EVALUATION OF UNICEF’S EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SYSTEMS

Annexes
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Annexes
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ANNEX B – SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS

The evaluation’s survey was administered globally via the UNICEF internal email system. Response to the survey was voluntary. As of its close, the survey had recorded responses from 214 individuals from the following countries and Regional Offices:
What types of emergencies has your office responded to in the past 18 months?

- Earthquake: 28 (17%)
- Landslide: 9 (6%)
- Tsunami: 6 (4%)
- Volcanic activity: 6 (4%)
- Avalanche: 5 (3%)
- Flood: 24 (55%)
- Extreme temperatures: 10 (7%)
- Drought: 40 (26%)
- Wildfires: 0 (0%)
- Cyclones: 17 (11%)
- Storms / Wave surges: 18 (10%)
- Disease epidemic: 44 (39%)
- Insect / Animal plague: 1 (1%)
- Conflict / Complex emergencies: 73 (48%)
- Famine: 18 (12%)
- Displaced populations: 81 (49%)

Industrial accident: 1 (1%)
Transport accident: 3 (2%)
None: 0 (0%)

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

Were the emergency(ies) you responded to in the last 18 months identified by your office on the EWEA system?

- Yes (100% were identified on EWEA): 99 (32%)
- No (100% were not identified on EWEA): 12 (6%)
- Less than 50% were identified on EWEA: 18 (7%)
- More than 50% were identified on EWEA: 24 (8%)
- Does not apply: 50 (14%)
Does your office have an emergency / contingency plan in place?

- Yes [189] - 88%
- No [25] - 12%

When was the last time you used the EWEA system?

- Less than 30 days ago [40] - 21%
- Less than 6 months ago [71] - 33%
- Less than 12 months ago [46] - 21%
- I have never accessed the EWEA system [68] - 25%

How useful is the EWEA system in preparing your section to deal with an emergency?

- 1 - Not useful at all [29] - 14%
- 2 [30] - 14%
- 3 [77] - 36%
- 4 [84] - 30%
- 5 - Very useful [14] - 7%

Does your section have the tools and guidance it needs to respond to different levels of emergencies?

- Very confident - we have all of the tools and guidance necessary to respond to emergencies [33] - 15%
- Confident - we have some of the tools and guidance necessary to respond to emergencies [139] - 65%
- Less confident - we have limited tools and guidance necessary to respond to emergencies [80] - 14%
- Not confident - we do not have the tools and guidance we need to respond to emergencies [12] - 6%
Which of the following training on emergency preparedness have you participated in the past 12 months?

- UNICEF internal training: 77 (36%)
- UNICEF led training - with partners: 29 (14%)
- External training: 28 (13%)
- I have not participated in emergency preparedness training in the past 12 months: 127 (59%)

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

Have you participated in any simulations on emergency preparedness in the past 12 months?

- Yes: 79 (36%)
- No: 138 (64%)
- I don't know: 2 (1%)

Are you a member of a roster, list or other group that is maintained by UNICEF to quickly ramp up support in an emergency?

- Yes: 71 (33%)
- No: 123 (57%)
- I don't know: 20 (9%)
ANNEX C – SUMMARY OF DESK STUDY RESULTS

To complement the information gained from other investigative methods, the evaluation included a desk study of emergency preparedness of various UNICEF COs. This study comprised three sections:

1. Comparison of risk/hazard analysis in 30 countries, considering the risks identified in EWEA vs. actual emergencies responded to by COs during 2012;
2. Comparison of preparedness actions planned and indicated within EWEA with actual preparedness activities as reported in COAR and other documents accessible on the CO portal, together with documents shared by UNICEF with the evaluation team prior to and during visits; and
3. Comparison of comments, conclusions and recommendations related to emergency preparedness with UNICEF evaluations and lessons learned exercises with similar studies on the same events by other organizations. This examined reports on the Pakistan flood response of 2010 and HOA famine response of 2011.

1. Comparison of Emergencies Anticipated vs. Actual Emergencies

The analysis compared 30 countries grouped into three nominal sub-groups of 10:

i) High risk of emergency with low capacity: Somalia, Mali, the DRC, Haiti, Niger, Mauritania, Kenya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Sudan;
ii) Medium emergency risk with medium capacity: Columbia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Nepal, Philippines, Georgia, Uzbekistan; and
iii) Low emergency risk with high capacity: Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Thailand, Morocco, Senegal, Namibia, Ghana.

The analysis considered the frequency and type of emergency (natural disaster, conflict, epidemic, etc.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Emergencies experienced</th>
<th>Number/% predicted EWEA</th>
<th>Number/% not predicted EWEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55 (90%)</td>
<td>6 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23 (74%)</td>
<td>8 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>81 (84%)</td>
<td>16 (16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sampling is not statistically significant; hence it is not possible to draw clear conclusions. Nonetheless some tentative observations may be presented:

- As might be expected, the experience and capacity of the COs in Group (i) to anticipate emergencies is better than for Group (ii) or (iii).
- The relative lack of ability of medium-risk countries to anticipate emergencies appears a concern. Weakness of the low-risk countries is perhaps less worrisome as the impact of emergencies in these countries upon CCCs is likely to be much less than for the second group.
- Despite the advantage of hindsight, the list of emergencies that were not anticipated is surprising. It might be expected that epidemics and natural disasters would dominate this list, as by nature,
these are unpredictable. Emergencies of acute malnutrition were not anticipated in four countries in 2012 despite the fact that three of these (Mali, Mauritania and Niger) have been recognized as famine-prone for most of the past decade. Refugee crises were not anticipated in three countries: Jordan, Lebanon and Mauritania – despite the fact that these countries border nations experiencing extreme conflict and/or complex crises for well over one year. That both refugee and nutrition-related crises were missed in the WCARO region indicates some oversight in review of preparedness by the RO.

2. **Comparison of Planned (EWEA) Preparedness Actions vs. Actual Preparedness Completed**

The intention had been to study CO documentation and consider the following metrics:

- Comparison of planned vs. actual content of preparedness activities, whether these focused upon basic emergency needs (e.g. water, health, nutrition) or whether higher needs were also considered (e.g. education, protection);
- Comparison of planned vs. actual preparedness, whether these included contingency plans or minimum readiness for multi-hazards;
- Comparison of planned vs. actual early warning;
- Comparison of planned vs. actual early action;
- Comparison of planned vs. actual completion of simulation exercise;
- Comparison of planned vs. actual preparedness activities using explicit (rather than inferred) targets as described in CCCs; and
- Comparison of planned vs. actual preparedness activities for building community resilience.

However, this information was not found to be presented consistently in EWEA or other key CO documentation accessible on the intranet, and/or presented during CO visits. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn. The principal finding from this exercise is that UNICEF does not comprehensively compile what is completed for preparedness.

A few observations can be presented from the review of the documentation:

- There is no uniform definition of an emergency for UNICEF across COs;
- UNICEF only records emergencies that were responded to. There is no record of emergencies that were missed, or which UNICEF COs judged did not require response.
- Preparedness appears to be conducted according to variable capacity of CO, not to need. The CCC's should be interpreted as minimum standards, which can be exceeded, but should always be targeted. However the CCCs do not appear prominently as targets in the majority of COs' EWEA or other preparedness reports. As noted in the Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation, Investing in Humanitarian Action, Phase III (2006–2009), page 57, "It is difficult to measure performance if the results expected are not clear, and the emphasis has been on compliance with procedures and delivering a list of activities."
- Some countries are still using the EPRP system as a basis for preparedness.
3. Comparison of preparedness in UNICEF emergency response evaluations vs. external evaluations

A comparison was made between UNICEF and external reports on responses to the HOA famine in 2011 and Pakistan floods in 2010. This was a qualitative analysis based upon review of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- IASC Real Time Evaluation of Pakistan Flood Response, 2010</td>
<td>- IASC Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Humanitarian Response Index Pakistan Report 2011 “Lessons from the Floods”</td>
<td>- “A Dangerous Delay: The Cost of Late Response to Early Warnings in the 2011 Drought in the Horn of Africa” Oxfam and Save the Children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The comparison of emergency studies is obviously subjective and, hence, the following are presented as points for consideration:

- UNICEF has included preparedness as a key factor in evaluations since 2006 (Somalia). While other external evaluations have made recommendations “to improve preparedness,” until recent HOA studies, these recommendations have appeared largely superficial, without defining the scope or purpose of activities to be performed.
- In terms of preparedness, the HOA crisis appears unique as the single largest humanitarian emergency response in recent times, which might have been anticipated and forestalled, but was not. The comparable recent emergency responses to Darfur 2005, Pakistan floods 2010 and Haiti earthquake were crises, which might, at best, have been anticipated as possible events. The HOA crisis could have, and perhaps should have, been anticipated as a probable event.
- From a preparedness perspective alone, it then appears unfortunate that UNICEF did not conduct a comprehensive evaluation in real time, or after the crises. The lessons learned exercise provides a valuable insight, yet misses external perspectives, focuses a disproportionate attention upon corporate response mechanisms and misses operational practices, which might inform future crises.
- UNICEF’s lessons learned are heavily oriented toward the UNICEF response after L3 crisis was declared. This response was largely good. The exceptional aspect of the Horn of Africa crisis was that the early warning worked well, but this did not result in early action and thousands of lives were lost, which might have been averted. The lessons learned deals with the deficiency of early action in a rather superficial manner (e.g. the Executive Summary simply states, “The scale of the pre-L3 UNICEF response was constrained by the available funding”). Several of the other key reports tackle the problem of inadequate early response more directly: Save the Children/Oxfam; UN WFP; UN FAO; IASC. These other reports very clearly highlight the failure of the system and present constructive recommendations to improve contingency early action responses. Given that the crisis was primarily characterized as famine and UNICEF is the global leader for nutrition, the lessons learned exercise appears lightweight.
Neither at the Kenya CO level nor at the ESARO level is there evidence that system changes have resulted from the UNICEF’s lessons learned exercise. If the situation were repeated, it is not certain that UNICEF’s system would decide upon early action any better than in 2011.
Focus Group Workshop

**Emergency Preparedness Scenario Workshop**

**Suggested Participants**

1. **UNICEF**
   a. Head of Office
   b. Deputy Head of Office
   c. Heads of Programmes
   d. Emergency Focal Point
   e. Head of Logistics/Supplies
   f. Cluster Coordinator (if applicable)

2. Contact person from selected implementation partners
3. Government
4. Contact points for Emergency Preparedness and main contacts of each UNICEF division

**Goal of Workshop**

This exercise is not intended to run an emergency response scenario. Rather, it seeks to assess the overall preparedness of the UNICEF office in terms of planning, preparations, systems and overall understanding of emergency response.

**Expected Time Commitment**

Two Hours

**Scenario**

A brief (1–2 paragraph) scenario will be developed for each CO that is from the CO's current EWEA.

**Questions**

1. Is this scenario identified as a potential risk on the EWEA?
2. How does the EWEA provide guidance to your office in responding to this emergency?
3. What would likely be the “trigger” for this office to:
   a. Become aware of this situation?
   b. Make a decision to take action?
   c. Determine when external help was needed?
4. Who is responsible for coordinating emergency response in this office?
5. Is there an updated emergency plan/manual in the office?
6. Is there an up-to-date emergency contact list?
7. Are there pre-signed contracts with partners to deliver aid appropriate for this scenario?
8. Do implementing partners have the expertise needed to deliver aid appropriate for this scenario?
9. Which UN partners would you contact and share info with immediately?
10. Who would you quickly mobilize in clusters you lead?
11. How would you plan to monitor the situation, and your response?
12. How would you determine that you are reaching the most affected populations?
13. Is the office aware of the location of other responses in similar situations they can refer to for best practice?
14. Does the Government have the capacity to address this situation?
   a. If yes, what role does the UNICEF office play?
15. How would the UNICEF Regional Office be involved, if at all?
16. What standard UNICEF guidance should be followed in this scenario?
17. Does the office have adequate human resources to address this emergency?
   a. If no, how would you go about securing those resources?
18. Does the office have adequate financial resources to address this emergency?
   a. If no, how would you go about securing adequate funding?
19. Does the office have adequate supplies to address this emergency?
   a. If no, how would you go about securing adequate supplies?
20. Are there other major bottlenecks you think you would encounter?
21. How has UNICEF’s regular programming helped to build local capacity so that they are able to respond adequately, or limit the extent of the emergency?
22. To what degree does UNICEF continue its regular programming during this emergency?
23. What the understanding of this office about how broad and deep the UNICEF response should be in light of fulfilling the CCCs?
24. How would you determine, post-response, how well your preparedness plans, etc. worked? Didn’t work?
   a. How would you share this learning with the rest of UNICEF?
25. If you had a Magic Wand, what would you do, or have done, differently?
Country Office KII Field Guide

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS AND BACKGROUND

1. For you, what does emergency preparedness mean?
2. In your view, what are the main elements of emergency preparedness? Look at two key components: Early Warning (how does CO notice if floods, famine etc. are likely) and Early Action (contingency plans and activities relative to those scenarios which are estimated likeliest to occur).

OFFICE BACKGROUND ON EMERGENCIES

1. Would you explain the emergencies that your Country Office has had to deal with?
2. What type of emergencies do you believe pose the greatest risk for this country?

MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION

1. Would you explain changes your office has carried out in the past two years to better prepare you for emergencies?
2. Within your office who is responsible for and accountable for Emergency Preparedness?
3. Who else in your office is engaged in emergency preparedness planning and activities?

GUIDANCE AND TOOLS

1. Would you please identify the tools and guidance that you have available to you in preparing for emergency?
2. Would you explain which of these tools you use the most and why?
3. Is there any guidance or any operating procedures that you are missing?
4. Would you explain the advantages of the Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) system in helping your office prepare for emergencies?
5. Would you explain the process your office uses for considering and completing the EWEA?
6. What sources of evidence does your office use to assess risk and plan for emergencies?
7. In your experience do you think that the EWEA is a sufficient mechanism as it stands for linking warning with action, why or why not?
8. How can you use the EWEA to flag situations where there may not be a national emergency, but where certain regions, groups may be at risk?
9. Do you feel that there are any challenges in ensuring coverage across ethnic groups, geographical regions?
10. Are there ways in which the EWEA system might be improved upon?

SUPPORT AND FEEDBACK FROM REGIONAL OFFICES, HEADQUARTERS, EMOPS

1. What do you understand as the role of the Regional Office in helping you prepare for emergencies?
2. Would you explain what types of support the Regional Office has provided you in preparing for emergencies?
3. What kinds of feedback do you receive from Regional Offices on your EWEA? Does this feedback meet your expectations? Why or why not?
4. What is missing, if anything, in the emergency preparedness support you receive from Regional Offices?
5. What do you understand as the role of HQ – NY and EMOPS Geneva – in helping you prepare for emergencies?
6. What are the most useful types of Emergency Preparedness support you receive from HQ and from EMOPs?
7. What is missing, if anything, in the emergency preparedness support you receive from HQ; from EMOPS Geneva?

FOR COUNTRIES THAT HAVE HAD EXPERIENCED RECENT EMERGENCIES
1. At the point of the crisis, what preparedness actions had your office already taken?
2. What preparedness practices or actions did your office carry out that worked well in helping you respond to the emergency?
3. How well did the EWEA system serve to prepare you for the emergency?
4. How accurate would you say your risk/hazard analysis proved to be?
5. Did the EWEA system help trigger response actions for your office?
6. What were the main steps you took at the onset of the emergency to mobilize for response?
7. What were the bottlenecks, if any, in carrying out the steps at the initial stages of an emergency?

FOLLOW-UP AND LEARNING
1. What would you explain as innovative or best practices that your office used in preparing for or responding to an emergency?
2. What are the processes your office uses to assess your performance in an emergency?
3. In your emergency experience, what are the main lessons your office has learned about what works and what could have been better in emergency preparedness?
4. What evidence does your office maintain about the results of different types of preparedness activities – in contributing to meeting the CCCs?
5. How does your office share what you have learned in emergency preparedness with other offices in your region?

HUMAN RESOURCES
1. Which people in your office have significant experience and/or skills for dealing with emergency situations?
2. How do you consider emergency experience and emergency expertise in your recruitment process?
3. How do you factor in human resource requirements into your planning for emergencies?
4. What are the gaps you may have identified in terms of experience and expertise available in your office to deal with emergencies?
5. What kinds of expertise would you like to be able to bring in in at the onset of an emergency?
6. What are the steps that you would take to access critical human resources in an emergency?
7. Did you seek/get outside help in bringing in specific skills expertise to your office? If so, what was the mechanism you used? (e.g. first line responders roster, regional partners’ roster, UNICEF regional roster, HQ secondment, etc.)
8. How satisfied were you with the timeliness of response in accessing expertise from the rosters?
9. What lessons have you learned about human resource requirements for emergency response (for offices that have had emergencies)?
CAPACITY BUILDING FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

1. What specific training or other emergency preparedness capacity-building activities has your office participated in over the past two years? Who participated from your office?
2. What gaps in your CO emergency preparedness skills, if any, have the simulations and training helped you identify?
3. How do you use limited human resources in your office to the best advantage when dealing with emergencies? Preparedness?

FINANCIAL

1. In budgeting for your CAP and AWP, how do you decide what to budget for emergency preparedness? Is there a budget line item for preparedness activities?
2. What typically happens if a major emergency happens? Are CO funds then reprogrammed?
3. In the COs' fundraising, do you try to raise funds for preparedness? Do you have tools that you use to help you raise funds for preparedness activities?
4. What are the mechanisms that Country Offices have in place to quickly raise money when an emergency happens?

SHORT AND LONG-TERM PROGRAMMES

1. What is your understanding of Emergency Risk Informed Programming?
2. How does your office build in emergency preparedness in your program planning processes?
3. How well are provisions for resilience and longer-term recovery currently built into CO preparedness planning?
4. At the Country Program Document Stage how do you build in risk assessment and analysis to your SitAns?
5. How does your office incorporate Risk Assessment and Emergency Preparedness into your annual work planning and mid-term review process?
6. How do you address emergency risk and emergency preparedness for each of WASH, Nutrition, Child Protection, Health, GBV, Education?
7. Would you identify some examples of best practices (for each of WASH, Nutrition, Child Protection, Health, GBV, Education) that you have incorporated into your programmes that support early recovery and building resilience?
8. How might COs structure programming so as to ensure that the Program divisions can better support emergency preparedness and more resilience of the country?
9. How does business continuity planning help you sustain essential program operations during emergency?

PARTNERS IPS

1. Would you explain how emergency preparedness and response is built into your agreements with implementing partners?
2. How do you assess partners’ capacity to prepare for emergencies? Are there tools or benchmarks that you can use for this?
3. Would you explain how you work with implementing partners to ensure and enhance their emergency preparedness? Capacity building?
4. What if your NGO partners are not “fit to act” in an emergency (e.g. inflexible management structures)? Are there SoPs that can help you?
GOVERNMENT
1. Who do you work with most closely in government on emergency preparedness?
2. Would you explain how the CO is involved with emergency preparedness in government?
3. What are the specific activities that your office is involved in to support capacity building of government? On emergency preparedness? On early response planning?
4. How does your CO advocate for equity in its preparedness efforts with government?

INTER-AGENCY PARTNERS
1. How do you plan emergency preparedness activities with your in-country UN partners?
2. What works the best in inter-agency preparedness planning? What are its limitations?

CLUSTERS
1. In which ways has the CO, in its role as cluster lead, been able to influence the prioritization of emergency preparedness within the cluster?

IASC Field Guide
1. What has been UNICEF’s contribution towards and benefit derived from participation in the IASC Preparedness SWG? Comment upon UNICEF’s engagement in:
   - Process: developing understanding, facilitating and leading initiatives
   - Outputs: specific decisions and actions which develop preparedness
2. Estimate the time and resources that UNICEF has dedicated to the IASC SWG since its inception in 2002.
3. Is there evidence to indicate that the IASC SWG on preparedness is on track?
4. Would you agree with a criticism that IASC SWG preparedness group is focused upon developing preparedness actions for implementation in 3–5 years? Is there evidence that this SWG has been able to influence emergencies that are happening now?
5. How compatible is UNICEF’s risk/hazard analysis with that of key IASC SWG preparedness members?
6. What evidence exists to indicate that the IASC SWG has served as a platform to share and promote best practice?
7. How is UNICEF exploring the harmonization of resources for training and monitoring of preparedness at the IASC SWG level? What evidence exists to indicate these initiatives are gaining acceptance?

Regional Office Field Guide
RESOURCES
How has UNICEF harnessed the human, financial, supply & logistics and intellectual resources at its disposal to achieve its intended emergency preparedness outcomes?
1. Human Resources (RO)
   a. Does UNICEF regional office staff have sufficient capacity (consider both time and competency) to undertake emergency preparedness work? What evidence exists?
   b. There is an observation from another UNICEF colleague that "the development of emergency preparedness in UNICEF is undermined because staff generally lack rounded out skills. These are more difficult to develop because UNICEF is no longer a career for life and thus there is a loss of (emergency) experience with UNICEF now increasingly reliant upon external consultants and short-term contracted staff." Would you agree with this statement in your region? What steps are being implemented in regional office itself
and in country offices at the initiation or with support from regional office to improve emergency preparedness skills amongst key staff? What evidence exists in support of narrative responses?

c. Are any of UNICEF’s automated risk analysis systems potentially counterproductive in achieving change in staff and partners toward a risk-aware mindset?

2. Financial Resources
   a. Is funding sufficient to realize the intended goals of UNICEF preparedness activities across the region?
   b. How well is emergency preparedness financially integrated within UNICEF for ensuring sustainability of emergency preparedness internally and among partners?

3. Supplies
   a. Does UNICEF have access to, or is the organization able to acquire, sufficient supplies to be prepared to respond in times of emergencies?

PROGRAMMING

1. What initiatives have been initiated or supported by the regional office to ensure that core country programmes in areas such as Education, WASH and Protection are risk informed?
2. Are core programmes designed to be able to rapidly scale – either up or down, as appropriate – in times of emergency response?
3. Who is responsible and how is the decision reached to suspend or alter core programmes in response to an emergency – is this process explained as part of the preparedness work?
4. How will the regional office maintain ongoing support to all countries in the region when an emergency affects one specific country office?
5. To what extent are regional program staff involved in creating and having oversight on emergency preparedness actions relating to programming?
6. How systematically are provisions for longer-term recovery incorporated into emergency preparedness plans?
7. How well integrated is emergency preparedness, and humanitarian response, into regular programmes?
8. How has business continuity planning ensuring sustained action in recent emergencies?
9. Is there evidence that UNICEF’s emergency preparedness activities have reduced risk and vulnerability to the impact of hazards?
10. Which, if any, of UNICEF’s emergency preparedness activities and outputs have reduced waste and realized efficiencies?

MANAGEMENT

1. How many emergencies typically occur per annum in the region? How many does UNICEF respond to? How many are missed or receive grossly sub-optimal response? What evidence exists?
2. Is there evidence that heightened emergency preparedness has resulted in timelier, strengthened responses?
3. How many emergency interventions have been evaluated or lessons learned exercises conducted? What was the role of the emergency office in initiating or contributing to these exercises? What evidence exists to indicate follow-up to recommendations?
4. To what extent, if any, does regional office use the (CO) emergency preparedness plans in actual emergencies? What evidence can be presented? Are any plans created in consideration of a crisis having regional or sub-regional consequences?
5. Do UNICEF’s emergency preparedness plans result in responses that are proportional to actual emergencies? Has the regional office conducted any analysis to compare preparedness plans with subsequent emergency situations?
6. How relevant, appropriate, and timely has the support from ROs to COs, been in boosting overall emergency preparedness? What evidence can be presented in support?
7. What accountability tools do regional emergency officers have at their disposal to ensure compliance across UNICEF’s emergency preparedness activities? Are these tools utilized? What is the outcome?

8. How does the regional office analyze risk across the portfolio of countries in the region? What evidence can be presented? To what extent does the risk categorization compiled by EMOPS compare with the assessment of risk (if any) conducted by regional and country offices?

9. How has UNICEF’s emergency preparedness strategy been developed, managed, maintained and adapted?

10. How clear are roles and responsibilities throughout UNICEF for ensuring adequate emergency preparedness? “The EWEA system is a performance monitoring tool on preparedness and risk analysis.” From EWEA SOP document, which continues, “Primary responsibility always lies with regional offices, with HQ providing active support.” Is this feasible and practiced in the region? What evidence is available?

11. How effectively have roles and responsibilities been met according to UNICEF’s existing Accountability Framework?

12. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that UNICEF can review its emergency preparedness performance and practice continuous learning?

13. How does UNICEF realize organizational learning about best practice in emergency preparedness?

14. Which of UNICEF’s emergency preparedness activities or systems exemplify best practice?

15. Is the regional office participating in any regional initiatives that relate to emergency preparedness? This includes collaborations with regional Governmental (e.g. African Union) entities and regional non-governmental agencies.

16. Is UNICEF’s approach to CO emergency preparedness relevant across the variety of contexts that exist in the region?

17. To what extent are CO EWEA reviews conducted by RO? What obstacles exist?

18. “COs are required to update the various sections at least twice during the year, during annual review/work planning and during mid-year review.” from Oct 2011 EWEA Quality Review. To what extent is this practiced, feasible and useful? What evidence exists?

19. Is there a shared understanding across RO, CO and key partners regarding terminology relating to emergency preparedness? Is this a practical or theoretical obstacle? Terms like “emergency,” “disaster” and “humanitarian action” do not always have the same meaning to different people. Is the definition (page 1 of TOR extracted from CCCs) commonly understood and applied? Is the criteria of “large numbers of a population” restrictive in this region? Are these terms in common use in other UN organizations and in key partner organizations? HERMI paper uses somewhat different definition of emergency (“an event which has a humanitarian impact”) as indicator of inconsistent use in UNICEF.

20. Is the RO able to immediately coordinate with partners, assess the situation and advocate for the CCC, and manage an appropriate surge (HR and supplies) from “Making UNICEF Country Programmes Emergency Risk Informed” Is this happening? Is this realistic to expect that appropriate surge will be managed?

21. HERMI paper stresses the need to prioritize situations according to hazard. But what impact are we talking about? The same event (e.g. earthquake) might have a “critical” impact upon functioning of schools but only a “moderate” impact in terms of loss of life. A coup might lead to suspension of judicial system and “critical” violations of human rights, but again might have only “minor” impact upon loss of life – what metrics can be practically used by CO’s and what thresholds applied?

22. "Contribute to a Common Country Assessment and UNDAF that promotes a holistic approach to emergency risk management and DRR, moving away from stand-alone contingency planning" From HERMI paper – does this present any challenge for UNICEF? Will UNICEF be willing to identify sensitive issues (forced displacement, withholding of assistance to affected communities (e.g. Myanmar)), which could be problematic for wider UNDAF, even if these are vitally important for emergency preparedness?

23. Is UNICEF’s approach to CO emergency preparedness relevant across a variety of contexts?
24. Are the emergency preparedness systems of UNICEF well adapted to meet the requirements of crises that are substantially restricted to remote programming?

25. How are preparedness actions conducted for L2 emergencies in the region, given the lack of SSOPs for response?

26. What emergency preparedness activities appear especially effective and efficient regarding cost/benefit (cost in wider sense: financial cost + human cost)? Which activities appear not to be effective and/or efficient? What evidence or concrete feedback/commentary exists?

27. Which staff/functions does the regional office determine need to be involved in emergency preparedness? Does this list compare with perceptions at country office level?

28. What contribution does the Regional Office make to the development of SITANS (reference Regional Performance in UNICEF’s Global SITAN review)? How is this conducted and what are the positive and negative aspects of this process?

29. In your region the Global SITAN review noted that (number) ex (total number of) countries mentioned conflict as a risk factor and described that (number) gave insufficient attention to conflict. What are the factors here? It appears that conflict risk is not adequately described.

PARTNERSHIPS

1. How effective have emergency preparedness efforts been with respect to UNICEF’s actions as Cluster lead agency at CO as well as HQ levels?

2. How uniformly well understood and applied are the various aspects of emergency preparedness by UNICEF major partners?

3. What has been UNICEF’s added value to and from inter-agency and regional partners’ emergency preparedness efforts?

4. To what extent have the gains reaped through UNICEF’s engagement in inter-agency processes justified the investments in the same?

5. To what extent have UNICEF’s emergency preparedness interventions supported its commitment under the revised CCCs to strengthen national capacity?

6. Has UNICEF advocated for equity in its emergency preparedness efforts as part of it national capacity development and other upstream activities?
Implementing Partner KII Field Guide

PARTNERSHIP BACKGROUND
1. How long have you been a UNICEF partner?
2. What responsibilities does your organization have as part of the UNICEF partnership agreement?
3. What responsibilities does UNICEF have to your organization as part of the UNICEF partnership agreement?
4. What kind of tools/guidelines has UNICEF given your organization for use prior to or during emergencies?
5. Do we have the partnership agreement?

BAROMETER OF PARTNER READINESS
1. What are the mechanisms for bringing your organization into action in the event of an emergency?
2. How quickly after an emergency would your organization be mobilized?
3. What does your organization see as its own strengths and weaknesses with a view to emergency preparedness?
4. Has UNICEF taken any steps to help your organization take advantage of or address these?
5. Is there an agreement or some kind of framework in place with government to facilitate your organization’s work in an emergency?

CONTRACTING RELATIONSHIP OR PARTNERSHIP
1. Does your organization have any involvement in UNICEF’s own emergency preparedness planning (e.g. consultations over emergency forecasting)
2. Does UNICEF involve your organization in any kind of real-time monitoring during or prior to an emergency situation?
3. What are UNICEF’s reporting requirements for accountability that have been agreed with your organization for an emergency?

PAST EXPERIENCE
1. Has your organization been involved in responding to an emergency prior to their partnership with UNICEF?
2. Has your organization been involved in responding to an emergency since its partnership with UNICEF?
3. If yes, what is your view on how well UNICEF was prepared for that event and responded well?
4. If yes did you feel that UNICEF acted in timely manner so that as an implementing partner you were able to move forward quickly or did you have to wait for a lot of decisions from above?
5. Did UNICEF come back to your organization afterwards (a) provide feedback, and (b) ask for lessons learned?
Government KII Field Guide

BAROMETER OF GOVERNMENT READINESS
1. Who within the government is responsible for overall emergency preparedness?
2. When and how does planning for emergency situations take place?
3. Does the government have any specific guidelines or policies for taking account of children within any emergency response?
4. Could you supply those contact points and guidelines?
5. To what extent is emergency preparedness something that involves the international community in your country (and specifically, UNICEF)?
6. If an emergency situation happened tomorrow, please walk through the steps that would take place in the first hours and days, then longer-term.

BAROMETER OF UNICEF SUPPORT
1. Is there any systematic way in which UNICEF would be involved in emergency planning by government (e.g. invitation to periodic planning meetings)?
2. Is there any systematic way in which the government is involved in emergency planning by UNICEF?
3. How, if at all, and how frequently has UNICEF offered the government support in emergency preparedness?
4. Capacity building?
5. Logistical advice?
6. Assistance with specific policies or guidelines?
7. Simulations?
8. Other?
9. Is there at least one single tangible product of UNICEF involvement (e.g. specific set of skills, policies, etc.)? Please identify as many as possible. What evidence can be used to support that these products exist?
10. How does UNICEF’s support on preparedness compare to/complement that of other organizations?

PAST EXPERIENCE
1. If there has been an emergency situation in the country in the last 2 years:
2. How well, in your view, did the government anticipate the emergency situation?
3. Was the government able to respond to the situation quickly?
4. Was the government able, in your view, to respond in an appropriately large scale to the situation?
5. Was the international response (i) essential, (ii) a support to the government’s own response, (iii) of little, or no relevance?
6. Did the government feel the international community anticipated the situation adequately?
7. Did the government feel the international response was timely, appropriate?
8. Is there any specific comment on UNICEF’s response?
9. What if anything was UNICEF’s value-added?
10. What could be improved upon in the future?
11. Are there specific steps that UNICEF could take to improve emergency preparedness?
Supplies and Logistics KII Field Guide

1. Who are the key points of contact for Supply Division (a) at HQ level; (b) Regional Level; (c) Country level?
2. Where does responsibility for supply decisions rest at the CO and RO level?
3. In what ways is Supply Division involved in preparing (a) COs (b) ROs (c) HQs for emergencies?
4. What are the major changes Supply Division has made in the past two years to improve preparedness? Timeliness of response?
5. In the event of an emergency, when and how would Supply Division be involved in a response?
6. What are the major constraints that Supply Division and in-country supply staff currently face in responding to emergencies?
7. To what extent does Supply Division work with UNICEF partners in country governments, for example, participating in capacity building support? [examples]
8. Taking account of expected issues (e.g. funding constraints) do you feel the number and location of logistics-focused positions adequately reflects the needs of UNICEF?
9. What systems are in place, if any, that involve Supply Division in planning discussions at the country or regional levels at different points in the planning cycle?
10. How, in what form, and how frequently do you provide capacity building opportunities to (a) CO (b) RO (c) HQ-level staff? Do you feel capacity within the organization is sufficient and consistent across offices to respond effectively to emergency situations?
11. In what percentage of emergencies that UNICEF responded to in 2011/12 were supplies distributed within 72 hours? Where this did not happen, why not?
12. In your view, what are the crucial changes that UNICEF might make to support preparedness for response?
13. Specific country experiences
   a. How would you rate the capacity level of staff in supply and logistic issues?
   b. How would you rate the readiness level of the country office from a supply and logistical perspective for potential emergency situation?
   c. If the country has experienced an emergency in the last 3 years, can you describe that experience, its successes and challenges, etc.?
   d. What steps, if any, do you believe this country can do to improve its emergency readiness?
1. What does emergency preparedness mean for you and your organization? Is it uniformly understood or do different component parts differ in their understanding?

2. Is there discussion with UNICEF regarding potential emergency scenarios in your country that may threaten children?

3. Are your roles and responsibilities clear when developing emergency preparedness plans and activities in collaboration with UNICEF?

4. How effectively have these roles and responsibilities for preparedness been performed by you and by UNICEF respectively? Can you describe actual examples as evidence?

5. Has your organization collaborated with UNICEF in any simulation or training exercises related to emergency preparedness?

6. Has your organization, in collaboration with UNICEF CO, considered refining emergency preparedness activities based upon evidence of ‘best practice’ either from UNICEF’s experience in other contexts or from other organizations?

7. How has UNICEF and your organization estimated the human resources requirements to achieve preparedness outcomes? What options have been considered to meet these requirements? What agreements have been made between UNICEF and your organization as joint commitments towards these requirements?

8. How has UNICEF and your organization estimated the financial requirements to achieve preparedness outcomes? What options have been considered to meet these requirements? What agreements have been made between UNICEF and your organization as joint commitments towards these requirements?

9. How has UNICEF and your organization estimated the material and logistic requirements to achieve preparedness outcomes? What options have been considered to meet these requirements? What agreements have been made between UNICEF and your organization as joint commitments towards these requirements?

10. In your opinion, do the emergency preparedness plans and activities developed with UNICEF appropriately consider longer-term recovery?

11. Looking back at previous emergency preparedness collaborations between your organization and UNICEF, is it possible to judge if these efforts have resulted in timely and focused responses to crises?

12. Have preparedness activities conducted in collaboration with UNICEF only focused upon preparedness for response or have these also attempted to mitigate threats and/or vulnerability?

13. What roles and contributions from UNICEF have been particularly valuable in developing emergency preparedness plans and actions?

**Desk Study Guide**
ISG conducted a review of UNICEF's emergency preparedness activities in countries addition to those country offices physically visited. This was completed at three levels:

1. Limited desk review of key indicators from 80 UNICEF country offices, which reported response to humanitarian situations in 2011.

2. Detailed desk review of preparedness activities in Lebanon, Mali and Mauritania (in the event that DRC CO will not be visited, then it will be included in this category). Lebanon has been suggested as an example of good practice during the scoping mission. Furthermore the links between Lebanon and the unfolding crisis in Syria adds to apparent relevance. Mali and Mauritania are suggested as it permits the evaluation team to explore preparedness characteristics in slow-onset crises having regional dimensions. Mali has added the complexity of emergent acute conflict upon
situation of a chronic nutrition crisis, which forces remote management of assistance and preparedness. This same desk review will also consider the eight COs to be visited in addition to Pakistan and Somalia.

3. In-depth review of preparedness activities in Pakistan and Somalia. Both countries are suggested as they have experienced large-scale emergencies in recent years and remain at extreme risk to future L3 crises.

### Level 1 Review

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Review action</th>
<th>Specifics for consideration</th>
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| UNICEF responded to 292 humanitarian situations in 2011 – where did these occur and what happened? | • How many qualify as ‘emergency’?  
• What was the scale and scope of UNICEF’s intervention in term of population served, financial/HR commitments?  
• What patterns may be discerned in terms of concentrating UNICEF’s emergency work among different contexts, such as natural disasters, conflict, mid or low income, fragile states, etc.?  
• What patterns may be discerned in terms of size and scope of UNICEF partnerships with local and international NGO’s and Government? |
| Compare the response to the 294 humanitarian situations with the preparedness plans created by Dec. 2010. | • How many situations were anticipated in size and scope in risk analysis? |
| In countries where emergencies were concentrated (size, frequency and scale) what was correlation to level of preparedness actions by UNICEF team? | • Correlation to risk identified in SITANS?  
• Correlation to risk identified in CCA’s?  
• Correlation to risk identified in EWEA?  
• Correlation to number of UNICEF CO and RO staff contributing and reviewing EWEA reports?  
• Correlation to frequency of review for EWEA (should be min twice/year)?  
• Correlation to number and profile of Programme Department staff involved in EWEA? |
| In the top 10 countries for UNICEF’s Emergency response in 2011 | • Evidence permitting (only COAR to be reviewed): compare financial expenditure on emergency response efforts with that of emergency preparedness;  
• Compare financial expenditure on preparedness efforts towards building national |
and sub-national capacity with expenditure on UNICEF’s own response capacity or the capacity of other international partners.

### Level 2 Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review documentation:</th>
<th>Specifics for consideration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Country Programme Document (CPD)</td>
<td>• Are preparedness plans limited to addressing basic needs (water, shelter, etc.) vs. higher needs (education, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. CPAP</td>
<td>• Do preparedness plans indicate evidence of (i) theoretical response; (ii) early warning; (iii) early action (i.e. minimum levels of response in place)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. COAR – Country Level Annual Report</td>
<td>• Are efforts directed towards stimulating preparedness mindset through evidence of (iv) frequency and scope of simulation exercises; (v) involvement of Programme Department?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Country Situation Analysis Report (SitAns)</td>
<td>• Which evidence indicates preparedness efforts aim to build capacities to address CCC’s and national and sub-national skills and eventual resilience of affected communities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Early Warning – Early Action (EWEA) report</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Country Mid-Term Review (MTR) report</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Inter-Agency Contingency Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Emergency and Disaster Risk Reduction Annual Workplan and report</td>
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<td>9. Funding appeals launched by UNICEF or contributed to by UNICEF pertaining to emergency preparedness and/or response</td>
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<td>10. UNICEF Press releases drawing attention to worsening crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. National Disaster or Emergency Planning document (if such exists)</td>
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### Level 3 Review

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review documentation &amp; interview:</th>
<th>Specifics for consideration</th>
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</table>
| 1. Review UNICEF internal evaluation reports, lessons learned studies, etc., which pertain to emergency preparedness and/or response within last 2–3 years; UNICEF Management letters in response to such reports | • Compare conclusions and recommendations between UNICEF and external evaluations, lessons learned, etc.  
• Compare recommendations with subsequent Management reports and specific CO and/or Cluster workplans  
• Compare the impact of lessons learned from UNICEF’s evaluations with other organizations |
| 2. Review external evaluation reports, lessons learned studies etc., which pertain to general emergency preparedness and/or response by humanitarian agencies within last 2–3 years |                                                                                                                                                             |
|                                                                                                 | • To what extent, if any, does UNICEF use its preparedness plans in actual emergencies?  
• Do UNICEF’s preparedness plans result in responses that are proportional to actual emergencies?  
• How does UNICEF realize organizational learning with regards to best practice in preparedness?  
• How financially well integrated is emergency preparedness within |
3. Review CPAPs 2009–12
4. Review external situation analysis (e.g. International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, etc.) in the public domain
5. Review evidence in COAR reports (2009–12), which indicates recommendations from evaluations, lessons learned, exercises, etc.
6. Interview (face-to-face or phone or video-conference) with Regional Representatives, Regional Emergency Officers, Country Representatives, Country Emergency Officers, and relevant personnel from HQ EMOPS. It may also be possible and relevant to interview key contacts in other UN agencies (e.g. WFP in Rome and FAO the case of Somalia). Aim of this interview process is not to rework previous evaluations, but to orientate discussion towards a more positive learning experience for UNICEF (which seems mute in other evaluations) and simply to ask “if you had to do the preparedness part again for this crisis, what would you do differently?”
7. Interview Regional Directors and Director EMOPS to discover what positive measures are taken by UNICEF to:
   - improve decision making and risk management related to early warning;
   - mobilize preparedness financing;
   - optimize best practice and break the pattern of “chronic amnesia” on lessons learned.

- Compare UNICEF’s risk/hazard analysis with external analysis
- UNICEF for ensuring sustainability of emergency preparedness internally and among partners?
- How well integrated is emergency preparedness, and humanitarian response, into regular programmes?
- How systematically are provisions for longer-term recovery incorporated into preparedness plans?
- To what extent have UNICEF’s preparedness interventions supported its commitment under the revised CCCs to strengthen national capacity?
- What is UNICEF’s contribution to and from IASC preparedness processes?
CO and RO Survey

1. Where do you work? List of COs and Countries
2. What division do you work for in your office? Choose from a list
3. In your opinion, what are the key elements of emergency preparedness?
   a. UNICEF’s ability to respond to crisis
   b. developing actions for post-crisis recovery;
   c. building capacity of national and sub-national partners
   d. developing DRR efforts at country level
   e. developing risk-informed programming
   f. developing inter-agency efforts for emergency preparedness
   g. all of the above
4. Has your office responded to an emergency in the past 18 months?
5. What type of emergency has your office responded to in the past 18 months? Choose from a list
   a. If yes, did your office implement this emergency preparedness plan in responding to the emergency or emergencies?
   b. If no, does your office have an emergency preparedness plan in place?
6. When was the last time the emergency preparedness plan for your office was updated?
7. How useful to you is the EWEA system in preparing your office to deal with an emergency? Likert Scale
8. Does your office have the tools and guidance it needs to respond to different levels of emergencies?
9. Have you supported an emergency response for another office in the past 12 months?
10. Do you know who the emergency focal point is in your office?
11. Do you have a clear understanding of your role and responsibilities in a time of emergency? Likert Scale
12. Do you believe you know exactly what to do, as a UNICEF staff member, in a time of emergency in your country?
13. Have you participated in any training on emergency preparedness in the past 12 months?
14. Have you participated in any simulations on emergency preparedness in the past 12 months?
15. Are you a member of a roster, list or other group that is maintained by UNICEF to quickly ramp up support in an emergency?
16. Are you satisfied that your office has the information and tools needed to assess risk of the types of emergencies you face?
17. Do you believe your regular, long-term programming is designed to easily scale (up or down) in times of emergency?
18. Does your office have guidance for Emergency Risk-Informed Programming (ERIP)?
19. Does your office carry out ERIP?
20. Do you believe that your regular, long-term programming is designed to build local capacities that would help the country respond in times of emergency?
21. Do you believe your office has the resources necessary to respond to an L1 emergency today?
22. Does your office believe that processes are in place to allow you to quickly access additional resources you need?
23. Are you satisfied with your Office’s ability to coordinate with other UN Agencies on issues related to emergency preparedness?
24. Are you satisfied with your Office’s ability to coordinate with partners on issues related to emergency preparedness?
25. Are you satisfied with your Office’s ability to coordinate with host government on issues related to emergency preparedness?

26. Does your office participate in Cluster coordination meetings focused on emergency preparedness and response?

27. Are you satisfied with your Office's ability to influence emergency preparedness activities with other UN Agencies?

28. Are you satisfied with your Office's ability to influence emergency preparedness activities with partners?

29. Are you satisfied with your Office's ability to influence emergency preparedness activities with the host government?

30. How accurate do you feel your office is in assessing the early signs of emergencies? Likert scale

31. How efficient do you feel your office has been in acting upon the early signs of emergencies? Likert Scale
# ANNEX E – CLUSTER ANALYSIS FOR SITE VISITS

## Variables Included

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<tr>
<th>Included Variables</th>
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<tr>
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### Planned Interventions

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### Actual Interventions

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| CO Staff size |
| Co Allotted Budget |
| Emergency budget |
Variables Omitted

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Reason for Omission</th>
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<tr>
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Standardization of Variables

In order to minimize the effects of numerical differences, variables were standardized, and in the case of the planned/actual interventions, combined. The nominal approximate maximum value per variable after standardization was 10, with the exception of CO Budget and Emergency Budget. The extreme variability of these values led to standardization to an approximate maximum of 20. There may be some skewing of results from this extra weighting. The classification can be easily reworked to reweight these variables to 10 if so desired. Planned and actual interventions per country were summed individually.

Missing Data

A number of data points for individual countries were missing from the UNICEF dataset – specifically in the Gini coefficient variable. To offset the results of missing data points, replacement estimates were used based on the most recently available data (from WB or OECD), or (albeit crude) representative estimates were calculated using ranking on the UNDP Human Development Index relative to similar countries.

Clustering Scenarios

Scenario 1 – country office staff size included per UNICEF direction. Unstandardized ranking is from 1-5. Values were doubled to bring the standardization to 10 in line with the other variables. The analysis approach minimizes the variability within, and maximizes the differences between, clusters.

Clusters – Scenario 1 – Country Office Staff Size Included

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Clusters – Scenario 2 – Country Office Staff Size Omitted

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**Final Cluster Centers – Scenario 1**

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**Final Cluster Centers – Scenario 2**

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I. Background and Rationale

1. Emergencies\(^1\) have been shown to negatively affect the realization children’s and women’s rights, both directly (i.e., through death, injury, and loss of protective forces) and indirectly (i.e., by disproportionately affecting poor countries and eroding development gains).\(^2\) Accordingly, the call to humanitarian action has been central to UNICEF’s mandate since the Organization’s inception, when it was originally established as the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund. Later, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its Optional Protocols, which further articulated UNICEF’s mandate and mission, identified the universal rights enshrined within it as inalienable – and non-severable during emergencies – and conferred specific rights and duties in emergency situations.\(^3\)

2. Over time, UNICEF’s role in emergencies has grown, a trend that will likely continue in the years ahead. In the late 1990s, disasters alone affected an estimated 66.5 million children a year; with the effects of climate change yet to be fully known, these numbers are projected to increase to as many as 175 million a year in the coming decade.\(^4\) Figure 1 provides a snapshot of UNICEF’s growing role in emergencies over the past seven years. In 2011 alone, 80 UNICEF country offices (COs) responded to 292 humanitarian situations, including 108 natural disasters, 83 health crises and 74 socio-political crises.

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\(^1\) An emergency is defined by UNICEF as a situation that threatens the lives and well-being of large numbers of a population and requires extraordinary action to ensure their survival, care and protection (United Nations Children's Fund, 'Programme Policy and Procedure Manual: Programme Operations', UNICEF, New York, 22 January 2009).


3. Given the higher frequency of emergencies due to intra-state conflict, climate change and pandemics that are likely in the foreseeable future, with potentially higher impact on children, it is crucial that UNICEF be optimally prepared so as to minimize loss of life, reduce human suffering, and realize children’s rights when emergencies occur. Accordingly, UNICEF has made considerable investments to strengthen its emergency preparedness in recent years. It has also established a dedicated unit within the Geneva offices of its Division of Emergency Operations (EMOPS), the Preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction (PDRR) Section, to lead the Organization’s preparedness strategies.

4. At the same time, recent audits and evaluative exercises have pointed to the Organization’s uneven levels of preparedness from one emergency and one context to the next, both in the face of sudden-onset and slow-onset crises. Although UNICEF has been acting on the recommendations emanating from these exercises, no systematic, independent examination has yet been undertaken to pinpoint the specific gaps in UNICEF’s preparedness policies and systems that need to be addressed, or the assets that need to be strengthened or capitalized on.

5. In October 2011, UNICEF’s Evaluation Office (EO) proposed the present Evaluation of UNICEF’s Emergency Preparedness Systems in conjunction with a Programme of Cooperation to strengthen the Organization’s overall emergency capacity. The EO then formalized this proposal within the

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6 Among the most noteworthy of these has been a series of Programmes of Cooperation (PoCs) between the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and UNICEF to strengthen UNICEF’s broader capacity for preparing for and responding to emergencies. The first of these consisted of a three-phased PoC from 2000-2009, and a second PoC was agreed for the period from 2012-15.


framework of its 2012-13 planning process, citing the following justifications for the exercise rooted in the analysis above:

1. The heightened human, financial and reputational risk to UNICEF in emergencies, which is borne out in stark relief when UNICEF is (or is perceived to be) unprepared;
2. Mounting evidence of UNICEF’s variable preparedness, coupled with the lack of a focused evaluation on preparedness to date;
3. The significant investment in UNICEF’s preparedness to date, and with this the onus to demonstrate fiduciary responsibility and value for money for these investments;
4. The increasing focus on preparedness in the inter-agency policy arena within which UNICEF is a key partner, most recently by way of the Transformative Agenda, but also including the impending move from the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals; and
5. The opportunity for effecting positive change within UNICEF, with the establishment of a consolidated PDRR Section in Geneva, and at a broader strategic level the Organisation’s recognized need to better integrate emergencies (and particularly resilience) into its 2014-17 Medium-Term Strategic Plan (MTSP).

6. Through a process of broad consultation with divisions and offices across the Organization, UNICEF management agreed that the proposed evaluation indeed represented a key institutional priority for inclusion in the EO’s 2012-2013 Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (IMEF). The IMEF was endorsed by UNICEF’s Evaluation Committee in February 2012 and approved by the Organization’s Executive Board in June 2012.9

II. Preparedness at UNICEF: An Overview

7. From one agency, and even one professional, to the next, there are different understandings of the term “preparedness.” In the broadest sense preparedness refers to all measures taken in advance of emergencies to prevent or reduce their impact. However, a large number of humanitarian organizations use a more restrictive definition, often labeled “emergency preparedness,” that includes measures undertaken to anticipate emergencies (i.e., early warning), and respond to and recover from them. There is wide recognition that emergency preparedness is a key component of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) – and that it is to be distinguished from prevention, which focuses on lowering the likelihood of an emergency event occurring in the first instance, and from mitigation, which focuses on reducing the impact of an emergency before the actual event. The official definition used by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) states that preparedness refers to the knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions. This definition’s emphasis on capacity makes preparedness a critical component the resilience11 agenda, which is gaining

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9 A renewed focus on preparedness is occurring at the inter-agency as well, where similarly variable preparedness has been noted. The Transformative Agenda, agreed by the Inter-agency Standing Committee in December 2011, calls for a renewed focus on systematic improvement throughout the humanitarian system, including preparedness. A parallel evaluation of inter-agency preparedness is currently being planned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

10 Preparedness for recovery is very limited in many agencies, however.

11 Resilience is often defined as the ability of governments and communities to absorb and cope with different shocks and stresses.
increased momentum in the international arena. The evaluation’s engagement with resilience will be within this limited aspect of national and sub-national capacity development for emergency response.

8. Within UNICEF, preparedness plays a critical enabling role to help Country Offices (COs) meet its Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs), the normative standards that articulate the Organization’s direct accountabilities in emergency situations. The CCCs entail a set of indicative preparedness actions under programmatic and operational activities, including those related to national capacity development across all programmatic sectors, including through Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Specifically, the CCCs include “explicit strategies to reduce disaster risk and develop local capacity at all stages of humanitarian action, including preparedness (p4) … [They] underscore the critical role of preparedness for rapid response using disaster risk reduction to minimize vulnerabilities and reduce disaster risks for children and women in all programming. This is achieved by investing in early warning and emergency preparedness and strengthening resilience to disasters.” (p11) Moreover, UNICEF’s preparedness commitments are enshrined in the Mid-Term Strategic Plan (2006-2013) Focus Area 5: Policy advocacy and partnerships for children’s rights, which includes “supporting national emergency preparedness capacities.” (p7) This dual focus on internal preparedness as well as national capacity building for preparedness signals a relatively recent shift, reflecting a growing recognition of the latter’s importance for longer-term sustainability.

9. At the corporate level, the concrete means through which UNICEF aims to achieve preparedness encompass a wide range of systems, strategies, processes and programmes that jointly contribute to the Organization’s overall state of readiness. For the purposes of this evaluation, these include the following overarching strands of intervention:

(1) Prior to 2009, the main preparedness process of UNICEF COs was the development of Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRPs), which focused on analyzing how a given CO would respond in the event of various emergency scenarios. Several formats were developed over the years, but the corporate requirement was that these plans were to be updated on a yearly basis. Parallel to the development of EPRPs, beginning in 2004 EMOPS had developed an initial version of the Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA) system, which focused primarily on early warning and also required regular CO inputs. In 2007, UNICEF introduced the added requirement for all COs to develop business continuity plans in addition to their EPRPs.

(2) In 2009, in response to a call to streamline its various CO preparedness planning requirements, UNICEF moved away from the EPRP process to a revised version of the Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA) planning system. The system required COs to undertake a regular assessment of the risk of emergencies in their respective country contexts (Early warning tab), self-assess their actual level of preparedness to respond to the identified emergency risk (Key action tab), and identify preparedness activities to be included in programme sector and operational annual workplans (Preparedness tab). The EWEA system also aims to ensure better organizational capacity for emergency/crisis preparedness monitoring and support, namely through an interactive functionality that allows UNICEF regional offices (ROs), as the overseers of CO accountability in UNICEF, to provide feedback on EWEA outputs to the COs under their remit. EWEA thus functions as the performance monitoring system of ROs’ and

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12 Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCGs), UNICEF, May 2010
COs’ self-reported emergency preparedness through an online portal. (This portal is now linked to UNICEF’s overall performance management system.)

(3) The EWEA system is an integral component of the Emergency Risk-Informed Programming (ERIP) approach, which was introduced in 2010. ERIP is an approach that aims to integrate emergency risk in the formulation and/or Mid-Term Reviews (MTRs) of UNICEF’s regular country programmes. It requires COs to undertake emergency risk analysis in their Situation Analyses (SitAns), in order to guide commensurate strategies and results for addressing priority emergency risks in the development of their planning, budgeting and management documents. ERIP is thus an approach aimed at better integrating various risk programming streams such as DRR, climate change adaptation, conflict sensitivity and peace building.

(4) Acknowledging that CO investments in emergency preparedness and risk-informed programming cannot be the same across all COs, but rather need to be commensurate with the level of emergency risk in the country at hand, EMOPS maintains an Emergency Risk Classification of all countries where UNICEF has a country programme. The classification of COs is updated yearly in collaboration with ROs, based on the OCHA Global Focus Model. It is increasingly being used to determine preparedness standards based on the risk level of the country at hand. For example, as the calculation of the CO preparedness score reported in the global dashboard differs based on whether a country is at low risk or medium/high risk, the level of analysis of emergency risks in the SitAn should also differ on the risk level of the country as well as the results and strategies to address the priority risks.

(5) Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is a systematic approach to identifying, assessing and reducing natural disaster risk. Specifically, the purpose of DRR is to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society in order to avoid (prevent) or to limit (mitigate and prepare for) the adverse impacts of natural hazards on populations and facilitate sustainable development. At global level, UNICEF works closely with the ISDR, which is tasked with supporting governments in the implementation of The Hyogo Framework for Action: 2005 – 2015: "Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disaster." Finally, UNICEF is working within the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) to promote the integration of DRR and climate change adaptation into common UN plans and frameworks. At country level, UNICEF works to strengthen its programming in preparedness given its presence and focus on building partnerships with government and civil society from the national to the community level.

(6) In addition to preparedness planning, UNICEF has also invested significant resources in developing and conducting preparedness training and simulations to strengthen staff capacity to respond in emergencies. These include general Emergency Preparedness and

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13 Although the EWEA system was initially intended to bring together emergency preparedness and business continuity planning, these processes have remained separate.

14 Preferably in collaboration with other UN agencies through the CCA/UNDAF

15 At UNICEF, these main documents include the Country Programme Documents (CPDs), Country Programme Action Plans (CPAPs), Country Programme Management Plans (CPMPs) and consecutively in Annual Workplans (AWPs), Rolling Workplans (RWPs), and Annual Management Plans (AMPs).

16 “Risk” is understood here as a function of exposure to both natural and man-made hazards, coupled with the vulnerability of children and the capacity of governments.


18 The framework contains the following five building blocks for effective disaster risk reduction: governance, risk assessment, knowledge and education, risk management and vulnerability reduction, and disaster preparedness and response.
Response (EPR) as well as sector-specific trainings that are regularly conducted in all UNICEF COs, mainly with support from RO level. It also includes emergency simulations of UNICEF’s own response, as well as simulations of UNICEF’s response with inter-agency partners and with government. These simulations are conducted at country level, with the emergency response training being staged in simulated environments (e.g., since 2009, Brindisi).

(7) UNICEF also has a number of other mechanisms in place at the procedural level to ensure overall predictability of action in UNICEF’s organizational response in the event of an emergency.

- At the highest level these include, most notably, the recently approved **Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs)** for Level 2 and 3 emergencies, aimed at strengthening UNICEF’s ability to rapidly harness its corporate resources and streamline processes for maximum timeliness, effectiveness, efficiency and relevance in large-scale and corporate disasters.\(^{19}\)
- A recent business impact analysis at Headquarters (HQ) is informing a revised **Business Continuity Management** plan to be implemented in 2012, which aims to strengthen the Organization’s ability to ensure to maintain continuity of critical functions during and after a crisis incident of any nature.
- UNICEF’s **Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)** policy, though not specifically geared to emergency situations, poses potential complementarities as well as overlaps with the Organization’s preparedness activities. ERM is a systematic and integrated approach to manage opportunities and risks that could affect the achievement of the planned results and objectives at all levels of the Organisation. It allows managers to systematically deal with events that cause uncertainty and respond in a way to reduce the likelihood and impact of significant risks and maximize opportunities.
- Finally, individual divisions, such as the Division of Human Resources (DHR), Programme Division (PD), and Supply Division (SD), have developed a host of **domain-specific initiatives** intended to streamline procedures and support specific preparedness at country level within their respective functions.

10. In addition to corporate-wide, structured preparedness initiatives, UNICEF’s Country Offices and Regional Offices also engage in a wide range of preparedness activities that meet emerging local needs that fall beyond what the above-noted standard mechanisms or systems prescribe. These measures increasingly target building the capacity of partners/Government on preparedness or on engaging in joint preparedness planning, and reflect risks identified within the planning process through Situation Analyses and Common Country Assessments.

11. While all of the above aim to respond to UNICEF’s corporate accountability to ensure timely and predictable humanitarian action in an emergency, UNICEF must ensure that available policies, systems and mechanisms work in harmony and efficiently to provide comprehensive guidance and resources in practice. To that extent, while UNICEF’s policy commitments and accountabilities for emergency preparedness are clearly defined at the corporate level, so too must they be clearly delineated among country offices, regional offices and headquarters.

\(^{19}\)Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs) for Level 3 Emergencies, UNICEF EMOPS, July 2011; Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs) for Level 2 Emergencies, UNICEF EMOPS, Forthcoming
12. Since 2001 UNICEF, together with WFP, has been co-chairing the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Strategic Working Group (SWG) on preparedness. In recognition that UNICEF’s emergency response is part of a broader international humanitarian system, including actions undertaken in meeting UNICEF’s accountabilities as Cluster Lead and Global Cluster Lead, significant resources and staff time have been devoted to inter-agency preparedness work, resulting in several key results. These include enhanced inter-agency early warning (e.g., HEWS Web, IASC EWEA reports), contingency planning and simulations (e.g., IACP, IAES, GES guidelines and increased practice of IA contingency planning and simulations at country level), and enhanced inter-agency focus on the development of national and local capacities for emergency preparedness (e.g., Five country initiative in 2011, Country Capacity Development Study in 2012). It also includes the use of stand-by partners, a global web roster for rapid deployment of qualified personnel, and joint emergency simulations.

13. Despite the Organization’s multi-pronged strategies in this area, at this stage UNICEF does not have a consolidated, comprehensive logic model that encapsulates how these contribute to short- and long-term results either individually or jointly. For the purpose of this evaluation, the EO has developed a basic inferential logic model linking ostensible inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact-level results. (See Annex A.) The model identifies as its targeted long-term impact increased protection and reduced harm and death to children in humanitarian situations, borne out in improved response by the international humanitarian community of which UNICEF is a part, and increased national and subnational capacity to respond. These impacts are underpinned by outcomes focusing on increased capacity both within UNICEF and among its inter-agency and national partners, coupled with enhanced programmatic outcomes within specific sectors that address the root causes of emergencies. These outcomes, in turn, are supported by a number of outputs such as: evidence generation and tool development; preparedness plans; partnership building; technical assistance; and advocacy leading to policy change. This EO-generated logic model will be subject to stakeholder validation during the inception phase of the exercise.

III. Evaluation Objectives and Purpose

14. The evaluation’s objective will be to examine, as systematically and objectively as possible, the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency\(^{20}\), connectedness, sustainability and coverage of UNICEF’s current emergency preparedness systems across its global operations. Its main purpose will be to help UNICEF become better braced for the wide range of emergencies it faces – and to blunt the effects of emergencies when they do occur – and thus help it save more lives and reduce human suffering in ever-better ways. The evaluation will generate recommendations identifying concrete actions for UNICEF to undertake toward this end.

15. In order to look both backward and forward, the evaluation will need to assess the evolution of its preparedness systems to date as a means of tracking progress. The evaluation will therefore take both a summative and a formative approach, in that it will look at results achieved or not achieved thus far (summative) in order to shape the direction of the Organization’s preparedness systems in the future (formative). The evaluation will thus serve two purposes. On one hand, independent evaluation that candidly examines UNICEF’s performance to date is a vital part of ensuring

\(^{20}\) For the purpose of this evaluation, Efficiency will be broadly defined to include areas ranging from how effectively UNICEF has allocated its human and financial resources to its preparedness work, to cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency considerations. (See Section IV.) Should formal cost-efficiency and -effectiveness analysis be undertaken, every effort will be made at the outset of the evaluation to establish clear and measurable benchmarks for expenditure, results, success and failure.
accountability—e.g., to the Executive Board and senior management for results achieved, to donors for showing value for their investments in preparedness, and to programme countries and affected populations in emergency-prone countries. On the other hand, learning from this information on past experience is necessary if UNICEF is to improve its practice and policies in future. While both purposes will be important in this exercise, ultimately it is the latter that will receive somewhat greater weight.

16. Given this dual focus on accountability and learning, the intended users of this evaluation are manifold. The main client will either be the UNICEF’s Deputy Executive Director (DED) for Emergencies, or the Director of EMOPS along with his Deputy Director and Chief of the Preparedness and DRR Section in Geneva. Other key HQ-level stakeholders include, in order of centrality: the Deputy Executive Director (DED) for Emergencies; other EMOPS sections; Programme Division (PD); relevant sections of the Division of Human Resources (DHR) and Supply Division (SD); the Public Alliances and Resource Mobilization Office (PARMO) and Private Fundraising and Partnerships (PFP) Division; and others as appropriate. For Regional Offices (ROs), Regional Directors, on whom Country Representatives rely for guidance, will be important stakeholders, as well as Regional Emergency Advisers (REAs), the evaluation could help strengthen oversight and support to COs’ preparedness and response efforts. At CO level, management can use the evaluation to sharpen their preparedness activities. Finally, findings and recommendations from the evaluation should also contribute to UNICEF’s engagement in inter-agency preparedness efforts.

IV. Scope

17. The evaluation is not intended to provide a narrow diagnostic scan of documentation in the EWEA system to see how these align with HQ-driven quality standards. Nor is it broadly intended to document the precise results of every project-level intervention undertaken at every level of the Organisation. Rather, it aims to assess the full range of preparedness-related activities and outputs in achieving targeted outcomes and impacts – their collective contribution to preparedness, and the contribution of each in doing so – and to the extent possible. The evaluation should examine the relative value of the range of organizational investments against outcomes and impacts to determine if UNICEF is making the right choices in building national capacity to prepare for and respond to emergencies. The evaluation will engage all areas of preparedness for which evidentiary standards can be met.

18. The evaluation aims to examine UNICEF’s overall institutional effectiveness in the area of preparedness. It will therefore focus on the corporate performance of the Organization, down to the level of programmatic results achieved through process-level preparedness efforts, as a whole as its unit of analysis, highlighting strengths and vulnerabilities at each level of the Organization in line with UNICEF’s Accountability Framework. As such, while it will include a series of country case studies (see Approach and Methodology below) to illustrate emerging institutional issues as they play out at field level, it will not focus in depth on country-specific issues or generate separate country-specific reports.

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21 The precise internal client of the exercise will be determined prior to finalization of this ToR.

22 OCHA is also undertaking an evaluation of emergency preparedness. Synergies will be sought and depending on the objectives and timing in relation to OCHA’s evaluation, UNICEF’s evaluation could potentially feed into the OCHA exercise’s findings and recommendations.
19. The evaluation, in addition to looking explicitly at UNICEF and the major prongs of its preparedness interventions, will also take a lens to relevant linkages within and outside the Organization. Within UNICEF, while assessing the overall achievement of targeted results as a result of its preparedness activities and outputs jointly, it will also attempt to unpack the relative contributions of specific preparedness output areas to overall results (i.e., the contribution of each) and the linkages and interactions among the pillars. Further, given the shift toward more sustainable long-term preparedness strategies, the evaluation should help provide conceptual clarity around UNICEF’s approach to building resiliency of the state, institution, community, and child to reduce vulnerability through its various prongs of intervention. This is particularly important in light of UNICEF’s 2014-2017 Medium-Term Strategic Plan (MTSP), within which national capacity development plays a prominent role but to which UNICEF’s emergency systems have yet to be explicitly linked. Finally, while the evaluation will be primarily inward-looking, it will also closely examine UNICEF’s contributions to inter-agency preparedness efforts globally and nationally. In formulating its recommendations, the evaluation might also look outside the Organization to good evidence-based practice elsewhere in the humanitarian community.

20. The following set of evaluation questions, framed along the OECD/DAC criteria, will guide the evaluation in pursuit of its stated objectives and purposes:

- **Relevance/ Appropriateness**
  - How “fit-for-purpose” are UNICEF’s preparedness systems for capturing key contextual factors that influence the likely impact of specific emergencies, and how well informed is this process by solid risk/hazard analysis?\(^{23}\)
  - How relevant is UNICEF’s current approach of readying all COs for large-scale emergencies, as opposed to a more custom-tailored approach that acknowledges one or more CO typologies of (e.g., permanent emergency countries, middle/high income countries, or other characteristics)? What typologies might be relevant, and how might specific aspects of UNICEF’s preparedness work be improved to reflect these?
  - How appropriate is UNICEF’s current, standardized approach to CO classification, with different requirements according to different overarching risk levels? What if any alternative approaches does UNICEF need in order to reflect different contexts?
  - To what extent have preparedness plans been used in actual emergencies, and when they have, how commensurate with the actual emergency have they proved to be? When they have not, why not?
  - How relevant, appropriate, and timely has the support from HQ to ROs/COs, and from ROs to COs, been in boosting overall preparedness?
  - To the extent that actions emanate from policies, how clear and comprehensive are policies that inform UNICEF’s emergency preparedness? How well are these understood by HQ/RO/CO staff? How well do policy commitments translate into robust practical action in support of preparedness?
  - To what extent do UNICEF’s broad areas of preparedness engagement in Section II above constitute a necessary and sufficient set of activities it needs to be undertaking in order to

\(^{23}\) These include, most prominently, such preparedness exercises as SitAns, regular EW updates in EWEA, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments, Comparative Risk Assessment, and so on.
be as prepared as it (and its partners) can be? What if anything is missing? What if anything is redundant?

- **Effectiveness/Impact**
  - To what extent has UNICEF met its CCCs in emergencies where achievement has been measured? To what extent has achievement of these been girded by preparedness actions undertaken explicitly in support of the CCCs?
  - To what extent have the various preparedness-related outputs and activities in Annex A achieved their targeted outcomes? What has the contribution of each of these been to the achievement of results?
  - How uniformly well understood and applied are the various aspects of preparedness by UNICEF and its major partners (e.g., pre-positioning of supplies, ensuring procedures for fast-tracking staff deployment and PCAs, etc.) as a precondition for the achievement of results?
  - What if any evidence is there that heightened preparedness has resulted in timelier, strengthened response and/or lowered risk and vulnerability to the impact of hazards, and thus helped minimize loss of life and human suffering?
  - What was the rationale for moving from the EPRP system to the EWEA system, and what if any evidence is there that the latter has enhanced preparedness? What, if any, aspects of preparedness have been omitted in the switch and how have these affected UNICEF’s emergency response?
  - What patterns are to be observed in UNICEF’s overall level of preparedness (e.g., between sudden- and slow-onset emergencies, large and small COs, chronically vulnerable COs vs less vulnerable, middle- vs high-income countries, etc.)?

- **Efficiency**
  - How adeptly has UNICEF harnessed the human, financial and intellectual resources at its disposal to achieve targeted preparedness outcomes?
  - How clear are roles and responsibilities throughout the Organization for ensuring adequate preparedness, and how effectively have these been fulfilled in view of UNICEF’s existing Accountability Framework?
  - How effectively has the starting point for preparedness – information and knowledge – been harnessed for maximum preparedness?
  - What if any of UNICEF’s preparedness outputs and activities are particularly high value-for-money? Which are potentially low value-for-money, and what cost-effective alternatives should be considered, either in its specific prongs of intervention or in its overall approach?
  - Overall, to what extent have the results of UNICEF’s internal and external preparedness-related efforts justified the human and financial investments on both of these fronts to date?

- **Connectedness/Coordination/Coherence**
  - How clearly and uniformly understood throughout the Organization is UNICEF’s overall approach to preparedness – i.e., its logic model or theory of change?
  - How clear are the linkages among the various prongs of UNICEF’s preparedness-related interventions in contributing to results?
  - How clear and close are the linkages between the EMOPS-led preparedness effort and other divisions and offices within UNICEF – e.g., other HQ divisions, ROs, and COs?
UNICEF efforts and inter-agency actors (e.g., OCHA, other major humanitarian agencies such UNHCR and WFP as well as NGOs, programme countries, etc.)?

- What has been UNICEF’s added value to and from inter-agency and regional partners’ preparedness efforts? To what extent have the gains reaped through UNICEF’s engagement in inter-agency processes justified the investments in the same?
- How effective have preparedness efforts been with respect to UNICEF’s actions as Cluster lead agency at CO as well as HQ levels?

**Sustainability**

- How systematically are provisions for longer-term recovery incorporated into preparedness plans?
- To what extent have UNICEF’s preparedness interventions supported its commitment under the revised CCCs to strengthen national capacity?
- How systematic and effective have business continuity planning been in ensuring sustained action in recent emergencies?
- Given the increasing focus on mainstreaming humanitarian action into the Organization, how well integrated is emergency preparedness both into regular programmes?
- How financially well integrated is preparedness within UNICEF (e.g., for ensuring sustainability of preparedness within the Organization and among its partners)? How effectively is this monitored?

**Coverage**

- How explicitly has UNICEF sought to identify the likely reverberations of various emergency scenarios on children’s and women’s rights, and on those likely to be made most vulnerable in hypothetical emergencies? How accurate have these estimates turned out to be in actual emergencies?
- How much forethought has UNICEF given to identifying where likely pockets of the hardest-to-reach in emergencies will be and preparing to reach these in the event of an emergency and advocating for equity in its preparedness efforts as part of it national capacity development and other upstream activities?

22. All of the questions above will be answered both at the topline (i.e., overarching UNICEF) level, while also identifying any detectable and salient differences there are in these responses among the various types of contexts in which UNICEF works (e.g., MICS vs LICs, urban vs rural, strong vs less strong government capacity to engage, and so on)? In addition, all of the above questions will be explored with a view to uncovering the explanatory factors (internal and external factors) that have helped or hindered UNICEF’s preparedness efforts24. Answers to the “why” question underlying each of the items above will help elucidate the key enabling factors that need to be continued or replicated – and constraining factors that need to be addressed. These will form the basis the recommendations that emerge from the evaluation. A scan of good practice emerging from other organisations’ preparedness efforts will help further inform recommendations.

V. **Approach and Methodology**

24 Such factors may include initiatives or policies not related to preparedness but which nonetheless impinge upon UNICEF’s ability to respond to emergencies in a timely, predictable and efficient manner, such as the corporate implementation of VISION.
Overarching Approach

23. The evaluation’s overall approach will be guided by the principle of credibility – that is, ensuring that the best evidence available is harnessed, and that it is analyzed appropriately, so as to generate findings, conclusions and recommendations that resonate and that management can therefore feel confident acting on. This approach presumes four main pillars, depicted in Figure 2. These include:
   a. **Consultation** with and participation by key stakeholders, in the form of a Reference Group (see Section VI) and other venues (e.g., on-going communications and updates), so as to ensure that the evaluation remains relevant to UNICEF’s work, and that the evidence and analysis are sound and factually accurate;
   b. **Methodological rigour** to ensure that the most appropriate sources of evidence for answering the questions in Section IV are used in a technically appropriate manner;
   c. **Independence** to ensure that the analysis stands solely on an impartial and objective analysis of the evidence, without undue influence by any key stakeholder group;
   d. **Evaluation team composition** to ensure that the foregoing three pillars are adequately understood and followed, and that the appropriate evaluation skills and appropriate subject matter expertise to make the analysis of the evidence authoritative and believable.
Figure 2 – The Elements of Evaluation Credibility and Utility

It will be the EO’s responsibility to ensure that each of these elements is adequately attended to throughout the evaluation, and the Reference Group’s responsibility to support the EO in achieving each.

24. Prior to embarking on data collection, the evaluation team will undertake a brief scoping and inception mission and prepare a short Inception Report for review by the Evaluation Office and the Reference Group. The Inception Report will illustrate the team’s understanding of the evaluation and the expectations around it, and set forth a specific roadmap for implementing this ToR and delivering an independent, credible and utilization-focused evaluation. It will be a forum for spelling out the specific methods and data sources from which it will garner evidence to answer each evaluation question and to assess attribution/contribution of results to UNICEF’s preparedness efforts (i.e., an analytical framework); a validated logic model for use in the evaluation and the precise performance benchmarks against which UNICEF’s preparedness will be assessed based on a better understanding of UNICEF’s preparedness work; validation of country case study selection; a more thorough internal and external stakeholder analysis and sampling strategies; any proposed modifications to the evaluation questions; further thoughts on any other areas (e.g., risks, country case study selection, and so on). Data collection instruments will be shared with the EO separately, on which the EO will in turn seek Reference Group feedback.

Methodology

25. Upon finalization of the Inception Report by the EO in consultation with the Reference Group, the evaluation team will embark on data collection and analysis. In keeping with the emphasis on methodological rigour, the selected evaluation team will be expected to employ a mixed-method approach – i.e., triangulation of the most appropriate qualitative and quantitative methods, and the most appropriate documentary and perceptual evidence\(^\text{25}\), for answering each evaluation question at hand.

\(^\text{25}\) Documentary data is gathered from written records, reports, papers, emails, etc. It can provide time-specific and factual information of events and proceedings. Perceptual data is gathered from individuals’ opinions based on their experiences. Findings based solely on perceptual data should use trend analysis and/or triangulation with other data to deduce findings given its subjective nature.
26. Within this overarching framework, and in light of the evaluation questions posed in Section IV, the evaluation team will be expected to use the following combination of data collection methods in this evaluation:

- **Informal desk review** for general background on UNICEF’s preparedness systems;
- **Formal desk review** of relevant documentation from within and outside UNICEF (e.g., evaluations, EWEA inputs, simulation reports, EPR training materials and other guidance, business continuity plans, Annual Work Plans, and so on), which the evaluation team systematically reviews either for specific qualitative or quantitative data points or for an aggregated tally of specific data points across documents (e.g., number of preparedness plans cross-referenced in Country Programme Documents across all non-emergency COs, number of annual reports that mention emergency preparedness, etc.);
- **Key informant interviews (KIIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs)**, in person or by telephone or Skype, with UNICEF staff at HQ (NY and GVA), RO and CO levels; donors and partner agencies at HQ and CO level; and, importantly, beneficiaries and operational partners at the CO level (governments, partners, community representatives, and directly affected populations);
- A **UNICEF staff survey** to elicit a snapshot of the state and functioning of preparedness systems across the Organization;[27]
- **Direct observation** of key preparedness activities (e.g., simulations, Country Team meetings, etc.) in real time to obtain a direct, first-hand perspective on how UNICEF “does” and talks about preparedness; if numerous direct observations of the same variety are undertaken (e.g., numerous simulation exercises), the evaluation team will be expected to use a checklist tool for the purpose of comparison; and
- **Secondary data analysis** of existing datasets (e.g., situation monitoring data), as appropriate for answering the questions above. In light of individual evaluation questions related to Effectiveness and Efficiency related to value for money, it is also expected of the evaluation to also include some form of cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness, or investment analysis.

27. In addition to visits to HQ locations (Geneva, New York, and Copenhagen) and selected ROs, the evaluation team will visit 6-8 COs for approximately one week each in order to examine how preparedness activities are undertaken in country, determine the extent to which these have contributed to emergency response, and assess CO perspectives on preparedness in greater depth. Given the short amount of time in country, it is not envisaged that the evaluation team will produce separate country reports, but rather that the data gathered will serve as input into the main report. Instead, the evaluation team will provide CO management with an end-of-mission debrief on its findings, and provide management an opportunity to validate these findings or point the team toward further evidence to consider.

28. A purposive (i.e., targeted) sampling of countries will be employed with an expected aim to illustrate more general strengths and weaknesses within the Organization’s preparedness systems. Country selection will include at least one country from each region. Other selection criteria will include: overall saturation, typology and level of real-life “testing” of preparedness-related activity; success stories vs. challenge stories; emergency-affected vs emergency-prone; type of crisis (natural, conflict,

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[26] Depending on the type and number of the specific document type at hand, the evaluation team may draw a random sample rather than reviewing the full universe of documents.

[27] If another internal survey effort is undertaken during the course of the evaluation, the evaluation team might be able to dovetail off of these other initiatives and add a handful of questions about preparedness.
displacement, health, nutrition; sudden vs. slow onset); emergency level (Level 1 – Level 3); periodicity (i.e., when the last major evaluative effort of emergency-related systems was undertaken); CO size; income level of the country (LDCs, MICs, etc.); feasibility in light of access/security constraints; and other criteria deemed relevant. The Reference Group will be consulted on criteria development and specific COs worth exploring, as will Regional M&E Chiefs and Regional Emergency Advisers. For non-case study COs and ROs, the evaluation team will nonetheless be expected to undertake a meta-analytical overview of the non-selected COs and ROs on some of the most critical indicators pursuant to the evaluation questions above.

29. In evaluating preparedness, assessing direct attribution of UNICEF’s emergency response success to its preparedness efforts is difficult for two main reasons. First, there are often no counterfactuals at hand for judging agencies’ preparedness efforts: when an emergency does not occur, there is no way of knowing whether they were effective, and when emergencies do occur, it is impossible to fully know what the response would have been like in the absence of the specific preparedness activities. Second, in many if not most countries, both preparedness and response occur within an inter-agency context, and often with some form of national capacity development, and in exceedingly constrained environments. In these cases, a lack of effectiveness in preparedness or response is often despite rather than because of individual agencies’ efforts. This makes it difficult to draw results back to UNICEF specifically. That said, the evaluation will make every effort to establish counterfactuals (through an analysis of natural between-groups differences and within-groups differences) and undertake a contribution analysis. In its Inception Report the selected evaluation team will be expected to articulate its plan for addressing issues of attribution and contribution.

VI. Management and Governance Arrangements

30. Management and governance arrangements for the exercise will be established with a view to the maximizing the credibility and hence utility of the evaluation, as outlined in para 19 above. An Evaluation Specialist in UNICEF’s Evaluation Office will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the exercise, under the guidance and supervision of the Senior Evaluation Specialist responsible for humanitarian-related evaluations. As evaluation manager for the evaluation, the Evaluation Specialist’s role will be to oversee the project from inception to product dissemination, including: recruiting and managing the evaluation team, serving as the interlocutor with relevant stakeholders, monitoring the budget and work plan, organizing field missions and desk search to support data collection, coordinating Reference Group meetings, and ensuring clear and consistent communications with key stakeholders. In managing the evaluation team, the Evaluation Specialist will focus on ensuring adherence to these ToR and to established norms and standards for evaluation. S/He, along with the Senior Evaluation Specialist, will accompany the selected evaluation team for the first few days of data collection in order to ensure adherence to evaluation good practice, and to help smooth the team’s entrée into the CO. This in no way compromises the independence of the evaluation team.

31. An Evaluation Reference Group will constitute the main consultation platform. The Group will serve in an advisory capacity, its key role being to help strengthen the evaluation’s substantive grounding and its relevance to the Organization, and thereby increase its ultimate utility. Reference Group members will be responsible for reviewing key outputs of the evaluation, including this Terms of Reference, the Inception Report and draft reports. Additionally, individual Reference Group members may be asked to assist the EO in the recruitment of the evaluation team. Ultimately, the evaluation
team and the Evaluation Office will assess the appropriateness for incorporation into the final products based on other evidence collected during the evaluation process, and make the best-informed judgment possible and square Reference Group members’ views, bearing in mind the overall objectives and purpose of the exercise, its cost, and other issues. Formal responsibilities of the Reference Group will be articulated in a separate Terms of Reference.

32. It is proposed that the Reference Group include the following 10-12-members:
   - EMOPS (1 Geneva-based colleague for the preparedness and DRR perspective, 1 New York-based colleague for overall policy relevance, and 1 New York-based colleague for the HQ field support perspective)
   - Programme Division (1)
   - Supply Division (1)
   - Division of Human Resources (1)
   - Regional Offices (2-3 Regional Emergency Advisers, who in turn will be asked to cull inputs on key evaluation outputs from the remaining REAs as well as the COs under their remit);
   - Country Offices (2-3 Representatives with experience in emergency and emergency preparedness); and
   - External partners, including OCHA (1), UNDP-BCPR (1), and WFP (1).

A Peer Review panel of senior-level experts external to UNICEF will also be composed in order to add a layer of objective, impartial validation of the consulting team's analysis.

33. Regional M&E Chiefs and non-participating Regional Emergency Advisers will also be kept apprised of the evaluation from the outset, and be consulted on major outputs by their respective Reference Group members (EO and the RO member of the Reference Group). Each relevant unit within HQ, ROs and COs will be asked to nominate a focal point to assist with coordination and support of the evaluation as necessary. This will entail the following:
   - Providing all documents and information requested by the evaluation manager and team in a timely fashion;
   - Ensuring access to all stakeholders within their respective operational units, and to other key stakeholders outside the organization as necessary; and
   - Coordinating all necessary administrative and logistical assistance for data collection missions as well as other data collection activities.

**VII. Risks, Challenges, and Opportunities**

34. The Evaluation Office anticipates several potential risks associated with this evaluation. First, the relationship between the various preparedness-related activities in UNICEF cannot be presumed to be widely understood as a cohesive whole within the Organization. This creates a challenge for the evaluation team to be able to create a workable logic model, which serves as the foundation for the evaluation framework. In order to mitigate limitations in future evaluation findings due to the potentially loose construction of the framework, the Evaluation Office and Reference Group will work with the evaluators during the scoping and inception phase to ensure clarity of what precisely is being evaluated.

35. Another specific risk to this exercise includes CO perceptions that the evaluation is an audit- or inspection-like compliance check. This, coupled with the lack of CO-specific evaluation reports, could
limit buy-in and perceived utility, engendering resistance and ultimately a lack of uptake of findings and recommendations. A pointed effort will be made from the outset to adequately communicate the evaluation’s objectives, purpose and scope, and to underline the utility of COs’ experience for fostering organizational learning rather than enforcing sanctions for under-preparedness. The Reference Group can potentially play a role to allay some of these concerns as well as ensure greater relevancy. In addition, mission debriefing at the end of data collection in country will provide country-specific preliminary findings to the office in support of country learning and maximizing evaluation use to all engaged stakeholders.

36. Timing presents another potential risk for this evaluation. The evaluation must be completed in an abbreviated period of five months (by January/February 2013). This has several implications. First, there may be a need to limit the number of regional visits to meet the budget and deadline while still reaching a sufficient representative sample of country and regional offices. Second, time for data collection will be tight and most likely limited only to national-level efforts, with only a limited degree of outreach to beneficiary communities. Third, CO and RO office support will be necessary to ensure that time spent in country is well used and documentation sharing happens well before arrival. Consultants need to quickly begin with data collection, and logistical issues should be resolved prior to arrival. HQ-level support can be provided if needed to ensure smooth and efficient country visits. To mitigate this risk, the Evaluation Manager will work to ensure close cooperation between the EO and Reference Group and COs/ROs. Aggressive milestone setting and management will be followed by the Evaluation Office to ensure the project is kept on track for on-time delivery. The Evaluation Office can also provide some back office analysis if needed in order to help the workload of the evaluation team under the short timeframe of finalizing the evaluation. In this case, attention will be paid to ensure independence of the team.

37. Past experience demonstrates that even the strongest evaluations may not serve as catalysts for change if senior management does not respond to its recommendations and commit itself to incorporating those it agrees will make a critical difference. The Evaluation Office, together with the Reference Group, can help mitigate this risk by keeping senior managers abreast of key milestones within the evaluation, and by precipitating demand for evaluation results by Country Offices, Regional Offices, and Headquarters divisions through the consultative process of the evaluation itself.

38. The recognized risks notwithstanding, this evaluation presents UNICEF with a significant opportunity as well. It is anticipated that the EO’s Annual Report to the Executive Board will include a thematic report on UNICEF’s evaluations related to humanitarian action. This evaluation thus presents a timely opportunity for UNICEF to showcase the Organization’s ability to work together to produce high-quality, credible evaluations that are used.

VIII. Deliverables and Timeframe

39. The evaluation will produce the following major outputs, all of which will be grounded in UNEG Norms and Standards and good evaluation practice, to be disseminated to the appropriate audiences:

- An Inception Report (maximum 20 pages), informed by an initial scoping mission, that outlines the selected evaluation team’s understanding of the evaluation and expectations, along with a concrete action plan for undertaking the evaluation. It will spell out the specific methods and data sources from which it will garner evidence to answer each evaluation question and to assess attribution/contribution of results to UNICEF’s preparedness efforts (i.e., an analytical
framework); a validated logic model for use in the evaluation and the precise performance benchmarks against which UNICEF’s preparedness will be assessed based on a better understanding of UNICEF’s preparedness work; validation of country case study selection; a more thorough internal and external stakeholder analysis and sampling strategies; any proposed modifications to the evaluation questions, further thoughts on any other areas (e.g., risks, country case study selection, and so on). The Inception Report will be reviewed by the Evaluation Manager and the Reference Group for feedback before finalization;

- A comprehensive **Data Collection Toolkit** that translates all of the methods agreed in the Inception report into specific data collection instruments;
- A **Draft Report (maximum 50 pages)** generating key findings and recommendations for concrete action, underpinned by clear evidence (for review by the Evaluation Manager, Reference Group and select CO/ROs for factual comment on case studies), and an Executive Summary of no more than 5 pages that weaves together the evaluation findings and recommendations into a crisp, clear, compelling storyline;
- A **second Draft Report** that incorporates the first round comments and feedback from the Evaluation Office, Reference Groups and relevant COs/ROs;
- A **Final Report** that incorporates final comments from the Evaluation Office, Reference Groups and relevant COs/ROs on the second draft report;
- A **presentation** of the major findings and recommendations of the evaluation to HQ, delivered in person and by Webinar; and
- A short **synopsis of the final report**, intended for wider external circulation to UNICEF’s partners and the Executive Board.

40. The following timeframe assumes two month as a rough estimate for finalizing the evaluation Terms of Reference and recruitment of the evaluation. The calendar will be revisited with more concrete dates as UNICEF approaches the kick-off of the evaluation.

**Figure 3 – Evaluation of UNICEF’s Preparedness Systems – Project Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitute Reference Group</td>
<td>20 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalize Terms of Reference</td>
<td>17 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit consulting team</td>
<td>14 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kick off evaluation</td>
<td>1 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct scoping Mission to Geneva / New York</td>
<td>8-12 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver draft Inception Report</td>
<td>15 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver data collection toolkit to EO</td>
<td>19 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undertake data collection, including field missions</td>
<td>29 Oct – 23 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undertake data analysis and draft report</td>
<td>26 Nov – 28 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver first Draft Report</td>
<td>28 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver second Draft Report</td>
<td>1 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver Final Report</td>
<td>15 February</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
X. Dissemination and Use

41. The final report will be a published document, publically available on UNICEF’s website, with the executive summary translated into French and Spanish. It is therefore critical that the report not only be strongly evidence-based, but also well written – including a 2-3 page Executive Summary that captures the core story of UNICEF’s preparedness systems in a crisp, clear and compelling narrative. The evaluation team will also be expected to deliver a presentation of the main findings and recommendations to UNICEF colleagues in both New York and Geneva via videoconference, and to a wider audience by webinar. Additional communication and dissemination options are being explored and will follow depending on demand and budget. The Evaluation Office will work with Reference Group members from the outset to determine the best vehicles for communicating findings and recommendations for maximum uptake.

42. A communication hub will be set up on the EO’s intranet site to provide intermittent project status updates and share finalized outputs to keep staff abreast of the ongoing activities given the high interest. This will serve to promote awareness and hence increase the likelihood of uptake from the start as well as more enable greater efficiency under the tight timeframe.

43. It is expected that a standard management response will proceed as per the UNICEF Evaluation Policy, led by the Director of EMOPS. On EMOPS’s request, the EO will help support EMOPS in this process.

X. Evaluation Team Profile

44. A three person team will be recruited to conduct the evaluation, including: 1 senior-level team leader (D2 level); 1 senior-level team member (P5 level); and 1 support analyst (P3-P4 level). The Team Leader will be responsible for undertaking the evaluation from start to finish, and in a timely and high-quality manner, for the bulk of data collection and analysis, as well as report drafting. The Senior Team Member will play a major role in data collection and analysis, and will co-author the report. The Analyst will provide back-office support, conducting systematic desk reviews and other analyses, assisting the team with logistics, etc.

45. The overall team will embody a mix of expertise in evaluation, qualitative and quantitative methods, humanitarian response, preparedness, disaster risk reduction, and UNICEF’s emergency systems. A Terms of Reference detailing the explicit desired profile of each team member will be developed for the advertisement of this evaluation.

XI. Budget

46. A preliminary budget was developed as part of the scoping and development of the concept note for the Preparedness Evaluation to the Evaluation Committee. The Evaluation Office will cover all expenses.
ANNEX G – INFERRED LOGIC MODEL

UNICEF’s Preparedness Systems: Inferred Logical Model

OUTPUTS

- Evidence Generation and Tool Development
  - Risk-informed SITANs/CCA
  - Risk Assessment (national, EW analysis in EWEA)
  - EW reports (OPSCEN reports, Top 15, IASC EWEA report)
  - IA guidelines, PDR inputs, development of EWEA

- Development of UNICEF & IA Preparedness Plans
  - EPRPS (up to 2009), DCP
  - CO inputs in EWEA system
  - UNICEF/IA contingency plans and security plans
  - Emergency Risk Informed Country Programmes (UNDAF & CPAPs) and workplans (AWP/RWP)

- Preparedness Partnerships Building
  - Country-level partnerships with government, CSO, UN agencies, NGOs and RCM
  - IASC Preparedness SWG
  - Global partnerships (UN, NGOs, Donors, RCM, Regional Organisations)

- Technical Assistance
  - EPR training, contingency planning & simulations
  - Capacity development of government, partners and communities
  - Sector or operation preparedness (standards development, logistics)

- Policy Change Based on Advocacy
  - Increased attention to inter agency preparedness
  - Expanded focus to Disaster Risk Reduction
  - Strengthened focus on capacity development of national and local actors

OUTCOMES

- Strengthened UNICEF (HQ, RO, CO) and IA preparedness and capacities to respond to emergencies

- Strengthened national preparedness and capacities to respond to emergencies

- Specific programmatic outcomes achieved that target addressing root causes of emergencies

LONGER-TERM OUTCOMES AND IMPACT

- Improved international humanitarian response

- Increased capacity of national and sub-national actors (incl. Communities) to prevent, respond & recover from emergencies

- Reduced harm and death and increased protection of children due to man made or natural disasters