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Evaluation database

Evaluation report

2014 CAR: Interagency Operational Peer Review of the Response to the Crisis in the Central African Republic

Executive summary


On 11 December 2013, following consultations with IASC Principals, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) formally activated an IASC system-wide level 3 (L3) emergency response to the Central
Africa Republic. On 5 March 2014, the IASC Principals agreed to extend the L3 system-wide response for six months. A L3 emergency requires an operational peer review to be undertaken within 90 days of the declaration in order to review progress of the response and to recommend any adjustments. To this end, the review was conducted from 24 February to 5 March 2014 (including travel).


This field-oriented review focused on four areas: leadership; the humanitarian programme cycle; coordination; and accountability to affected people. It also looked at other aspects of the response operations, including security management, and the usefulness of the Transformative Agenda protocols associated with the declaration of the L3 emergency. Support from headquarters, including from the Emergency Directors and IASC Principals, was also considered. The aim was not to conduct an evaluation but to recommend adjustment to the response (or so-called "course correctors"), and to identify good practice. Review of the response and its efficiency was done only insofar as it would support such a goal. Additional information on the purpose, scope, and schedule of the review can be found in Annex I.


The team interviewed about 200 individuals, including national and local government representatives, international and national/local NGOs, donors, representatives of the military, HCT members, cluster coordinators, and the Senior Humanitarian Coordinator (S/HC). It also met with about 150 affected people and community leaders. In addition to Bangui, members of the team travelled to Bossangoa and Bambari. Observations were included in this report if they were noted by several stakeholders or if they could be substantiated by secondary data or results from the self-assessments. It is important to note that many of those interviewed had been deployed after the L3 declaration and thus did not have knowledge of the prior response.
4. In addition to key informant interviews, the team reviewed secondary information, including situation reports, planning frameworks, inter-cluster coordination group and HCT meeting summaries, internal lessons learned, briefing notes on thematic issues, and needs analyses, and other documents. It also collected qualitative feedback and perceptions through four self-assessment exercises with the HCT, the inter-cluster coordination group, and inter-agency groups in Bossangoa and Bambari. The self-assessments consisted of a series of questions covering the four key areas of the review and the results are referenced in this report, where applicable.

Findings and Conclusions:

The declaration of an IASC system-wide level 3 emergency response to the crisis resulted in significant capacity and leadership strengthening. Nevertheless, the response remains insufficient in scale and speed given the magnitude of the needs. Limited funding, lack of access and poor infrastructure have impeded the humanitarian effort. To date, only 21 percent of the planned US $547 million for humanitarian assistance has been obtained.
The complex nature of the crisis, with needs and priorities evolving almost on a daily basis, combined with limited funding, which for the most part is tied to specific projects, make it difficult for the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to both respond to and anticipate challenges. A stronger field presence is essential in this regard. The HCT must accelerate the operational scale-up in the provincial capitals and the surrounding rural areas to be able to better respond and monitor the crisis. It should also develop both advocacy and fundraising strategies, and establish a response monitoring framework to effectively communicate unmet needs and results.
The security management structure is another critical area of weakness. Humanitarians report a lack of confidence in the security analysis to take full advantage of the available humanitarian space. This report recommends several measures to move towards a more robust security management structure. The HCT must also take more decisive action on key response priorities, including rendering people safe. Protection of civilians must be addressed with a greater sense of urgency.

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Report information


Central African Republic





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