Designing Social Protection Frameworks for Somaliland

Final Report

Gabrielle Smith
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This is an independent report and does not necessarily reflect the views of UNICEF. Any errors are on the part of the author.
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<td>Somalia Resilience Programme</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Key issues for UNICEF and its partners to consider in developing a social protection framework for Somaliland

Macro-level context

- Poverty is multidimensional and has social and economic characteristics.
- Women and children are particularly vulnerable; however, other groups such as the elderly, disabled and young people are also likely to be vulnerable, but data for these groups do not exist.
- Given the overlying shocks and access constraints, the situation is likely to be worse in South Central Somalia.
- Multiple challenges need to be addressed, a number of which correlate with income insecurity. This is important to consider in the design of social protection programmes; however, it is unlikely that a single programme can address all needs simultaneously.
- Chronic long-term and transient poverty and food insecurity exist.

Mapping vulnerability

- Poverty levels are high and chronic; large portions of the population are exposed to recurrent and cyclical shocks (e.g. droughts, heavy rains/floods, seasonal and chronic shortages of water, food and employment), as well as prolonged periods of stress because of conflict; people’s capacities to cope through traditional means are being eroded; and many people are vulnerable to particular lifecycle risks.
- A strong rationale exists for establishing some kind of formal, long-term and predictable national social protection system in Somaliland that could address chronic poverty/vulnerability, and be topped up in the event of a crisis.
- It is necessary to address lifecycle (idiosyncratic) and covariate shocks, and to consider the linkages between these as well as to address the compounding affect of multiple vulnerabilities.
- The social protection framework should include programmes that address needs in urban and rural areas. Programmes must not contribute to continued urban drift and should address the needs of those ‘left behind’ in villages, informal settlements or homesteads after able-bodied community members have migrated.
- While the nature of covariate risks can vary between areas and between livelihood groups, idiosyncratic risks are common to all and consistency in programming across locations could be feasible – though some risks are likely to be greater in rural areas where service access is reduced.
- Social protection cannot do everything: it cannot address all the risk factors above, or the structural causes of vulnerability. Social protection is an essential component, but many other things are needed to address the immediate and underlying causes of vulnerability.
- The social protection framework should address the needs of those who cannot work, in addition to those who have the capacity to work, but still face particular risks.
- Social protection systems must seek to address social as well as economic vulnerabilities (assets and income; social networks and marginalisation). This includes being aware of the inequalities in a society and the marginalisation, lack of autonomy and burden of labour of particular groups and, as a minimum, should do no harm.
- Communities understand vulnerability as it relates to particular and clearly identifiable groups, rather than poverty, because a high proportion of the community may be considered poor. This understanding by communities is important to take into account when selecting beneficiaries for social protection programmes.
- At the same time, it is important not to bypass the needs of young people who have the capacity to work but suffer from a chronic lack of opportunity, particularly given the risk of
armed militant groups recruiting disaffected young people and contributing to future insecurity.

- UNICEF and its partners should investigate social protection interventions that support positive coping strategies or access to positive coping (e.g. improvements to the creditworthiness of marginalised groups).

**Mapping current social protection programmes and challenges**

- Major gaps exist in the formal social protection system relative to the level of need.
- International best practice and current programmes in Somaliland could form the foundation of a social protection or safety net system. However, current programmes comprise only some of the possible options and others will need to be considered.
- UNICEF and its partners will need to go beyond agency mandates to design programmes that best fit needs.
- Food aid is a huge challenge and should only be considered where markets are not functioning.
- Programmes should seek to complement and not interfere with community social assistance, which forms a vital coping strategy.
- UNICEF and its partners will need to implement social protection in a way that minimises the risk of powerful interests co-opting assistance.

**Feasibility and entry points for the Social Protection Framework**

- Political entry points exist to establish social protection as a government-owned service, though extensive and long-term engagement would be needed to build technical and financial capacity. Government engagement will be required from the outset.
- In the short-to-medium term implementing the social protection framework will need support, to varying degrees. NGOs are appropriate partners, providing they have the trust of communities, and rigorous monitoring and accountability mechanisms are incorporated.
- Capacity issues and access constraints mean that the social protection framework should focus on a small number of clear interventions.
- A private sector service provider to handle payments should be selected by a tender process.
- The UN’s optimum role is one of overall coordination, capacity building, advocacy and fundraising rather than direct implementation.
- Entry points to establish the necessary long-term technical and financial support, though attempts to build on existing programmes must take into account limitations.

**Defining social protection**

- UNICEF and its partners should focus on simplicity, with a clear definition of what constitutes social protection, prioritising social transfers.
- Where markets are functioning well, income transfers are generally understood to be preferable to food transfers, and this is particularly true in the context of Somaliland.
- The social protection framework should be based on long-term predictable income transfers as the recognised foundation of social protection systems worldwide, and the most feasible and appropriate social protection interventions for Somaliland at this time.
- It will be important to build linkages with wider complementary services to leverage most benefit from social protection.

**Approaches to selection of beneficiaries**

- A lifecycle approach has many advantages over Poor Relief programmes directed at households living in poverty.
- The nature of informal social protection systems in Somaliland and Islamic culture is very much in line with a lifecycle approach.
- A lifecycle approach is the most appropriate to achieve not only protection but also the prevention of falling into poverty for the vulnerable, as well as the promotion of economic activity for poor families.
• A lifecycle approach necessarily requires greater investment, but is more effective and generates political support.
• It is not possible for countries to offer universal access for all, or to all at the same time. Access will need to be staggered, and difficult decisions made about whom to prioritise. Coverage should be increased over time, as well as the incorporation of more programmes.

Entitlements
• Developing a system based on entitlements holds real potential to leverage a peace dividend and build the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens.
• Such an approach requires government engagement from the outset, along with the development of policies and strategies, such as for communication and accountability.

Reaching the poor and vulnerable of working age
• The dominant issue influencing the effectiveness of labour-intensive public works in the region is that of adequate investment in contextual appraisal, and the flexibility of programme design to accommodate specific local social relations, labour market conditions and livelihoods.
• Benefits conferred by a simpler cash transfer programmes approach in the Somali context – through, for example, a child grant for working age families – are likely to have a greater impact and be more cost effective.
• A complementary policy focus would be to help working-age individuals engage in the labour market, which in many cases is best achieved by giving poor families consistent access to social security benefit.

Addressing covariate risk
• The social protection framework needs to address covariate and lifecycle risks; and consider designing programmes that could address both, as well as the need for additional safety net programmes during times of food security shock and humanitarian need.
• Long-term programmes are likely to be effective at addressing a variety of idiosyncratic shocks as well as reducing vulnerability to covariate shocks and contributing to building resilience. In addition, short-term safety net programmes are likely to be needed to deal with the wider needs that covariate shocks create.

Types of programmes
• Initially, a child grant and old age pension should be at the core of the social protection framework—potentially alongside a disability benefit for working age people – as happens in many other countries.
• It would be possible to provide a child grant for 20% of children aged 0-4 years, an old age pension for 70% of people over 60 years and a Disability Benefit for people with severe disabilities at a cost of around 1.2% of GDP for Somalia (and at around 0.8% of GDP in Somaliland).

UNICEF and its partners should:
• Use the social protection framework to inform the design of national social protection policy and strategy.
• Assess the capacity of relevant institutions to identify gaps in technical skills, institutions, systems, and financial management.
• Train national government staff.
• Build capacity of district staff in programme operations.
• Establish concrete long-term funding and technical assistance commitments from donors for systems building, transfers, and crisis modifiers.
• Build a management information system.
• Tender for appropriate payment service providers.
• Establish clear institutional arrangements.
• Design operational procedures and train staff.
• Establish process monitoring/oversight, and impact evaluation.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and rationale
Somalia ranks as one of the least-developed countries in the world and has been severely affected by conflict and natural disasters. Since the civil war in 1991, a protracted and complex humanitarian and livelihoods crisis has existed in the country. This has resulted in large-scale population displacement, deterioration of infrastructure and a decline in access to services, all of which have limited the livelihood opportunities of poor Somali households. Declining access to natural resources and increasing frequency of drought cycles are making it increasingly difficult for rural households to maintain their livestock and crop production levels. It is commonly acknowledged that drought cycles in the Horn of Africa region as a whole are becoming shorter and more severe, meaning traditional coping mechanisms are becoming inadequate and households have little time to recover before the next crisis.¹

The impact is seen in widespread chronic and extreme poverty and high levels of stunting and acute malnutrition among children. In mid-2011 two consecutive missed periods of rain led to the worst drought in East Africa for 60 years and contributed to failed harvests, soaring food and water costs, and depleted grazing and farmland. More than 13 million people across the Horn of Africa were in need of humanitarian assistance. The impact of drought, conflict and increasing global food prices meant that by May 2011 more than 2.85 million people were in crisis in Somalia.² Famine was declared in five of the eight regions in South Central Somalia (SCS).

It is widely recognised by Governments, donors and local communities that inadequate measures were taken to prevent or mitigate the early signs of the food security crisis in 2010 and that humanitarian responses came late.³ The handling of the situation in the Horn of Africa and the 2012 food security crisis in the Sahel has led to critical scrutiny of the international aid system. Fundamental problems included a focus on responses to crises, rather than their prevention; the impact of counter-terrorism laws and related policies in donor countries; and a reluctance to act early or release funding based on forecasts of crises. Annual response appeals are increasingly regarded as an expensive and inefficient instrument to deal with recurrent crises, at best saving lives but limited in saving livelihoods.

Out of this scrutiny has come a renewed interest in the ‘resilience agenda’, with a recognition that helping countries to protect themselves against increasingly frequent disasters in the longer term and to cope better with crises is a more effective and efficient way of spending aid, compared with recurring humanitarian support.⁴ A number of donors and agencies, including the European Commission (EC), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for International Development (DFID) and United Nations (UN), have developed approaches to foster resilience to shocks.⁵ Several areas of consensus exist among donors and NGOs concerning what is required:

- More predictable and longer-term funding for countries experiencing protracted crises;
- Flexible funding mechanisms to respond to the earliest signs of crisis;
- Disaster risk reduction (DRR) embedded in longer-term interventions, which cuts across sectors to develop risk-informed programming to build systems that can respond to a variety of crises; and

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¹ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), 2012.
² Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU), 2012.
³ Haan et al., 2012.
⁴ In Kenya, DFID-funded study found that $2.90 in humanitarian spending was saved for every $1 spent on disaster resilience. This avoided losses and ultimately led to development gains (Venton et al., 2012).
⁵ EU, 2012; DFID, 2011b; USAID, 2012; UN, 2012. UNICEF defines resilience as ‘the ability to withstand threats or adapt to new strategies in the face of shocks or crises, in ways that preserve the integrity of individuals, households and communities (while not deepening their vulnerability)’. 
• Linking relief to development including crisis modifiers, to anticipate, scale up and scale down development and relief interventions according to changing needs, through responses that not only save lives at any cost, but also achieve positive livelihood impacts.

In 2012 UNICEF in collaboration with World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) developed the Joint Resilience Strategy (JRS), a long-term approach aiming at strengthening the resilience of the people of Somalia and Somaliland to withstand shocks, to break the recurrent cycle of emergencies.\(^6\) This aimed to strategically align programming between the three agencies to increase resilience in vulnerable communities through three complementary pillars:

1. Strengthen the productive sectors – increase household income by diversifying livelihood strategies, intensifying production and enhancing access to markets and market information;
2. Improve basic social services – strengthen vulnerable household human capital by enhancing demand and access to services; and
3. Establish predictable safety nets – to address the most vulnerable people’s basic needs through predictable and sustainable transfers of food or cash, including the destitute or seasonally at risk. The objective of the safety net pillar is to support the transition from emergency assistance to longer-term and more predictable support, with flexibility and capacity for timely scaling-up in times of crisis.

The JRS is to be implemented in five districts across Somaliland, SCS and Puntland.\(^7\)

Of major interest is the potential for a social protection system and safety net-style interventions to support the poor and vulnerable to better deal with crises. UNICEF defines social protection as a set of public and private policies and programmes that aim to prevent, reduce and eliminate economic and social vulnerability to poverty and deprivation.\(^8\) Social protection is generally regarded as a government-owned and budgeted social service. At the core of this service are social assistance programmes – regular and predictable transfers of food or income – that share the common objective of providing food and income security, and ensuring the wellbeing of citizens who are vulnerable to unacceptable risks or deprivation. Social protection also plays a complementary cross-cutting role by ensuring the poorest and most vulnerable people can access essential social services.

### 1.2 Aims and objectives

The aims and objectives of the assignment were as follows:

**Purpose:** to undertake a study on social protection in Puntland, Somaliland and SCS, and identify gaps and entry points for social protection within each zone. UNICEF will use the assignment’s outputs to support advocacy to the Somaliland and Puntland authorities, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and donors in the case for introducing and funding of social protection policies and programming.

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\(^6\) DFID is also working towards a similar set of objectives through its Multi Annual Humanitarian Funding to INGOs.

\(^7\) Five districts: Burco, Odweye, Bossaso, Iskushuban and Dolow.

\(^8\) UNICEF, 2012b Global Social Protection Framework: ‘Social protection can be understood as a set of public actions which address not only income poverty and economic shocks, but also social vulnerability, thus taking into account the inter-relationship between exclusion and poverty. Through income or in-kind support and programmes designed to increase access to services, social protection helps realize the human rights of children and families. Social protection strategies are a crucial element of effective policy responses to adverse economic conditions, addressing not only vulnerabilities caused or exacerbated by recent crises but also increasing preparedness to future uncertainty’. 
Expected results:

1. **Vulnerability analysis**: identification of key drivers of inequality and vulnerability in each region, to guide the development of social protection frameworks and future programmatic responses. This will include analysis of the different types of vulnerability (including economic and social) and the factors that affect this. The analysis will be based on secondary data sources, as well as qualitative data collected from key stakeholders, including community members in urban settlements and rural areas. It should include the participation of vulnerable groups that are a priority for social protection, including children, women, pastoral communities and minority clans.

2. **Mapping exercise**: this will include stakeholders (institutions and structures) at the national, sub-national and community levels that are involved in social protection-related activity; the current social protection policy, institutional and regulatory/legal framework, where this exists; along with existing social protection and safety net-related initiatives.

3. **Social protection framework**: a draft child-sensitive social protection framework will be developed that highlights feasible interventions to address the particular risks that vulnerable groups face. In the northern regions, where capacity and stability are greater, the framework will be government owned and long term. It will be aligned with national development priorities. In SCS, the focus will be on predictable, flexible assistance to reduce dependency on unreliable emergency support, and take into consideration how to transition to something nationally owned as capacity develops. Frameworks will provide information including groups to be targeted; the size and scope of the intervention; and its expected impacts and estimated costs.

1.3 Methodology

Development Pathways worked in partnership with Somali NGO Social-life and Agricultural Development Organisation (SADO) on this assignment. SADO was established in 1994 and is committed to supporting initiatives that seek to release the potential of the Somali people to change their own lives through sustainable, integrated and people-centred development, and to improve living standards across the country. SADO is well established across the country, and a member of country-wide networks and platforms including the Peace and Human Rights Network and Somalia South-Central Non-State Actors.

SADO provided two senior research supervisors to oversee data collection in all three zones, and sourced and contracted four data collectors local to each zone. SADO organised the fieldwork logistics.

1.3.1 Inception period

**Literature review**

The research team undertook a literature review, comprising a comprehensive bibliography and inventory of relevant secondary data, which included grey and academic sources from Somalia and Somaliland, to inform the study approach. This was underpinned by the team’s extensive knowledge of social protection schemes internationally. The review highlighted a number of key issues that informed the research design and broader conceptual framework for developing the social protection framework. The key points on the conceptual framework are in Section 1.4; full details are in the inception report.

**Tools development**

The team leader (with inputs from others in the team) developed a qualitative research manual for the research team, which outlined the main aims of the study, its geographic zones and locations, the institutional organisation of the study, and its expected results. The manual provided an overview of each research instrument, comprising tools for in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), community mapping and key informant interviews (KIIs), and detailed guidance for their use. It also provided general methodological guidelines for conducting research, based on ethical research principles, including research protocols to follow when arriving in a district/locality, and guidelines for working with women and children. Finally, it provided guidance and frameworks for reporting.
Work plan
The team leader finalised districts and study locations within the districts in discussion with SADO and UNICEF. In each zone the rationale for selecting districts had to:

- Ensure representation of communities from different livelihoods zones;
- Include the views of minority and marginalised clans;
- Comprise districts for which existing data\(^9\) highlighted high levels of vulnerability;
- Focus on districts and study locations where access for research was secure,\(^{10}\)
- Overlap with the targeted areas in the Joint UN Resilience Programme in all zones; and
- Be restricted to districts that were no more than one day’s travel from urban centres, to make best use of the time available.

Annex A highlights the districts and communities included in the study. Locations are outlined in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 Map of study locations\(^{11}\)

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\(^9\) Including the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) for Somaliland and Puntland and WFP trends in nutrition 2007-12 – see UNICEF 2011a and 2011b.

\(^{10}\) Based on UN security classification and SADO’s assessment.

\(^{11}\) Source: UNICEF Somalia Country Office
1.3.2 Implementation
The field research was undertaken consecutively in each zone, beginning with Somaliland and ending in Puntland.

Training
In each zone, the team held a training workshop for local data collectors prior to data collection activity. These provided essential information on: the background, rationale and objectives of the assignment; definitions of risk and vulnerability; social protection and cash transfer programmes, including lessons from global experience; training in the data collection methods to use, the themes to explore, facilitation techniques and the formats for reporting information; and the daily schedule of activities. Tools were field-tested and finalised based on feedback from the team.

Qualitative data collection: tools and sampling
The team used four instruments during the study (further details of the instruments and methodology are provided in Annex B; Table 1 below shows the number of activities completed per zone).

i) Community mapping: a meeting with the local leader(s) to map the community and gain information to inform the demographic groups and research themes to pursue:
- Details on the size of village, the main sources of livelihoods, and the presence or absence of clinics, schools and other services;
- Identification of the major traders and locations of markets;
- Presence of any NGOs and the types of projects delivered in the area;
- Whether the community received any formal aid;
- Significant historic and recent events in the village (both positive and negative); and
- Perceptions of vulnerability.

ii) Focus group discussions (FGDs): held with key demographic groups in communities, to better understand vulnerability and risks, their causes, coping strategies and opinion of social protection. This included construction of seasonal timelines of risks and shocks. In each district the team aimed to complete approximately six FGDs, with an average size of six people. The following groups were included:
- Older people (50+): including separate FGDs with older women and with older men;
- Adults of working age (25-50): including separate FGDs with adult women and with adult men;
- Young people (18-25): including separate FGDs with female youths and with male youths;
- People with disabilities: mixed groups of adults;
- School-age children (10-14): mixed groups of children.

In Hargeisa, the selection of Dami as a study location ensured the inclusion of the views of a marginalised group – the Gabooye clan.

iii) Life history interviews: the research team held in-depth one-on-one interviews with people from the demographic groups listed above and with out-of-school children, enabling discussion on key events and shocks in people’s lives and exploration of how vulnerability changes through the lifecycle.

iv) Key informant interviews (KIIs): the team interviewed key informants to better understand: the context; existing institutions, policies and programmes relating to or complementing social protection; concerns of decision-makers in government and development/humanitarian partners; and to identify constraints and opportunities for social protection and safety net programming and synergies with other interventions. The interviews took place at the community and district levels in the study locations, at the national level, and in Nairobi, with:
- UN departments working on safety nets/cash transfers, service delivery, or resilience programming;
- Development partners;
• NGOs;
• Key informants on other national social protection programmes, including the Hunger Safety Nets Programme (HSNP) in Kenya and the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia;
• Relevant ministries;
• Relevant service providers, including teachers, health workers and financial services;
• District representatives of relevant ministries;
• Local authorities;
• Community leaders; and
• Religious leaders.

A summary of stakeholders included in the KII s is provided in Annex C.

Table 1 Activities completed per zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Somaliland</th>
<th>SCS</th>
<th>Puntland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community mapping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older people (50+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (25-50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people (18-25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-age children</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with disabilities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per zone</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life history interviews</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of interviews and participants per zone</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reporting and analysis
The team took detailed, handwritten notes of all interviews during the research exercises. They also made electronic recordings where security allowed and with communities’ permission and took photos of the flipcharts and diagrams produced. At the end of each day, the research team came together to record a daily summary report of the key reflections and themes that had emerged and to learn from the day. At the end of data collection in each zone, the team leader held a consolidation workshop to synthesise and interpret the main findings from the research, including trends, similarities, differences and implications for programming. The research supervisor typed up the notes from the KII s and life histories and sent them to the team leader to support the analysis.

Quantitative analysis
The team analysed the existing quantitative data that UNICEF’s NGO partners had collected under the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group Phase 3, to contribute to the understanding of vulnerability and the impact of regular predictable cash transfers to household resilience. This included analysis using the food consumption score (FCS), Coping Strategies Index (CSI) and expenditure patterns, and a comparison with the data collected in Phases 1 and 2.
1.4 Conceptual Framework

1.4.1 Defining the scope of the framework

During the inception period the team leader agreed with UNICEF on the need to narrow the focus of the interventions a social protection framework would support to build political understanding, and therefore buy-in, and focus on what was feasible given the context and capacity.

Numerous definitions of social protection exist. However, generally speaking in all frameworks social protection refers to a set of public and private policies and programmes that aim to prevent, reduce and eliminate economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty and deprivation. All frameworks agree that social protection protects against hazards that directly affect income, living standards and wellbeing, and prevents negative coping that is detrimental to long-term welfare.

A well-established social protection system can be conceptualised – at a simple level – as comprising two pillars, namely social security, and social care and support services. Social security is made up of three types of instrument, as set out in Figure 2:

1. **Tax-financed (or donor-financed) benefits**: often referred to as social assistance or social transfers. At the core of social protection systems are social assistance programmes in the form of social transfers – predictable direct transfers to individuals or households, most commonly as income but also as food. These usually aim to provide individuals or families with some form of minimum consumption. They can either be provided to everyone in a particular category (such as children, the unemployed, elderly people or people with disabilities) or to the poor. They may include interventions to support engagement with the labour market. These interventions provide the socially and economically vulnerable in the population with a minimum income and the means to smooth their consumption during challenging periods in their lives. Government initiatives that provide universal access to social services can be understood as a form of social transfer, although these tend to fall under the policies of the health and education sectors.

2. **Social insurance mechanisms**: these are financed through personal contributions (in formal economies, generally by deductions from employees’ salaries)\(^{12}\) – and focus on enabling people to smooth their consumption over their lifetimes: they save in a fund and, in the event of a particular contingency – such as old age, disability, sickness or unemployment – they are eligible to receive regular and predictable payments for as long as the contingency lasts.

3. **Labour legislation**: the government can mandate employers to finance social protection by, for example, establishing a minimum wage and specifying statutory maternity payments, pay during leave or minimum notice periods.

Social safety nets are another type of intervention within the broader umbrella of social security. These are also non-contributory and publicly financed transfers, but provided on a temporary or short-term basis.\(^{13}\)

\(^{12}\) An employer’s contribution can be regarded as finance from employees in that, if the employer did not pay the contribution, it is likely that wages would be higher. Employers’ contributions tend to suppress wages.

\(^{13}\) UNICEF, 2012a.
To build a comprehensive system, as outlined in Figure 2, takes decades. As with any definition, uncertainty exists around the fringes of the definition. Each country develops its own understanding of what is or is not social protection, and contexts will occur where other instruments are included that diverge from this – such as childcare services or health and safety regulations for example (see Figure 3).

However, at its core the social protection system from country to country rarely changes: it is the national system of income transfers. Social transfers are the key building block for emerging social protection systems, and affect all multidimensional areas of poverty. A primary aim of government-financed social protection systems worldwide is to ensure that a minimum income floor and access to services is established for economic and socially vulnerable groups, to keep people out of poverty and to support investments in human capital development.

**Figure 2 A simple classification of social security schemes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF INSTRUMENT</th>
<th>SOURCE OF FINANCING</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Social Transfers   | Financed from taxes | • Social pensions  
                      |                     | • Disability benefits  
                      |                     | • Child grants  
                      |                     | • Workfare  
                      |                     | • Grants for poor households |
| Social Insurance   | Financed by contributions from employees | • Contributory pensions  
                      |                     | • Survivors pensions  
                      |                     | • Invalidity benefits  
                      |                     | • Unemployment insurance  
                      |                     | • Maternity insurance  
                      |                     | • Death benefits |
| Labour legislation | Financed by employers | • Minimum wage  
                      |                     | • Statutory maternity benefits  
                      |                     | • Leave pay  
                      |                     | • Compensation for dismissal  
                      |                     | • Work injury compensation |

**Figure 3 An example of a social protection system that comprises social security and care services**

---

14 Source: Developed by Development Pathways  
15 Source: Developed by Development Pathways
Social protection in the form of regular and predictable cash transfers\textsuperscript{16} is increasingly acknowledged by Governments, donors and international organisations as a crucial component of strategies to tackle poverty, inequality and vulnerability. At least 30 countries have significant long-term cash transfer schemes; in sub-Saharan Africa, these include Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The schemes include interventions in contexts of environmental fragility and recurrent crisis, such as the PSNP in Ethiopia, HSNP in northern Kenya – including among Somali populations – and experiences of providing social protection to pastoralists, such as the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) scheme in Uganda’s Karamoja region. Evidence proves that cash transfers have the potential to enable the extremely poor and vulnerable to build resilience to shocks and break inter-generational transmission of deprivation, by allowing better management of risks and generation of a wide range of positive economic and social impacts.

Such transfers have proved feasible in this context and since 2008 there have been a range of experiences (both positive and negative) on which to build. The recent experiences of providing cash transfers to vulnerable populations in SCS and Puntland showed the very significant impact cash has on the wider local economy and individual households, improving household food access and health and nutrition outcomes for children, and servicing debts and opening credit lines that are critical coping strategies in times of stress. In Puntland cash transfers allowed households to contribute to zakat and sadaqah (respectively, compulsory and voluntary giving within Islam; see Table 8, Section 4.2 for full definitions), which improved their community standing and contributed to the functioning of traditional social assistance. The majority of concerns proved to be unfounded and there were demonstrable benefits of cash and vouchers over in-kind assistance\textsuperscript{17}. A number of weaknesses were identified in these programmes that may serve as valuable lessons for future cash transfer programmes in Somaliland.

The draft UNICEF social protection strategy, in line with UNICEF’s global understanding of social protection systems, outlines a vision of a comprehensive system that comprises interventions under social assistance, social insurance, measures to ensure equitable access to services, labour market interventions and social legislation.\textsuperscript{18} Although these can be said to comprise good practice internationally, they are not be feasible in low-income countries and certainly not in Somalia, where provision of even basic services is poor and government capacity and access are too constrained to put in place such a disparate range of programmes at the same time.

Given the capacity of the state and others, the team leader agreed that it was critical to keep things simple and to prioritise interventions. We agreed that the starting point should be to focus on social assistance in the form of social transfers. Firstly, it is the only form of intervention that is truly feasible in the short-to-medium term; secondly, there is a good deal of previous experience to build on including in Somaliland; and thirdly, because of the importance of building local understanding and buy-in to create a clearly defined core to social protection as a standalone social sector. Scope exists to add other elements (social insurance, social legislation) to the framework.

For this study we agreed that the team would take Devereux and Wheeler’s PPPT (protective; preventative; promotive; transformative) framework as its starting point and would focus on social transfers as the key building block for social protection and safety nets in Somaliland. A well-designed cash transfer programme can contribute to all of these outcomes:\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Protective – protecting the consumption and attainment of other basic needs of those who cannot
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{16} Social assistance also includes in-kind transfers and waivers supporting access to services.

\textsuperscript{17} Beneficiaries preferred cash to food aid (and requested ‘no more food aid’), whereas cash and vouchers appear more cost efficient and cost effective at reducing negative coping mechanisms and achieving a minimum dietary diversity. See Hedlund et al., 2013 for more information.

\textsuperscript{18} Collins, 2013.

\textsuperscript{19} Brewin and Dunn, 2014.
meet them through other means;
- Preventative – mitigating risks and preventing a (further) fall into poverty;
- Promotive – allowing households and individuals to achieve their productive potential; and
- Transformative – reducing the structural inequalities that cause vulnerability.

1.4.2 A conceptual framework for vulnerability
During the inception period the team leader agreed with UNICEF that the mapping of vulnerability must take into account not only covariate but also idiosyncratic risks. Idiosyncratic risks affect individuals or households and correlate very clearly with particular demographic groups and ages of the population – in other words there are particular shocks experienced at particular times during the lifecycle (as illustrated in Figure 4 below). A social protection framework for Somaliland must seek to address these lifecycle vulnerabilities, but also take into account the prevalence of covariate shocks.

1.5 Structure of the report
This report presents the findings relevant to Somaliland. It comprises the following:

- **Section 1: Introduction and background**
- **Section 2: Macro-level context** – presentation of available data on livelihoods, poverty and vulnerability for the country as a whole and each zone.
- **Section 3: Mapping of vulnerability** – main findings from the field research, including trends in livelihoods; shocks and stresses; coping strategies; understanding of vulnerability, its causes, and how this varies by geography, livelihood age, gender, disability and ethnicity.
- **Section 4: Mapping of social protection** – including government and development and humanitarian partners’ interventions, as well as discussion of informal social protection sources; identification of gaps and best practices.
- **Section 5: Feasibility and entry points** – the enabling environment, and programme and policy linkages.
- **Section 6: Developing a theory of change for social transfers** – summary of the key debates and international evidence that inform the framework.
- **Section 7: Framework and recommendations** – presentation of the proposed social protection framework options for each of the three zones. In Somaliland and Puntland the emphasis is on government engagement, whereas in SCS the aim is to move away from recurrent, short-term and time-limited humanitarian programmes to something more predictable and long term. As per UNICEF’s request, the focus is on pilot cash transfer programmes. The options include longer-term requirements (10-15 years), as well as the immediate priorities (3-5 years), along with recommended next steps for consideration by UNICEF and its partners in developing options set out in the frameworks.
2. MACRO-LEVEL CONTEXT

The report presents data for Somaliland where they exist, or has been generalised for Somalia as a whole (meaning the three Zones of Somaliland, Puntland and SCS).

2.1 Political and security context

Since the civil war of 1991 and the collapse of the state, Somalia has been in a state of violence and civil strife. The social and economic infrastructure has collapsed and hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced. Somalia is commonly identified as a fragile state context\(^{20}\) and the country now consists of three semi-autonomous zones: north-west Somalia, known as Somaliland; north-east Somalia, known as Puntland; and SCS. Each zone has its own administration. The authorities in Somaliland have judicial, legislative and executive systems, and similar ministries exist in Puntland, that deal directly with donors and set development priorities. Although the north has experienced relative security in recent years, security continues to be a fundamental concern. The government is in the early stages of moving to a development agenda and capacity shortfalls are inevitable in terms of resources and skills, which hampers the roll-out of state services.

2.2 Demographic context

Although no accurate data on population size exist,\(^{21}\) Somalia as a whole has an estimated population of approximately 10.5 million,\(^{22}\) which is characterised by a high birth rate (6.4) and a large young population. Data from Somaliland\(^{23}\) estimate the average household size to be more than six individuals, though a significant number of households are estimated to have 10 or more members.\(^{24}\) Almost half the population is under the age of 15 and more than 70% are under 30 years old. Life expectancy is low and only about 3% of the population is over the age of 65. More than 60% of households have at least one child under the age of five, and 91% have a child under the age of 18. The years of conflict, increasing migration and, in urban areas, increasing abandonment of families have led to an increase in female-headed households, with approximately 33% of households in Somaliland thought to be headed by a woman.\(^{25}\)

Somaliland is experiencing rapid rates of urbanisation (estimated at 3.4% per annum) and one-third of the population is estimated to be living in urban areas; by 2050 this is expected to be 50-60% of the population, beyond the levels projected for neighbouring countries.\(^{26}\) This is in part because of population displacement – famine and insecurity has displaced an estimated 1.6 million people across the country\(^{27}\) – but also due to ‘drop-out’ from nomadic pastoralism.

Service provision

Provision of basic services (education, water, sanitation and health) in Somalia and Somaliland is poor. This was exacerbated in 2013 when Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) pulled out, citing unacceptable security

\(^{20}\) OECD-DAC characterises fragile states as those which are ‘unable to meet [their] population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process’ (OECD, 2008). Similarly, DFID (2005, pg.7) defines fragile states as ‘those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people’.

\(^{21}\) Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia has not had any form of reliable data system that supports humanitarian, recovery or development actions. The last population census was done in 1985-86, but no data were released. Only a few data were released from the earlier census conducted in 1975. UNDP carried out a settlement survey in 2005-06, but the Somali administration came out against it, because it believed that the population had been underestimated.

\(^{22}\) United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), n.d.

\(^{23}\) UNICEF, 2011b.

\(^{24}\) In Somaliland, 15%.

\(^{25}\) UNICEF, 2011b.

\(^{26}\) UNICEF, 2014.

\(^{27}\) Brewin and Dunn, 2014.
threats to its staff. Development plans in the northern zones have prioritised infrastructure (roads and government buildings) rather than social services.

In 2009 there were an estimated 625 health posts and 225 maternal and child health centres across Somaliland, SCS and Puntland. Assuming a population of 10.5 million, this amounts to just one health post per 15,200 people. The private sector has met some of the demand, and charges user fees. There are an estimated 1,211 primary education posts – public and private – in the country.

Access to water and sanitation is chronically poor (see Table 2 below), with huge disparities between rural and urban areas. Piped water is only available in urban centres and most households in rural areas must rely on unimproved and insecure sources, such as rainwater collection, unprotected wells, or tanker trucks.

2.3 Environmental context
The country is populated by a resilient and highly independent people, whose nomadic heritage has evolved to survive in the harsh and arid environment of the Horn of Africa. However, in the past decade, climatic shocks compounded by the civil strife in parts of the country have severely affected the livelihoods of pastoralists and agriculturalists alike, and combined to contribute to the famine experienced in large parts of SCS in 2011. Somaliland is prone to recurrent drought and floods in much of the country and it is commonly agreed that the frequency and severity of climatic shocks is increasing. While accurate data is lacking, many areas of the Horn are experiencing long-term declines in rainfall. While rainfall in the Horn is inherently unpredictable and there is considerable uncertainty about how climate change will affect rainfall trends in the future, the long-term decline in ‘long rains’ precipitation in the Horn of Africa has been linked to anthropogenic warming, attributing the 2011 drought to climate change, and predicting increasingly arid conditions and more frequent droughts.

The increase in frequency and severity of drought cycles is reducing the ability of households to rebuild livelihoods between crises and contributing to a steady erosion of assets. A variety of social, political, economic and environmental factors compound susceptibility to drought across the Horn of Africa, and more particularly in Somaliland, including: high rates of poverty and chronic malnutrition; poor access to health care and basic services; high dependency on low-productivity, rain-fed agriculture; high risk of conflict; high rates of environmental degradation; capacity constraints in government; and political marginalisation of vulnerable groups. The increasing frequency of droughts, expanding populations and widespread poverty also in turn contribute to the growing challenge of environmental degradation.

2.4 Socio-economic context
Somaliland has some of the lowest economic indicators in the world. According to the available data, GDP per capita was estimated at $347 (current US$ prices) in 2012, which is the fourth lowest in the world. The economy is based primarily on the livestock industry, wholesale and retail trade (particularly in the informal sector), and to a lesser extent agriculture. More than half the population depends on nomadic pastoralism, with agriculture mainly practised in the northwest and in inter-riverine areas in the south. Poor households

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28 Médecins Sans Frontières, 2013.
29 Brewin, 2014.
30 Bailey, 2013.
31 Bailey, 2013. Southwestern Ethiopia has been on a downward trend since the 1960s. Across southern, southwestern and southeastern Ethiopia, growing season rainfall has declined by 15-20% since the 1970s, with impacts further exacerbated by significant warming. A similar pattern of decreasing rainfall and rising temperatures is evident in Kenya, where long rains have declined by 100mm since the mid-1970s in the areas of central Kenya that are critical for growing surplus crops.
32 Bailey, 2013.
33 World Bank, 2014. Poverty line defined as cost of consuming 2,100 kcal per day per person in the household, plus ‘some non-food income’ (value not defined); set at $28.5/person/month in urban areas and $25.2/person/month in rural areas.
in urban environments including those in internally displaced persons (IDP) settlements often depend on daily wage labour. Cultural norms dictate defined economic roles in households, especially in nomadic livelihoods. Males predominate in cattle and camel rearing, with women responsible for milk marketing. Females predominate in small livestock production. Men sell primarily to the export market, whereas women trade locally for consumption. Agricultural production involves men and women; again women trade primarily in local markets while milling and commercial sales are the domain of men. Strong markets provide critical support, facilitating the movement of people, money, goods and credit. The country is characterised by very low levels of investment (ranked 180th in the world for gross fixed capital formation) and chronic unemployment, with employment:population ratios much below the sub-Saharan African average.\textsuperscript{34}

Around $1.3bn in remittances is transferred to Somalia annually, some $500m of it from the UK, which far exceeds international aid. The remittances are an important coping strategy for those who receive them; however, such transfers are not equitably distributed, and tend to exclude the poorest and most vulnerable who lack such social networks.

A recent household consumption and expenditure survey for Somaliland estimated poverty in urban areas to be 29%, similar to poverty in urban areas in neighbouring Ethiopia (26%); and that rural poverty was 38%, which is higher than in Ethiopia (30%).\textsuperscript{35} However, the study only covered settled rural and urban populations, not urban IDP populations or nomadic communities that commonly have some of the highest indicators of poverty. Therefore these are likely to be underestimates. Income inequality is much higher than Ethiopia, with an urban Gini coefficient of 0.43 and a rural Gini coefficient of 0.46.\textsuperscript{36}

The factors above and the lack of a functional state have combined to ensure that the country has some of the worst indicators of social development, as indicated in Table 1.\textsuperscript{37} Average life expectancy at birth is just 54.7. Women and children are some of the worst affected, although data are lacking for other vulnerable groups such as the elderly and disabled.

Infant mortality remains a huge concern and at the regional level child mortality indicators have improved little if at all in the past 15 years. This is linked to limited access to reproductive health services, with almost half of women receiving no antenatal care and the majority giving birth at home, especially in rural areas. Childcare and feeding practices, including breastfeeding and complementary feeding, are sub-optimal: 28% of children under five had been left with inadequate care in the past week. Immunisation coverage is low and most children aged 12-23 months have not received the basic vaccines. Diarrhoeal disease and malaria are prevalent in children, with diarrhoea peaking in the weaning period (12-23 months). Access to water and sanitation facilities is very restricted, particularly in rural areas and is much lower than in neighbouring countries. Use of contraception is very limited and modern contraceptive methods almost non-existent. Primary and secondary enrolment rates are much lower than neighbouring countries.

These figures mask huge disparities between rural and urban areas and between wealth quintiles. Many of the indicators correlate with poverty – with indicators for mortality, living conditions, access to services, health-seeking behaviour and other health indicators all far worse for those in the bottom quintiles than in the wealthiest. Service access is much reduced in rural compared to urban areas. Many also correlate positively with the education of the mother, showing the importance of education outcomes for girls and young women in breaking the cycle of poverty.

\textsuperscript{34} ILO, 2012.
\textsuperscript{35} World Bank 2014: Poverty line based on cost per person of consuming 2,100 kcal plus some non-food income ($28.5/person/month urban or $25.2 rural).
\textsuperscript{36} World Bank 2014.
\textsuperscript{37} Taken from MICS, a representative sample survey of women 15-49 and children under 5 in Somaliland and Puntland – see UNICEF 2011a and 2011b.
Table 2 Selected indicators of wellbeing 2011\(^{38}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Puntland</th>
<th>Somaliland</th>
<th>Does indicator improve: with wealth?</th>
<th>with education of mother?</th>
<th>in urban areas?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neonatal mortality rate</td>
<td>46/1,000 (national figure)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of births per woman</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of contraception</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antenatal care from trained professional</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth with a skilled attendant</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth in a health facility</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARE PRACTICES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breastfed in first hour</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive breastfeeding first 6 months</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementary feeding</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamin A for child under 5 in last 6 months</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full immunisation coverage 12-23 months</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate treatment of diarrhoea with oral rehydration therapy</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria cases receiving proper medication</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated insecticide net use children</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHILD HEALTH STATUS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child mortality under 1 year</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child mortality under 5 years</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidence of diarrhoea for child under 5, in past 2 weeks</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malarial fever in the past 2 weeks</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACCESS TO WATER &amp; SANITATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to improved water source</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No sanitation</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to improved water and sanitation</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDUCATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy women</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net intake rate of children aged 6 entering Grade 1</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school net attendance</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary completion</td>
<td>50% boys; 59%; girls 69% boys; 40% girls</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school net attendance</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARRIAGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls’ marriage 15-19 years</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in polygamous union</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHILD PROTECTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children living with neither parent (parents dead)</td>
<td>12% (13%)</td>
<td>12% (11%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child labour (household / family livelihood) 5-14 years</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The traditions and behavioural norms that accompany a conservative form of Islam are defining characteristics of the country. Somalia and Somaliland ranks second to Afghanistan as the worst country

\(^{38}\) UNICEF, 2011b.
worldwide for women. Women are subordinate to men in nearly all aspects of life. Women and girls in Somali society face particular economic and social vulnerabilities, including the constraints of culturally gendered work norms; balancing income-generating opportunities with domestic demands; and mobility constraints. They disproportionately shoulder the burden of ill health and limited reproductive health rights are a significant concern. Polygamy is prevalent and the huge unmet need for modern contraception methods encourages higher birth rates. About 98% of women have undergone the practice of female genital cutting (FGC), which often complicates childbirth. Household decision-making power is often concentrated in the husband’s hands, which can be reinforced by physical violence. Women suffer from limited opportunities to exercise meaningful voice and agency at the community level. However, in many households women are breadwinners, engaging in small-scale enterprises, especially in urban areas, and they are responsible for family welfare.

Low levels of school attendance and completion, and literacy are noticeable across the country as a whole and across livelihood zones. Lack of education is seen as a major contributor to poverty and vulnerability in this context, because it constrains livelihood options and resilience to shocks. Education of children was a primary aspiration of communities in two recent studies. Child labour in the home or in family livelihoods is slightly more common for girls, and more common in rural areas. It increases for those children aged 12-14 years. In urban areas children working in remunerated economic activity outside the home is more common.

The collapse of the education system and high birth rates has resulted in a huge mass of poorly educated and underemployed young people. Youth unemployment is a critical issue and can serve as a rich pool of recruits for militant groups.

**Food security and nutrition**

Since the 2011 famine, the humanitarian situation has improved somewhat, largely because of consecutive good rains and the delivery of assistance in more areas of the country. However, the scale of need remains vast: 1 million people still require aid to meet their basic needs, and without support a further 1.7 million who recently emerged from crisis could fall back into crisis. Child and maternal under-nutrition in their acute and chronic forms remain an enduring problem. Data from 2001-09 show that median rates of global acute malnutrition have remained at ‘serious’ (10 to <15%) or ‘critical’ (15 to <20%) levels. It is estimated that for the period 2008-12 some 32% of children were moderately or severely underweight; 42% were moderately or severely stunted; and 13% suffered from moderate or severe wasting. The majority of food for household consumption is purchased, even in rural areas, and inflation poses a major challenge to the wellbeing of households. Prices of major goods have been volatile over the past five years, with sharp peaks in 2008 and 2012. The Somaliland Household Survey 2013 estimated that 57% of rural (not including nomads) and 42% of urban (not including IDP) households did not consume the minimum food requirements. Access to food is a major contributory factor to poor nutrition, which social norms and pressures exacerbate, leading to poor care practices, and poor hygiene and sanitation.

**Local governance and clan dynamics**

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39 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), n.d.
40 UNICEF, 2011b and 2013
41 Brewin and Dunn, 2014; SomReP, 2014
42 AfDB, 2013
43 UNICEF, 2011b.
44 This is particularly the case for riverine areas.
Somaliland has a clan-based society, with clan membership playing an integral role in the socioeconomic and political arenas. In the absence of a central government, communities have reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, consisting of civil law, customary law and religious law, through clan lineage. The Somali population is divided into major clans and a number of minority groups. The clan system has presented ready-made fault lines along which the country has been fractured for the past 30 years. Clans include the Hawiye, Isaaq, Darod, Rahanweyn, Dir, Digil, and other ethnic minorities. Major clans dominate political structures and confer major benefits of social solidarity and support within sub-clans and extended family networks. In contrast, minority groups – including non-ethnic Somali groups such as the Jareer Bantu and Banadir, and low-status groups such as the Gabooye, Yibir and Tumal – lack the extended social networks that form a safety net for the majority tribes, which makes them more vulnerable to economic crises. Members of minority clans also have limited political power. The famines of the early 1990s and 2011 affected minority clans most. Militant Islamist group al-Shabaab has garnered significant support from minority communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MACRO-LEVEL CONTEXT: KEY CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Poverty is multidimensional and has social and economic characteristics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Women and children are particularly vulnerable; however, other groups such as the elderly, disabled and young people are also likely to be vulnerable, but data for these groups do not exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Given the overlying shocks and access constraints, the situation is likely to be worse in SCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multiple challenges need to be addressed, a number of which correlate with income insecurity. This is important to consider in the design of social protection programmes; however, it is unlikely that a single programme can address all needs simultaneously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chronic long-term and transient poverty and food insecurity exist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. MAPPING VULNERABILITY

Vulnerability is a factor of people’s exposure to risk (including covariate and idiosyncratic risks) and their capacity to manage this risk. This capacity is influenced by their access to (and return on) productive assets (such as labour and access to credit or inputs), services and social networks. Vulnerability to shocks and stresses can thus be economic (being in poverty/at risk of falling into poverty) and social (lack of autonomy, discrimination and marginalisation); the two are linked. Social protection can reduce exposure to risk and strengthen individuals’ and households’ capacities to deal with these threats in an integrated manner.

Understanding individual, household and community vulnerabilities and their trends over time is important to ensure design of appropriate and effective social protection programmes and targeting mechanisms. It is critical to have a good understanding of the multidimensional nature of vulnerability, to understand who is vulnerable and why. To develop a theory of change it is important to appreciate trends in livelihoods in Somaliland, in the shocks and stresses that occur, the coping strategies people have available to them, and to understand how people’s exposure to risk can change according to lifecycle and external events.

3.1 Contextual information on the study sites in Somaliland

Togdheer is the second-largest region in Somaliland with an estimated population of 350,000. Livestock, are the foundation of the region’s economy and there are many nomadic communities as well as agro-pastoralists (primarily rain fed). Land on the upper plateau comprises arid grassland, with wooded areas existing but receding because of land use change and charcoal production. The region’s urban centre, Burco town, is an important hub in the livestock trade. The region has the lowest rates of exclusive breastfeeding, female literacy and attendance at secondary school, and the highest infant mortality in Somaliland. Study locations included Odweyne District – the peri-urban centre and the rural community of Getitaly – and the rural community of Beer, plus peri-urban settlements on the outskirts of Burco town in Burco District.

The research team visited two IDP camps in Hargeisa. These settlements are still known as IDP camps, despite being essentially permanent. The Stadium IDP settlement, near the centre of town, has existed for almost 20 years; the government established the Digaale IDP camp, on the very outskirts of Hargeisa, less than a year ago. The two camps share similar local governance structures, security situations, environmental conditions, and trends and livelihood groups; however, they differ socio-economically. The third study location, Dami, is an area where the majority of the discriminated groups (e.g. the Gabooye clan) have lived for decades.

3.2 Trends in livelihoods and vulnerability

Environmental shocks, conflict, poor governance, marginalisation and chronic poverty are the main drivers of vulnerability of the population as a whole. Chronic, entrenched poverty and extensive economic hardship were fundamental concerns in communities visited. In the study locations the vast majority of households are low income; very few are high income. Collective purchasing power is low.

The team identified a number of major trends in livelihoods. Several of these are consequences of the underlying drivers, but many also contribute to the drivers and increase the vulnerability of livelihoods within the study locations. Increasing poverty and vulnerability affect livelihoods in rural areas, because of recurring and increasing climatic shocks, and other constraints to livelihoods such as lack of economic opportunity. Trends also include, increasing economic migration and rapid urbanisation. Services in Somaliland have improved slightly; however, these remain grossly inadequate and inaccessible to the majority in rural areas and to IDP and poor communities in urban areas.

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45 Ministry of National Planning and Development, n.d.
46 UNICEF, 2011b.
These trends in livelihoods, which have a bearing on vulnerability and on the design of social protection programmes, are discussed in detail below. Our analysis shows that these trends can affect different groups in different ways.

3.2.1 Trends in rural livelihoods and economic opportunities
Livelihoods in the rural study sites visited are primarily subsistence based, with surplus crops or livestock being exchanged for basic commodities in the region’s urban centres.

In Somaliland, while herding remains the dominant livelihood overall, in the districts and communities the team visited there has been reduction in herd sizes in the last 10-15 years, a consequence of livestock disease, recurrent droughts and general water scarcity, overgrazing and land use change. This has reduced the traditional coping mechanism available to households to deal with their consumption and expenditure needs. Herd composition has changed: cattle have all but vanished from the study areas, with a few stock kept as working animals for agriculture only. Herds constitute camels and – more often – small livestock. In the northwest, land acquisition and the fencing-off of traditional communal grazing land for private use is constraining access of pastoral households to range. This goes against the founding principle of pastoralism, which makes livelihoods resilient to water scarcity, and is contributing to resource conflicts.

Agro-pastoralism in Somaliland was acknowledged to be more diverse, but still water dependent and therefore also exposed to the climatic trends mentioned above. Some communities considered that this way of life was potentially more vulnerable to shocks than pastoralism because it is sedentary, though as noted above this coping strategy for pastoralists in certain areas is reducing. Agro-pastoral communities commented on the untapped potential of agriculture. Agricultural production in the study areas was reported to be low, despite potential, with some considering that production has declined over the last 5-10 years. Overall, there has been very little investment in agriculture in terms of inputs, finance, infrastructure, irrigation or markets.

Rural areas in general have suffered from a chronic lack of alternative opportunities for productive livelihoods or employment. The local economy in the study sites reportedly almost collapsed during drought years but also Jiilaal (the dry season). All FGDs highlighted the desire to diversify but cited limited options. People lack the necessary inputs to move beyond subsistence farming and to become more climate resilient. Numerous barriers prevent pastoral households from entering agriculture, including access to land, tools and knowledge, as well as cultural barriers.

Women, in particular, have attempted to diversify into small businesses such as teashops, vegetable trading and fodder production. These tend to be in peri-urban areas rather than within rural communities where purchasing power is minimal. The sale of khat is a relatively lucrative trade, given the high demand, and this is increasingly a livelihood opportunity for women. However, this must be weighed against the significant negative social and economic impacts of the custom on households and communities (see below). In farming communities, respondents commented that skills such as basket-weaving and other crafts were underused because of lack of access to capital to start businesses.

3.2.2 Trends in migration and urbanisation

“You can’t eat from an empty hand”

Somali proverb; participant in Mogadishu expressing their extreme poverty and focus on simply trying to survive

Constraints to nomadic livelihoods and changes in herd size and composition have led to a trend in Somaliland towards increasing sedentarisation of pastoralists. Those without or with very few pack animals are forced to drop out of the nomadic way of life. Agro-pastoralists, too, increasingly rely on a semi-sedentary

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47 This is likely to be further encouraged by the government of Somaliland and it is a priority under the agricultural sector of the Regional Development Plan.
household for agriculture with pastoral satellites. This sedentarisation is leading to more urban characteristics even in rural areas, with settlements are becoming more permanent.

Across the country the trend towards migration to urban areas is rapidly increasing particularly among pastoral households. The drift towards peri-urban centres such as Burco\(^{48}\) and Hargeisa has led to the creation of or expansion of overcrowded and impoverished informal settlements, such as the IDP camps. In addition, poor immigrants from SCS and Ethiopia are arriving in the northwest.

The issue of fracturing families is important and has implications for social protection. Generally, able-bodied men (and increasingly also women) migrate to the pastoral satellites or the towns for work, while others go to the IDP camps.

People in all zones explained that previously seasonal movement in and out of urban centres was a common but temporary activity for pastoralists and farmers alike, but increasingly households were settling for long periods, or permanently, in urban and peri-urban areas. The permanence depends on the context and the causes of migration. Pastoral households that have destocked have no livelihood to return to. While small livestock generally remain a common asset for households in these settled areas,\(^{49}\) their herds have gone and the way of life for these people has totally changed. Former pastoralists’ lack of hope of was palpable in Hargeisa; it would require high investment to re-establish viable herds. Some have moved from rural areas because they no longer see the potential in their traditional livelihoods.

The interviewees in the IDP settlements in all zones were employed primarily as daily labourers, particularly in construction and hauling goods (men) and as domestic servants (women). Others worked in a variety of petty trades including tea shops, hawkling/street vending, buying and selling milk, shoe-shining, car-washing and selling khat. Jobs are generally insecure and poorly paid and competition is increasing as the influx to the cities continues. IDPs experience discrimination in the job market in competition with local people. Markets and opportunities in the city are generally far from IDP settlements and expensive to reach. Households find it difficult to invest or diversify livelihoods because they lack the capital and skills. IDPs from agro-pastoral communities were considered to have more directly transferable skills than pastoralists to adapt to urban opportunities. Destocked pastoralists mostly worked as daily labourers and unskilled builders. IDP interviewees reported that attending to basic needs was their main concern.

Our research highlighted the high heterogeneity of urban informal settlements due to their location and length of establishment. Households and new arrivals in Digaale experienced many problems because of their isolation from employment opportunities and transport.

Economic migration is becoming more common, especially for young men, which is leading to an increase in the number of female-headed households (this is discussed further below – 3.4 Coping strategies). In the north the trend in rural areas and urban settlements was for youth out-migration. Youth migration from rural pastoral communities in Togdheer region has been significant and has increased over the past two decades, with young men disillusioned with the future of pastoralism travelling to Burco and Hargeisa. Young people were generally considered to lack a hope of make a living, and have been migrating inside the country and overseas (Ethiopia, Libya and Yemen and beyond to Europe and the wider Middle East). The perception among the young people the team interviewed was that life was better overseas, with one commenting that ‘life would be better if I [had] a passport’. This is discussed further below.

Urbanisation is creating a continuous new demand for livestock products from households that are unable to meet these through their own production. This could present new income opportunities for rural

\(^{48}\) Rural migrants are moving to two IDP camps on the edge of Burco, with a combined population of about 15,000.

\(^{49}\) The World Bank Household Consumption Survey 2013 showed that 6 out of 10 urban and settled rural households had access to livestock. However, this did not include IDP camp residents.
households. However, none of the interviewees cited demand from urban centres as a positive trend affecting their community.

3.2.3 Trends in household labour
Changes to livelihood strategies are having an impact on the division of labour and gender roles within households. In all livelihood zones – rural and urban – the team found that women’s engagement in economic activities was increasing. People acknowledged that women shouldered the responsibility of supporting households to cope with crises. But although women’s burden of labour might have increased, it has not changed their entrenched gender roles or marginalisation in decision-making.

In urban centres more economic opportunities were available to and culturally appropriate for women than for men. But men in urban areas (especially, but not exclusively, men from pastoral livelihoods groups) considered certain jobs to be suitable only for women. Meanwhile, in pastoral communities the changes in herd composition and the switch to small livestock – the care of which has traditionally devolved to women (and children) and is easier to inherit – has further increased women’s burden of labour but also disenfranchised young men. A traditional role for young men as camel herders remains in those households that can afford camels.

Men have become increasingly dependent on their wives for economic support, which has reportedly created tension in households. Interviewees reported cases of domestic violence, and that women’s working had disincentivised male heads of households from looking for work. Interviews reported that divorce rates were rising, especially in IDPs areas, because of poverty and domestic economic pressures.

Child labour is prevalent. It is increasing in areas that are experiencing water scarcity, where people are switching to smaller livestock, and in IDP camps. It was common to hear that girls were expected to take on homemaker duties if their mothers were working.

3.2.4 Environmental trends
Officials and communities commented on the environmental changes that have taken place in the past decade, including increasing desertification caused by recurring poor rains and charcoal burning across the northwest and northeast. They also noted invasive tree species as a problem; and the encroachment of urban settlements on what was previously grazing land. Officials cited population pressures, poverty and lack of access to critical inputs (seeds, skills, water) as contributing to environmental degradation, because communities were unable to follow sustainable livelihoods practices. Another problem interviewees mentioned repeatedly was the introduction of genetically modified seeds, which prevented seed-saving and threatened agro-pastoral and farming livelihoods. The poor planning and rapid sprawl of informal settlements is creating additional environmental challenges across the country, including a huge increase in plastic waste and sanitation problems.

3.2.5 Khat consumption – an emerging social problem
In rural and urban areas the increasing, almost daily, consumption of khat by men is acknowledged to be approaching epidemic proportions and is a growing social problem. Every young man the team interviewed in Somaliland chewed khat. This is linked to the lack of economic opportunities available for young men and is contributing to women’s burden of labour as they take on productive roles. All FGDs with women highlighted this as a growing issue.

3.2.6 Trends in access to services in the study sites
In the rural areas and urban informal settlements that the team visited they found a chronic lack of access to essential services, including health and education services and water and sanitation. The gap between the need for essential public service provision and the available services is huge.
Health
Women and older people, in particular, repeatedly mentioned poor health to be a major challenge. Almost all available health services are private and very few people can afford to pay for them.\textsuperscript{50} 

Mother, neo-natal and child health (MNCH) primary healthcare has been made free at point of use in Somaliland; however, significant barriers to access remain on the supply and demand sides. In rural areas supply-side barriers include low coverage and capacity of government services, huge queues and a lack of trained personnel and supplies, where services exist. The government of Somaliland, working with development partners such as UNICEF, has been increasingly investing in the health sector over the past five years to support the supply side (see Section 4). However, change will take time.

Burco District has the best facilities in the Togheer region, but only has one general hospital, with 150 beds. In 2013, MSF stopped support to the hospital in Burco and interviewees acknowledged supply-side issues had got worse since then. Other districts just have health centres, without qualified doctors. Odweyne District has a single health centre to serve the entire population and five primary heath units. There were no MNCH posts in any of the rural communities the research team visited and families needed to travel to urban centres up to 45 km away. Where transportation was required, such as for pregnant women to deliver babies, households were forced to sell livestock to cover the cost. During rainy seasons the roads become impassable, restricting access. Interviewees cited maternal mortality because of a lack of access to medical facilities as very common.\textsuperscript{51}

Concerns over the quality of the healthcare and supplies provided, including widespread suspicion about the results of diagnosis and source of medicines, also affects demand for services. This is particularly the case for the services provided free of charge, where people considered that you received a ‘single pill for every ill’; in other words there is a lack of quality diagnoses.\textsuperscript{52} These findings are similar to those of a recent DFID study into barriers to access to health services for women and children in Somaliland.\textsuperscript{53}

Education
The education status of the population is generally low. Barriers to access included the costs of schooling, nomadic lifestyle, poor coverage and capacity of public schools, and lack of qualified staff and supplies. All communities and all age groups highlighted the importance of education. Parents and older people considered the inability to educate their children to a higher level to be one of the biggest challenges in their lives; while young people cited leaving school as one of their biggest personal issues.

Access to education in the rural areas the research team visited has improved somewhat because of investments in infrastructure and the Ministry of Education’s free education policy. However, people in rural and urban areas commented that the introduction of the free education policy without adequate supply-side support has had a negative impact on the quality of state-provided education. The pupil:teacher ratio has increased, and qualified teachers have moved to private schools because they were not being paid. Hidden costs for parents and guardians still exist; for example, exam fees, school maintenance costs and learning materials. This continues to force many parents to take their children out of school.

In the study sites the team visited there were no opportunities for secondary education in rural areas, which means that children must be sent away to live with relatives if they are to continue their schooling. The fees for secondary education make it inaccessible for the majority, especially in rural areas. Interviewees generally agreed that boys were more likely than girls to be given this opportunity. There were no vocational training

\textsuperscript{50} Odweyne has around 7 private clinics and one public health outpost. Per capita expenditure in Somaliland on health is less than $5, compared to $33 recommended by the World Health Organization (Key Informant in Odweyne, 2014).

\textsuperscript{51} Maternal mortality continues to be the leading cause of death among women of reproductive age in Somaliland.

\textsuperscript{52} This was a barrier to access cited in relation to the IOM-funded free MNCH post in Mogadishu.

\textsuperscript{53} Brewin, 2014
opportunities available in rural areas. Young people interviewed expressed frustration that they could not pursue their educations.

Sending children to school does not only mean bearing the cost, but also relinquishing the support that children could have contributed to the family. Families having to make hard choices and placing a greater value on their children’s learning skills they can put to use in the working world.

Gender disparities exist in state and Koranic education, with girls dropping out around the age of 12. The research team noted this in one rural community in particular, where only one girl was attending school, which had more than 50 boys.

Water and sanitation
Access to clean water is a growing challenge in rural areas and in the poor informal settlements in urban centres. The water catchments in rural areas were generally open and shared with livestock; people did not consider them to be clean. Water scarcity is increasing in Togdheer; many areas have water trucked in and people have to pay. In urban centres all households must pay for water and facilities are overcrowded. The Digaale IDP camp had no piped water supply. In overcrowded urban areas sanitation is a growing concern. The sanitation of the camps the research team visited was very poor, with no rubbish collection, and not enough toilets to serve the entire population.54 Nobody emptied the toilets and they were poorly maintained.

3.2.7 Trends in food and nutrition security
People in all locations commented that the level of hunger of the population has decreased in comparison to years of drought and especially the famine of 2011. However, the interviewees reported a generalised and chronic difficulty with accessing sufficient food, especially in urban areas. Insufficient food was a challenge that children mentioned in all locations. Malnutrition was reportedly widespread in IDP camps because of a lack of economic access, and was a visible problem in Hargeisa. Interviewees in all urban areas mentioned that inflation has become an increasing problem in recent years. Some pointed to the arrival/return of the diaspora as a contributory factor in the increases to the cost of living. In rural areas seasonal variations in access to food were highlighted as contributing to spikes in malnutrition during dry seasons. Besides access to food, interviewees mentioned women’s workload and care practices as contributing to malnutrition. It was noted that children, the elderly and expectant mothers feel its effects most acutely.

3.2.8 Trends in technology
The spread of the mobile (cellular) telephone network, access to phones and exponential rise in the use of mobile money transfers in the last years is quite extraordinary, providing a communication device for families separated by migration and removing the need to carry cash. Mobile phone penetration in Somaliland is estimated at around 45%.55 Telecommunications is one of the most dynamic and innovative industry sectors and is very competitive: there are four mobile network operators in Somaliland alone and seven more in the rest of Somalia. Fierce competition has led operators to offer some of the world’s cheapest rates. The telecommunications industry is investing heavily in this region to improve connectivity.

According to GSM Association, mobile money transfer is expanding at one of the quickest rates internationally, although there is significant variation across the country. In the areas the team visited, mobile money transfers are being used for e-money transactions in the smallest stores and even for public transport fares, for example. The population is rapidly becoming accustomed to using mobile phones, and a number of those included in FGDs cited having access to mobile phones.

54 In the Stadium IDP camp, 10 families were using one toilet.
55 GSM Association (personal communication, 2014).
In other recent surveys with communities, drought and conflict were the main risks identified. This is understandable, given the memory of households in the survey sites who had been affected by and were still recovering from one of the worst droughts in history (2010-2011), and the insecurity across large areas of the country. However, people encounter other significant risks on a predictable and even regular basis.

Respondents in urban and rural communities identified two broad categories of shocks and risks that affect households and individuals, which must be taken into account in the design of social protection frameworks. As mentioned above, these can be divided into covariate shocks and stresses that affect the community as a whole; and idiosyncratic risks, the impact of which are felt at the individual and household level and correlate very clearly with a person’s lifecycle and socio-cultural norms, meaning that certain demographic groups are more vulnerable. These are outlined below.

3.3.1 Covariate shocks

The research team found similarities as well as certain important differences in covariate shocks between zones, and urban and rural communities. These shocks and stresses overlap and compound each other; covariate shocks are more likely to severely affect those households and individuals that idiosyncratic shocks also affect. The household-level shocks and stresses interviewees mentioned were consistent across all locations. Community-level issues such as water scarcity affect everyone in a community, but do not affect them equally; rather, the groups and individuals experiencing idiosyncratic shocks are likely to be more exposed to the impacts of covariate shocks and/or struggle to cope when they occur.

Communities mapped the significant events that have affected them over several decades, which formed the basis of a discussion on covariate shocks and stresses. They drew up seasonal calendars that showed the variety of cyclical events that affect livelihoods. Communities identified both natural and human-made shocks and stresses, including droughts and water scarcity, flooding, typhoons, disease outbreaks and conflict. These are illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3 Community mapping of significant events

|-------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|

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56 Brewin and Dunn, 2014; SomReP, 2014.
Conflict and insecurity
Conflict places particular constraints on populations’ movements and rights and the functioning of markets and services; it affects people’s ability to earn a living or meet basic needs and increases their exposure to harassment and violence. Interviewees identified conflict and insecurity as significant negative events in both the north and south; however, reflections on the impacts were different.

Study participants highlighted the impact of the Somali civil war, which caused mass displacement to Ethiopia. The resulting power vacuum and local tribal clashes continued to cause population displacement from Burco and Odweyne until 1996. This remains fresh in people’s minds, leading them to place a high value on peace. There were no current reports of insecurity in rural or urban Somaliland. Communities considered the security context to have greatly improved – in the study area at least – because of the government’s investment in security measures and peace building. They acknowledged, however, that there are cases of crime and rape, which can affect those living in IDP camps. Interviewees mentioned the security situation in the disputed Sool-Sanaag territories, which are outside of the study area. They considered this dispute to be contained and do not directly affecting their communities; however, people believed that a lot of government resources were going towards this area to ensure stability. Local government stakeholders said other authorities receive less as a result. This highlights the importance of looking at the local context rather than making generalisations about conflict and insecurity.

Interviewees mentioned land-related conflicts, including small-scale resource conflicts between sub-clans in rural areas, especially over pastoral and agricultural land.

Hazardous weather
Interviewees considered seasonal hazards to be increasing in intensity, which affects rural and urban livelihoods. The infrastructure to provide protection from or to divert water, heavy rain, flooding and hail is lacking, which contributes to crop and livestock losses and reduces access to health centres and markets. It also contributes to inflation of food prices (below) and can result in food shortages in urban areas. In overcrowded urban areas the lack of drainage means that rainfall negatively affects overburdened sanitation systems. Interviewees noted seasonal increases in waterborne diseases (cholera; malaria; diarrhoea) affecting children, women and the elderly in rural and urban communities, even in normal rainy seasons.

Water scarcity
All communities noted the increasing frequency of drought cycles and issues of water scarcity, though impacts are not evenly spread. Drought was specifically mentioned as a shock in a handful of years, but drought cycles are more frequent than previously. In the ‘normal’ years, communities identified stresses associated with water scarcity in the dry seasons, which are contributing to economic and health-related problems.

Rural communities commented that rainfall is more erratic and is considered to be poorer than before, the water table nowadays is lower, and there is a lack of adequate infrastructure for irrigation, water storage and conservation. Interviewees identified water scarcity as a major problem in the northwest. It is affecting all rural livelihoods, given the dependence of pastoralism and agricultural livelihoods on water, constraints on livestock migration and lack of opportunities for economic diversification. The repetition of climatic stresses and years of failed rains was resulting in losses of productive assets, reducing the productive capacity of the land and households’ ability to earn sufficient income from traditional livelihoods. Traders and

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57 In pastoral areas herd sizes have diminished, because they cannot replenish themselves before more must be consumed or lost. In agricultural areas the yobar baruur – the time of year when their crops are not ready to be harvested, but stores of other crops have been used up – is increasing; harvests are not sufficient to last through the lean season.
businesspeople in rural areas also suffer from reduced purchasing power and population migration during these poor seasons. These climatic shocks are contributing to the loss of livelihoods and the increasing urban drift of households that have left the nomadic way of life or that have lost farming livelihoods.\textsuperscript{58}

While livelihoods in urban areas are relatively better cushioned from the immediate impact of water scarcity, the linkages between the rural and urban economies also mean negative shocks for urban households in terms of reduced supply/quality of milk and meat; increased cost of milk, meat and grain; and an increased burden of support for rural relatives.

**Inflation**

Interviewees noted inflation as a seasonal factor linked to the shocks above, which was an issue for rural but especially for urban communities, given households’ dependence on markets for the majority of their food needs. People depend greatly on imports. Consistently high prices, with seasonal increases, were reported in Hargeisa and were considered linked to the return of the diaspora.

Table 4 summarises the communities’ seasonal calendars of a typical year, which showed strong similarities between livelihood groups, and highlighted the positive and negative effects of seasonal events in rural and urban areas. In general, pastoralists and casual labourers in the northwest were more likely to experience food shortages during the dry seasons. Farmers reported experiencing food shortages at the end of the dry season and during the first two months of Gu, until the harvest. All livelihood groups regularly experienced food shortages.

**Table 4 Summary of community seasonal calendars in a typical year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Migration of pastoralists, affecting access to milk and education; reduced business in the area</td>
<td>Animals have grass.</td>
<td>Lack of water</td>
<td>Waterborne diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High prices of goods</td>
<td>Sufficient milk and meat</td>
<td>Inflation of foodstuffs</td>
<td>Eid\textsuperscript{59} – increased household expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of food and water</td>
<td>Low inflation of food</td>
<td>No pasture for livestock</td>
<td>Increased water supply, but may be unclean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malnutrition increases</td>
<td>Crops growing, including fodder</td>
<td>Migration of herds</td>
<td>Crops growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low or no agricultural production</td>
<td>Malaria increases</td>
<td>Search for daily labour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livestock become weak and may die</td>
<td>Diarrhoea increases</td>
<td>Ramadan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colds increase</td>
<td>Food prices rise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Child labour on the land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{58} People who were affected by the 2006 tsunami still live in IDP camps in cities in Puntland and have not returned to their livelihoods.

\textsuperscript{59} Note: Eid falls in different calendar months year on year, so the above can be said to relate to 2014.
| Urban | • Lack of water  
• Lack of food – inflation and more demand for food from the town  
• Malnutrition  
• Inflation of meat/milk or bad quality of products  
• Demand for financial support from rural areas increase  
• Immigration of rural people to town  
• Unemployment increases with competition from rural influx | • Unclean water – poor sanitation  
• Malaria increases  
• Diarrhoea increases  
• Colds increase  
• Low price of meat and milk  
• Decreased opportunities for some trades in town | • Lack of money and food  
• Food prices rise – reduced imports from Gulf (too stormy for boats)  
• People living hand to mouth  
• Immigration of people from rural areas, and selling charcoal, tomatoes, milk  
• Ramadan – increased social assistance  
• Malaria rate still high | • Malaria  
• Diarrhoea.  
• No clean water  
• Low prices of meat and milk  
• Decreased opportunities for some trades in town |

**Disease outbreak**
Pastoral communities noted that Rift Valley fever had a huge negative impact between 2000 and 2006, in terms of livestock health and the immediate impact on nomadic livelihoods, as well as a livestock export ban that affected people directly and indirectly because it reduced government revenues. Rural and urban communities also cited outbreaks of measles and the incidence of polio.

**3.3.2 Household-level (idiosyncratic) shocks and stresses**
Among those that interviewees mentioned repeatedly were disease/poor health, incapacity or death of a family member, and family breakdown. Annex D also shows examples of significant events throughout people’s lifecycles from the life history interviews. These illustrate the significance of these personal and household-level events in addition to the covariate shocks to people’s wellbeing.

**Disease/poor health**
Common diseases mentioned included: in adults and the elderly high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis and back pain, strokes and eye diseases; in children, malnutrition, malaria, measles, diarrhoea/waterborne diseases, respiratory diseases, tuberculosis, whooping cough; and in women, urinary tract infections, malnutrition, malaria, pneumonia, anaemia and eclampsia.

Economic impacts included the need to cover the cost of transport to seek medical attention, or cost of healthcare; as well as the reduced ability of the household to pursue a livelihood strategy because of a breadwinner’s debility or time spent caring for sick relatives. Social impacts included the increasing burden of labour on others in the household, including children and women, with further knock-on effects on health and nutrition.

Interviewees noted waterborne diseases as a challenge in all livelihoods. As outlined above, some health risks were associated with particular seasons, including malnutrition in the dry seasons and an increase in waterborne and respiratory diseases during rainy months. Malnutrition is pervasive and chronic and visibly affects a large percentage of the population. However, many people only seemed to regard it a seasonal issue, and only affecting particular groups (children and women). It is likely that everyone’s diet is so chronically, and traditionally, nutrient poor that this situation has become normalised. Child malnutrition can have irreversible effects on the future growth and wellbeing of children into adulthood.

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60 Interviewees frequently mentioned malaria, cholera, diarrhoea and the common cold.
Interviewees considered non-communicable diseases to be increasing, particularly in urban areas, and because of a combination of old age, livelihood activity and lifestyle/diet. They noted frailty and debility of the elderly as challenges to pursuing economic strategies. Besides aging, the livelihood strategies people pursue can contribute to rheumatism, arthritis and joint pains in later life. They understood that diseases correlated with particular lifecycle stages (including children’s susceptibility to disease and malnutrition; women’s risk of reproductive health problems; and the frailty of older people and their pre-disposition to both communicable and non-communicable diseases).

Interviewees considered mental illness to be increasing, which they blamed on the increase in khat abuse and stress-related illnesses because of the uncertainty in life that people are facing. Related to this was the increase noted in cases of family breakdown and divorce.

**Incapacity and death of a breadwinner**

The research team identified many women in Digaale IDP camp whose husbands had died in conflict in SCS. This was also a major shock that respondents in SCS identified, as did older respondents in Somaliland (in relation to the conflicts there in the 1980s and 1990s). Besides the immediate loss of labour that affected the rest of the household, a widow might also lose her livelihood if her husband’s family took over his business or land after his death. There were cases of breadwinners being disabled, affecting their ability to work. Numerous respondents had lost family members to conflict or illness. Children and young people often mentioned loss of parents, with economic and psychological impacts. These children generally identified the loss of their parents as the worst thing that had happened in their lives.

**Gender-based violence**

In urban IDP areas, interviewees considered violence against women to be a growing issue because of the lack of law enforcement and reduced clan protection.

**Loss of employment**

This was a factor in urban areas, and interviewees generally agreed that unemployment and competition for jobs were increasing. Particular issues that they mentioned included discrimination against minorities and seasonal downturns in wage-earning opportunities.

### 3.4 Coping strategies

‘We are hunters but hungry; we are people with water but thirst; we are always moving but never get away from our place.’

*Quote from FGD respondents, explaining how they cope but cannot change their situation*

Interviewees employed a range of strategies to deal with crises, shocks and stresses, such as entrepreneurship, mobility and reliance on social networks (Table 5). Strategies were broadly similar regardless of gender or clan, but with some differences related to age and livelihood characteristics. A major difference in urban areas was the increase in begging. Some strategies may be considered negative, meaning that the strategy risks increasing the household’s vulnerability to future shocks and stresses. Interviewees generally agreed that the increase in the frequency and intensity of shocks was constraining some strategies.
### Table 5 Coping strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Sale of livestock</td>
<td>• Sale of assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consumption of livestock or crops</td>
<td>• Reduced consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reduced consumption</td>
<td>• Buying food on credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Buying food on credit</td>
<td>• Taking on debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Taking on debt</td>
<td>• Seeking support from others in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Seeking support from relatives in urban areas, or others in the community</td>
<td>• Remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Seeking alternative income/diversifying livelihood/economic migration to towns and abroad (including some women)</td>
<td>• Seeking alternative income/economic migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Drying grass for fodder</td>
<td>• Begging – women and children, especially in Gabooye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Migration of herds</td>
<td>• Foraging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Charcoal production</td>
<td>• Taking children out of school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Taking children out of school</td>
<td>• Sending children to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sending children to relatives in urban areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Debt and credit
Taking a loan from relatives or taking food on credit from traders are hugely important coping strategies at times of crisis or stress and to smooth seasonal income. The literature highlights the importance of trust and social networks in being able to access loans or credit, with evidence that socially marginalised groups, minorities, and IDPs can be excluded from these support systems. In the study locations, the research team found that accessing this coping strategy depended on the confidence of the creditor and collateral of the debt; it was therefore difficult for those without assets and for IDPs and minorities without social networks to get loans or credit. An interesting finding was the presence of informal revolving credit schemes established by women in Somaliland. These mechanisms can also become constrained in prolonged times of stress.

#### Selling or consuming assets
Selling livestock has been a way for pastoral households to raise cash for other needs, but this was based on large herd sizes, and households normally sold livestock in good health. For the majority of pastoral households included in the research, livestock was now only sufficient to provide milk and to sell only as a last resort when times were especially hard. With herd sizes dwindling and the frequency of drought cycles increasing, coping strategies that reduce herd sizes before they have had time to recover can be considered negative. Destocking as a last resort when livestock is in poor condition contributes to household destitution.

#### Reducing consumption
Urban respondents said that they would reduce their number of meals and also purchase inferior goods (e.g. powdered milk) during lean seasons.

#### Diversification
Livelihood diversification, within the constraints of the limited economic opportunities mentioned above, has developed as a common coping strategy for agro-pastoral and riverine households in response to environmental and seasonal shocks, as well as to localised conflict. It was common practice for households to combine working on farms, pastoralism and going to the city to work as casual labourers. In urban areas entire families were working. Interviewees generally agreed that pastoral households have fewer options for

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61 Brewin and Dunn, 2014; Gabrielle and Nori, 2007; SomReP, 2014. The last study gives the primary reasons for respondents taking credit as being to buy food or service debt (60%), and the secondary reason being to access social services. This highlights an inability to cover basic needs. Only a small percentage (7%) had taken on debt to invest in livelihoods.

62 According to pastoral respondents, it takes seven years for herds to recover from a drought.
diversification, because they lack the skills required, and culturally have no history of taking on particular income-generating activities. Rather, the tendency is for households to continue until the herd has dwindled to such a point that they have to abandon pastoralism out and move to urban areas.

**Migration**
Seasonal migration is a traditional coping strategy for nomadic communities and is a major factor that contributes to the resilience of pastoral communities experiencing water scarcity and seasonal decreases in pasture availability. In certain areas constraints on migration have negatively affected this vital strategy.

Interviewees agreed that economic migration to urban centres and further afield was increasing. This was especially the case for young men, though it was becoming increasingly common for women also. Economic migration can be a positive coping strategy, but when it is forced and when options are limited it can increase vulnerability. It can be expensive to migrate; for example, in Hargeisa, families were selling everything they had, including their homes, in the hope of sending children overseas, with no guarantee that they would find well-paid or sustained employment. Interviewees considered that the cost of sending a relative overseas was such that the poor in the IDP camps did not generally have this option. The practice of people-trafficking across borders is increasing, and with this comes the risk of kidnap for ransom. Interviewees commented on a ‘brain drain’, particularly from rural areas, where the more educated leave to seek opportunities elsewhere. This also contributes to a situation where rural communities must support an increasing number of dependants, because the economically active are leaving, but children and the elderly must remain. Migration can increase social or economic vulnerability, because migrants may have no means of earning an income or have to live outside traditional clan safety nets; the vulnerability of the families they leave behind may also increase. Given the lack of security of employment, the costs of economic migration even over short distances can present a barrier for the poorest.

**Remittances**
The huge aggregate value of remittances from the diaspora is well documented and it is certainly an important source of household income. For example, remittances to Somaliland are worth up to $400 million annually. The Burco District Development Plan cites remittances as being the second-most significant source of income in the district. As with cash transfers, these will have positive multiplier effects beyond the beneficiary households that benefit the wider economy. However, some studies have found that these benefits are not shared equally, with the poorest and most vulnerable most likely to miss out. This was in line with findings of this report. In Somaliland, although interviewees in Burco town often mentioned remittances, few did in Odweyne and nobody did in the rural communities. Rural households were rather more likely to receive financial support from relatives in Somaliland.

Although remittance outlets have a high penetration in Somaliland, there were few outlets in the rural areas that the research team visited, with coverage only noted in peri-urban centres. However, mobile money transfer services were available everywhere in the study areas. This does not, however, mean that penetration is equal across the country, but it is an encouraging sign of the speed with which these services are being adopted. Interviewees explained that nowadays even the poorest households are able to access mobile phones (even if they do not own one). Households in rural areas use them as a communication channel for immediate support from relatives further afield. This agrees with the findings of a Cash Learning Partnership study on mobile money transfers and emergency cash transfer programmes run by various aid agencies in SCS, which highlighted that households were so comfortable with these services, and their use by traders so ubiquitous, that there was little if any ‘cashing out’ of transfers (i.e. collecting physical cash.

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63 See Hedlund et al. 2013
65 See Hedlund et al. 2013
66 See Hedlund et al. 2013
from a mobile money agent); rather, cash transfers were used in their entirety as electronic money to pay for goods and services in stores.67

Interviewees generally felt that young people’s moving to the city or overseas did not mean that the family left behind would receive financial support. In many cases people said that girls were more likely to send remittances back than boys; as one respondent commented, ‘It’s better for one woman to go away than 10 men’.

**Begging**
This remains taboo in rural areas. It is a predominantly urban strategy that vulnerable people who cannot help themselves or do not have relatives with the means to help them employ. Interviewees considered that these people had no other means to survive but begging and that it was increasing as a livelihood strategy in urban centres, especially among the elderly but also children and women.

**Taking children out of school**
People take children out of school for a number of reasons. In pastoral communities the traditional means of coping with water scarcity in the dry season is to migrate to more remote areas. Similarly, in the rainy season children may have to leave school to help with the harvest. Children may also have to leave school during food shortages. If their mothers are seeking work, young girls may have to sell produce at markets, as well as to care for siblings and carry out household duties. Early marriage for girls aged 12-13 years old remains common in rural areas.

**Informal social protection**
In Somali society, all manner of informal sharing mechanisms and support for households during bad times exist. They are based on kinship and family ties, and are primarily for household-level shocks (see Section 4).

**3.5 Characteristics of vulnerability**

‘Nin fadhigaaga arkaya, looma sara joogsado.’ – ‘You don’t stand up for a person who can see you are sitting.’

*Meaning, when a person can vividly see your sufferings, there is no need to tell him in words.*

In every community and in all groups included in the study, there were very clear ideas defining vulnerability and agreement on who was considered ‘most vulnerable’ to shocks. The poor were defined as those households that could not eat, or had limited assets. In all the communities the research team visited, interviewees considered poverty to be pervasive, with key informants claiming that up to 70% of the population could be considered vulnerable because of poverty. However, despite this being a defining characteristic of the population, there was a clear perceived differentiation between the community as a whole and those considered to be most vulnerable to shock, who included:

- The very poorest/destitute;
- Those people who could not get help from other means, such as from relatives; and
- Those who could not help themselves or were suffering the most in almost all aspects of their lives, particularly health.

Communities ranked vulnerability to prioritise the needs of specific groups, who they perceived to be vulnerable to particular social as well as economic factors:

- Children, especially orphans;

• People living with disabilities (including the chronically ill) and especially those without family support (including those with mental illnesses);
• The elderly, especially those without family support; and
• Female-headed households (especially widows without family support).

The communities also acknowledged as vulnerable other groups that faced particular challenges, particularly social vulnerabilities. These include unemployed young people and minority clans, but the communities did not prioritise them for assistance because they regarded them as being economically able to help themselves.

These groups fit clear demographic categories of vulnerability and many of their risks are felt at particular stages of the lifecycle, as depicted in Figure 4. The issues relating to these particular vulnerable groups are considered below, which shows that these groups are more pre-disposed to particular idiosyncratic shocks. Vulnerability can be compounded across the lifecycle – such that if specific vulnerabilities felt early in life are not addressed these can further determine and exacerbate vulnerabilities faced later in life. Exposure to these risks is also likely to mean that households and individuals will be disproportionality affected by covariate shocks.

**Figure 4 Risks and shocks experienced throughout the lifecycle**

![Figure 4](image)

**Women**
Women are increasingly taking on more economic activities in households in rural and especially urban areas because of poverty, the stagnation and erosion of traditional livelihoods, economic migration of men and impact of conflict. While the emergence of women as economic agents may be considered positive in terms of building household resilience, given their continued socio-cultural marginalisation in household decision-making and political spheres, and persistent stereotyping of gender roles, it could also have negative effects.

Men continue to make most household-level decisions concerning expenditure. Women are increasing their productive role beyond the home, but continue to shoulder the burden of labour for household chores (collecting firewood, searching for water, cooking food, caring for livestock, washing clothes, cooking, caring

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68 Source: Developed by Development Pathways
for children, etc.). This puts them at risk of greater health problems – which has a knock-on effect on the lives of their children. Women continue to face multiple reproductive health risks, including: anaemia; malnutrition; eclampsia; urinary tract infections; and pregnancy-related/childbirth risks because of their lack of access to healthcare facilities. Maternal mortality is prevalent, especially in rural areas and most commonly in nomadic communities; many young women die during the delivery because of the lack of medical facilities. Additionally, women do not trust the healthcare professionals and prefer traditional midwives.

Women in polygamous households experience numerous challenges including difficulties in accessing sufficient resources, inter-household conflict over resources and abandonment (usually of the older wife). In cases where polygamy is continuing, divorce of the first wife is common.

While women in urban female-headed households have the opportunity to pursue economic activities, those in pastoral communities can find it hard to engage effectively in the livestock-based production system because they need men to access clan resources and ensure the protection and herding of large livestock assets. Engagement in economic activity can also reduce care for small children or mean that girls have to leave school.69

Moreover, as mentioned above, violence against women in urban areas is a growing issue because of the lack of law enforcement and reduced clan protection.

**Children**

Interviewees acknowledged that children were among the most vulnerable, because they depended on others for their basic needs, were disproportionately exposed to health-related shocks, and faced difficulties in accessing their rights to education and a childhood. Interviewees acknowledged that particular groups of children were more at risk than others; for example, those who had lost one or more parents, or who were living without their family and depended on others for support.

Communities in two recent studies mentioned children’s education as a primary aspiration.70 A major barrier to school attendance was the cost associated with schooling, both in terms of direct costs and opportunity costs to household income derived from child labour. Girls’ access to education has increased in the past five years because people have begun understand that girls’ education is as important to the community as it is to the family. However, they continue to be more likely to be removed from school than boys; and in rural areas, especially, it remains common for girls to enter into marriage early because they have few other options. Interviewees considered that children had greater access to education in agro-pastoral communities than in pastoral ones.

Child labour is commonplace and children also have to undertake household chores such as fetching water, collecting firewood and rearing small livestock.

Besides the prevalence of common childhood illnesses, interviewees considered children’s health to be contingent on their parents’ income, seasonal changes and economic shocks, such as conflict; this was particularly the case for children under the age of five. In Somaliland, in particular, interviewees considered a high proportion of children to be malnourished because of poor access to food and poor childcare practices because both men and women are out at work. Stunting is a widespread problem; likewise, diarrhoea and waterborne diseases are common.

The conflict has contributed to a high proportion of orphans, generally in the care of relatives or the surviving parent. These children are vulnerable to a number of social risks including violence and sniffing glue is major issue.

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69 This was also a finding of the FSNAU 2012 study.
70 Brewin and Dunn, 2014; SomReP, 2014.
People living with disabilities

In a recent study by CEVSI and Handicap International on Children with Disabilities in Somaliland, 42% of the survey sample contained at least one family member with a disability. For those with physical disabilities (the number of whom has increased in SCS because of the conflict) and/or chronic illnesses, mobility is a huge challenge, with a chronic shortage of equipment to support their needs. In rural areas the distance to services and livelihood opportunities presents a critical barrier, while in both rural and urban areas hardly any facilities have disabled access. In Hargeisa there are no specialised programmes or agencies to help people with disabilities in the IDP camps.

People living with disabilities face widespread marginalisation and discrimination. One interviewee described them as being invisible to others. While every FGD identified them as one of the most vulnerable groups of people that should get priority for assistance, the reality is that disabled people generally only get help from relatives rather than the wider community. Disabled children lack access to education because of the barriers outlined above and because education for disabled children does not tend to be prioritised among both parents and the authorities. The CEVSI and Handicap International study indicated that the barriers to education for children with disabilities were much more serious in areas outside of Hargeisa because of the lack of resources, services and access. In general, community attitudes towards children with disabilities were negative. For example, in some towns 80% of respondents believed that children with disabilities should not play with other children; 50% of households considered that children with disabilities could not contribute to household affairs; and 34% had discriminatory views about children with disabilities.

Likewise, disabled adults cannot easily access employment opportunities. With the requisite technical training or support disabled people have the potential to access economic opportunities, and this was highlighted as a priority by disabled rights groups. While some disabled people work, they tend to depend on relatives or wider society for their survival. Many abandoned disabled people in Burco had no other means to survive than begging. Those living in the rural areas suffer the most neglect. Some disabled people have received a zakat payment, but this only happens once a year and does match their constant need for help.

The elderly

Interviewees acknowledged that older people were highly vulnerable to falling into poverty. Age increases susceptibility to small yet debilitating shocks such as age-related and chronic illnesses, and the growing frailty of older people themselves reduces their ability to work and can push households into poverty. Older men who marry late or for a second time may have young children who they still must provide for. This increases the vulnerability for these children, as well as the chances that their mothers become early widows. With no formal support or specialised services for older people, and living in chronic poverty, many older people are forced to continue to look for what work they can do; there were examples of elderly people doing physically demanding manual labour. Eventually, when they cannot work any longer they become dependent on others in their household or community for their basic needs. In the event of a food shortage, interviewees acknowledged that the elderly were among the most affected. Similarly, the elderly in SCS find it difficult to deal with conflict when populations are displaced. Generally, older people were respected and not discriminated against. Interviewees considered that older women were more vulnerable because they have lower status than men in the community and are often not economically independent.

Other vulnerable groups

Young people: a critical issue that interviewees mentioned time and again was unemployment. This is contributing to the mass migration of young people, which can lead to different vulnerabilities in urban areas where they lack access to services and young women are exposed to violence. Young people who the research team interviewed expressed a lack of hope, particularly when they see well-educated people

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71 CEVSI and Handicap International, n.d.
72 CEVSI and Handicap International, n.d.
returning to their area having been unable to find work.\textsuperscript{73} The concern is that disaffected young people could cause future conflict in the region. A political barrier – age discrimination – prevents young people from participating in the political process.

Communities believed that in general vulnerability correlated closely with a person’s ability to work; they considered those people who had a job/livestock to be the least vulnerable. From a youth perspective, communities identified unemployment as the main youth problem, but at the same time they believe that young people have the capacity to work and do not consider them vulnerable in the same way as other groups. Young people therefore cannot easily access informal social protection.

**Clans:** there are two distinct forms of discrimination along clan lines. One concerns the discrimination of historically marginalised groups such as the Gabooye\textsuperscript{74} in Somaliland. The other form of discrimination, especially in SCS, concerns clans that are a minority in a particular geographic location.

The political situation in Somaliland is changing and moving in the right direction as far as the Gabooye people are concerned. The Gabooye now have political representation. Unfortunately, nothing has changed in terms of clan relations, between the Gabooye and other clans – as one respondent said, ‘We are still looked down upon by the majority clans.’ An emerging social problem in Hargeisa was the ghettoising of the Gabooye neighbourhood, which has no law enforcement services, leading to high rates of crime and exposure of young people to illegal drugs. Interviewees considered that this had increased the school drop-out rate, particularly among boys; they also believed that it had increased mental and physical illnesses. Within Gabooye society, also, disabled people, children and elderly are the most vulnerable groups.

However, Gabooye livelihoods are relatively insulated from certain shocks because they enjoy monopolies on trades that climatic factors do not affect directly, including metal working, barbering and shoemaking. However, they are just as exposed to commodity inflation and in a bad drought, for example, the reduced purchasing power of the community would affect them too.

**Livelihood:** of the four principle livelihood strategies in Somaliland,\textsuperscript{75} it is not possible to say that one livelihood group will always be more or less vulnerable than any other. Each particular livelihood can be heterogeneous,\textsuperscript{76} while the vulnerability of a particular livelihood to shocks or their ability to cope is intimately linked to other contextual factors. It is also often the case that households will undertake a variety of (perhaps seasonal) livelihood activities. However, based on the research team’s findings from community meetings and wider studies,\textsuperscript{77} we can make some general statements about the relative vulnerability of particular livelihood strategies:

- All the livelihood systems are highly vulnerable to shocks.
- Rural areas generally suffer from reduced physical access to services, whereas in urban areas the cost of living and dependence on the market for basic needs means there are more financial barriers to accessing basic needs. In IDP areas, lack of access to services continues to present a challenge.
- Incomes in rural areas are largely seasonal, with many poorer households relying on casual labour to supplement their income. Seasonal variation in food security and peaks of acute need in rural areas are therefore greater. Urban livelihoods depend less directly on climate, but rural-urban linkages are such that they continue to experience some seasonal impacts.

\textsuperscript{73} In Burco all the young males had been to school; and two young people that the research team interviewed had been to university, but still lacked opportunities.

\textsuperscript{74} A number of small marginal clans in Somaliland are concentrated in particular areas and all come under the umbrella of the Gabooye; in Puntland these clans still exist as separate dispersed groups. Interviewees considered that they were perhaps less visible and therefore less exposed to day-to-day discrimination; however, they still cannot marry into other clans.

\textsuperscript{75} Pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, riverine and urban.

\textsuperscript{76} For example, in the case of pastoralists much will depend on herd size and livestock.

\textsuperscript{77} UN, 2014; FSNAU, 2012.
• In urban areas there is high heterogeneity among IDP areas. The interviewees considered that the recently established settlements or settlements far from the city are vulnerable because of a lack of social networks or employment opportunities.

• Historically, nomadic households were some of the wealthiest and most resilient because they had large herds, could migrate at times of water scarcity, and had plentiful food reserves and social support structures. Pastoral areas suffered less from food deprivation in the 2011 famine and had less negative coping than agricultural areas with similar characteristics and conditions. The increasing frequency of environmental shocks, remoteness and marginalisation of communities and curtailments to nomadism have exacerbated the vulnerability of pastoralist communities. While pastoralism continues to be the dominant livelihood, for communities where herd depletion has occurred and grazing areas have diminished, this has seriously undermined the economic stability and coping strategies of pastoral households, especially in the northwest. Households’ dependence on livestock for nutrition means that shocks that affect their animals also tend to have a rapid and acute impact on nutrition, though recovery is also rapid. They are generally further from services, so experience greater health problems. Pastoral households also face greater barriers – economic, skill related and cultural – to diversifying livelihoods than agricultural or urban households. Destocking is contributing to an increasing urban drift, which is becoming permanent because people cannot recover their traditional way of life.

• Farming livelihoods depend on climate and are affected by water scarcity and heavy rain/flooding, which contributes to the erosion of the productive capacity of land, reduced harvests and even loss of livelihoods. Sedentary farmers are more vulnerable than pastoralists to covariate shocks, such as drought and conflict, because they must leave their assets behind. On the other hand, their skills are potentially more directly transferable to urban employment. Farming households were considered to react more quickly to the warning signs of water scarcity than pastoral households, which do not destock until the last moment. IDP households from agricultural backgrounds are more likely to be able to retain links with their traditional livelihoods and to consider returning to these in the future (though this will depend on the length of time households have been displaced). In general, nutrition is chronically poor because of poor diet and sanitation.

• The combined livelihood strategy of agro-pastoralism means that households more diverse by nature, but the agricultural and pastoral elements are equally vulnerable to climatic shocks. Agro-pastoral households are sedentary, so are also vulnerable to conflict. Their diets are more diverse than households that pursue only one livelihood strategy.

• In rural areas interviewees considered that some of the most vulnerable households were those without livestock, which had dropped out of their livelihood. In urban areas they included recently arrived IDPs who lacked social networks or family ties. The interviewees called them *dadka jilicsan*, poor people who had no livestock, agriculture or business activity.

These risks and vulnerabilities are summarised in Table 6. Many of these vulnerabilities are felt at different stages of the lifecycle and, show the potential for compounding vulnerabilities through the lifecycle; while many of the disability- and clan-related vulnerabilities relate to a lack of access to work opportunities.
Table 6 Summary of the risks and vulnerabilities that vulnerable groups face

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Elderly</th>
<th>Disabled(^{78})</th>
<th>Gabooye</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Young people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Chronic and seasonal acute malnutrition</td>
<td>• Increasing health problems and difficulty accessing health services</td>
<td>• Widespread social discrimination – everyone, including NGOs, overlook their needs (‘almost invisible’)</td>
<td>• Members of Gabooye clans are socially marginalised – in many ways</td>
<td>• Burden of labour is growing – economic and household activities, including childcare, cooking, fetching water and collecting wood. Leads to weakness, poor health and injuries</td>
<td>• Young people more likely to migrate and take more risks than adults who already have commitments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Many economic barriers to education; and cultural barriers for girls</td>
<td>• Frailty/weakness</td>
<td>• Marginalisation in terms of access to job opportunities and education</td>
<td>• Lack of formal job opportunities; employment, marriage, and social discrimination</td>
<td>• Lack of of formal job opportunities; employment, marriage, and social discrimination</td>
<td>• Lack of of formal job opportunities; employment, marriage, and social discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>• In the rainy season agro-pastoral households pull children out of school to assist with livelihoods; herd migration affects pastoral children – falling behind peers</td>
<td>• Non-communicable diseases</td>
<td>• Mobility challenges and lack of disabled access restricts access to services</td>
<td>• Cannot integrate with others</td>
<td>• Pregnant women expected to work</td>
<td>• Lack of of formal job opportunities; employment, marriage, and social discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Burden of labour to assist with household chores – getting water is a big task, including in the middle of the day and during the night</td>
<td>• Poor nutrition</td>
<td>• Barrier to marriage and thus children, who provide a safety net in old age, especially for women</td>
<td>• Live in a ‘ghettoised’ district with high crime rates and lack of services or security</td>
<td>• Widows in rural areas depend on <em>dumal</em> (when a widow marries her husband’s brother/cousin) a survival strategy</td>
<td>• Unemployment and underemployment in traditional livelihoods – families in rural areas supporting young men because they do not have camels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manual labour from age 8-10; injuries from carrying heavy loads.</td>
<td>• Lack of mobility and difficulty with transport, especially in rural areas</td>
<td>• Dependence on others (family or community) for livelihood and care; may resort to begging, especially those without children</td>
<td>• Lack of social rights</td>
<td>• Exposure to and risk of abuse of drugs, which are sold in their district</td>
<td>• Contributing to khat uptake in young men.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Access to food</td>
<td>• May still have dependants, especially if married when older – must continue to earn a living, despite frailty</td>
<td>• Those who can start a business; others subsist on support from relatives and neighbours</td>
<td>• More female-headed households, with fewer options for marriage</td>
<td>• More female-headed households, with fewer options for marriage</td>
<td>• Lack of capital to start businesses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Children pulled out of school if no meals for the household</td>
<td>• Dependence on others (family or community) for livelihood and care; may resort to begging, especially those without children</td>
<td>• Blind children are kept at home</td>
<td>• Discrimination in school leading to high drop-out rates</td>
<td>• Economically, livelihoods in many cases may be less vulnerable; monopolies over particular semi-skilled trades, not exposed to climatic variance – e.g. barbering, shoemaking; metal working; FGC (women)(^{80}) as well as day labourers</td>
<td>• School is not valued because they have not seen others benefit from it – still have no jobs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cannot afford books/uniforms</td>
<td>• No say whatsoever in household decision-making</td>
<td>• Same challenges exist in urban and rural areas,</td>
<td>• Reproductive health problems and lack of access to medical services</td>
<td>• Social security and assistance – not seen to be in need.</td>
<td>• Cannot access community social assistance – not seen to be in need.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Distance to school</td>
<td>• Reduced decision-making power in households (men) vs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Challenge of ensuring health and education of children</td>
<td>• Cases of teen pregnancy in urban areas.</td>
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<td>• Cultural barriers to girls’ education (sit at back of class; cannot eat lunch)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Child illness and mortality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased power for women</td>
<td>Emotional distress of children migrating</td>
<td>Caregivers for children of extended families who cannot afford to keep them (pastoral)</td>
<td>Clans, which are a minority geographically, are not socially excluded (marriage, jobs), but excluded from local political decision-making and access to resources</td>
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<td>but to a greater degree in rural areas</td>
<td>Beginning to get a greater voice and also political and civil representation – quotas for the education and employment sectors</td>
<td>Same challenges exist in urban and rural areas, but those in rural areas face greater constraints</td>
<td>Nepotism in allocation of contracts to local NGOs, and who the NGO supports (i.e. their own clan)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Marginalised from household decision-making on expenditure, especially in rural areas – unless the husband is elderly or it is a female-headed household</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Low literacy levels and poor education</td>
<td>Early marriage</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Female-headed households in pastoral areas lack opportunities to move to better pasture</td>
<td>Rate of polygamy in study areas was falling because only the wealthy can afford it</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Where polygamy occurs, insufficient resources lead to rivalry; divorce and abandonment of the elder wives is common, especially in urban areas; children become rivals</td>
<td>Violence in urban IDP camps – lack of social networks</td>
<td>Khat epidemic is reducing men’s economic support to households and increasing the burden of labour on women</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

79 Where a wife is much younger than her husband she may take on more power as they get older.
Poverty levels are high and chronic; large portions of the population are exposed to recurrent and cyclical shocks (e.g. droughts, heavy rains/floods, seasonal and chronic shortages of water, food and employment), as well as prolonged periods of stress because of conflict; people’s capacities to cope through traditional means are being eroded; and many people are vulnerable to particular lifecycle risks.

A strong rationale exists for establishing some kind of formal, long-term and predictable social protection in Somaliland that could address chronic poverty/vulnerability, but also be topped up in the event of a crisis.

It is necessary to address lifecycle (idiosyncratic) and covariate shocks, and to consider the linkages between these as well as to address the compounding of vulnerabilities.

The framework should include programmes that address needs in urban and rural areas. Programmes must not contribute to continued urban drift and should address the needs of those ‘left behind’ in villages, informal settlements or homesteads after able-bodied community members have migrated.

While the nature of covariate risks can vary between areas and between livelihood groups, idiosyncratic risks are common to all and consistency in programming across locations could be feasible – though some risks are likely to be greater in rural areas where service access is reduced.

Social protection cannot do everything: it cannot address all the risk factors above, or the structural causes of vulnerability. Social protection is an essential component, but many other things are needed to address the immediate and underlying causes of vulnerability.

The framework should address the needs of those who cannot work, in addition to those who have the capacity to work, but still face particular risks.

Social protection systems must seek to address social as well as economic vulnerabilities (assets and income; social networks and marginalisation). This includes being aware of the inequalities in a society and the marginalisation, lack of autonomy and burden of labour of particular groups and, as a minimum, should do no harm.

Communities understand vulnerability as it relates to particular and clearly identifiable groups, rather than poverty – because such a large percentage of the community may be considered poor. This is a lesson for targeting.

At the same time, it is important not to bypass the needs of young people who have the capacity to work but suffer from a chronic lack of opportunity – particularly given the risk of armed groups recruiting the disaffected youth and contributing to future insecurity.

UNICEF and its partners should investigate social protection interventions that support positive coping or access to positive coping (e.g. improvements to the creditworthiness of marginalised groups).
4. MAPPING SOCIAL PROTECTION

4.1 Formal social protection
Through KII with government and development partners at the national level and the wider literature review, the research team looked at the availability of social protection or safety net programmes and schemes that the FGS, governments of Somaliland and Puntland or development partners had implemented. Through its community-based research, the team also considered any relevant interventions by agencies and NGOs within the study locations. This is not an exhaustive study of all existing interventions across the country. But although the report may have left out certain schemes that development partners, NGOs or civil society organisations (CSOs), its findings clearly show a picture of huge gaps in social protection. The system that exists is grossly inadequate to address the needs identified in Section 3: in fact, it cannot be called a system at all.

Besides some extremely limited and fairly ad hoc government support for small numbers of vulnerable and/or destitute people, UN agencies and NGOs provide the bulk of assistance, and in a project-based and therefore unsustainable fashion. The coverage of these interventions is extremely low compared to the level of need; none of the programmes the research team encountered had national coverage and generally communities included in this study were not benefiting from those that were in place. There is very little long-term and predictable support that focuses on the chronically vulnerable. The majority retain a humanitarian focus of consumption support rather than wider livelihoods support. Some programmes seek to go beyond this, but are still in transition to a developmental approach. Nevertheless, there are best practices to build on in developing a social protection framework.

4.1.1 State-provided social assistance and social insurance
Government-supported social protection is practically non-existent in Somaliland.

Social insurance
Even formal and public sector workers lack access to such systems. The authorities in Somaliland plan to introduce a pension for civil servants; DFID and the World Bank are likely to support this as part of their work on civil service reform and public financial management (PFM). In terms of health insurance, no mechanism yet exists for accreditation of health facilities, which is important in the process of setting up health insurance schemes, nor is there a regulatory and quality assurance mechanism for private clinics.

Access to services
In Somaliland the government and UNICEF working to increase the supply and the demand side for basic services. In the last 5 years, the introduction of policies for universal access to primary education and abolition of MNCH fees are a starting point.

The central government budget envelope for health increased by 248% for the period of 2010-14, resulting in a proportionate increase of 393% in health sector allocations during the same period. The increase has partly funded additional health workers, as well as a 100% salary increase for Ministry of Health staff. Somaliland has also developed a Health Sector Strategic Plan (2013-16) with six broad strategies. UNICEF and other health partners support the government in running 105 medical health centres in Somaliland, which provide well-baby clinics, immunisation and nutrition screening, antenatal/postnatal care services, delivery services, and child and maternal nutrition; and 160 health posts for treatment of common diseases, and preventive and promotive healthcare services. In addition, in four of the six regions of Somaliland UNICEF
and the government have led the roll-out of the Essential Package for Health Services (EPHS) to support the improvement and expansion of healthcare services.

The government of Somaliland has increased education budget allocations considerably from $2,268,824 in 2010 to $11,761,049 in 2014. The increased funding has partly covered the additional expenses arising from the abolishment of school fees in 2011, as well as the recruitment of 1,460 teachers and salary increases for Ministry of Education staff. Despite these efforts to support the supply side, issues remain – such as the distance pupils must travel to school, and the lack of adequate teaching infrastructure and supplies, and qualified teachers – that limit the effectiveness of this policy. Under its education programme, UNICEF has begun activities to complement this government policy through supporting teacher training and topping up teachers’ salaries. The hidden costs that parents must cover – such as examination fees, uniforms and supplies – are other barriers to education. UNDP and the government of Somaliland support a programme that helps deaf people to access education in Burco, but services for children with disabilities are extremely limited.

Social transfers
The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA) supports former military personnel who are living with disabilities in Somaliland, but this is not a well-defined or coordinated programme.

Other government-supported initiatives are ad hoc, very small scale and lack regularity or predictability. These include:

- In Hargeisa: the MLSA provides ad hoc support to the destitute and urban poor; and
- In Hargeisa: in the last 2 years, an MLSA-supported programme started distributing small grants for income-generating activity, which targeted young people in the urban centre. It was not clear who the programme targeted or why. The programme is no longer running. The MLSA submitted a proposal to the National Development Committee (NDC) for a similar programme, but it was not put forward for funding.

4.1.2 Programmes of development partners

Conditional transfers
The main type of social assistance that external parties (i.e. non-government) provide is cash for work or food for work. A variety of initiatives are under way in rural Somaliland, which include an FAO and WFP cash and food for assets programme under the UN JRS; and the activities of the NGO consortium that runs the Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP). The research team did not come across similar initiatives in urban centres.

Cash for Work
This FAO programme comes under the Social Safety Nets pillar of the UN JRS. The programme has the dual objective of ensuring food security of vulnerable households through access to temporary paid employment opportunities, while also rehabilitating infrastructure to improve communities’ wider resilience to climatic shocks, in particular water scarcity. This has involved low-skilled rehabilitation of four simple infrastructures related to water catchment and irrigation in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas.

Phase 1 began as a response to the 2011 famine and continued through recovery until 2013, operating each year in the two dry seasons. Households received $120 per fortnight for about three months. In the early phases, FAO made around $7-8m in transfers each season, and reached 220,000 rural households in all zones over a period of two and a half years. The headlines of the recent independent evaluation of the FAO programme are highlighted in Box 1.
Box 1 Main findings from an independent evaluation of the FAO ‘Cash for Work’ programme

- The programme was successful in terms of temporary short-term consumption smoothing among beneficiaries.
- The cash element of the programme has the potential to improve household resilience to future shocks to a certain extent, through investment in productive assets such as livestock.
- The works component provided employment to beneficiary households at a time when traditional livelihoods face a seasonal downturn and where there is a chronic lack of alternative livelihood opportunities.
- The works component did not encroach too much on day-to-day livelihood activities and households were free to send different household members to work on different days. Some teenage workers were observed – it was not possible to tell if the works conditions were taking children away from school.
- While in general it was not the better-off who were working, given that beneficiaries needed to be able-bodied, the research team found that arguably the most vulnerable households that lacked labour capacity were missing out. In some cases, it was difficult to engage women and female-headed households, because communities considered this inappropriate activity for women.
- Lack of access and entrenched cultural norms along clan lines meant powerful local interests could manipulate targeting. This led to resource allocation based on clan affiliation and also meant that resources did not reach the most vulnerable areas. At the sub-clan level, however, resources were targeted appropriately according to the criteria for vulnerability.
- The team did not highlight any great issues in terms of diversion, though there were examples of soldiers and government officials claiming a ‘management fee’. The team thought this may have been because the transfers were understood as wages, rather than external assistance. It is also likely that the choice of areas targeted contributed to this difference to some degree (the programme made a decision not to engage in riverine areas and areas under militant control).
- The team credited the management control and oversight procedures put in place, including call centres and satellite imagery, with ensuring a high degree of accountability.
- Community pressure to share resources meant that different households received support in each season – which might prevent them falling (further) into poverty, but was not sufficient to address the underlying chronic problems they faced.
- Evidence suggested that the quality of the infrastructure programmes was poor and badly planned. For example, communities expected the water catchments and tertiary canals to be washed away in the rains and weed bushes to grow back quickly after being removed. Furthermore, communities highlighted that there had been a focus on tertiary canals when the bottleneck for irrigation was primary canals. This places a big question mark on the quality and durability of infrastructure and potential of the works component to achieve its secondary objective of reducing community vulnerability to climatic shocks.

Overall the programme provided a fairly solid foundation on which to build a safety net function. However, the team had various recommendations:

- A programme based on the condition of work needs to provide parallel support for households that are vulnerable but who cannot fulfil this condition.\(^{81}\)
- A safety net programme needs to identify the right geographical areas and ensure that targeting is based on need rather than clan affiliation, which requires an agency presence to oversee the process.
- The works component needs further thought if the objective is to increase future resilience to shocks rather than just to create short-term employment. Some of the assets that would be most useful and most sustainable are likely to require investment in skills and machinery. The team considered that FAO needs to give more thought to what it wants to achieve from public works programmes (PWPs). The Cash for Work programme had a combined function as a safety net for the vulnerable and a productive programme to create assets and employment – it is difficult for one programme to meet multiple objectives. The evaluators also felt that the instrument (cash for work) had been pre-determined and was mandate- rather than need-driven.
- The approach would benefit from a more in-depth understanding of livelihoods and vulnerability.

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\(^{81}\) From 2014, UNICEF and FAO plan to pilot an unconditional transfer, which UNICEF will administer, in the same geographic area as the FAO cash for work programme, under the JRS.
A time-bound project that provides support for a single dry season is addressing the immediate issue of under-employment but not the underlying factors contributing to livelihood vulnerability. Now the programme is seeking to become a more long-term seasonal safety net. The FAO aims to register the same households for multiple seasons, with the intention of providing more surety to households and addressing some of the more chronic problems. The plan for the 2014 dry season was to provide $9m as cash transfers (excluding implementation and administration costs).

A cash transfer over a longer period could allow households to make future investments to reduce their vulnerability. This would depend on the starting condition of the households and a programme design that was based on a firm understanding of livelihoods and vulnerability.

The FAO implemented the programme under significant operational constraints, largely relating to security, which have inhibited adequate contextual analysis and programme design adaption to suit local needs, as well as management and monitoring activities, with the result that little is known about programme performance in key areas relating to targeting, participation, implementation, quality and selection of assets, and distribution of asset impacts. An appraisal of the experience of the programme suggests that social protection programming could provide appropriate support to poor populations and enhance food security. However, it is not clear that PWP s are the most appropriate instrument to meet identified needs in a timely, efficient and effective manner. It is not possible to comment on the cost effectiveness of such an approach, given the absence of: i) targeting or outcome data; or ii) cost data, but this is an area for further consideration.

It is not clear that the requisite preconditions for PWPs, as set out in the FAO guidelines, currently prevail in Somaliland, in terms of functioning markets; non-interference with existing livelihoods; the creation of assets that meet the basic needs of the targeted population; and the need to avoid potential conflict.

**Food for Work**

WFP’s Food for Assets programme takes a similar approach. This falls under the productive assets pillar of the UN JRS, but as with FAO’s Cash for Work programme it has the dual objective of creating community assets to enhance resilience to climatic shock, while also preventing vulnerable households falling (further) into poverty.

The theory of change of the WFP programme is unclear. The strategy that staff in the WFP regional office outlined was to support households during the lean seasons with temporary food assistance, so that they did not need to sell their livestock. However, from discussions with programme managers in Somaliland it seems that beneficiaries are in fact enrolled for 15 months and that assistance is provided in all months, good or bad. Either type of approach (e.g. temporary assistance in the lean months and longer term assistance for 15 months) has potential to reduce household vulnerability, but the way in which this happens and the impact on long term vulnerability and resilience will of course be different.

The value of the assistance provided is also 100% of the household food basket, even in good months, and does not differentiate by household size. Given that it is not an emergency programme at a time of acute need and these households have other livelihood strategies, this seems excessive.

The rationale for improving resilience is that the livestock holding of the household will be protected and will have increased by 30% by the end of the programme. Dwindling herd size is certainly a major challenge facing

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82 FAO, 2014.
83 FAO, 2013a; FAO, 2014; Farhat et al., 2014.
84 FAO, 2014.
85 FAO, 2013b.
pastoral households in the north. The extent to which a 30% increase in herd size will improve longer-term resilience will depend on the starting size of the beneficiaries’ herds. For the households most in need and close to dropping out of pastoralism, with only 8-10 shotts (sheep and goats) per household, this is unlikely to be sufficient.

While no evaluation of the Food for Work programme was available, the infrastructure being created is very similar to that of the FAO programme, and the skill level of the beneficiaries in both programmes are the same, so it is possible to infer there may be similar problems with the durability and contribution to climatic resilience of the Food for Work programme’s outputs.

Other examples of PWPs include:

- **Somali Community Relief and Economic Support project**: funded by USAID and implemented by ADESO in the Sanaag and Mudug regions; a livelihood recovery project that includes cash for work, provision of agricultural inputs and rehabilitation of water facilities.
- **Natural resource management support programme**: funded by the EU and implemented by ADESO; directly linked to people’s livelihoods in pastoral and agro-pastoral communities; includes a cash for work component, though this is short term. The programme looks into the provision of alternative livelihoods through skills development and provision of grants; linked to the ADESO-Save the Children social safety net programme, mentioned below.
- **Food for Peace**: World Vision is implementing the USAID Food for Peace programme as a small component of its work within the SomReP consortium. In the consortium is providing about $5m in food assistance.

**Alternatives to PWPs**

It is not entirely clear how the employment creation component of these PWPs will address the underlying causes of vulnerability: constraints on traditional livelihoods and lack of sustainable economic strategies. The research team could not find a programme or strategy that supported the economically active in any way other than through public works – including investing time in their own livelihood strategy to make it more productive or resilient to shock; or building skills/links to longer-term livelihood opportunities that would reduce the underlying causes of vulnerability.86

Concern Worldwide is planning to launch a pilot programme in Hargeisa that will take a different approach to providing conditional social assistance to the poor of working age. This takes BRAC’s approach of graduation and will provide regular and predictable income support for a time-bound period, linked to investment in training, financial management, psycho-social support and one-off grants for income-generating activity.

**School feeding**

Of all the social assistance programmes that development partners are implementing, WFP’s school feeding programme is the most widespread and established. WFP began the programme in 2003 and now provides school feeding in over 20% of primary schools across the country. In the north, at least, this is in partnership with the Ministry of Education. The programme aims to provide meals to all children, as well as a monthly take-home ration (a can of oil) as an incentive to families to keep girls in school. In partnership with the Ministry of Finance,87 they procure the food outside of Somaliland, but recruit cooks from the local community who are and paid in kind. The National Development Strategy of Somaliland (2010) provides for the expansion of this programme.

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86 The ADESO-Save the Children programme was doing this to a limited degree, though there was no a cross-over between those provided income support and those receiving training.
87 Interview with WFP Somaliland, 2014.
WFP considered that this programme had improved school attendance\textsuperscript{88} but data were not available that could show whether the programme had affected on education outcomes. WFP was unable to provide information about annual budget for the programme, but commented that the programme was expensive to implement because of the transportation costs involved in food procurement.

In the study locations the research team visited, school feeding had been implemented in one district in Somaliland (Odweyne) and one district in Puntland (Garowe). Interviews identified two problems with the school feeding programme at the local level. While these could be isolated cases, it highlights possible challenges to the programme’s design and the importance of monitoring and oversight:

1. According to the communities in Somaliland, they are experiencing chronic water shortages, which can make it impossible for the schools to cook the food provided. When the research team visited, the food was sitting unused in the store. Teachers explained that the time they spent trying to find solutions to the water issue was taking them away from their teaching responsibilities. Some children had to go home to help their families during their lunch hour, which meant they might be missing out on the meal.
2. In Odweyne, cultural barriers meant that girls could not eat with boys. Girl children did not get a school meal, but rather were given their ration to take home.

**Unconditional cash transfers (UCTs)**

The Cash Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG) in SCS: the first experience of unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) at significant scale came during the 2011 famine response and early recovery. Under UNICEF’s coordination, international and local NGOs came together to form the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG), which distributed cash and vouchers worth $90m to more than 1.3 million households across nine regions of SCS, over 14 months. The scheme is no longer running, but it showed that it was feasible to undertake cash transfer programming quickly, and at scale, to achieve humanitarian objectives in a complex environment. Interviewees in SCS who had been enrolled on the programme were very favourable towards it. The programme generated a number of lessons to inform future cash programming in the region. These are summarised in Table 7.

**Table 7 Findings from the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG) evaluations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive findings</th>
<th>Lessons/challenges identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Showed that cash and vouchers were feasible in this context</td>
<td>Start of the programme was delayed by up to 5 months because of collective failings of UN and donor governments to: a) commit funds based on forecasts, at first signs of crisis; b) prioritise humanitarian need for action over political risk of intervening in this context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not contribute to market failures, but rather stimulated market response</td>
<td>Lack of response analysis meant interventions were shaped by each agency’s mandate or previous ways of working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaled up much more rapidly than food aid could have done and reached a greater number of people than Cash for Work</td>
<td>Consistent reports of payments to local authorities; and systematic bribes in IDP camps, in which NGO partners were sometimes implicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far cheaper than food aid to deliver (85% of budget on the cash programme reached beneficiaries vs. 35% for food).</td>
<td>Access challenges and lack of sufficiently robust accountability mechanisms of international NGOs (INGOs), leading to lack of oversight of activities on the ground and cases of diversion, some of which went undetected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positively affected household food security and reinforced coping mechanisms (e.g. debt repayment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash could be delivered safely even to beneficiaries located in parts of the country under control of militias</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{88} WFP had not provided any reports to the research team by the time of writing.
Households could remit funds to relatives in inaccessible and worst-affected areas of Bay and Bakool
Private sector played a vital role as a delivery partner, reaching households rapidly
Risks of money-laundering can be substantially mitigated through careful monitoring
Majority of the presumed risks did not occur in practice
People preferred cash to food aid and vouchers, including women
Funds provided in the place of origin allowed households to remain in the area to pursue their livelihood, rather than migrate to IDP camps
Women kept control of cash provided to them, and it was perceived to improve women’s position and voice within the household and community
Women could spend more time caring for children
Where NGOs built existing programmes this led to greater efficiency in time and cost

Donors’ reaction to cases of potential diversion – despite evidence that far more aid was being diverted in kind
Reliance on community-based targeting judged to be inappropriate in this context (lack of access, meaning no oversight of targeting; clan affiliations of NGO partners; and lack of knowledge of local power dynamics; quick turnaround required), leading to exclusion and inclusion errors
Limitations of nutrition-based targeting method employed in some areas
Lack of re-targeting/flexibility in value of the transfer, despite the change in vulnerability over the duration of the programme and knowledge that some of those in need were being excluded
Did not reach the worst-affected areas
Some beneficiaries were threatened with violence
Hawala (money transfer) offices were overwhelmed – long queues
UNICEF’s financial systems and human resources were not sufficient or flexible enough for partners to deal with all the requirements of a humanitarian response at this scale

The evaluation made the following recommendations that should be taken into account before setting up a safety net programme in SCS:

- The need for a more open dialogue that acknowledged the reality of issues such as ‘taxation’ and how to deal with them;
- The need to consider protection concerns as part of the programme design, especially for vulnerable groups;
- NGOs and the evaluation team considered donors’ reactions to cases of suspected fraud to go against the ethic of risk sharing. Donors need to develop a position on risk and agree in advance on ‘appropriate and proportionate responses’ for investigating and responding to cases of alleged fraud;
- The need to engage local partners actively, based on capacity assessment, and build their capacity to manage risks on cash transfer programmes, as well as to put in place the monitoring and systems to back this up;
- The need to establish and train in accountability mechanisms and controls before an emergency occurs;
- Building on existing programmes led to greater efficiencies in time and cost); and
- Blanket targeting within a geographical location may have been better than community-based targeting in the first stages (3-6 months) of the emergency.

UNICEF’s planned approach to develop seasonal UCTs in Somalia comes out of this evaluation. It is provisionally scheduled to begin in 2015.

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89 Donor counter-terrorism regulations such as those of the Office of Foreign Asset Control of the US Government.
The research team identified several ongoing UCT programmes of development partners or NGOs, details of which are below.

**Puntland — Social Safety Net Programme**: an EU-funded 30-month pilot programme that ADESO and Save the Children International implemented in the Sanaag and Karkar regions in 2012. The programme has several components: cash transfers to 1,200 vulnerable households (84% women) over 18 months; skills development (alternative livelihoods; improving pastoral livelihoods; literacy and numeracy) and business grants for an additional 1,000 households; a community fund for implementation of DRR priorities; and contingency fund (each community to receive $15,000, of which $5,000 would fund the contingency plan as part of early action). ADESO and Save the Children have developed action plans based on a risk analysis using the DRR approach; this has led to the rehabilitation of roads, gullies, transit centres, etc. The NGOs aim to work collaboratively with the Puntland administration.

The cash grant was $85/month, designed to cover the full minimum expenditure basket, though because of inflation it only covers 50%. An evaluation reported that grants had improved the food security of the households⁹⁰ (unsurprisingly, perhaps, given the size of the grant). Other impacts of the cash transfers have included repayment of large debts incurred during previous poor seasons, which has re-established access to credit; as well as enabling beneficiary households to make contributions to informal social assistance (zakat and sadaqa). These have reinforced coping mechanisms and resilience to shock, and reduced the burden on the wider community of supporting these households; more children are going to school; and 44 of the 1,200 households that receive regular cash relief report having started income-generating activities.

Selection criteria for the cash grants and livelihoods support components were based on vulnerability (e.g. households chronically without labour capacity and/or with many dependants) and poverty-related indicators. It is not clear how easy it would have been to verify all of these (e.g. number of shoats, size of land, access to remittances). There has been no monitoring or evaluation of the livelihoods support component (e.g. evidence of training being put into practice, use of the lump sum grant or success of any businesses), so it is not clear how successful the programme has been in establishing alternative.

The programme has generated a number of lessons to consider in relation to setting up a social protection framework:

- Programmes can act as safety nets for those enrolled, but with a single round of targeting it is not possible to catch anyone who is falling into poverty during programme implementation or to support new households if a crisis occurs.
- This has implications for the size of grants, which are considerably larger than grants provided to a comparable target group under the HSNP in Kenya – is it better to cover more people with smaller amounts?
- Inflation has reduced the value of assistance, as have local exchange rate fluctuations against the dollar – this needs to be considered in the design of social protection programmes.
- It is not clear to what extent the underlying situation has improved for households after 18 months and there are questions as to which people it is possible to support in this fashion, to the extent that they no longer need assistance. It may be better for programmes with a plan for ‘graduation’ to focus on those households or individuals with labour capacity.
- It is feasible to begin to link programmes to government in the north, but low governance capacity means they will need a good deal of support.

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⁹⁰During the Gu season, which is usually the best season of the year. Even so, 25% of households at baseline reported that they had faced food shortage in the previous three months. By November 2011 this figure had decreased to 18%, and continued to decrease until the end of the project. Even in February-March 2012 during the dry (and typically harshest) Jilaal season, the numbers had reduced significantly to 10%.
• Selecting beneficiaries is a great challenge in a context where it is very hard to distinguish between households’ levels of poverty/vulnerability, and the whole community is exposed to climatic shocks and conflict; and when it can be hard for agencies to engage directly with communities for security reasons. The criteria were considered by those in the workshop to be fair.

• How to deal with seasonal needs/gaps and the type of support to address these.

Other cash transfers that were identified included:

• **BRiCS Consortium:** the Building Resilience Communities in Somalia (BRiCS) consortium’s programme is multi-sectoral and designed to respond to community priorities. The programme addresses community- and household-level vulnerability. The consortium has carried out community consultations, which were scheduled to have been completed by early July 2014, after which implementation of community projects across different sectors could begin. The programme includes a safety net component as an early response mechanism, but the consortium had not decided on the modality of delivery (i.e. cash or food). It may be that this will be revised to allow for the funds from the safety net allocation to be channelled through the community, where it will then be decided how they will be allocated. The programme seeks to cover 102 villages, 27 districts across 7 regions in SCS. It appears to prioritise covariate shocks.

• **SomReP Consortium:** an NGO consortium led by World Vision International, SomReP has a small fund (about $200,000) for immediate response, as well as funds to undertake social transfers at the community level within its initial phase. The cash component includes cash for work and cash relief ($80 per month for six months). It is intended that the response funds should allow communities to be able to act independently of humanitarian organisations to respond to small-scale emergencies or take steps to reduce the intensity of a crisis once certain thresholds have been met. A small component of the $54m grant will be available over the next four years. Key informants in this research commented that in the event of a crisis, communities are unlikely to allow the consortium to make changes once activities have been agreed on (e.g. if funds have been allocated to support community preparedness actions). Educating communities would also therefore be necessary.

• **DFID Cash Transfers for Health Outcomes:** DFID is undertaking a feasibility study to consider the introduction of cash or voucher-based assistance to improve health outcomes for children in Somaliland, which could be conditional or unconditional. However, this is still very much at the inception stage and if it progresses to implementation is only likely to be carried out on a small scale and pilot basis that focuses on achieving health outcomes as a priority.

• Other small-scale NGO programmes that support investment in livelihoods were reported. This included a USAID-funded cash relief assistance programme for vulnerable households that ADESO was implementing in the Lower Juba, Bay, Bari, Mudug and Sanaag regions. The project provides cash transfers to vulnerable households for 18 months, combined with livelihood support. An SOS Children’s Village programme in Hargeisa was providing cash grants for enterprise to young people and women, and a similar Danish Refugee Council programme was aimed at small business owners in Odweyne.

**Food distribution**

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91 A four-year integrated programme that brings together key NGO actors to implement resilience-building programmes. The consortium of NGOs was formed last year and comprises NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Concern, Save the Children and International Rescue Committee. NRC leads the consortium. BRiCS’s strategy is to build resilience through a community-led approach and involves a long process of community consultations and analysis of risks, hazards, vulnerabilities and measures to address them. Communities then prioritise actions that will address the issues identified. These actions will involve a range of sectors in which the various organisations have expertise or capacities. This process aims to help beneficiaries take early measures to enable them to better cope with shocks by reducing their intensity and impact.
In general, markets in Somaliland function well and cash distribution channels have good penetration, meaning that cash can be delivered more effectively than food and without causing inflation. Food aid is only relevant in contexts where markets are weak or to protect the food consumption of particular vulnerable groups. Despite this, food distribution is continuing in various areas through NGOs, most often in partnership with WFP. This includes food rations and high-energy biscuits for malnourished children. While it was not possible in the time available to go into further detail with agencies delivering food aid, a large number of community respondents and key informants in government, as well as donor agencies and NGOs, reported a good deal of antipathy and frustration towards the continued provision of food aid in this context. Issues they raised repeatedly were that food was provided inappropriately and was depressing local production; food was not purchased locally and everything was imported; and there were reports of NGOs not distributing seasonal food aid until the harvest season. Communities also expressed dissatisfaction with the quality and type of food that WFP provided (in contrast to the commodities provided by Turkish aid agencies, which were considered to be locally appropriate). All reported that food and high-energy biscuits ended up on the open market, further depressing prices, or were given to animals. Limiting inappropriate food aid provision is a priority in the Togdheer Regional Development Plan.\textsuperscript{92}

Access to services
Programmes that seek to address welfare and complementary services can be crucial for social transfers to achieve their full impact. In the study locations, communities and leaders of local and INGOs reported providing assistance to improve access to services in general, and health-related services in particular. This included provision of subsidised medicines; healthcare for pregnant women; water subsidies for the first few months after IDPs arrived at a camp in Hargeisa; programmes assisting children in IDP camps to access schooling; and affordable shelters in IDP camps.

Lessons from the study locations
- Information about the performance of the FAO PWP in key areas is generally unavailable, which prevents informed decision-making on the suitability of extending the programme as a component of a social protection framework. While it may be necessary to be pragmatic and accept suboptimal programme implementation in some contexts, systematic monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is required if a programme’s implementation and performance are to be credibly assessed; as well as sufficient analysis of the local context to ensure that the programme’s design has been adapted to suit local social and economic specificities;
- The assistance that aid agencies provide does not achieve the expected coverage or consistency relative to the level of need, nor is it well understood by the wider community;\textsuperscript{93}
- People do not trust the government to provide such assistance and associate it with bribery from government staff and other injustices;
- People, particularly minorities, do not trust local NGOs because they consider them to be gatekeepers and to bias distribution along clan lines;
- Interviewees repeatedly asked for assistance be provided more directly to them rather than through government or NGO intermediaries, believing them to be corrupt. This indicates the fear of diversion;
- Interviewees in urban areas in Puntland commented that poverty targeting and community-based targeting approaches created conflict, because those who are the most established (i.e. those who have been there the longest and have the greatest social standing), have the advocacy skills to ‘shout the loudest’ and get the support; and

\textsuperscript{92} Ministry of National Planning and Development, 2014 – 2016, n.d.
\textsuperscript{93} In the study locations in Burco and Odweyne (districts under the UN JRS) the research team found no examples of cash for work. Interviewees knew about of the existence of food for work in the area, none of them were enrolled and community awareness of the agencies or programme objectives was limited, which suggested that coverage in the study locations was low. Assistance in SCS appeared to be very concentrated in particular locations.
• Interviewees understood how assistance could improve their wellbeing, including through investment in basic needs, health and education of children and investment in livelihood activities. Small businesses were the most common investment mentioned.

4.2 Informal social protection – Sharing and social capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zakat</strong></td>
<td>Religious obligation for every able adult Muslim whose wealth exceeds a certain threshold (equivalent to 85g of gold) for a specific period of the year to pay a mandatory contribution to eight categories, including the poor, those in need of assistance, those who are indebted and unable to pay their debt, and wayfarers who do not have anyone to support them.</td>
<td>Compulsory in Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sadaqah</strong></td>
<td>Voluntary charity.</td>
<td>Encouraged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quaraan</strong></td>
<td>Community donations; wealthier households pay money into a pooled fund that is shared among poor households. Also when businesspeople save for times when large sums of money are needed to deal with community problems, such as arrests, deaths or health emergencies.</td>
<td>All the rest are customary commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irmaansi</strong></td>
<td>Sharing of milk (rural areas only). Poor households request assistance from wealthier people who are not friends or relatives. They receive a loan of a milking animal and use the milk, then return the animal to its owner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dhowrto/xersi</strong></td>
<td>Sharing of milk (rural areas). Surplus milk and butter are distributed among poor households that do not have milking animals, especially during dry seasons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afur</strong></td>
<td>Wealthier households provide food to the poorest households in the community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dumal</strong></td>
<td>When a woman is widowed, she marries her husband’s brother or cousin, who supports her and her family.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Xigiisan</strong></td>
<td>When a husband is widowed, her family gives him a wife to take care of his home and children.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Axan</strong></td>
<td>When a family member dies, the community provides the household with food for around a week.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Talci</strong></td>
<td>Funeral support when someone dies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affarta-bax</strong></td>
<td>Assistance provided to a woman for 40 days after the birth of a child.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mag</strong></td>
<td>‘Blood money’. If a community member kills someone from a different community, the killer’s community gives camels to the victim’s community (50 for a woman; 100 for a man).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kaalmo</strong></td>
<td>When a household loses its livestock in a seasonal shock, other households contribute livestock to replace the herd of the affected household.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gadlid ceeshi</strong></td>
<td>Pastoralists/agro-pastoralists borrow animals for transport when migrating.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Baaho</strong></td>
<td>Door-to-door collections for the urban ‘poorest of the poor’.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Of these, only *dhowrto* was not prevalent; communities considered it to be something from the past. Some were specific to rural or urban areas, such as *imaraansi* and *baaho*, respectively. There were several lessons of relevance:

- Social assistance tends to be given along kinship and clan lines, meaning that new arrivals to an area, minorities and the marginalised can fall through the net. This is particularly true for the Gabooye, who receive little in the way of support from other clans. It includes *zakaatul maal*[^1], which although officially the mosque should distribute in reality is given between individuals and was acknowledged to put the family first, followed by the needs of disabled, orphans and the elderly. There is no accountability and no authority to control whether those who should be giving money to the poor are doing so.[^2] In the majority of communities, interviewees considered that many of those in need did not benefit from *zakaatul maal*.

- The research team found that urban areas were more individualistic, with greater heterogeneity and reduced family ties, and a commensurate reduction in the extent of informal support. However, examples of strong social support remained, with the *baaho* system – which the team had not heard of before – operating in IDP settlements. This depended on the length of time that settlements had been in existence and thus the strength of social bonds. For example, in the Stadium camp in Hargeisa, which has existed for almost 20 years, a council had been set up to formally distribute assistance every month.

- Young people and men of working age cannot access community mechanisms. The definition of working age is very flexible – such that if an elderly man continues to work he is unlikely to be considered in need of community assistance.

- Communities generally agreed that systems were becoming overwhelmed and current levels of assistance were insufficient to prevent asset depletion and poverty – this corresponds with the findings of other recent research.[^3] Many women in the IDP camps said that previously they used to ‘help each other with open hands’, but now every single person has experienced a crisis/shock. The research team found a similar situation in pastoral communities.

- While informal social protection is generally considered to support the poor and vulnerable (as per the categories of vulnerability seen in Section 3)[^4] it is not predictable or regular enough to meet the needs of those who are chronically poor or vulnerable.

- The research team encountered *dumal* (known as *levirate* elsewhere) and *xigisilsan* in rural communities; interviewees viewed them as a social assistance mechanism to deal with loss of a breadwinner or caregiver. They considered the practice of marrying a close relative of the deceased (the brother/sister or cousin) to be the best option for the children of the deceased, because they were more likely to know their prospective step-parent, who would also be more likely to wish to support them. While it is not compulsory for women to accept *dumal*, interviewees acknowledged that it is a survival strategy in rural areas, and it is uncommon – or indeed prohibited – for women to marry outside of the clan. Interviewees considered it shameful if a widow is not offered *dumal*. While these practices address particular lifecycle shocks, they raise many issues regarding gender relations and power dynamics, and would not be suitable as the foundation for formal social protection. The research team did not encounter cases of *dumal* in urban areas, where female-headed households were far more prevalent, which suggested that where women had the opportunity for economic independence this was preferable.

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**MAPPING SOCIAL PROTECTION: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK**

[^1]: A form of *zakat* based on individual giving to another individual, as opposed to *zakatul fitr* which is the public distribution food to the poor that marks the end of Ramadan.

[^2]: In areas that al-Shabaab controls, the group takes *zakat* by force and distributes it arbitrarily.

[^3]: Brewin and Dunn, 2014.

[^4]: A 2013 Mercy Corps study analysing factors that influence resilience found that those receiving informal social assistance and *zakat* were less resilient, which tallies with those receiving assistance being among the most vulnerable.
• Major gaps exist in the formal social protection system relative to the level of need.
• Best practices and current programmes could form the foundation of a social protection or safety net programme. These are, however, only some of the possible options and others will need to be considered.
• UNICEF and its partners will need to go beyond agency mandates to design programmes that best fit needs.
• Food aid is a huge challenge and should only be considered where markets are not functioning.
• Programmes should seek to complement and not interfere with community social assistance, which forms a vital coping strategy. Communities are likely to understand programmes that align with the values and premises of traditional assistance (in terms of classification of vulnerability). Formal social transfers to vulnerable groups are likely to reinforce traditional support systems, because households that usually require support will instead be able to contribute to the system. However, formal social protection programmes must go beyond the confines of clan and family that presently limit the value of community mechanisms for some of the most vulnerable.
• UNICEF and its partners will need to implement social protection in a way that minimises the risk of powerful interests co-opting assistance. They might consider building on effective community mobilisation and development initiatives, such as community education committees, community self-help initiatives, community health/WASH committees, and village development committees as a platform to ensure the inclusion of marginalised and minority groups in the decision-making process.

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98 Evidence shows that those who receive transfers from aid agencies often share their transfers with others.
5. FEASIBILITY AND ENTRY POINTS FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION

Despite access challenges, recent experiences of aid agencies over the last 5 years in providing cash transfers to vulnerable populations in SCS and Puntland have showed that they are feasible to implement. The majority of concerns proved to be unfounded and the programmes showed the benefits of cash and vouchers over in-kind assistance.\textsuperscript{99} It will be important to learn from these experiences.

All interviewees agreed that, given the chronic nature of the problems that people are facing, a long-term social protection-style programme or system based on social transfers is needed; and that, even in such a complex environment, they should be addressed as developmental issues. They also agreed that this should be feasible given previous experiences.

This section summarises the findings from the KII s and considers the enabling environment, and programme and policy linkages, while keeping in mind that formal social protection is a government-owned social service and what this means in the context of Somaliland.

5.1 Potential for government-owned social protection

A number of key informants acknowledged that one of the main challenges in addressing vulnerability and resilience at scale and in a sustainable way centres on governance. Beyond consumption and survival needs, they considered delivery of basic services essential to the broader resilience agenda and that working with the government to build systems will be crucial in any long-term initiative that seeks to contribute to resilience. This is no different for social protection, which generally speaking should be understood as a government-owned system; a pillar of and complementing other state provided social services. Therefore it is essential that any social protection framework is not simply designed and perceived as a UN project; that collaboration with the government is established from the outset; and that the UN strategy supports the government to build and implement a nationally owned system.

Interviewees generally agreed that conditions in Somaliland are favourable for planning a formal government-owned system and that this was important. A key objective for UNICEF and its partners therefore must be to build government capacity, while any proposed framework should take into account the government’s own thinking on social protection where this exists.

Interviewees considered that there was real space emerging in Somaliland to make engaging with government on social protection a feasible proposition over the next three years. Over the last 10 years, Somaliland has experienced a remarkable process of state building, including demobilisation, development of institutions, establishment of a security force, printing of a new currency and commencement of basic services. The government has articulated its national economic recovery and development priorities in the National Development Strategy, and has highlighted social protection, which is part of Pillar 5 (basic services). This falls under the mandate of the MLSA.

Interviewees from a number of ministries showed interest in social protection. The meetings highlighted the obvious potential synergies of social protection with other government strategies, including those of the ministries of education and health, the Disaster Management Authority, and government priorities in relation to youth employment and improvements in the livestock and agriculture sectors. Social protection also aligns

\textsuperscript{99}The CVMG evaluation (Hedlund et al., 2013) proved that beneficiaries preferred cash to food aid (and requested ‘no more food aid’). Cash and vouchers appear to be more cost efficient and cost effective in reducing negative coping mechanisms and achieving a minimum dietary diversity. The findings of an FAO evaluation (Farhat et al. 2014) and the evaluation of the Save the Children-ADESCO social safety net programme (Dunn, 2012) were similar in relation to the feasibility of, utility of and preference for cash.
with peace-building objectives because it has the potential, if well designed, to contribute to a social contract between state and citizen.

What came across very strongly was a real desire on the part of the government for more national ownership and involvement in programmes, and that rather than aid agencies bypassing government structures, there is at a minimum, coordination of agency projects with national development priorities and ideally a role for government to deliver these.

An administrative framework is developing to promote and explore social protection within the government, and which could eventually establish a programme. This includes the establishment of the Budget Policy Committee and the inter-ministerial National Planning Commission. In 2013, DFID and DANIDA set up the $70m Somaliland Development Fund to support the implementation of Somaliland’s development and economic recovery plan, in accordance with national priorities. The fund cannot be considered as budget support because it does not go through the government’s financial system. But it does use the government’s planning mechanism to identify priority projects, and the projects the fund supports are included in the government’s annual plans and budgets.

Under the Ministry of National Planning and Development, development planning has been decentralised, with the establishment of regional development plans covering the next three years, based on the National Development Strategy pillars. The Togdheer Regional Development Plan includes social protection under social development as a sector of social services, with a vision of ‘an effective social protection system that cares for vulnerable and marginalised groups.’

Phase 2 of UNICEF and the Ministry of Interior’s JPLG capacity development project is beginning to provide health and education programme funds through central government for delivery of social services, and is building capacity of district administrations in six districts to take an active role in delivery of these services, including fund management. This includes support for the design of district development frameworks.

The World Bank and DFID, meanwhile, are providing support to the Ministries of Planning and Finance to improve PFM over the next two and a half years, including strengthening budgeting and planning, enhancing revenue, investing more and coordinating external resources. The Government of Somaliland budget has steadily increased year on year from $51,710,000 in 2010 to $152,000 in 2014.

Other issues to consider are:

- Establishing government-owned social protection frameworks will bring with it the challenges of working with a fragile state, including security concerns, a still-developing state capacity for policy and planning, and low revenues.
- While national strategies mention social planning and ministries have expressed their interest in it, no draft policy or strategy on social protection has emerged, nor is there a clear understanding of what social protection covers. There is a lack of a common understanding on the issues that affect vulnerable populations and no consensus on priority interventions. The MLSA is planning to draft a social protection policy in the next 12 months. It will be important to engage with the MLSA and to use this framework as the basis for discussion and development of the policy to avoid two parallel initiatives.

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101 Also in partnership with UNDP and the ILO.
102 Hargeisa, Odweyne, Burco, Borama, Berbera, Sheikh.
103 Ministry of Finance, 2013.
104 In some cases, social protection was confused with ‘protection’.
• The MLSA has a small budget relative to others and a smaller say in setting national development priorities.\textsuperscript{105} In countries where social protection has moved forward quickest it has been championed by powerful ministries such as planning or finance, and it will be important to bring these on board in Somaliland. In fact these ministries appear to be engaging with the north. The Ministry of Finance indicated that it would be willing to discuss entry points for a social protection framework in Somaliland, including a commitment to an incremental scaling-up of government funds, if this would engage development partners.

• The above governance initiatives are in their early stages and a good deal of further technical, administrative and financial management capacity will be required at the national and local levels. DFID reported that no data are available on levels of corruption in the government. Levels of trust between development partners, such as DFID, and the government are high, but systems are weak.

• Government members expressed frustration that agencies often do not include them in discussions on programme or strategy design, or that engagement is often tokenistic. Indeed, some ministers raised concerns that international agencies’ operations were ‘neither based on the priorities of the communities nor the realities on the ground’. The desire to shift towards longer-term programming and with the government in the driver’s seat appears to be real. To build the necessary buy-in, key informants in the government stated that they to be involved from the beginning of the process and not to be simply presented with a programme for endorsement. Finally, a number of interviewees expressed frustration at the humanitarian focus of certain agency programmes, and particularly of food aid. It was the perception of some ministries that the focus of a number of NGOs and agencies is short term in nature and not geared towards necessary long-term change and development. To engage the government, the framework will need to be seen as a developmental strategy with a focus on assistance, not ‘more of the same’; hence the need to involve and support the government in the framework from the beginning.

• The government’s initial role in any programme including social protection will need to be that of coordinator; its capacity to perform this function will need to be developed. The potential for financing and technical support from development partners is considered further in Section 5.3.

5.2 Accountability, security and implementing partners
Given the capacity shortfalls identified in national and local governance above, it is likely that the programme will require varying degrees of support to implementation. This will be necessary for all administrative stages of the programme’s operations cycle. Recognised good practice is for a payment service provider to manage the delivery of transfers to beneficiaries on national social protection schemes, for transparency and accountability. This should be a requirement whether for a formal nationally owned social protection programme or an agency-implemented safety net.

5.2.1 Administration partners
Administrative processes required on the programme side include communicating the programme to communities; administering the processes of identification, registration and enrolment of beneficiaries; establishing and maintaining a database; preparing monthly payment requests for authorisation; providing oversight and monitoring; and managing a grievance process.

Depending on the location, it could be possible for district and local authorities to be directly involved in certain elements of the administration cycle, subject to a capacity assessment. A civil society partner could potentially provide added value and support in terms of community mobilisation, supporting accurate, transparent and accountable targeting and monitoring, as well as management of grievances. This was the approach taken on the Kenya HSNP, with INGOs implementing particular components of the programme in the first instance, with a gradual process of engagement and handover to local authorities as capacities

\textsuperscript{105}As stated in the 2014 Somaliland budget, the MLSA’s share of the total national budget envelope was 0.3\% ($378,351) in 2013 and 0.36\% ($553,115) in 2014.
developed. A number of INGOs have the expertise and interest to provide such a role, though it will
nevertheless be important for the programme to be understood and designed as being government owned.
In Somaliland, in areas where capacity of local government has been supported through the JPLG
programme, from the beginning local government – specifically the Social Affairs Department of the District
Council – could potentially have a role in certain administrative activities (e.g. an oversight role in registration,
a role in preparing monthly payment lists, and perhaps monitoring).

The clear message from key informants was that the UN should not be directly involved in implementation.
Rather, it should focus on high-level coordination, including adequately supporting the CSOs that are selected
as administrative partners to set up robust monitoring and accountability mechanisms, along with advocacy
around governance and fundraising for implementation of the framework, and capacity development of the
government to establish technical capacity, resources, guidelines, policies and systems. CSOs on the other
hand should be involved in the implementation of specific interventions in the framework. Security seems to
be, and may always be, a hindrance to the physical presence of international organisations in Somaliland.
This needs to be acknowledged and measures put in place to build capacities of local CSOs. Key to this
arrangement is having in place strong monitoring and accountability mechanisms.

5.2.2 Payment service providers
The hawala money transfer system and mobile money transfer services are well established in Somaliland
and have been used to successfully to deliver cash transfers in aid programmes. Mobile money transfer is
relatively new, however coverage is rapidly expanding and is already penetrating rural areas. In the areas
the research team visited, penetration of Telesom’s Zaad mobile money product appeared to be greater than
the hawala system, and almost all businesses accept e-money now – but it is difficult to extrapolate this to
the national level. The relative benefits of these systems are outlined in Table 9.

Table 9 Comparison of mobile money transfer and hawala remittance system for cash transfers

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<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile money transfer</td>
<td>• Any Zaad agent can pay out or transfers can be spent as e-money in stores, meaning it has potential to support households in the event of migration or displacement&lt;br&gt;• Reduced opportunity cost for beneficiaries – in areas with adequate penetration of agents; the system is convenient with no need to queue up or even to cash out&lt;br&gt;• The system is totally automated and offers the potential for efficiency gains when applied at scale or to make changes to the transfer values of beneficiaries in accordance with a change in their circumstances&lt;br&gt;• Improves security for staff and beneficiaries because there is no need to travel with or handle cash</td>
<td>• Requires network coverage, electricity and a network of mobile money agents, which is increasing rapidly but is not national yet&lt;br&gt;• High set-up (equipment) costs&lt;br&gt;• Limited cash flow of agents can increase opportunity costs for beneficiaries – but this is not seen as a challenge because storekeepers now accept e-money, reducing the need to cash out at all&lt;br&gt;• Requires individuals to meet the due diligence ‘Know Your Customer’ requirements of the provider (not onerous in case of Zaad, where an NGO/agency ID will suffice)&lt;br&gt;• The system can be difficult for illiterate people or those new to the technology – investment in training is needed&lt;br&gt;• Potential for deception/coercion and loss of income remains – international evidence shows beneficiaries share their personal identification numbers (PINs).&lt;br&gt;• Potential for technical errors</td>
</tr>
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107 According to GSM Association, the mobile money transfer market in Somalia is one of the most rapidly expanding markets (personal communication, 2014).
- Offers an opportunity for communication with beneficiaries over the phone
- Robust and reliable technology.
- People are becoming familiar with mobile money transfer and like it
- Automation and controls increase accountability and reduce opportunities for fraud and diversion (a number of communities requested mobile money to deliver aid for this reason)
- Leaves an audit trail
- The technology is restricted in areas under the control of al-Shabaab
- A possible barrier will be certain donors’ concerns over the use of particular financial service providers. A majority shareholder of Zaat/Hormuud was recently removed from the ‘banned’ list for UN partnerships, but remains on a US government’s list of potential links to terrorism

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<th>Service</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
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| **Hawala remittance system**  | • Improved security for staff and beneficiaries relative to manual distributions  
  • Low set-up costs.     
  • Can be set up relatively quickly  
  • Beneficiaries’ familiarity with and trust in the system  
  • Convenient for beneficiaries in urban areas  
  • Leaves an audit trail  
  • A simple process for those unfamiliar with phones or mobile money systems | • In areas not well served by outlets, this presents a high opportunity cost for beneficiaries  
  • Beneficiaries must physically collect cash from particular branches. This can lead to queues at branches, which are an opportunity cost and also present some security risks beneficiaries. This system is not well equipped to deal with the mobility of Somali households  
  • Liquidity issues, especially with large numbers of beneficiaries and when dealing with smaller denominations  
  • Not automated, meaning the system does not have a great deal of flexibility to scale up or change transfer values at short notice  
  • Not likely to be insured  
  • May charge a significant service charge  
  • Chances of beneficiaries being coerced and defrauded if not monitored well. In one case, a hawala agent was implicated in fraud during the famine response  
  • A possible barrier will be certain donors’ concerns over the use of particular financial service providers. |

It would be good practice to invite both partners for discussion and assess the relative merits of each system through a tender. Selection criteria would need to include a feasibility analysis, mapping of coverage, cost-benefit analysis, etc. Depending on the geographical location of the programmes to be implemented under the framework, there may be a case for establishing partnerships with both providers to begin with.

### 5.3 Opportunities for financial and technical support

Clearly any move to establish such a system – whether government owned or agency driven – will require long-term commitments for financial and technical support on the part of donors and their partners, both humanitarian and development. If agencies are serious about implementing social protection or safety nets as a crucial component of developmental strategies to reduce poverty and vulnerability and build resilience to shock, commitments must go beyond the standard 3-5 years of programmatic and election cycles. In Ethiopia, the EU applied the concept of resilience to social protection, in a context where the government

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108 Hedlund et al., 2013.
has some level of capacity, and the process has taken more than 10 years to achieve any tangible results.\textsuperscript{109} The absolute minimum commitment is 10 years – the reality is more likely to be a 20-year approach. Results and impacts will be seen far earlier, but commitment for support must be sustained to develop the system to the extent required.

5.3.1 Donor support
A major challenge when addressing vulnerability in Somaliland has been the limited availability of long-term funding and separation of longer-term and humanitarian approaches. An outcome of the 2011 famine response was an acknowledgement among donors and others of the need for longer-term funding and strategies that go beyond emergency response, to ensure continuity in addressing complex issues related to poverty and vulnerability to shock,\textsuperscript{110} while at the same time pre-empting and responding appropriately to early signs of crises.

This requires a coming together of development and humanitarian objectives and funding into cohesive and long-term programmes that to address the underlying vulnerabilities (chronic factors) and have flexible funding arrangements to respond to covariate shocks as they occur. The main developmental and humanitarian donors showed some appetite for giving greater consideration to social protection, including ECHO and the EC; and DFID is recruiting a social development adviser who will be more involved in dialogue on social protection. Opportunities therefore exist to look at a system where donors work together on programmes that simultaneously address governance issues, systems building, accountability and linkages to other services; as well as the long-term financing of social transfers, with a predictable rapid response to early signs of crisis. It will be equally, if not more, important that donors are willing to fund not only the transfers, but also the development of the social protection system itself.

It will be necessary to take into account the risk aversion and responses of certain donors in face of evidence of diversion and taxation on previous cash transfers.\textsuperscript{111} Certain donors continue to have concerns over the diversion of aid and breaches of anti-terrorism legislation – with scrutiny of aid provided in the form of cash, despite evidence that there is also similar diversion of in-kind resources. According to key informants, aid agencies are dealing with this risk by: i) avoiding working in areas where diversion is a risk, despite these areas being some of the most in need; ii) developing programmes that are lower risk, but not the most effective in dealing with people’s real needs; or (iii) down-playing or remaining silent on the reality of these issues for fear of the consequences. An open and honest dialogue must take place that acknowledges that some diversion is inevitable, but that this should not be a reason to stop humanitarian assistance; rather, the dialogue should also include proposals on how to confront diversion.

5.3.2 Resilience programming
UN agencies and INGOs are currently designing or implementing a range of resilience strategies and programming across all Zones, with the aim of helping communities, households and individuals protect themselves against shocks in the longer term, and to cope more effectively with crises.\textsuperscript{112} Common features of these approaches – on paper at least – are to mainstream risk reduction and risk management as a central objective of programmes, bring together complementary interventions, and move towards longer-term...
approaches to what are development problems. The UN JRS\textsuperscript{113} or NGO programmes\textsuperscript{114} could align with and provide potential entry points for longer-term social transfers:

- All these NGOs and UN agencies have been involved in provision of social assistance in Somalia/Somaliland, and cash transfers in particular;
- Consortium NGO actors are large INGOs that (in theory) can mobilise rapidly and engage collaboration at the local level – important for any strategy or programme to be accepted by local communities and leadership;
- It provides an opportunity for joint monitoring; the NGO resilience consortia have been in discussions on developing common indicators for resilience measurement;
- Opportunities exist for establishing links and referrals between programmes, such that beneficiaries on these programmes could benefit from cash transfers provided under a social protection/safety net framework, while those enrolled in a social protection programme would have the opportunity to access basic complementary services;
- The UN JRS is a 15-year plan; for which an initial 3-year programme has been designed, providing a window of opportunity to develop the necessary long-term engagement; and
- All strategies have a safety net objective or component.

However, a number of limitations must be acknowledged in the design of a framework that seeks to use these programmes as entry points:

- **Limitations in humanitarian reform**: despite the lessons from the 2011 famine response, unlike other countries in the Horn of Africa the humanitarian system in Somalia and Somaliland (with the exception of the donor changes above) has reportedly not undergone necessary reforms.\textsuperscript{115} This was considered to be partly because of the rapid turnover of staff, meaning that institutional knowledge is regularly lost. Interviewees mentioned that the continued formulaic responses to crises were a major concern; they believed that, in general, agencies made proposals that were not based on response analysis of the best options for communities, but which most closely aligned with their mandate or previous experience.
- **Limited conceptualisation of social protection**: UNICEF and its partners must agree on a common definition of social protection, because organisations have different understandings of what it means, as well as of its place within the resilience agenda. In general, the NGO resilience consortia and UN agencies do not appear to have discussed what constitutes social protection in this context. While UN and NGO stakeholders mentioned the need for longer-term and predictable safety nets, their understanding of what constituted a safety net within the framework of resilience was generally quite narrowly defined, focusing on mechanisms for early responses to seasonal and other covariate shocks (drought and conflict), rather than tools for addressing chronic vulnerabilities and easing consumption for vulnerable populations beyond times of stress. They have given little thought to the types of interventions that could be developed.
- **Limitations of the UN JRS**: Key informants commented on a number of implementation challenges to the JRS. Issues included: severe delays to programme activities; lack of funding; lack of

\textsuperscript{113} Objectives are to strengthen productive sectors; improve basic social services; establish productive safety nets to meet basic needs through predictable and sustainable transfers of food or cash for the destitute or seasonally at-risk populations.

\textsuperscript{114} SomReP targets 70,000 households in three livelihood sectors – pastoral, agro-pastoral, and peri-urban – in eight priority regions. It aims to build household and community resilience to drought and related risks in Somalia. Baseline analysis led to recommendations for safety net style programmes for the most vulnerable. DFID is funding a £21m BRICS programme that is targeting 30,000 households. The Danish Refugee Council’s Community Driven Recovery and Development programme is another example.

\textsuperscript{115} This was conclusion of research by Prof. Dan Maxwell of Tufts University and others; two key informants also mentioned this in interviews (2014).
coordination between agencies; lack of resources on the ground; and continuation of those projects that align with agency mandates and previous experience. Interviewees believed that if agencies were to achieve tangible benefits they would have to revisit implementation modalities, and consider new approaches rather than continue with existing programmes, and where possible establish a physical presence. The interviewees considered that this would be critical to the success of implementing a new concept and building the capacity of stakeholders and partners. They also reported that there was a disconnect within UNICEF between senior management (in Nairobi) and mid-level management, especially at the field level, which meant that activities sometimes did not reflect commitments or that commitments made to donors did not reflect the realities on the ground. Therefore, while interviewees considered UNICEF to be the best agency to lead the process of setting up resilience-building systems – compared to other UN agencies – communication and coordination within the JRS must improve.

• Lack of coordination of resilience activities: interviewees from the NGO resilience consortia said that engagement with the JRS has primarily been about avoiding duplication of effort in programme locations, rather than trying to establish complementarities at the district level. Establishing mechanisms for cross-programme referrals has reportedly been very difficult. There has been no discussion on joined-up approaches to safety net provision. The interviewees hoped that engagement would be further defined in a workshop for partners in Nairobi in 2014.

5.3.3 Potential funding mechanisms for social transfers
Historically, low levels of domestic revenue mean that administrations have had to limit spending to sustaining core government functions and maintaining peace and stability.

Social services in Somaliland (including allocations for the Ministries of Health, Education, Water, Justice, Youth, and MLSA) receive only 14.4% of the national budget, of which the MLSA’s allocation is a tiny percentage. A directive from the Ministry of Finance to ‘significantly increase budget allocations for social services from 2015’ was published this year. The Ministry of Finance was interested in talking to development partners about the potential increase to the MLSA’s budget allocation for use on social protection, provided there was a well-articulated plan with commitment of leveraging development finance for the purpose. However, the size of national budget means any increase will be limited in the short-to-medium term.

Somaliland: Somaliland Development Fund (SDF)
If Somaliland were to prioritise social protection in Pillar 5 of the National Development Strategy within two years’ time, financing could potentially be channelled through existing mechanisms. One option to explore would be the potential of the SDF, the first example of a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) that supports development priorities of Somaliland. An MDTF approach was used to establish funding for the PSNP in Ethiopia. The project funding cycle is reliant upon ad hoc financial support from donors: DFID and DANIDA contributed $70m in the first phase; Norway has committed to funding in 2015 and the Netherlands is considering providing support at a later stage. The government’s annual budget lists these project funds.

DFID and DANIDA have had several consultations with the government over the past six months to prioritise key projects for funding through the SDF. The challenge will be to ensure that the government prioritises safety nets for funding through the fund. Current priority sectors (see Box 2) do not relate to social development. This might change in a future consultation, if the National Development Committee (NDC) were to approve a social protection project. Advocacy would be needed to build government support for social protection or safety net funding through the SDF.

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116 The principal focus on public works and even in-kind assistance suggests a limited vision of what can constitute safety nets in this context and the definite pull of agency mandates.
117 In 2014, 63% of the budget was allocated to the security pillar in Somaliland, in contrast to 14.4% for all social services, (Ministry of Finance, 2013).
118 This year the fund is projected to make up 6% of the national budget.
The World Bank is also setting up a MDTF ($154m) for infrastructure projects. Though it is not clear how much of this will be earmarked for Somaliland, it could be possible to release SDF financing for safety net mechanisms in the future once this MDTF is up and running. DFID hopes that a second phase of the SDF will look at basic services in Sool and Sanaag. This is at a concept note stage and will be funded in 2015-16. The opportunity exists to use this mechanism to fund safety net programmes.

**Box 2 Current priority sectors under the SDF**

- **Roads:** the focus is mostly on maintenance of existing roads because construction of new roads is quite expensive (approx. $1m per kilometre) and corruption is always a risk.
- **Water:** investing in the improvement of Hargeisa and the Burco water company facilities. These seem like a safe bet because a lot of work has already gone into setting up basic systems for them through UN-Habitat; the two companies have been operating with reasonable levels of efficiency.
- **Livestock:** possible construction of two holding grounds for large livestock to fatten animals up and provide veterinary services before shipment to the Middle East.
- **Agriculture:** looking at a catchment water conservation project, including construction of mini-dams to generate youth employment. This is seen as a long-term strategy for agricultural production.
- **Environment:** looking at setting up regional hubs for the Ministry of Environment and provision of technical assistance to the ministry.

**Somalia-wide (all three zones)**

**Stability fund:** DFID is to set up a stability fund for the whole of Somalia that will focus on bottom-up approaches that act as peace dividend. It has not focused yet on basic services. Opportunities may exist to financially support implementation of the framework through the SDF.

**SomReP:** the consortium is bidding for a $40m resilience grant from the Africa Development Bank (AfDB) that covers all three Zones, which will have a large capacity-building component including at the community level and government administration levels. In the north links could be made with the capacity-building the government requires to administer social protection programmes, because safety nets are a priority activity within SomReP’s resilience programming.

**Private sector:** the future of aid will increasingly involve the private sector, which already funds or subsidises humanitarian initiatives\(^{119}\) and development projects to a significant degree. The private sector contributes millions of dollars to social welfare and humanitarian response annually as *zakat* – though this is not well organised or consolidated in a way that has the desired impact at the community level. Several interviewees considered that it was important to engage the private sector in the delivery of services and financing of safety net products. They believed it could be a useful way of leveraging finance if the private sector was given a tangible programme to support. A future financing source that would be interesting to consider would be to link social protection schemes to a more formalised system for consolidating and directing *zakat* contributions, under a *zakat* commission, if the government were to establish one.\(^{120}\)

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\(^{119}\) When Typhoon Haiyan affected communities in Puntland in 2013, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was the first to respond to the crisis. It raised millions of dollars through its religious leaders’ networks domestically and among the diaspora. These funds were used to restore people’s livelihoods through restocking of goats and camels, as well as small grants to re-establish businesses.

\(^{120}\) The authorities in Somaliland and Puntland list the establishment of *zakat* commissions in their national development programmes, but little if any progress has been made.
• Political entry points exist to establish social protection as a government-owned service, though extensive and long-term engagement would be needed to build technical and financial capacity. Government engagement will be required from the outset.

• In the short-to-medium term implementing the framework will need support, to varying degrees. NGOs are appropriate partners, providing they have communities’ trust, and rigorous monitoring and accountability mechanisms are built in.

• Capacity issues and access constraints mean the framework should focus on a small number of clear interventions.

• A private sector service provider to handle payments should be selected by tender process.

• The UN’s optimum role is one of overall coordination, capacity building, advocacy and fundraising rather than direct implementation.

• Entry points to establish the necessary long-term technical and financial support, though attempts to build on existing programmes must take into account limitations.
6. DEVELOPING A SOCIAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK FOR SOMALILAND: DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Experience from national social protection programmes in the region and globally has shown the important contribution that social protection can make to reducing poverty, protecting against risk, cutting across all areas of human wellbeing. Social protection can also generate positive impacts on household productivity, social cohesion and national economic growth. However, these impacts and benefits depend on effective design. Therefore, it is essential that social protection schemes are well designed and, ultimately, well funded.

This section outlines some of the key design issues underpinning social protection systems, which will inform Somaliland’s social protection framework.

6.1 Designing social transfer programmes

As mentioned in Section 1, given the context in Somalia, the framework should focus on social transfers as the core of an emerging social protection system, with the aim of progressively moving towards a more comprehensive system over time.

6.1. Modality of social transfers

International experience indicates that, as social protection moves away from small-scale, short-term, often donor-driven interventions towards more comprehensive government-owned and lifecycle-based national programmes, cash inevitably becomes the transfer of choice. There is significant evidence indicating that cash transfers enable those living in and vulnerable to extreme poverty to build resilience to shocks and break the inter-generational transmission of poverty, by allowing better management of risks and generating a wide range of positive economic and social impacts. International evidence is summarised in Box 3.

Box 3 The impact of social protection through long-term cash transfers

| Equity: | cash transfers have proven to reduce inequality and the depth of poverty. Cash transfers can keep girls in school longer and delay early marriage and childbirth. Cash transfers directed at women can increase their control over family resources and help them gain more decision-making power within the household. Nationally owned and entitlement-based social protection programmes that aim to address risk throughout the lifecycle can improve the rights of vulnerable and marginalised groups, including children and the elderly. For example, a Development Pathways study indicated that introducing a pension in Karamoja in Uganda may have helped in reducing female genital mutilation. |
| Food and nutrition security: | poor households tend to allocate a significant proportion of cash transfer expenditure to food, improving food security and nutritional outcomes. In the longer term, additional food consumption and increased use of health services can reduce the prevalence of stunting and wasting, which has long-lasting effects on the cognitive development of new generations. |
| Human capital development: | cash transfers reduce barriers to accessing essential social services for poor households. Evaluations of social cash transfer programmes in Zambia and Malawi have found that households invest transfers on health and education, leading to a reduced incidence of reported illnesses, increased school enrolment and falls in school absenteeism. In South Africa, cash transfers to children on the Child Support Grant have increased school attainment. |

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121 See, for example DFID, 2011a and Kidd, 2014.
124 DFID, 2011a.
125 Aguëro et al., 2007; DFID, 2010; Manley et al., 2011.
Risk management and fostering resilience: regular and predictable cash transfers enable the poor to protect assets against shocks and prevent negative coping strategies, thus protecting longer-term income potential. UNICEF research in South Africa found the percentage increase in the poverty headcount that occurred because of the international financial crisis would have doubled without the Child Support Grant. In situations of cyclical emergencies and protracted crises, efforts to move towards institutionalised, predictable cash transfers in Kenya and Ethiopia are proving to constitute a timelier, more flexible and cost-effective alternative to emergency aid. The PSNP in Ethiopia supports 7.8 million people at risk of food insecurity and has helped break the need for emergency food programmes (although, as noted below, concerns remain about its impact on children and household productivity). A new risk-financing mechanism is allowing the programme to expand in times of shock, providing flexible assistance appropriate to the scale and duration of the crisis. By helping to protect people from having to sell their assets, it allows them to recover much more rapidly and build resilience to shocks. In northern Kenya, DFID is supporting the government to provide a more integrated package of support to drought-affected regions through alignment of social protection services with support for other social services, market strengthening and embedding DRR.

Livelihoods promotion: well-designed cash transfers in developing countries do not create disincentives to work and save. Cash transfers assure a consistent level of consumption in the poorest households, which allows for greater investment in livelihoods and future production or income. Beneficiaries increase their engagement in the labour market by reducing loss of work because of ill health and covering opportunity costs of job seeking. In India, farmers with a guaranteed level of income under the Employment Guarantee Scheme invest in higher yield varieties. Beneficiaries of Social Cash Transfer programmes invested in productive inputs and hired more farm labour in Malawi and increased cultivation of cash crops in Zambia. In South Africa, in households that received the pension and disability grant labour rates were 11-12% higher than among comparable non-participants, and employment rates were 8-15% higher.

Building the social contract and state legitimacy: social protection has the potential to strengthen the legitimacy of fragile states by demonstrating that the government is willing to redistribute wealth to all citizens. Evidence from countries emerging from conflict, such as Nepal, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, shows that social transfers can contribute to fostering lasting peace and security and rebuild the social contract between the state and socially and economically marginalised citizens. Pensions, disability and child welfare grants in South Africa have been key elements in citizenship and state building since the end of Apartheid.

There is international acceptance that where markets are the primary source of food and are functioning, the default transfer for national social protection systems – in particular those addressing lifecycle risks – should be cash. Other benefits of cash over food (or other hybrid forms of transfer, such as vouchers or coupons) include:

- **They are usually cheaper to administer and logistically easier to manage than food aid:** the cost of delivering cash is often less than 50% of the cost of delivering the equivalent value in food. A DFID-sponsored study of the comparative delivery costs of cash, food in public works programmes in Malawi and Zambia found that delivering $1 cost between $0.09 and $0.65 when the transfer was in cash while the cost of delivering $1 in the form of food cost between $0.79 and $1.91. Setting up and running a voucher scheme is more administratively demanding than cash and presents less potential for national expansion.

- **They reduce the risk of dependency and disincentives:** in the context of chronic food insecurity, in-kind food aid should be restricted to situations where markets are not functioning properly, and

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127 Berhane, et al., 2011.
128 Vincent and Cull, 2009; Figazzolo and Weedon, 2011.
129 Holmes, 2009.
130 Kidd et al., 2014.
131 White, 2005.
should be linked to local production, where quantity, quality and supply chains allow for this. There are concerns that massive food aid shipments disrupt local markets and undermine the resilience of local food systems, affecting producers and future resilience. In contrast, cash transfers and vouchers can stimulate local production, strengthen local food systems and empower beneficiaries in ways that food aid cannot.

- **They allow individual choice:** cash transfers leave the choice of how to use the transfer to the beneficiaries. Not only is this important for their self-respect, but the reality is that families know their real needs, and cash provides the only way to guarantee them the flexibility to meet them. Because of this, people often sell their food, vouchers or input transfers cheaply just to get cash, which is an inefficient means of providing a cash transfer. Evidence exists of this happening in Somaliland. Internationally, evaluations of social protection programmes show little empirical evidence of the misuse of cash transfers.¹³²

- **They stimulate markets by increasing purchasing power:** in general, cash transfers are more effective at stimulating consumption and generating economic growth, whereas food transfers may depress local markets. Recent studies by FAO have indicated significant multiplier effects from cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa.¹³³

This does not mean that cash transfers will always work effectively and poorly designed programmes can present challenges. For example, the 2008/09 world food crisis showed that some cash transfer schemes had been poorly designed to respond to short-term inflation. In Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and UNRWA’s Special Hardship Assistance Programme in Palestine, food transfers were better able to shield beneficiaries from inflation because rising market prices eroded the value of cash transfers (although the value of the food transfers in real terms was artificially maintained); and in the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya the real value of cash transfers fell during this period.¹³¹ The fall in the value of the PSNP cash transfer affected beneficiaries’ preferences between 2006 and 2008 – whereas they preferred cash before the food price crisis they preferred food during the crisis, which was a higher-value transfer. It is therefore essential to establish a clear objective of a social protection programme to accurately determine benefit levels, and to consider how the programme will respond in the event that inflation critically reduces the effective value of the transfer. It is critical that there is a clear policy on indexing the value of transfers, so that they do not lose purchasing power.

**6.1.2 Duration of social transfers**

Cash and food transfers can be provided on a temporary (often seasonal) basis or as regular and predictable, long-term programmes. It is internationally recognised that social protection should not be provided for a limited period then suddenly withdrawn; it should also not be offered as a single one-off event. Social protection is designed to address risk and vulnerability – not just poverty – and families continually face risks. People slip in and out of poverty constantly as they have children, grow old, face crises and so on. A key objective of social protection is to offer people support when they need it.

Large one-off transfers, and short-term cash transfer programmes may be relevant interventions in certain contexts within Somaliland but they should not be considered core social protection, which should be provided over long periods as regular and predictable transfers. However, establishing linkages between core social protection and one-off transfers is important. For example, the Bangladesh Char’s Livelihood Programme provides a monthly cash transfer alongside a single lump sum transfer that can be used to purchase a productive asset (usually livestock).

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¹³² DFID, 2011a; Kidd et al., 2014.

¹³³ FAO, 2014.

¹³⁴ OPM and IDS, 2012; Kidd et al, 2014. It should be emphasized that the cash transfers in these three contexts of Ethiopia, Palestine and Kenya are in effect acting as a more efficient alternative to ad hoc humanitarian programmes. They are not core lifecycle social protection schemes.
6.1.3 Establishing objectives for social transfer programmes

The core objective of social transfers is to increase the incomes of individuals and families, and thereby directly reduce income poverty, and in this they have been remarkably successful. Figure 5 illustrates how social protection in the form of social transfers can have a range of additional impacts including: tackling under-nutrition; increasing school attendance; helping families access health services; promoting income generation and access to the labour market; reducing social exclusion and restoring dignity; stimulating demand in support of economic growth; and strengthening the social contract and building the nation-state. A wealth of international evidence highlights the significance of regular and predictable income support in providing breathing space to families and households: after people have taken care of their immediate needs they begin to prioritise longer-term investments and make higher-risk, higher-return economic decisions that have the potential to transform their lives. The FAO Cash for Work programme in Somalia, as well as the Save the Children-ADESCO social safety net pilot, shows evidence that regular and predictable income support improves well-being.

Figure 5 Social protection: from consumption to investment

To establish a theory of change for a social protection framework in Somaliland it is important to consider the potential benefits that social transfers can confer on beneficiaries, to enable them to enhance capacity and overcome the risks and challenges raised in Section 3. It is equally important to consider their limitations.

Table 10 outlines how regular and predictable income transfers can help in addressing the risks and vulnerabilities identified earlier in the paper. Based on international evidence and experience of cash transfer programmes in a particular country a star rating is awarded, with *** being strong evidence for potential, ** being some evidence for potential and * being limited evidence for potential. These benefits are presented within Devereux and Wheeler’s protective, preventative, promotive, transformative (PPPT) framework for social protection, and arguments are provided on how well-designed social transfers can contribute to achieving each of these four objectives.

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• **Protective capacity:** to protect the consumption and attainment of other basic needs of those who cannot meet them through other means;
• **Preventative capacity:** to better mitigate risks and prevent a fall in living standards;
• **Promotive capacity:** to support greater productivity; and
• **Transformative capacity:** to transform and reduce structural inequalities in society, which contribute to vulnerability.

Table 10 indicates how each benefit contributes to fostering greater resilience for beneficiary households as well as for communities. It is informed by the variety of recent research identifying critical factors contributing to resilience.⁹³⁷

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⁹³⁷ Mercy Corps, 2013; SomReP, 2014; UN, 2014
### Table 10 Impacts of long-term and predictable income transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Benefit of transfer</th>
<th>Long-term cash</th>
<th>Link to resilience building</th>
<th>Limitations in the context of Somaliland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection</strong></td>
<td>• Beneficiary meets basic consumption needs (food)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>• Healthy well-nourished population is the basis of resilient communities</td>
<td>• Contingent on supply-side barriers for commodities, through markets functioning well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Beneficiary meets basic consumption needs (clean water)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bear in mind wider barriers to good nutrition (care practices; hygiene)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Beneficiary meets basic consumption needs (health/education)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Supply-side barriers to water access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevention</strong></td>
<td>• Provide economic means to deal with idiosyncratic shocks across the lifecycle, such as childbirth, illness, incapacity of a breadwinner, ill-health, old age, unemployment</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>• Prevents erosion of assets or loss of livelihoods and resort to other negative coping strategies that increase vulnerability to future shocks</td>
<td>• Supply-side barriers to services; also other demand-side barriers (trust).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide economic means to deal with the impacts of covariate shocks, such as water scarcity, poor weather, livestock disease and conflict</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Needs to be offered consistently across particular stages of the lifecycle to have a true impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Additional seasonal/short-term transfers may still be needed, depending on scale and severity of the shock (this will need to kick in rapidly, which will require prior availability and quick release of funding – something that has not yet happened)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bear in mind wider barriers to ensuring good nutrition (care practices; hygiene), and how nutrition pathways differ according to livelihood groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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138 See DFID (2011a) for a more detailed discussion on the quality of evidence on the impacts of social protection.
- Public works outputs enable communities to prevent future crises
- Households can repay debts
- Households have collateral to access credit (food/loans)
- Livelihood recovery/restoration, including relocation or movement out of IDP camps
- Achieve development potential of children by investing in their health and education; more time to give them care and attention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Contribute to future household livelihood or income by making productive investments and being able to access the labour market</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Livelihood recovery/restoration, including relocation or movement out of IDP camps</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Achieve development potential of children by investing in their health and education; more time to give them care and attention</td>
<td>***</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Mitigates impact of future climatic shocks on livelihoods is mitigated</td>
<td>• Need to acknowledge the limitations of outputs provided, with low-skilled labour and lack of equipment, for longer-term community resilience</td>
<td>• Cultural barriers to accessing credit remain for particular groups (e.g. marginalised groups, women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improves access to critical coping strategies.</td>
<td>• Need to budget for continuing maintenance of assets so that they do not deteriorate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improved access to capital assets</td>
<td>• Chronic lack of alternative livelihood opportunities in rural areas because of structural barriers; some barriers to entry into alternative livelihoods in urban areas because of lack of skills/cultural barriers</td>
<td>• Feasibility of social transfers to contribute to this will depend on livelihoods in question and cost of restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• If livelihoods depend on the same climatic factors, they continue to be vulnerable to shocks</td>
<td>• Lump sum transfer may be more appropriate than social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Transfers will not affect wider constraints to livelihoods (security context/inputs/rangeland) and are likely to require simultaneous investment elsewhere to support climate-resilient livelihoods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Supply-side barriers to services; also some other demand-side barriers (trust)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Households have collateral to access credit (food/loans)
- Cultural barriers to accessing credit remain for particular groups (e.g. marginalised groups, women)
| Transforma
tion | Stimulate markets and provide multiplier effects to the rest of the community | *** | Markets support the movement of goods and people | ** While strong and well-functioning markets exist conflict and poor weather can disrupt them |
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restoring dignity and hope for the future</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Positive psychological impact critical to deal with shocks and break the cycle of poverty</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s socio-economic empowerment</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Release women’s potential as ‘agents of resilience’</td>
<td>Entrenched cultural norms mean that provision of a cash transfer alone is unlikely to address the social marginalisation of women; a social transfer risks negatively affecting women (and children) if it further increases their burden of labour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential to contribute to social cohesion, peace dividend and building social contract between state and citizen</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Peace building is central tenet of resilience strengthening because it reduces shock at source</td>
<td>Mistrust of government means that approach will take time to build a social contract Must take care not to create tensions within or between communities, which is possible through inappropriate targeting methodologies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who are normally dependent on others become independent, can live with dignity and can contribute to society, including supporting others</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Reduces burden on wider community, builds credit system and reinforces informal social assistance system, which are critical coping strategies</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 10 highlights, regular predictable cash transfers can address a number of vulnerabilities related to shocks, food insecurity and chronic poverty, contribute to the development of livelihoods, stimulate markets, and enhance access to basic services. However, the potential to contribute to these different objectives varies depending on programme design including such things as the duration, frequency and value of the transfer. Different programme designs are better suited to meeting different objectives, and it will not be possible to meet all the above goals with one scheme.

Table 10 also highlights factors in the context of Somaliland that could limit the potential impact of social transfers, at least in the short-to-medium term. Poverty is multidimensional, and it has structural and social drivers. Income support cannot compensate for poor or absent services, social exclusion or an unresponsive state. For example:

- Transfers cannot address supply-side issues in health, education and other key social services, though they can facilitate access to such services, in the form of household transfers. They can also complement fee waivers, in coordination with other sector policies.
- Transfers alone will not address the social marginalisation of particular groups, including marginalised clans and women, although inclusive social protection approaches would enhance the incorporation into schemes of marginalised or particularly vulnerable groups. Other social protection instruments – such as childcare services – or social transfers provided as part of a broader strategy to address specific exclusion issues, would be required.
- To achieve their productive potential young people require access to inputs, skills training, credit and access to markets.
- Transfers will not prevent the loss of livelihoods in the event of severe conflict, forced displacement, loss of harvests or the deterioration of livestock in the event of severe water scarcity. However, during such events they can support consumption and minimise negative coping mechanisms such as selling livestock or assets, thereby encouraging a more rapid recovery. Nonetheless, additional interventions will also be required. Pastoralist households in such contexts must begin livestock off-take, while initiatives to tackle the vulnerability of livelihoods to climate must be central to any approach to resilience. In these cases, the provision of a larger lump sum transfer may be more effective to meet a livelihood recovery objective – such as restocking camels – than regular smaller transfers, given the capital investment required. But, such one-off grants for restocking are perhaps more appropriately considered as livelihoods interventions: they would not be part of the social protection framework, but would be complementary to it.

Social protection programmes add most value when they are delivered as part of a holistic set of policies, including programmes contributing to broader access to services, credit and savings, and employment creation.\footnote{139}

Figure 6 highlights the importance of a social protection framework being incorporated within a wider set of social policies, which should be embedded within a broader resilience framework.

\textbf{Figure 6 Social protection as part of a package of broader public service delivery}\footnote{140}

\footnotetext{139}{It is said that the PSNP coupled with other complimentary basic services prevented the situation in Ethiopia from being as severe as it was in Somalia. See Berhane et al. 2011.}

\footnotetext{140}{Source: Developed by Development Pathways.}
DEFINING SOCIAL PROTECTION: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK

- UNICEF and its partners should focus on simplicity, with a clearly defined framework of social protection, prioritising social transfers.
- Where markets are functioning well, income transfers are generally understood to be preferable to food transfers. This is particularly true in the context of Somaliland.
- The framework should be based on long-term predictable income transfers, which are recognised as the foundation of social protection systems; they are also the most feasible interventions for Somaliland at this time.
- It will be important to build linkages with wider complementary services to leverage greater benefits from social protection.

6.2 Reaching the poor and vulnerable: targeting approaches

Across developing countries, the topic of targeting in social transfer programmes generates significant debate. Targeting refers to the methods and approaches used to establish criteria for eligibility for social transfer schemes and to identify those people who qualify.

Social protection in its broadest sense – including, for example, contributory social insurance – encompasses the non-poor, responding to lifecycle risks that they too experience with the aim of protecting them from falling into poverty. However, many social transfer schemes prioritise people who are living in poverty or are particularly vulnerable. Targeting approaches can derive from political and ethical notions of fairness, from economic considerations of cost-effectiveness, or from a combination of the two. In the first case, societies judge existing levels of poverty, vulnerability or inequality as unacceptable, while in the second case societies aim to maximise welfare under existing putative budget constraints.

It useful to make a distinction between targeting approaches, as a feature of programme and policy design, which establish a rationale and criteria of eligibility for those who should receive a particular benefit; and targeting mechanisms, which accompany programme implementation in terms of how to identify and reach the targeted beneficiaries. From this perspective, targeting approaches are concerned with who is to be reached and why – including eligibility criteria – and can include a range of options such as poverty assessment, social categorisation, and vulnerability criteria. Targeting implementation is concerned with questions of how beneficiaries are identified and reached through the registration process.

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141 Slater and Farrington, 2009.
A basic distinction exists between inclusive lifecycle and poverty-focused targeting approaches. The rationale of an inclusive lifecycle approaches is that programmes should be accessible to everyone facing a particular risk throughout their lifecycle, such as childhood, widowhood, disability and old age; the rationale of poverty-focused targeting approaches is to limit the costs of programmes by concentrating scarce resources on those living in poverty. While many poverty targeted programmes focus resources on households and act as traditional Poor Relief schemes – as was common in 19th Century Europe – many countries target lifecycle programmes at those living in poverty. Indeed, it is common for countries to combine both universal and poverty-targeted approaches within their broader national social protection systems, providing some schemes as lifecycle entitlements while others are targeted to those on lower incomes.

The lifecycle and poverty targeted approaches to social protection are essentially based on a key difference in thinking about how to tackle poverty. A poverty-targeted approach seeks to tackle the symptom, which is poverty itself; in other words, all those who are suffering from the symptom should receive similar treatment. In contrast, a lifecycle approach tries to tackle key causes of poverty, recognising that people face a range of risks and challenges that vary across the lifecycle, and that these challenges contribute to making them more vulnerable to falling into poverty. It attempts to capture more diffuse notions of vulnerability or social exclusion.\footnote{142}

Targeting mechanisms are used to put these approaches into practice.\footnote{143} Poverty targeting relies on a range of approaches to identify those living in poverty, such as means testing (based on an assessment of income or wealth), proxy means testing (based on a weighted combination of characteristics believed to be highly correlated with wellbeing or deprivation) or selection by communities. Universal lifecycle approaches often use simple demographic characteristics of individuals to identify beneficiaries, such as age, disability and widowhood. These indicators can be applied on their own or in combination, whereby several criteria must be met simultaneously to secure eligibility.\footnote{144} Other targeting mechanisms also exist. Self-targeting is based on voluntary participation, and is used in some cash-for-work programmes. Geographical targeting can be used to focus or ration the targeting of any of the above mechanisms – for example, to focus on households in arid zones; or regions of high food insecurity.

To be effective, targeting approaches and mechanisms need to: capture those who are eligible and avoid significant exclusion errors;\footnote{145} be easy to put into practice; be well understood and accepted by citizens; and be capable of enrolling individuals or families as soon as they become eligible. Table 11 summarises some of the advantages and disadvantages of different targeting methods.

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\footnote{142}{Slater and Farrington, 2009.}
\footnote{143}{Kidd et al., 2014.}
\footnote{144}{Bukuluki and Watson, 2014.}
\footnote{145}{Exclusion errors occur are when a targeting approach erroneously excludes households or individuals who are eligible for assistance. Inclusion errors, on the other hand, occur when a programme erroneously includes those who do not fit the eligibility criteria.}
## Table 11 Comparative advantages and disadvantages of different targeting types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means-tested (income)</td>
<td>• Accurate when information on incomes can be found</td>
<td>• Costly to implement; high data requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy means tested (scorecard based on range of other asset indicators, with cut-off for eligibility)</td>
<td>• Provides an “objective” means of estimating incomes, if implemented well</td>
<td>• Excludes informal sector/subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can involve communities in administering scorecards or validating results</td>
<td>• When means test is unverified – as in Brazil and South Africa – it is easier to game the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Stigma may be attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Costly to implement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Generates significant inclusion and exclusion errors and relatively arbitrary results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Especially poor at including social vulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Not well understood by communities – creates social tensions and conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Requires qualified, trained and independent enumerators to generate accurate results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Expensive to implement and, as a result, is rarely updated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• It cannot be used to identify those falling into poverty, so fails as a safety net.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorical targeting (Age or other characteristic)</td>
<td>• Less capacity required than with means-testing</td>
<td>• A single programme addresses one category of the population and is most effective when multiple programmes are in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Transparent, easily understood, accepted by communities</td>
<td>• Possible stigma if selection of category of population is problematic (such as individuals affected by HIV/AIDS or low castes in India).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regarded as entitlements and unlikely to generate stigma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cheaper to administer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Politically acceptable and popular</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based targeting</td>
<td>• Involves community and can generate local ownership if done well and includes entire community</td>
<td>• Strong risk of bias resulting from uneven local power relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical targeting</td>
<td>• Concentrates resources on spatially focused needs, by providing transfers universally within specific localities</td>
<td>• If undertaken only by community elites, may not be popular in community</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relatively cheap</td>
<td>• Difficult to apply in urban settings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Can increase tensions between eligible and non-eligible groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Time-consuming and expensive to do well and requires considerable oversight and facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• May require dedicated survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Can lead to errors of inclusion and exclusion if politically rather than needs driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• May not be politically supported as prioritises certain regions over others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-selection</td>
<td>• Limited technical capacity required</td>
<td>• Can create high exclusion and inclusion errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Requires low benefit levels, which may not provide meaningful protection</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• In public works, favours families with excess labour capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box 4 summarises a number of principles for approaches to targeting based on the experience of social transfers across Africa. It indicates that no perfect targeting mechanism exists and trade-offs have to be made, if governments are unwilling or unable to invest sufficient resources to reach all those who are vulnerable. Key objectives of targeting should be to minimise errors, be simple and cost effective to administer, and gaining acceptance by communities and citizens more broadly. The targeting approach and mechanism selected should take into account not only policy and programme aims, but also the country
characteristics (such as its poverty profile; degree of formalisation of the labour force; degree of social solidarity; and government and administrative capacity). The choice of social protection instrument and targeting approach should also take a long-term perspective: while it is not possible to reach all those who are in need in the short-term, governments should plan to build a more comprehensive system over time, gradually incorporating priority categories of the population.

Box 4 Lessons learned from social transfer targeting: experiences from across Africa

- There is no single best approach to targeting. Every mechanism has its strengths and weaknesses and trade-offs have to be made (e.g. targeting costs versus accuracy; and complex but more accurate individual assessments versus simpler but less accurate proxy indicators).
- It is important to minimise both inclusion errors (leakages) and exclusion errors (under-coverage). The latter is likely to be more important in efforts to build social consensus and political support.
- Complex concepts such as vulnerability and multiple eligibility criteria create challenges. While they may aim to sharpen targeting accuracy, they also create opportunities for diverse interpretation and manipulation.
- Poverty-targeted approaches in contexts where the vast majority of the population are poor are fraught with difficulty. People do not understand why some are selected and some are not, when there is very little separating their circumstances. This risks generating social tension.
- Simple, single criteria that are not easy to falsify and facilitate transparency, community understanding and acceptance. They may also help minimise exclusion errors and keep administrative costs low (for identification and verification). However, broad categorical targeting (e.g. all citizens over 65) may overlook other populations who also need social assistance – although many will benefit indirectly – so complementary programmes that target other vulnerable groups are also needed, as part of a comprehensive lifecycle approach.
- Politicisation distorts the allocation of social assistance if ‘patronage bias’ rather than indicators of need determines eligibility. Local and community leaders need to support programme implementation, but mechanisms are necessary to curb their influence and ensure that programme objectives are not compromised.
- Grievance procedures should be implemented as standard for all social transfer programmes, to allow those who feel unfairly excluded an opportunity to complain formally. These can help address concerns about targeting errors and politicisation.

Overall, in the case of Somaliland, a lifecycle approach is more appropriate than a poverty-targeted approach for a number of reasons. These are set out below.

6.2.1 Challenges of accurately poverty targeting in low-income countries

While concentrating scarce resources on those ‘most in need’ is appealing for obvious reasons, the reality is that in contexts where the vast majority of the population works in the informal sector and where the majority of the population are poor or vulnerable to falling into poverty, poverty targeting is fraught with difficulty, being both costly and demanding to implement. While significant effort has been invested internationally in developing the proxy means test (PMT) methodology as the best option for identifying families with low incomes (described in Annex E), it is inherently problematic due to its in-built inaccuracies and arbitrariness of selection.

Figure 7 shows that the PMT is very likely to generate high exclusion errors particularly at low coverage. Exclusion errors for programmes using the PMT with 10% coverage are around 60%, although this drops to around 40% when coverage is 30%. At very low coverage, therefore, errors increase. Unless the programme aims for high coverage comparable to the proportion of the poor in the population (and most do not – many aim for 10-20% of the population) this essentially creates arbitrary cut-offs between households with nothing separating their circumstances.

146 Samson et al., 2010
147 Source: Ellis et al., 2009.
148 See Kidd and Wylde (2011a) for a detailed explanation of the proxy means test targeting methodology.
The errors associated with the PMT, once implemented, tend to be higher than those predicted by using the household survey. For example, Mexico’s *Oportunidades* programme has an exclusion error of 70% with coverage of 20%. Even, Georgia’s Targeted Social Assistance Programme – which was described by the World Bank (2009) as ‘among the best-performing similar programmes in the world’ – excludes around 60% of eligible beneficiaries, against coverage of 7%. Some developing countries use alternative methodologies to select people living in poverty, but all have similarly high errors. For example, Brazil’s *Bolsa Família* programme uses an unverified means test and has an exclusion error of 59%.

Exclusion errors mean that often the majority of the poorest people in low-income countries do not benefit when poverty targeting is employed. When coverage is restricted to a relatively small proportion of those living in poverty, as it usually is on such schemes (10-20% of the population is the usual cut-off), poverty targeting tends to function like a rationing mechanism, choosing a small proportion of people from among a much larger group that qualify for assistance.

In contrast, lifecycle programmes potentially guarantee the inclusion of all those who are living in or vulnerable to poverty and who are within the category. Furthermore, the categories used tend to be associated with poverty, such as children, the elderly and people with disabilities. However, as noted above, an inclusive lifecycle system requires multiple programmes addressing priority categories and, as a result, is significantly more expensive than a poverty targeted approach. This is not necessarily a disadvantage as higher investment delivers greater impacts and could provide a welcome stimulus to economic growth by generating more consumption, thereby building a larger market for entrepreneurs. Errors of inclusion or exclusion may occur on universal lifecycle programmes, but international experience indicates that these are usually very small (see Box 5).

**Box 5 Potential errors in universal schemes**

> It is possible for errors of inclusion and exclusion to occur in universal schemes. For example, in a universal programme for the elderly, some people who are below the age of eligibility may access the scheme. And, during registration, a small proportion of the population may still find it difficult

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to access the programme if, for example, they do not have the required identity. Nonetheless, most universal programmes have almost insignificant exclusion errors. Those that do not enter into universal programmes tend often to be the most affluent who self-exclude themselves because the benefits are too low.

In developing countries the exclusion of eligible older people is usually minimal and is much easier to address in a simple universal programme than in a poverty-targeted pension. For example, an appeals process could be established to deal with exclusion errors. Many low-income countries have been successful in excluding younger people, even when identity card coverage is low, and have used mechanisms such as age calendars and community verification. Identifying children for a universal programme targeted at those of young age is also less problematic than poverty targeting, but does require initially a mechanism for identifying age, if birth certificates are not widely available. However, once the programme starts, all new entrants will be new born children and their entry into the programme could be linked to providing them with birth certificates.

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150 Veras et al., 2007.
152 Veras et al., 2007.
153 Slater and Farrington, 2009; Stewart and Handa, 2008; Ellis, 2011; Miller et al., 2009.
155 McPherson, 2011.
6.2.2 Poor families are best served by universal programmes

International evidence suggests that if a policy priority is to reach those living in poverty, it is best not to target them directly. Rather, the poor will benefit much more from popular, universal programmes compared to tightly poverty-targeted schemes.

The first reason for the poor benefiting more from universal programmes is that higher coverage is associated with better coverage of the poor. Figure 8 shows the relationship between coverage and effectiveness – in terms of the percentage of the poorest quintile who are excluded – for a range of programmes that follow poverty-targeted and more universal lifecycle approaches. On the right-hand side of the scale, 0 indicates no coverage of the poorest 20% of the selected category; and on the left-hand side 100 indicates universal coverage of the poorest 20% of the group. The numbers in the blue flags indicate the proportion of the poorest 20% of that group that is excluded from the scheme.

**Figure 8 Relationship between coverage and effectiveness of a sample of social security schemes**

The diagram shows that the higher the coverage of the programme, the lower the exclusion of people living in poverty from a scheme (for the selected category of the population). For example, the universal Old Age Pension in Mauritius covers 100% of the intended beneficiaries – i.e. all those over 60 years – and therefore all older people with the lowest incomes. In contrast, Brazil’s *Bolsa Família* programme covers just over 20% of the population, but excludes nearly two-thirds (59%) of those living in extreme poverty.

However, it is also crucial to take into account political economy factors in the design of social protection programmes, as discussed in Box 6. International experience suggests that poverty-targeted schemes do not tend to achieve the necessary coverage to be effective at providing an income floor for the poorest, as opposed to schemes that adopt a lifecycle approach.

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156 Source: Kidd, 2013.
Box 6 Political economy of targeting in social protection programmes

The design of targeting in social protection schemes has a significant impact on budgets and transfers. Countries with a greater commitment to more inclusive and universal programmes tend to invest more in social protection, since universal programmes reach all economic groups and build alliances between the poor and those in the middle of the wealth spectrum, as well as the more affluent. As Sen (1995) pointed out, the poor are politically weak and can find it difficult to defend their own interests. Programmes building alliances between the poor and those who are better-off are more likely to receive higher levels of investment and, indeed, provide higher values of transfers to the poor than poverty targeted programmes.\(^{157}\) Fiszbein and Schady (2009) of the World Bank agree, noting the standard economic theory argument is that: ‘Transfer schemes narrowly targeted at the poor would tend to have limited support because a small share of the population benefit, whereas the costs are dispersed across all tax-payers.’

The World Bank (1990), in the World Development Report, highlighted the danger that poverty targeting could undermine political support for schemes, leading to inferior outcomes for the poor:

*In practice, success of public interventions involves more than cost-effectiveness. The demands made by different sections of the population, and their ability to exert pressure on the authorities, are often more influential than government’s economic calculations. Fine targeting based on a single-minded concern for cost-effectiveness can reduce public interest in the vigorous implementation of government programs to help the poor. In the late 1970s Sri Lanka replaced a universal food subsidy with a less costly, targeted food stamp program. In time, the benefits delivered by the new program declined. The middle classes no longer gained from the scheme, and although the new program was more cost-effective, it lost crucial political support. A food subsidy directed at the poor in Colombia was so tightly targeted that it lacked an effective political constituency, and was dropped at a change of administration. The analysis of public policy has to be alive to considerations of political economy.*

Poverty-targeted poor relief schemes in developing countries – such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil, Oportunidades in Mexico and the Benazir Income Support Programme in Pakistan – tend to have a maximum cost of around 0.4% of GDP; once they have reached a certain size, spending does not appear to increase and may even fall. Such schemes usually stay small and this makes them relatively ineffective because investment of 0.4% of GDP is well below the minimum required to provide a basic social protection floor for poor citizens.\(^{158}\) The low coverage of these programmes results in high levels of exclusion of the poorest members of society.

A lifecycle approach to social protection on the other hand requires – but also results in – much greater state investment. By investing in schemes that have higher coverage – often universal within a category of the population – and are directed at sections of the population regarded as ‘deserving’ because of their vulnerabilities, political support for social protection is much higher. Those in the middle deciles, who are very often also highly vulnerable, know that they will also benefit,\(^{159}\) and popular support generates increased national budget support. Thus, over time coverage of such schemes tends grow and ultimately leads to the creation of a social protection floor (see Section 6.2.7) that is highly effective at tackling poverty and inequality.

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\(^{158}\) While many studies have shown the impacts of poor relief programmes on beneficiary families, in reality the impacts are small compared to those from larger, more universal schemes (and, of course, most intended beneficiaries miss out). Evidence of this can be seen in Brazil where the *Bolsa Família* poor relief scheme – which is frequently claimed to have had significant impacts – in reality has very small impacts compared to the much larger system of minimum wage pensions (see Kidd and Huda, 2013).

\(^{159}\) The unconditional Child Support Grant in South Africa has achieved a budget of 0.9% of GDP. It has a high-income eligibility threshold, which allows those in the middle deciles to enter the scheme, thereby building an alliance between those living in poverty and those in the middle, the main voting bloc of the co-ruling African National Congress Party.
Tax-financed investment in social protection in countries that have adopted lifecycle approaches is much higher, reaching around 3% to 6% of GDP in middle-income countries such as Brazil, Georgia, Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa and Uzbekistan. Even Nepal, one of the poorest countries in the world, invests almost 1% of GDP in lifecycle schemes for the elderly, children, single women and people with disabilities (see Box 7). The significant investments by African countries in universal, categorical programmes is because they are regarded as entitlements and benefit the majority, thereby gaining more political traction and ultimately attracting much more of the national budget than narrow poverty-targeted programmes. The universal pensions of southern African countries generate government investment of between 0.4% and 1.3% of GDP, while South Africa’s near universal Child Support Grant – which reaches 70% of children – has annual expenditures of almost 1% of GDP.

Box 7 Nepal: an example of a low-income country investing in a life cycle approach

In 1997 the government established a universal Senior Citizens’ Allowance for all people over 75 years and a universal Single Women’s Allowance for over 60s, which complemented an existing pension for government employees. In addition, it set up two Disability Allowances, for severe disabilities and less severe disabilities. In 2009, after the end of the civil war, coverage increased substantially:

- The age of eligibility for the Senior Citizens’ Allowance dropped to 70 years– and 60 for members of the Dalit caste and those in the poorest area of the country.
- In 2010 the government introduced a child grant for children aged 0-4 years. This is universal in the poorest areas and is provided to all Dalit children in the rest of the country, reaching 409,000 children, around 13% of all children 0-4 years.
- In 2011 the age of eligibility for the Single Women’s Allowance was reduced to 18 years

6.2.3 Risk of poverty targeting creating conflict and instability

Evidence shows that selecting people for programmes based on poverty can undermine community cohesion. Many examples exist worldwide of poverty-based selection causing social conflict; in particular those using the proxy means test targeting methodology. Combining multiple proxy indicators into a computed assessment of vulnerability is complex and difficult to explain to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike. Communities often do not understand the process, which creates conflicts because it is not clear why certain households benefit while others do not. The targeting reduces social cohesion, one of the main resources for vulnerable families in this context. For example, in Mexico and Nicaragua, non-beneficiaries who were living in poverty expressed feelings of despair, frustration, envy, resentment and jealousy and withdrew their labour from voluntary community activities (which also happened in Indonesia).

In some places, it has provoked unrest. For example, in Mexico, while Progresa beneficiaries were cleaning the streets, non-beneficiaries threw rubbish at them and knocked down community fences. In Indonesia, during the roll-out of the Bantuan Langsung Tunai programme, protests took place over the poverty-based selection process in around 30% of villages and levels of crime increased by 5.8%. Similarly, in Lebanon...
the introduction of proxy means testing led to riots in some refugee camps, and in Lesotho the houses of village chiefs were set on fire (which did not happen with the introduction of the country’s universal pension). Meanwhile, in Kenya, administrators of the Cash Transfers for Orphans and Vulnerable Children programme tried to avoid unrest over the selection of beneficiaries using a proxy means by telling non-beneficiaries that they would be incorporated into the programme in the near future, which was untrue.

Evidence exists that communities across developing countries oppose selection on the basis of poverty. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, communities often protest ‘We are all poor here.’ In Malawi, for example, one community argued: ‘We are one group of people therefore targeting some and leaving out others is not right.’ In many cases, communities have subverted selection processes by redistributing the benefits to everyone.

On the other hand, communities generally consider programmes that target vulnerable categories of the population in particular to be fair, especially when regarded as entitlements. In a context where the majority can be said to be poor, communities nevertheless appreciate that certain people among them are more vulnerable than others and are regarded as more deserving, such as the elderly people with disabilities, widows and children. They are also closely related to the majority of members of the community. Our research has revealed consistency in the opinions of communities in all zones and across all demographic groups over the need to support particular categories of the population.

6.2.4 Complexity and cost of administration

Allowing everyone in an eligible category that is relatively easy to verify – such as everyone over or under a certain age – access to a scheme greatly simplifies the administration of universal programmes, which is important in countries with newly emerging administrative systems. The complexity of poverty-based selection necessarily leads to higher administrative costs than with simple universal schemes. They require more steps to be taken, more information to be captured and transferred, and the involvement of many more people. For example, the proxy means test requires a large amount of information to be captured, some of which is difficult to obtain, and large numbers of enumerators; a universal pension, however, essentially requires only one piece of information, a person’s age.

Poverty-targeted programmes should be re-targeted often to maintain their focus on those who are currently poor. This means revisiting all beneficiaries on a regular basis. It is prohibitively expensive to do this as often as is needed; for example, for Mexico’s Oportunidades programme it only happened once in 10 years, though the plan now is to re-target selection after five years. This infrequent re-selection comes at the cost of increasing inaccuracy over time, because families move in and out of poverty. A recommendation of the feasibility study on social protection in SCS was to invest in information systems to track changes in poverty to sub-district level to inform targeting. However, this is a huge investment and it is questionable how feasible it would be as no country has yet managed to do it effectively. Such a system would only be of value if re-targeting happened on a regular, timely basis. Evidence from programmes around the world suggests that any system in Somaliland would be insufficiently reactive to changes in wellbeing and indeed would encounter significant operational obstacles.

Retargeting of recipients is much less complex for universal schemes, thereby reducing administrative costs. Once people have registered for a scheme it is clear from the outset when they will no longer be eligible for a benefit and they can be automatically deleted from the scheme’s payment system at virtually no cost. For

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168 Kidd et al., 2011.
169 Kidd et al., 2011.
170 Calder et al., 2011.
171 Adato, 2000; Adato and Roopnaraine; 2004, Mgomezulu; 2008, Huber et al., 2009; Ellis, 2008; and Hannigan, 2010
172 Mgomezulu, 2008.
173 Escobedo Zolotto, 2011.
174 Brewin and Dunn 2014.
example, with a child grant, as soon as children reach the maximum age of eligibility, a scheme’s management information system (MIS) can automatically remove them. Similarly, when beneficiaries die their names would be removed. To make recertification work in practice still requires feedback and monitoring mechanisms; for example, a management information system can flag when a child reaches a particular age; and, some checks need to be put in place for an old age pension to ensure that recipients are still alive and that somebody else is not claiming benefits after their death. However, such mechanisms are far less onerous than regular mass re-certification through household surveys under a poverty-targeted programme, and with the appropriate MIS and administration it is possible to automate certain processes.

The simple eligibility criteria of universal schemes also make it easier for community members to support the accountability of the system, as long as a grievance and complaints mechanism is in place, because it will be clear to them when a person or household is receiving a benefit in error. However, in contexts where exclusion errors using poverty-based selection methods exceed 50% of the eligible population the costs of operating an effective grievance system significantly increase. Consequently, most schemes reduce costs by not establishing effective grievance systems. In Mexico, for example, despite exclusion errors of 70%, only 0.1% of selection decisions on the Progresa programme were contested.\(^{175}\)

Universal categorical transfers have very simple selection processes and therefore minimise the potential for corruption, as people know who is eligible and how much they should receive. In contrast, poverty-based selection processes are complex and afford many more opportunities for corruption. Programme staff responsible for selection have been known to abuse their position and manipulate the selection of beneficiaries – sometimes receiving bribes – as happened in Bangladesh and India.\(^{176}\) This is not to say that such risks do not exist in lifecycle programmes that use categorical indicators, but rather that the simplicity of lifecycle programmes and qualifications for eligibility make it harder to conceal fraud.

Community-based selection is particularly prone to abuse, and given that community selection never leaves an effective audit trail – which would require adequately documenting the rationale for the selection of individual beneficiaries – it is very difficult to monitor whether corruption has happened in community-based targeting.\(^{177}\) The PMT methodology is less susceptible to corruption, but it does happen, in particular when enumerators are from local communities.\(^{178}\)

Inevitably communities can ‘get wise’ to the selection criteria and attempt to manipulate the selection process. This is human nature and is the case for any programme. Given the potential rewards, cheating is more common in poverty-based selection processes. In Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer programme, for example, 9% of households created ‘ghost’ members, presumably to increase their chances of being selected for the programme.\(^{179}\) A key reason for Mauritius’s move from poverty-based selection to universal access for its old age pension in 1958 was because of complaints from those who had honestly declared their income that they were losing out, while those cheating the system were being rewarded.\(^{180}\) However, programmes based on indicators that are easy to verify, such as age, can keep gaming the system to a minimum.

### 6.2.5 Poverty-targeted programmes may create difficult choices for households

Well-designed social protection schemes can encourage families with labour capacity to engage in the labour market and invest in income-generating activities. However, the choice of targeting approach may have a bearing on how effectively a social protection programme will be at encouraging their engagement.

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175 Skoufias et al., 1999.
176 HelpAge International; 2003, Kumar, 2008; Hossain, 2007; and BRAC, 2008.
177 Abraham and Plateau, 2000; Chinsinga, 2005; Miller et al., 2008; and Kidd et al., 2011.
178 A study in a Southeast Asian country has shown extensive manipulation of results by community leaders in the proxy means test, but the evaluation has not been publicly released. See also Calder et al., 2011.
179 Miller et al., 2008.
180 Willmore, 2006.
If an allowance is provided through a lifecycle approach families will not be penalised for making such investments because beneficiaries will continue to be eligible to receive the allowance. Evidence from OECD countries shows that the more universal the provision of child benefits and childcare, the higher the engagement of mothers in the labour market.\textsuperscript{181} Women are supported, through social protection, to be more productive – with benefits to the whole economy (and thus the financing of social protection).

A concern with poverty-based selection processes is that, in effect, people only continue to receive benefits if they continue to live in poverty. Evidence is emerging that poverty-based selection disincentivises people from working; for example, a recent World Bank study in Georgia, which looked at the use of a proxy means test, found that mothers of young children were reducing their engagement in the labour market, so as to remain poor.\textsuperscript{182} This is particularly understandable in contexts where it is difficult to find a regular predictable income through the labour market or constrained traditional livelihoods. Social protection can and should support poor and vulnerable households to invest in their productive potential without penalising them for doing so.

### 6.2.6 Reduced ability of poverty targeted schemes to act as a safety net for the vulnerable

Figure 4 (Section 3.5) illustrated the types of shocks and challenges that individuals face in Somaliland, from early childhood to old age, with disability and covariate shocks being major threats throughout the lifecycle. It is important to recognise that the main risks that people face are similar in all countries. These are exacerbated for poor people because they have fewer resources to enable them to cope. However, the particular challenges and frequency of shocks that a large proportion of the non-poor face at certain stages of the lifecycle means that they too are vulnerable to falling into poverty. The lifecycle approach recognises this and also provides protection to these groups. A lifecycle approach, therefore, is not just protective but preventive, providing social protection not only to those living in poverty but also to those at risk of falling into poverty. Establishing such an inclusive system of multiple interventions takes time and it will not be possible to address all lifecycle stages at the same time.

A major weakness of poverty-targeted approaches is the concept of a fixed group of poor people. Poverty is a dynamic concept, with household incomes highly variable. As a result, a large proportion of any national population moves in and out of poverty or is in danger of falling into poverty. Therefore, the proportion of the population that should be considered to be living in poverty – and therefore regarded as priority candidates for social protection schemes – is always higher than the poverty rate. Indeed, poverty lines are not objective constructs but relatively political or arbitrary concepts: governments decide where to place a poverty line. Even when a consistent poverty line is employed, very different poverty rates can emerge, depending on the assumptions used.

### 6.2.7 The Social Protection Floor (SPF)

In 2009 the UN endorsed the concept of the Social Protection Floor (SPF) for all countries. The SPF was designed around the concept of a lifecycle approach to social protection. It envisages that countries establish a set of tax-financed guarantees that are directed towards tackling lifecycle risks. Priority is given to schemes that provide income security for: children; those of working age to protect them against the risks of sickness, disability, maternity and unemployment; and the elderly.\textsuperscript{183}

The SPF envisages that, if this set of lifecycle schemes is established, then a minimum level of protection will be provided to the vast majority of families in a country, in particular those in greatest need of support. An additional safety net could be established to pick up those who fall through the cracks in the SPF, but it would only need to be small in coverage and budgets. As in developed countries, the vast majority of investment

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\textsuperscript{181} Kidd, 2012
\textsuperscript{182} Kits et al., 2013.
\textsuperscript{183} ILO, 2012.
would be directed at lifecycle schemes. A basic principle of the SPF is the ‘universality of protection, based on social solidarity’. 184

6.2.8 Building a lifecycle system takes time
An important point to note is that a lifecycle approach takes decades to build. Investing in a variety of programmes allows governments to simultaneously address multiple risks and vulnerabilities; however, this must develop over time and as capacity and financial resources allow.

Experience shows that countries initially prioritise one lifecycle scheme and then extend provision to other lifecycle risks as political support for social protection grows, which is more likely with an inclusive scheme. Over time, comprehensive coverage is achieved of the families living in poverty and, indeed, in many countries, of the majority of the population. This approach also means that households may gain access to multiple schemes if they are exposed to multiple lifecycle risks: for example, a household with an older person and children may be able to access an old age pension and child benefits. Consequently, those households that face the greatest risks may receive the most support.

The lifecycle social protection systems in South Africa and Brazil have taken decades to establish. Overall, the vast majority of households in South Africa are in receipt of a social grant, with many receiving multiple grants. A very significant proportion of households in Brazil – almost certainly more than half – receive some form of social protection benefit, ensuring that a minimum floor is well on the way to being established.

6.2.9 Challenges with community-based targeting
While community-based targeting, in which community members (or elites) choose beneficiaries, is often used as a means to identify the poor and vulnerable on aid programmes and has many advocates, a good understanding of the context and a good deal and time and resources are needed to ensure that local power dynamics do not create inclusion and exclusion errors. There is extensive evidence that targeting through local authorities, unless rigorously facilitated and monitored, can be open to distortion and capture of assistance by powerful local interests. This is seen in national social protection programmes, as well as other emergency assistance programmes implemented in the humanitarian sector. The only country that systematically uses community-based targeting at the national scale is Rwanda and, as Figure 9 indicates, there are very significant inclusion errors when it is applied in the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme, which is targeted at the poorest 8% or so of the population.

Certainly, in Somaliland, there is extensive evidence of elite capture of resources in transfer programmes in this context, where assistance ended up being targeted according to the interests of dominant clans in SCS in 2011 and 2012, at the expense of minorities and marginalised groups. When coupled with the difficulties of access in SCS and the scale of programming, it was not considered to be a transparent process and has influenced views on NGOs.  

**APPROACHES TO TARGETING: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK**

- Taking into account this comprehensive assessment of targeting mechanisms and approaches and the context, on objective grounds the provision of universal categorical access through a lifecycle approach has many advantages over poverty-based selection. Categorical targeting takes into account broad definitions of vulnerability and not just poverty. Meanwhile, the inclusion of the poor is likely to be higher; administrative costs will be lower; political support is more likely; fiduciary risk is less; and social cohesion is more likely to be strengthened.

- The nature of informal social protection systems in Somaliland and Islamic culture is very much in line with a lifecycle approach.

- A lifecycle approach is the most appropriate to achieve not only protection but also prevention of falling into poverty for the vulnerable and promotion of economic activity for poor families. A focus on individuals rather than households will also deal with the challenge of determining what constitutes a household in reaching polygamous families and households split across locations. It would encourage equity across clans and wealth groups, and build social cohesion, which will be critical in fragile state contexts.

- It necessarily requires greater investment, but is more effective and generates political support.

- It is not possible for countries to offer universal access for all, or to all at the same time. Access will need to be staggered, and hard decisions made about whom to prioritise, increasing coverage and adding more programmes over time. Geographic targeting could be combined with universal approaches to further ration coverage in the short-to-medium term. As a first step to building a comprehensive system, the framework should focus on a small number of programmes, to protect against risks at critical stages of the lifecycle plus covariate shocks. This will be a step towards achieving the UN’s SPF.

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185 Source: Kidd, 2015.
186 Hedlund *et al*., 2013; Brewin and Dunn, 2014.
187 In Somali tradition, a number of disadvantaged groups must not be attacked during conflicts and should be actively protected. These include women, children, the sick, the elderly, disabled people, clergy, and unarmed and neutral groups such as prisoners and travellers.
188 An SPF is the first level of a comprehensive national social protection system. It comprises: universal access to nationally defined essential services, such as health, education, housing, water and sanitation and other services; and social transfers in cash or in kind, to ensure income security, food security, adequate nutrition and access to these essential services. The UN SPF incorporates nationally defined measures to ensure income security during childhood and old age, and during periods of unemployment or disability, and measures that ensure access to essential services.
6.3 Building the social contract: entitlements vs. discretionary government charity

The concept of social protection is based on the notion of a ‘social contract’ between the state and its citizens. A government’s legitimacy is based to a significant extent on its ability to ensure that the conditions are in place to enable people to achieve an acceptable standard of living and to protect citizens when autonomous systems fail. A further important macro-impact of social protection is therefore on social cohesion and the strengthening of the national social contract between citizens and the government.

In Somaliland, as in other fragile states, social protection has the potential to support state building and achieve a peace dividend. Indeed, provision of cash transfers can be a relatively straightforward means of building the profile of nascent government in the area of service provision. This provides potential for the government to make a quick and visible difference to the wellbeing of poor and vulnerable citizens, compared to the promise of delivering quality health and education services, which are very important but can take a huge amount of time and effort to achieve.

To realise these benefits it is essential that citizens recognise that the support is coming from the government. The way that the programme is designed and communicated to people will also have a bearing on its effectiveness in this respect. It is vital to have a strong communication strategy, particularly in terms of empowering beneficiaries to monitor the programme and claim their entitlement, and to make them understand that the programme is a national programme when it is likely that people’s face-to-face contact will be with implementing partners (CSOs and staff of the payment provider).

Social protection can be provided as assistance to the ‘deserving’ at the discretion of governments, which can be ad hoc, insecure and open to abuse. Or it can be established and understood as an entitlement, often backed up by constitutional dispositions (such as the right to social security), meaning that all citizens, including the better off, have a right to access the benefit.

As entitlements, universal schemes strengthen the social contract between government and citizens. The same is not true of poverty-targeted programmes. South Africa used the expansion of a social protection system based on entitlements to help the country overcome divisions caused by apartheid. And the IMF has suggested that the introduction of Mauritius’s universal pension played a key role in enabling the country to overcome racial divisions and accept structural reforms as it moved from being a mono-crop economy to Africa’s most successful economy.189 The old age pension in Nepal is believed to have contributed to the country overcoming the legacy of civil war, because it was one of the few services that could reach conflict areas and show the central government’s commitment to the nation’s citizens. Following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the residents of Kosovo were left without access to pensions, because their pension funds were now in Serbia. Under a UN mandate a universal old age pension was established, is likely to have helped the residents overcome the legacy of civil war there, too.190

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**ENTITLEMENTS: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK**

- Developing a system based on entitlements holds real potential to leverage a peace dividend and build the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens. From a state-building perspective such an approach is preferable.
- The implication is that such an approach requires government engagement from the outset, along with the development of policies and strategies, such as for communication and accountability.

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6.4 Achieving human development: conditional versus unconditional transfers

A common means of encouraging the more affluent to pay for poverty-targeted schemes through their taxes is to make them conditional.191 Historically, conditions have been in the form of labour and public works

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190 Gubbels et al., 2007.
191 Fiszbein and Schady 2009
continue to be popular in many countries. In the past 10 years conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have increased, whereby families are obliged to send their children to school or attend health clinics: if they do not comply with a minimum level of attendance, their benefits may be withdrawn. These conditions are imposed despite an absence of robust evidence that they increase school attendance or improve child health and nutrition; indeed, the evidence suggests that conditions are not necessary to fulfil human development goals (see Box 8).\textsuperscript{192} Most African cash transfers do not impose conditions, yet evaluations in Kenya and Malawi show effects on human development indicators are still large and significant.

**Box 8 Do conditions affect human development?**

There has been considerable international debate on the value of imposing conditions that oblige beneficiaries of social protection schemes to send their children to school or attend health clinics. The evidence from studies is inconclusive about whether imposing conditions has any greater impact on human development beyond what would have been achieved through the provision of a transfer. Indeed, it would seem that the strongest evidence suggests that it has no impact. The results are summarised below:

- In Morocco, a study found no added value in enforcing conditions: unconditional cash transfers were more effective than conditional transfers.\textsuperscript{193}
- In Burkina Faso, the best interpretation of results in the experiment was that the use of conditions had an impact on enrolment of young children aged 7-8 years who were not enrolled in school prior to the study.\textsuperscript{194} However, among already children enrolled at school – including older children – the unconditional transfer seems to have been just as effective.
- In Kenya, no additional value was found in imposing conditions.\textsuperscript{195} In fact, it was shown that the conditions became administratively too difficult to manage.
- A systematic review by Manley at al (2012) to ascertain whether conditional schemes had an impact on child nutrition did not find evidence of any additional impact.
- A comprehensive review of evidence for the World Bank also found no conclusive evidence on the impacts of imposing conditions on cash transfers.\textsuperscript{196}

In low-income regions, such as Somaliland, the cost of monitoring conditionality would be very high and supply-side barriers in accessing government services pose great challenges. Imposing conditions where such barriers exist risks penalising households, over-stretching services, and reducing the quality of services provided. Indeed, it is almost certain that Somaliland does not have the administrative capacity to monitor compliance with conditions. An alternative might be to focus not on sanctions, but rather on using “nudges” and messaging to incentivise households to send their children to school.

**ATTACHING CONDITIONS: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK**

- Based on current coverage and capacity of education and health services in Somaliland and the challenges with administering and monitoring conditions attached to social protection programmes, CCTs are not considered as appropriate.
- The framework should consider incorporating broader “nudges” and messaging in its communication strategy to incentivise families to access services where these exist.

**6.5 Approaches for reaching working-age people**

The objective of social protection programmes directed at those of working age should be, besides providing support for consumption needs, to support them to improve their livelihood or employment situation and thus address the root cause of why they are vulnerable to income shocks. Often, for ideological reasons, governments and donors provide social protection benefits to working age families on the condition that


\textsuperscript{193} Benhassine \textit{et al.}, 2013.

\textsuperscript{194} Akresh \textit{et al.}, 2013.

\textsuperscript{195} Ward \textit{et al.}, 2010.

\textsuperscript{196} Fiszbein and Schady, 2009
they take part in public works employment, so-called workfare programmes. However, these are not the only policy options for reaching and benefiting households of working age.

6.5.1 Labour-intensive public works (LIPW) and social protection

LIPW programmes can be attractive to policymakers and donors in low-income countries for the supposed win-win they offer, addressing household poverty and food insecurity, as well as contributing to the development of sustainable livelihoods for the wider community. Their attraction is understandable given high levels of poverty and unemployment, seasonal livelihood shocks and demand for infrastructure rehabilitation. LIPW are a policy option promoted in a number of studies on Somalia and the main safety net that the WFP and FAO consider in the UN JRS. Developing countries are also putting increasing emphasis on establishing graduation strategies for such schemes, with the aim of changing households’ circumstances, such that they no longer rely on social protection.

This section takes into consideration the evidence and relevant lessons from international experience of LIPW programmes with social objectives, especially in neighbouring countries in the region, in particular the WFP’s Cash for Work programme in Kenya, PSNP in Ethiopia, and NUSAF 2 public works component in Northern Uganda. These are similar to evaluation findings in Somalia. International experience has shown that the effectiveness of LIPW programmes as social protection instruments in contexts of chronic poverty depends on a number of critical design and implementation factors. These include:

- The adequacy of the value of the wage in relation to the household consumption gap, and indexing of transfers to ensure value is not lost because of inflation;
- The duration of employment in relation to the duration of the hunger period;
- The timing of employment in relation to needs and labour availability;
- Repeated support over a number of years to avoid asset depletion;
- The scale of provision in relation to the number of those eligible;
- That labour conditions should not impact negatively on the household;
- Regular and predictable payment;
- The adoption of appropriate targeting mechanisms to reach those eligible; and
- The adequacy of administrative and technical personnel – a prerequisite for attaining the previous outcomes.

Failure in relation to any of these factors has been found to undermine the effectiveness of interventions in terms of providing social protection benefits or to address chronic poverty, which are required to be regular and predictable and available when needed. Evidence shows that often these preconditions are not achieved, and thus caution should be exercised before deciding to set up an LIPW programme in the context of a social protection framework in Somaliland:

**Difficulties in dealing with inflation:** setting and maintaining an adequate wage is a challenge in many programmes, particularly when donors deliberately set wages low to limit the demand to participate in programmes, and when inflation results in a deterioration in the value of a fixed cash wage over time. This was documented in Malawi, and Ethiopia, where between April and July 2008 the purchasing power of PSNP wages – and therefore the effective value of the wage rate – fell by nearly 20% a month. Studies note the

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197 Brewin and Dunn, 2014; Gabrielle and Nori, 2007.
198 This is based on an analytical report compiled for this purpose by public works expert Dr Anna McCord (McCord, 2014) – the full report is available from Development Pathways.
199 FAO, 2013a; and a verbal summary of OPM qualitative evaluation of the FAO’s Cash for Work programme in Somalia, the report for which is not yet available. This source is cited as ‘OPM, personal communication’
200 See e.g. McCord et al., 2013; McCord, 2012a; Devereux and Solomon, 2006.
201 As recommended in Subbarao et al., 1997.
202 Hobson, 2008 and Chirwa et al., 2004.
negative implications of low wages for achieving social protection objectives. A social protection programme based on unconditional payments would face similar challenges; however, it is administratively far easier to index-link social protection payments to inflation than it is wage rates, which may be pegged to the minimum wage in country and need to be related to market wages.

**Limited utility of LIPW infrastructure:** the technical quality, durability and appropriateness of the assets created is a key precondition for potential longer-term livelihoods gains. There is little evidence to indicate that the assets created through LIPW programmes directly promote productivity and livelihoods gains among target groups, or the population more generally, over time. The key constraining factors are:

- Poor choice of assets resulting from limited implementation capacity to analyse community livelihoods strategies and preferences, and a limited menu of externally defined options;
- Ad hoc or village-level asset selection rather than strategic selection related to livelihoods development planning;
- Poor quality of assets, often constrained by inadequate technical inputs and limited capital budgets; and,
- Failure to clarify asset ownership and responsibility and budgets for maintenance over time.

Adopting predefined menus can undermine perceptions of local ownership and accountability, as well as livelihoods impacts, as was observed in the case of Somalia. Adopting a predetermined list may be a greater risk where there is pressure to conform to agency mandates, and was recognised as a challenge to be addressed in the next phase of the FAO Somalia programme.

Indeed, in some cases poor infrastructure planning has negatively affected pastoral households and communities. A concentration of water points in the wrong place can have serious negative impacts on rangeland. A recent programme in Uganda selected water points on a piece-meal basis at village level to meet the labour demands of the transfer programme, rather than by reference to any overall plan to develop rangeland. Evidence from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda shows that such assets can have adverse effects on pastoralist livelihoods; for example, attracting herders to a rehabilitated water catchment and thereby causing pasture depletion. Assets may deliberately be selected to promote particular livelihoods strategies over others, in line with donor or governmental policy preferences. This was the case with the NUSAF programme in Karamoja, Uganda, where LIPW were used to promote settled agriculture and contribute to the removal of grazing areas from the pastoral system. While this may result in the successful promotion of agricultural productivity, it may at the same time reduce rangeland available to support livestock in the dry season and thereby undermine the resilience of pastoralist communities.

**Limited impact on livelihoods:** Governments, authorities and donors have repeatedly introduced LIPWs to address chronic and cyclical poverty yet programmes generally do not addressing the underlying cause of this vulnerability, which is access to long-term, productive livelihood opportunities. Partly this is because of the lack of opportunity for households to access repeated employment. A quantitative panel study of the PSNP has found that significant effects on household food security are only discernible after several years of participation in the programme participation. However, a study of 167 programmes in 29 sub-Saharan African countries in 2009 found that only 4% offered repeated or on-going employment to participants, despite two-thirds of programmes having social protection objectives and being intended to support the

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203 Devereux, 2002.
204 FAO, 2013a.
205 Farhat et al., 2014
206 Bhuvanendra et al., 2013.
207 FAO, 2013a.
208 Bhuvanendra et al., 2013.
209 Berhane et al., 2011.
chronically poor. This indicated the limited social protection impact of much programming.\(^{210}\) Programmes that offer only temporary support through a single episode of employment cannot be considered to provide social protection, which by definition is characterised by continuing or seasonal support.

However, wage income tends to be directly consumed, particularly where programmes are targeted at the poor, and little evidence shows that programmes result in significant accumulation of productive assets. They may, however, prevent annual distress asset sales and hence reduce disinvestment if implemented in a timely way and on a repeated cyclical basis. Even in the PSNP, which provides repeated support to households, and which has been operational since 2005, only 5% of participants have graduated and it is not clear to what extent this is a sustained movement out of poverty, rather than administrative removal from the programme. Evidence from the PSNP has shown that providing complementary inputs, including agricultural extension and microfinance, is needed alongside repeated employment over a number of years, to achieve any identifiable improvement in livelihoods.\(^{211}\) The same is true of programmes that provide income support without works conditions.

In a few cases, such as India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), evidence exists of positive impacts on sustainable livelihoods, where there are real synergies in terms of the work undertaken and resilience. Nonetheless, the Indian scheme is an entitlement available to all rural residents, not targeted only at the poor. The combination of asset creation and employment, however, has not in most instances been sufficient to have a sustained impact on livelihoods.

**Impact of fulfilling the works condition:** unlike cash transfer provision, participation in the works component has an opportunity cost to the household in terms of domestic or other activities foregone. This may have significant adverse implications in terms of withdrawal from pre-existing livelihoods and domestic activities, and also significantly reduce the overall benefit of participating in the programme. Analysis of income foregone on two programmes in South Africa suggested that for workers who had given up alternative income, the net values of the wage provided was only 30-60% of the gross transfer.\(^{212}\) Consequently, the cost-effectiveness of workfare programmes is significantly reduced. On the PSNP, the timing of the works component in some cases led to a reduction in productivity as a result of enrolment in the programme, which increased the need for food purchases and risk of dependency.\(^{213}\)

There is worrying evidence that participation in LIPW programmes can harm women and children’s nutrition because of the caloric expenditure of the works requirement, and reduce childcare time.\(^{214}\) Evidence is emerging that such programmes negatively affect children more broadly, including leading to their withdrawal from school to engage in labour or to carry out domestic care activities previously performed by adults.\(^{215}\)

The seasonality of provision is also key, in terms of when support is required and when labour is available. In Somalia the works condition on LIPW programmes have previously entailed calling pastoralists back for registration and employment, which disrupts migration patterns when whole households are obliged to remain in a particular location to work; and also requiring them to work at the time of minimum physical strength.\(^{216}\) Programme participation in some cases also results in families dividing for the duration of

\(^{210}\) McCord and Slater, 2009.
\(^{211}\) Berhane et al., 2011.
\(^{212}\) Ahmed et al., 2007; McCord, 2012a.
\(^{213}\) Berhane et al., 2011.
\(^{214}\) Although little empirical evidence explores this question (McCord, 2012a), participants raised this concern in relation to the FAO programme in Somalia (OPM, personal communication).
\(^{215}\) Tafere and Woldehanna, 2012.
\(^{216}\) McCord, 2012a.
\(^{217}\) FAO, 2013a.
programme, with male pastoralists continuing traditional migration patterns and leaving women and children in fixed locations to participate in the programme, which can negatively affect nutrition.\(^{218}\)

It is likely that India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) may have fewer negative impacts, because as an entitlement people can access the programme whenever they desire. This is likely to reduce the opportunity costs of engaging in the scheme and may make the programme a better complement to a strategy aimed at increasing employment and income-generating opportunities for participants.

**High propensity for exclusion errors:** these programmes by definition exclude households without working-age labour, and those with high dependency ratios, highlighted in this study and many others worldwide as being some of the poorest and most vulnerable in society. Numerous cases exist of powerful interests capturing benefits, registering as programme beneficiaries and making decisions about the type and location of infrastructure, which has meant that the most vulnerable may not have benefitted. There is often elite determination of assets to be constructed so that they benefit personally. This was the case with the CVMG evaluation in Somalia, where majority clans co-opted the outputs.

Where employment is rationed and allocated autonomously, allocation may go to dominant social or ethnic groups, reinforcing patterns of exclusion and undermining the wage’s social protection function. Targeting challenges are particularly acute where access to LIPW employment is subject to significant rationing, because of limited programme size, rather than being available to all, or a majority of those who seek it. This was found in the recent evaluation of the FAO Somalia programme, where dominant clan groups were registered for work and the ethnic-Bantu minority was excluded.\(^{219}\)

### 6.5.2 Alternatives to LIPW for those of working age

For social protection systems that aim to support households of working age to improve their employment, options, alternatives to LIPW programmes include direct income support, with links to incentives and training to work,\(^{220}\) and other social transfers not tied to labour provision.

**Graduation programmes**

These programmes, such as the BRAC’s Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP) programme and *Chile Solidario* provide additional and often intensive livelihoods support to working-age beneficiaries alongside regular predictable income support. The type of support provided, which includes psychosocial support and livelihoods advice, training and assets for income generation, can be very helpful and increase incomes as well as building the skills and resilience of beneficiaries. Increasingly, other poor relief programmes are providing similar assistance, such as the *Bolsa Familia* scheme Brazil and PSNP in Ethiopia.

However, there are two main lessons here, which may show the limited application of such programmes to Somaliland in the short term:

- Despite intensive support, impacts may be very modest. An evaluation of BRAC’s TUP programme shows that, using 2007 values, the average increase in earnings from the beneficiaries’ income-generating activities was only US$23 per year, with annual per capita expenditure increasing by US$10.60\(^{221}\) This was a mere 4.5% of the poverty line. This increase in income is nowhere near sufficient to enable beneficiaries to escape even extreme poverty. Beneficiaries are not homogeneous: some will do very well, whereas others will struggle. Certain factors, including a supportive partner, small number of dependants and previous business experience are all factors that will affect success. Evidence shows that sustainability of gains is not assured for all participants,

\(^{218}\) McCord, 2014.

\(^{219}\) FAO, 2014.

\(^{220}\) For example, young people interviewed wanted to buy equipment, tools and seeds to increase agricultural yield, or invest in alternative livelihoods.

\(^{221}\) Bandiera et al., 2012.
and those who struggle may fall back further into poverty once the transfer is removed. This is because participants still experience shocks and stresses, including illness, unemployment, continued costs of childrearing or even the birth of another child. Without access to the security of a social protection transfer, their only option is to draw down on their assets. It is also extremely difficult – and expensive – to provide complementary support to social security recipients at the national scale. BRAC’s TUP programme and Chile Solidario are small-scale schemes that reach relatively few families and, as a result, are affordable. Despite its strong commitment to graduation, there is no evidence that Ethiopia has yet managed to provide large-scale additional support to PSNP beneficiaries.

In reality, the best approach may be to help beneficiaries of social protection schemes to access other mainstream labour market programmes, wherein they can receive training, loans and other support.

Unconditional cash transfers (UCTs)
Well-designed UCTs can enable families to engage more actively in the labour market, through various means:

- **Social protection provides households with investment capital**: social protection is often used to invest in a household’s own income-generating activities. In Mexico’s Oportunidades programme, 14% of transfers were invested in productive assets, including animals and land, in Nicaragua, beneficiaries increased their investments in agricultural equipment; and in Brazil, the Bolsa Família scheme has increased the probability that beneficiaries will invest in small businesses. This can be further enhanced by beneficiaries having greater access to credit, because the scheme acts as collateral.

- **Social protection provides breathing space**: the guarantee of a regular transfer also changes the worldview of beneficiaries. It provides them with a minimum income platform that gives their lives predictability. No longer do they need to worry about whether they will be able to feed their children tomorrow or next week. Instead, the guaranteed receipt of a social transfer offers people security and the knowledge that they will be able to provide their children with the basic essentials of life for the foreseeable future, as well as keep them in school. As a result, families can plan ahead, invest in income-generating activities or look for employment. Indeed, there is evidence of families receiving social transfers showing enhanced entrepreneurial behaviour by being more willing to invest in riskier but higher-return activities. Indeed, even schemes for the elderly, people with disabilities and other particularly vulnerable people have led to beneficiaries investing in small enterprises, with examples found in countries such as Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia.

- **Social protection can support job seeking**: households receiving South Africa’s Child Support Grant are 18% more likely to be searching for jobs than non-beneficiaries. In Mexico and South Africa, it was found that beneficiaries were more likely to look for work because they could afford bus fares and presentable clothes.

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222 Krishna et al., 2010.
223 Huda, 2012.
224 Gertler et al., 2007.
228 Devereux, 2002.
229 Ardington and Lund, 1995; Devereux et al., 2005; Neves et al., 2009; Uprety, 2010; Covarrubias et al., 2011; and Bukuluki and Watson, 2012.
231 Marcus, 2007; Ardington et al., 2009.
When formulating social protection policy for working-age families in developing countries, a better focus would be on helping families access work, whether this represents employment or income-generating activities. Those families of working age can be helped in other ways to enter the labour market through the establishment of a lifecycle approach to social protection, because all individuals are part of a household unit. Evidence shows that providing income support to older people, for example, enables grandmothers to care for children, freeing up mothers’ time to engage in the labour market.

Governments do not want to provide long-term transfers to adults whom they believe should be actively engaged in the labour market; they fear creating dependency. Yet the difference between this and providing child benefit is minimal. Both are transfers to working-age families. Child benefits, however, do not generate similar calls for graduation and there are no concerns about children being dependent. Therefore, if governments want to provide working-age families with a long-term platform from which they can engage more effectively in the labour market, including through their own income-generating activities, they should provide child benefits rather than poor relief, to prevent people being removed from programmes even when they are still living in or vulnerable to poverty.

**REACHING THE POOR AND VULNERABLE OF WORKING AGE: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK**

- The dominant issue influencing the effectiveness of LIPW in the region is that of adequate investment in contextual appraisal, and flexibility of programme design to accommodate specific local social relations, labour market conditions and livelihoods. This is necessary to ensure, in the first instance, that a LIPW programme does not have adverse implications or exacerbate existing social or economic problems; and in the second, that it has the potential to confer meaningful social protection benefits and food security gains to the intended target group. To achieve this, programme design needs to ensure the provision of employment of the requisite duration and seasonality, which may vary from location to location, together with timely payment, which also needs to reach the intended beneficiaries. Only if these basic challenges of relevant design based on livelihoods analysis, provision of appropriately timed employment and payment, and effective targeting can be met, will a PWP provide social protection benefits. Localised socio-economic analysis, programme design flexibility and targeting all pose significant challenges in this context. This is a major obstacle to programme quality and accountability, and it is unlikely that significant livelihoods benefits will accrue.
- Benefits conferred by a simpler cash transfer programmes approach in the Somaliland context are likely to be greater and more cost effective.
- A better policy focus would be to help working-age individuals engage in the labour market, which in many cases is best achieved by giving poor families consistent access to social security benefit. Participation in a social security scheme and active engagement in the labour force should not be seen as incompatible; rather, they are mutually supportive.

### 6.6 Dealing with covariate risk: long-term social protection and crisis modifiers

#### 6.6.1 A lifecycle approach to addressing covariate risks

Given the frequency of covariate shocks it is important that a social protection framework supports households to manage these risks. Research has highlighted that a number of development partners are considering time-bound safety nets to enable households to deal with the covariate shocks mentioned.

As outlined above, long-term, regular and predictable income support programmes are essential to enable vulnerable groups to cope with and absorb repeated idiosyncratic shocks. However, long-term cash transfers provided through an inclusive lifecycle approach will also support households to better manage and mitigate the impact of covariate risks such as climatic shocks and seasonal stresses. Firstly, such a programme provides a guaranteed source of income to households which is not climate- or season-dependent and contributes to consumption in lean periods, mitigating their impact. Secondly, providing this every month, not only in the lean months, should allow households to plan ahead and make provisions for cyclical risks. In Kenya and Ethiopia programmes have shown the potential for regular cash transfers to contribute to the resilience of households affected by both covariate and household-level shocks.\(^{232}\) Evidence at the household level is

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\(^{232}\) Merttens \textit{et al.}, 2013
stronger for Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), which provides unconditional transfers, than for the PSNP, where most assistance is provided as public works. Similarly, in times of conflict, the source of income would continue for households regardless of whether they became displaced, enabling them to better adapt to conflict and insecurity. It is therefore likely that long-term cash transfers to vulnerable groups would have a similar effect on a seasonal safety net, providing households with an income floor that protected a minimum level of consumption and reducing their need to resort to negative coping.

Their effectiveness would depend on a social protection system’s coverage of the population, the size of the transfers and scale of the shock. Additional, short-term, seasonal safety nets would be necessary in the event of a severe crisis, to top up the benefits of existing beneficiaries and to reach those in the population that are vulnerable to climatic shocks but are not in the social protection system. In particular, such a scheme could be important in preventing peaks in acute malnutrition. But it is the long-term social protection floor that will address the fundamental underlying issues contributing to vulnerability.

### 6.6.2 Emerging interest in crisis modifiers

In terms of providing additional support during crisis periods, resources must be committed in advance and available immediately. Interest in Somaliland is growing in the idea of crisis modifiers, though international experience or evidence are limited.

**Contingency funds:** the PSNP in Ethiopia comprises a risk financing mechanism, which is not part of the PSNP budget and can only be activated twice within the five-year cycle. The triggers for the risk financing mechanism are linked to the early warning systems in the country. The first time this facility was activated was in 2011 and meant that significant numbers of people were added to the programme. Government, development partners and researchers have identified several challenges. The country’s early warning systems do not always work together and can contradict one another, which may delay activation of the financing mechanism. Overall, the process was complicated and lengthy partly because it is part-funded through World Bank loans, which take time to set up. Several ministries were also involved – the programme’s coordination/management structure will be revised in the second phase, when it will come under the office of the prime minister.

**Effective systems:** a growing school of thought considers that the most efficient and effective means of scaling up humanitarian/preventative assistance in times of crisis may be to link safety nets to existing programmes, to take advantage of the underlying systems and capacities. A long-term social protection system is also essential for this. In northern Kenya in Phase 2 of the HSNP, the idea is to sign up everyone in drought-prone counties to a bank account. Although only 20% will receive regular cash payments under the long-term programme, the idea is that others can receive payments quickly in an emergency. It still has to be proved if it will work.

**Targeting:** it is important to bear in mind targeting strategies that will allow the scaling-up of this additional safety net based on early indications of need. Criteria that are sensitive to increasing vulnerability and that are easy to verify will have to be used. In previous emergencies nutrition targeting has been used to some effect; however, it was limited by the uneven presence of nutrition services and did not provide a timely indicator of approaching crises. The evaluation of the cash and voucher programme in 2011-12 considered whether a geographically targeted blanket distribution would have been better at reaching the most vulnerable, at least in the initial months, to reach excluded minorities. The targeting process in the PSNP emergency response in 2011 was also equally lengthy.

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**ADDRESSING COVARIATE RISK: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK**

- The framework needs to address covariate and idiosyncratic risks; and consider designing programmes that could address both, as well as the need for additional safety net programmes during times of food security shock and humanitarian need.
Long-term programmes are likely to be effective at addressing a variety of idiosyncratic shocks as well as reducing vulnerability to covariate shocks and contributing to building resilience. In addition, short-term safety net programmes are likely to be needed to deal with the needs of the wider population during covariate shocks.
7. FRAMEWORK AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the proposed social protection framework for UNICEF and its partners, comprising programme options along with recommendations. In Somaliland the emphasis is on government engagement. The framework will provide a systematic approach to addressing the issues that affect poor and vulnerable groups.

The main things to bear in mind are that: i) it will take decades to establish a comprehensive framework in any context and particularly in this context; and ii) this means that it is impossible to address all of the constraints and vulnerabilities identified, adequately or simultaneously. It will require UNICEF and its partners to make hard choices. A national policy and strategy, should one be developed, may go beyond this to set a broader vision for social protection; however, in the short-to-medium term the options UNICEF and its partners should prioritise a small number of simple social transfer programmes. The principles on which the proposed framework is based are listed in Box 9.

Box 9 Principles of the framework

- Based on the principles of protection, prevention, promotion and transformation (PPPT)
- Simplicity over complexity
- Based on social transfers and mostly cash transfers
- Long-term income support through an inclusive life cycle approach, addressing structural vulnerabilities, with capacity to provide an additional and predictable safety net for rapid scaling-up and preventative action during covariate shocks
- Establishes a minimum income floor and responds to different dimensions of exclusion and deprivation, addressing economic and social vulnerabilities, and prioritising unconditional transfers with incentives not conditions
- Considers alternatives to LIPW programmes for families of working age

In establishing a framework it is important for UNICEF and its partners to agree on the vision of the sector in 15-20 years’ time, to set the path for future interventions as funds and capacities develop. In the short term UNICEF should prioritise interventions that: are (relatively) easy to design and implement; generate success stories and political buy-in, and thus greater resources over time; and that do not cause social conflict.

UNICEF and its partners should roll out the framework in phases, with the initial phase being more of a pilot that builds political and civic support through successes, and allows lesson-learning (for adjustments), capacity building, and for funds to be made available. It is vital that those intending to invest in the framework, which in the first instance will be donors and UN agencies, are committed to a long-term vision, and to a framework and interventions that go beyond agency mandates and pet projects. This has to be the starting point, otherwise the framework will never be able to address people’s real needs.

The programme options presented therefore include:

**Phase 1** – considered the immediate priorities based on what can be considered feasible in the short-to-medium term (3-5 years); and

**Phase 2** – the longer-term requirements for building a more inclusive framework (10-15 years). It includes recommended next steps for UNICEF and its partners to consider.

These are in line with the national vision for social protection.

**Proposed vision for the framework**: by 2030, Somaliland will have in place the foundations of an inclusive social protection system of income transfers for families that protects consumption of the most vulnerable...
citizens; prevents a fall (further) into poverty caused by shocks; promotes human development and productive livelihoods; and complements and adds value to other socio-economic development policy.

7.1 Framework options through an inclusive lifecycle approach

An inclusive lifecycle approach to social protection will protect core vulnerable groups from risks and shocks. These groups are common to all societies and many social protection systems around the world. Covariate shocks are a particular concern and need to be factored into the framework. However, this should not lead us to consider Somaliland as fundamentally different to other countries or lose sight of the fact that the day-to-day lifecycle risks and vulnerabilities are similar in all contexts and all societies. Sooner or later, all national systems begin to evolve towards a lifecycle approach.

Although the intensity and nature of covariate shocks differs between locations and between livelihood groups, these lifecycle risks are common to all zones and all communities. This means that a common and overarching framework can be designed for all of Somaliland, and similar programmes designed for the other zones (Puntland and SCS). It has the benefit of standardising design features and systems to simplify processes, while still being owned and implemented relatively independently by authorities in autonomous regions. It also provides the operational structures that will allow testing to begin on a safety net to better deal with covariate (climatic) shocks.

For the same reason, the framework does not develop different programmes for particular livelihood groups such as IDPs. In the first instance it is important to get the basics right, and to build the foundations of a lifecycle system for all groups because all suffer the same lifecycle risks. It is also important not to pit livelihood groups against each other in this context. It will be possible to direct these programmes to serve the needs of particular groups according to the geographic areas selected in Phase 1, with rigorous monitoring to determine similarities and differential impacts to inform Phase 2. Therefore it is vital to get away from agency mandates and target groups.

A lifecycle approach has to start somewhere and, as mentioned above, it will be impossible to begin all programmes or meet all needs at once. Rather UNICEF and its partners will need to prioritise these and consider some form of further targeting/rationing of these programmes.

Implementing these programmes will establish and put into practice basic systems for identification, registration, record keeping, payments, monitoring and grievance processes, while addressing some of the most urgent needs for social protection. These systems will serve as a platform for delivery of new and progressive programmes over time.

This framework has embedded at its heart the principles of child protection (see Box 10). Multiple social protection mechanisms counteract child poverty – because children are part of and are cared for by families and kinship networks. As well as programmes that benefit children directly, extensive evidence shows that programmes targeting other groups can confer a variety of benefits on children as well. UNICEF and its partners should aim to make all programmes child sensitive; in other words, to design them in such a way as to confer benefits where possible, but that as a minimum seek to do no harm. UNICEF and its partners must consider the importance of indirect as well as the direct pathways for income support to contribute to health and education outcomes.  

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233In Kenya the positive impacts of HSNP on school performance are not driven by increased educational expenditure or school attendance but by improved psycho-social experience. Arriving at school better fed, presentable, and adequately equipped is reported to be improving children’s confidence and capacity to concentrate.
Box 10 UNICEF’s principles of child-sensitive social protection

- **Children at the core** – children are very vulnerable and the key to reducing intergenerational transmission of poverty.
- **Direct and indirect impacts** – because they are part of a household.
- **Avoid adverse impacts** – reduce or mitigate direct social and economic risks to children.
- **Intervene as early as possible** to prevent irreversible impairment or harm to children.
- **Consider age and gender-specific risks and vulnerabilities**
- **Mitigate the effects of shocks, exclusion and poverty on families.**
- **Make special provision to reach children who are particularly vulnerable and excluded.**
- **Include the voices and opinions** of children, their caregivers and young people in programme design.

### 7.1.1 Option 1: Child grant

Childhood is associated with multiple vulnerabilities: social and economic dependence; a lack of voice; and health vulnerabilities. Indicators of child health and wellbeing across the globe consistently show the disproportionate impact of poverty and shocks on children’s wellbeing. Impacts of poverty felt in childhood, particularly stunting and lack of education, are critical to future development and contribute to poverty traps.

Children are therefore a key target group to benefit from social protection programmes. Particular groups of children are acknowledged to be more at risk because, for example, they have lost one or more parents, are living in poverty, or living on the street. Given the extent of chronic and extreme poverty, lack of services and multiple, repeated and overlapping shocks, including the impact of long-term conflict, on children, it could be argued that in Somaliland all children are vulnerable.  

**Phase 1:** UNICEF and its partners should roll out a child grant as a pilot programme, which can be done through an initial phase, or phases, of mass registration on launching the programme. Child age is likely to be the defining criterion for entry to and exit from the programme. While lack of formal documentation – birth registration or identification – will create a challenge, this is not insurmountable.

Children face different risks at 0-2 years, during infancy, during primary school and during adolescence. While the needs of all children are important, given capacity and resources it will be important to start somewhere and UNICEF and its partners will need to decide which age group to prioritise:

**Children 0-2 years or 0-4 years:** a child grant that reaches caregivers of infants and very young children has the potential to support families to reduce the impact of a birth on family income while supporting improved caregiving practices, early childhood nutrition and cognitive development.

**Children 5-11 years:** for children over the age of five there is potential for a child grant to contribute to food security, nutrition and schooling. If there is a need to compare impacts to those on a school feeding programme (Option 2) then this pilot may be preferable.

The proportion of families fitting these criteria will be high and it may be necessary to ration eligibility further. Given the difficulties with poverty targeting mentioned above, rather than linking child grant eligibility to low incomes, the following additional criteria could be applied:

- **Orphans and vulnerable children (OVC):** research highlighted that the rate of orphanhood (single or double) is likely to be quite high. One way of rationing coverage of the programme would be to focus

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234 Indeed, the definition for OVC that the Puntland Agency for Social Welfare (PASWE) uses includes ‘those orphaned or abandoned, living in extreme poverty, living with disability, affected by conflict, abused by parents or care givers, malnourished because of poverty, parents who are HIV-positive, and those who are marginalised or discriminated against,’ PASWE, 2013.
in the first instance on children in particularly vulnerable family circumstances – i.e. OVCs. Care would need to be taken in developing criteria for OVC that are easy to apply and do not create stigma.

- **Affluence testing:** instead of a focus on finding the poorest, it could be easier to remove the small percentage who are easily identifiable as better off. One way achieve this could be to remove those families where the head(s) of the household work in the formal sector, though this will not narrow down the scale of coverage by very much. However, other identifiers of relative wealth could be found.

- **Benefit capping:** the value of the grant can be capped to a maximum number of children per family. Given large household sizes and potential for non-traditional family units this may be appropriate for Somaliland. The report has found no evidence that systems which provide a benefit per child create ‘perverse incentives’ to have more children. However, a cap on children per family or household could encourage families to share children around.

- **Geographical targeting:** UNICEF and its partners could limit the programme to a particular geographical area to ensure sufficient coverage of eligible families within the targeted zone.

**Phase 2:** assuming the pilot is successful and political and financial commitments are guaranteed, UNICEF and its partners should progressively roll out the grant over several years in a phased implementation across districts. Once coverage has been achieved for one age group, the programme could progressively expand to account for needs of other age groups.

The programme should operate on a regular, predictable basis, ideally delivering payments every month, but considering logistical challenges this could be arranged every two months or even quarterly. The programme could work through on-demand or periodic community-based rounds of registration. In the future, registration could be linked to a formal birth registration process (if one is introduced), to health centres (in the case of pregnant women) or to school enrolment (in areas where services exist).

This would build complementarities between the objectives of social protection and wider social policies.

The child grant should not be made conditional on health-seeking behaviour or on school attendance. However, complementary “nudges” and messaging could be developed to promote these outcomes among beneficiaries, as an integral part of a programme’s communication strategy.

### 7.1.2 Option 2: Old age grant

Older people globally are acknowledged to be highly vulnerable to falling into poverty. Small shocks such as illness, and the growing frailty of older people themselves, reduces their ability to work and can throw households into poverty. Older people then become dependent on others in the household or community for their basic needs.

Based on international evidence, an income support programme for older people will generate strong citizen support and political buy-in, while being financially manageable. Somaliland has a youth bulge and, as in other countries, will experience an ageing population in the future; moreover, the proportion of the population that is older is projected to increase.

Besides enabling older people to support themselves with dignity, evidence shows that they invest such transfers in the household, with benefits for working-age families. The State’s taking on the role of duty bearer for older people removes their dependence on others in the household or wider community, and has been shown to improve households’ economic potential.\(^{237}\)

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\(^{235}\) This would not mean that grants would be conditional on school attendance; but rather that services became more joined up so that the school registration process could be one channel by which families also registered their child for the child grant.

\(^{236}\) People over 50 made up 7.9% of the population in 2010; by 2030 they are projected to account for more than 10% (UNDESA, n.d.).

\(^{237}\) In South Africa households in receipt of a pension had higher labour force participation.
Of particular interest is extensive evidence that programmes which target older people can bring multiple benefits to children in their care, given the extent of orphanhood and likelihood that grandparents care for a large number of children, and also enable parents to enter the labour market. Evidence from the Puntland Agency for Social Welfare (PASWE) indicates the extent to which family members including grandparents often care for OVC.

**Phase 1:** UNICEF and its partners should pilot an old age grant programme, which can be done through an initial phase, or phases, of mass registration on the programme’s launch. It is a relatively straightforward programme to implement, having clear eligibility criteria, which cannot be easily falsified, and clear exit criteria. While lack of formal documentation – birth registration or identification documents – will create a challenge this is not insurmountable. Moreover, experience with pastoral populations in Uganda has shown that it is straightforward to develop proxies for age.

Normal practice is to make age the defining criterion; given the life expectancy, there would be arguments for having the age of eligibility for old age grants at 55 years. However, on a similar programme in Uganda, the age threshold for eligibility on the national programme is set at 65 years but is reduced to 60 years in the Karamoja region. Setting the age of eligibility at 55 years would generate higher costs so, to reduce costs, the age of eligibility could be set at 60 years.

Other ways to ration coverage include:

- **Limit coverage geographically in the first instance:** in selecting the pilot locations it should also be possible to select an area of intervention that is expected to correlate with high poverty levels. While no thorough household survey exists for Somaliland, it can be expected that rural locations, and IDP informal settlements in urban areas will be some of the most deprived. *This is the preferred option.*
- **Vary eligibility thresholds for men and women:** the programme could set the age threshold lower for women than for men, taking into account the increased vulnerabilities facing women. For example, this was the case in South Africa for a number of years before programmes were made comparable, and is still the case in Brazil. It adds a further layer of complexity to the programme, but should be easy to implement.
- **Make eligibility contingent on low incomes:** this approach has been followed in some countries in the early stages of rolling out senior citizens’ grants. However, given the difficulties mentioned with poverty targeting, especially in the context of Somaliland, and the need to focus on simplicity and reducing tensions, this should be avoided if possible. Making the programme eligible to everyone above the age threshold in the community will include community leaders and generate greater support.
- **Begin with a higher age of eligibility initially and lower it over time:** despite the arguments above for age 60 years, a higher age of eligibility would target the frailest older people and would increase the gender sensitivity of the programme, given that the older the age group, the proportion of women is higher.

**Phase 2:** assuming the pilot is successful and political and financial commitments are guaranteed, UNICEF and its partners should roll out the programme in a phased implementation across districts. In the long term, the age criteria should continue to reflect the reality of living conditions and average lifespan in the country. As with the child grant, this would operate on a regular, predictable basis, ideally once per month, though perhaps less frequently, taking into account logistical challenges. It would work through self-registration or periodic community-based rounds of registration.

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238 In South Africa children living with an older person who receives a pension will be 3-5 cm taller (Duflo, 2000; Case 2001).

239 PASWE, 2013. The report recommends social protection for caregivers of OVC.
7.1.3 Option Three: Disability grant
People with disabilities in Somaliland are in real need of support and this will be an important component of the framework for UNICEF and its partners to develop as capacity grows. Providing people living with disabilities a predictable income would relieve the burden on families and the wider community, and free up the time of working adults, particularly women, to pursue other livelihood tasks. Of course, it needs to be recognised that the highest proportion of people with disabilities are likely to be elderly and would benefit from an old age pension (to a large extent, an old age pension is a disability benefit).

Nevertheless, a Disability Benefit for the working age population could be challenging to implement because of the difficulty in identifying eligible individuals without national definitions of what constitutes a disability, different levels of disability, and verification.

**Phase 1**: implementation is not proposed at this stage; UNICEF and its partners should use this period to establish efficient and effective operating systems under the child grant and old age grant. During this period, the government should also further define national policy on disability. A disability study should be conducted to ascertain the magnitude of disability and types of needs. As noted above, older people with disabilities will be prioritised at this stage of the programme.

**Phase 2**: UNICEF and its partners should introduce a cash transfer for people living with disabilities, making use of the same operational infrastructure used to deliver social transfers, once this is in place. As above, this would operate on a regular, predictable basis, ideally once per month. It would work through self-registration, perhaps with an initial phase of mass registration upon the launch.

7.1.4 Option 4: Safety net to address covariate risk
The programme options implemented through an inclusive lifecycle approach would not only deal with chronic issues but should also act as an income floor to prevent some of the more acute issues brought about by covariate shocks such as drought. It is envisaged that the support provided on these programmes would reduce the need to sell assets and potentially also enable households to replace certain lost assets and thereby recover more quickly from shocks.

Nevertheless, it is highly likely that people will need further short-term assistance during times of acute crisis, to top up grants provided to existing social protection beneficiaries; as well as to scale up coverage to include others in the community who are not already enrolled on a social protection programme, but are also vulnerable to the effects of the shock. We envisage that the long-term social protection programme(s) would provide the delivery and administrative systems to make this a reality. This is a very new and innovative approach; trials have only recently begun in neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia and examples of successes that UNICEF and its partners might draw on are limited.

**Phase 1**: UNICEF and its partners should design a pilot temporary safety net programme or fund that is linked to the long-term social protection system and aims to address covariate risk, with funds committed from humanitarian and development partners.

- The focus should be on climatic shocks (principally drought), because these are more predictable than outbreaks of conflict or disease; it is easier to develop recognisable early warning systems for them; and because it is more appropriate to try and test this for the first time in a secure environment.
- UNICEF and its partners should set up a taskforce of all those involved in the delivery of the programme including the private sector service provider.
- Those involved (development partners, agencies) will need to have committed or ring-fenced funds that UNICEF and its partners can draw on in an emergency. In this first instance, they should calculate the value of the fund, taking into account the size of the population in the pilot project zone; the probable scale of future food insecurity based on trends data from the Food Security and Nutrition
Analysis Unit in Somalia (FSNAU); and an assumption that – in the worst case scenario – the safety net will need to make up 100% of the minimum expenditure basket.

- The safety net would make use of the same administrative processes as the long-term lifecycle cash transfers and therefore the pilot should run in the same location. UNICEF and its partners should select a district – or districts – that is relatively certain to experience water scarcity within the next 3-5 years.
- UNICEF and its partners should do as much as possible to prepare for rapid mobilisation in the event of an emergency. It is envisaged that the pilot will follow the approach that Kenya’s HSNP has adopted during Phase 2, registering the details of all the households in the targeted districts the social protection system MIS. UNICEF and its partners should establish a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the payment service provider to provide the necessary surge capacity. It may be possible to go one step further and register beneficiaries for the payment mechanism also.
- UNICEF and its partners should map out the processes for scaling up the safety net and designing the roles and responsibilities of all those involved. They will need to agree on early warning systems, along with the thresholds for drawing on the emergency funds. This should follow the principle of ‘no regrets’. For speed and simplicity, FSNAU’s food and nutrition security data collection and projections would be most appropriate for use as an early warning system. Additional indicators might also be considered (including herd migration, rainfall data, etc.); however, such data would need to be collected and interpreted with this task assigned to an organisation and budgeted for.
- UNICEF and its partners will also need to agree on a strategy for targeting resources in the event of a crisis. As mentioned in Section 6, the most preferable would be the blanket targeting of all households registered in an affected zone, but this would depend on resources and the size of the transfers to be provided.

**Considering programmes for livelihood recovery**

There are limits to what social protection or safety nets can achieve in the context of severe climatic shocks and the likelihood of large-scale asset depletion. To deal with the loss of assets on such a large scale, the most efficient approach would be to make compensation payments and the most suitable product for this is likely to be insurance.

Weather-indexed insurance is perhaps the most appropriate option to support livelihoods recovery in the event of climatic shock. This is a private insurance funded by individual contributions and underwritten by insurance houses. It is not therefore social insurance and because of this, the emerging nature of the product, and the need for simplicity and focus, it has not been included in the social protection framework. However, if such a system were a national initiative, underwritten by the government and supported by tax contributions, and with the poorest being subsidised, there is no reason why such insurance should not be considered a social insurance mechanism in line with contributory pensions and life insurance. This is considered further in the recommendations below.

**7.1.5 Potential Option 5: Support for young people and those of working age – Social protection linked to labour market interventions**

Given the youth bulge and worries about the potential impact of a generation of disaffected young people on the security situation, dealing with the issues of lack of opportunity and employment for young people are becoming, and are likely to continue to be, politically of interest.

However, it is important to inject some realism here: the problems facing young people are much bigger than social transfers can address alone. What is crucial for those of working age is access to labour market interventions. This could be through, for example, appropriate training and inputs to improve viability of traditional rural livelihoods; or appropriate training, skills development and access to investments to develop an enterprise. At present all the labour opportunities are in cities and rural-urban migration is inevitable; one intervention might be to develop programmes that equipped young people with the skills for successful
economic migration and to find jobs. However, **employment and labour policy are more appropriate to deal with these needs than social protection interventions.** As highlighted in Section 6, a social protection programme can complement such interventions to help young people to access these opportunities. But it is important to clearly separate financial support provided through a social protection sector from broader labour market interventions. However, if other cash transfers are established, it is likely that many beneficiaries would purchase the services of younger people, for example to work in their gardens. In Uganda’s old age pension, around 70% of beneficiaries have used their cash to employ others.²⁴¹

**Phase 1:** linking social protection to complementary labour market interventions, similar to what is seen in Bangladesh through BRAC and other organisations’ graduation programmes, is an aspiration that UNICEF and its partners should investigate once they have built the necessary capacity. However, it is important not to underestimate the costs or challenges such approaches.

Should UNICEF and its partners choose to promote this as an option under the framework, it will be important to start small, and to begin in a location conducive to success – i.e. an urban environment where complementary services (financial services, access to markets, training, etc.) are more likely to already exist. It would also mean building partnerships with providers of complementary services. A market assessment and full understanding of labour market opportunities for low-skilled young men and women would be essential. It should also be expected that a number of those enrolled in the programme may not succeed and are likely to require long-term support through social transfers.

**Phase 2:** depending on the outcomes from the pilot study, UNICEF and its partners will be able to make further decisions about the costs and benefits of investing separately and specifically in a system of social transfers that targets young people, linked to wider government and NGO labour market interventions.

**Other ways to benefit young people through a lifecycle approach**

It may in fact be better in the short term to invest in other transfers within the lifecycle framework that would reach many more people and potentially benefit young people and working-age adults indirectly:

- The establishment of a social protection system pumping cash into communities would increase households’ disposable income for purchasing goods and services. Providing young people in these communities with the skills, access to finance and/or a livelihood grant to enable them to take advantage of the economic opportunities for traders and service providers.
- Many young people in Somaliland are also parents, thus their households would also benefit from a child grant. With this in mind, it may be that the best use of funds in the short-to-medium term would be to address the problems that the next generation of young people will face in 5-15 years’ time and to focus on social transfers to meet the needs of children.

**LIPW to support people of working age**

Given the extensive international evidence, and evidence from LIPW programmes in Somalia, it is unlikely that such a programme would succeed in Somaliland, or that UNICEF and its partners could design a programme that would meet infrastructure development and social protection objectives cost effectively or at the scale required. The works condition of an LIPW programme also poses the risk of unintentional negative impacts. **This is not a preferred option for inclusion in the framework.**

We understand that FAO plans to go ahead with an LIPW pilot programme in SCS under the UN JRS. An LIPW programme with the objective of temporary employment and infrastructure creation fits within FAO’s mandate and may be useful in this context. However, these **should be the limits of the programme’s objectives and it should not try to combine social protection objectives,** which would require a

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²⁴⁰ The Government of Fiji, for example, has established such a policy focus; urban migration is a recognised and growing reality in small island states.

fundamentally different model. If the focus is on quality infrastructure and provision of temporary income support, FAO should put these programmes out to tender to the private sector and make maximising employment creation a key criterion for selection. In contrast, a programme that also aimed to achieve social protection of the poorest would be likely to end up employing low-skilled and low-paid labour at the expense of the quality of the infrastructure.

In the event that JRS agencies decide to proceed with LIPW as a programme option within the social protection framework in Phase 1, UNICEF and its partners should implement a pilot programme that takes into account the following:

- Test alternative ‘public works’ to manual labour, including considering remunerated social work. This would establish much-needed complementary social care services, such as childcare centres, and is likely to be better for women, too. Childcare centres would free up time for parents to undertake livelihood activities and seek employment.
- Flexible, shorter hours and childcare services to reduce women’s burden of labour.
- Alongside an LIPW programme it would be essential to support those households that could not fulfil the works requirement. Ideally, the LIPW programme should be implemented in the same locations as the child grant and pension pilots, rather than simply providing short-term UCTs to households in FAO’s target areas that do not meet the works requirement for enrolment in the PWP, which is the current plan.
- Any long-term focus on promoting an LIPW programme as a component of the social protection framework should be as an entitlement programme, and an employment guarantee.

However, as mentioned above, a better way to get income to these families would be to establish a well-funded child grant programme.

**Income support to meet the needs of vulnerable women**

The team identified female-headed households, including widows and abandoned women, as being particularly vulnerable. However, in a context where seasonal household splitting and polygamy are prevalent it is likely to be quite difficult to identify which households are indeed female headed. We consider that in the short term it would be better to meet their needs in other ways, by establishing other components of the lifecycle social protection framework such as a child grant and old age pension. The child grant should be designed in such a way that it is delivered to female caregivers where they live, placing cash directly into the hands of women. Recent experiences of targeting women with cash transfers have been positive in terms of the positive impact that it had on their involvement in household decision-making and relationships with their husband; positive scores on the women’s empowerment index; and increased spending on family welfare.  

Women in particularly difficult circumstances – for example, those who suffer domestic violence in urban areas – could be an ideal small target group within a broader youth category to test a graduation programme approach. Such cases could potentially be hard to identify. However, on the basis of the research team’s findings in urban areas, violence is affecting women. It would be useful to undertake further research on this issue to see whether there are civil society organisations that could oversee a trial of this type of initiative.

**7.1.6 Potential Option 6: School feeding programme for primary children**

School feeding is the only food transfer included as an option in this framework. Potential value exists in the rolling out a school feeding programme, given that the activities of WFP and FAO already have good coverage in Somaliland and would be likely to generate political support. Evidence internationally is that well-designed

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242 Extensive evidence from across the world shows that targeting women leads to longer-term investments in the health and education of children.
school feeding programmes in low-income countries have had a positive impact on school attendance, the nutritional status of children attending school, and potentially educational achievement.\textsuperscript{243}

That said, little clear information concerning the objectives of school feeding in Somaliland or rigorous evidence on its impact is available. We have summarised in this report extensive evidence of supply-side barriers to education outcomes for children, especially in rural areas. Such a programme can therefore only be expected to have an impact on education attendance in areas where education services exist, and an impact on education outcomes cannot be guaranteed. Extensive evidence also suggests that broader financial barriers, beyond access to food, are preventing children from accessing education services. Thus it is likely that while school feeding may bring more children to school it will not bring all children, and it would be likely to be of greater benefit to those from wealthier households.

Our research found that some children were missing out on school feeding schemes because they had to go home during lunchtime to help their families. Moreover, in areas of water scarcity the research team found that looking for water for the preparation of school meals was taking staff away from their teaching responsibilities. UNICEF should also bear in mind international evidence that meals at school may simply substitute meals for children that would have been provided at home.

**Phase 1:** UNICEF and its partners should review the design of the WFP school feeding programme, taking into account the above. They should consider why children might not be at school or performing well, and the potential of school feeding (including take-home rations) to address these needs. To accurately assess the relative merits of school feeding versus other instruments in the longer term, the analysis should include a rigorous evaluation of the benefits of the WFP programme on school attendance, nutrition and education outcomes for poor families, taking into account the cost.

It is now widely acknowledged that, rather than sourcing food from international or even national markets, it is better to procure nutritious food from local producers and thus help the local economy. **WFP should implement this change as soon as possible.** One way is to give funds to schools to begin to manage this process. Schools can also procure local people and organisations to provide school meals, thereby supporting local employment.

**Phase Two:** subject to the results of the review and of the child grant pilot, and taking into account budgetary constraints below, UNICEF and its partners should consider progressively expanding a revised school feeding programme to the national level, with a national budgetary allocation, and incorporating measures to improve education and nutritional outcomes, especially for low-income households. They should consider how to:

- Increase procurement of locally produced food stocks, ideally putting decision-making power and management in the hands of schools;
- Take into account challenges of implementing the programme and of giving children access to the programme in areas prone to water scarcity;
- Ensure complementary actions, such as de-worming and micronutrient fortification to improve nutritional gains;
- Create conditions for improving education outcomes;
- Build in mechanisms to reduce substitution effects; and
- Establish controls to minimise leakage, theft and wastage of stock.

While little is currently known about budget allocations of UNICEF, the government and other partners for implementation of the social protection framework, it may be unlikely that funding is available to support a roll-out of an extensive school feeding programme and a child grant. In this event, a choice may have to be

\textsuperscript{243} Bundy et al., 2009 and Kristjansson et al., 2007.
made between funding school meals for school-aged children who can access school and supporting consumption for all families with school-aged children and/or for cognitive development of young children.

If UNICEF has to make a choice between income support and school feeding, we would recommend choosing income support because it provides the most benefit to those families in greatest need, especially since many may be not be in school.

7.1.7 Costing the framework for Somalia

This section estimates the costs of the programme options, in particular the child grant, old age pension and disability benefit. It is difficult to estimate costs and levels of government investment given the lack of reliable data on population numbers and Gross Domestic Product. Therefore, the estimates provided here should be treated with some caution.

To develop costing scenarios it is necessary to consider programme coverage and benefit levels. In setting the value it is important to bear in mind the following:

1. The objectives of the programme will have a bearing on the value at which the transfer is set. Some programmes have calculated transfer values according to a percentage of the cost of the minimum expenditure basket.
2. There is likely to be a trade-off between transfer value and coverage; UNICEF and its partners will need to decide whether to aim to cover a greater proportion of the poor and vulnerable but with a smaller transfer, or a smaller portion of the population with larger transfers that make a bigger difference to those who are enrolled. The smaller the transfer, the less impact at the level of the household, but the greater number of households the programme budget can support.
3. The values of transfers and eligibility criteria agreed should take into account the likely cost if a programme were adopted at national level. The total budget should be realistic, taking into account the government’s fiscal possibilities.
4. The cost of the transfers should be estimated in the long-term, so that it does not become too expensive over time.

While the value of transfers can be determined according to a range of criteria, it is useful to benchmark them as a percentage of GDP per capita, since this will indicate the extent to which they can be affordable. Based on international experience, the average values of lifecycle schemes as a percentage of GDP are:244

- Child grants are usually valued at between 3% and 6% of GDP per capita;
- The majority of old age pensions are valued at between 15% and 25% of GDP per capita;
- Disability benefits are usually set at the value of old age pensions.

Some examples are provided in Box 11 shows examples of benefit levels on schemes in neighbouring countries.

Box 11 Transfer values in neighbouring countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya:</td>
<td>HSNP</td>
<td>2,150 shillings (approximately $23) to each beneficiary household every two months. This was calculated as 75% of the value of the WFP food aid ration in 2006 and equated to $11 per month. Assuming a household size of 5, this works out at $2.2 per person. The household allocation subsequently increased to 3,150 shillings (approximately $34).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya:</td>
<td>Social pension for older people was originally set at 1,500 shillings per person per month, around $18. This was increased in 2011 to 2,000 shillings (approximately $21).</td>
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Ethiopia: payments under the PSNP were set at 6 birr/day per household in 2005, or roughly $9 per month. This equated to the cost of purchasing 3kg of staples.

Uganda: the senior citizen’s grant provides a monthly transfer of about $8.7, which is one-quarter of the international poverty line.

Nepal: the old age pension is valued at around US$6 per month, while the child grant is set at around US$2 per month.

Pakistan: stipend programmes for secondary school children are set at around US$2.5 per month.

Bangladesh: stipend programmes for primary school children are set at around US$1.30 per month while the old age allowance is set at US$3.90 per month.

Tables 12 to 14 illustrate some examples of the potential costs for the three programme options set out in Section 7.1 based on costs for the whole of Somalia. These include a child grant (three different age ranges); an old age grant (60+); and a disability benefit. Three levels of coverage are provided for each option:

- A universal benefit that reaches everyone in the category, with estimated administrative costs of 5% of the total budget;
- A benefit targeted at 70% of the category, which would imply using some form of affluence targeting for identifying the recipients and estimated administrative costs of 10% of the total budget;
- A benefit targeted at the poorest 20% of the population in the category, which would imply introducing poverty targeting (or, potentially, geographic targeting), with administrative costs set at 15% of the total budget.

Furthermore, Tables 12 to 14 present three options in terms of the value of the transfers: a high value option, medium value and low value. The low cost scenario is, however, the most in line with international experience, when the value of transfers is measured as a percentage of GDP per capita.
Table 12 Cost (in 2015) of implementing transfer programmes in Somalia – high transfer value scenario

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of GDP per capita</td>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>US$</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCENARIO 1 (universal targeting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>13,600</td>
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<td>0-4</td>
<td>18.28</td>
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<td>83.3</td>
<td>13,600</td>
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<td>6-11</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>13,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>13,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCENARIO 2 (70% targeted, using affluence testing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
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<td>Disability</td>
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<td>83.3</td>
<td>13,600</td>
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<td>SCENARIO 3 (20% targeted, using poverty or geographic targeting)</td>
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<td>11.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
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<td></td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>13,600</td>
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Table 13 Cost (in 2015) of implementing transfer programmes in Somalia – medium transfer value scenario

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<td>% of GDP per capita</td>
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<td>SCENARIO 1 (universal targeting)</td>
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<td>0-2</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>3,400</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
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<td>6-11</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
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<td>60+</td>
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<td>33.3</td>
<td>5,440</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>5,440</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCENARIO 2 (70% targeted, using affluence testing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>18.28</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>5</td>
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</table>
Table 14 Cost (in 2015) of implementing transfer programmes in Somalia – low transfer value scenario

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of GDP per capita</td>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCENARIO 1 (universal targeting)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>18.28</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1,360</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>8.3</td>
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<td>60+</td>
<td>6.54</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCENARIO 2 (70% targeted, using affluence testing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>18.28</td>
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<td>8.3</td>
<td>1,360</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCENARIO 3 (20% targeted, using poverty or geographic targeting)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1,360</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>18.28</td>
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<td>8.3</td>
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<td>6-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>5</td>
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The overall costs of the various options vary considerably. The cost of the high transfer value options would appear unrealistic for Somalia and, indeed, as a percentage of GDP would be among the most expensive programmes in the world. The low transfer value options are more realistic, in particular those reaching 70% or 20% of the category of the population selected. However, the medium value options are potentially affordable if they are targeted at a low proportion of the category but the value of the transfers would make an expansion of the transfers to a high proportion of the category unfeasible.

One package of grants that could be affordable over a five year period, if there were political commitment, would be:

- A child grant of SOS 1,360 (US$2) per month for 20% of children aged 0-4 years, which would cost
around 0.4% of GDP.

- An old age pension of SOS 3,400 (US$5) per month for 70% of older people aged over 60 years, which would cost around 0.7% of GDP.
- A disability benefit of SOS 3,400 (US$5) per month for 70% of working age adults with severe disabilities, which would cost around 0.1% of GDP.

The total cost of the package would be 1.2% of GDP – or SOS 25.3 billion (US$37.2 million) – which is less than Lesotho invests in its old age pension alone. Of course, there is a range of further options that could be used – for example, the coverage of the child grant could be increased and the old age pension reduced – but aiming for an overall cost of just over 1% of GDP is likely to be a feasible scenario in the short to medium term.

Over time, demographic changes would vary the cost of the benefits, with the elderly population increasing in size and the population of children falling as a proportion of the population. Figure 10 indicates how these changes would impact on the costs of the programmes, if coverage were to remain the same (assuming that the transfers are indexed to inflation and annual GDP per capita growth is set at a modest 3%).

**Figure 10 Costs over time of a) a child grant of US$2 per month for 20% of children aged 0-4 years and b) an old age pension of US$5 per month for 70% of older people aged 60 years and over.**

The potential fall in the overall cost of programmes over time – assuming that the 3% growth rate in GDP per capita is achieved – opens the potential for expanding the schemes over time. Table 15 examines the child grant for children aged 0-4 years. If the budget were to remain almost constant as a percentage of GDP per capita, the grant could reach 80% of children aged 0-4 years by 2050. Of course, the government could choose a range of other options, such as maintaining the coverage but increasing the age of eligibility or increasing the real value of the transfer. Indeed, once the principle of a child grant is embedded, the government could increase the budget and generate further options. So, for example, if the budget were to reach 0.6% of GDP in 2025, it would be possible to offer a child grant to 35% of children aged 0-6 years (at a value equivalent to US$2 per month in 2015 spending power). Similarly, if the budget were to increase to around 1% of GDP by 2040 – which is the equivalent of South Africa’s investment in its Child Support Grant – it would be possible to reach 70% of children aged 0-10 years. With stronger economic growth, the options for expansion would
be even greater. However, if the real value of the transfer were to increase, it would mean that coverage or the age of eligibility would have to be reduced.

Table 15 Increase in coverage of a grant for children aged 0-4 years over time, maintaining a similar budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2035</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>2045</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (% of GDP)</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.34</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Somalia could choose not to follow a lifecycle approach but introduce a programme providing transfers to households. A programme offering SOS 13,600 (US$20) per month to all households with a child aged 0-4 years would cost 8.3% of GDP, or SOS 181.1 billion (US$266.1 million). If the programme were offered to 70% of households with a child aged 0-4 years, it would cost 6.1% of GDP (SOS 133.1 billion and US$195.6 million); and, if offered to 20% of households with children aged 0-4 years, it would cost 1.8% of GDP (SOS 39.7 billion and US$58.3 million).

However, it is rare for cash transfer programmes directed at households to have budgets that go beyond 0.4% of GDP, in particular when directed at those living in poverty. So, if such a programme were introduced for the poorest 20% of households with a budget of 0.4% of GDP, it would be possible to provide a benefit of SOS 2,000 (US$2.90) per household per month. In an average household of 6 people, each person would receive only SOS 330 (US$0.50) per person per month, well below the value of the proposed child grants and old age pensions. In contrast, in a household of average size with one older person and one child aged 0-4 years, the average value of the transfer to the household would be SOS 4,760 per month. Given the presence of an older person and a young child, such a household would be likely to be more vulnerable. Therefore, the lifecycle approach would be likely to provide higher transfers to more vulnerable households.

7.1.8. Costing the framework for Somaliland

The costs of social protection schemes in Somaliland would be somewhat different to those in Somalia, given its higher GDP per capita, when compared to Somalia as a whole. As a result, when measured as a percentage of GDP, programme costs tend to be lower in Somaliland. Table 16 provides the costs of the low cost scenario programmes for Somaliland, as a percentage of GDP.

Table 16 Cost (in 2015) of implementing transfer programmes in Somaliland – low transfer value scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target category</th>
<th>Target group as % of total</th>
<th>Coverage of group targeted</th>
<th>Monthly transfer size in 2015 (2012 current prices)</th>
<th>Admin. costs (%)</th>
<th>Total cost in 2015 (2012 current prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

245 Key assumptions are that the value of the transfer is indexed to inflation, GDP per capita growth averages 3% per year. Administration costs are set at 15% of the overall cost of the benefits, but reduce to 10% in 2045 and 2050, as a result of using affluence testing. Population projections are based on UN-DESA’s World Population Database projections.

246 Administration cost is assumed to be 5% of the cost of the transfers, as it is a universal programme.

247 Administration cost is assumed to be 10% of the cost of the transfers.

248 Administration cost is assumed to be 15% of the cost of the transfers.
Therefore, the lifecycle package of schemes suggested earlier for Somalia would cost a total of 0.96% of GDP (SOS 10.5 billion; US$15.4 million), a little more than invested by Nepal in its national social protection system. The cost of each scheme is set out below.

- A child grant of SOS 1,360 (US$2) per month for 20% of children aged 0-4 years, which would cost around 0.29% of GDP.
- An old age pension of SOS 3,400 (US$5) per month for 70% of older people aged over 60 years, which would cost around 0.59% of GDP.
- A disability benefit of SOS 3,400 (US$5) per month for 70% of working age adults with severe disabilities, which would cost around 0.08% of GDP.

If, however, a household benefit providing SOS 13,600 (US$20) per month to those households with a child aged 0-4 years, the cost would be 6.4% of GDP (SOS 70 billion; US$102 million) for all such households, 4.7% of GDP (SOS 51.5 billion; US$75.2 million) for 70% of households and 1.28% of GDP (SOS 14 billion; US$22 million) if targeted at 20% of households with children aged 0-4 years. However, caution would need to be taken if this kind of programme were adopted since it could create a perverse incentive that could damage household cohesion. If households were to have more than one child 0-4 years of age, they may be incentivised to split so that they could receive multiple benefits. Or, excess young children may be passed to other households to enable them to access the programme. Providing a grant to all children aged 0-4 years – while it may cost more – would not generate this perverse incentive, although as indicated earlier, it would be preferable to reduce the value of the grant below SOS 13,600 so as to make it more affordable. For instance, a child grant of SOS 3,000 (US$4.40) per month to 40% of children aged 0-4 years would cost 1.28% of GDP (SOS 14 billion; US$22 million).

Administration costs have been set at 5% of the cost of transfers for the universal programme, 10% for the programme targeted at 70% of children and 15% for the programme targeted at 20% of households.

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249 Administration costs have been set at 5% of the cost of transfers for the universal programme, 10% for the programme targeted at 70% of children and 15% for the programme targeted at 20% of households.
7.2 Recommendations

A move to an inclusive social protection system cannot happen overnight. In the short term it would be prudent to invest in first establishing and then increasing the coverage of just one or two schemes (the child grant and old age grant outlined above); and to plan a gradual expansion of these and other priority schemes in the long term. The following are the recommended actions for UNICEF and its partners to prioritise during Phase 1 of the framework.

7.2.1 Government engagement and capacity building

The Somaliland authorities are keen to move towards a long-term development approach and want greater government involvement and ownership of national development processes. Social transfers have the potential to build the government’s profile and the social contract with citizens. While there are large capacity issues (technical, financial, institutional) to acknowledge, the foundations of a governance structure exist in the north upon which to build. The capacity challenges are not insurmountable as long as agencies have an appetite for long-term engagement. To build national understanding, support and capacity to implement social transfer programmes, UNICEF and its partners should prioritise the following:

- **UNICEF should use this proposed framework to engage with the Somaliland government to inform the design of national social protection policy and strategy:** this should include deciding with the government which department should have the mandate to lead on social protection – which is most likely to be the MLSA. As a guide, the policy should: clearly define social protection; set the rationale for social protection and specifically social transfers, with reference to the nature of poverty and vulnerability, and national development priorities; set out policy commitments to be incrementally rolled out and increase coverage of well-defined social transfer programmes that are in line with a lifecycle approach; and set out policy commitments to build the capacities, systems and processes needed to make social transfers a reality, as well as to ensure adequate systems for monitoring and evaluation.

- **Training and capacity building of the national government** is necessary to build understanding within the government at all levels on the relevance of social protection and social transfers, and to build national capacity to implement social protection programmes under the framework. This could include study tours to learn from similar programmes in other countries (such as Kenya and Uganda), with participants from not only the MLSA but also champion ministries, including those responsible for finance and planning.

- **District capacity in programme operations should be developed, in conjunction with the JPLG programme:** this will be necessary from the outset of any pilot phase, though CSOs are likely to play a role in implementation in the short-to-medium term.

UNICEF and its partners will need to make a considerable investment in building capacity to govern and administer social protection at all levels of government, with plans to systematically hand over responsibility to the government as its capacity increases. Capacity needs assessments of all relevant institutions should inform the scope and nature of training and support to identify gaps in technical skills, institutions and systems and financial management. From these, a Capacity Development Strategy can be developed that outlines the necessary actions to improve capacity to deliver social protection. Table 16 details the probable constraints to capacity development, and actions to address these. UNICEF and its partners should plan to regularly assess needs and deliver supplementary guidance as programmes evolve.
Table 16 Building capacity to administer social protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Probable constraints</th>
<th>Capacity strengthening</th>
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</table>
| Technical      | • Limited understanding of social protection frameworks, key design considerations  
• Lack of skills relating to engaging with vulnerable households/community mobilisation, partner assessment, design of grievance mechanisms, M&E or data analysis | • Regular, short training courses and guidance tools on e.g. market assessment, targeting and grievance procedures, delivery procedures, running the MIS, and systems for data collection and analysis  
• Study tours to other low-income countries with social protection programmes  
• Technical assistance expertise established within departments responsible for coordinating and implementing transfer programmes, coupling national and district staff with skilled UNICEF (or other) expertise |
| Institutional   | • Lack of resources – staff and equipment including vehicles and ICT – to undertake the necessary administrative tasks, especially at sub-national levels, and maintain oversight  
• Lack of processes and systems to implement a formal social transfer effectively and efficiently, with minimal risk | • Ensure programme budgets include provision for adequate resourcing of key departments responsible for administration  
• Develop standard operating procedures and institutional arrangements, and provide full training in these.                                                                                                                                 |
| Financial       | • Lack of capacity in PFM and economic analysis                                                                                                                                                                        | • Engage with development partners working in the area of PFM (DFID and World Bank) to develop a multi-year action plan for building capacity to manage a national social protection programme portfolio.                          |

7.2.2 Develop a long-term vision and commitments

To develop a social protection programme, on paper and in practice, requires a fundamental shift in donor and agency mind-set and programme designs. This shift is beginning to be recognised and articulated by development partners though more needs to be done. The following will be important to consider:

- **Moving beyond projects and mandates:** the UN JRS provides a vehicle for implementing pilot social protection and safety net programme(s). The strategy will be implemented over a period of 15 years and includes a social safety net pillar, with funds committed in the short-term that could support mobilisation. Given that the framework will follow a lifecycle approach, beneficiaries should not simply exit the programme on completion of a two- or three-year project cycle but, rather, when they reach the end of a particular lifecycle stage. In other words, UNICEF and its partners must acknowledge from the outset that such a project, while time bound, is the first stage in the transition to a nationally owned programme.

- **Long-term technical and financial commitments:** in the medium term the programme will require the support of development and humanitarian partners, which will require advocacy on the part of UNICEF and like-minded agencies. It would be helpful in the next 12 months to establish which partners have a genuine interest in supporting a coherent country strategy and can commit to contributing funds. As a starting point, these should include organisations mentioned in this report: DFID, the European Commission, ECHO, the World Bank and UN. These organisations would form a core group, unified in approach through a MoU, which other organisations would be able join. In Somaliland, UNICEF and its partners should explore the potential of using the SDF or establishing a separate and specific MDTF. Testing a predictable safety net to scale up during climatic shocks would be more complex because donors will have to commit funds in advance, and it will necessarily involve a combination of emergency and development finance instruments. An MDTF might once again be an option. The type of instruments in use in Ethiopia offer useful examples, but other innovations should also be considered. The process is likely to take years rather than months, and UNICEF will
need to employ staff or consultants with expertise of financing instruments to draw up a realistic plan and milestones. UNICEF and its partners must also commit finances for both the transfers and operating costs, including capacity development activities.

7.2.3 Achieving increased coverage through progressive implementation
The framework is based on the principle of progressive realisation. In Phase 1, the lifecycle programmes should be piloted in a small number of defined geographical areas. To select those areas the following should be taken into account:

- **Maximise success**: begin in the areas where it is easiest to implement the programmes and where it will be possible to demonstrate their impact. Therefore, the most challenging areas should be avoided for the pilots. Selection should take into account: security and access concerns; mobile phone network coverage; distance and accessibility by road; and local governance.
- **Complementary services**: ensuring linkages to wider complementary services and programmes is important if transfers are to achieve their full potential. Therefore, the pilot programmes should be implemented in locations where such linkages have a greater chance of being assured.
- **Overlap of multiple livelihood zones**: this will avoid the risk of conflict between pastoral, agro-pastoral and riverine clans in rural areas, while also providing an opportunity to monitor similar and differential impacts.
- **Vulnerability**: in the absence of a comprehensive household survey, it may be possible to select those sites where a high proportion of poor and vulnerable people reside. In urban areas this should focus on IDP settlements and in rural areas on locations with chronic problems of water scarcity and food insecurity, if one objective is to pilot a safety net for dealing with covariate shocks.
- **Population density**: selecting provinces that contain a high proportion of the population would make it possible to run a pilot in a relatively contained geographic area. Progressive expansion in these areas over time would achieve high coverage.

The districts that have potential to fulfil much of the above are those to be covered under the UN JRS. Some of these, such as Somaliland’s Togheer, also overlap with the UN JPLG programme and are likely to be where local government capacity is greatest. A further site in Hargeisa with urban residents living in poverty could be added: the districts under the JRS include urban centres of significant size such as Burco. Depending on the capacity and budget for the pilots, two study sites could be included comprising different conditions – e.g. urban vs. rural – to maximise lesson learning. During the selection of beneficiaries, it may be necessary to impose an additional requirement of proof of residence for a minimum number of years to avoid encouraging immigration into programme areas. The areas included in a safety net pilot should overlap those in the long-term lifecycle programme pilot.

Subject to the findings of the pilot phase, the aim during Phase 2 would be to progressively roll out these schemes across the country. This should follow a similarly phased approach, with geographical coverage being systematically expanded as implementation capacity and budgets increase.

7.2.4 Developing efficient and effective systems for operations
Investing in the wider systems and operational capacities of the pilots and their implementers will be critical. UNICEF should not be involved directly in implementation but focus on setting up operational systems and administrative processes at national and sub-national levels. These will include systems for: targeting/registration; payments; management information systems; monitoring and evaluation; and grievances and complaints. All the systems should be standardised across all pilot areas. In the short-to-medium term, third parties may carry out this work, with the aim of transferring control to the government as its capacity grows.
Building an effective payment system
Engaging a financial service provider to manage the cash delivery operations is standard practice on many national social protection programmes and is feasible in Somaliland. UNICEF and its partners should make an invitation to tender to assess potential providers for the pilot programmes. Based on international experience, an electronic payment process would be recommended. Mobile money transfer should be considered on the basis of coverage, accessibility, accountability, potential for flexibility and potential for cost-effectiveness at scale.

Building systems for coordination and capacity strengthening
To reach large-scale implementation, it will be necessary to establish clear institutional arrangements to coordinate the inputs of the various stakeholders at all levels (development partners, national and local government, implementing partners), while also ensuring progressive capacity strengthening of national stakeholders. Based on experiences in other low-income countries, the following points should be considered:

- It is likely that, when implementing the social protection framework, the national authorities will devolve some administrative responsibility to the district council level (in the north only), while making extensive use of partnerships, subcontracting certain functions to service providers with a comparative advantage. Expertise differs across organisations, including CSOs and private sector firms, and a combination of services will be most appropriate. It would be helpful to establish a programme management unit (PMU), under a management contractor, to: develop the various processes and systems; undertake capacity assessments; contract implementing partners for administrative tasks that district councils are unable to provide; build understanding and capacity in the various processes; and coordinate the administrative inputs of local government and implementing partners. Ideally, such services should be tendered out to potential service providers.
- UNICEF and its partners should support government to establish a National Social Protection Secretariat, to be hosted within MLSA, given its natural mandate for social protection, and appoint a national social protection coordinator to manage the Secretariat. Within the PMU described above, in the short-to-medium term – and subject to the results of a capacity assessment – a social protection adviser should support the coordinator’s role, with the mandate to build understanding and operational capacity.
- To coordinate activities between development partners and identify potential complementary activities of other ministries, a Social Protection Steering Committee should be established. This would comprise the MLSA, senior officials from key line ministries and heads of mission from development partners. The MLSA should chair the committee, with UNICEF’s support. However, the Ministry of Planning or Ministry of Finance might assume this role in Phase 1 if this generates greater buy-in across government. Long-term PMU staff would be involved in and advise the committee. The committee would guide the development of sound and appropriate social protection policies, and action plans to implement the programmes. Similarly, a sub-committee could be established at district level, headed by the District Council (in Somaliland this would be the Social Affairs Department), incorporating CSO implementing partners and representatives of the PMU. This sub-committee would be responsible for coordinating and implementing all activities at the district and community levels.

Building processes for ensuring accountability and reducing exclusion
Through rigorous operational processes and systems, it will be important to minimise the risk of excluding eligible individuals and households, including: socially excluded groups, such as minority clans and women as well as those whose mobility may create barriers to access, such as nomadic households, families with young children, the elderly, and people with physical disabilities. The best approach would be to involve target populations themselves in the design of these processes.
Design and implementation of a communications strategy

An effective communications strategy is essential to: i) ensure that eligible beneficiaries are made aware of and fully understand who is providing the programme, its objectives, criteria for eligibility, proof of eligibility required, how to enrol, how to receive payments, and the value of transfers they should expect; ii) ensure that non-beneficiaries fully understand the criteria for eligibility and why they are ineligible; iii) ensure that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are aware of the mechanism for providing feedback to the programme implementers if they wish to raise a grievance; and, iv) inform beneficiaries of any future changes to the programme’s design or operations. It is also a means of providing additional sensitisation and messaging to households enrolled in the programme. Good practices for communications strategies are presented in Box 12.

Box 12 Good practices to follow when designing a communication strategy

- Present messages in local languages.
- Use media and communication channels accessible to, familiar to and trusted by the target population, including written information, but also other media and communication channels for those with low literacy. These are likely to include pictorial tools and word of mouth.
- Make messages simple and clear as possible.

Investing in training for operations staff

Irrespective of whether implementers are government or CSO partner staff, it will be important to provide them with training on the importance of reducing discrimination of socially excluded groups, and to find ways to monitor and address this.

Designing appropriate registration and enrolment procedures

It is important to make programmes as straightforward as possible for poor and vulnerable individuals and families to access them. Registration and enrolment procedures should seek to minimise applicants’ responsibilities, as well as the number of steps in the process that they have to go through. Ideally, registration should be a one-step process, with all the requisite information being collected from the applicant during a single registration meeting. This means setting eligibility criteria that are easy to verify. In the case of programmes based on geographical location and age, the criteria are minimal, but proof of eligibility must still be obtained. In the case of Somaliland, where few formal identification documents exist, it will be important to consider how to obtain proof in simple, practical terms. The involvement of local elders is likely to be one possible mechanism. Another consideration will be whether to have pull or push registration processes: in other words, will it be an on-demand process that is up for individuals to access at any time but which requires them to travel to administrative offices; or should a mass registration process be used that visits communities on particular days. Similarly, to enrol beneficiaries on the payment system it will be important to make sure they are able to present the proof of identity required by the payment service provider.

Investing in accessible payment processes

UNICEF and its partners must ensure that the process for accessing the transfer is appropriate for beneficiaries and does not entail opportunity costs. Pay-points must be sufficiently close to communities and queuing time should be kept to a minimum. It may be necessary to modify payment cycles to take into account differences in livelihood patterns in rural and urban areas: for example, payments on a three-monthly cycle may be more appropriate for nomadic pastoralists. It is likely that special provision will have to be made for those with mobility issues, perhaps by making a third party eligible to collect transfers on their behalf. In areas where the system has good penetration, mobile money transfer can offer significant advantages to deal with some of these issues.
Investing in an accessible grievance mechanism
Those people who believe they have been wrongly excluded from the programme, or who face challenges in accessing the programme, should be able to report their grievances to the programme implementers, to be assessed and addressed. Good practice indicates that channels of communication for registering a complaint should be accessible to the programme’s target group. This means taking into consideration the distance people must travel, the cost of access, and the channel through which the grievance is communicated. For populations with low literacy, a face-to-face channel or voice call facility may be appropriate. Beneficiaries should trust the service provider they have to meet, and should be comfortable talking to them (taking into account challenges for socially excluded groups). Phone lines are an option where households have access to a phone and if the number provided is free to call. Other options are complaints boxes in communities.

Processes for local food procurement
In the event that the framework includes a long-term food-based transfer, developing an operational strategy to procure at least some food locally from producers and thus help the local economy must be an urgent priority.

7.2.5 Investing in rigorous monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
It will be crucial to build support for social protection and to improve programme design and processes. Whatever the primary objective of the programme, it will be important to look beyond this to assess the broader contribution and impact of the programme on family wellbeing and resilience, including potential and unintentional negative impacts. A core focus of any evaluation will be to determine how well it helps people weather crises and stresses that might otherwise have resulted in destitution. Examples include:

- Impact on food security, nutrition, access to services;
- Impact on productive asset holding, household income and/or engagement in the labour market;
- Extent to which social protection reinforces traditional social assistance and social networks; and,
- Ability of long-term cash transfers to enable households to better deal with climatic shocks – and conflict, should this become a factor during implementation – including CSI.

Besides evaluation of the programme options outlined above, WFP should also invest in an evaluation of its school feeding programme.

Table 17 Summary of recommended actions in Phase 1 (2014-19) outlines the key recommendations that should be prioritised during Phase 1 of the framework.

Table 17 Summary of recommended actions in Phase 1 (2014-19)

| 1. National capacity building                      | • Use the SPF to inform the design of national social protection policy and strategy  
|                                                    | • Assess the capacity of relevant institutions to identify gaps in technical skills, institutions, systems, and financial management  
|                                                    | • Train national government staff (which could include country visits)  
|                                                    | • Build the capacity of district staff in programme operations (through JPLG) |
| 2. Develop a long-term vision and commitments     | • If the UN JRS provides a vehicle to pilot social transfers, it must be understood from the beginning by everyone involved that it is the first stage in a long-term nationally owned initiative, not a time-bound project  
|                                                    | • Establish concrete long-term funding and technical assistance commitments from donors, for systems building, transfers, and crisis modifiers |
| 3. Pilot programmes and crisis modifier for shocks | • Design two lifecycle programmes (for children and the elderly)  
|                                                    | • Select implementing partners  
|                                                    | • Run pilots in a small number of defined geographical areas |
- Select locations based on (e.g.) i) maximum chance of success; ii) presence of complementary services; iii) high indication of vulnerability; iv) overlap of livelihood zones; v) high population density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Building systems and processes (PMU through a management contractor)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Build a MIS for the programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tender for appropriate payment service provider(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish clear institutional arrangements (national secretariat at MLSA; steering committee of government and partners; district-level implementation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Design operational procedures and train staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Invest in rigorous M&amp;E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Establish process monitoring/oversight, and impact evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY


FSNAU (2012) Gender in Emergency Food Security, Livelihoods and Nutrition in Somalia, a compendium of what we know; and recommendations on what we need to know for enhanced Gender Analysis, Baseline report, FSNAU.


UNICEF (2011a) *Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey for Puntland*, UNICEF.

UNICEF (2011b) *Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey for Somaliland*, UNICEF.


### ANNEX A: SUMMARY OF TARGETED COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Region/province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Study location</th>
<th>Livelihoods</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Somaliland</strong></td>
<td>Togdheer</td>
<td>Burco</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>Pastoral, agro-pastoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Burco</td>
<td>Pastoral, agro-pastoral, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Odweyne</td>
<td>Getitaly</td>
<td>Pastoral, agro-pastoral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odweyne</td>
<td>Dami</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woqooyi Galbeed</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
<td>Dami</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stadium settlement</td>
<td>Urban (IDP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Digaale settlement</td>
<td>Urban (IDP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Central</strong></td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Dharkenley</td>
<td>Midnimo</td>
<td>Urban (IDP), riverine (seasonal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘UNICEF camp’</td>
<td>Urban (IDP), riverine (seasonal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waaberi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Afgoye town</td>
<td>Urban, urban (IDP), riverine,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural settlements</td>
<td>Riverine, agro-pastoral, pastoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Shabelle</td>
<td>Afgoye</td>
<td>Afgoye town</td>
<td>Urban, urban (IDP), riverine,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural settlements</td>
<td>Riverine, agro-pastoral, pastoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Puntland</strong></td>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>Bossaso</td>
<td>Biyokulule camp</td>
<td>Urban (IDP)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mingis camp</td>
<td>Urban (IDP)</td>
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<td>Ajuuraan camp</td>
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<td>Garowe</td>
<td>Garowe</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jowle</td>
<td>Urban (IDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sin U Jiif</td>
<td>Pastoral (sedentary)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX B: STUDY INSTRUMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument type + number</th>
<th>With whom</th>
<th>Purpose to find out the following:</th>
<th>Methodological comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community mapping (CM) and timeline 1 per district</td>
<td>Community leaders, clan heads, religious leaders, local officials, service providers</td>
<td>Detail on the size of village/community; natural resources, main sources of livelihoods and constraints to development; presence or absence of clinics, schools and other services, including markets and traders. Presence of any CBOs and NGOs and the types of projects delivered in the area. Identification and ranking of particularly vulnerable groups. Whether the community receives any formal aid, who benefits, and how this is organised. Existence/operation of informal social protection mechanisms. Current governance and security situation Significant historical and recent events in the village (both positive and negative).</td>
<td>Most of the information will be obtained through a focus group-type discussion of key themes. Complementary information will obtained on significant historical events and classification of vulnerabilities through a community timeline and vulnerability/coping matrix developed for this purpose (provided in the toolkit). Some participants could be identified for later KIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions (FGDs)</td>
<td>In each district, complete FGD with:</td>
<td>To identify and understand key risks, vulnerabilities and coping strategies across the life course, by gender, and by category of population. To identify and understand experiences (and expectations) of participation in either formal or informal social protection mechanisms. To identify and understand views on local accountability mechanisms linked to social protection mechanisms and understand potential sources of exclusion. To identify and understand issues around access to and use of social services (health, education) and markets for themselves, for the community in general and for most vulnerable groups.</td>
<td>It is assumed that each locality will feature a predominant livelihood (pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, riverine/coastal, urban/peri-urban – including pastoralists who have abandoned pastoralism). FGDs should ideally capture individuals of this profile. FGD in urban areas should aim to capture views of drop out pastoralists where this is known to be a feature. We want to hear the opinions of minority groups, but do not want to stigmatise or single them out. If the study location is a village hosting significant minorities in the particular study locality, presumably all FGDs will reflect their views so there is no need to seek separate FGDs with minorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among adults and older people a mix of monogamous and polygamous marriages should be represented if possible. Age cut-offs are indicative and do not need to be exact. Visual exercises to accompany FGDs with adults (aged 20-50) include a seasonal livelihood mapping (in the toolkit). Two specific visual exercises (also set out in the toolkit) will be used to help elicit the views of children.

### Life history interviews (LHIs)
To be selected from the categories in column two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time to allot for each: 1-2 hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In each district, complete LHI with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• One working-age adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• One older person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• One child who is out-of-school/orphan/child labourer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Person with disability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To better understand vulnerabilities through the lifecycle for specific vulnerable individuals.
To understand yearly cycles and trends over the years.
To understand how access to informal social protection and ability to cope changes over the lifecycle.
To identify and understand experiences with participation in formal social protection programmes.

Some of the respondents for LHIs might be selected from among the most articulate participants in the FGDs. A gender and age balance should be sought across the interviews (i.e. if you select an older man, select a working-age woman). If a FGD with disabled people is not possible in a particular location, the team might consider an LHI of a person with disability. In minority areas LHIs with adult males and females should if possible be with an adult from a minority.

Specific visual exercises to accompany LHIs include 1) individual timeline (recommended for all); and 2) daily time schedule (optional – perhaps most relevant for women and children).

### Key informant interviews (KII)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time to allot for each: 1 hour</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• District representative, relevant ministries and local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local and international NGOs, CBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (locality) level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Community leader(s)/elders; religious authorities,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Teachers, health workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local CBOs and NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To better understand the overall context.
To map existing institutions, policies and programmes related to social protection.
To identify and understand strengths and weakness in existing informal social protection systems.
To identify constraints and opportunities for social protection programming, including synergies with other interventions (include previous experiences as well as recommendations).

Each KII will be different, depending on the nature of the Ki, their roles/functions and areas of expertise. It is NOT necessary to discuss all of the questions provided in the KII tool in the same detail with all KIs; rather to focus in on particular details with each. KII with local authorities/government at district level can be held in a group if you prefer.
## ANNEX C: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

### District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Study location</th>
<th>Participant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Odweyne</td>
<td>Odweyne</td>
<td>Local Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Odweyne</td>
<td>Getitaly</td>
<td>Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MCH Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Principal of Primary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primary School Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Burco</td>
<td>Burco</td>
<td>Deputy Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primary School Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
<td>Stadium</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Council Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Community Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Teacher</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Midwife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Waaber</td>
<td>District Director of Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>UNICEF Camp Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
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<td>UNICEF Camp Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Darkenley</td>
<td>Wadjair District Council Member</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Wadjair Director of Women Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Afgoye</td>
<td>Afgoye</td>
<td>Community Elder</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Midwife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Head teacher in private school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local authority member</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Garowe</td>
<td>Garowe</td>
<td>District Director of Villages, Gender Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Puntland State University Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Jowlle</td>
<td>Camp Jowlle Council Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Chair of Camp Jowlle/Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Sin u Jif</td>
<td>Head Auxiliary Nurse, MCH</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Principal of School</td>
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<td>Bossaso</td>
<td>Bossaso</td>
<td>Mayor of Bossaso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Leader</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Teacher</td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
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<td>Local Authority Member</td>
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### National

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Head of Education Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Head of Health Sector; Nutrition Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Social Development Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
<td>Minister; Director Social Affairs; Director General; Deputy Director, Child Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>National Authority for Disaster Management and Preparedness</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Advisor; Director of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs</td>
<td>Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ministry of National Development and Planning</td>
<td>Vice Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>JPLG</td>
<td>Officer for Health; Education Consultant; Officer for the President’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Country Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>CCBRS Child Protection NGO</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>Resilience Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Resilience Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Field Programme Manager</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Dahabshil</td>
<td>Corporate Client Service Manager</td>
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<td>Zaad</td>
<td>Zaad Service Manager</td>
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<td><strong>PUNTLAND</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
<td>Vice Minister</td>
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<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Fiscal Decentralisation Consultant</td>
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<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Gender Advisor</td>
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<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Director of Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ministry of Women, Development and Family Affairs</td>
<td>Minister; Director General</td>
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<td>Vice Presidents Office</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Rehabilitation</td>
<td>Minister of Planning; Director of Planning</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Save the Children International</td>
<td>Programme Manager, Social Safety Nets Project; Deputy Head of Office</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Care International</td>
<td>Programme Manager, Rural Women’s Programme; Deputy Area Manager</td>
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<td><strong>SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
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</table>

**Nairobi**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>UNICEF Somalia</td>
<td>Social Protection Specialist</td>
<td>Olivia Collins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Senior Social Policy Specialist</td>
<td>Natalia Winder Rossi</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Cash Based Interventions, Programme Manager</td>
<td>Giuseppe Simeon</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Resilience Focal Point</td>
<td>Adam Bernstein</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Health Advisors</td>
<td>Kate Bigmore, Karen Stephenson</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Technical Assistant, Somalia</td>
<td>Morten Petersen</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Senior Nutrition Advisor</td>
<td>Peter Hayley</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Regional Humanitarian Food Assistance Expert</td>
<td>Massimo Larosa</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Concern Worldwide</td>
<td>South Central Programme Manager</td>
<td>Sarah King</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>BRiCS/NRC BRiCS Resilience Consortium Head</td>
<td>Gianmaria Pinto</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>ECHO Ethiopia Ethiopia Adviser</td>
<td>Johan Heffink</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>EU Resilience Programme Manager Somalia</td>
<td>Paulo Tosseli</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>ADESO Programme Manager</td>
<td>Ibrahim Hussein</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>WVI/SomReP Operations Director, SomReP Resilience Consortium</td>
<td>Kevin Mackey</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>DFID Governance Adviser Somaliland/Puntland</td>
<td>Angus Miller</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>NRC FSL Adviser</td>
<td>Quentin Legallo</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Oxford Policy Management Consultant (Lead Author of Cash for Work Programme Evaluation 2013 for FAO)</td>
<td>Andrew Kardan</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>DFID Somalia Head of Health, Wealth and Humanitarian Team</td>
<td>Pauline Seenan</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX D: LIFE HISTORY TIMELINES OF RESPONDENTS ILLUSTRATING SHOCKS THROUGH THE LIFECYCLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lifecycle stage</th>
<th>Somaliland male 50+</th>
<th>Somaliland disabled male 25-50</th>
<th>Man 25-50</th>
<th>Woman 25-50 (0x2)</th>
<th>Disabled girl 19</th>
<th>Child 14 years (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Childhood</strong></td>
<td>Loss of parents (11)</td>
<td>Loss of livestock and Moving from nomadic life to village (10)</td>
<td>Going to school</td>
<td>Never went to school</td>
<td>Loss of father Becoming paralysed (9) and no treatment</td>
<td>Going to school at 6 years – first day! lack of education now at 14 because of financial barriers Drought in 2011 and the loss of livestock Lack of family income and food Eid – new clothes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Loss of father (3)</td>
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<td>Father died Leaving school (11) for economic reasons</td>
<td>Lack of continuing in school</td>
<td>Being buried on family nomads Lack of education</td>
<td>Accident killed my cousin Death of father</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Adulthood</strong></td>
<td>Second wife (30) Supporting family through farming</td>
<td>Opening shop – new livelihood and improvement in living condition</td>
<td>Opening shop – new livelihood and improvement in living condition</td>
<td>Loss of first husband in 2005 Divorce 2 years ago Remarriage 2007 Caring for children with little support Loss of livestock 4 years ago</td>
<td>Loss of first husband in 2005 Divorce 2 years ago Remarriage 2007 Caring for children with little support Loss of livestock 4 years ago</td>
<td>Hopelessness – nothing to do My life is not getting better – no education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age</td>
<td>Dealing with repeated droughts – lost livestock</td>
<td>Lack of mobility</td>
<td>Moving to Burco/IDP Hargeisa (positive) - income and ability to send children to school (Madrasa and boarding school – Islamic Relief)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cannot afford to send children to secondary school</td>
<td>Cannot afford to send children to secondary school</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conflict – loss of relatives</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No health problems yet</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Income struggle (rural)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Moving to urban area 2011 without support</td>
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</table>
ANNEX E: DESCRIPTION OF PROXY MEANS TEST METHODOLOGY

The proxy means test uses national household surveys as its basis. Its premise is that, since household income is difficult to measure accurately during the selection of beneficiaries – and detailed verified means tests are time intensive and administratively costly – household income can be estimated by measuring assets and other variables (known as proxies for poverty). Running regressions of potential proxies against poverty, using information in a national household survey, identifies proxies. Proxies usually cover aspects such as demographic characteristics (e.g. age of household members and size of household), characteristics of the house (e.g. type of roof or floor), durable goods (e.g. refrigerators, televisions or cars) and productive assets (e.g. land or animals).

Each proxy is given a specific weighting and the weightings are calculated by the strength of a particular proxy in explaining poverty. While any one proxy may be relatively weakly correlated with welfare, correlations improve if multiple proxies are used. However, even the best multiple correlations are always relatively poor and the R-squared is usually in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 (an R-squared of 1 would be a perfect correlation). This weak correlation is a key explanation for selection errors.

Once a range of weightings has been identified, a scorecard is developed. There are usually around 10 to 30 proxies in total. Households are visited and assessed against their possession of the particular proxies. Surveys are more challenging than often thought – see Kidd and Wylde (2011) for more information – and, as a result, more errors enter into the process at this point. Once the survey is finished, each household is given a score and those below a score corresponding to a putative poverty line are regarded as eligible.