political positions.
Appendix C: Methodology for Field Information Collection

C.1 Considerations & Definitions
The primary purpose of the field research phase was to examine potential effects of UNICEF programmatic interventions, particularly in terms of how they supported or not the coping strategies adopted by communities and families. This is related to:

- the appropriateness of programmatic choice
- the appropriateness of design
- the effectiveness of programmes

Coping strategies are understood as the adjustments, in times of crisis, in traditional or typical mechanisms or patterns for securing livelihood. A distinction is made between coping strategies which serve to protect livelihood patterns, and survival strategies which may secure short-term basic needs at the cost of medium to long-term livelihood.

Livelihood patterns are very broad -- livelihood taken to include access to and availability of food and health care as well as more difficult to measure social and cultural needs of the family/community.

This evaluation focused on UNICEF programme performance. This meant that while information collection had to include an understanding of priority concerns in the communities studied, according to representatives of the broader community as well as potentially vulnerable sub-groups in those communities, it was necessary to focus on those aspects of livelihood to which UNICEF can or could reasonably respond. Of key importance was whether, in responding to identified needs, UNICEF programmes managed to take into consideration and support coping mechanisms. In an effort to prioritize aspects of livelihood to which UNICEF could respond, reference was made to nutrition conceptual framework and the Conceptual Framework for UNICEF Emergency Interventions developed by EMOPS, as referred to in the Introduction of the report.

C.2 Sampling
Unit of analysis
Based on the above considerations, the unit of analysis is naturally at the community and household level.

Definition of household and family was complicated by the fact that mobility of household members between rural and urban centres was a key strategy for coping and survival, with the departed family often still an integral part of the production-consumption unit. Similarly, the nature and permanency of unions between men and women appears to have been affected by the crisis, with
economic benefits of union a necessary consideration for women. Extended rural families often live in a ‘cour’, sometimes including several shelters gathered together in one area with smaller units. In urban areas or even small rural towns, and particularly when families have moved, this practice appears to break down, thus changing support networks. The complex relationship between these households in terms of production and consumption activities make it difficult to quantify the relative importance of various mechanisms for ensuring livelihood. However, for the purposes of this rapid assessment, it was only necessary to identify differing coping and survival strategies, for various household and family profiles, link them to rough levels of wealth/poverty and potential effects on access to or effectiveness of UNICEF supported interventions.

Sampling to facilitate this was multi-staged (site, community/sub-group and household test cases) and used a variety of purposive sampling approaches designed to provide information rich cases for study from a range of programme contexts.

Site selection
The first level of sampling, the site, was defined as an area encompassing smaller and larger communities including the end of the service delivery chain, for example the basic primary health care unit or end of the EPI chain. This meant that without pursuing extremes, the selection of cases within the site would allow information collection regarding families and communities with better and worse access to UNICEF programmes.

It was first decided that sites should be chosen to represent the three distinct areas of operation in which the Country Office worked in their Basic Services programming: Port-au-Prince, Grand Goave/Leogane, and the North-West Department. In addition, for each site, criteria for selection was to include:

- representation of a range of programme interventions, particularly keeping in mind priority interventions in unstable contexts (presumably at least health, nutrition, WES);
- representation of a range of partners in each site, including both partners considered successful and less successful; the location of mini-clusters would ideally coincide with a concentration of partners;
- programme activity from at least as far back as before September 1994.

The sites chosen met these criteria to varying degrees. (See more detailed description of the characteristics of each site under the section on Context in Appendix C: Analysis of Coping Strategies.) Sites chosen were Gros Morne/Grande Plaine representing the North-West and Meyer/Kafe Lompre from the Grand Goave area. For Port-au-Prince, field work was interrupted after one day by the threat of insecurity. Due to constraints on rescheduling and the great diversity

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among urban slum contexts, sampling was adjusted to include interviews in three different slums: Morne l’Hopital and La Saline in Port-au-Prince proper, and St Martin.

Selection of key informants
Within a given site, information collection focused on reconstructing ‘typical’ patterns and how they have changed during different phases of the crisis for identified sub-groups (poor/wealthy, powerful/weak with emphasis on the latter in each comparison).

In addition to prior consultation of secondary sources, this entailed selection of key informants (identified by project staff and people from the community as having a valuable perspective) for different issues such as:

- characterization of the site including its different communities and resources (mapping);
- characterization of the population groups and sub-groups within communities;
- description of food security-related activities (broader than economic activities);
- ranking health related concerns; health seeking practices; health/WES services use;
- identifying community/kinship support (a backdrop to food security, health, caring practices).

In the first round of information collection, interviewers tried to piece together general patterns, alternating questions on what was true for ‘most people’ within a certain sub-group (i.e. ‘poor’ families; families in an isolated area) with similar questions on the individual or family’s behaviour and experience. The former as well as constant reference to the historical focus of the research sometimes helped lead interviewees away from exaggerating their personal case.

Following this, key informants were sought out who represented identified sub-groups (criteria-based stratified purposive sampling) as test cases, to confirm or disprove the cumulative picture. Sub-groups were determined most effectively by eliciting descriptions of differences between wealthy and poor, by ranking economic activities in terms of desirability and benefit. Based on criteria produced from these descriptions, cases of households representing different sub-groups were selected and interviewed using random walk techniques. Selection for group interviews (a limited form of ‘focus group’ due to constraints of translation) was planned on-site in order to pursue emerging questions for further exploration; time/logistical constraints meant that these generally included people who knew each other, coming from a same small locality.

The above stages were not followed in Port-au-Prince due to the necessary adjustments mentioned. The first day initiated in ‘Morne l’Hopital’ followed selection process as outlined focusing on broad coping strategies. However, an additional 3 group interviews were carried out in St Martin focusing on the workings of local organizations and one group interview was carried out in La Saline focusing on the working of the local water management committees.

C.3 INFORMATION COLLECTION TECHNIQUES AND TOOLS
Key informant and test case interviews were informal, based on evolving interview checklists, guided by a general framework included below. In addition, interviews used the following visualization techniques where appropriate:

- mapping (relative importance and accessibility of services, identification of physically isolated communities/sub-groups, boundaries for catchment areas, identification of geographically/environmentally-based problems);
- time line (manifestation of effects of crisis);
- proportional piling/pair-wise ranking (proportional representation of population sub-groups; ranking of importance of sources of food income, economic activities, health problems, health care practices including use of health services, ...).

C.4 INTERVIEW GUIDE
All themes were explored for trends/changes related to phases in crisis, using locally significant events which could be related to the different stages of the crisis.

Basic underlying questions:
1. In terms of .... (nutritional needs, health, water, community support, ed), how do you normally survive and how did this change (and therefore appropriate UNICEF response)?
2. Did (identified services/activities) affect or not the families well-being?

Outline of information needed
nutrition/food security
- relative importance of food purchased/traded/borrowed/own production; how/who/with what resources was food purchased/traded/borrowed/produced (list and rank/ note division of labour and responsibilities m/f) & any changes in each
- how relative importance of food quantities usually consumed changed (seasons, crisis); why (availability, access -- is credit an issue?? ) other options

nutrition/food intake
- intra-household division of food sources -- who eats what, when (probe: season; ages groups especially 0, 1, 2-4; m/f)

nutrition/health/ WES
- priority health problems --(probe: definition/local understanding; separate causes and illness; differences general, women, children (girls, boys) [rank]
- response to health problems including use of health services -- what do people do when they have a health problem; when do people use the health service [rank] (probe knowledge of preventative services)
- how do people get water? (probe: availability -- season, system, time/access -- transport,
containers/quality--how to know if water is good or not?)

education
• is this mentioned as important; did access change? for whom?

community/family
• changes in community organizations, response to common problems
• changes in family/ departure of member

services/projects
• orientation/prioritization of interventions (objective vs. activity)
• actual vs. proposed functioning of service/project
• who are targeted by/involved in service delivery
• who are those who have access (characterize according to other mechanisms they have of ensuring livelihood) and has this changed?

C.5 CONSTRAINTS
The major constraints in carrying out the field part of the research were foreseen. Time constraints limit the findings to broad brush strokes of livelihood patterns and coping strategies. Three days were allowed for each site with the exception of Port-au-Prince which was cut to one and one-half days due to security problems. Interviews were written up based on researchers’ notes as opposed to transcripts. The translation benefited from the community development experience of translators, which allowed them to rapidly understand the orientation of the field research and thus translate with attention to the style and content of questions and answers, as well as contribute their opinions as to how certain questions could be addressed. Similarity between French and Creole meant that interviewers could link observation of physical expression to the gist of what was being said, subsequently clarified through translation. Preparation of group interviews and individual interviews was facilitated by UNICEF field staff on hand, particularly for introductory meetings with community leaders and interviews with key informants for services or projects.

Given the above conditions and constraints, the findings cannot be asserted with any great certainty. They do nonetheless serve to underline key questions. In the case of Haiti, this focused particularly on the question of access to services conditioned by affordability. This is then recommended for further study in order to determine the magnitude of the problem.

C.6 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING METHODOLOGY
Were this methodology used again for a similar purpose it is suggested that:

• Time spent in each site be increased to five days to ensure greater certainty in the findings;
• Where local personnel can be found of sufficient objectivity and professional skill, as well as proficiency in the language of interviewees, it would be preferable to train them to carry out interviews directly, processing information under the guidance of perhaps an external person; this would better ensure a balance between knowledge of local customs and questioning of traditional assumptions;

• Despite familiarity with the existence of RAP, field offices may not fully understand the implications for preparing field work; offices should receive a full introduction to methodologies used well before the actual evaluation and should be more involved in the planning and design of tools.
Appendix D: Analysis of Coping Strategies

D.1 **Context**
The two rural sites were included in field research -- Gros Morne/Grand Plaine representing the North-West and Meyer/Kafe Lompre representing Grand Goave/Leogane -- each including a larger town and satellite village.

Gros Morne/Grand Plaine was an area just south of the North West Department, where WES activities were predominant, since 1992, and health activities had been initiated only since 1995. Gros Morne was a very busy market town of over 5000 inhabitants. Grand Plaine was about 1.5 hours drive without true road access, a village of about 500 in the hills where a health agent did outreach work and a water system had recently been installed. Several NGOs including CARE were active in Gros Morne. Caritas, the Mayors and the mixed state/private Hospital Alma Mater were the key partners.

Meyer and Kafe Lompre, in the Grand Goave area, were rural disperse populations around a small centre, Meyer being slightly larger, with a bigger market and the centre of the Section Communal of the same name. Interviews at the nearby town (1 hours drive) of Viala were also included as an area which was potentially more isolated. UNICEF activities included credit, education and health, integrated through the Community Organization project, and had been initiated in 1991. Partners included the Episcopalian Church, Mission Alpha as well as the ministries of Social Affairs and Education.

[In Port au Prince, field work was interrupted by the threat of insecurity. Since there was no time to compensate for the lost day, the approach for selecting interviews, detailed in Appendix B, as well as the objective of understanding coping strategies were necessarily abandoned. Interviews were carried out in Morne l’Hopital and La Saline, Port-au-Prince as well as in St. Martin, Delmas variously covering activities in health, water, education, credit and community organizations, and focusing on services in general.]

D.2. **Findings -- Rural Coping and Survival**

D.2.1 **Basic livelihood strategies**

There is a marked contrast between the two rural areas observed. Gros Morne showed, far more dramatically than Meyer, the ill effects of the *coup d’état*, the former with a much larger proportion of the population resorting to mere survival strategies.

This said, the basic livelihood strategies pursued by families who managed to cope were similar.
Below the purely commercial class (some members of which made enormous profits during the embargo), families depended on both their own agricultural and livestock production as well as cash income. Access to land was clearly a key sign of families still being able to cope to some extent, though this depended on the size of the plot. Cash income was vital, allowing families to buy additional/alternative food and basic products such as oil, kerosene and agricultural tools and seeds. Cash also allowed access to basic services -- education, health, transport.

The balance between a family’s own production and cash income was traditionally achieved through a similar distribution of labour in both locations. Men worked the land aided by older children and to a lesser extent the women. Women’s labour in agricultural production and in child care was widely sacrificed in favour of her commercial activities. The range of women’s commercial activities was enormous, including on the upper end the so-called “Madame Saras” who engage in wholesale trade. Among the poorer families, the big distinction was made between those who sold the family’s own production and those who bought and sold produce. This latter group itself included a wide range. Women with more cash available increased their volume of trade, entering into the sale of non-agricultural products and increasing the geographic area covered by their travels, as their situation permitted.

These livelihood strategies depended on community organization and informal support to provide credit and shared labour. Credit was available to some extent through external support, but also under the “solde” systems (revolving credit within an association of women) and informally under short-term loans for quick transactions or longer loans to cover unexpected costs, such as health services (cash was necessary for health services as well as for traditional medicines and spiritual cures).

In the Gros Morne area, however, even before the September 1991 coup d’etat, generally poorer production potential and several years of drought meant that many more families were struggling. Only the minority of women in the rural town of Grand Plaine were reported to buy and sell produce, the rest resorting only to the sale of their own agricultural produce and small livestock. (By contrast in Meyer interviews repeatedly suggested that almost all women engaged in some form of trade.) In Gros Morne’s slums, references were made to renting land through the “deux-moitiees” system in which half of produce was given as payment. There were also easily identifiable families who no longer could rent a plot of land, resorting to hiring out their labour instead.

D.2.2 Immediate effects of the crisis
All families below the level of large-scale traders were hurt by the crisis, though to varying degrees. Families were hit by increases in prices (linked to skyrocketing transport prices) and a corresponding dwindling of disposable income for commerce and credit. These combined to choke the volume of

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trade which families could afford, particularly for small-scale traders.

Locally, repression translated into escalation of violence, theft and extorsion, and initial population displacements from the cities, increasing temporarily the burden on rural families. While repression did limit community-based organization’s freedom, reportedly the more economically oriented organizations, such as credit association, were able to continue functioning. Extorsion did accentuate the drain on scarce cash.

D.2.3 Coping strategies

In response to the embargo, various coping strategies were adopted. Many were common to families in both Meyer and Gros Morne areas.

Where cash was considered inadequate, either for supporting women’s commercial activities or for consumption purposes, and where families still cultivated their own or rented land, a number of labour-based options for increasing available income were reported involving older children. Older boys and young men were reported leaving to find work -- provincial cities, Port-au-Prince, Dominican Republic and the USA were mentioned. However, these boys/young men appeared to be considered independent of the family unit. Older girls were also reported going off to nearby town or cities, Gros Morne/Leogane, or Port-au-Prince. Factory work in Port-au-Prince was mentioned as the best option though this was the most difficult to find. Most young women left in search of domestic labour, though they often had to hire a contact to find a placement. If these options did not bring in income, they at least reduced the drain on family cash reserves.

Protection of women’s commercial activities was clearly a central part of families’ response. In one group interview, women mentioned opting for reducing expenditures on meat and rice while they continued to allocate resources to a ‘solde’ system to support their trade activities.

Sale of small livestock was traditionally used to cover expenses such as school fees, health services, seeds/tools, kerosene. Livestock was ranked in descending order of value to the family as follows: pigs, mules, goats, pigeons, chickens. Mules would be essential not as a trade item, but as transportation for market goods. The sale of a pig, for example, could bring in considerable cash. Families with higher value and more livestock were protected to some extent against inflationary prices as the return on their own sales were also increased.

112 In both areas, populations displacements immediately followed the coup, from Port-au-Prince to the relative stability of rural areas. People generally were reported to return to the cities after February 1993. There was also a smaller level of movement between villages, the ‘bourg’ and the ‘maquis’ where displacement to a new location afforded the protection of anonymity for the politically active targeted by returned section chiefs and their supporters.

113 The current price mentioned in one interview was as high as 1,300 gourdes, the equivalent of 130 days of agricultural labour.
D.2.4 Survival strategies
At a certain point, where families’ land was too small or insufficiently productive, or when families’ had no land, options were more desperate ranging from erosive coping strategies to simply survival in destitution. These were much more frequently mentioned in interviews in the Gros Morne area than in Meyer. Most of the interviews in the two worst slums in Gros Morne and in the satellite town of Grande Plaine gave a fairly consistent picture of families using survival strategies which undermined family structures and eroded productive capital.

There was a notable divide in labour-based strategies, as poorer families involved younger children in income earning. Economic activities for children close to home appeared limited; artisanry (making and selling banana leave fences in town), seasonal day-labour in the agricultural sector and water carrying were mentioned for young and adolescent boys. Young girls were sent to nearby towns or cities, Gros Morne/Leogane or Port-au-Prince, working as domestic labourers but receiving room and board in lieu of pay. The increase in families resorting to these strategies were confirmed by rising estimates on street children and children in domestic labour. Interviewees in Port-au-Prince also talked about the increased numbers of youth, mostly 14-18 year old boys although also some pre-adolescent boys, who came to find work in the streets while families were still back on rural homesteads, with or without the knowledge of the sons’ whereabouts. Again these strategies served to reduce the number of mouths to feed.

As men’s agricultural labour was no longer advantageous on their own land, men were reported to sell their labour either nearby (Antibonite rice fields near Gros Morne were frequently mentioned) or in Port-au-Prince or Dominican Republic. The sale of women’s labour in the agricultural sector, or as porters in town, was reported in cases where women were single and had no land or could maintain no commercial activity. The actual income obtained from these options was limited. Salary for agricultural day-labour seems to have stayed the same during the crisis (10 gourdes per day), despite inflation in other prices. Income was also limited by seasonality of labour and competition for few openings.

The order in which each of these options was pursued was difficult to determine. As families faced more strained circumstances, it was clear family members traveled further and further afield in search of income. However, even in that pursuit, investment in transportation was still necessary. As long as possible, ties were maintained with cash income coming back to a homestead, a small plot of land being maintained where some family members and small children stayed. Breaking up of the family unit started with older children.

Reduction in expenditures was also a widely reported response to the situation, including reduction in expenses on food to sometimes alarming degrees among the families interviewed in the
poorest neighbourhoods. This is echoed by findings in the Harvard Study.\textsuperscript{114}

Distress sale of assets was also reported. This included both the sale of productive assets such as livestock (sometimes to the point of diminishing or abandoning animal husbandry). Poorer families were reduced to the sale of household assets such as sheets and blankets, pots and pans.

These sales were mentioned in relation to covering basics such as food, oil, health services or for paying back debts related to health services.

Interviewees, particularly those not trading, referred to the need to borrow to cover the cost of health services. There was insufficient time available to determine at what point families decided to eliminate this expenditure.

Charity was a central part of survival for many families. In the case of water services, in Gros Morne where there was a cost recovery system in place for most water committees, it was repeatedly reported that anywhere from 2 out of 10 to 5 out of 10 families could not afford to pay for water services. Of 6 committees, 5 reported having a system to forgive payment by such families, though this appeared to depend on the person managing the pump at the time.

The information given by interviewees is confirmed by other sources. It is estimated that 70\% of families manage with 10 gourdes per day\textsuperscript{115} which corresponds to the reported pay for agricultural day-labour.\textsuperscript{116} An adequate water supply for a family of 7 in Gros Morne, even if measured according to international standards for rural areas\textsuperscript{117} would cost between 5-10 \% of such a family income.

\section*{D.2.5 Implications for UNICEF programmes}

Based on the above, it was possible to draw a number of tentative conclusions about the appropriateness of UNICEF programmes:


\textsuperscript{115}Secr\`etaire d'Etat de la Population, Population et developpement en Haiti, 11 July 1995. This calculation applies the estimate of distribution of resources to the average annual income. It is not clear whether there is an adjustment for unreported income.

\textsuperscript{116}As confirmed in numerous interviews in Gros Morne and Grande Plaine, August 21-23, 1996.

\textsuperscript{117}20L/person/day in rural zones; 30L/person/day in villages under 2000 and 70L/person/day in villages more than 2000.
Analysis of the above suggested that a proportion of the poor, easily identified by communities themselves, were reduced to survival strategies during the crisis in order to cover basic food needs. While data analysis has shown the strong correlation between disease and malnutrition, and has shown dangerously low rates of exclusive breast-feeding as an additional cause of malnutrition, access to sufficient food was also a problem for the poor. This suggests that it would be important for UNICEF to explore coordinating its health education and therapeutic nutrition activities, with food security related activities of other organizations.

Commercial activities were clearly indicated as a preferred coping strategy for families. (The little information collected in Port-au-Prince suggested that this was also true in urban areas.) UNICEF support to credit for women traders served to bolster such commercial activities. However, given that credit programmes targeted only women who already had sufficient disposable income to engage in trade\textsuperscript{118}, this excluded those families which were resorting to survival strategies. In the case of Meyer, where most women were traders, this criteria for participation did not mean much. However, this does have implications for the extension of credit programmes in poorer zones, such as Gros Morne or the whole North-West Department. Credit programmes in poorer zones, will serve to benefit the small-scale trader, but this may represent an elite among the poor. Such results must then be examined carefully according to what the objective of the credit programmes is.

Access to health and water services were both affected by availability of cash. With regard to health, even the practice of borrowing to cover costs can be classified as an erosive coping strategy and is likely to undermine timely referral to health services which is crucial for such problems as acute respiratory infection, dehydration in small children and complications in birthing. This clearly underlines the importance of low-cost services and free basic drugs as well as outreach (eliminating the transport cost for beneficiaries in isolated areas). Both of these were promoted in UNICEF programmes. However, its broad range of partners included the Hopital Alma Mater in Gros Morne, which offered consultation services unaffordable for a large part of the population. This was particularly true during the crisis, even according to observations of the doctor, but is also true today. Furthermore, charging for drugs including ORS and chloroquine appears to occur, though prices vary. The forthcoming survey on household expenditure and health services use will be essential to determining the degree to which affordability is an issue in basic drug supply as well as low cost consultation services by health agents. This may also provide insight for the cost-recovery approach in the WES activities.

\textsuperscript{118}This criteria is typical of most successful micro-credit programmes which require previous experience in trade and some minimal contribution by beneficiaries of credit.
The break up of the family unit as a strategy for survival was an alarming trend noted in Gros Morne area. UNICEF has little comparative advantage in preventative measures such as food security programmes or economic development initiatives, however, the product of this trend, an increasing population of children who were without the care and protection of family, is fully within the organization’s areas of concern. UNICEF attention to street children and children in domestic labour arrangements was *ad hoc* and small-scale during the emergency. This is an area where the CO continues to offer *ad hoc* material support. The Bridging Programme included interesting approaches for special education initiatives for both street children and children in domestic labour, though this has not fully taken off. This could have been an area for increased action during the crisis, and represented a valid cause for UNICEF to advocate a broader interpretation of humanitarian assistance.

In the interviews conducted, the issue of education was noted more than anything for its absence as a priority issue. Information on school enrolment and education services only came in response to prompting. This gives little direction on what could have been an appropriate action in the area of education. It might have been more feasible for the CO to work in urban education initiatives with street children and children in domestic labour as a means of providing some form of interaction, care and support. The work by the CO with the constitutional government representatives on the development of the National Education Plan may have been the wisest and most strategic intervention during the crisis as this lay some groundwork for preparing the way for the transition period.
Appendix E:  
Chronology of Major Events for Haiti Country Programme 1991-1995

**SEPTEMBER 1991 TO EARLY 1993 - UNICEF REACTING ALONE**

**September 1991**  
Military coup d'etat led by General Raoul Cedras ousts popularly elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide.

**October 1991**  
The OAS imposes sanctions. June 1992 government of Marc Bazin (*de facto*) hailed as unconstitutional.

**September 1992**  
Arrival of new UNICEF representative. Previous representative accepts medal from military government one day before her arrival.

**October 1992**  
Joint UN appeal for emergency assistance. UNSG authorises joint OAS/UN mission to Haiti to negotiate with government.

UNICEF starts to move away from being solitary executing agency delivering medical supplies. Begins joint preparations with PAHO/WHO and NGO partners for immunization campaign, distancing itself from the period of the previous representative, when the organisation was isolated and considered a creature of the *de facto* government.

Opening of PROMESS, consolidated essential drugs shipment and transport operation in Haiti started by PAHO/WHO and run by consortium of donors and aid organisations. UNICEF stores bulk of its supplies with PROMESS.

**EARLY 1993 TO MID 1993 - REORIENTATION AND NEW PARTNERSHIP**

**March 1993**  
UN/OAS Humanitarian Appeal finally ready for release. Appeal generates 10 percent of funds requested by SRSG. SRSG had still not met with heads of UN agencies in Haiti.

DHA approval of political criteria for October 1993 UN/OAS appeal.

**April 1993**  
April 10 International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) authorized by UN General Assembly.
New UNICEF programme and health officers arrive.

First jointly planned vaccination campaign starts and continues through July. Vaccinations accompanied by distribution of ORS, Vitamin A, iron for pregnant women.

**June 1993**

June 16 UN Security Council imposes oil and arms embargo on Haiti under Chapter VII of UN Charter.

**JULY 1993 TO OCTOBER 1993 - BRIEF OPENING FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT**

**July 1993**

July 3, 1993 Governor's Island Agreement obligates Cedras to retire and return of Aristide by October 30.

UNICEF health officer starts preparing emergency programme

Late July- early August visit of UNICEF-sponsored Harvard School of Public Health team to study impact of embargo on children.

**August 1993**

August 25, 1993 Haitian parliament ratifies Aristide appointment of Robert Malval as prime minister (result of Governor's Island breakthrough), UN Security Council lifts embargo and authorises UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

**OCTOBER 1993 TO JULY 1994 - REIMPOSED EMBARGO**

**October 1993** Governor's Island agreement collapses. October 11, 1993 UNMIH advance team arrives and is met in harbor by armed civilians and turns back from landing. Four days later, on October 15 Aristide Justice Minister Francois-Guy Malary is assassinated.


October 18 UN re-imposes oil embargo and backs it with naval blockade.

Harvard University study on impact of embargo on Haitian children released by UNICEF. The report is critical of embargo and meets with controversy.
Partial evacuation of all UN peacekeeping, civilian and agency personnel begins at this time and lasts until March 1994. SRSG still has not held a single coordination meeting with UN Agencies. UNDP Resident Representative agrees to evacuation, without consulting agencies which he is charged with representing at Security management team.

**Late 1993-early 1994**

UNICEF does vaccination campaign for measles with NGO partners, but not with government. Minister of Health for Constitutional Government ordered campaign to be postponed until return of Aristide. Because of both Haitian and UN politics, UNICEF is effectively cut off from any serious consultation with Minister of Health from his appointment in September 1993 until January 1994.

**February 1994**

UN humanitarian fuel programme starts

**March 1994**

Movements of international professional staff restricted through to March 1994. Purpose of evacuation never clarified. Essential staff under Security Phase IV confined to Port au Prince and prevented from carrying out mandate outside of city. UN agencies were excluded from Security management Team, which was controlled by SRSG staffers and peacekeepers.

**May 1994**

On 11 May 1994 Emile Jonassaint, head of Supreme Court, sworn into office as provisional president by 13 right wing senators (of which eight were elected in unconstitutional elections conducted under previous de facto regime).

At end of month UNDP Resident Representative resigns after several months during which he was scarcely present in Haiti and in which not a single UN Agency coordination meeting had been held between November 1993 and May 1994.

**June 1994 to September 1994 - Preparation for the Invasion**

**June 1994**

In June-July 1994 prospect of severe UN sanctions and impending physical isolation of Haiti through severing of air links and closing of border with Dominican Republic compels US, Canadian and other embassies to evacuate families and other non-essential personnel.

From June through September UN peacekeeping personnel leave Haiti, culminating in ejection of UN Civilian Observer mission in mid-July. UN
presence reduced to resident agencies, all of which insist on staying to maintain humanitarian operations despite uncertain political climate of sanctions and impending invasion. From June through December UN resident agencies, under leadership of new UNDP Resident Representative and DHA coordinator develop security system. No evacuation was ordered during this period, although all internationals were given the option to leave should they feel threaten by the situation.

**July 1994**


**September 1994**

On September 19, 1994 MNF (Multi-National Force) of 20,000 arrives in Haiti without opposition as result of Clinton delegation negotiation of peaceful departure by Cedras government.

**September 1994 to 1995 - Tentative Transition**

**October 1994**

On October 15, 1994 President Aristide returns to Haiti

Accelerated UNICEF programme October 1994-March 1995 requests total funding of $10,496,000.

**November 1994**

UNICEF participates in official national immunization campaign under Aristide government.

After military intervention, UN under UNDP leadership develops successful interagency appeal for poverty alleviation and reconstruction. Appeal generated 20 percent of request within first month, and served as basis for wider EERP. Bi-weekly coordination meetings took place under UNDP leadership and sharing of information between participating agencies.

New SRSG appointed.

**January 1995**

Less than three months after restoration of constitutional government of Aristide, international donors have round table talk in Paris under World Bank auspices and pledge more than a billion and a half dollars on condition that structural reforms undertaken in various parts of economy.

UNICEF 1995-97 programme coincides for first 18 months with EERP,
overall economic recovery plan by international donors.

**June 1995**

Municipal and legislative elections are held. UNICEF unites all political parties in show of support for child rights.
Appendix F: Programme Review

F.1 INTRODUCTION
The review of programmes and sectoral groups in the case of Haiti is complicated by the number of changes that these have gone through. The original CPR for 1990-1995 was replaced by a succession of emergency appeals, contingency plans and joint UN planning processes, all of which helped to introduce gradual or sometimes sudden changes. These were then followed by the 1995-1997 Bridging Programme which introduced a formal restructuring of programmes and reorientation of projects within programmes. The activities actually executed appear to be a hybrid of overlapping programmes, as well as the response to unforeseen opportunities or challenges.

The review of programmes here is presented according to the current sectoral structure, as per the 1995-1997 Bridging Programme:

- Health and Nutrition
- WES
- Education
- Women/Community Organization
- Communication/CRC

The programme “Strengthening Local Capacities” presented in the same document, is not analyzed here; it has not evolved as originally presented, with activities executed corresponding more to the Community Organization facet of the programme. This is discussed more in the main text in Chapter 4.

Each programme mentioned above is analyzed according to:

- Evolution of programme orientation
- Cross-sectoral links
- Constraints
- Major achievements
- Challenges
- Evaluations and Studies

In general the evolution of different programmes is towards a much more coherent and

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119 For the purposes of the CPE, reference to ‘programme’ and ‘project’ follow the terminology used in the actual Bridging Programme 1995-1997. This is distinct from current use in the CO, where staff appear to equate ‘programmes’ with ‘sectors’, and ‘projects’ with ‘programmes’.
balanced ensemble, well suited to the context of transition to democracy. Where vestiges of a reactive emergency response remain as noted in the following sections, key staff in the Country Office are generally very much aware. However, the critical mass for bringing about the changes may not have been reached. A number of factors contribute to this inertia: highly politicized relationships with partner organizations, pressures to be seen as active, a constant flow of demands directly from community level organizations, staff burn-out. (These are discussed in greater detail in the main body of the report.)

F.2 HEALTH AND NUTRITION
F.2.1 Evolution in programme orientation
The health programme shifted from a vertical programme at the beginning of the crisis to an integrated and decentralized approach to management of child and maternal health and nutrition. This corresponded to a gradual shift away from a basic needs/supply focus, including rehabilitation of health facilities and cold chain, to increased involvement in training and policy development, particularly with the current promotion of the Bamako Initiative. The health programme has also broadened to include a reproductive health project in the Northwest Department (jointly with CARE and UNFPA) in which 400 TBAs have been trained.

For the nutrition facet of the programme, while objectives remained comparable, from 1993, the orientation shifted from food security related malnutrition to disease related malnutrition with a focus on micronutrients, immunization, CDD. From 1994, the promotion of exclusive breastfeeding for ages 0 to 6 months was added. This was based on analysis of available data on the nutrition profile of under fives which showed strongly the importance of disease and low breast-feeding rates. In area-based programmes, curative interventions still figure in the form of 12-day nutrition education and wet feeding programmes organized in communities with the involvement of mothers or caregivers in food preparation and with close supervision of weight gain. A “food-supported MCH” programme is scheduled to begin in January 1997 in the Northwest.

In the context of the crisis, UNICEF involvement in AIDS interventions was reduced to the provision of solo-shot syringes. In 1995, training at the primary health care was reintroduced. A reproductive health/STDs/AIDS project is currently being implemented in the Far Northwest with plans to train 350 TBAs.

F.2.2 Intersectoral links
Linkages are less apparent in early programmes which, though formally integrated in basic services areas, did not appear to linked in the field. Health programme staff are working in concert with WES

\[120\] Where possible, this also coincided with distribution of Akamil for dry rations.
staff on basic health messages on water, though field agents interviewed held confused understandings around the relationship between CDD and water/hygiene. Linkages to the Community Organization programme are not clear, though programmes operate in the same geographic areas. See F.4 Community Organization.

F.2.3 Constraints
The complications of not working with the State included the fact that most cold chain equipment was managed by State-run or mixed health facilities.

The changes in Minister and Director General have also lead to problems in continuity.

For broad reaching programmes, particularly EPI, a multitude of partners were necessary as each NGO reached fairly small populations. This in itself tended to lead to a fragmented approach.

During the crisis years, local printing of communications materials was made impossible by the embargo. Similarly, already limited access to radios in the general population was exacerbated by the cost of batteries. Health workers of differing levels were shown to be the most important sources of information for the EPI campaign carried out in 1993.121

F.2.4 Major achievements
The first measles vaccination campaign, initiated in 1993 in response to a nation-wide measles epidemic, was carried out in four Departments, an achievement shared with NGO partners, mayors and Departmental Directors. However, critics see the delay of a nation-wide immunization campaign until 1994 as the result of political pressures by the constitutional government at the cost of the child population.

In the national campaign launched November 1994 and lasting until July 1995, 2.7 million children aged 9 months to 14 years were immunized against measles bringing coverage as estimated by the government to 95%. Again, the dramatic change in measles immunization coverage is an achievement with UNICEF shares with partners. Both the President and the Minister of Health have been strong advocates of the campaign.

The CO managed to insert itself into the policy development process, notably on CDD and the introduction of the BI. This was an important strategic move.

The campaign for the promotion of exclusive breast-feeding was observed in three field sites to have widely succeeded in transmitting a clearly understood message. This has received committed support of the President.

121 EPI coverage survey
F.2.5 Challenges

**Strengthening of health promotion/education components:** Programme targets for reduction of disease-related mortality and malnutrition demand significant change in behaviour. Field interviews showed consistent gaps in absorption of messages related to CDD and ORT among health agents, auxiliaries, community water committees and sanitation agents. The breast-feeding promotion appears to have contrasting results. It will be important to study carefully training results, including identifying influential factors and more promising approaches.

Key informants at the community level, as well as in a sister UN agency and partners in the Haitian media, questioned the appropriateness of nutrition education messages used during the crisis when poor mothers simply had difficulty buying food of any kind. During the evaluation, health agents still refer to their work providing nutrition education on the three food groups -- energy, protection and growth. The logic of UNICEF’s approach to the nutrition problem, discussed above, was not clear at field or central levels, among partners or consumers.

**Linking response to food security and disease related malnutrition:** UNICEF promoted a coherent response to disease related malnutrition. However, it is clear that during the embargo, food security played an important role in increases in malnutrition. In *Morne l’Hôpital*, a positive linkage between two strategies to improving nutrition was observed: mothers of children identified as malnourished were the first to benefit from the credit programme as an aid to families’ food security. In other areas visited, notably Gros Morne, such links were currently not evident, even where other organizations were involved in food distributions, and where food security might well be a significant factor in malnutrition (see Appendix C: Analysis of Coping Strategies). Similarly, wet feeding programmes like the *foyé de nutrition* were not adequately linked to family food distributions to bolster intra-familiar food distribution and consumption in the home. This was a problem noted by field staff in partner organizations, particularly in health facilities. Reportedly from 1995, UNICEF and PAHO/WHO began working with NGOs to improve targeting of food aid. The challenge for UNICEF is not necessarily to take on more programmes. The challenge will be to obtain local analysis of the nutrition profile in the poorest areas, determining the relative importance of food security and disease, and to coordinate interventions with organizations addressing food security where appropriate. The proposed “food-supported MCH” could achieve this.

F.2.6 Evaluations/studies


*Health facility analysis in the Northwest Department*, CARE 1995 (UNICEF supported)

F.3 WATER AND SANITATION

F.3.1 Evolution in programme orientation
The WES programme has remained with essentially the same overall orientation throughout the period under study, focusing on increasing access to water and sanitation in rural and urban areas through service delivery, particularly construction of systems. Interventions differed for rural and urban area-based programmes, the former based on the more typical use of hand-pumps and VIP latrines, the latter involving the construction of water tanks, contracting with water trucks, paving for drainage and distribution of tools for garbage collection and disposal. During the time of the de facto government, WES activities were largely limited to repairs to water systems and direct delivery of water in urban areas in order to maintain levels of access to water.

All area-based programmes involved the formation of community management committees for water resources, though this has been strengthened recently. 1995 saw the introduction of a support to a unit in the Service National d’Eau Potable (SNEP) to ensure training and monitoring of community water management committees.

In 1996, a new approach, taking from the work in the Community Organization Programme, is currently being proposed to ensure a greater community commitment and involvement in water projects. Plans were mentioned to ensure that community-based organizations provide a better encadrement to community water management committees.

At the same time, UNICEF is preparing a reorientation away from construction, particularly in sanitation where the cost of sanitation by latrines may not be justified. A survey carried out in Leogane, demonstrated that presence of latrines may have limited impact on hygiene and sanitation: 83% of children having access to latrines defecate in the yard or garden; only 17% of those having latrines are aware of the importance of hand washing; and 38% of those without latrines do not consider having one a priority.

F.3.2 Intersectoral links
See F.2. Health and F.4 Community Organization. The WES Programme staff have improved links with the Community Organization Programme. Targeting of construction activities has also been linked to schools, health centres and centres for street children.

F.3.3 Constraints
The speed with which construction of water systems and latrines can move forward cannot be matched

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123 Interview, Edele Thibaud, Officer, UNICEF Haiti, August 28, 1996.
by the building of sustainable community water management committees. There have been problems particularly where these committees are newly created expressly for the management of the water system or have no anchor in a larger older community organizations.

WES activities appear to have been less constrained during the crisis by politicization of interventions. This was possibly attributed to the location of water activities in the government structure within a much larger Ministry of Public Works, allowing lower level contacts purely at the technical level; this contrasts for example with the Health Ministry. Nonetheless, in rural basic services programmes, the involvement of water counterparts in joint planning exercises with UNICEF has been limited, perhaps affecting opportunities for greater links with the Community Organization approach.124

F.3.4 Major achievements

Despite difficulties in strengthening community water management committees, particularly in the urban setting, a 1994 evaluation found that 71% of pumps installed since 1983 by the SNEP and NGO partners, were still functioning and 66% of community committees were still in existence.125

The establishment of a community organization unit within the SNEP is a significant move in building institutional capacity which can have a far-reaching impact on effectiveness of expensive construction activities be they financed by UNICEF or other partners.

During the crisis period funding of the water programme increased from roughly US$ 790,000 in 1992 to US$1.4 million in 1994. During the years of the coup d’état, UNICEF was a major actor in WES. Calculations for beneficiaries for UNICEF WES activities are complicated by different reporting over the 1992-1995 period and are based on estimates of catchment populations for different water systems. In Port-au-Prince, at least 8 water reservoirs or holding tanks were constructed or rehabilitated between 1992 and 1994. Populations benefitting from water trucked in to 17 slums in Port-au-Prince varied between 50,000 in 1992 and 150,000 in 1994, returning to 50,000 in 1995. This number has reduced since 1995 as management has been transferred to community committees and difficulties in strengthening these committees has lead to irregular service.

Calculations for beneficiary populations in rural areas were not consistently made, though activity levels clearly jumped as corresponded to increases in funding and mobility with the end of the crisis. In 1992, 30 different medium to small-scale water systems were installed or repaired. Over the 1993-1994 period over 20 large water systems or reservoirs and 14 smaller water pumps were repaired or installed. In 1995, over 104 water systems were reported repaired or installed, as well as 3 large systems and 13 mini-adduction systems benefitting roughly 110,000 people.

124 Interview UNICEF Country Office heads of sections, August 27, 1996.

F.3.5 Challenges

Extricating UNICEF from construction activities: Programme staff underline the importance of policy development including promoting the community organization approach in the WES sector. This will require a major shift in funding orientation which partners might be unwilling to accept.

Strengthening partners work with community organizations: Due to the numbers involved, UNICEF clearly does not have the capacity to work directly with community organizations beyond an experimental pilot project level. As the large donors enter into the WES sector, it will be essential to have a critical mass of partners who understand a common approach to working with community organizations -- adaptable to different community contexts, reliant on capacities developed or existent within partner organizations. It will be important for UNICEF to work with partner organizations to define ways in which to improve their work with community organizations. See comments under Women/Community Organization.

Capacity building training for community water management committees Water sector staff have been very involved in their partners’ work with communities, including curriculum development and the actual execution of training. However, training with community level organizations does not necessarily produce the desired effects -- particularly on the financial management of the water systems. This is reportedly more acute in the urban setting\textsuperscript{126}, but was evidenced even in the disfunction of 34% of water committees noted in the 1994 evaluation of hand-pumps. In conjunction with the Women/Community Organization programme and UNICEF partners, it will be important to develop approaches to training which allow measurement of technical skills acquired and transmitted, which at the same time mesh with participatory monitoring of organizational development (i.e. what is the committee supposed to do and how will they know if they are on the right track) by community management committees themselves.

Ensuring affordability Related to the above, it will be important, particularly in urban settings and in any time of sudden increase in prices of basic goods, to monitor affordability of water services. This would ideally be managed by a strong community organization, as part of their financial management, but cannot realistically be left to current community water management committees. It will be important for UNICEF to understand local coping mechanisms, particularly allocation of cash income, in order to assess affordability of water services.

In rural zones, 80\% of the population is living in “absolute poverty.”\textsuperscript{127} It is estimated that

\textsuperscript{126}Interviews, Aboubacar Saibou, Joseph Baptiste, Programme Officers, UNICEF Haiti, September 3, 1996.

70% of families manage with 10 gourdes per day\textsuperscript{128} which corresponds to the reported pay for agricultural day-labour.\textsuperscript{129} An adequate water supply for a family of 7 in Gros Morne, even if measured according to international standards for rural areas\textsuperscript{130} would cost between 5-10 % of such a family income.

See comments under F.2 Health and Nutrition.

F.3.6 Evaluations/studies


F.4 WOMEN/COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

F.4.1 Shifts in programme objectives and strategies

This sector combining Community Organization with Women was created structurally within the Country Office in the 1995-97 *Bridging Programme*, bringing together aspects of the previous urban and rural basic services programmes, and community organization and advocacy programme and the women’s programme (previously linked with Education and *Konesans Fanmi*, a major advocacy and communications programme). This restructuring corresponds to a major shift in the overall strategy of the Country Programme particularly with regard to the role of community organizations. This is demonstrated in the *Outline Emergency Programme for Haiti*, in November 1993, where the

\textsuperscript{128}Secretaire d’Etat de la Population, Population et developpement en Haiti, 11 July 1995. This calculation applies the estimate of distribution of resources to the average annual income. It is not clear whether there is an adjustment for unreported income.

\textsuperscript{129}As confirmed in numerous interviews in Gros Morne and Grande Plaine, August 21-23, 1996.

\textsuperscript{130}20/L/person/day in rural zones; 30L/person/day in villages under 2000 and 70L/person/day in villages more than 2000.
objective of reducing the negative effects of the crisis is balanced by the strategy of “creating the basis for longer term development in the social sector especially attempting to increase local communities capacities.”

In the 1994 proposals for programming (the Accelerated Programme October 1994-March 1995, Bridging Programme 1995-1997, the Emergency Economic Recovery Programme) this is more clearly linked to the context of fragile democracy specifying the objective of strengthening community organizations “in the short term to respond to needs and develop preparedness, and in the medium- to long-term to develop the ability to identify, analyze & act upon locally managed services and democratic participation.”

The place of the community organization strategy in the overall Country Programme, however, is ambitious when compared to more specific programme documents. Project documents outline a strategy for working with community organizations starting with action at the level of individual and group needs with an eventual move to broach broader community needs when organizations are better consolidated. This would suggest more caution with regard to short-term expectations of this approach for emergency preparedness and response.

The evolution of the women’s programme is less evident in Country Office documents produced during the crisis phase as it did not fall within the definition of humanitarian assistance. The Women’s Programme was originally designed to operate on two levels: strengthening the institutional framework of women’s organizations from national to local levels and improving the health status of women through:

- reducing maternal mortality rates;
- improving economic status of 100,000 women;
- reducing early pregnancies and low birth weights;
- reducing illiteracy amongst women.132

This Women in Development (WID) focus seems to have continued as opposed to a strong reorientation to a ‘mainstreaming of gender’ approach. Work has included advocacy for national level policy development as well as forging of women’s organizations at national and local levels. The Women’s Programme has focused in community-level activities on improving economic status through small income-generating projects. However, as the community organization strategy was clarified towards late 1994-95, the nature of the micro-projects undertaken with women’s groups has broadened to include needs as identified by the groups themselves, be they specific to women’s health,

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economic status or otherwise.

As community-based organizations are intended to provide the base for all of UNICEF programmes, the focus on women’s participation with the Community Organization Project has the potential to introduce a gender-sensitive approach from the bottom up. However, this will only occur as progress is made in strengthening community-based organizations themselves, to which there are a number of constraints discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

F.4.2 Cross-sectoral links
This programme is naturally linked in area of operation to basic services programmes such as Health-Nutrition, WES and Education programmes. In practice, it appears that basic services programmes have been planned independently until recently. As community organizations define clear needs, these were responded to by the basic services programmes using pockets of funding set aside. Staff in sectoral programmes are beginning to develop activities designed to capitalize on the network of community organizations developing.133

F.4.3 Constraints
In the early stages of the crisis, population mobility and the security/political risks involved in participating in community organizations hampered both the work of building local organizations and the credit facet of the women’s programme. This is the explanation given for the stalling of the credit programme which grew from 40 credit groups in formation in February 1992 to only 48 having been formed in July 1994, without all of them necessarily still existing.

The definition of humanitarian assistance by the UN/OAS limited these activities to general funds. Human and material (particularly transportation) resources allocations by UNICEF and partners was too low (front-line field staff estimated to represent 1/5 of that required) for any significant effects in organizational development to be achieved.134

Conceptual understanding of organizational development and capacity building/empowerment by front-line staff (UNICEF-funded and partners) has been extremely weak. Training of field staff was initiated in 1996.

Support to national policy development appears to be slowed, even after the return of President Aristide, at least in part due to national level political tensions and competing priorities. Relations with the first Minister of the Status of Women and Women’s Rights were not productive. The mobilization of a consortium of women’s organizations in the Alliance des Femmes Haïtiennes

133 Interview, Edeline Thebaud, Officer, UNICEF Haiti, August 28, 1996.

(AFHA), bringing together 42 organizations, eventually floundered; this has been attributed alternately to political infighting or the lack of a commonly perceived raison d’être.

F.4.4 Major achievements
UNICEF maintained a presence at the local level which gave it credibility before community organizations.

Credit has undoubtedly helped beneficiary women in maintaining vital commercial activities despite inflationary prices. (See Appendix C).

After a difficult start, a critical analysis of UNICEF’s work strengthening community organizations allowed the development of a coherent promising approach to working with community organizations, laying the basis for local level partnerships.

F.4.5 Challenges
Defining work with community organizations: Staff all complain of being overwhelmed by the individual demands of community level organizations which continue to arrive. UNICEF clearly cannot continue to operate at this level unless for development of replicable tools and methodologies. It will be important then to define a high-impact but financially affordable niche for itself still within a strategy of strengthening local level organizations for participation in democratic development. (See recommendations in Chapter 7 in the main text.)

Linking policy development to local level priorities and realities: UNICEF involvement in policy development in WES, health and education sectors opens the possibilities of integrating a new approach to working with community organization among government partners: this is clear, for example, in the promotion of the Bamako Initiative and the establishment of the community organization unit in the SNEP. However, in addition to a well developed and marketable approach to working with community organizations, UNICEF will need to have information on local needs and realities in order to influence policy development and action at national and local levels.

F.4.6 Evaluations/studies


F.5 CEDC/CRC/ADVOCACY

F.5.1 Major changes in programme objectives and strategies
This sector is also a product of a reorganization introduced in the 1995-1997 Bridging Programme. However, both the CEDC programme and Konesans Fanmi, the key advocacy and communications programme existed in the 1990-95 CPR, the latter linked to the Education Programme.

In the CEDC programme, while ad hoc response to requests for supplies continues, work has been reoriented to providing technical training to NGO partners, fostering innovative response to identified problems such as child prisoners and fostering the development of networks. Studies carried out during the crisis (1993) on the situation of street children and children in domestic labour arrangements paved the way for interesting innovation under the Education programme in the Bridging Programme.

The introduction of advocacy activities related to the CRC has perhaps provided a clear vehicle and orientation for both the CEDC and Konesans Fanmi projects. Advocacy around the CRC began most concretely in 1994 with its ratification.

F.5.2 Cross-sectoral links
CEDC response is linked to service delivery activities, particularly around nutrition, health (vaccination)
and water services for centres or facilities. *Konesans Fanmi* is in essence the social mobilization and communication complement to the health programme and a vehicle for parental education. Advocacy around the CRC has remained mostly linked to CEDC programmes.

**F.5.3 Constraints**
The highly divisive political context (both within and outside the UNICEF Country Office) made dialogue promoting ratification of the CRC and practical follow-up to that act extremely difficult.

The limited access to traditional media (radio, television) or mass media by urban and rural poor mean that communications strategies must be designed using community level agents as a dissemination network as well as other innovative approaches.

**F.5.4 Major achievements**
The CRC was ratified in 1994, among the first acts of the newly returned constitutional government.

The Haitian Coalition for the Defence of Child Rights (COHADDE), an umbrella organization for the promotion of child rights was formed in 1994.

The Political Parties Declaration on Child Rights was signed by all but one of the active political parties on May 12, preceding the 1995 elections, following a one-day Symposium to analyze and discuss issues around Child Rights. The timing of the latter has been criticized by some key actors; this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

The Country Office has begun to consolidate partnerships with organizations working in the area of CEDC and has facilitated relationships between NGOs and government in this sector where divisive relations prevailed previously.

**F.5.5 Challenges**
*Shifting from an ad hoc supply focus to capacity building*
This shift is most necessary in the CEDC project, where requests for ad hoc supplies continue.

*Weighing the effectiveness of training/communications campaigns*
A major evaluation of *Konesans Fanmi* was carried out in 1993. Several weaknesses were noted among them monitoring by partner institutions, application of the cascade training model and adaptation of communication materials for diverse segments of the public. As with the health promotion/education component of the Health Programme, it will be important that on-going monitoring and evaluation be part of the *Konesans Fanmi* project in order to ensure response to such findings.

*CRC as a framework for future monitoring activities*
As discussed in Chapter 5, the originally planned Planning and Monitoring Project of the Bridging Programme proposed capacity building and empowerment activities for local authorities and community organization networks to build their monitoring and planning skills. This offers UNICEF an excellent opportunity to both improve information on the situation of women and children and to advocate for the CRC. This is also a logical link between the community organization approach and the CRC.

F.5.6 Evaluations/studies


F.6 Education
F.6.1 Evolution of programme orientation
The Education programme was originally linked to the Women’s Programme and the advocacy and communications project Konesans Fanmi. This shift took place with the introduction of the Bridging Programme 1995-1997.

The latter document indicates a clear refocusing of the Education Programme on two axes: strengthening the quality of primary education and the development of flexible alternative education programmes suitable to increase access to primary education by children in especially difficult circumstances, particularly street children, children in domestic labour and over-age children without education. The latter builds on the development of non-formal education initiated in 1993 with a basic study, a seminar and the development of a non-formal education curriculum.

However, the programme continued through 1995 with activities in pre-school education and adult literacy training as defined in the 1990-95 CPE, as well as with the sponsoring of school children adopted in 1994. UNICEF support was without significant contribution to longer term objectives or a clear link to the situation analysis. The latter points to limited access and high inefficiency at the primary school level to be the key problem in Haiti’s education sector.

Support was very much supply oriented and largely unsustainable. In pre-school and adult literacy programmes support included everything from provision of office supplies, furniture and teaching materials to payment of salaries. Each did correspond to some extent to activities which were feasible and tangible at the time with new or established partners. When prompted, parents reported vague benefits from pre-school programmes such as pride in their children’s behaviour. The
sponsoring of school children possibly contributed to building good relations with the elected government at the return of President Aristide.\footnote{Interviews, Aboubacar Saibou, Programme Officer, UNICEF Haiti, 6 September, 1996; Per Engebak/Carolina Owens, Officers, Latin American Desk, UNICEF New York, 25 September 1996. Mabiala Mambu, former Education Officer UNICEF-Haiti, “Working in a Crisis Situation: The Haitian Experience in Basic Education”.

Despite this emergency response focus, even before the return of Aristide in 1994, UNICEF was working with the elected Ministry of Education on the development of a National Education Plan.

F.6.2 Cross-sectoral links

Education activities have been linked to other facets of the basic services programmes. *Konesans Fanmi*, mentioned above, previously part of the education programme was clearly a link between education and health sectors. In developing policy, there are now perhaps increased opportunities for integrating life skills, basic health messages and promotion of the CRC to the Education Programme activities.

F.6.3 Constraints to execution

The definition of humanitarian assistance by the UN/OAS limited these activities to general funds. Furthermore, as resources were limited, they were, where possible, redirected towards emergency basic services.

During the crisis period, school enrollment decreased particularly due to the effects of inflation on disposable income. In the early period after the coup, some schools closed temporarily due to insecurity.

F.6.4 Major achievements

*Insertion in policy development.* Despite the focus on emergency response, the Country Office maintained support to the development of a National Education Plan.

*Maintenance/restoration of UNICEF’s image:* Over 6000 children were sponsored for at least one year of education (cumulative figures 1994 and 1995). The contribution that this support made to restored relations with the Constitutional Government might far outweigh the unsustainable contribution to those children’s education.

F.6.5 Challenges

*Responsible exit from unsustainable programmes:* The recent ending of UNICEF support to preschool initiatives is poorly understood in rural and urban areas. With higher profile partnerships, such as that with *Fonds du Parrainage National*, where the very virtue of the intervention was its visibility, it will be extremely important to phase UNICEF’s separation from the programme so as to ensure
some element of continuity.

Support to coordination of private and public sectors: Where 80% of the sector is privately run, and quality of education has long been a concern, it is crucial that UNICEF’s role building bridges and fostering coordination be used to advantage, supporting the State normative and coordination role.
Appendix G: Interviewees and Participants in Workshops

G.1 PARLIAMENT
- Samuel Madistin, Senator
- J. Robert Martinez, Senator
- Dr. Elie Plancher, Senator

G.2 CIVIL SERVICE
- Pierre Denis Amédée, Minister of Social Affairs
- Jean André, Former Director General, Ministry of Health
- Emmanuel Buteau, former Minister of Education
- Dr. Gaston Delouche, Hospital Alma Mater, Gros Morne
- Yvan Etienne, Ministry of Social Affairs
- Evans Paul, former Mayor, Port-au-Prince
- Mathilde Flambert, former Minister of Social Affairs
- Dr. Jean François, Ministry of Health, Gran Goave
- Jean Molière, Minister of Health 1993 - 1995; Minister of Interior, 1996
- Lydie Parent, Mayoress de Petion Ville
- Pierre Michel Sajous, former Director General, Ministry of Health (1993-1994)
- Dr. Yolène Vaval Suréna, Director of Planning, Ministry of Public Health; first Coordinator of AFHA (Alliance des Femmes Haïtiennes)
- C. Tardieu, Consultant on Education, Representative PNE
- C. Werleigh, Former Prime Minister (1995-1996)

G.3 NGOs AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
- Dr. Jean André, Director, AOPS*
- Tom Friedeberg, Director, CARE International
- Suzanne Igras, Health Coordinator, CARE International
- Brunet Chérisol, Child Care Haiti*
- Yvon Labissiere, CDS*
- Emmanuel Lacroix, President, COHADDE
- Colette Lamothe, Director, COHADDE
- Father Attilio Strà, COHAN LaKay*
- Father Wilfrid Alfred, Episcopalian Church, Kafe Lompre
- Clotaire St. Natus, FLASSEF*
- Antoine Levelt, Fonds de Parrainage National*
- Vanya Berrouet, FONHEP*
- Mr. Desroches, Director, FONHEP
- Eddy Joseph, Deputy Executive Director (Catholic Sector), FONHEP
- Eveline Verdier, Coordinator of the Independent Sector, FONHEP*
- Dr. Marie Renée Lubin Francisque, Grace Children’s Hospital
- John Yates, Director, Grace Children’s Hospital
- Dr. Josette Bijoux, in charge of Promess (Programme of Essential Drugs), WHO/PAHO
- Marie Antoinette Toureau, Konesans Fanmi*
- Joseph C. Bernard, Director, Mission Alpha
- Pierre Richard, Mission Alpha
- Marie Marthe Sévère, Mission Alpha*
- Michel St. Louis, Parole et Action*
- Dr. Claude Suréna, Rotary Club, Pétion Ville
- Martine Bernier, SCF-Canada*
- Donald Balthazar, UFODEV*
- David Jédiné, UFODEV*

*Participants at the NGO consultation workshop. Many of these participants were also interviewed individually.

**G.4 MEDIA**
- Richard Widmaer, Directeur, Radio Métropole
- Anne Marie Issa, Radio Signal FM
- Guy Jean, Directeur, Radio Tropic FM

**G.5 UN AGENCIES**
- Cristian Ossa, Resident Representative, UNDP
- Augustin Larrauri, Representative, UNESCO

- Heidi Swindells, Representative, UNFPA
- Dr. Marie Andrée Diouf, Representative OPS/OMS

**G.6 DONORS**
- Peter Paprosky, Deputy Director, ACDI
- Robert Padberg, General Consul, The Netherlands
- Tadaharu Chichii, Charge d’affaires, Embassy of Japan
- Bettsy Brown, Director, Division of Health, USAID, Haiti
- Larry Crandall, Director, USAID, Haiti
- Joe Goodwin, New Deputy Director, USAID, Haiti

**G.7 UNICEF-HAITI STAFF**
- Paul Reel Africot
- Joseph Baptiste
- Babacar Diop
- Hugues Foucault
- Claudette François
- Elizabeth Gibbons
- Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron
- Margarett Jean-Félix
- André Laperrière
- Max Lélio-Joseph
- Martin Murama
- Ralph Midy
- Lauréat Morissette
- Eveline Pressoir
- Aboubacar Saibou
- Ita Sheehy
- Flora Sibanda Mulder
- Edèle Thébaud
- Jean Lecaire Toussaint
- Daniel Verna

**G.8 UNICEF HEADQUARTERS STAFF**
- Per Engebak
- Peter McDermott
- Hans Narula
- Carolina Owens
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