



Dimensions of Human Development

SABINA ALKIRE *

The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

Summary. — If human development is “multidimensional” then perhaps we need to discuss what we mean by multidimensional: what is a dimension, and what *are* the multiple dimensions of interest? This paper develops an account of dimensions of human development, and shows its usefulness and its limitations—both in general and in relation to Amartya Sen’s capability approach. The second half of the paper surveys other major “lists” of dimensions that have been published in poverty studies, crosscultural psychology, moral philosophy, quality of life indicators, participatory development, and basic needs, and compares and contrasts them with the account sketched here. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. INTRODUCTION: THE PHENOMENON OF “LISTS” OF HUMAN ENDS IN ECONOMIC LITERATURE

Quite often, when one reads a text on economic, social, or human development, one stumbles across a “list” or array or set of items that the author has written down as ingredients of the quality of life or as basic human needs, elements of the utility vector, aspects of well-being, or universal human values. The list may have been jotted swiftly or it may have grown reflectively, in long silent evenings or penetrating empirical analysis. It may trail off with “etcetera”¹ or it may try to be complete.² It may be offered as “one person’s opinion” of what may be “universally” true,³ or it may be used, revised, and offered as a best (to date) attempt at a general account.⁴ Its elements may be extremely vague⁵ or quite specific.⁶ It may have direct economic⁷ or political implications.⁸ It may be supported by appeal to philosophical argument, literary example, qualitative or quantitative evidence, broad consensus, or common sense.

Why do persons engaged in development regularly do this? Perhaps they have a hunch that certain professional problems could be addressed more efficiently by use of a “list”—a simple set of items that jog the memory. For example,

—In developing a methodology for community exercises in rural and urban areas, Chilean professor and activist Manfred Max-Neef constructed a matrix of 10 human needs. Consideration of these needs in a participatory manner enables a community to interpret its own situation holistically.

—After an extensive survey of the Quality of Life literature, Robert Cummins identified seven domains of well-being which together constituted well-being. He developed a Comprehensive Quality of Life Survey instrument, that collects subjective and objective indicators in these seven domains.

—Based on her interpretation of Aristotle, and in an endeavor to extend Sen’s capability approach, Martha Nussbaum has widely

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circulated and defended a list of 10 central human capabilities, with the express intention that these should provide the basis for “constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations.”⁹

—In analyzing a large study of Voices of the Poor from 23 developing countries, Deepa Narayan *et al.* found that six dimensions of well-being emerged as important, in very different ways, to poor people all over the world.

—In developing the work of the Basic Needs School, Frances Stewart identified 10 features of the “full life,” and Doyal and Gough identified 11 “intermediate needs” that governments should address.

As these examples suggest, in many practical undertakings, be they participatory monitoring or data collection, constitution building, policy making, or needs assessment, leaders in development have found it useful to construct a list of the different dimensions.

This paper proposes a conception of “dimensions” of human development (in full view of the vigorous discussions on utility and preferences), and a rough set of them (even though there need not be complete agreement on any exact set of dimensions). It discusses what, precisely, it might mean for health, or understanding, or faith to be a “dimension” of human development. Having proposed a conceptual account of what dimensions are, the paper then compares and contrasts different lists of dimensions from various disciplines—including the examples just given. Finally, it discusses how specifying these dimensions might contribute in a limited but significant way to development theory and practice.

By *dimension* I mean nothing unusual: “any of the component aspects of a particular situation.”¹⁰ The key features of dimensions are that they are *component aspects* of something—in this case human development—that *coexist* with other components.

By *human development*, I will mean human flourishing in its fullest sense—in matters public and private, economic and social and political and spiritual. This is wider than some definitions of well-being that relate only to material deprivations or to aspects of well-being that can be publicly provided.¹¹ I use this definition because the pursuit of narrow goals affects wider aspects of well-being. This definition is also narrower than human-centered development as a whole because it relates *only* to

well-being considered person by person (evaluative). For human development consists, as Sen would argue, of other things besides well-being achievement for any particular person at time *t*; it also considers their agency aspects—¹² what they are able to do about the causes they follow, such as space exploration or saving the seals. In addition, it consists of nonindividualist aspects of social living that are of utmost importance. Limitations of space require this focus.

I will argue that when we look philosophically at the coexisting components of well-being we come upon an important practical and theoretical tool which is, very simply, a rough set or list of dimensions. As a tool, like a set of crescent wrenches, there are times when nothing else will do the job. But like any wrench set, much of the time it will sit on the shelf, being calmly irrelevant. Other tools are also crucial to human development: tools for improving the distribution of improved well-being, tools for increasing the duration or sustainability of such improvements, and so on. Elements of process also have substantive importance, such as the ongoing freedom communities (especially women, ethnic minorities, and other excluded groups) have to have their human rights respected and to participate in the decisions that affect their lives; the institutionalization of services that are transparent and effective; the ability to learn, to adapt, to empower, to target the weakest, to carry on valued traditions, or to invent new technology; the obligation to care for the natural environment. But in this paper, let us leave everything else aside and focus the eye simply and fully on the “dimensions” tool.

2. WHY SPECIFY DIMENSIONS?

Why does one need to specify dimensions? Is not it enough to observe that income is not enough, and let whatever dimensions are relevant to the activity at hand surface naturally?

One fundamental reason for a serious account of dimensions is to give secure epistemological and empirical footing to the multidimensional objective of human development. Poverty, which is-to-be-reduced, and well-being, which is-to-be-enhanced, have normative roles akin to a utility maximand. In the neoclassical approach, income was the metric that conveyed utility or value; therefore, a respectable economic strategy was to maximize national income per capita, with some correction for

externalities and distribution. But most discussions now acknowledge that income per capita is a necessary but insufficient proxy of well-being. The *World Development Report on Poverty 2000/2001* takes the multidimensionality of poverty as its starting point, following the clear trend in development literature and practice, from the Basic Needs through to Amartya Sen's capabilities approach.¹³ They join with many before who have undertaken to rethink the objective of economic activity and produce an alternative account that is theoretically and empirically defensible, while also being flexible and appropriate to diverse cultural and political settings.

Such a rethinking fits into the succession of discussions about utility and its components. John Stuart Mill argued that the components of the utility vector could not be added up—utility was, perhaps, multidimensional.¹⁴ But unlike prior discussions, today a rethinking of the “objective” of human development may be informed by large-scale crosscultural data on people's values, objective life situations and subjective well-being, which was not available 50 years ago when the debate of “utility” was dropped like a hot potato from economic journals, or even 30 some years ago when the Basic Needs school arose.¹⁵ There is an unfortunate *lack* of awareness of the more subjective and psychological studies in development circles. Thus it might be interesting to revisit old questions about utility and the normative objective of economic activity in light of recent studies of human values. For, as Sen wrote in 1970, “It seems impossible to rule out the possibility of fruitful scientific discussion on value judgments.”¹⁶ To undertake such research without stumbling over the problem that you cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” requires a clear philosophical framework such as the one presented below.

A second fundamental reason is practical and relates to the need for effective methodologies for communities to evaluate tradeoffs. A multidimensional approach to development as exemplified in Amartya Sen's capability approach requires many more value choices to be made explicitly—whether by democratic institutions that can be publicly scrutinized, by participation in neighborhood meetings, or by public debate—rather than relying on the market. This need for explicit value choices can be a strength, insofar as it empowers diverse groups of a society to shape their common good. Yet communities need to figure out how they can

exercise this freedom cost-effectively and reliably—they need streamlined methodologies for effective public debate.¹⁷

A third fundamental reason is that a set of dimensions can help groups to identify unintended impacts. As the Marglins' book *Dominating Knowledge* points out, “a major problem is precisely that historically growth has expanded choice only in some dimensions while constricting choice in others.”¹⁸ In *Development as Freedom* Sen argues that unintended consequences of development investments and policies, which were also analyzed by Smith, Menger, and Hayek, can and should be anticipated and factored into a decision-making process.¹⁹ With globalization increasing the tension between cultural values and economic values, this problem grows more acute. There may be tremendous practical value in referring deftly, with a mental glance, to a set of dimensions of human development, in order to spark conversations about objectives or to make sure that no obvious negative side-effect of a proposed initiative is overlooked. No practical methodology can do away with hard choices, much less can one tool. But it can assist groups to make more informed, reflective choices.

A final reason for this study relates simply to the political-economy of ideas: theories that are not user-friendly do not spread. On this topic, we could benefit by considering the historical trajectory of the basic needs school.²⁰ As scrutiny of a number of basic needs texts would bear out,²¹ the basic human needs approach defended human development. Its interests were not confined to the physical requirements of a minimally decent life and it was not guilty of Sen's allegation that it had a “commodity fetish.”²² Yet in practice, a user-friendly procedure never caught on for how to define human needs, or on what the role of participation was in this needs-defining process.²³ Therefore the World Bank program and early ILO efforts among others followed what did seem clear, which was that the oft-cited basic needs “examples” focused on health, education, clothing, shelter, sanitation and hygiene. So the programs provided commodities to meet these needs. Their rigid (mis)interpretation of the basic human needs approach led to the criticism raised by Sen, Ravallion, and others²⁴ that basic needs *programs* were often, in practice, overly focused on commodity demands, even though the basic human needs *approach* was far more holistic. For these institutions,

commodity approaches were user-friendly; multivalue participatory approaches were not. The new wave of multidimensional approaches to development will be vulnerable to similar subversion by (mis)interpretation until they are able to deal much more directly and practically with the valuational exercises implicit in a multidimensional approach.

(a) *Dimensions and capabilities*

Consider how “dimensions” might relate to one approach to development, namely Amartya Sen’s capability approach. In this approach, *development* is not defined as an increase in GNP per capita, or in consumption, health, and education measures alone, but as an *expansion of capability*.²⁵ Capability refers to a person’s or group’s *freedom* to promote or achieve valuable functionings. “It represents the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve.”²⁶ Capabilities may relate to things near to survival (the capability to drink clean water) or those which are rather less central (the capability to visit one’s aunt, the capability to eat rich sweets). The *definition* of capability does not delimit a certain subset of capabilities as of peculiar importance. Rather Sen argues that the selection of capabilities on which to focus is a *value judgement* that is to be made explicitly, and in many cases by a process of public debate.²⁷ Thus unlike the basic human needs approaches, Sen has refrained from developing (i) a list of basic capabilities, and (ii) a procedure for identifying which categories, and which capabilities within categories, should have priority.

For 15 years, however, some critics of the capability approach have complained because Sen does not give more direction as to what capabilities are especially valuable.

Given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be relevant, given the extent of disagreement among reasonable people about the nature of the good life, and given the unresolved problem of how to value sets, it is natural to ask how far Sen’s framework is operational.²⁸

Frances Stewart advocates the capabilities approach be strengthened by “the valuation that priority should be given to achieving basic capabilities.”²⁹ Martha Nussbaum has proposed a set of 10 central universal, normative human capabilities to be protected by constitutional guarantees. But her work is directed to national

legislative bodies, and does not give much guidance to specific microeconomic initiatives, for example, which require much more of a participatory approach. One tool that would contribute to identifying valuable capabilities would be a set of the dimensions of value. Other process-oriented tools would also be required.

It would be well, before continuing, to review the way in which Sen has conceptually both acknowledged such critiques and defended his own position, because in doing so we will recognize the potential problems which any sets of dimensions might have. Sen recognizes that capabilities must be identified, and can be ranked from the more central to the trivial, that both of these tasks involve an evaluative exercise and even that “it is valuation with which we are ultimately concerned in the functionings approach.”³⁰ He also recognizes that the identification of basic capabilities is practically required for poverty measurement and analysis.³¹ Furthermore Sen holds that Nussbaum’s Aristotelian view (that one can identify a single list of functionings which constitute the good life) “would not be inconsistent with the capability approach ... but is *not*, by any means, *required* by it.”³²

Sen resists further specification because this would be contentious and as he argues, “it is not obvious that for substantive political and social philosophy it is sensible to insist that all these general issues be resolved *before* an agreement is reached on the choice of an evaluative space.”³³ For example, Sen argued that Nussbaum’s “view of human nature (with Aristotle’s unique list of functionings for a good human life) may be tremendously overspecified. . .” and that the introduction of such a list would require “a great deal of extension as a theory for practical evaluation.” Furthermore, Sen notes that there is a positive value in an incomplete theory which is “consistent and combinable with several different substantive theories” and which may be filled in by reasoned agreement, itself a valuable process.³⁴

The conclusion of this excursus into the capabilities approach, which provides the philosophical foundation of human development accepted in this paper, is that if a set of dimensions is to be proposed it must avoid being derived from a particular *metaphysical* standpoint, being *overspecified*, and being too *prescriptive*. I have already made the case that *without* agreement on some kind of multidimensional framework cum procedure-for-identifying-locally-valued-and-relevant-ca-

pability sets, the multidimensional approaches to development are operationally vacuous and risk being *misunderstood* and *misoperationalized* by practitioners. So the question now is whether there are ways of conceptualizing dimensions of human development that satisfy Sen's concerns and those of his critics. Below I propose one such way; surely there are others.

(b) *Dimensions: a foundational account*

The philosophical work of an interdisciplinary group which includes John Finnis has developed a conception of "basic human values" which seems a promising way to fulfill Sen's concerns and offer a handy tool.³⁵ Rather than trying to identify "basic needs" (based on biological/psychological consideration) or "basic capabilities" (based on a consideration of political necessity) or some general not-yet-moral prudential reasoning, Finnis' approach seeks to identify the "reasons for acting which need no further reason."³⁶ This sounds dry and abstract but, if you can bear to follow, is the key to thinking through dimensions. Finnis argues that these reasons or basic values can be identified by a mature person of any culture or socioeconomic class or educational level who asks herself, "why do I do what I do?" and "why do other people do what they do?" In reflecting on "why do I/others do what we do?" a person is reflecting on her life experiences, her historical situation, relationships, projects, tastes, beliefs, and the lives of others she knows to try to see the "point" or the "value" of different activities. She is not scientifically examining the human psyche, but rather using her normal process of reflecting or reasoning about what to do. Finnis suggests that the question "why do I/others do what we do?" when asked repeatedly by any person or group, leads to the recognition of a *discrete heterogeneous set of most basic and simple reasons for acting which reflect the complete range of human functionings*.

For example I may ask, "why did you come to this evening lecture on the dreams of dolphins?" To which you might reply, "because it seemed interesting." I would ask again, "why did it seem interesting?" To which you might reply, "Well, there were several reasons, really. Partly I wanted to meet with others who were had invited me and go to the pub afterwards, and partly I wanted to learn something radically new." I would persist, as only a two-year old or philosopher can, to ask, "why?" To which you might explain, with your endless patience, "On

the one hand, I came for friendship, on the other hand, I wanted to increase my knowledge—that's all I can say." In other words, the simplest reasons you give to explain your action refer to "friendship" and "understanding."

Finnis writes that there is "no magic number" of basic reasons, and there is "no need for the reader to accept the present list, just as it stands, still less its nomenclature (which simply gestures toward categories of human purpose that are each, though unified, nevertheless multi-faceted)." But the idea is that if people from any culture, in any language, went through this introspective process, they would come up with a set of these reasons for action that were roughly similar. Finnis and his colleagues over 30 years have suggested what that list might look like. They have found their set to be analytically useful³⁷ and to give an account for "all the basic purposes of human action."³⁸ The applied ethical deliberations of Finnis and his colleagues demonstrate the powerful practical value of specifying basic reasons for action (see Table 1).³⁹

Finnis suggests that these dimensions are *self-evident* (potentially recognizable by anyone) in a very particular philosophical sense which

entails neither (a) that [the dimension] is formulated reflectively or at all explicitly by those who are guided by it, nor (b) that when it is so formulated by somebody his formulation will invariably be found to be accurate or acceptably refined and sufficiently qualified, nor (c) that it is arrived at, even only implicitly, without experience of the field to which it relates.⁴⁰

They are *incommensurable*, which means that all of the desirable qualities of one are not present in the other, and there is no single denominator they can be completely reduced to,⁴¹ and thus *irreducible* (the list cannot be made any shorter). Another characteristic of the dimensions is that they are *nonhierarchical*, which means that at one time *any* of these dimensions can seem the most important—they cannot be arranged in any permanent hierarchy. On the day of a significant performance a singer may not eat very much, nor see friends, nor read the newspapers, nor go to the market, because he is preparing himself to sing with all the resonance and beauty he can. The aesthetic dimension is periodically more important to him than friendship or health. In the longer term, people and communities make similar commitments which affect their mix and relative weighting of values.

Table 1. *Finnis: basic reasons for action*

Life itself—its maintenance and transmission—health, and safety

Knowledge and aesthetic experience. “Human persons can know reality and appreciate beauty and whatever intensely engages their capacities to know and to feel.”

Some degree of excellence in *Work and Play.* “Human persons can transform the natural world by using realities, beginning with their own bodily selves, to express meanings and serve purposes. Such meaning-giving and value-creation can be realized in diverse degrees.”

Friendship. “Various forms of harmony between and among individuals and groups of persons—living at peace with others, neighbourliness, friendship.”

Self-integration. “Within individuals and their personal lives, similar goods can be realized. For feelings can conflict among themselves and be at odds with one’s judgements and choices. The harmony opposed to such inner disturbance is inner peace.”

Self-expression, or Practical Reasonableness. “One’s choices can conflict with one’s judgments and one’s behavior can fail to express one’s inner self. The corresponding good is harmony among one’s judgments, choices, and performances—peace of conscience and consistency between one’s self and its expression.”

Religion. “Most persons experience tension with the wider reaches of reality. Attempts to gain or improve harmony with some more-than-human source of meaning and value take many forms, depending on people’s world views. Thus, another category...is *Peace with God, or the gods, or some nontheistic but more-than-human source of meaning and value.*”

Source: Grisez et al. (1987).

The “basic reasons for action” in Finnis’ approach comprise a set of those reasons out of which people act in seeking “wholeness” or “wellbeing,” in pursuing “human development.” Thus they may be accurately, and perhaps more simply, considered as *the dimensions of human development*.

(c) *Dimensions of human development and of capability: a proposition*

Let me suggest a working concept of dimensions which attempts to crystallize the discussion thus far. Dimensions of human development are *nonhierarchical, irreducible, incommensurable and hence basic*⁴² *kinds of human ends*. Dimensions do not derive from nor divide up an idea about what the good life is, but rather are values or “reasons for action” which people from different language groups and neighborhoods could recognize based on practical reason—that is, on their own experience of figuring out what they are going to do, or on their observation of other people’s experience.⁴³

Put differently, the dimensions of development are like the “primary colors” of values. An infinite range of shades can be made from our primary colours, and not every painting (or life or community or income generation project) uses all or even most shades. But if, for example, all yellow hues were entirely missing, then my understanding of color would be

consistently skewed. Similarly, while not every community activity will reflect every dimension, if *all* expressions of the dimension of friendship (such as solidarity, compassion and affection) are missing then our framework of human development may be fundamentally skewed. The epistemological foundation that Finnis sketches for these dimensions—based in only practical reason (is), but forming the basis for ethical reflection (ought) is a key contribution. His account clarifies as others have not been able to, the relationship that “universal” dimensions of development may have (i) with empirical data from surveys, (ii) with reflections on values within many different cultures, and (iii) with normative proposals as to what institutions that wish to promote “development” “should” or “should not” undertake.

We have come a long way. We started by observing the phenomenon of human-end-list-making among economists and social scientists, and the need for a tool to think about multiple human ends. We then reflected on the practical use that such generic and universal lists would have (if they could exist) in the social sciences. There followed a sideways excursion into Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities, where the question was rephrased in terms of the need for a structure of human capabilities, and some pitfalls to be avoided were noted. Finally, Part I concluded with a simple suggestion that Finnis’ foundational account of basic reasons for

action be considered as “dimensions of human development.”

3. THE SET OF DIMENSIONS

The second part of this paper will address itself to the remaining task, which is roughly setting out the dimensions of human development. It will do so very simply, by considering a pool of possible sets that are empirically or theoretically substantiated. Philosophically this pool will be considered “not... by way of any ‘inference’ from universality or ‘human nature’ to values (an inference that would be merely fallacious), but by way of an assemblage of reminders of the range of possibly worthwhile activities and orientations open to one.”⁴⁴

In addition to Finnis’ set of basic human values we shall consider an array of components of human well-being or flourishing which have been set forward by philosopher Martha Nussbaum, by Manfred Max-Neef, who worked practically on identifying and meeting basic needs in Latin America, by Robert Chambers, Deepa Narayan, and others who contributed to the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor study, by Shalom Schwartz, a psychologist who has done large-scale crosscultural research on values, and by Robert Cummins, Maureen Ramsay, and Len Doyal and Ian Gough, who have each surveyed and synthesized “lists” of human needs in different literatures.

This paper started in the outset that, although there is no dearth of “lists” of well-being/values/human needs, authors have developed their lists in response to different questions, hence the items on the lists represent different philosophical kinds of things. It would not be adequate simply to sort the lexical word-items into categories, then, because such an exercise, apart from being impossible because the same words are differently defined in different lists, would misrepresent the underlying project of each author. Thus I begin by introducing briefly each author whose list is to be considered, and sketching, with unfortunate brevity, how the list has arisen in their own work. The relationship between their work and the dimensions set forward in Part I of this paper is elaborated individually for each author.

(a) *Martha Nussbaum: basic human capabilities*

Martha Nussbaum, the Ernst Freund Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of

Chicago, is developing a neo-Aristotelian account of universal values “as a foundation for basic political principles that should underwrite constitutional guarantees.”⁴⁵ This account articulates human flourishing in terms of capabilities, which are the set of valuable beings and doings that a person or society has a real (both internal and external) possibility of enjoying. Nussbaum identifies a list of basic capabilities that “have value in themselves” (rather than being merely instrumental), and are specific yet open to plural specification.⁴⁶ Her list is incomplete; it identifies only the set of human capabilities that are necessary for a dignified human existence anywhere. She writes, “I believe that we can arrive at an enumeration of central elements of truly human functioning that can command a broad cross-cultural consensus.”⁴⁷ Indeed she notes that her proposed list has already been revised a number of times and that it thus, in its present state, already represents a kind of “overlapping consensus.”⁴⁸ By “overlapping consensus” she intends the same definition as John Rawls: “that people may sign on to this conception as the freestanding moral core of a political conception, without accepting any particular metaphysical view of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical or religious view, or even any particular view of the person or of human nature” (many disagree that she has accomplished this).⁴⁹ Her list is also flexible; as she points out, her proposed list has already been revised a number of times and the current list is proposed “in a Socratic fashion, to be tested against the most solid of our intuitions.”⁵⁰

The outcome of Nussbaum’s inquiry is a set of central human capabilities which “can always be contested and re-made”⁵¹ but which, like Rawls’ primary goods, “can be endorsed for political purposes, as the moral basis of central constitutional guarantees, by people who otherwise have very different views of what a complete good life for a human being would be.”⁵²

Nussbaum describes her central human functional capabilities in considerable detail, because Nussbaum’s categories specify institutional or legal means that facilitate the concerned capabilities. This marks her approach as significantly different from Finnis’, because whereas his categories represent generic dimensions of human value, hers is further downstream in the operational process and intends direct constitutional and political

applications. Still, it is useful to compare the titles of her central capabilities.

Her list of central capabilities has been revised several times. The most recent version, Table 2, was explained under the following headlines: *life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination, thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, and control over one's environment.*⁵³

In comparison with Finnis' set of reasons for actions, Nussbaum does not include excellence in work (although she does include

play), or harmony with a greater-than-human source of meaning and value. She separates life from bodily health and bodily integrity, and practical reasonableness from "control over one's environment." She also includes categories that have an imperfect overlap with Finnis': "senses, thought and imagination" (which include some knowledge), and "emotions." Her category of affiliation seems roughly parallel to Finnis' friendship. The category "other species" is a new proposition.

Table 2. *Nussbaum: central human functional capabilities*

Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one's bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.

Senses, imagination, thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason—and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing self-expressive works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one's own way. Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain.

Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)

Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience.)

Affiliation. *A.* Being able to live for and towards others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedoms of assembly and political speech.) *B.* Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, protections against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin.

Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

Control over one's Environment. *A. Political.* Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.

B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally but in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into mutual relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

Source: Nussbaum (2000) reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.

(b) *Manfred Max-Neef: axiological categories*

Manfred Max-Neef, a Chilean professor and activist, has, together with his associates, developed a matrix of human needs. He uses this matrix, practically, to conduct community exercises in rural and urban areas. The matrix has been used in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Sweden, and the UK at least. The exercise divides participants into groups of 10 individuals, who gather for two days. In “an intense process of introspective analysis,”⁵⁴ the groups analyze the 10 needs and “satisfiers” that have constructive or destructive effects in their society. They describe four kinds of expressions of each need: being (attributes), having (tools, norms), doing (agency), and interacting (social expressions in time and space). Their analysis is provoked by ten classes of need that Max-Neef has proposed.

For example, one community’s interpretation of the human need for “understanding” might have the expressions as in Table 3.⁵⁵

Max-Neef’s classification is generic, like Finnis’. He proposes that “needs can be satisfied at different levels and with different intensities.” In addition, needs can be satisfied at the level of the individual, of the social group, or of the environment.⁵⁶ Needs which are not adequately satisfied reveal an aspect of human poverty. In his own work with groups, Max-Neef devotes considerable attention to the thesis that poverty generates social pathology.

Max-Neef’s set of needs is intended to be exhaustive: to indicate all dimensions of human need that are universal, even though they may not all be observable in all communities (because there may be unmet needs, or poverties). Max-Neef’s list remains “provisional” and open to modification.

The nine elements of Max-Neef’s matrix are: *Subsistence, Protection, Affection, Understanding, Participation, Leisure, Creation, Identity, and Freedom*. Interestingly, they form the closest parallel to Finnis’ set: subsistence and protection together parallel life; understanding parallels knowledge; creation and leisure par-

allel work and play. Participation and identity parallel practical reason. Participation does so insofar as it refers to the valuable process of choice-making which practical reason concerns. Identity does so insofar as it refers to the goodness of choices which in shaping (as every choice does) the identity of the chooser, does so in a way that promotes inner integrity and outer authenticity, or what Finnis earlier called practical reason.⁵⁷ Affection parallels friendship. Max-Neef has no distinct category for marriage or religion/transcendence. He writes that he does not think transcendence is a universal need yet, but it may become so as the human race evolves.⁵⁸

(c) *Deepa Narayan et al: dimensions of well-being*

A team led by Deepa Narayan, the Principal Social Development Specialist in the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Group, and including Robert Chambers, Patti Petesch, and Meera Shah, undertook a pioneering study of the values of poor persons, which is entitled *Voices of the Poor*. First, in a study entitled *Can Anyone Hear Us*, Narayan et al. synthesized 81 poverty assessments conducted by the World Bank in 50 countries. Second, Narayan, Chambers, Shah and Petesch led a new study entitled *Crying Out for Change* in 23 countries, all of which followed a standardized participatory methodology. Both studies gathered data, including subjective data and quotations of the poor, and analyzed the information. Together, both studies represent over 60,000 persons.⁵⁹ It is pioneering because it is the only crosscultural study of this magnitude to date which includes primarily poor, illiterate, and in some cases remote, respondents. As such, it is of central interest.

A major finding of the study was that the poor view and experience poverty as multidimensional. This finding emerged because one aspect of these studies was to analyze how the poor define poverty.⁶⁰ In *Crying out for Change*, “the starting question was ‘How do people define wellbeing or a good quality of

Table 3. *Max-Neef: four expressions of the human need for understanding*

Need	Being	Having	Doing	Interacting
Understanding	Critical conscience, receptiveness, curiosity, astonishment, discipline, intuition, rationality	Literature, teachers, method, educational policies, communication policies	Investigate, study, experiment, educate, analyze, meditate	Settings of formative interaction, schools, universities, academies, groups, communities, family

life, and ill-being or a bad quality of life?" Facilitators elicited and used local terms so that participants would feel free to express whatever they felt about a good life and a bad life."⁶¹ The reports contained both direct quotations and summaries of responses. The qualitative data were then analyzed to see what components of "well-being" and (separately) "ill-being" emerged in common across climates and cultures, countries and conditions.⁶² Substantial areas of commonality were noted by the research team, and described in Table 4.

In comparison with Finnis' categories there is remarkable similarity between *Voices of the Poor* and the 1987 account. In *Voices of the Poor*, however, life was subdivided into Material Well-being, Physical Well-being (Health), and Security—which parallel Finnis' description of the category (bodily health, vigour, and security). Knowledge was not prominent as a good-in-itself (although human capital, in the instrumental sense of being an asset, was).

Table 4. *Narayan et al: well-being according to the Voices of the Poor*

Material Well-being: having enough
Food
Assets
Work
Bodily well-being: being and appearing well
Health
Appearances
Physical environment
Social well-being:
Being able to care for, bring up, marry and settle children
Self-respect and dignity
Peace, harmony, good relations in the family/ community
Security:
Civil peace
A physically safe and secure environment
Personal physical security
Lawfulness and access to justice
Security in old age
Confidence in the future
Freedom of choice and action
Psychological well-being:
Peace of mind,
Happiness,
Harmony (including a spiritual life and religious observance)

Source. Narayan *et al.* (2000, pp. 25–30, 37–38). See Narayan (2000, pp. 32–65) for a similar but not identical list.

Work was mentioned; play was not. Relationships were clearly valued, and while marriage was not a distinct good, familial relationships were distinguished from wider community relationships. Self-integration, in the sense of having self-respect and dignity and psychological well-being, was present, as was practical reasonableness, in the sense of Freedom of choice and action. Harmony with the sacred is present in both accounts.

(d) *Shalom Schwartz: universal human values*

Shalom Schwartz holds the Clara and Leon Sznajdermain Chair as Professor of Psychology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has proposed and revised a "theory of the universal content and structure of human values" based on empirical crosscultural research. In developing a framework for the empirical research, Schwartz and coworkers have tried to formulate (i) "the substantive content" of values, (ii) the "comprehensiveness" of the values identified, (iii) whether the values have some equivalence of meaning across groups of people, and (iv) whether there is a meaningful and identifiable structure of relations among different values.

Schwartz defines values as

desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity. Implicit in this definition of values as goals is that i) they serve the interests of some social entity, ii) they can motivate action, giving it direction and emotional intensity, iii) they function as standards for judging and justifying action, and iv) they are acquired both through socialization to dominant group values and through the unique learning experiences of individuals."⁶³

In the course of his research Schwartz tested and rejected Milton Rokeach's separation of terminal and instrumental (mode of conduct) values.⁶⁴ This might make his work more difficult to compare with Finnis' than previous writers, because the universal values conflate principles of practical reasonableness and basic human goods.⁶⁵ Yet Schwartz claims that *each* of these value areas contains both terminal and instrumental aspects. If that is the case then one could consider the claimed "terminal" aspect of each value as a "dimension" of human development comparable to Finnis' (for example, universalism and benevolence must relate somehow to goods of affiliation/relationship with people and other species).⁶⁶

Schwartz has progressively tested his theory in different countries (in all inhabited continents), regions, religions, and language groups, and made adjustments to the list of values along the way. The respondents initially were generally university students and school teachers; more recent data include 13 near-representative⁶⁷ national samples, and eight samples using adolescents. Respondents would be presented with a list of about 30 terminal values and about 26 instrumental values, identified by two or three brief phrases. Respondents would “set their scale” by choosing and rating the most important value as seven (“of supreme importance”), the least important value as zero. They would then rate how each value fared “as a guiding principle in my life” on a scale from negative one to seven.⁶⁸

Schwartz selected the 56 values by drawing on values literature⁶⁹ and modified his substantive list of value dimensions in response to evidence from about 200 surveys in 64 countries involving well over 60,000 respondents.⁷⁰ His current set of comprehensive⁷¹ value dimensions are shown in Table 5.

Schwartz asserts, in defense of this list, that “[i]t is possible to classify virtually all the items found in lists of specific values from different cultures . . . into one of these ten motivational types of values.”⁷² Schwartz also tested an 11th value, “the goal of finding meaning in life” or spirituality, but found that, as it is not derivable from universal human requirements⁷³ and may not be recognized across cultures.

Schwartz’s dimensions identify security as a value, but not a wider sense of bodily life and health, and they do not include marriage. Achievement appears again as a value that may parallel accomplishment or “excellence in work and play.” Pleasure and stimulation appear again, and there are new suggestions—power,

conformity, tradition, and universalism—that have not been encountered in previous lists.

(e) *Robert Cummins: quality of life domains*

Robert Cummins, Professor of Psychology at Deakin University, Australia, has surveyed theoretical and empirical literature regarding the “quality of life” and classified the terminology within them into “domains of subjective well-being.”⁷⁴ Domains of subjective well-being are generally used on a questionnaire that would ask “how satisfied are you with *domain*?” Initially, Cummins reviewed 27 different accounts of “quality of life” domains—distinct accounts from those Schwartz considered—⁷⁵ and found that a clear majority supported five of Cummins’ seven domains (material and emotional well-beings, health, productivity, and friendship); 22% and 30% supported the remaining domains of safety and community, respectively.

Subsequently, Cummins “tested” his seven domains in the following way. Over 1,500 articles relating to quality of life were identified. Cummins constructed five criteria for allowing data on the quality of life to be included in his study, and 32 studies of the 1500 fulfilled these criteria. Together these 32 studies—overwhelmingly Western—proposed 173 names of “domains” for quality of life indicators (the aggregate number of domains was 351, but there were some repetitions). Cummins classified each named domain into one of the seven categories or left it unclassified as a residual.⁷⁶ His work was checked by two colleagues, and differences of opinion were resolved by discussion. Cummins found that 68% of the 173 values domains (83% of the 351 domains mentioned) could be sorted into seven domains.⁷⁷ He subsequently developed a Comprehensive Quality of Life survey instrument,

Table 5. *Shalom Schwartz: universal human values*

<i>Power</i> (social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources)
<i>Achievement</i> (personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards)
<i>Hedonism</i> (pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself)
<i>Stimulation</i> (excitement, novelty, and challenge in life)
<i>Self-direction</i> (independent thought and action—choosing, creating, exploring)
<i>Universalism</i> (understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature)
<i>Benevolence</i> (preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact)
<i>Tradition</i> (respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide)
<i>Conformity</i> (restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms)
<i>Security</i> (safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self)

consisting of subjective and objective measures of quality of life in each of the seven domains.⁷⁸

The seven domains are *Material well-being, Health, Productivity, Intimacy/friendship, Safety, Community, and Emotional well-being*. Material well-being, health, and safety clearly parallel Finnis' "life" dimension; productivity may be instrumental to "excellence in work and play"; intimacy/friendship parallels Finnis' friendship at least, and probably marriage as well; emotional well-being is a subcomponent, perhaps, of practical reasonableness (harmony of thoughts and feelings); the category community parallels friendship or sociability. Missing from Cummins' synthesis (not from his sources, nor from Andrews and Withey) is knowledge, practical reasonableness in the sense of meaningful choice, and harmony with a greater than human source of meaning and value.

(f) *Maureen Ramsay: universal psychological needs*

A similar exercise in list consolidation was done by Maureen Ramsay. Ramsay was interested in identifying "objective and essential" physical and mental health needs prior to developing empirical indicators for these needs and identifying means to satisfy needs or restore natural mental functioning. She studied the psychological needs identified by 10 authors (these are again different from Rokeach and Andrews' streams): Bretano (1973),⁷⁹ Maslow (1943),⁸⁰ Fromm (1956),⁸¹ Nielson (1963),⁸² Lane (1969),⁸³ Davies (1963),⁸⁴ Packard (1960),⁸⁵ Galtung (1980),⁸⁶ Mallman (1980),⁸⁷ and Krech, Crutchfield, and Livson (1969).⁸⁸ Ramsay classified their lists into six categories of needs based entirely on convergence, rather than reasoned argument.⁸⁹ Her work is included because it draws on the psychological literature that was known to, and has informed, the basic needs tradition in economic development.

Ramsay's set of human needs is: *Physical survival; Sexual needs;*⁹⁰ *Security; Love and relatedness; Esteem and identity; and Self-realization*. She draws mainly on clinical studies to substantiate that each category is a "need."⁹¹ Physical and security parallels Finnis' life; love and relatedness parallel friendship and affiliation; esteem and identity parallel self-expression imperfectly; self-realization likewise parallels self-integration and practical reason imperfectly. Sexual needs are distinct. She does

not mention knowledge, work, play, or religion as objective human needs.

(g) *Doyal and Gough: basic human needs*

Doyal and Gough (1991) in *A Theory of Need* proposed to develop a concept of need that is grounded both philosophically⁹² and practically—with respect to the indicator debates and other debates in the social sciences. Their theory defines universal needs as "preconditions for social participation which apply to everyone in the same way"⁹³ and concludes "that universal needs exist, that sets of basic and intermediate needs can be identified and that degrees of need satisfaction can be charted."⁹⁴ In particular, they identify exactly two universal "basic needs"—Physical Health and autonomy. Physical Health is conceived "as [physical survival and] the absence of specific diseases, where disease is defined according to the biomedical model." Autonomy of agency is defined as "the capacity to initiate an action through the formulation of aims and beliefs" and requires "mental health, cognitive skills and opportunities to engage in social participation." Each subcomponent of the needs is further defined. Doyal and Gough specify eleven "intermediate needs," involving culturally invariant characteristics of commodities which usually generate desirable capabilities (see Table 6).

These needs are distinct from the definitions of "dimensions" in two interesting ways. First, Doyal and Gough are deliberately limiting their scope to *preconditions* of well-being, not well-being itself. Their project, then, is fundamentally different from the current one, for it did not intend to identify the full range of relevant areas of well-being. Their approach is nonetheless included as representative of the kinds of "basic needs" which many others have also put forward.⁹⁵

Table 6. *Doyal and Gough: intermediate needs*

Nutritional food/water
Protective housing
Work
Physical environment
Health care
Security in childhood
Significant primary relationships
Physical security
Economic security
Safe birth control/childbearing
Basic education

A second difference of this approach is that basic needs are defined such that their fulfillment is normative. While Doyal and Gough would say that the “satisfiers” of these needs may vary widely, they argue that needs themselves can be specified (at varying levels of specificity—a need to be without cholera; a need for “adequate” housing) *without* consultation of the related population. Furthermore, because these needs are understood to be the “preconditions” of a fulfilled life, there is always a normative duty, they argue, to fulfill them.

These authors, then, provide “an assemblage of reminders of the range of possibly worthwhile activities and orientations open to one.”⁹⁶ The authors come from several distinct intellectual literatures on values. Studies in different cultural and geographical areas were included to some extent. This set of authors is limited—at a minimum we should also consider the prominent work in moral philosophy by John Rawls; the tremendous policy science approach set out by Harold Lasswell; Andrews and Withey, whose work on concern clusters stands upstream of much Social Indicators literature; and Qizilbash, who published his list recently in this journal. Their dimensions and others’ are set out in Appendix A.

As may be apparent, the description and consideration of even as few as seven different lists raises more issues than can be adequately addressed, and there would be a number of ways of organizing a discussion about points raised.

4. TOWARD A SYNTHESIS

Earlier I made the assertion that the epistemological foundation that Finnis sketches for these dimensions—based in only practical reason (is), but forming the basis for ethical reflection (ought) is a key contribution. I claimed that his account clarifies the relationship that “universal” dimensions of development may have (a) with empirical data, (b) with culturally diverse value systems and (c) with normative proposals. How does this work? Max-Neef (1992) and Grisez *et al.* (1987)⁹⁷ both agree that dimensions of the nature we sketched above should have the following:

—*The dimensions must be valuable*: they must be readily recognizable as the kinds of reasons for which oneself or others act. Put differently, they must be human “ends” rather than means only; intrinsically valued rather than only instrumentally conve-

nient (*only* is important, for many will be both).

—*The dimensions must “combine scope with specificity”*:⁹⁸ each dimension should be clear—which requires specificity—yet vague—so that persons of different cultures and value systems find them to be familiar. The dimensions should not overlap.

—*The dimensions must be “critical” and complete*: taken together, they should encompass any human value. These include dimensions which are presently valued by some groups but not others.

—*The dimensions do not pertain to one view of the good life*: dimensions of human flourishing represent the basic values people are seeking when they “be and do and have and interact”—morally or immorally. They are neither virtues nor personal qualities (gentleness, self-respect).

I would suggest that if one scrutinized each of the lists set out in Appendix A, according to these criteria, one could come up with a set of dimensions that seemed to work—the number and language would vary somewhat. But one could then use this set of dimensions as a hypothesis of universal values for further empirical testing, such as Schwartz and Diener have undertaken; as a “matrix” for participatory discussions on holistic development planning, such as Max-Neef has undertaken, or to identify unintentional side-effects of proposed development initiatives, as many organizations have not undertaken; or as a theoretical construct of the orthogonal dimensions of development. Iteration between these practical exercises and the theoretical set of dimensions would do real work in expanding the dimensions that are understood to be relevant to poverty reduction activities, and tempering one-sided materialism.

One might, at this point, propose a definitive list of basic dimensions of human development based on the evidence so far. I think an energetic argument about the definitive list may not be the most useful focus of debate, for the following reasons. First, the lists here are partly biased to Western sources; a synthesis exercise should take into account a much wider literature. This is not because Western sources are necessarily biased (many use crosscultural data); it is because until one compares their accounts with those analyzed in other cultures, one will not know whether or not they are. Second, even if one did propose a synthesis it would need recurrent: (i) empirical testing, and

(ii) participatory processes of discussion and deliberation. As one who believes in the value of such participation I prefer to leave that final rounding out to others—especially because there will always be some residual arbitrariness in any working set of dimensions, even if it proves useful, which is what authors have gestured to when they point out that their categories are “provisional,” and that there is no “magic number” of elements. Third, as the authors have shown, the lists may vary slightly depending upon the project to which they are applied. Finally, lists are useful not if they are universally acclaimed but if they are effectively used to confront the many challenges of this generation.

What I do hope to have given is a clear account of how a set of dimensions might be a nonpaternalistic and useful tool in addressing a number of knotty development problems—from participatory exercises to data collection drives, from national policy making initiatives to public debates—in a multidimensional fashion; and how they might be founded epistemologically in a way that respects the insights and aspirations of women and men from all races, classes, and political orientations.

5. CONCLUSION

Earlier we noted Sen’s reservations against the specification of basic capabilities were that such a list must avoid (a) being derived from a particular metaphysical standpoint, (b) being overspecified and (c) being too prescriptive. The account of dimensions proposed here avoid these charges. In simple terms, this account addresses the problem of overspecification by proposing generic dimensions that represent the most basic reasons for action

which are incommensurable in kind (recognizing also there will be incommensurabilities within expressions of a single dimension), rather than particular needs or virtues or capabilities. This account addresses the problem of irrelevance by establishing those dimensions on the basis of practical reason—dimensions which persons already are using as reasons for action. This account addresses the normativity question by suggesting that these dimensions are reasons for action which pertain to moral and immoral actions alike; hence their description alone does not allow any moral conclusions regarding tradeoffs.⁹⁹ Finally, the identification of basic reasons for action which are valid crossculturally commits one to a broadly realist ethic (in line with the capability approach), although not, on the face of it, to a single metaphysics.

The above discussion, and the identification of dimensions of human development, most exemplifications of which are not the direct objectives of economic investment, are valuable in throwing light on all of the possible angles of discussion on human development, and on the respective roles of participatory processes, and market and political and institutional systems in promoting it.¹⁰⁰ But it is evident that the dimensions are resource-dependent to different degrees; that the data available on the dimensions, and their comparability, vary dramatically; that individuals and cultures pursue these dimensions in radically different ways, and that in order for human development to become an operational objective in the sense of a feasible goal for which planning, monitoring and evaluation frameworks can be designed, heroic specification is required. In the spirit of the capability approach, the process of specification should be collaborative, visible, defensible and revisable.

NOTES

1. Galtung (1994, p. 20). “Longer lists could be imagined.”

2. Max-Neef (1993, p. 20). “Fundamental human needs are finite, few and classifiable.”

3. Griffin (1996, p. 30). “It does not matter if you disagree with my list.”

4. Finnis (1980, p. 90). “I suggest that other objectives...will be found, on analysis, to be ways or

combinations of ways of pursuing...one of [these] basic forms of good, or some combination of them.”

5. Doyal and Gough (1993) “autonomy.”

6. Nussbaum (2000) “Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally but in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work,

being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into mutual relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.”

7. Doyal and Gough (1993) “We contend therefore that universal objective basic needs exist, can be identified and their satisfaction monitored.”

8. Nussbaum (2000, pp. 82–83). “I shall now specify certain basic functional capabilities at which societies should aim for their citizens.”

9. Nussbaum (2000, p. 5). Nussbaum’s theory has been presented in Nussbaum (1988, 1990, 1992, 1995a,b, 1998b, 2000). The most complete articulation of this approach to date is in Nussbaum (2000).

10. The Complete Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition (1989).

11. This is the sense of well-being employed by Sen (1987, p. 27) but is distinct from, for example, the concept of well-being by Qizilbash (1997a,b).

12. See especially Sen (1985, 1992, 1999).

13. Explicit treatments of the “multidimensionality” of development include Stewart (1985), Bay in Fitzgerald (1977), Griffin and McKinley (1994, p. 2), Haq (1995), UNDP (1990), UNESCO (1995, 1998), Norton and Stephens (1995).

14. Mill distinguished “pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments” from pleasures from “mere sensation.” Sen (1981, p. 194), citing John Stewart Mill. See Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* circa 1176a. In economics, see the discussions of Cox (1997) in the July issue.

15. Research into values began in the 1930s, and were extended by Thurston (1959), leading to significant efforts (mostly of a psychological nature) to establish the empirical basis of the basic human needs in the 1960s and 1970s. Fitzgerald surveyed various empirical studies in support of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and concluded, with Cofer and Aply, that “Maslow’s theory of human needs has not been established to any significant extent.” (Fitzgerald, 1977, p. 46). The field has, however, moved swiftly since then. See, for example, Inglehart (1997), Veenhoven (1993), Schwartz and Bilsky (1987), Narayan (2000), Narayan, Chambers, Shah, and Petesch (2000), Argyle and Martin (1991), Diener and Suh (1997, 2000), Diener, Diener, and Diener (1995), Kahneman *et al.* (1999). Apfel-Marglin and Marglin

(1996), Bond (1988), Brekke, Luras, and Nyborg (1996), Chambers (1995), Cummins (1997, 2000a,b), Diener (1995), Gasper (1996a), Illich (1978), Inglehart (1993), Lasswell and Holmberg (1969), Max-Neef *et al.* (1989), Ng *et al.* (1982), Ng (1996), Rawls (1971), Renshon (1974), Rokeach (1969), Qizilbash (1998), Springborg (1981).

16. Sen (1970, p. 64).

17. See, for example, criticisms in Beitz (1986), Basu (1987), Crocker (1992, 1995), Daniels (1990), Nussbaum (1993), Qizilbash (1996a,b), Sugden (1993, p. 1953), Stewart (1996), Alkire (2001, Chapter 1).

18. Apfel-Marglin and Marglin (1990, p. 4).

19. Sen (1999, p. 257).

20. For brief historical accounts see, for example, Gasper (1996b), Hettne (1995, pp. 177–180), Streeten (1995), Doyal and Gough (1993), Moon and Bruce (1991), Springborg (1981).

21. Stewart (1985, Chapters 1, 2), Streeten, Burki, ul Haq, Hicks, and Stewart (1981, pp. 33–34), Van der Hoeven (1988, pp. 11–12), Sandbrook (1982, p. 1), Crosswell (1981, p. 3).

22. Stewart (1985) makes this clear in the opening chapter. See also the “human production function” of UNDP (1990). Sen’s criticisms are found in “Goods and People” (Sen, 1984, Chapter 20).

23. In 1984 Paul Streeten published a short article which reflected on “unanswered questions” of the basic needs approach: who defines needs; if the goal were full human flourishing or meeting basic needs; where participation fits in; which needs institutions can legitimately plan to meet; how to coordinate international funding for the meeting of basic needs. These goals still require systematic responses (Streeten, 1984).

24. In Sen (1984, pp. 513–515). Cf Anand and Ravallion (1993) and Streeten (1995).

25. Sen (1990).

26. Sen (1992, p. 40).

27. Sen (1992, pp. 42–46); and Sen (1999, pp. 76–85).

28. Sugden (1993, p. 1953).

29. *Greek Economic Review*. For another angle on the need to specify basic capabilities, see B. Williams' comments on Sen's Tanner lecture on the Standard of Living (1987, p. 100f). Beitz (1986) likewise raised the difficulty of identifying relative significance of different capabilities, as has Gasper.
30. Sen (1985, p. 32), see also Sen (1987, p. 108f), Sen (1992, p. 44f), Sen (1982b) "Description as Choice."
31. Sen (1980, 1983, 1993a,b, 1997, 1999).
32. Sen (1993a,b, p. 47).
33. Sen (1993a,b, p. 49).
34. Sen (1993a,b, p. 48).
35. Alkire and Black (1997). As we noted in this paper, the theory which John Finnis articulates is the product of a collaborative effort between himself, the theory's originator Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and others. It is worth mentioning that many persons including Nussbaum have the impression that Finnis' approach involves the conservative and paternalist constraint of human freedom when in fact he offers a liberal defence of the humanity of persons and the importance of free choice. We maintain that his controversial conclusions regarding homosexuality and contraception are not entailed by the fundamentals of his theory and, more importantly, that those fundamentals, which have been developed with a high degree of analytic precision, have much to offer in extending the capabilities approach. See also Finnis (1997, 1998, 1999).
36. Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis (1987, p. 103).
37. "In this way we can analytically unravel even very peculiar conventions, norms, institutions, and orders of preference, such as the aristocratic code of honour that demanded direct attacks on life in duelling." Finnis (1980, p. 91).
38. Finnis (1980, p. 92).
39. Such ethical deliberations obviously require further moral principles. For an introduction to these see Alkire and Black (1997), George (1993, Introduction), Finnis (1980, Chapter V), Grisez *et al.* (1987).
40. Finnis (1980, p. 68).
41. Obviously comparisons take place, and have some rational grounding (Griffin, 1986, Chapter V; Finnis, 1980, 1996) but comprise free choices or commitments (which constitute identity), not simple maximization.
42. There are broadly two ways we could use the term basic. The first is to think of all capabilities, physical and emotional and intellectual and spiritual, and find the smallest number of different kinds that nonetheless map the whole range of capabilities. The second is to consider a subset of the first—namely, those capabilities which are "basic" to human survival, depend on material resources, and can be publicly provided. This paper considers only the first as, oddly, it is the easier to identify, being less a function of culturally specific ideas of institutional responsibilities and public/private distinctions.
43. For a philosophical account of the dimensions see Finnis (1980, 1983), and Alkire and Black (1997).
44. Finnis (1980, p. 81).
45. Nussbaum (2000, pp. 70–71).
46. Nussbaum (2000, p. 74). Nussbaum's account of the capabilities approach is developed in Nussbaum (1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995a,b, 1998b, 2000).
47. Nussbaum (2000, p. 74).
48. Nussbaum (2000, p. 76).
49. Nussbaum (2000, p. 76).
50. Nussbaum (2000, p. 77).
51. The process for remaking this is not very clear; see Alkire and Black (1997).
52. Nussbaum (2000, p. 77 and p. 74, respectively).
53. Like Finnis and Griffin, Nussbaum's list has evolved over time. See, for example, Nussbaum (1993, 1995b, 1998a,b, 2000).
54. Nussbaum (1993, p. 42).
55. From Table 1, Max-Neef (1993, pp. 32–33).
56. Max-Neef (1993, p. 18).
57. In Grisez *et al.*'s (1987) formulation, identity might parallel self-expression.

58. Max-Neef (1992, p. 27). See likewise Schwartz (1992). Max-Neef does not give a complete account of the evolution of human needs nor of processes for recognizing the emergence of new needs. Therefore his conceptual account of needs is incomplete, because it is not clear, for example, how he determines whether or not “transcendence” is now a universal need.
59. Roughly 40,000 in the first study; 20,000 in the second.
60. That statement appears to be a contradiction in terms (if you ask a poor person to define poverty, then implicit in your selection of persons to approach is a definition of poverty already). But the procedure followed was to inquire in each location who was poor in the village or neighborhood, and to gather a group of those whom the community considered poor, and discuss with such groups the concepts of well-being and ill-being. Chapter 1 of *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear us* (Narayan, 2000) illustrates the dimensions; Chapter 2 relates how the poor define well-being and ill-being.
61. Narayan *et al.* (2000, Chapter 2).
62. The dimensions of ill-being were not mirror images of well-being, although some direct comparisons were, of course, noted (e.g., food). I consider the dimensions of well-being that emerged, because these are the closest thing to a practical reason-based definition of human flourishing by the poor.
63. Schwartz (1994b, p. 21) see also Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) and Schwartz (1992).
64. See Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, pp. 15–16, 36–37). The validity of his hypothesis to test the terminal-instrumental distinction might be challenged, but discussion of these procedures lie well outside the boundaries of this paper.
65. See especially Finnis’ account of the principles in Chang (1997).
66. Alternatively, one could consider the 30 terminal values tested—see Schwartz (1992, pp. 60–61).
67. Near-representative samples represent subgroups in proportions similar to their population proportions, and cover the full range of ages, gender, occupations, and educational levels. But near-representative samples do not employ rigorous sampling techniques. The 13 countries include “Australia—a near-representative sample of Adelaide adults ($n = 199$); Chile—a representative national sample ($n = 304$); China—a near-representative sample of Shanghai factory workers ($n = 208$); East Germany—a near-representative sample of Chemnitz adults ($n = 295$); Finland—two representative national samples averaged ($n = 3120$); France—a representative national sample ($n = 2339$); Israel—a near-representative sample of Jerusalem adults ($n = 170$); Italy—a representative national sample ($n = 210$); Japan—a representative sample of Osaka adults ($n = 207$), the Netherlands—a representative national sample of employed males ($n = 240$); Russia—a representative sample of Moscow adults ($n = 189$); South Africa—a representative sample of employed Whites in Midrand ($n = 249$); West Germany—a near-representative sample of adults from several states ($n = 213$).” Quoted from Schwartz, Personal Communication, May 19, 1999.
68. 7: of supreme importance. 6: very important. 5, 4 unlabeled; 3: important. 2, 1 unlabeled. 0: not important. –1: opposed to my values.
69. Schwartz cites Rokeach (1973), Braithwaite and Law (1985), Chinese Culture Connection (1987), Hofstede (1980), Levy and Guttman (1974), Munro (1985), and the “examination of texts on comparative religion and from consultations with Muslim and Druze Scholars” (1992, p. 17).
70. Schwartz (1994) summarizes progress until that date. His work also crossreferences other values theories and research. The 64 countries include two African, two North American, four Latin American, eight Asian, two South Asian, eight E European, one Middle Eastern, 14 European, two Mediterranean, Australia and New Zealand.
71. For an explanation of the test of comprehensiveness see Schwartz (1992, p. 37).
72. Schwartz (1994, p. 23).
73. Schwartz identifies three universal requirements: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and requirements for the smooth functioning and survival of groups. Discussion of the empirical findings of spirituality is in Schwartz (1992).
74. Cummins (1996).
75. The seminal work in social indicators research was Andrews and Withey (1976), who identified 29 “concern clusters” for social indicators research Andrews and

- Withey (1976, pp. 380–39); this literature develops their work.
76. A table of these terms and the residual appears in Cummins (1996, p. 309).
77. Cummins (1996, p. 309).
78. This instrument can be downloaded from http://acqol.deakin.edu.au/instruments/ComQol_A5.rtf.
79. Bretano put forward a hierarchy of 10 needs, which must be progressively satisfied in human development: maintenance of life, sexual needs, recognition by others, provision for well-being after death, amusement, provision for future, healing, cleanliness, education in science and art, need to create.
80. Maslow set out five categories of needs, again ordered in a hierarchy: physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem needs, self-actualization needs.
81. Fromm set out five needs: relatedness, transcendence-creativity, rootedness, sense of identity and individuality, the need for a frame of orientation and devotion.
82. Nielsen tried to identify “some of the central elements” of human need—14 in total: love, companionship, security, protection, sense of community, meaningful work, sense of involvement, adequate sustenance and shelter, sexual gratification, amusement, rest, recreation, recognition, respect of person.
83. Lane relates 10 needs which inform human political behavior: cognitive, consistency, social, moral, esteem, personality integration and identity, aggression expression, autonomy, self-actualization, and need for instrumental guide to reality, object appraisal and attainment.
84. Davies categories are: physical needs, social affectional needs, self-esteem and dignity needs, self-actualization needs.
85. Packard “discussed the eight hidden needs towards which marketing theory is orientated.” Ramsay (1992, p. 152)—emotional security, self-esteem, ego gratification, recognition and status, creativity, love, sense of belonging, power and a sense of immortality.
86. Galtung’s list has 28 rich elements grouped into security needs, welfare needs, identity needs, and freedom needs.
87. Mallman defined need as “a generic requirement that all human beings have in order not to be ill” Ramsay (1992, p. 152) quoting Mallman (1980, p. 37). One way he defines the need field is in terms of maintenance, protection, love, understanding, self reliance, recreation, creation, meaning, and synergy needs.
88. Lederer (1980) argues that the list of human motives given by Krech, Crutchfield and Livson can be analogously applied to needs Ramsay (1992, p. 152). Their list is too long and complex to print here.
89. Ramsay (1992, pp. 149–178).
90. Later she reclassified sexual needs as subsumed under physical survival “in their physical aspects” and partly under each other category “in their psychological aspects.”
91. For example, “Spitz (1949) made a comparative study of infants raised in nurseries by their own mothers and those raised in a foundling home. 100% of the first group survived and developed into normal healthy adults. In the second group there was a 37% mortality rate by the end of the second year, and those who did survive were more apathetic or hyperexcitable” (Ramsay, 1992, p. 154).
92. They draw on Braybrooke (1987), Raymond Plant, Alan Gewirth, Wiggins (1998), and Amartya Sen.
93. Doyal and Gough (1993, p. 5).
94. Doyal and Gough (1993, p. 9).
95. See the complete discussion of basic needs in Alkire (2001).
96. Finnis (1980, p. 81).
97. A simple method of evaluation is proposed and defended philosophically in Grisez, Boyle and Finnis.
98. Max-Neef (1992, p. 31).
99. As these are “basic reasons for action” which are recognized by practical reason as being “valuable” (not necessarily moral), then one might suspect an action which pursues one of them to be “better than” an action which pursues none. But, this judgement of “better” cannot meaningfully be made: consider Thomas who,

instead of sitting in the fog of depression and gloom, goes out in search of fresh bread, and steals it from an urchin to whom the baker had just given a warm loaf. In order to assess the “goodness” or “badness” of this action *even for Thomas* (who may sink further into

gloom because of his action later), additional principles are required.

100. Arrow (1997) again stresses the need for co-ordination of such systems to protect “invaluable goods.”

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(For Appendix A see opposite.)

APPENDIX A

Table 7. *Dimensions of human development*

Grisez et al. (1987)	Nussbaum (2000)	Max-Neef (1993)	Narayan et al. (2000)	Schwartz (1994)	Cummins (1996)	Ramsay (1992)	Doyal and Gough (1993)
Basic human values	Central human capabilities	Axiological categories	Dimensions of well-being	Human values	Domains of life satisfaction	Human needs	Intermediate needs
Life	Life	Subsistence	Material	Power	Material	Physical survival	Nutritional
Knowledge and appreciation of beauty	Bodily health Bodily integrity Senses, thought, imagination	Protection Affection Understanding	well-being Bodily well-being	Achievement Hedonism Stimulation	well-being Health Productivity	Sexual needs Security Love and relatedness	food/water Protective housing Work
Some degree of excellence in work and play	Emotions Practical reason	Participation Leisure Creation	Social well-being Security	Self-direction Universalism Benevolence	Intimacy/ friendship Safety	Esteem and identity Self-realization	Physical environment Health care
Friendship	Affiliation	Identity	Freedom of choice and action	Tradition Conformity	Community Emotional well-being		Security in childhood
Self-integration	Other species	Freedom	Psychological well-being	Security			Significant primary relationships
Coherent self-determination, or practical reason	Play Control over one's environment						Physical security Economic security Safe birth control/ childbearing Basic education
Religion, or harmony with some greater-than-human source of meaning and value							
Rawls (1993)	Galtung (1994)	Allardt (1993)	Andrews and Withey (1976)	Lasswell (1992)	Diener and Biwas (2000)	Qizilbash (1996a,b)	
Political liberalism	HR in another key	Comparative Scandanavian welfare study	Concern clusters	Human values	12 life domains	Prudential values for development	
The basic liberties	1. <i>Survival needs: to avoid violence</i>	<i>Having</i>	Media	Skill	Morality	Health/nutrition/ sanitation/rest/ shelter/security	
Freedom of movement, freedom of association and freedom of occupational	Individual and collective 2. <i>Well-being needs: to avoid misery</i> Nutrition, water, air, movement, excretion,	Econ resources Housing Employment Working conditions Health	Societal standards Weather Government Safety	Affection Respect Rectitude Power Enlightenment	Food Family Friendship Material resources	Literacy/basic intellectual and physical	

Continued next page

Table 7—continued

Rawls (1993)	Galtung (1994)	Allardt (1993)	Andrews and Withey (1976)	Lasswell (1992)	Diener and Biwas (2000)	Qizilbash (1996a,b)
Political liberalism	HR in another key	Comparative Scandanavian welfare study	Concern clusters	Human values	12 life domains	Prudential values for development
choice against a background of diverse opportunities Powers and prerogatives of office and positions of responsibility in political and economic institutions Income and wealth The social bases of self-respect	sleep, sex, protection against climate, against diseases, against heavy degrading boring work, self-expression, dialogue, education 3. <i>Identity needs: to avoid alienation</i> Creativity, praxis, work, self-actuation, realising potentials, well-being, happiness, joy being active subject, not passive client/object, challenge and new experiences, affection, love, sex; friends, offspring, spouse, roots, belongingness, networks, support, esteem, understanding social forces, social transparency, partnership with nature, a sense of purpose, of meaning, closeness to the transcendental, transpersonal	Education <i>Loving</i> Attachments/ contacts with local community, family and kin, friends, associations, work-mates <i>Being</i> Self-determination Political activities Leisure-time activities Opportunities to enjoy nature Meaningful work	Community House Money Job Services Recreation facilities Traditions Marriage Children Family relations Treatment Imagination Acceptance Self-adjustment Virtues Accomplishment Friends Religion Health Own education Beneficence Independence Mobility Beauty	Wealth Well-being	Intelligence Romantic relationship Physical appearance Self Income Housing Social life	capacities Self-respect and Aspiration Positive freedom, autonomy or self-determination Negative freedom or liberty enjoyment Understanding or knowledge Significant relations with others and some participation in social life Accomplishment (sort that gives life point/ weight)

4. *Freedom needs: choice*

In receiving/expressing
information and
opinion, of people/
places to visit and
be visited in,
consciousness
formation, in
mobilization,
confrontation,
occupation, job,
spouse,
goods/services,
way of life

Source. Categories used in a survey of 4,000 respondents from Scandinavia. See Allardt in Nussbaum and Sen (1993).