Executive Summary

Introduction

This report provides the results of an evaluation of the UNICEF’s fifth and sixth country programmes in the Philippines (CPC 5 and CPC 6) stretching over the period 1999 to 2009 and involving over US$111 million. The evaluation was commissioned by the UNICEF Philippines Country Office (PCO) and is intended to inform PCO management decisions on the CPC 6 extension (2010-2012) and the next country programme (2012-2016), as well as contribute to UNICEF organizational learning (and good practices) on promoting children’s rights and well being globally.

The evaluation was framed by existing measurement frameworks for CPC 5 and CPC 6, as well as key evaluation issues, negotiated with and approved by the Evaluation Advisory Committee1 and UNICEF’s Senior Management Team during the evaluation inception phase. Volume II, Appendix II provides the final evaluation matrix which defines the scope and focus of this evaluation.

Evaluation methods included extensive documentation review, secondary data analysis, in-person and telephone interviews, focus sessions and site visits to six focus areas, where UNICEF had concentrated their efforts over this period. The methodology and analytical process were comprehensive, providing rigor and validity through triangulation (of both sources and methods). The Evaluation Team consisted of international and national consultants, who were committed and adhered to ethical principles and standards of evaluation.

Profile of UNICEF Support to the Philippines

UNICEF’s support to the Philippines began in 1948 and since that time has broadened considerably, as exemplified below:

- **UNICEF Roles** evolving from an initial focus on emergency aid to children to encompass service delivery, capacity building and advocacy.

- **UNICEF Primary Targets** increased from children and families (in the 1950’s) to include national and local government agencies and civil society organizations (since the 1990s).

- **UNICEF Program Approach** initiated in CPC 1 (1979) represented a departure from previous project-based initiatives, guided by analyses of the needs of children. CPC 3 (1988) and CPC 4 (1994) introduced area- and sector-based programming respectively.

Compared to previous UNICEF programs, the major distinction of CPC 5 and 6 was the focus on strengthening national and local government capabilities. UNICEF’s development and pursuit of a Child Friendly Movement (CFM) promoted a more holistic and sustainable approach that addressed children’s needs in local, regional, and national contexts.

**CPC 5 (1999-2004)** sought to “implement national and local government capacity building to implement the CRC and to contribute to a massive mobilization in support of a CFM, at all administrative levels, and local communities and within the family.” This was a multi-sectoral

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1 An Advisory Committee was established for the evaluation and included representatives from the Government of Philippines (GoP), UNICEF programmes, Aus Aid and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
approach, crossing and integrating seven programs or sectors (Communications, Local Policy and Institutional development, Health and Nutrition, Education, Children in need of special protection, Gender and Coordination, monitoring and evaluation), through 19 defined projects.

**CPC 6 (2005-2011)** defined “*reduction of disparities among children in national and focus areas by at least 50%*” as its key objective and pursued 18 defined projects within four sectoral components – Health and Nutrition, Education, Child Protection, HIV/AIDS; and two multi-sectoral components – Communications and Local Policy and Institutional Development.

CPC 5 and 6 shared the same 24 focus areas, and many similar programs and projects. They are differentiated in two ways. Firstly, CPC 6 objective emphasized disparity reduction among children in national and focus areas; CPC focused more on capacity building. Second, program components were defined differently. In CPC 5 there were three interrelated multi-sectoral components, while CPC 6 had four sectoral and two multi-sectoral components. (CPC 6 included HIV/AIDS, a new component that did not exist in CPC 5.)

**CPC Context**

**The Philippines** is an archipelago of 7,107 islands populated by roughly 88.6 million people, of which more than 43% are children under the age of 18. Complex (and highly decentralized) political and administrative structures support the seventeen regions, 81 provinces, 1,514 municipalities, 136 cities, and 41,995 barangays. The national economy, the 48th largest in the world at an estimated 2009 gross domestic product (nominal) of $161 billion, has seen previous growth decrease considerably due to both the global financial crisis and two recent natural disasters.

The Philippines moved to a ‘middle income country’ in 2009 but suffers from considerable social issues and disparities, reflected in its 105th ranking (out of 182) in the 2009 Human Development Index and in current projections of not achieving certain MDGs. Ongoing conflict and security issues, as also exist in a global context, compound the Philippines’ vulnerability.

**The UN, and UNICEF** more specifically, are long time and critically important players in Philippines’ development efforts. Global declarations (notably the Millennium Development Goals (2000), the UN Monterey Summit (2002), and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), a changing aid architecture and UNICEF corporate priorities (such as collaboration and partnerships, leveraging, programmatic approaches and knowledge management) have all framed the work undertaken by UNICEF during CPC 5 and CPC 6.

**CPC 5 and CPC 6 Performance**

CPC 5 and CPC 6 performance was examined from four perspectives relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency.

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2 The exceptions were Gender and Development, and Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation, which were programs in CPC 5 only.

3 Most recent, 2007 census.

Relevance: CPC 5 and 6 objectives were relevant to the needs and priorities of the Philippines over the decade and were found to be well aligned with UNICEF’s corporate developmental priorities as well as the priorities of other key developmental agencies in the Philippines between 1999 and 2009.

Effectiveness: UNICEF made notable contributions to enhance local and national government capabilities to implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Philippines, including valued and recognizable contributions to strengthening the institutional capabilities of Local Government Units (LGUs) in reviewed focus areas. The Child Friendly Movement, developed collaboratively by UNICEF and the GoP, was a remarkably bold and innovative approach focusing on institutional and systems changes, with explicit attention to advocacy and capacity building and delivered in a integrated, multi-sectoral approach.

However, UNICEF missed opportunities to learn from this experimental approach, notably due to a lack of data and some faulty assumptions in program design (chiefly how the design evolved from CPC 5 to CPC 6). These have impeded UNICEF’s ability to measure the impacts of CPC 5 and 6, specifically on reducing disparity among children in the Philippines. The evaluation also found UNICEF’s effectiveness to be limited by the dominance of service delivery in its organizational culture and by the absence of systematic attention to leveraging in its program management practices.

Sustainability: There was insufficient explicit attention to sustainability of results in the CPC 5 and CPC 6 programs. While capacity building was central to both programs, the absence of a common understanding, clear strategy, and systematic approach to capacity building within the UNICEF Philippines Country Office (PCO) contributed to its mixed performance in supporting sustainable capacity building results.

Efficiency: The evaluation supports the findings on efficiency identified in the 2009 program review and in the global staff survey. While UNICEF and its key stakeholders invest considerable time and resources in planning and reporting, they typically under-invest in analyzing the results of UNICEF investments and managing for results. The absence of systematic approaches to capacity building, leveraging resources, and sustainability in UNICEF PCO reduces the potential cost-effectiveness of its investments. Delays by UNICEF in addressing recommendations of previous reviews and evaluations reduce the UNICEF PCO’s organizational efficiency and effectiveness.

UNICEF Country Program Management

The evaluation also looked at management issues, including UNICEF PCO strategic and programmatic management, partnership management and revenue generation.

Strategic management and programming: CPC 5 and 6 were hampered by the absence of clearly articulated program theories, upon which management decisions could be made. For example, while the CFM espoused an integrated multi-sectoral approach, this was not sufficiently supported by the program design or by UNICEF and GoP contexts. In addition, the disparity reduction focus of CPC 6 was not well linked with the underlying CFM approach initiated in CPC 5.

UNICEF has played multi-faceted roles in the Philippines and will be challenged in the future to identify its niche – i.e., the role(s) in which it has greatest comparative advantage. Clear and appropriate country program results frameworks (as were not found to be present in CPC 5 and 6) will be critical to meaningful assessment and UNICEF’s ability to claim success. This includes the need for systems to track the country program’s cumulative performance.
Partnership management: UNICEF has made some modest progress in harmonizing its work with other UN agencies in the Philippines, and efforts continue in this regard. UNICEF has developed effective and mature partnerships with the GoP at national and provincial levels and with several CSOs; however, its partnerships with other donors are underdeveloped.

Revenue generation: UNICEF has been very effective in generating increased financial support for its programs over the past decade. However, its support from traditional sources (bilateral development organizations) has been waning in recent years, reflecting changing donor funding patterns, and raises financial risks for UNICEF’s continued programming in the Philippines.

Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons

Over the last decade, UNICEF, through and with its strong partnership with the GoP, made notable contributions to enhance government capabilities to implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Philippines – the overarching goals of both the CPC 5 and CPC 6. CFM espoused an integrated multi-sectoral approach and made valued and recognizable contributions, most notably in strengthening the institutional capacities of LGUs in focus areas and in national policy development. This evaluation revealed some issues for UNICEF to address as it plans its next country program and some lessons that could inform programming for children.

The following recommendations provide direction for UNICEF PCO going forward:

1. The UNICEF PCO should articulate a clear theory of change for the next country program and define its role within the change process to maximize its comparative advantage and resources in the Philippines.

2. In its upcoming programming in the Philippines, the UNICEF PCO should define sustainability strategies. These should include exit strategies, identification of risks and mitigation strategies to achieve sustainable results, and more sustainable approaches to capacity development.

3. In clarifying its program theory and future roles in the Philippines, the UNICEF PCO should increase its efforts to more systematically leverage resources for children.

4. The UNICEF PCO should develop a single clear results framework and a monitoring system to track and report on its performance in realizing planned objectives.

5. The UNICEF PCO should develop a more holistic approach to revenue generation that complements its program strategy and ensures adequate provision for its operational and administrative needs.

Lessons learned from this evaluation that may be of benefit to programming for children (notably within UNICEF and the UN) are:

1. An organization that operates in a complex, multi-stakeholder context needs a single, clear results framework that speaks to all stakeholders.

2. Organizational change requires strong leadership, commitment, as well as the necessary incentives, support mechanisms, and checks and balances.

3. Innovative programs that aim to realize societal change take time and require a long term vision, commitment, as well as mechanisms to support program learning and adaption.

4. To be perceived as credible and trustworthy partners, organizations must demonstrate and account for their performance to stakeholders or risk reputational and/or financial risks.

5. Over reliance on one or a few sources of revenue reduces the viability of an organization.
6. The results of a capacity building initiative are more likely to be sustained if the initiative is mainstreamed within the targeted entity, if it supports one-time rather than ongoing costs, if exit strategies are defined and used, if sustainability issues are identified and addressed in timely ways, and if individual capacities are supported in tandem with (as opposed to in isolation of) institutional capacity building.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APSSC</td>
<td>Asian Pacific Shared Services Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Government Overseas Aid Program</td>
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<td>BCPC</td>
<td>Barangay Council for the Protection of Children</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFM</td>
<td>Child Friendly Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSS</td>
<td>Child Friendly School System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMT</td>
<td>Country Management Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNSP</td>
<td>Children in Need of Special Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Program Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>UNICEF Country Program for Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Country Planning Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPDO</td>
<td>Children’s Program Development Officer</td>
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<td>CPE</td>
<td>Country Program Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Development Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCD</td>
<td>Early Childhood Care and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMEP</td>
<td>Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMR</td>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGU</td>
<td>Local Government Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPID</td>
<td>Local Policy and Institutional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPC</td>
<td>Municipal Council for the Protection of Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCWC</td>
<td>Municipal Council for the Welfare of Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Middle income country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICS</td>
<td>Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMR</td>
<td>Maternal Mortality Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPO</td>
<td>Master Plan of Operation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Acronyms

MTR  Mid Term Review
MTSP  Medium Term Strategic Plan
NEDA  National Economic Development Authority
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCO   Philippines Country Office
PCPC  Provincial Council for the Protection of Children
PCWC  Provincial Council for the Welfare of Children
PME   Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
PPA   Program Performance Assessment
ProMS Program Management System
RBM   Results Based Management
RC    Resident Coordinator
RIRR  Revised Implementing Rules and Regulation
SMR   Strategic Moment of Reflection
SPLD  Social Policy and Local Development
TOR   Terms of Reference
UN    United Nations
UNCT  United Nations Country Team
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFP   World Food Program
WHO   World Health Organization
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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The Government of the Philippines (GoP) and UNICEF have cooperated in promoting children’s rights since 1946; the first UNICEF country program for children (CPC 1) was established in 1979. Since 1999, the Government-UNICEF Country Programs for Children (CPC 5 and 6) have focused on promoting the child friendly movement in achieving measurable results for the most disadvantaged children.

Over the past 10 years, UNICEF has expended over US $111 million in programming through CPC 5 and 6; 28 per cent of this was funded through UNICEF’s regular resources, while the rest (72 per cent) was funded through other resources. In 2009, UNICEF and the GoP agreed to extend the CPC 6 by two years to the end of 2011 to dovetail the UNICEF program cycle with that of the GoP.

UNICEF contracted Universalia Management Group Ltd. (i.e., the international consultant) and Dr. Fernando Aldaba (i.e., the national consultant) to evaluate the outcomes and implementation of its fifth and sixth Country Programs for Children from 1999 to 2009, including all disbursements made up to 31 December 2009. The terms of reference (TOR) for the evaluation are found in Volume II, Appendix I.

The evaluation is expected to assess UNICEF’s contributions to the GoP Medium Term Development Goals and capture lessons learned to inform the next round of the Common Country Assessment – UN Development Assistance Framework (CCA-UNDAF) 2012-2016 and the formulation of the UNICEF CPC 7.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the results obtained in CPC 5 and CPC 6 and to capture lessons learned to inform the new country program (2012-16).

The primary audiences for the evaluation are UNICEF, including the UNICEF Philippines Country Office (PCO), UNICEF HQ, and the UNICEF Regional Office (EASPRO). Secondary audiences include UNICEF’s key development partners in the Philippines, including the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA); agencies that fund UNICEF, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Australian Government Overseas Aid Program (AusAID), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); NGOs; and the UN Country Team.

An earlier version of this report was submitted to the Advisory Committee and to the UNICEF Management Team. Their comments and suggestions have been incorporated into this final report.
1.2 Evaluation Methodology

1.2.1 Overview

The evaluation was undertaken for UNICEF Philippines by a team of international and national consultants under the direction of an Advisory Group of key CPC stakeholders including UNICEF and the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).

During the Inception Phase, the Evaluation Team developed the methodology for the evaluation (see sidebar). The Advisory Group provided guidance and feedback on all interim deliverables and approved the final Inception Report (February 2010) that served as the basis for conducting the evaluation. Data collection was carried out between February and April 2010 in the Philippines by a team of six international and Filipino consultants.

The evaluation conforms to the principles, standards and practices set out in the Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System (2005), DAC Principles for evaluations (1991), and the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (2007).

1.2.2 Evaluation Framework

With input from UNICEF, Universalia developed a detailed methodology for the evaluation and an evaluation framework summarizing the major evaluation questions and sub-questions (see Volume II, Appendix II). A summary of evaluation foci is provided in the sidebar.

1.2.3 Data Sources

There were four major sources of data for this evaluation: people, site visits to a sample of CPC-supported focus areas, documents, and information systems.

People: A total of 314 individuals were consulted for the evaluation through individual and group interviews and focus groups. These included UNICEF staff, GoP partners, bilateral donors, UN agencies, and civil society organizations (CSOs). See Volume II, Appendix III for a complete list.

About the Inception Phase

The Inception Phase included a review of selected UNICEF documents, a visit to UNICEF Philippines between 23 November and 4 December 2009, interviews with 45 key UNICEF stakeholders, a two-day working session with UNICEF implementing partners in Clark, a brief visit to a province receiving UNICEF support (Northern Samar), and several working sessions with UNICEF stakeholders. Due to time and data constraints, a couple of the Inception phase objectives were not realized during the mission. These gaps were addressed in January 2010 with the active support of UNICEF and the national consultant.

CPC 5 and 6 Evaluation Foci

CPC Context
CPC Performance (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability of results, efficiency)
CPC Management
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
Focus Area visits: The Evaluation Team visited six (or 25 per cent) of the focus areas supported by UNICEF. This purposeful sample was selected on the basis of the criteria outlined in the sidebar. Additional details on the sampling strategy and the method of data collection in the field visits are provided in Volume II, Appendix IV.

Documents: The list of documents and websites reviewed during the course of the evaluation are presented in Volume II, Appendix V. The team drew heavily upon previous reviews and evaluations of UNICEF’s program in the Philippines between 2001 and 2009.

Quantitative Analysis: The team also utilized quantitative analysis to examine changes in selected but comparable indicators from the available Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2000 and MICS 2007 data. This analysis is presented in Volume II, Appendix XII.

1.2.4 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

UNICEF’s country program in the Philippines is a composite of its program, project, and sub-project investments. In keeping with the TOR, the bulk of analysis in this evaluation was at the country program level, as opposed to the program component or project levels.

Key methods of data collection were document review, semi-structured face-to-face and telephone interviews, focus group discussions, and observations during the visits to UNICEF Philippines and the six focus areas.

The team used descriptive, content, statistical, and comparative analyses to analyze the data for this study and, to the extent possible, ensured validity through data triangulation (confirming data from multiple sources). Based on the data analysis, the Evaluation Team developed findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

1.3 Evaluation Team

The Evaluation Team consisted of the following members:

- Gerry Cooney – Team Leader (Canada)
- Heather Buchanan – Assistant Team Leader (Canada)
- Dr. Fernando Aldaba - Contextual Advisor and Manager Focus Group Area Data Collection (Philippines)
- Rudy Broers – Evaluation Consultant (Canada)
- Joselito Sescon – Evaluation Consultant (Philippines)
- Reuel Hermoso - Evaluation Consultant (Philippines)
- Sarah Peek – Research Assistant (Canada)
1.4 Limitations

The evaluation faced a number of challenges related to information and personnel availability. These are highlighted in this report, relative to the implicated issues and findings. However, this section provides an overview of the evaluation’s limitations, notably related to the evaluation scope and plan as committed in the Inception report:

Quantitative analysis was intended to support findings and recommendations related to CPC 5 and 6 effectiveness and especially the performance / results in LGUs. In spite of best efforts, the evaluation is constrained by the availability and utility of data. The evaluation team was not mandated (nor did it have the time or financial resources) to generate or create new data and, after close examination of several national sources, agreed with UNICEF to use MICS data. As indicated in the sidebar, and further detailed in Appendix XII, this resulted in limitations to the findings and conclusions on disparity reduction – the key thrust of CPC 6. The limitation is specified in finding 6 of this report and implications covered evaluation’s recommendations.

Content analysis, a significant feature of this evaluation, was heavily dependent on document and personnel availability. Despite the active assistance and support of UNICEF PCO, the Evaluation Team was unable to obtain some previous UNICEF corporate and PCO documents that informed CPC 5 and 6, and historical information about UNICEF’s programs prior to CPC 5. Important gaps have been flagged in this report. Specifically, at the time of writing the Evaluation Team had requested but was missing information on: UNICEF’s response to previous country program evaluations, the 2008 Department for International Development (DFID) Report on Emergencies, and the 2010 Inter UN Gender Audit. As a consequence, analyses related to, and dependent upon this documentation remains incomplete.

As is often the case, there were also constraints on the availability of personnel / stakeholders (in Manila and in the focus areas). While a ‘second round’ of key informant interviews were limited due to personnel availability, the evaluation addressed these challenges through the final report validation process.

1.5 Organization of the Report

Following this introductory chapter:

- Chapter 2 provides a profile of the UNICEF Philippines Program,
- Chapter 3 presents the context,
- Chapters 4 and 5 examine program performance and management respectively, and
- Chapter 6 presents the conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned.

A list of CPC 5 and CPC projects is presented in Appendix I. All other appendices are provided in Volume II.

### MICS data

**Utility:** While CPC 6 objectives focused on disparity reduction at the barangay level, MICS reports at the provincial level.

**Availability:** Comparable MICS data (2000 to 2007) was only available for 10 of the 24 LGUs supported by UNICEF.
2. Profile of UNICEF Support to the Philippines

2.1 Overview

This chapter provides an overview of UNICEF support to the Philippines before and after 1999, and its financial investments and human resources in the Philippines during the review period.

2.2 UNICEF Support to the Philippines: 1948-1999

UNICEF’s support to the Philippines began in 1948 and it established a country program in 1979. Between 1948 and 1999, UNICEF broadened its focus considerably, as shown in Exhibit 2.1.

UNICEF Roles: From its initial focus on emergency aid to children in 1948, UNICEF gradually broadened its roles to encompass service delivery, capacity building of national and local government agencies, and advocacy. Service delivery remained a very strong focus throughout the period, albeit more focused on service delivery (through pilots) in the latter stages.

UNICEF Primary Targets: Over the period, UNICEF’s primary targets also increased – from an initial focus on children and families to include national and local government agencies and civil society organizations. Its focus on national agencies waxed and waned over time: while these were primary targets in CPC 1 and 2, they were less prominent in CPC 3 when UNICEF began to work more in selected provinces.

UNICEF Program Approach: CPC 1 marked the advent of a “program approach” in the Philippines; prior to that, it invested in individual projects. To date, its programs have been guided by an analysis of the needs of children. CPC 3 and 4 introduced area- and sector-based programming respectively, and UNICEF began to focus its efforts in certain geographic areas (provinces or depressed areas) and sectors.

Exhibit 2.1 UNICEF Programming In the Philippines (1948-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>CPC</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Primary Targets</th>
<th>Project/Program Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948 -</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency aid to children</td>
<td>Individual children, families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Harnessing community resources to meet children needs</td>
<td>Individual children National government</td>
<td>Centred on the needs of children as borne out by a situation analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Delivering basic services</td>
<td>Individual children National government</td>
<td>Centred on the needs of children as borne out by a situation analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Building the capabilities of key government agencies involved in nationwide programs such as immunization, control of diarrheal diseases and water and sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency assistance/feeding programs for malnourished children (due to sugar crisis) in Negros Occidental, combined with other basic services e.g., food production, bio-intensive gardening</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Cited from CPC 5 MTR 2001 p.61; complemented by information provided by Ms. Reggie Molera, a former UNICEF PCO staff member
### UNICEF Country Program Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>CPC</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Primary Targets</th>
<th>Project/Program Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988-1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Service delivery in selected depressed areas</td>
<td>Individual children, Local governments, Selected depressed local areas</td>
<td>Centred on the needs of children as borne out by a situation analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Area Based Child Survival and Development Program in seven most depressed provinces: Ifugao, Negros Occidental, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-tawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Expanded national coverage of selected program interventions</td>
<td>Expanded national coverage, Focus on selected provinces, Selected depressed local areas</td>
<td>Area based Child Survival and Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Convergent delivery of all UNICEF supported services in selected provinces</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sector Based Child Survival and Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extension of coverage of areas with special needs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural Integrated Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on high impact areas (health, nutrition, EFA), special needs areas (CSAC and child labour) and convergent rural and urban areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Basic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stronger partnerships with and building capacities of local governments (in line with full implementation of the Local Government Code)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MCH, Watsan, EPI/CARI and Nutrition Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSAC and Child Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Mobilization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.3 UNICEF Support to the Philippines: 1999-2009

Over the period of this review, UNICEF was guided by two Country Programs for Children – CPC 5 and CPC 6, which are briefly profiled in Exhibit 2.2 below. The similarities and differences between CPC 5 and 6 are described below.

**Similarities between CPC 5 and 6**

Compared to previous UNICEF programs in the Philippines, the major distinction of CPC 5 and 6 was the focus on strengthening national and local government capabilities. UNICEF’s development and pursuit of a Child Friendly Movement (CFM) promoted a more holistic and ultimately sustainable approach that addressed children’s needs in local, regional, and national contexts. The intent was to identify and address key longer-term institutional gaps and barriers at local and national levels, rather than shorter-term measures focused on the immediate needs of children. This focus was reflected in the CPC 5 objective.
CPC 5 and 6 shared the same 24 focus areas, and many similar programs and similar projects. (See Appendix I for a comparative list of projects).

CPC 5 and 6 both defined expected program results in terms of children and intermediary partners (see sidebar). While neither CPC 5 nor CPC 6 included any specific program component focused on emergency support, both provided assistance for natural and other emergencies over the decade.

Differences between CPC 5 and 6

While CPC 6 planning documents continued references to strengthening institutional capabilities, the CPC 6 objective emphasized disparity reduction among children in national and focus areas. (The use of the word “among” rather than “between” contributed to some ambiguity about CPC 6 objectives and expected results).

Another key difference between the two programs was how program components were defined. In CPC 5 there were three interrelated multi-sectoral components, while CPC 6 had four sectoral and two multi-sectoral components. (CPC 6 included HIV/AIDS, a new component that did not exist in CPC 5.)

Exhibit 2.2 Overview of CPC 5 and 6 Objectives and Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>No of Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1999-2003, plus one year extension 2004 | CPC 5   | To implement national and local government capability to implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) To contribute to massive mobilization in support of a Child Friendly Movement at all administrative levels, local communities and within the family. | 3 multi-sectoral components  
  - Communication  
  - Local Policy and Institutional Development  
  - Strategic program support to health, nutrition, education, child protection, and gender and development  
  7 programs  
  Communication  
  Local Policy and Institutional Development  
  Fostering Health and Nutrition Caring Behaviours through a Child Friendly Movement  
  Creating Child Friendly Learning Conditions for Education for All  
  Children in Need of Special Protection  
  Gender and Development  
  Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation | 19               |
### UNICEF Country Program Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>No of Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2005-2009               | CPC 6   | To reduce the disparities among children in national and focus areas (as evidenced by major health, nutrition, education, and protection indicators), by at least 50% of their 2003 national levels | 2 multi-sectoral components  
Communication  
Local Policy and Institutional Development  
4 sectoral components  
Health and Nutrition  
Education  
Child Protection  
HIV/AIDS | 18             |

2.4 UNICEF Investments in the Philippines (1999-2009)

This section provides an overview of UNICEF’s expenditures in the Philippines over the decade.

**CPC 5 and CPC 6 Overview**

Between 1999 and 2009, UNICEF spent approximately US$111 million in the Philippines; US$31.28 million (28 per cent) from Regular Resources (RR) and nearly US$ 80 million (72 per cent) from Other Resources (OR).

As shown in Exhibit 2.3, 65 per cent of Other Resources was provided by governments (i.e., bilateral assistance agencies). Thematic donors, the Philippines private sector (which includes corporate and individual entities), and UNICEF National Committees each provided approximately 10 per cent of total OR. UN assistance was provided from agencies such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).

**Regular Resources vs. Other Resources**

The Regular Resource allocation is calculated on the basis of the size of the child population, the annual Under Five Mortality Rate, and the Gross National Product per capita.

The Executive Board establishes ceilings for the total amount of Other Resources that UNICEF and partners plan to seek for the Country Program, taking into consideration previous fundraising performance and implementation rates. These ceilings do not cover additional OR that may need to be raised through emergency appeals, usually in the framework of a UN Consolidated Appeal.

UNICEF Program Policy and Procedures Manual
Exhibit 2.3  Other Resources (OR) by origin, 1999-2009

Exhibit 2.4  Relative Growth in Other Resources, 1999-2009

Annual Expenditures

Total UNICEF expenditures in the Philippines tripled from US $5.8 million in 1999 to $18.4 million in 2009. Of this, RR increased at a considerably slower pace over time (34 per cent) as compared to OR growth of 380 per cent (from US$3.16 to $14.9 million). Exhibit 2.4 shows how OR has grown in proportion to total UNICEF expenditures over time, from almost 60 to 80% of UNICEF PCO expenditures. The main reasons for the growth in OR include the significant increase in financial support from AusAID in CPC 6 (effective 2006), increased support from Thematic Funds (for developmental as well as humanitarian purposes after 2005), as well increased private sector support (see Section 5.4 for further analysis).
Program Expenditures by Sector

Over the period, the greatest UNICEF program expenditures in the Philippines were in health and nutrition (30 per cent), followed by child protection (21 per cent) and education (17 per cent), as illustrated in Exhibit 2.5 below.

The UNICEF programs with the greatest growth in overall UNICEF expenditure between 1999 and 2009 and over time are the education sector (375 per cent) and cross-sector support (1100 per cent). The greatest growth in UNICEF OR sector expenditures over time are found in the education (719 per cent) followed by the health and nutrition (315 per cent) sectors.

Exhibit 2.5 Program Expenditures by Sector (1999-2009)

Note: 1: Gender & Development was categorized as a distinct program expenditure from 1999-2003 only.
Note 2: Coordination, Monitoring & Evaluation was recorded as a distinct program expenditure in 2004. Since then, UNICEF has included Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation as part of Cross-sectoral Support. We have combined both in this analysis.
Emergency Assistance Expenditures

UNICEF expenditures on emergency assistance have ebbed and flowed over time in keeping with natural or man-made calamities, as shown in Exhibit 2.6 below (UNICEF began to track its expenditures on emergency assistance in 2005). A major expenditure in 2007 was in response to the massive oil spill off Guimaras – a UNICEF focal area – in November 2006. In 2009, a combination of natural disasters and the global financial crisis contributed to a significant increase in UNICEF’s emergency assistance.

Exhibit 2.6 Emergency Assistance Expenditures, UNICEF-Philippines (2005 -2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure in US $</td>
<td>1,281,512</td>
<td>267,198</td>
<td>3,180,834</td>
<td>856,233</td>
<td>6,866,574</td>
<td>681,512</td>
<td>13,133,864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Administrative and operational costs

UNICEF reports that its administrative and operational costs increased from US $756K in 1999 to $828K in 2009. This means that such costs have declined over time in relation to total expenditures from 12% to 4%. Costs incurred in 1999 and 2004 were higher than other years: in 1999 due to substantial capital expenditures for office equipment and vehicle purchases, and in 2004 due to the transfer and fitting-in of furniture and equipment when UNICEF-Philippines moved to its present location in RCBC Plaza, Makati City (see Volume II, Appendix VI). These administrative and operational costs include rent, office supplies and so forth, but exclude staff salaries due to reported difficulties in classifying salaries as administrative or overhead costs.

2.5 UNICEF Human Resources in the Philippines

In the Philippines, UNICEF currently draws upon the support of full-time staff, secondees, office-based contractors, as well as volunteers and interns. Over the CPC 5 and CPC 6 programming period, there have been a few changes in the human resources composition in the UNICEF Philippines office as indicated below and detailed in Volume II, Appendix VII:

- While UNICEF expenditures over the period grew threefold, total staff increased by a relatively modest 25% (from 55 staff in 1999 to 69 in 2009).
- This has been partially offset by the engagement of other human resources since 2004. In 2009, for example, these included 17 secondees, 22 office-based contractors, and 5 volunteers/interns.
- Professional staff positions decreased from 51 per cent in 1999 to 44 per cent in 2009.
- The percentage of female staff (60 per cent) remained relatively stable over time.
- The balance between national and international staff changed during the period, with international staff increasing from 10 per cent in 1999 to 15 per cent in 2009. The most notable change was among Section Heads – the majority of whom are now international staff, while most of these positions were held by national staff in 1999.
- In 2009, the average tenure of international staff members was 1.5 years, while national staff had an average tenure of 6.5 years. As a consequence, the national staff plays a very important role in familiarizing newcomers (and particularly international staff) to UNICEF PCO’s evolution, practices and approaches.
3. CPC Context

3.1 Introduction

UNICEF’s program in the Philippines is affected by the various contexts in which it operates. These include the Philippines country context, the global context, the UN System context, and UNICEF corporate and country office contexts.

3.2 Philippines Context

This section provides a general overview of the Philippines context (social, political and economic context of the country), the situation of children, and the country’s progress in poverty alleviation and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Overview

The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands with a total land area, including inland bodies of water, of approximately 300,000 square kilometers. The three biggest island groupings include Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Its political and administrative structure is composed of seventeen regions, 81 provinces, 1,514 municipalities, 136 cities, and 41,995 barangays. In 2007, the most recent census, it had a population of 88.6 million with approximately 8 million citizens living or working temporarily in foreign countries.

The national economy of the Philippines is the 48th largest in the world, with an estimated 2009 gross domestic product (nominal) of $161 billion. In 2009, the country was classified by the World Bank as a middle income country with an average income of US$ 3,510 per capita (2008 estimate of Purchasing Power Parity by the World Bank).

In the 2009 UNDP Human Development Report, the Philippines’s Human Development Index ranking was 105 out of 182 countries. Some regions in the Philippines have been vulnerable to natural disasters such as typhoons and drought while others have been affected by decades of armed conflict.

The Situation of Children

More than 43 percent of the Philippines’ population is under 18 years of age and the population is growing at a rate above 2 per cent (from 1995 to 2007 the average growth rate was estimated at 2.16 per cent), one of the higher rates in the developing world. In 2007, there were also around 2.6 million unregistered children, most of whom are Muslim or from other indigenous peoples (4th CRC Periodic Country Report 2007). A review of progress in realizing the targets for children set in CHILD 21 (the 2000 Philippine National Strategic Framework for Plan Development for Children) indicates that there has been marked improvement in reducing infant mortality rates

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7 However, NSO and Plan Philippine had implemented the Unregistered Children and Birth Registration Projects which were able to register at least 1.86 million in 2006 (CWC Situation Report)
(IMR) and under-five mortality but more effort is needed in reducing maternal mortality rates (MMR) and meeting education goals (see Volume II, Appendix VIII). Children in the Philippines face many major social risks. CHILD 21 identified over 20 key threats to children at different stages of the life cycle (see sidebar and Volume II, Appendix IX for additional information on the situation of children). The 2009 assessment regarding the status of the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Philippines (October 2009) recognized several positive developments in the Philippines aimed at protecting and promoting the rights of the child, but also noted several areas for increased attention (see Volume II, Appendix X).

Political Context

Policy environment – In 1974 during the Marcos administration, the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) was promulgated. It was the first legal edict enacted for the protection of the rights of children and youth. The ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 July 1990 marked a key commitment of the GoP to the rights of children in the Philippines. Since then, the government has signed various declarations and launched plans, frameworks and initiatives signaling its commitment, as shown in the sidebar. The latest assessment regarding the status of the implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child in the Philippines prepared by the Committee on the Rights of the Child (October 2009) noted the need for the Philippines to build further on these commitments, recommending that it mainstream the National Plan of Action for the implementation of Child 21 by providing and clearly specifying specific budget lines for programs and set up adequate follow up and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philippines commitments to Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education for All (1991-2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine National Strategic Framework for Plan Development for Children 2000-2025 (Child 21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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While there have been a number of important legislative changes in the Philippines aimed at addressing the above mentioned threats to children (see sidebar), challenges remain in the implementation of these laws. For example, the assessment of the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Philippines noted the need for the Philippines to take all necessary measures to ensure the full and effective implementation of domestic laws to better protect the rights of the children to harmonize legislations fully with the provisions and principles of the Convention.

**Government Priorities and Reforms**

The following are the key reform programs of the government in the health, education, and social protection sectors.

**BESRA** (the Basic Education Sector Reform Agenda), drafted in 2006, aims to create a basic education sector that is capable of attaining the country’s Education for All objectives by the year 2015. To achieve its outcomes (see sidebar) BESRA calls for strong and sustained efforts toward involving communities in the reform effort, continuously upgrading teacher competencies and teaching quality, and building and mobilizing an institution-level national constituency. It also highlights the importance of early childhood care and alternative learning systems and the critical role that the private sector plays in increasing their reach.

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**Key Changes in Legislation Affecting Children since 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magna Carta for Disabled Persons (1992)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (1992)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Act Promulgating a Comprehensive and National system for ECCD (2000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (2003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father (2004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newborn Screening Act (2004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magna Carta for Persons with Disability as amended (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act Requiring the Certification of the DSWD to Declare a Child Legally Available for Adoption (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Child Pornography Act (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magna Carta for Women (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education Outcomes**

- All persons beyond school-age should acquire the essential competence to be considered functionally literate
- All children aged 6 should enter school ready to learn and prepared to achieve the required competencies from Grade 1 to 3 instruction
- All children aged 6 to 11 should be on track to completing elementary schooling with satisfactory achievement levels at every grade, and all children aged 12 to 15 should be on track to completing secondary schooling with similarly satisfactory achievement levels at every year.
- Every community should mobilize all its social, political, cultural and economic resources and capabilities to support the universal attainment of basic education competencies in Filipino and English.

**BESRA**
FOURmula ONE for Health In 2005, the Department of Health embarked on the implementation of this framework for health sector reform to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of the health system. FOURmula ONE for Health intends to implement critical interventions as a single package backed by effective management infrastructure and financing arrangements and following a sector-wide approach.

Poverty Programs The two main flagship programs being implemented at present are the government’s Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (also known as the 4Ps) and the KALAHI-CIDSS. Under the 4Ps, as of May 2009, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) has covered 446 cities and municipalities in 63 provinces in 7 regions by; it targets the very poor and grants cash allocations of P800–P1,400 per month to families on the condition that their children attend school at least 85 per cent of the time and receive vaccinations and health care. The 4Ps also involves conditionalities for pregnant mothers to undergo pre and post natal care. The KALAHI-CIDSS is a community-driven development program also delivered by DSWD that organizes targeted communities to prioritize their basic infrastructure needs and gives grants to finance identified projects including day care centers and water and sanitation projects. The DSWD is also implementing a national household targeting system for poverty reduction which seeks to the unify criteria for the selection of the poorest population, create a database of poor households as a reference in identifying beneficiaries of social protection programs, and reduce leakage to non-poor and under-coverage or exclusion of the poor in social protection services.

Political Leadership – After the 1986 people power revolt in the Philippines, a new constitution was ratified by the citizenry mandating the establishment of a new democratic legal and institutional framework. Since then there have been elections every six years and three presidents. In 2001, another people power revolt ousted the sitting president, Joseph Estrada, and installed the Vice President, Gloria Arroyo as acting president. In 2004, Arroyo was elected for a new six-year term. National and local elections were held in May 2010. The new President-elect, Benigno Aquino III, is expected to put great emphasis on job creation, poverty reduction, and social services such as health and education. Most of the major reforms in education, health, and social welfare to date will probably be continued and even enhanced.

Decentralization – Congress enacted the Local Government Code of 1991 which provided for greater powers and autonomy for local government units (LGUs). Several frontline services were decentralized (e.g., health, social welfare, agriculture and the environment), but the delivery of education services remained with the Department of Education. Attempts at localization reforms are underway.

Human and financial resources for the delivery of decentralized services have remained insufficient, especially for lower class municipalities all over the country. While the income derived from the Internal Revenue Allotment by lower class municipal local governments increased due to the Decentralization Law, resources for social services are still inadequate.

Elements of the FOURmula ONE strategy

Health financing – The goal of this health reform area is to foster greater, better and sustained investments in health. The Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, through the NHIP, and the Department of Health, through sector-wide policy support, will lead this component jointly.

Health regulation – The goal is to ensure the quality and affordability of health goods and services.

Health service delivery – The goal is to improve and ensure the accessibility and availability of basic and essential health care in both public and private facilities and services.

Good governance – The goal is to enhance health system performance at the national and local levels.
Moreover, despite new fiscal powers, many local governments have not been able to raise revenues from their own constituencies mainly because of weak capacities and lack of economic activities in their areas. The national government also experienced recurring fiscal deficits because of decreased tax effort and thus allocation to LGUs was also affected.\(^9\) For example, the budgets for education, health, and water and sanitation sectors for the MDGs were tightly constrained from 1998 to 2005 as a response of the national government to the continuous decline in the tax effort (Manasan 2007).

**Conflict and Security\(^{10}\)** – The Philippines is home to two of the longest-running armed conflicts in the world: against the communist insurgency (CPP-NPA-NDF) and against the Bangsa Moro rebellion (MNLF and MILF). Both conflicts have run for almost four decades and have resulted in numerous deaths. According to the government, more than 4,700 combatants (including soldiers and police as well as NPA, MNLF and MILF fighters) were killed between 1984 and 2002. These protracted wars have affected innocent civilians including children living in the main areas of conflict, as well as the country at large. As of the end of August 2009, based on data from the government’s National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), an estimated 66,000 families, or between 330,000 and 400,000 people remained displaced in Mindanao. Around 40-60 per cent of internally displaced persons are children.\(^{11}\) The situation has discouraged foreign investment with negative consequences for the economic and social development of the country. The World Bank estimates that direct loss from the Mindanao conflict from 1971-2001 was US$2-3 billion (Schiavo-Campo and Judd, 2005).

**Economic Context**

**Macroeconomic growth** – While the Philippine economy expanded during the 1960s through the 1970s with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of between 5 and 6 per cent, it slumped in the 1980s and mid 1990s to approximately 2 per cent. Between 2000 and 2007, the Philippines returned to moderate expansion of 5 per cent. However, the average GDP growth rate from 2001-1007 was still among the lowest in ASEAN; for example, Cambodia and Vietnam experienced growth rates of 9.98 and 7.74 per cent respectively (ADB Key Indicators 2008). The situation changed considerably in 2009 due to the effects of both the global financial crisis and two devastating storms in the Philippines; economic growth decreased to 0.9 per cent in 2009 from 3.8 per cent in 2008 (National Statistical Coordination Board). The positive growth registered amidst the global decline in the last two years was mainly due to the resiliency of remittances from overseas workers which was estimated at US$ 17.34 billion in 2009 (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas).

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\(^9\) Tax effort reached a peak of 17 per cent (tax revenues as percent GDP) in 1997 but was down to 14 per cent in 2008.

\(^{10}\) Source: Philippines Human Development Report 2005.

Poverty – Despite the moderate economic growth rates experienced by the Philippines in recent years, poverty incidence has remained relatively high (see sidebar). For example:

- Poverty incidence among households increased from 24.4 per cent in 2003 to 26.9 per cent in 2006 and the number of poor families increased from 4.02 million in 2003 to 4.68 million in 2006.
- The headcount index increased from 30.0 per cent in 2003 to 32.9 per cent in 2006 and the number of poor people from 23.8 million in 2003 to 27.6 million in 2006.
- In the 2006 Official Poverty Statistics for the Basic Sectors, fishermen posted the highest poverty incidence (49.9 per cent) among the eight basic sectors in the Philippines, followed by farmers (44 per cent) and children (40.8 per cent). Women had a poverty incidence of 30.1 per cent.
- Children accounted for the greatest number of the poor at 14.4 million, mostly from Regions V, VI and IVB.

Main causes of poverty in the Philippines

Low to moderate economic growth for the past 40 years and low growth elasticity of poverty reduction
Weaknesses in employment generation and the quality of jobs generated
Failure to fully develop the agriculture sector
High inflation during crisis periods
High levels of population growth
High and persistent levels of inequality (incomes and assets), which dampen the positive impacts of economic expansion; and
Recurrent shocks and exposure to risks such as economic crisis, conflicts (e.g. MILF and CPP-NPA), natural disasters, and “environmental poverty.”

Source: Poverty in the Philippines: Causes, Constraints and Opportunities, ADB (2009)

Official Development Assistance (ODA) – ODA has been declining in the Philippines over the past several years despite the continued prevalence of poverty in the country. As shown in Exhibit 3.1 below, ODA Total Gross Disbursements decreased to approximately US$0.9 billion in 2008 from a peak of US $2 billion in 1993. Forty per cent of ODA in the Philippines now comes from Japan, the largest donor. The classification of the Philippines as a middle income country is likely to reduce future donor assistance. The Philippines has adopted several ODA modalities including sector-wide approaches (for procurement, judicial, health, education), program-based ODA (for poverty reduction, HIV/AIDS, MDG, good governance, gender mainstreaming), area-based programming, as well as project-specific ODA (Illo, 2005).12

12 Illo, Jeanne. ODA Coordination in the Philippines (April 2005), paper written for UNDP

August 2010
© UNIVERSALIA
Exhibit 3.1 ODA Total Gross Disbursements (1992-2008)  

![Graph showing ODA Total Gross Disbursements (1992-2008)]

Social Development

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – The Philippines has had mixed performance in achieving MDGs. For example, subsistence incidence decreased from the 1991 baseline figure of 24.3 per cent to 13.5 per cent in 2003, but household and population poverty incidence while showing improvement in 2003 declined again in 2006. In the 2005-2006 school year, the net enrolment rate for girls in elementary education was 85.4 per cent, exceeding that of boys (83.6 per cent). At the secondary level, enrolment rates by sex were maintained (63.5 per cent for females versus 53.7 per cent for males). Achievement rates generally favoured girls. The infant mortality rate declined from 57 deaths per 1000 in 1990 to 25 in 2008. HIV/AIDS remains below the national target of 1 per cent of the population.

MDG Challenges in the Philippines

Key challenges include meeting the MDG targets for the decrease of Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) and the reduction of unsafe abortion (clandestine/unsafe abortions). The maternal mortality rate of 162 per 100,000 live births means that an average of eight women die every day due to pregnancy and childbirth related causes. Although abortion is illegal in the Philippines, about 25-30 per 100,000 women in the reproductive age (15-44 years) resort to abortion which accounts for 15-20% of maternal deaths. The Philippines is one of 55 countries accounting for 94% of all maternal deaths in the world and is statistically off-track for achievement of MDG 5 by 2015. Maternal deaths are closely related to neonatal deaths.

13 OECD DAC

14 For the 2006-2007 school year, net enrollment rate for girls was 84.1 per cent and for boys, 82.4 per cent for elementary; for secondary, 63.4 per cent for girls and 53.9 per cent for boys.
However, other targets related to the situation of children and mothers fell short of expectations and require considerable improvement. For example, it is generally accepted that the poverty reduction goal, in all likelihood, will not be met and given the current global economic crisis, the prospects of achieving the poverty reduction goal have become even lower. Access to primary education declined as the net enrolment rate dropped from 96.8 per cent in 2000 to 83.2 per cent in 2006. The decline in the number of maternal deaths has slowed from 209 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1993 to 162 deaths in 2006, but it is not anticipated that the 2015 target of 52 deaths per 100,000 live births will be met. Access to reproductive health care improved at a modest rate for currently married women ages 15-49, from 49.0 per cent in 2001 to 50.6 per cent in 2006, but it is recognized that the 2015 target of 80 per cent access will be difficult to realize. Finally, current estimates cite only a medium probability of achieving the MDG target for nutrition.

Most MDGs entail activities devolved to local government units, many of which have little capacity to formulate, finance, and implement MDG programs and projects. For MDGs in poverty reduction, health, education, and water alone, the financing gap is estimated to be somewhere between $12.2 billion and $15.7 billion (Manasan 2007). The budgets for education, health, and water and sanitation sectors for the MDGs were tightly constrained from 1998 to 2007 as a response to the continuous decline in the tax effort. With the crisis, it is expected that government resources will be further constrained and thus widen the financing gap.

### 3.3 Global Context

International events and changes in aid architecture in the past decade have had major impacts on relationships between international development agencies and their development partners. Increased global attention to and investment in peace and security concerns, as well as the global financial crisis, are affecting priorities for foreign aid and have effects on middle income countries (MICs) such as the Philippines.

**Global declarations** – The ways in which development aid is delivered have been influenced by global events and declarations such as the Millennium Development Goals (2000), the UN Monterey summit (2002), and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). The Paris Declaration principles have led to a stronger focus on managing by and reporting on results, and to a greater emphasis on supporting national development plans. There is an increased focus on delivery mechanisms that maximize country ownership while aligning and harmonizing donor efforts, including program-based approaches (PBAs) and budget support. Good practices and lessons learned are emerging, but donors and partner countries are still experimenting. While the Paris Declaration has become a reference point for most bilateral and multilateral donors, there has also been growing critique of its gaps and shortfalls. One common criticism has been its lack of focus on the importance of non-governmental organizations and human rights issues including gender equality. The aim of the 2008 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra was to review and reflect on the Declaration’s practical impacts on aid effectiveness. One consequence of the application of aid effectiveness principles is that donors are increasingly concentrating their ODA in a limited number of countries and sectors. In such circumstances, donors tend to channel their support to least developed countries (LDCs) over MICs.

**New funders and funding mechanisms** – The architecture for global aid has become increasingly complex over the last decade, with a proliferation of aid channels, the growing importance of non-DAC and other emerging donors (such as China), and a significant degree of earmarking.

15 Sawada and Estudillo (2005) and Balisacan (2009)
According to the International Development Association (IDA), the average number of donors per country rose from about 12 in the 1960s to about 33 between 2001 and 2005. There are currently over 230 international organizations, funds, and programs; donor proliferation is most pronounced in the health sector (more than 100 organizations are involved). New donors bring more resources to help developing countries reach the MDGs, but also new challenges for harmonization and alignment.

According to IDA, about half of the ODA delivered through multilateral channels in 2005 was earmarked by sector or theme. The boom in earmarking of aid for specific uses through global or “vertical” programs and funds\(^\text{16}\) began in the late 1990s when several large vertical funds were created, primarily in the health and education sectors. Vertical funds have resulted in unprecedented funding and attention for needy causes such as infectious diseases, but critics claim they contribute to the fracturing of aid, a lack of donor harmonization, the weakening of in-country systems, and misalignment of the priorities of donors and recipient countries.

**Global conflict and security agendas** – Over the past decade, an increasing proportion of global resources have been invested in security concerns. The events following September 11, 2001, as well as the emergence of conflicts in various parts of the world have led to massive investments in peace and security initiatives. Currently, the conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq are absorbing considerable global resources and the attention of world leaders, and consequently reducing their support for development initiatives.

**Global economic situation** – The difficult global economic context over the past couple of years has similarly affected the economic contexts of countries around the world, and their support for ODA. This is expected to continue, given recent events in Europe.

### 3.4 UN Context

**Delivering as One** – The UN Secretary-General established a High-level Panel to explore how the United Nations system could work more coherently and effectively across the world in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, and the environment. In November 2006, the panel released its report, "Delivering as One." For development operations, it organized its proposals around four “ones”: One Program, One Empowered Leader and Empowered Team, One Budgetary Framework, and One Office. As a consequence, UN agencies are exploring and identifying opportunities for increased in-country collaboration with one another, and engaged in learning how to work with one another as effectively and efficiently as possible. As in the case of all new working relationships, this will take time.

**Humanitarian Response** – As part of the UN reform process in 2005, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) agreed to implement a ‘cluster approach’ to improve the predictability and quality of humanitarian response in non-refugee settings. UNICEF has agreed globally to lead the clusters for nutrition, water and sanitation, common data services, and education, while continuing strong field work in health and child protection. Along with its UN counterparts in the Philippines, UNICEF is learning how to implement this approach.

\(^{16}\) The OECD and the World Bank define vertical programs as “international initiatives outside the UN system which deliver significant funding at the country level in support of focused thematic objectives.” This is in contrast to the horizontal approach of country-based aid.
3.5 UNICEF Context

Corporate Context

A Global Organizational Review was conducted in 2006-2007 to help assess UNICEF’s organizational health and provide guidance for organizational improvement. In the last quarter of 2007, UNICEF launched a series of initiatives to achieve the strategic shifts recommended by the review. Each initiative has established an implementation team, including field staff, to oversee progress and ensure the realization of objectives. The Improve 360° website on the UNICEF Intranet serves as an information resource for all staff to learn about developments and progress in each of the initiatives. In 2009, the initiatives entered the phase of implementation and organization-wide communication; in 2010 they are expected to roll out, and in 2011 efforts will be dedicated to mainstreaming, refining, and evaluating the changes undertaken. Examples of some of the key initiatives are outlined in the sidebar.

The Medium-Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) 2006-2009 is the main programming document guiding the Fund’s strategic work. In 2008, UNICEF’s MTSP was extended through to 2011; in 2009, it was further extended to cover programming through 2013 in order to take into account the recommendations of the next comprehensive policy review that will be held in 2012. The MTSP shows a clear shift towards leveraging as a corporate approach to make a difference for children around the world (see sidebar). In addition, the newly introduced Focus Area 5 – Policy Advocacy and Partnerships for Children Rights – explicitly incorporates leveraging.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected UNICEF Organizational Change Initiatives</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dynamic Programming Approaches:</strong> revision of programming policies and practices to make UNICEF programs more dynamic, strategic, and responsive to the rights and priority needs of children in national development contexts. This includes lightening and simplifying the country planning and management structure and program process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge and Content Management:</strong> development of a strategy for knowledge and content management with the systems and tools to capitalize on knowledge resources and help position UNICEF as the global knowledge leader for children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Framework for Collaborative Relationships and Partnerships:</strong> formulation of a global strategy for collaborative relationships and partnerships to reinforce UNICEF’s capacity to engage in and leverage these interactions to achieve greater results for children.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Leveraging in UNICEF’s MTSP (2006-2009)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the four year period of this medium-term strategic plan, UNICEF aims to make a difference for children around the world by putting at the centre of its work:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Strengthened alliances within and beyond the United Nations to promote sustained and scaled-up investments for children and families, as a central strategy for the millennium agenda;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Continued support for building national capacities to fulfill children’s rights, with increased emphasis on strengthening policy frameworks, service delivery and institutions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Systematic efforts to leverage additional resources and results for children through advocacy and partnerships and by generating evidence to inform decision making.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNICEF Medium Term Strategic Plan Overview (2005, p.6)
Philippines Context

Established institution committed to children – UNICEF has a long history (60 years) in the Philippines. It is strongly identified with children and is well known, trusted, and respected at national and provincial levels of government and society for its development and humanitarian support. Its national and provincial partners are intimately familiar with its programs, evidenced by how easily they can describe its six country programs since 1989.

Managing competing expectations – Over the past six decades, UNICEF has assumed an increasing number of roles, worked with a multitude of different partners in a large number of geographic areas on a wide range of different issues related to children’s rights and well-being in the Philippines. It faces competing challenges to serve the immediate practical and longer-term strategic needs of children.

Activity-oriented culture – The multitude of UNICEF programming foci, venues, and partners, compounded by the emergency and security context of the Philippines as well as the evolving and sometimes demanding UN and UNICEF contexts and requirements contributes to a very activity-oriented and responsive office culture. While this enables UNICEF to address immediate needs and priorities, it restricts its ability to address issues and challenges requiring longer term solutions, and to reflect on its performance. This, combined with the number of roles played by the organization, tends to foster organizational fragmentation rather than coherence.

Program in transition – Following a decade of support for a Child Friendly Movement in the Philippines, UNICEF is in the process of charting future directions. Its immediate priorities for 2010-11 focus on supporting the GoP in addressing some lagging MDG goals, experimenting with new social policy development initiatives, and engaging key stakeholders in reflective exercises aimed at informing future directions. As is the case in any organization in a similar context, transition fuels excitement as well as apprehension among its staff and long-standing partners about its future directions, roles, programs, support, and size in the Philippines.
4. CPC 5 and CPC 6 Performance

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the overall performance of CPC 5 and CPC 6 from four different perspectives: program relevance, program effectiveness, sustainability of program results, and program efficiency.

4.2 Program Relevance

4.2.1 Overview

This section examines the extent to which UNICEF’s Country Program has been and has remained aligned with the needs and/or priorities of the Philippines, UNICEF, and the UN. Spanning a decade, CPC 5 and CPC 6 transpired over a critical period in development assistance thinking and in the history of the Philippines.

4.2.2 Relevance to Philippines Context

Finding 1: CPC 5 and 6 objectives were relevant to the needs and priorities of the Philippines over the decade.

The UNICEF CPC 5 and 6 program objectives to help strengthen government agencies at the national and local levels to implement the CRC, and to assist the Philippines in addressing noted disparities in education, health, nutrition, and child protection were clearly aligned with the needs and priorities of the Philippines over the decade, as demonstrated below. The main concern raised by interviewed stakeholders related to delays by UNICEF in supporting the government’s health reform agenda.

Focus on the Rights of the Child

As noted above, the Philippines has a very high ratio of children (43 percent of the population is under age 18) and an additional estimated 2.6 million unregistered children— which reinforces the need for attention to children’s well-being and for UNICEF’s presence. CPC 5 and 6 were well moulded for this context. The policy environment within which CPC 5 was conceptualized was framed by key international commitments, national laws, and frameworks.

- In December 1999, the President signed the World Declaration on the Survival, Protection, and Development of Children agreed to at the World Summit for Children and launched the Framework for the National Plan for Children. Subsequently, the National Plan for

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OECD DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management.

Philippines 2007 Census.
Children, 1990-1992 was adopted and served as the basis for the formulation of subsequent Plans for Actions for Children, including the latest Philippine National Strategic Framework for Plan Development for Children for the period 2000-2025 (CHILD 21).

- The agreement for CPC 5 between UNICEF and the GoP was also deeply rooted in the Social Reform Agenda (SRA), including the Minimum Basic Needs (MBN) approach (also known as the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act, 1997). The Act mandates the adoption of area-based, sectoral, and focused interventions to poverty alleviation.

- This focus on children’s rights and needs is also mirrored in the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plans (MTPDP 1998-2003 and 2004-2010), as well as in the Second, Third, and Fourth GoP Reports on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, covering the period 1995 to 2007.

Devolution

The Philippines has a complex and layered political and administrative context. In 1991 the GoP adopted the Local Government Code, which essentially devolved the management of most social services to Local Government Units (LGUs). This provided multiple points of entry for donors and UNICEF responded to the challenge. CPC 5 worked with the Leagues of Provinces, Municipalities, Cities and Barangays to carve program strategies to meet the needs of the day. Both country programs established close links to GoP (central agency, national departments, regional representatives, and LGUs) to ensure alignment and continued relevance with ongoing national and local priorities. CPC 6 cited this as a determining factor in the selection of the focus areas “strategic links with government priority areas and programs” (CPAP page 19). CPC 5 and 6 operated in selected focus areas (19 provinces and 5 cities) and the selection of focus areas was sensitive to those most in need and strategically designed to build capacity at the local levels (barangay and provinces/cities), where scarce resources had serious impacts on social programs.

Interviewees report the longstanding relationship has been and continues to be relevant and aligned with their efforts at both national and LGU levels. UNICEF is reportedly responsive to both the needs and capacities of the areas where they work.

Poverty reduction and capacity building at local and national levels

The Child Friendly Movement (CFM) promoted in CPC 5 and 6 represents a holistic strategy towards poverty reduction – through attention to the capacity and engagement of governments at all levels to address children’s issues, and, importantly, attention to community engagement. The CFM was both demand and supply focused and well placed for the Philippines 1999 context and development over the subsequent decade. With a proliferation of policies, frameworks, and legislation in place (1999) and in development (1999-2009), there was and is a critical need to pay close attention to the enactment, implementation, and protection and delivery of rights and services promised in these authoritative commitments. The CFM sought to do just that.

Sectoral reform agendas

UNICEF’s efforts in the education sector fully supported the national BESRA strategy – targeting early childhood care and development (ECCD) through support for home based and institutional day care facilities, a focus on primary and secondary schools through the Child Friendly School System initiative, and attempting to maximize the impact of limited resources through exploration (piloting) of alternative service delivery models (ASD) for education. In the area of child protection, UNICEF also supported the child protection focus on geographic areas experiencing conflict, registration of births, and efforts for protection of children within the judicial and penal systems.
the health sector, while UNICEF was seen as delayed in responding to the Philippines’ health reform agenda (launched in 1999), their policies, technical guidelines, tools and focused support to LGUs was aligned with the ongoing health sector reforms.

4.2.3 Relevance to UNICEF Corporate Priorities, the UN, and Key Donors

Finding 2: CPC 5 and 6 were well aligned with UNICEF’s corporate developmental priorities as well as the priorities of other key developmental agencies in the Philippines between 1999 and 2009.

A review of the priorities of donor agencies active in the Philippines over the period 1999 to 2009 indicates that UNICEF programming in the Philippines was highly congruent with their developmental priorities as well as UNICEF’s own corporate priorities.

Congruence with UNICEF corporate priorities

Not surprisingly, CPC 5 and 6 were highly congruent with UNICEF’s evolving corporate priorities over the period as articulated in the MTSPs issued during the period 1999-2009. 19

CPC 5 and 6 reflected UNICEF’s corporate commitment to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, namely the survival and development of the child, the best interests of the child, non-discrimination, the right of the child to participate and be listened to, and the principles of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The MTSP for 2002-05 also underlined the importance of an integrated approach to the development of the child, with a particular emphasis on early childhood development (ECD).

They matched the emphasis given by UNICEF to a human rights based approach (HRBA) to programming for children, as well as a stronger focus on disparity reduction, reaching the unreached, the most disadvantaged, and the most vulnerable.

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19 While the 1998-2001 MTSP was not available for review, subsequent references indicated the priorities were “wide ranging and loosely defined”
CPC 6 design also strongly reflected UNICEF’s corporate priorities of supporting national implementation of the Millennium Summit Declaration and pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals, as well as aiming to make an effective contribution to poverty reduction through advocacy and partnerships that generated sustained investments in children’s survival, development, and protection. In addition, CPC 6 components and priorities closely mirrored those found in the MTSP, as shown in the sidebar.

Finally, in keeping with UNICEF’s corporate emphasis on partnerships, CPC 5 and 6 also paid significant explicit attention to partnerships within the various stakeholder groups in Philippines society, as well as external actors including UN agencies.

**Congruence with UN and other development agency priorities**

UNICEF developmental priorities in the health, education, and child protection sectors mirror the priorities of the key agencies active in the Philippines including other UN agencies, the World Bank, and AusAID. A review of their development priorities over the CPC 5 and 6 periods indicates:

- similar commitments to supporting the GoP in the realization of the MDGs (World Bank, ADB, and various UN agencies);
- a particular focus on enhancing human development and basic social services for the poor (World Bank, ADB, AusAID and various UN agencies);
- development of infrastructure, particularly in the provinces (World Bank) and emphasis on sub national and local capacity building (World Bank and various UN agencies); and
- a focus on southern Philippines, Mindanao, and other parts of the Visayan region (ADB, AusAID) and the rural poor in Southern Philippines (AusAID).

While other development agencies also articulated other development priorities such as good governance and macro-economic development, these are clearly outside UNICEF’s mandate and not considered here. The one anomaly relates to the emphasis on emergency response and disaster management, which is identified as a clear priority in the AusAID country strategies for 2004 and 2007, but not highlighted in the same way in the UNICEF (or UNDAF) Frameworks for the Philippines. Events in the Philippines in the past few years are leading development agencies, including UNICEF, to consider increasing attention to emergency and disaster management in their programming frameworks in the future.

**4.2.4 Ongoing relevance of UNICEF Programming in the Philippines**

The previous sections suggest that UNICEF priorities were generally relevant in the Philippines over the decade. However, looking forward, it is equally important to consider whether UNICEF priorities are still relevant to Philippines’ development, given what is known, understood, or anticipated about Philippines future development needs, as well as the corporate priorities of UNICEF and other key development agencies in the future.
While the Philippines was categorized as a Middle Income Country in 2009, development challenges remain. The high incidence of poverty continues, fuelled by the global economic crisis, the slow growth in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, urban migration, and internal conflicts. The Philippines is expected to fall short of meeting some of the planned MDG goals (maternal mortality ratio, contraceptive prevalence rate, cohort survival rates, and net enrolment rate. 20). This situation is exacerbated by natural disasters. Thus, it is expected that the Philippines will continue to require external support from donors including UNICEF to help it address its development challenges.

While it is anticipated that there will be an ongoing need for UNICEF support to the Philippines in the future, changes in both the UNICEF and Philippines contexts suggest the need for both to revisit current priorities. This matter is examined in Section 5.1.

4.3 Program Effectiveness

4.3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of UNICEF programs in the Philippines over the period 1999-2009. Our analysis examines CPC effectiveness in realizing:

- Overall country program objectives of CPC 5 and 6 (as defined in the Master Plan of Operations for CPC 5 and the Country Program Document for CPC 6);
- UNICEF corporate objectives related to replication and leveraging.

In our analysis, we focus as much as possible on those areas where there is evidence of UNICEF having made a contribution to the stated results, relying on what we were told by interviewed UNICEF staff and stakeholders, observed during field visits to focus areas, and/or extracted from an extensive review of background documentation.

4.3.2 Country Program Objectives

Typically, the effectiveness of a program is examined in the context of its objectives. In this instance, CPC 5 and 6 had three stated objectives (see sidebar). While these statements appear to define distinct objectives for the two programs, a closer review of UNICEF country program development documentation for CPC 5 and 6 – namely the Master Plan of Operation (MPO), the Country Program

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Action Plan (CPAP), and the Country Program Document (CPD) – reveals a *continuum of thinking* on UNICEF’s mission and strategy for the decade. For example,

- The explicit focus on the CRC and the CFM in the CPC 5 MPO is implicitly the foundation for CPC 6 as well.
- The CPD, and more notably the CPAP for CPC 6, reveal repeated references to CFM, describing strategies (sector specific) to build on the successes of CPC 5 and the CFM by judiciously applying lessons learned in the next five-year period. 21

As a consequence, the Evaluation Team felt it would be more appropriate to examine these objectives together as if they were the *combined implicit objectives* for CPC 5 and 6. At the same time, the team felt it was important to flag some salient differences in the statements which separately convey messages of intent about UNICEF’s *overarching mission* (to strengthen selected key institutions to implement CRC), its *overarching approach* or strategy for the period (massive mobilization through a child friendly movement), and its *overarching target* (defined focus areas and specified disparity reduction by 50 per cent for CPC 6). The three stated objectives are re-categorized as shown in the sidebar and used as the basis for assessing UNICEF country program effectiveness below.

**Overarching Mission – Strengthening Institutional Capacities**

**Finding 3:** Over the decade, UNICEF made notable contributions to enhance local and national government capabilities to implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Philippines.

UNICEF’s work in the Philippines over the decade did help to strengthen institutional capabilities to implement the CRC in the Philippines at national and local levels. UNICEF stakeholders in the Philippines as well as document reviews reveal notable contributions in terms of changes and improvements to policy and legislation and in institutional systems and practices.

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UNICEF, through its efforts in supporting the government to develop the 2000 *Philippines National Strategic Framework for Plan Development for Children (2000-2025)*, or *Child 21*, secured the political foundation for CFM at a national level. This national document, which set out the roadmap for promoting and safeguarding the rights of Filipino children, adopted CFM as its overall strategic framework. UNICEF was recognized by the GoP as having played a key role in this process: “We would also like to thank UNICEF and Dr. Terrel Hill who has been supportive of the efforts of completing this document”.

(Child 21, Acknowledgement).

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21 UNICEF identified three important lessons from the Midterm Review of CPC 5 to inform the design of CPC 6: the need for improved targeting of interventions, to further intensify CFM in the focus cities (where it was seen as less successful than in the provinces), and the need for a rights-based approach to programming.
UNICEF is credited with many important contributions to national policy and legislative changes that reinforce the CRC in the Philippines. UNICEF is reported to have provided key and timely technical, legal, financial and/or advocacy support that enabled the following policies and legislation:

- the development of Child 21 (see sidebar),
- the National Strategic Framework to End Violence against Children and the one year implementation plan;
- the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (2004);
- the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRRs) of the Milk Code (2006) and the defense of the RIRRs (2006-2007); and

More recently UNICEF is credited for its role in negotiating with the Moro Liberation Front (MLF) about the role of children in armed conflict (see sidebar).

Several of the changes identified above are reported to have had multiplier effects. For example, the National Police Commission published the Police Manuals on the Management of Cases of Children in Conflict with the Law and the Supreme Court revised the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2009). In addition, focus area stakeholders noted the ripple effects of such national policy changes at the local level, which tended to reinforce local actions in support of children.

Finally, the approach taken through the CFM was seen as a positive influence on intra-governmental relationships and operations. CFM was a cohesive force in bringing different sector-driven bureaucracies together.

While UNICEF is credited with supporting these important changes, UNICEF staff interviewed for the study lamented that the national government has been slow in implementing much of this legislation and raised questions about UNICEF’s role in supporting national and local government agencies once a law is in place; some said that UNICEF’s support tends to lose momentum after legislation is in place (e.g., the Milk Code).

UNICEF is widely acknowledged by interviewed stakeholders for its contributions to innovation in the education system. In keeping with its (then) corporate focus on early childhood development, UNICEF Philippines is acknowledged as a key driver of ECCD in the national agenda and for its introduction of models for home-based and institution-based ECCD.
Additionally, UNICEF developed and supported the Ministry of Education’s efforts in the Child Friendly School System (CFSS). Starting with 131 schools in 1999, CFSS has expanded to more than 3500 schools in 14 regions, 20 provinces, 61 municipalities, and 5 cities. UNICEF has directly supported schools (school libraries, computers, training for teachers in CFSS pedagogical techniques) and provided funds for the Ministry of Education to pilot initiatives and innovations such as alternative service delivery approaches.

UNICEF is widely recognized for its many contributions to local government understanding, commitment, systems, procedures and mechanisms that reinforce the CRC at the local level (see sidebar as well as the following finding for further discussion). These contributions were particularly evident in the CPC focus areas; they did not spread to all parts of the Philippines as originally envisaged in the design of CPC 5 due to resource constraints, lessons learned, and changes in CPC 6 program priorities.

UNICEF is recognized for its contributions to increasing awareness among various stakeholder groups about child’s rights inside and outside of the government. While UNICEF has limited documented evidence about the effects and impacts of its numerous awareness campaigns (such as Days of Peace), training and media programs that it has supported, proxy indicators such as increased number of reports about child abuse were noted by some of those interviewed to point to increased awareness about children’s rights in the Philippines. Moreover, the widespread adoption of “child friendly” awards suggests heightened attention to the subject of children rights in the Philippines. However, as noted in the sidebar, the existence of such awards alone does not necessarily indicate increased understanding about or commitment to addressing children’s rights.

Examples of UNICEF contributions at the local level

- The establishment of mechanisms to monitor compliance with CRC (e.g., Barangay Councils for the Protection of Children and the Local Councils for Protection of Children)
- The development, adoption and spread of the four gifts (development plans, local investment plans, local code for children, and local State of the Children report) within the targeted focus areas
- Establishment of networks to support Children in Need of Special protection
- The development of Knowledge Centres in the LGUs
- Adoption of integrated multi-sectoral approach to address children’s needs (e.g. ECD)
- Strong teams and networks of children’s advocates at the local level

One indicator of increased awareness is the heightened national attention to “child friendliness” of a community, school, LGU, newspaper, and the spread of child-friendly awards and contests some of which continue today.

However, the 2007 study of the Child Friendly Movement noted that the concept of child-friendliness was not necessarily uniformly understood by those giving and receiving the awards. Beyond the Presidential Awards for the Most Child Friendly City, there are no established standards or mechanisms in place to monitor the use and or the quality of such child friendly designations, which has possibly detracted from the potential utility of these awards in increasing a robust understanding of children’s rights.

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UNICEF is acknowledged for its support for the creation and development of various children’s rights networks and coalitions. The 2009 Program Performance Assessment (PPA) provides numerous positive examples of such support (see sidebar).

Notwithstanding these well appreciated contributions by UNICEF, there is considerable scope for improvement in how the Philippines protects and promotes the rights of the child, as noted in the 2009 assessment by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Such gaps are potential areas for future cooperation by UNICEF in the Philippines.

Finding 4: UNICEF has made valued and recognizable contributions to strengthen the institutional capabilities of LGUs in reviewed focus areas.

Throughout CPC 5 and 6, UNICEF applied its efforts to targeted focus areas, working closely with LGUs in 19 provinces and five cities. The selection of the focus areas was substantively the same in both periods (see sidebar) allowing a continuum of services that led to some of UNICEF’s greatest successes. Societal or behavioural change as envisaged in the CFM has a long gestation period and even after 10 years, is a work in progress. In the six focus areas examined in this evaluation, there was evidence that UNICEF contributed to the following improvements in LGUs:

### CPC 5 criteria:
- a) poverty criterion (4th and 5th class municipalities
- b) municipalities where CPC 4 activities are ongoing
- c) potential for success (based on past track record
- d) other existing and proposed IFI interventions

### CPC 6 criteria:
- a) ranking of provinces according to key social and economic indicators
- b) strategic links with government priority areas and programs
- c) In cities: the magnitude of street children, child labour and sexual exploitation; size of urban population; strategic links with major urban programs; continuity of UNICEF assistance.

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23 CPC 5 initially identified 20 provinces.
• **Improved organizational performance** illustrated by the development and approval of local ordinances/policies promoting the welfare of children; the establishment of referral systems for violence against women, child abuse and child trafficking; inter-agency convergence and coordination through the establishment of Provincial, Municipal, and Barangay Councils for the Protection of Children; the reported increase in absolute budget for social expenditures over the last 10 years; and the extension of service coverage beyond those areas supported by UNICEF.

• **Improved organizational capacity** was reported, albeit with greater demonstrations at the LGU than barangay level. Focus areas indicate CPC activities served to increase and sustain activity/membership of the councils for the welfare and protection of children (CWC/CPC) at the provincial or city levels; catalyzed partnerships and networking within and across sectors; resulted in upgraded skills and knowledge of local government staff (including planning and reporting skills and those pertaining to health, education, welfare and child protection), and institutionalized manuals and other tools (i.e., ECCD and police investigations).

• **Improved organizational motivation** to address children’s issues, demonstrated through the attention to children’s needs in LGU mission statements, business planning, and reward systems; regular publication of state of children reports and local plans for children; UNICEF’s concurrent efforts at the national level (advocacy and policy development) were cited as supportive to developing and maintaining the focus on children.

This qualitative evidence is elaborated in Volume II, Appendix XI.

**Overarching Approach – Child Friendly Movement**

**Finding 5:** The Child Friendly Movement was a remarkably bold and innovative approach for UNICEF in the Philippines, but UNICEF missed some opportunities to learn from this experimental approach.

During CPC 4, UNICEF had a large number of UNICEF partners (230), worked in a large number of geographic areas and sectors in the Philippines, and faced shrinking UNICEF resources. This contributed to what some interviewed UNICEF staff described as a very fragmented program. The mid-term review of CPC 4 undertaken in 1996 made several recommendations aimed at increasing the program’s focus in terms of geographic concentration and partners, and

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**Child Friendly Movement**

The program strategy shall focus on the transformation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child from a legal framework into a well-defined, nationwide child friendly movement involving families, communities, and local and national government, as well as the private sector.

The Movement shall be goal-oriented and including establishing child-friendly neighbourhoods, schools, facilities, media, workplaces of parents, religious communities, communities (Barangays), municipalities, cities and provinces.

**CPC 5 Master Plan of Operations 1999 p.4**

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24 Provincial Councils for the Protection of Children (PCPCs), Provincial Councils for the Welfare of Children (PCWCs); (Municipal Councils for the Protection of Children (MCPCs)/ Municipal Councils for the Welfare of Children (MCWCs); and Barangay Councils for the Protection of Children (BCPCs)

25 Only one LGU is able to report on expenditures for children discreetly from overall social program expenditures. This same limitation applies to the national GoP, per the CRC Reports.
underlined the need for the program to pursue an integrated multi-sectoral approach and adopt a strategy mix that focuses UNICEF assistance in policy development and capability building through technical assistance in relevant areas.26

In 1996, in anticipation of a new country program period, the head of UNICEF and the secretary of the Department of Social Welfare jointly developed a visionary strategy for children’s development in the Philippines that would become known as the Child Friendly Movement (see sidebar). This strategy placed children at the centre of the human development agenda and surrounded them with supportive layers of local, provincial, regional, and national organizations and institutions that were aware and capable of providing services to children. The authors of the Child Friendly Movement developed the diagram shown in Exhibit 4.1 to depict the types of partnerships envisaged by the Movement. The Child Friendly Movement was subsequently used to inform the design of CPC 5.

Exhibit 4.1 The Child Friendly Movement

The Child-Friendly Movement

Putting children at the centre of the human development agenda

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The CPC 5 design was a remarkably bold, innovative, and forward looking strategy for its day where sectoral strategies were the norm in UNICEF. Its key distinguishing characteristics include the following:

- **The strong ownership** by both UNICEF and the GoP who jointly designed the approach. This differed from previous programs which some interviewed UNICEF staffers criticized as UNICEF-centric and supply rather than demand oriented, with the consequence that the projects were viewed as belonging more to UNICEF than to its partners.

- **Almost 50 per cent of the planned results were stated in terms of the expected achievements at the institutional and/or systems levels**, setting the program apart from UNICEF program designs before and since that emphasize the expected impacts on children’s’ well-being.

- **The strategy espoused an integrated multi-sectoral approach.** This was reflected in the articulation of the three cross-sectoral program components (see sidebar) and in the establishment of mechanisms to foster cross-sectoral collaboration such as Area Focus Officers (AFO) in UNICEF and Technical Working Groups in the focus areas.

- **The explicit attention to the importance of advocacy, technical support, and capacity building** as opposed to service delivery. The Master Plan of Operations emphasized the importance of building systems for service delivery (as opposed to service delivery itself.) Interestingly, these proposed approaches predated UNICEF’s corporate emphasis on “upstream” activities commencing in roughly 2005.

- **Finally, while not explicitly stated in the planning documents, adoption of the CFM implied a long term commitment** by UNICEF beyond the five-year country program cycle. The scope and nature of the changes envisioned by the CFM were societal changes, requiring strong GoP and UNICEF commitment and support, as well as a long-term approach.

The child-friendly programming approach in the Philippines was radically different from approaches used by UNICEF prior to CPC 5 and highly experimental. However, a review of the CPC 5 design documents indicates that the experimental nature of the program was not explicitly recognized. For example, risks and assumptions associated with the design were not articulated and the design lacked mechanisms and responsibilities to review, adjust, and refine the approach over time. Furthermore, subsequent reviews of CPC 5 implementation placed more attention on
the effectiveness of CPC 5 in realizing planned objectives than on the effectiveness of the CFM approach and its program theory of change. This may, in part, reflect relatively limited UNICEF operational resources in comparison to its growing program resources (see Section 2.4).

The first external review of the CFM was conducted in 2007, eight years after the program was launched. It was a generally positive, constructive review. It recommended that UNICEF continue supporting CFM, with a few course corrections including:
- boost the demand side of CFM;
- clarify the differences between the CFM and CPC;
- re-communicate the central concepts of the CFM;
- tighten CF attributions, awards and rewards;
- revise CFM monitoring, and adopt a research stance with regard to the CFM. It does not appear that these recommendations were addressed. The recommendations in the CPC 6 MTR instead led UNICEF to decide to abandon key aspects of the CFM approach in 2007 (see sidebar).

Due to the absence of CFM monitoring mechanisms, UNICEF lost the opportunity to identify strengths and weaknesses of the approach and make necessary adjustments to improve CPC program delivery in timely ways.

**Overarching Target – Disparity Reduction**

**Finding 6:** Due to lack of data and some faulty assumptions in program design, it is not possible to quantify the impacts of CPC 5 and 6 on reducing disparity among children in the Philippines.

During the course of this evaluation, every effort was made to integrate a quantitative assessment of CPC 5 and 6 effectiveness in the focus areas, notably important as a stated objective of CPC 6 was to reduce disparity by 50 per cent over 2003 levels.

**CPC 6 MTR Recommendations**

The review recommended that:
- a new conceptual framework for CFM be developed that would “shift the focus from building child-friendly institutions to creating rights-responsive interventions”, grounded on a sound situation analysis”
- the Area Focal Officer system be replaced by a more “classical program development and implementation approach” through the normative county office hierarchy of program section chief and project officers
- support to local Knowledge Centres would end; local governments were encouraged to provide their own resources to manage existing centres.

**MTR Follow-up**

Following the review, UNICEF management made several changes in the CPC design including the reallocation of resources from local to national levels, and abolished the position of Area Focal Officer, seen as instrumental to the CFM approach. Certain investments were abandoned, including support for the knowledge centers. Intentions to replicate CFM nationally were similarly abandoned.

Interviewed government stakeholders indicated that they were puzzled as to UNICEF’s decisions regarding the CFM.

The overall program strategies build on those developed in CPC 5 and consist of … (b) capacity building with priority given to institutions, systems and duty bearers in the most disadvantaged **30 percent of barangays** in the focus areas …

CPAP, p.16
However, after extensive review of available statistical data (detailed in Volume II, Appendix XII), the Evaluation Team found that in the reviewed focus areas, disparity reduction between 2000 and 2007 had mixed results: awareness of children’s rights has increased; education, on average, has worsened in enrolment but improved in cohort survival; the infant mortality rate has improved while the maternal mortality rate has not. These are similar to the national trends reported in the Midterm MDG report of 2007 for the same period (see Volume II, Appendix XII, Table 15).

However, the evaluation was unable to derive justifiable findings and conclusions for the focus areas or nationally. The problem is two-fold. First there is a lack of data on all focus areas due to LGU self-administration of the MICS in 2000. Second, and more importantly, there are problems with causality and attribution (program theory).

In CPC 6 design documents, UNICEF narrowed the scope of its services to selected (30 per cent) barangays within the 24 focus areas. During program implementation, however, this was reportedly limited to only 10 barangays (equivalent to 4 per cent of barangays in an average focus area) due to resource limitations. The implicit CPAP assumption that focusing on 30 per cent of the barangays would contribute to any statistical impact for the entire focus area is untenable, and given that a much smaller percentage of barangays were actually targeted further undermines the assumption. Moreover, even if the assumptions had been plausible, neither UNICEF nor the GoP established systems to collect baseline data in barangays or to track improvements over time. Finally, the MICS provides provincial data, not barangay data, so there is no basis to assess performance at the barangay level.

Had UNICEF operated in 30 per cent of barangays in each of the 24 focus areas, this would have roughly translated to 4 per cent of the total barangays in the Philippines – hardly sufficient saturation to effect or contribute to a change in national indicators (as is also specified in the CPAP p.16). As a consequence, while the qualitative and anecdotal pictures described in an earlier finding provide evidence of positive contributions on institutions in the focus areas, the Evaluation Team lacks the basis and information to quantify the impacts of CPC 6 on disparity reduction for children. UNICEF needs to be considerably more careful in how it designs and monitors its programs to better claim its successes in future programs. This matter is revisited in Section 5.2.

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27 There are 41,994 barangays in the 77 provinces and 85 cities in the Philippines, which would mean an average of 259 barangays in each focus area. Targeting 30 per cent would mean UNICEF works in roughly 77 barangays in each focus area.
4.3.3 Leveraging Resources for Children

Finding 7: While UNICEF has leveraged resources for children in the Philippines over the past decade, its effectiveness has been limited by the dominance of service delivery in its organizational culture and by the absence of systematic attention to leveraging in its program management practices.

Traditionally UNICEF has been known primarily as an emergency, action-oriented, and services/supply-driven organization. Its internal culture has been shifting towards an increased focus on leveraging since the mid 1990s and has accelerated recently as a result of evolving international and UN contexts. While the concept of leveraging is not formally defined in reviewed UNICEF documents, we suggest a working definition for the purposes of this review (see sidebar).

While leveraging has been an explicit corporate UNICEF priority since 2005 (see sidebar), in its final report, the Task Force on Leveraging Resources and Results for Children suggested that, "A bolder, more explicit and systematic approach should be taken to realize the full potential of leveraging – in accord with the changing role of the UN and multilateral institutions, the child focus of the MDGs, the rise of budget support and pooled funding modalities, the options that arise from simplification of UN procedures, (...)." More specifically, the report suggested that The new MTSP and future Country Programs should include clear, prioritized targets and strategies for leveraging around the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs – linked to measurable results and to UNICEF’s vision for children. These leveraging priorities should be based on carefully identified opportunities and comparative advantage, (...).

Leveraging in UNICEF Philippines

UNICEF PCO has been partially successful in leveraging resources for children in the Philippines by means of the strategies outlined in MTSP above.

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28 Ibidem.
29 Ibidem, p.2
In terms of **strengthened alliances to support sustained and scaled up investments for children**, UNICEF PCO has had considerable success in partnering with the private sector, other members of the UN system, and other donors over the decade which has generated significant resources for children in the Philippines (see section 5.4). However, it is not evident that UNICEF has been successful in using such alliances systematically to “promote sustained and scaled up investments for children.” For example, while UNICEF has generated financial support from the private sector, interviews with UNICEF staff indicate that such support is typically tied to a discrete need or request of a private sector donor that often distracts UNICEF from regular planned programming work, rather than dovetailing with UNICEF PCO priorities. In the UN joint projects, UNICEF has tended to work in parallel with other UN agencies on complementary project components.

In addition, while UNICEF PCO planning documents make occasional references to pilots, models, replication and scaling up, it is not evident that the approaches used in PCO are congruent with the UNICEF corporate approach as outlined in its Program Policy and Procedure Manual (see sidebar), or that it systematically seeks opportunities for leveraging.

Interviewed stakeholders inside and outside UNICEF indicate that pilots and models are not well or commonly understood and often used loosely. Moreover, even when such terms are included in project documents, there are no defined indicators to track UNICEF performance in leveraging. In most instances, UNICEF results (or its expected “success”) are defined in terms of impacts on children, not the successful adoption of a model. It appears that those implementing projects are more focused on implementing an activity or project to address a specific need in a particular area and forget that one measure of success is related to replication. As noted in the sidebar, this challenge is not unique to UNICEF PCO; many other UNICEF offices face similar challenges. Several interviewed UNICEF PCO staff acknowledge that it is not rigorous enough in its approach.

### Pilot Projects

The purpose of virtually all pilot projects is the testing out of a particular strategy, hypothesis or model intervention. Assuming that the pilot project will be completed and demonstrates successful results with reasonable efforts and costs, the tested interventions are then proposed for wider application – as a nationwide policy or program, or for a particular geographic region, or among particular population groups.

For each pilot project, two different levels of results must be distinguished:

1. The proof that the model intervention has the expected effect
2. The adoption of the model intervention – where positive in effect and feasible – into national or sub-national policies and development plans, and/or in provincial or municipal governments.

Many UNICEF offices support pilot projects for several years, without an apparent end or clearly defined results. Program partners may find it difficult to terminate such projects because of the benefits for the served community. Perceivably successful pilot projects are often not replicated – either because of the lack of political will, or the lack of resources. Such larger managerial dilemmas can be avoided by better formulated pilot project designs.

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Project number: c:\documents and settings\member\local settings\temporary internet files\contents\outdir\blacked\unicef cpe report - 01 august 2010\01.docx
The CPC 5 MTR (2001) identified the need for UNICEF to continue to accelerate the expansion of sustainable models to continue building momentum for CFM (see sidebar) noting that replications or scaling up of successful models is, after all, the key to sustaining CFM beyond CPC 5 (p.6). It also flagged the need for strategies and activities to converge in key intervention points and in specific geographic areas where scaling up activities were required. This would require, it argued, the need for closer linkages among program management and coordinating mechanisms, especially at the provincial level due to some identified weaknesses in the functioning of sub-national structures and operational processes.

In terms of building national capacities to fulfill children’s rights, the previous section provided examples of positive contributions made by UNICEF to strengthen national and local institutions and organizations, including NGOs. However, one major, long-standing concern with UNICEF’s approach to capacity building is the absence of a well-understood, common approach to capacity building that is used by UNICEF officers—which has had adverse effects on the design, effectiveness, and sustainability of investments. One example is the absence of information about the effectiveness and sustainability of UNICEF’s considerable investments in training individuals over the past decade.

Finally, in terms of leveraging additional resources and results for children through advocacy and partnerships and by generating evidence to inform decision making, UNICEF has had mixed success. Some of its advocacy campaigns over the decade (e.g., Days of Peace) are viewed quite positively by those interviewed. However, UNICEF staff themselves raised questions about the effectiveness of short term advocacy campaigns. The 2009 PPA noted the absence of an advocacy agenda within UNICEF PCO, which would provide some much needed focus to its leveraging efforts, and the need to become more effective at planning...
and managing advocacy campaigns. UNICEF is generally regarded as effective in partnering with civil society organizations, particularly in relation to child protection. However, its track record in generating evidence to inform decision making is mixed.

**UNICEF Culture and Management Practices**

A review of UNICEF’s management practices suggests that while they are partially supportive of leveraging at the planning stage, attention to leveraging tends to decline at subsequent stages of the program and project management cycles.

**Organizational culture –** While UNICEF corporate priorities are evolving, UNICEF offices around the world are experiencing challenges in moving away from traditional service delivery “downstream” roles where it generally has a well established role, a positive reputation, expertise and considerable control over immediate results, to more catalytic, influential “upstream” roles where UNICEF has less control over results and where success is measured by what others, not UNICEF, does.

Over the past six decades, UNICEF has been and continues to be very much involved in service delivery roles in the Philippines. Interviews with UNICEF PCO staff indicate mixed understandings about what it means for UNICEF to be more engaged in so called upstream roles, and place different emphasis on the relative importance of upstream and downstream roles in UNICEF. A review of UNICEF Country and Program Management Committee meeting minutes (including the PMT and CMT) and interviews with UNICEF managers indicate that there is limited if any formal attention to analyzing or reporting UNICEF PCO performance in leveraging in these discussions. Interviewed UNICEF staff indicates that leveraging has a relatively low profile in the organizational ethos, particularly in comparison to generating revenues.

**Exhibit 4.2 Overview of UNICEF Upstream and Downstream Roles in the Philippines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>CPC Programs</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Examples of UNICEF Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Downstream</td>
<td>CPC 1 to 6</td>
<td>Service provider</td>
<td>Providing services directly to children and families (directly or through NGOs)</td>
<td>Basic health and nutrition through Community Health Outposts</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Parental Literacy Classes</td>
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<td>Life Skills for Children at Risk</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement services</td>
<td>Procuring vaccines for GoP</td>
<td>Procuring supplies for ECCD and CFSS</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Program manager for donors or private sector</td>
<td>Managing a Handwashing Project on behalf of Proctor and Gamble and Dept of Ed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency support services</td>
<td>Support following natural disasters in the Philippines in 2009</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>CPC Programs</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Examples of UNICEF Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upstream</td>
<td>CPC 3 to 6</td>
<td>Advocacy &amp; Policy Dialogue</td>
<td>Providing technical expertise to inform policies and legislation for children</td>
<td>Support for Milk Code</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Convening of stakeholders involved in the advancement of children’s rights and conditions</td>
<td>Juvenile Justice Network</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National Strategic Framework to End Violence Against Children (Convening core groups of government and NGO supporters)</td>
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<td>Philippines Interfaith Network for Children</td>
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<td>National Childs Rights Network</td>
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<td>Mass communication about a particular issue affecting children</td>
<td>Days of Peace Campaign</td>
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<td>KNN Network</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Capacity Development</td>
<td>Providing technical expertise to support capacity building at individual, institutional and/or network levels.</td>
<td>Building systems in LGUs to support children</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Support for ECCD</td>
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<td>Providing training to police and court personnel on child protection laws</td>
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<td>Knowledge Generator and Disseminator related to CRC</td>
<td>Developing, testing models and supporting scale up</td>
<td>Child Friendly Schools</td>
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<td>Alternative Service Delivery (ECCD)</td>
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<td>Community Diversion of Children in conflict with the law Pilots (Cebu and Quezon City)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Generating and disseminating new knowledge</td>
<td>MICS – data for evidence based policy and program development &amp; assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CPC 5 and CPC 6 objectives, results and indicators** – A review of program planning documents for CPC 5 and 6 indicates that the concept of leveraging influenced the design of CPC 5. This was reflected in how objectives were articulated (i.e., the emphasis on institutional capabilities, systems, partnerships, and adoption of models) and in the types of strategies proposed to achieve planned objectives (including an explicit focus on advocacy, technical support, capacity building and model building). In addition, roughly 50 per cent of the program’s specific objectives were related to leveraging rather than service delivery.

The CPC 6 objective was expressed in terms of disparity reduction, and a review of planned CPC results and indicators indicates modest emphasis on leveraging. Of the 11 planned results for Health, Nutrition, and HIV/AIDS (in CPC 5 and CPC 6 together) only one result related to HIV/AIDS was articulated in terms of leveraging; the other results were stated as expected impacts on children. Similarly, in the Education Sector (over CPC 5 and 6) only one of eight results was articulated in terms of leveraging (ECCD result). Children in Need of Special Protection (CNSP) sector results paid mixed attention to leveraging, while Social Policy and Local Development (SPLD) results were generally expressed in terms of leveraging.
CPC 5 and 6 Reporting Practices – As noted above, UNICEF PCO reports focus on annual, short-term project accomplishments (typically activities undertaken during the year); they do not provide information on UNICEF’s cumulative performance in realizing planned program results. This approach to reporting overlooks longer term results, including those associated with leveraging which typically take place over longer time frames. There is no institutionalized mechanism in UNICEF PCO that systematically collects and analyzes UNICEF’s successes and short-comings in leveraging its resources for children.

Implications for future UNICEF Programming – UNICEF Philippines is not alone in trying to adapt and develop programming strategies and practices so that leveraging becomes an entrenched modus operandi in the organization; this challenge is faced by UNICEF offices around the world as they too try to respond to UNICEF corporate priorities. To be successful in making such a change, it will be necessary but not sufficient for UNICEF PCO to develop or acquire the technical, human and/or operational capacities, systems and know-how needed to leverage resources for children. Given that service delivery has been the dominating culture for six decades, considerable attention must also be paid to identifying the types of “motivational” changes that need to be made in UNICEF’s culture, incentives, rewards, values and mission and so forth so that leveraging becomes ingrained in its organizational ethos and practices.

This implies the need for strong understanding, commitment, buy-in, leadership, and support for leveraging throughout UNICEF, from headquarters to the regional offices and specifically in UNICEF Philippines. As UNICEF Philippines moves forward in planning CPC 7, it needs to address how it will transform the country office over time to address both motivational and technical shortcomings related to leveraging.

4.4 Sustainability of Program Results

According to the OECD DAC, sustainability refers to the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed; the probability of continued long-term benefits; and/or the resilience to risk of the net benefit over time.

In our understanding, this implies at least two key dimensions of sustainability: the continuation as well as the dynamic adaptation of what has been achieved during the lifetime of a project or program. The sustainability of results only reveals itself in the long term (and more evident in an ex-post evaluation than can be seen in this type of summative review). In the shorter term, what can be assessed is the relative likelihood of results/achievements being sustainable, based on the observable factors that enhance or hinder sustainability.

In considering sustainability of results/achievements, it can be helpful to analyze the data at different investment levels, as findings can vary from one level to another (i.e., from targeted individuals to organizations and institutions).
Finding 8: UNICEF and UNICEF PCO management practices pay insufficient attention to sustainability of results.

Current UNICEF corporate requirements place modest emphasis on sustainability. For example, UNICEF’s Policy and Procedure Manual contains only a couple of references to sustainability, as shown in the sidebar. Beyond this, UNICEF does not require its country program or project documents to contain explicit sections to identify and address potential concerns about sustainability, nor does it require projects to include sustainability strategies.

A review of UNICEF management practices found that relatively minor attention has been given to sustainability of results over the past decade, as discussed below.

Sustainability in Country Program and Project Plans

The Country Program documents for CPC 5 and CPC 6 do not include sections on how UNICEF plans to support sustainability of planned results. They make frequent reference to capacity building with the implicit assumption that the inclusion of capacity building as a program or project strategy will ultimately lead to sustainability of results. As discussed in the following finding, this has not been the case.

The CPC 6 CPAP discusses several CPC 5 lessons related to sustainability (see pp 12-13) but does not contain any strategy for how UNICEF will support sustainability of results. Similarly, the overview of CPC 6 program components in Annex 2 of the CPC makes only passing reference to sustainability (see sidebar).

UNICEF’s proposal to AusAID for CPC 6 includes a feasibility and sustainability strategy (p.66-67) that tends to argue why various results will be sustained, rather than describing how UNICEF will sustain them. However, while strengthening LGU capacity was a centerpiece of both CPC 5 and 6, the only reference to sustainability of results at the LGU level in the CPAP (see sidebar) assumes that the existence of the local code for children will be sufficient to ensure sustainability. While there is a short section labeled “exit strategy”, it merely indicates that all components will be mainstreamed within local government infrastructure; there is no discussion of how and when this will be done.
In reviewing a sample of CPC 6 project proposals (see sidebar), the evaluation found an overall lack of attention to sustainability: Four of the six proposals made no mention of sustainability; the other two proposals identified risks and opportunities related to sustainability, but did not articulate strategies to maximize opportunities or mitigate risks. For example the proposal “Accelerated Efforts to Reduce Disparities in Mountain Province” outlined characteristics that could contribute to sustainability rather than deliberate actions or strategies UNICEF planned to incorporate or pursue to ensure the sustainability of results.

**Sustainability in Program Evaluations and Reports**

In reviewed UNICEF country program evaluations for CPC 5 and 6, sustainability received ad hoc attention – it was mentioned in some parts of some reports, but was not addressed systematically with clearly developed mitigation strategies (see sidebar).

A review of CPC annual reports over the decade indicates modest attention to sustainability. However, there was a change in UNICEF’s latest report to AusAID (2010) which includes a section on sustainability (called Sustainability Strategy) within each component. While the content and quality of information in these sections varies significantly across the six components (some of the sections talk more to sustainability strategies, some provide evidence of sustainability of results, others do both or neither), the increased attention to sustainability is very positive and should be sustained in future UNICEF reporting practices.

**Implications for future UNICEF programming**

UNICEF PCO’s limited attention to sustainability of results has adversely affected UNICEF’s overall effectiveness in the Philippines. Those planning CPC 7 will need to take this into consideration.
Sustainability and Capacity Building

Finding 9: Capacity building was central to both CPC 5 and 6, but the absence of a common understanding, clear strategy, and systematic approach to capacity building within the UNICEF PCO contributed to its mixed performance in supporting sustainable capacity building results.

While capacity development has been widely adopted as an important strategy to support aid effectiveness and sustainable development, the “what, why and how” of capacity development is the subject of considerable debate and research. The absence of clearly defined concepts, expected results, clear entry level targets, and coherent logical frameworks for capacity development contributes to ambiguities among development partners and reduces the potential effectiveness of such strategies in contributing to sustainable developmental changes. Development agencies have generally not paid sufficient attention to capacity development, despite its prominence in their strategies (see sidebar).

The overall objective of UNICEF’s program in the Philippines is to build national and local capabilities to implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). While CPC 5 and 6 program and project documents make many references to capacity building, UNICEF PCO has not defined what it means by capacity building nor has it developed country level strategies or guidelines to support capacity building in its programs.

Previous evaluations and reviews of UNICEF’s programs in the Philippines (notably the 2007 MTR and the 2009 PPA) noted several short-comings in UNICEF’s approach to capacity building (see sidebar). As these have not been addressed by UNICEF to date, the findings of previous reviews remain relevant in 2010.

UNICEF management practices have been only partially conducive to sustainable capacity building. Based on our experience in reviewing capacity building initiatives, the results of such initiatives are more likely to be sustained if the initiative is mainstreamed within the targeted entity, if it supports one-time rather than ongoing costs, if exit strategies are defined and used, if sustainability issues are identified and addressed in timely ways, and if individual capacities are supported in tandem with (as opposed to in isolation of) institutional capacity building. In the following paragraphs, UNICEF supported initiatives are reviewed from these five perspectives.

Most funding agencies have assumed that supporting capacity development required no special individual or organizational skills or dedicated internal units, as has been the case with gender, the environment, or performance management. The assumption was that capacity issues were already mainstreamed, albeit informally. Yet, perversely, capacity management turned out to require expertise in such areas as political analysis, management theory and practice, and change management, which have always been in short supply in such agencies.

*Capacity Change and Performance*. Discussion Paper no 598 (European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2008) p.117

Capacity Building in UNICEF

Capacity building is an extremely important component of CPC 6 technical assistance. However, in the absence of an overarching strategy on capacity building, different sections have pursued different approaches with varying degrees of confidence and success.

...The evaluation finds that there is a general tendency to equate capacity building with skills training for duty bearers. Much less emphasis has been given to empowerment of rights holders and to strengthening of organizations and institutions. Neither has there been a clear vision, nor a systematic effort to build national capacity at all levels to respond to new challenges and institutional environment.

(CPC 6 MTR p. 60)
Extent to which UNICEF initiatives are mainstreamed – At the highest level, there are indications that the essence of the CFM initiative has been adopted by and integrated into Philippines social institutions and programs. The GoP has institutionalized award and recognition systems for Child Friendly Cities and communities.

Following the 2007 review of the CFM there was some discussion about changing the name of CFM to the Child Rights Movement. One key informant commented, How can UNICEF consider changing the name? It is our [GoP] initiative."

Other examples of UNICEF’s success in working closely with different levels of government to support the long term sustainability of its program include the previously noted legislative changes, and work on ECCD and the CFSS (see sidebar).

In contrast, several national government representatives interviewed for the evaluation criticized what one labelled as UNICEF’s “retailing” approach (i.e., developing an idea and then trying to sell it to government) as opposed to developing programs based on government priorities. Other representatives questioned UNICEF’s approach to piloting projects in LGUs and noted that without involving the appropriate national agencies, the potential for replication is lost. Several government representatives indicated that they sometimes feel that they are helping to support UNICEF’s programs, rather than vice versa; this sentiment was acknowledged by some interviewed UNICEF staff.

Another criticism voiced by several of those interviewed related to UNICEF’s limited coordination with regional and national agencies. They referred to the reduced participation of regional development offices in CPC 6, which effectively limited their potential awareness, involvement, ownership, and longer term support at the provincial level. They noted that regional support is

Examples: Mainstreaming successes
UNICEF has supported the development of a much stronger legal framework for children in the Philippines evidenced by the development of several laws for the protection of children. While the Philippines faces challenges in implementing some of these laws, having a national legal framework in place increases the likelihood of the sustainability of the protection and promotion of child rights.

The adoption and financing of home-based ECCD by LGUs, as well as changes in provincial and municipal legislation, have permitted increased honoraria of day care workers and home-based workers. (AusAID report 2010).

CFSS started in 1999 with 131 schools and has grown to the current 3500 child friendly schools in the Philippines. “Evaluation findings suggest that UNICEF’s commitment to addressing the whole child in a rights-based, child-centred manner has great potential to capture the vision of teachers and communities, and in so doing, to start the process of school transformation. UNICEF occupies a unique place in the developmental landscape as the interlocutor between grass roots engagement and national and international policy. This is an important position and can lead to mainstreaming. However, a critical step in realizing sustainability goals is to better understand and communicate information regarding the resources needed to establish and maintain a school’s child-friendly characteristics beyond the duration of UNICEF’s intervention. This is also important as UNICEF’s resources are never sufficient for it to do this at scale and yield maximum impact for children. Our research found evidence of this in both the Philippines and Thailand where CFS is now the model for elementary education.” (American Institutes for Research, 2009).

Examples: Mainstreaming disappointments
UNICEF support for the Knowledge Centres focused more on technical matters related to establishing the centres (e.g., hardware, software, skills development) than to how they would be maintained and sustained by the LGU or regional and national bodies over time.

While effective data management is a well accepted limitation in the Philippines, MICS was developed and is viewed as a UNICEF initiative. The National Statistics Office has the interest and capacity but is not given adequate resources by Congress to continue MICS. This reflects the limited appreciation for evidence-based program and policy making in the Philippines.
particularly important when key provincial bureaucrats are replaced after a new governor or mayor comes into office, as regional and/or national bureaucrats can help to orient and support newcomers and thus provide greater assurance of sustained results.

**Extent to which UNICEF has supported one-time, not ongoing operational, costs** – UNICEF is credited with providing timely and expert advice that was needed to fine-tune various pieces of legislation. Once the legislation is developed, there is typically no further need for UNICEF’s financial support for that purpose; however, there may be need for other types of support (e.g., systems development) needed to implement the legislation.

In contrast, interviewed UNICEF staff indicates that a considerable portion of support at the LGU level is used to cover ongoing costs in the LGU and the provinces (e.g., the costs of training and related allowances for LGU and barangay representatives, parents, women, children and others). Those attending LGU meetings receive allowances paid by UNICEF. During the visits to the focus areas during the evaluation, some LGU representatives and many barangay representatives noted that they expected to encounter difficulties in providing services once UNICEF’s financial support was withdrawn. Having such mechanisms in place has helped to keep children at the centre of the development agenda in these LGUs. It is recognized, however, that these mechanisms may not necessarily be sustained in the LGUs in the long term unless there are clear national, regional and/or local incentives (or requirements) and ongoing support to do so.

**Extent to which UNICEF defines clear exit strategies** – UNICEF’s support for building LGU capacities represents its single largest investments over the decade. While many capacities have been strengthened in the LGUs, it is too early to tell what capacities will be sustained; UNICEF continues to provide some financial and moral support to all the LGUs. The absence of strategies in CPC 5 and 6 regarding how and when UNICEF would withdraw its support from LGUs over time suggests that UNICEF had not paid sufficient attention to sustainability. This became particularly evident in November 2009, when UNICEF informed LGUs that it would be focusing on only 8 of the 24 LGUs during the CPC 6 extension period (2010-11). This was a surprise to the LGUs and was not part of a planned exit strategy.

**Extent to which UNICEF identifies and addresses noted sustainability challenges in timely ways** – Evidence suggests UNICEF needs to strengthen its ability to follow-through on mitigation strategies. Resource generation by LGUs for social programming was identified as a challenge and threat to sustainability since CPC 5 began and in subsequent reports including the CPC 6 MTR and the 2010 AusAID report. While there is some evidence to suggest UNICEF is taking action to mitigate this challenge, its overarching mitigation strategy and its implementation remain unclear. Interviewed LGU stakeholders raised concerns about their ongoing challenges in generating resources at the local level. It is not evident that UNICEF took or identified steps to help LGUs to address these challenges even though it is one of the key issues faced by LGUs in sustaining their services for children.

“In social budgeting, the program continues to monitor and report on the status of LGU’s social spending and engage civil society organizations, donors and national government agencies to address the deficient fiscal space required to close the expenditure gap.”

(AusAID report 2010, p. 36.)
Extent to which UNICEF supports individual capacities in isolation of institutional capacity building – Interviews and document reviews indicate that most of UNICEF’s capacity building resources are targeted at individuals (see sidebar). However, since UNICEF does not track or report information other than the numbers of persons who attend training events, it has no information on the extent to which such training is benefitting those who receive it, or has benefitted the institutions in which they work. Thus it is not possible to assess the extent to which such training is yielding the desired results, nor if those results will be sustained. This limitation has been noted repeatedly in several previous evaluations reviews over the decade and in reviews of other (non UNICEF) programs that focus on individual capacity development.

This is not to suggest that UNICEF should never support individual training, and in some instances, there are good reasons to do so (see sidebar). The concern is when UNICEF invests in individual training in the absence of a more holistic institutional capacity building strategy.

There is some evidence that the emphasis on individual capacity development is changing in some program components. For example, the Child Protection component is moving in the direction of institutional capacity building, likely brought on by its shift towards a systems-based approach to child protection after the MTR (see sidebar).

Implications for future programming

If UNICEF continues to identify capacity building as a key programming strategy in the Philippines in the future, it needs to follow up on previous recommendations, including those pertaining to developing and institutionalizing clear and comprehensive strategies and guidelines for this purpose. Otherwise, it is likely to continue to

Individual Capacity Building

Within the Child Protection component, UNICEF training for most of the two program cycles almost exclusively at the individual level (e.g., UNICEF training social workers, court/legal personnel, etc.).

As reported in the CPC 6 MTR, the Health and Nutrition sector as well as Education has traditionally relied on a skills training approach, focusing capacity building for duty bearers to prepare them to perform tasks or meet service provision objectives, with much less emphasis on strengthening institutions or organizations (CPC 6 MTR, p. 60).

There are good reasons to support individual training especially in areas experiencing armed conflict because of the often immediate and overwhelming need as well as the fact of instability of social institutions during armed conflict (e.g., they are doing a lot of training with social workers, teachers, community and church volunteers in psychosocial support and care to affected children such as art therapy and play).

(CPC 6 MTR, p. 44).

Systems Based Approaches in Child Protection

The child protection component is working heavily with the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT) – the body legislated for coordinating and monitoring the enforcement by member agencies (which include the Department of Justice and the Philippines National Police) of the 2003 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act – providing technical support (including testing of databases to improve monitoring and reporting) and supporting the establishment of local IACATs in CPC focus areas.


In 2009 the child protection component has been working with academic and professional institutions to strengthen the quality of casework response, including training 43 staff members from various colleges and universities offering the Bachelor of Science in Social Work and the courses Social Work Educators on Field Supervision and Child Rights and Child Protection and coordinating a consultation workshop with BSSW Agency Field Instructors (AFI) and BSSW Agency Field Supervisors (in coordination with the National Association of Social Work Education, Inc.) to further strengthen these professional systems.

Annual Report 2009, p.17
have a mixed performance in supporting sustained capacity building results. Of note, with the prevalence of capacity building, there is a need for corporate leadership in defining and guiding approaches/strategies for capacity building across UNICEF.

4.5 Program Efficiency

The TOR for this evaluation posed some general questions about the efficiency of UNICEF programming in the Philippines. During the Inception Phase, the Evaluation Team and the Advisory Group discussed potential foci for the review of efficiency, given the limited scope and resources for this review and also considering other recent reviews related to UNICEF efficiency, including the 2009 PPA, the 2009 global staff survey, and other ongoing UNICEF reviews and audits that have also been tasked with examining UNICEF efficiencies. The Evaluation Team agreed with the issues identified in those reviews, and rather than repeating the findings of those reviews, we drew upon the analysis in this evaluation to highlight three areas where the UNICEF PCO could be more efficient in the future.

Finding 10: The evaluation supports the findings on efficiency identified in the 2009 program review and the global staff survey.

The 2009 PPA identified several inefficiencies related to UNICEF’s highly dispersed programming, its annual workplanning process, some challenges with staff communication and coordination processes, and some slow programming processes. The 2009 global staff survey noted several concerns about UNICEF PCO efficiency. The Evaluation Team agrees with the issues identified in those reviews and encourages UNICEF to follow up on the recommendations.

Finding 11: While UNICEF and its key stakeholders invest considerable time and resources in planning and reporting, they typically under-invest in analyzing the results of UNICEF investments and managing for results.

UNICEF has traditionally invested considerable time in annual and multi-year planning exercises. For example, CPC 6 had at least three planning documents, and UNICEF prepared about 300 annual workplans in 2009. Such exercises consume a great deal of UNICEF and its partners’ time, and are often viewed as disproportionate to the amount of support received from UNICEF.

Despite the large amount of time spent in planning and activity reporting, UNICEF has considerable difficulty in reporting on its performance (as noted in section 4.2). As will be discussed in Section 5.2, this is linked to how UNICEF plans, manages, and tracks results and the adequacy of resources (financial and human) dedicated to this. The uneven growth in program and operational costs may contribute to this situation. UNICEF’s attention to managing for results should not stop at the planning stage, but should be maintained throughout the program cycle.

Finding 12: The absence of systematic approaches to capacity building, leveraging resources, and sustainability in UNICEF PCO reduces the potential cost-effectiveness of its investments.

Sections 4.2 and 4.3 noted many lost opportunities in UNICEF to leverage resources and support sustainability of results more effectively. Such lost opportunities reduce UNICEF’s potential efficiency. In addition, UNICEF delays in responding to recommendations in previous reviews regarding capacity building reduce its effectiveness and present other opportunity costs.
Finding 13: Delays in addressing recommendations of previous reviews and evaluations reduce the UNICEF PCO’s organizational efficiency and effectiveness.

UNICEF PCO has been subject to a number of isolated but overlapping reviews in the past couple of years including the PPA, this country program evaluation, the Strategic Moment of Reflection exercise as well as several ongoing audits. The overlap in objectives of these reviews has led to unnecessary duplication in review activities, which consumes the limited time of UNICEF PCO staff and UNICEF partners. Moreover, such reviews generate a number of recommendations for UNICEF which may outstrip its capacity to respond.

Many of the findings in this review regarding areas for UNICEF PCO improvement were made in previous reviews over the past decade. The limited utilization of previous reviews raises concern about UNICEF efficiencies. UNICEF’s senior management needs to explore why such recommendations have not been addressed in the past and should identify measures to increase the utilization of such reviews in the future.
5. UNICEF Country Program Management

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of UNICEF PCO’s management of CPC 5 and CPC 6 in the Philippines over the past decade. Due to the number of recent and complementary reviews commissioned by UNICEF in recent years, this chapter focuses on selected aspects of UNICEF country program management as listed in the sidebar.

5.2 Strategic Management and Programming

An assessment of strategic management typically considers how a program’s overall vision, objectives, and direction align with internal and external contexts and are supported by resource allocations. UNICEF Philippine’s strategic directions for the periods 1999-2004 and 2005-2009 are outlined in the CPC 5 Master Plan of Operations and the CPC 6 Country Program Document and CPAP.

Finding 14: The effectiveness of UNICEF CPC 5 and 6 were hampered by the absence of clearly articulated program theories.

Over the past couple of decades, there has been increasing attention to program theory. According to Weiss, a program theory helps to explain the ideas and assumptions that link a program’s inputs to the desired end results; other attributes of a program theory are provided in the sidebar. Program theories are important in evaluation as they provide a basis for testing the logic behind a program, help explain why a program worked (or not), and how to make it more effective.

CPC 5 and 6 design documents do not provide clear program theories that would allow the programs to be tested over time. They present the strategy or program theory as a program objective (e.g., “massive mobilization of administrative levels, communities and families in support of a CFM.”) If this were conceptualized by UNICEF as a theory of change, it would describe how UNICEF planned to improve the state of children in the Philippines – by linking strategies/activities with intended results and by specifying the causal assumptions behind the links between activities and the different levels/types of results (outputs, immediate and intermediate outcomes, and impacts). In the absence of such logic, UNICEF’s program theory is unclear.
A clearly articulated program theory is not merely a matter of wording or semantics; it is fundamental to understanding what a program intends to accomplish and how it will do it. This clarity of purpose is critical for those delivering the program and all those associated with it – beneficiaries, partners, stakeholders. Well stated program theory and objectives provide a decision framework for deliverers (at the component and projects levels) to identify what to pursue and how to pursue it, and provide a point of reference for all stakeholders to understand their relationship with the program.

The absence of clearly articulated program theories for CPC 5 and CPC 6 contributed to some inappropriate assumptions and design flaws, such as a lack of integration (discussed in more detail below). This is exemplified in the definition of objectives and results in CPC 6. While the CPC 6 program objective emphasizes disparity reduction (rather than contributing to massive mobilization of a child friendly movement), it continues to advocate the CFM. However, the rationale for this is not made clear in the document and there is no discussion of how CFM was expected to support the objective of disparity reduction. Following the 2007 MTR, UNICEF decided to shift its focus to a national level, a decision that should have been based on a clear theory of how this shift would affect disparity reduction. In addition, there is some inherent conflict between the objectives of CPC 5 and 6. While the CPC 5 objective was articulated in terms of a country-wide, all encompassing movement that was intended to have broad societal impact, the CPC 6 objective specified an exclusive approach, focusing on areas of greatest need.

Implications for future programming

To manage more strategically in the future, UNICEF will need to consider the theory behind its programs, at the overall country program, component and program/project levels, and how its desired outcomes are linked to its program plans and resources.

Finding 15: While the CFM espoused an integrated multi-sectoral approach, this was not sufficiently supported by the program design or by UNICEF and GoP contexts.

The previous chapter identified and applauded CFM as an holistic and innovative strategy pursued in CPC 5 and 6, where an integrated multi-sectoral approach to children’s development was central to the CFM vision. CPC 5 represented a departure from the traditional sector-based focus of UNICEF in the Philippines and elsewhere. However, integration of sectoral expertise and services is challenging, both for UNICEF and for its key partner, the GoP. Political, bureaucratic, and administrative structures are most often organized, funded, and operated using traditional, discipline-specific paradigms (not departmental or section/divisional structures).

Integration is more than creating a working group or committee to ensure information is shared laterally. It is about bringing together different sectoral expertise to design and deliver a single program/intervention with a common objective. The premise (supported in the literature with lessons learned) is that the vision is only realized with a collective effort, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

While the design of CPC 5 and 6 included some measures to support integration (in particular the approach used for ECCD 30), a review of planning documents indicates that a sectoral approach dominated the design, notably at the project delivery level.

For example, CPC 5 “shall include three interrelated components: (a) communication; (b) local policy and institutional development; and (c) strategic program support to health, nutrition,

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30 More recently, UNICEF has adopted a multi-sectoral approach to HIV/AIDS
education, child protection, and gender and development. This allows for a highly integrated set of activities among these strategic impact areas." (MPO 1999). Yet strategies to operationalize these were developed for only two of the three components: local policy and institutional development (LPID) and Communications. Together these represented only 15 per cent of the total estimated budget of $46 million.

The other 85 per cent (or $39 million) of the total estimated budget was invested in the strategic integrated program component, consisting of five elements: health, nutrition, education, child protection, and gender and development. However, each of these were then defined and guided by discipline-specific objectives, programs, projects, and budgets, rather than integrated programs or projects supported by multi-sectoral objectives, budgets and delivery processes.

Moreover, the vast majority of the budget set aside for the strategic program component ($23 million) was to be invested in health and education, relatively well-established sectors that had a long history of operating independently. Thus the de-facto operational structure for CPC 5 reinforced a traditional, so called “silo” approach, to UNICEF programming, rather than the integration espoused in the CFM. The CPC 5 MTR (2001) noted the disconnect between the CPC 5 plans (which focused on sectors) and the child-friendly wheel (which focused on individuals and institutions).

A review of CPC 5 planning documents suggests that implicit assumptions were made about the UNICEF and GoP contexts and their institutional readiness for such a radically different programming approach. Potential challenges, risks, and mitigating strategies were not explicitly identified, nor were they raised in the reviewed CPC 5 evaluations conducted between 2001 and 2004. In reviewing CPC 5 effectiveness, these evaluations instead focused on the effectiveness of the individual CPC 5 programs, rather than the overall effectiveness of CFM as a country programming approach for UNICEF and the GoP.

As a consequence, the CPC 6 design continued to embrace CFM without the benefit of a critical review of the key element – integration. Program design and delivery limitations to integration were carried forward into CPC 6. Current UNICEF practices, as noted in the sidebar, underline the importance of such reviews.

CPC 5 did institute Area Focus Officers (AFO) aligned geographically to be the primary contact points for UNICEF overall.

**Possibly the most important criterion for making choices during program design is well-founded experience from the past. Strategies often continue to be replicated without their validity being confirmed through evaluation, or other methods such as participatory reviews. Therefore if a specific strategy or program is proposed for continuation in the next CP, it should have been formally evaluated.**

From Program Policy and Procedure Manual (UNICEF Program Operations 2009) section 3.3.5 ii

There is a need for UNICEF officers to talk with one another – otherwise they risk having a very narrow perspective on the issue.

**Government representative**
This was in some respects an attempt at an integrated approach at the local level. Interviewed focus area representatives noted that this support helped nurture multi-sectoral integration within the LGU; however, this was not matched by a multi-sectoral perspective in UNICEF. The AFO mechanism was not felt to be useful by UNICEF and dissolved midway in CPC 6. Several partners and stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation reported that AFOs were helpful in communicating with UNICEF and the role is currently being reconstituted; however, this is more of a relationship management tactic than an integration remedy.

**Finding 16: UNICEF has a multi-faceted role in the Philippines and will be challenged in the future to identify its niche – i.e., the role(s) in which it has greatest comparative advantage.**

One of the challenges faced by many organizations is to define and nurture their comparative advantage or niche. Global competition has become the norm in most sectors, countries, and across all types of organizations and institutions including those involved in international development. Recent financial events have heightened the stakes. In this context, organizations are being increasingly challenged to be contextually relevant and to identify and focus on their strengths and added value. This also implies that they need to decide how and when to withdraw from activities where their relevance and/or added value have declined over time.

As an organization, UNICEF is in transition in terms of its roles, priorities, and strategies. As should be expected, different parts of the organization are evolving at different paces, reflecting the contexts within which they operate. UNICEF’s role in the Philippines has evolved considerably since it began working in the Philippines in 1948. It currently fills at least four roles, engages in approximately ten different kinds of services, and its activities span several sectors and target groups. Interviews conducted with UNICEF stakeholders during the evaluation indicate that UNICEF is very much appreciated for all of the roles that it plays in the Philippines today, but expressed some concerns as discussed below.

**Need to focus** – UNICEF’s stakeholders generally appreciate all of the work that UNICEF does in the Philippines – it has a positive reputation, a well known brand, and is lauded for its clear focus on the welfare and rights of children. However, a significant number of individuals in the Philippines national government, donors, and CSOs raised concerns about the continued relevance and appropriateness of UNICEF playing all of these roles going forward. They urged UNICEF to focus on fewer roles, sectors, activities, geographic venues, and partners. Their concerns echo the 2009 PPA which identified the diffused nature of UNICEF programming in terms of issues, locations, and funds.

Stakeholders did, however, vary in the relative priority that they placed on UNICEF’s various roles. As shown in Exhibit 5.1, there are some fundamental differences among UNICEF stakeholders’ expectations, particularly in the emphasis that they believe UNICEF should place on upstream and downstream roles in the future.

**Upstream advocates** – Overall, many/most of the representatives of the national government and multilateral and bilateral agencies who were interviewed urged UNICEF to focus more on upstream roles and activities, building on its comparative advantages in popularizing innovations that can be mainstreamed and that support evidence-based policy making.

Interviewed UNICEF staff in the Philippines had mixed views on the relative importance of UNICEF roles; some felt UNICEF should focus mainly on service delivery; others felt it should have a mix of roles. Their views tended to reflect their length of employment with UNICEF; those who had worked in UNICEF for longer periods tended to endorse UNICEF’s more traditional, downstream roles, while newcomers embraced new directions.
**Downstream roles** – All stakeholder groups interviewed insist that UNICEF continue to provide emergency assistance. UNICEF’s key stakeholder groups in the LGUs and particularly the barangays appreciate continued service delivery support from UNICEF, reflecting the considerable resource constraints that they face which affect their abilities to provide services to their constituents. Interestingly, however, several national government representatives interviewed specifically urged UNICEF to stop providing services that others, such as government, should be doing.

**Implications for future programming**

Noted differences in UNICEF stakeholders’ expectations create a dilemma for UNICEF in determining its future role and focus in the Philippines. One option is to maintain the status quo – i.e., continue its current roles and activities for a large and diverse group of stakeholders in a number of different sectors. While this option would allow UNICEF to avoid some difficult short-term decisions, it is likely to reduce UNICEF’s potential effectiveness even further as its resources, which are expected to be reduced, will be spread out even more thinly in the future. It would also prevent UNICEF from deepening its expertise and credibility and carving out a niche for itself.

The other option is a considerably more focused approach that would involve reducing its roles, the activities it is engaged in, the sectors it is active in, and the partners it aims to serve. While this option would provide an opportunity for UNICEF to develop a clearer niche and increase its effectiveness, it would be a major transformation for UNICEF (or, as one person indicated, a revolution). It would require a clear vision for UNICEF PCO and strong, dedicated leadership from UNICEF PCO management and the regional UNICEF offices. UNICEF PCO would need to engage in intensive discussions and planning with some long standing internal and external stakeholders, some of whom may resist organizational change. UNICEF management would also need to make some hard decisions about dropping certain activities and find the resources to invest in new directions. Such changes would likely affect the organizational culture, staff numbers, skill requirements, and UNICEF revenues. Thus, UNICEF would need to be committed, prepared, and resourced to lead and sustain such a major change initiative.

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**Exhibit 5.1 Stakeholder Views on UNICEF Roles in the Philippines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>National Government</th>
<th>Local Government</th>
<th>CSOs</th>
<th>Multilateral &amp; Bilateral Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service provider</td>
<td>Providing services directly to children and families (directly or through NGOs)</td>
<td>Many of those interviewed feel that this is the job of the government</td>
<td>Strongly supported</td>
<td>UNICEF could expand its reach by partnering with NGOs in program implementation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Procurement services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Highly valued</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Program manager for donors or private sector</td>
<td>Valued</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Stakeholder Views</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Government</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Multilateral &amp; Bilateral Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency support services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly supported by all interviewed groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy &amp; Policy Dialogue</td>
<td>Providing technical expertise to inform policies and legislation for children</td>
<td>UNICEF should increase its emphasis on upstream roles, particularly in advocacy, policy dialogue, technical expertise, and dissemination of knowledge</td>
<td>While UNICEF’s participation in advocacy network has strengthened lobbying efforts for children’s issues in the Philippines, but it should also use CSO networks to promote its advocacy interests</td>
<td>UNICEF should increase its emphasis on upstream roles, particularly in advocacy, policy dialogue, technical expertise, and dissemination of knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convening of stakeholders involved in the advancement of children’s rights and conditions</td>
<td>UNICEF should be more active in supporting special research initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass communication about particular issues affecting children</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity Development</td>
<td>Providing technical expertise to support capacity building at individual, institutional, and/or network levels</td>
<td>UNICEF should be more proactive in sharing global knowledge, technical knowledge, and best practices to the Philippines</td>
<td>UNICEF should continue to increase the capacity of NGOs involved with children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Generator and Disseminator related to CRC</td>
<td>Developing, testing models, and supporting scale up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generating and disseminating new knowledge</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Finding 17:** The absence of clear and appropriate country program results frameworks has hindered meaningful assessments of CPC 5 and 6 performance and UNICEF’s ability to claim success.

UNICEF’s country program planning procedures have evolved considerably over the past decade, with an increasing focus on results-based management (RBM). When CPC 5 was designed, UNICEF articulated programs with both general and specific objectives, as was done in the MPO. CPC 6 documentation (CPD 2004 and CPAP 2005) marked the first time that UNICEF’s program in the Philippines included a Results and Resources Framework and an Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (IMEP), a requirement that remains in effect today.
UNICEF’s Program, Policy and Procedural Manual provides guidance on preparing such frameworks and highlights the challenges faced across UNICEF in developing strong approaches to monitoring and evaluation of results-based programming (see sidebar).

UNICEF Philippines struggled with these challenges and acknowledged that there was an organizational learning curve in the period 1999-2009. While there are several examples of well articulated results, overall the limitations of the CPC 5 and CPC 6 objectives and results frameworks provide important lessons for the design and specification of future programming (as is underway for CPC 7). There are four such limitations or issues to consider, most of which are derived in some way from the SMART test. 31 In program documents reviewed, a number of the objectives of CPC 5 and the intended results of CPC 6 were either too broad in scope, overly ambitious in terms of resources and strategies, or revealed issues with coherence. This makes it difficult to measure progress and success. For example:

**Scope is too broad** – Some results statements tended to blur the roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities of UNICEF and the GoP (and other key players). For example, by including results such as those stated in the sidebar, UNICEF promised strategic improvements in the Philippines that were beyond its direct influence and control. There are many factors that affect the realization of these results, and if they were stated as impacts, as opposed to outcomes (CPAP) or outputs (UNDAF), the contribution of the UNICEF country program could be defined. At the level of goal, vision, or desired impact, it is acknowledged that the result will be influenced by a variety of factors and players. These need to be specified as risks in achieving the desired impact. For the purposes of monitoring progress and evaluating the degree of program success, there need to be well defined and feasible parameters for output and outcome results that consider UNICEF’s role in achieving the result.

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31 SMART stands for specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time bound, and is often used as a test or standard against which objectives or indicators are measured.
Too ambitious, given resources and strategies – The most prominent example is the overall CPC 6 objective which planned to reduce certain disparities by 50 per cent of their 2003 levels by 2009. Although the inappropriateness of this objective was raised by the MTR team in 2007, and acknowledged by UNICEF, the results framework for CPC 6 was never changed. Ongoing monitoring should allow a program to revisit its planned results, make adjustments in results and the way in which they are measured (indicator) or in the targets that can be reasonably achieved in the life of that program.

Coherence and measurability – Another complication in assessing CPC 6 effectiveness was the co-existence of three sets of country program results that are not consistent and that contain a large number of results and indicators. The results set out in the CPD (November 2004) and approved by UNICEF’s Executive Board in January 2005 were used as the basis for this evaluation. In the CPD, UNICEF Philippines aligns its 14 key results with the seven MTSP priority areas.

The CPAP for CPC 6, approved in April 2005, contained 26 expected outcomes (and many more expected outputs) drawn from the UNDAF 2005-2009. The CPAP results were organized into the five UNDAF result areas. In some cases, such as the Education program, results were recoded under different categories (i.e., ECD appears in Good Governance and in Basic Social Services). The CPAP results framework guided the CPC 6 MTR in 2007.

An AusAID program proposal (2005) contained yet a third set of results and a very detailed list of indicators (in a document of 30 pages) that were used by UNICEF to report to AusAID in 2009 but that were also used (in error) as the basis for the 2007 MTR. In 2009, when planning for the CPC 6 extension, UNICEF identified the discrepancies in these documents and re-affirmed that the results contained in the CPD were the official CPC 6 results (and thus to be used for this evaluation).

Clearly, results should be identical in all reporting vehicles. This situation raises an important issue for the design of country programs, seeking to find expression in different accountability vehicles but with a meaningful results framework that resonates with those responsible. In none of the cases cited here were the results organized to reflect the manner in which the UNICEF country program was structured or delivered (by components or sectors).

Additionally, although the MTR identified some limitations with the CPC 6 framework in 2007, and UNICEF subsequently made several changes to CPC 6 implementation, these were never formalized, further reducing the relevance of the CPC 6 results framework.

Following a full review of UNICEF’s core reporting mechanisms, there were a number of orphaned results – those where no follow on reporting occurred over the period of these two country programs. (See Volume II, Appendix XIII for further detail on results statements and issues with tracking these results.)

32 MTSP priority areas (7): Girls education; Early Childhood Development; Child Protection; Immunization Plus; HIV/AIDS; Communication for Childs Rights; and Local Policy and Institutional Development.

31 There were 34 UNDAF outputs with UNICEF involvement in the 2005-2009 UNDAF, and 26 of these were carried forward as outcomes in the CPC 6 CPAP.

34 UNDAF result areas (5): Macroeconomic stability, broad based and equitable development; Basic Social Services; Good Governance; Environmental Sustainability; Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.
Implications for future programming

UNICEF is one of many players (GoP, donors, CSOs, etc.) working in the field and in the focus areas and needs to be realistic in setting program objectives. Contributions and accountability are important in developing the program’s objectives and planned results.

Finding 18: UNICEF’s systems pay insufficient attention to tracking the country program’s cumulative performance.

While the need for and importance of effective monitoring and evaluations systems is acknowledged in CPC 5 and CPC 6 program documents, this evaluation and previous reviews indicate that UNICEF lacks effective systems to track and report on its cumulative performance over time.

Beyond the limitations identified in the previous finding about the lack of clear and appropriate objectives and results, UNICEF’s main results-tracking system – its Annual Reports – fails to generate the information needed to assess UNICEF’s planned to actual performance vis-à-vis its program objectives over time.

A review of documented analysis available in CPC 5 and 6 reports over the decade indicates that overall achievement of planned CPC 5 and 6 key results was quite modest and mixed within and across program components. (This judgment is based on analysis provided in Volume II, Appendix XIII.) The reports, which tended to focus on activities rather than outputs and outcomes, do not systematically report on all planned results, do not provide updated cumulative information on results from reporting period to period, and do not adequately reflect the findings and lessons from UNICEF commissioned evaluations over time. The result is incomplete information on UNICEF contributions.

Most of the reviewed results were categorized as “partially achieved” or “no information available”. The latter category includes results for which no information was included in reviewed documents, or where the recorded information was not relevant given the key result (e.g. UNICEF reported on activities rather than outputs or outcomes, UNICEF did not use the indicator identified in the planning document or UNICEF provided other unrelated information). In several instances, reviewed reports included information on results that were different from approved UNICEF program results (e.g. the 2007 MTR which reports on CPC 6 results as articulated in the CPAP, not the CPD).

In other instances where achievements are reported, it is not evident that UNICEF should be acknowledged (positively or negatively) for the contributions to the stated planned results (e.g. the elementary cohort survival rate has increased from 72% to 85% or the country has eliminated measles and maternal neonatal tetanus or mass media industry is compliant with the CRC) as it is not evident that this was a realistic result for UNICEF.

Interestingly, UNICEF did not develop a system to capture results at barangay level, even though disparity reduction in the barangays was as a specific focus of CPC 6.

Until recently, and with a few exceptions, UNICEF paid more attention to resource generation and annual activity reporting than to tracking the programs’ performance vis-à-vis planned objectives and results. However, it should be noted that UNICEF’s most recent report to AusAID (2010) does report on cumulative progress over CPC 6.

A final observation relates to UNICEF’s human resources investments in monitoring and evaluation. Despite the complexity and scope of UNICEF’s program in the Philippines, at some points during CPC 5 and 6, there was no one specifically tasked with monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Although the UNICEF PCO currently has one person responsible for monitoring and evaluation, in practice this individual has a number of other responsibilities (including support for corporate planning and reporting) which reduces the time available for monitoring and evaluation matters.
Implications for future programming

UNICEF needs to ensure that it has the right systems in place to track the types of results it is planning to realize. The absence of reliable data from which to derive quantitative evidence is very problematic, notably after 10 years of operating within the same target areas. Finally, the results need to be specified in a manner which can be tracked and priority given to establishing the monitoring systems to do so. Addressing these issues will require considerable UNICEF PCO commitment and financial support.

5.3 Partnership Management

Finding 19: UNICEF has made some modest progress in harmonizing with other UN agencies in the Philippines.

Harmonization and alignment have been priorities of the UN and UNICEF over the past decade. Buoyed by the Secretary General’s High Level Forum on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), the General Assembly’s Triennial Review (2004), and the adoption of the Paris Principles (2005), UN agencies have become more conscious of the need for and value of harmonization and alignment at the country level. They are expected to adopt and utilize the strategies summarized in the sidebar to guide their work.

Over the past decade in the Philippines, cooperation among UNICEF and UN agencies is reported to have concentrated on the preparation of a Common Country Assessment, the development of a common assistance framework (e.g., UNDAF 2005-11 and preparations for a new UNDAF), adoption of a Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) process, and some joint programming.

Since 2007, UNICEF has been engaged in the following six joint programs with other UN agencies (the last four of which were ongoing at the time of writing):

- Joint Program to Facilitate the Implementation of the CEDAW Concluding Comments (2007)
- Joint Program on HIV and Migration (2007-2009)
- “Alternatives to Migration: Decent Jobs for Filipino Youth” (funded by ILO, IOM, UNICEF and UNFPA in partnership with six national government agencies and four pilot LGUs). (2009-2011)
- Enhancing Access to and Provision of Water Services with the Active Participation of Donors (funded by UNDP and UNICEF) (2009-2012)
According to interviews with key stakeholders inside and outside UNICEF and reviewed UNICEF reports and evaluations (including the PPA), joint programming between UNICEF and other UN agencies is still in early stages.

The first joint program (CEDAW) reported several positive results, including the Magna Carta for Women (signed into law in 2009), the organization of the International Conference on Gender, Migration and Development in September 2008,\(^{35}\) and progress towards the harmonization of national and local legislations on CEDAW.\(^{36}\)

The findings of the second joint program on HIV and Migration are summarized in the sidebar.

It is premature to evaluate the effectiveness of the other joint programs because they are still relatively new.

Representatives of all UN agencies interviewed for the evaluation indicated that joint programming is still in early stages of development and is experiencing growing pains in the Philippines. They commented that UN agencies tend to be working independently within umbrella programs, rather than jointly on a common program, and also noted that there have been some issues about the mandate boundaries (including issues and target groups) of the different UN agencies that have contributed to some tensions among them.

**Finding 20: UNICEF has effective and mature partnerships with the GoP at national and provincial levels and with several CSOs; however, its partnerships with other donors are underdeveloped.**

The PPA provided an extensive assessment of how UNICEF manages partnerships. Generally it found that one of UNICEF’s greatest partnership strengths was its convening capacity, built on its strong reputation amongst government and civil society, which it has wielded successfully to “bring together institutions to address issues across UNICEF’s range of interests.” (PPA, p.18) This finding was repeated in key informant interviews conducted for this evaluation.

UNICEF is seen as a source of expertise for GoP representatives, is applauded for its ability to bring international expertise into the Philippines context, and has demonstrated tremendous capacity to partner with various national government partners over the decade. By way of example, UNICEF and NEDA are currently working on aligning and integrating existing measurement systems, including possible shared resources and tools to improve monitoring and evaluation functions/work.

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Throughout both CPC 5 and 6, UNICEF provided extensive support to LGUs (e.g., through the four gifts), and has been very effective in partnering with LGUs and their respective institutions (e.g., the Leagues) to pursue CPC objectives. LGUs are very appreciative of direct partnerships with UNICEF as very few bilateral and multilateral donors deal directly with local governments (most donor-funded projects are routed through national agencies). Since UNICEF is more engaged with LGUs, it is seen as being better able to respond more adequately and quickly to LGU needs.

Another area of partnership in which UNICEF has proven both effective and innovative has been in its engagement of faith-based organizations to meet its country program objectives, in particular to access and support marginalized and indigenous communities. For example, UNICEF’s partnering various faith-based organizations in providing outreach ECCD services to indigenous populations (AusAID final report).

UNICEF has been increasingly effective in partnership with the private sector in the Philippines, to the envy of other UNICEF offices in the region. It has attracted financial support for a variety of initiatives from an increasing number of corporations in the Philippines including Proctor and Gamble, Johnson and Johnson, and ING.

Like a number of other previous evaluations and reviews conducted over the decade, the PPA noted some short-comings in UNICEF’s partnerships with other organizations (see sidebar).

Interviews conducted with donor agencies during the evaluation revealed that they had relatively limited interactions with UNICEF, and had limited in-depth knowledge of its role. This was particularly true of donors who were not regular or current UNICEF PCO funding partners. UNICEF’s relatively modest presence in some sectors at the national level, combined with staff turnover in donor agencies, likely contribute to this situation. That being said, such donors expressed confidence in UNICEF’s ability to share its valued and extensive technical expertise on child rights issues with them. However, the means for doing so require further discussion.

5.4 Resource Generation

Finding 21: UNICEF has been very effective in generating increased financial support for its programs (although not its administrative and operational needs) over the past decade. However, its support from traditional sources (bilateral development organizations) has been waning in recent years, reflecting changing donor funding patterns, and raises financial risks for UNICEF’s continued programming in the Philippines.

As noted earlier, UNICEF’s overall program in the Philippines grew by threefold over the period – from USD $5.8 million in 1999 to $17.9 million in 2009.37 While its Regular Resources were constant in nominal terms (approximately $2.8 million per year), this represented a shrinking

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37 Readers should note that 2009 revenues include approximately US $6million in humanitarian support for natural disasters. As a consequence, this has distorted (i.e., reduced) the relative contributions of other resources in 2009.
portion of its overall revenues – from 44 per cent in 1999 to 16 per cent by 2009. As a consequence, UNICEF became considerably more dependent on Other Resources (OR).

An analysis of UNICEF’s OR over time (see Exhibits 5.2 and 5.3) reveals some interesting patterns:

- While support from bilateral agencies grew in absolute value and in proportion to all other sources for much of this period, and peaked at $9.3 million in 2008, they declined to $5.3 million in 2009.

- UNICEF has been very dependent on one main donor for the entire period. AusAID support represented 54 per cent of all bilateral ODA support over the period, and at least 77 per cent for a couple of years. In 2009, AusAID provided 59 per cent of UNICEF support from bilateral development agencies.

- The greatest growth has been from UNICEF thematic sources, which increased from a modest $170,000 in 2005 to over $3 million in 2009 (representing 22 per cent of OR).

- Private sector funding increased over the period from $700,000 in 1999 to $1.1 million in 2009, distinguishing UNICEF Philippines from other UNICEF offices. However, such resources are typically tied to specific initiatives and provide UNICEF with limited programming flexibility.

- Other sources (UNICEF National Committees and NGOs) provided relatively modest support for UNICEF over the period. National Committee support declined from a high of 32% in 1999 to an average of 9 per cent over the period.

- UNICEF’s operational and administrative resources (as well as the number of its program staff) did not grow in tandem with program revenues and expenditures over the period (see Section 2.4), likely contributing to some of the limitations identified in this report.

Exhibit 5.2 Evolution of OR in Dollars (1999-2009)
These changes in funding sources present significant risks and challenges to UNICEF PCO, particularly given the current economic context and its negative effects on the ODA contributions of many bilateral agencies who have been UNICEF’s traditional supporters. Moreover, some of the agencies interviewed for the evaluation indicate that they are facing increased pressure to fund GoP directly (through sector-wide support) or are increasingly restricted by their headquarters to fund national offices directly (UNICEF or other UN), given that their agencies are is already making core contributions to UNICEF. These contextual shifts underline the need for UNICEF PCO to embrace leveraging more assertively than it has to date.

Reviewed UNICEF PCO reports and meeting minutes as well as interviews all indicate that while UNICEF PCO pays considerable attention to private sector fundraising, it lacks an overall strategy to guide its resource generation activities. This raises considerable concerns about how it will finance its future programs in the Philippines.
6. Conclusions, Recommendations, and Lessons

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a summary of the main conclusions of the evaluation, the recommendations, and lessons learned that emerged from the evaluation.

6.2 Conclusions

Over the last decade, UNICEF, through and with its strong partnership with the GoP, made notable contributions to enhance government capabilities to implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Philippines – the overarching goals of both the CPC 5 and CPC 6.

The Child Friendly Movement (CFM) was a bold and innovative strategy that was relevant to the needs and priorities of the Philippines, UNICEF’s corporate developmental priorities, and the priorities of other development agencies in the Philippines. CFM espoused an integrated multi-sectoral approach and made valued and recognizable contributions, most notably in strengthening the institutional capacities of LGUs in focus areas and in national policy development. There are notable examples where UNICEF leveraged its resources, generated increased resources to augment its own contributions, and was instrumental in sustained change – for example, in the adoption and institutionalization of child-friendly mechanisms for schools and communities.

The review of UNICEF’s programming in the Philippines over the last decade revealed some challenges for UNICEF as it plans its next country program and some lessons that could inform programming for children.

The UNICEF PCO does not have a clear theory of change to guide its intended programming results, which have been overly ambitious and have not been adequately monitored or evaluated, and has not paid adequate attention to the sustainability of results. It has contributed to individual capacity development in national departments and LGUs but has no overarching vision to integrate these initiatives into an overall strategy for institutional development. As noted above, UNICEF has leveraged resources for some initiatives, but has not developed a leveraging strategy for its overall program. And while it has diversified its sources of financial support, it has not developed a plan or strategy to finance its future programs in the Philippines.

These issues are addressed in the recommendations that follow.

6.3 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The UNICEF PCO should articulate a clear theory of change for the next country program and define its role within the change process to maximize its comparative advantage and resources in the Philippines.

In the Philippines, UNICEF has confounded its ability to claim ownership for hard won successes and learn from its experience in delivering the program. Two issues are important going forward – clarifying its program theory of change and its role and relative contribution to that change.

While CFM was undoubtedly the foundational strategy for CPC 5 and 6, the focus waxed and waned throughout the 10 year period. There was fluctuation in the focus between national and local levels, between LGUs and barangays, and between a multi-sectoral and a sectoral approach. This was problematic in achieving its goal of broad societal change – which required a sustained, long term approach.
Articulating a theory of change would allow the program to more precisely define causal links between what program implementers will do and the impacts the program will have, including the interim results (outputs and outcomes) that would help the program measure progress. A well-defined theory of change and framework of results would help program managers decide what projects or components to pursue and where to invest scarce resources, and also how to assess progress and identify needed changes. It would also provide UNICEF and its stakeholders with greater clarity about its direction in the Philippines.

In planning for CPC 7, and with the benefit of an articulated theory of change, UNICEF PCO should consider where it can have the most impact given its expertise and resources in the Philippines. This will require a reflection on the comparative advantages of the UNICEF roles identified in this and other evaluations: research, knowledge sharing, network building, piloting innovations, and technical expertise for policy development.

Recommendation 2: In its upcoming programming in the Philippines, the UNICEF PCO should define sustainability strategies. These should include exit strategies, identification of risks and mitigation strategies to achieve sustainable results, and more sustainable approaches to capacity development.

The evaluation found insufficient attention to sustainability in CPC 5 and 6 program documents and in interim evaluations over the last decade. Sustainability should be considered in the design of new programs and monitored throughout the life of the program. This will require UNICEF to be considerably more proactive in identifying potential sustainability issues and developing sustainability and exit strategies during the planning stage, increasing attention to sustainability of results throughout implementation by requiring project and section heads to monitor and report on progress and challenges encountered and to identify mitigating strategies to support sustainability of results.

UNICEF PCO should clarify (in conjunction with UNICEF HQ), develop and foster a common understanding, approach, and strategy to capacity development that fosters sustainable institutional development. The UNICEF PCO’s capacity building efforts have accounted for a significant portion of its investments over the past decade, but much of this has been aimed at individuals. Future capacity building support should consider how capacity building initiatives will benefit institutions, where longer term benefits can be realized.

Recommendation 3: In clarifying its program theory and future roles in the Philippines, the UNICEF PCO should increase its efforts to more systematically leverage resources for children.

While the UNICEF PCO has had some success in leveraging resources for children, leveraging is not well or commonly understood in the organization. UNICEF’s program management practices pay insufficient attention to leveraging, and its organizational culture lacks the incentives and checks and balances to encourage leveraging.

In parallel with Recommendation #1 above, the UNICEF PCO should clarify how it will operationalize UNICEF’s corporate leveraging objectives. This may require UNICEF PCO to undertake a more thorough review of the strengths and weaknesses of current management practices for leveraging and identify strategies to address motivational and technical challenges in leveraging its resources.

Greater attention to leveraging could help UNICEF respond to the anticipated negative effects on UNICEF PCO revenues due to shifts in the funding priorities of bilateral agencies.
Recommendation 4: The UNICEF PCO should develop a single clear results framework and a monitoring system to track and report on its performance in realizing planned objectives.

The problems identified in this evaluation regarding both monitoring and evaluation of results cannot be overstated. After a decade of UNICEF Philippines programming, the lack of attention to results measurement is extremely problematic. The Evaluation Team would have liked to analyze causality and determine whether the CFM is a credible country level strategy for improving the well being and rights of children. Regrettably, there was insufficient data to do so.

Going forward, the UNICEF PCO should develop a single results framework that is shared by all and that has a specified number of results and agreed indicators that could be tracked, measured and analyzed.

Articulating its desired results in such a framework would resonate with program management and deliverers, and make ongoing measurement a meaningful exercise that, in combination with reviews and evaluations, could be used to adjust and improve the program throughout its lifespan. Having fewer selective results and indicators will make data and information more accessible, easier to collect, and expressed in units of measurement that can be analyzed and compared. This will lead to greater use and usefulness.

While the Evaluation Team recognizes the difficulties imposed through other accountability mechanisms (within UNICEF corporately and across the UN system), the primary driver of results-based management for the Philippines program needs to be the UNICEF Philippines program and country office.

Recommendation 5: The UNICEF PCO should develop a more holistic approach to revenue generation that complements its program strategy and ensures adequate provision for its operational and administrative needs.

While UNICEF programs in the Philippines benefitted from a steady growth in financial resources between 1999 and 2009, this is not expected to continue for CPC 7. Reviews of the global, donor, and Philippines contexts all suggest that programming resources for future UNICEF programs will be considerably more modest. Moreover, the steady support that UNICEF received from a few key bilateral donors over the past decade is less likely to continue. Future UNICEF programming budgets may be smaller than they have in the past, which will in turn require UNICEF to be more selective in its programming priorities.

UNICEF Philippines urgently needs to develop a holistic revenue generation strategy that dovetails with its program strategy and that provides a more diversified funding base. UNICEF should explore the possibility of untied corporate support from the private sector in the Philippines, which would give it considerably more flexibility to support its programming priorities, and should also explore the possibility of providing technical support in its areas of expertise as a service to interested donors. Finally, UNICEF needs to resolve the current imbalance between the resources it generates and allocates for programs and for operational and administrative costs.
6.4 Lessons Learned

This section identifies lessons from this evaluation of CPC 5 and 6 in the Philippines that may be of benefit to programming for children (notably within UNICEF and the UN):

An organization that operates in a complex, multi-stakeholder context needs a single, clear results framework that speaks to all stakeholders.
While UNICEF had several results frameworks in place during CPC 6, it lacked a clear, common, well understood and meaningful basis for analyzing its performance. Thus, while it respected corporate and donor reporting requirements, it missed the opportunity to learn from and make necessary adjustments to its programming approach so as to increase its effectiveness.

Organizational change requires strong leadership, commitment, as well as the necessary incentives, support mechanisms, and checks and balances.
While UNICEF PCO’s country program priorities included capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and cross-sector integration, these were not sufficiently supported and reinforced by PCO management in terms of allocating the necessary resources, developing the strategies, and/or allocating clear responsibilities that would help institutionalize such changes.

Innovative programs that aim to realize societal change take time and require a long term vision, commitment, as well as mechanisms to support program learning and adaption.
In the case of UNICEF, several changes in direction over the period reduced its ability to test and learn from its approaches. Despite significant investments in CFM during CPC 5 and 6, the organization missed valuable opportunities to analyze, document and share lessons learned with others about this innovative approach.

To be perceived as credible and trustworthy partners, organizations must demonstrate and account for their performance to stakeholders or risk reputational and/or financial risks.
In the case of UNICEF, additional attention and resources need to be invested in tracking and reporting on its performance and lessons to avoid the considerable difficulties encountered in assessing its organizational effectiveness and demonstrating its added value.

Over reliance on one or a few sources of revenue reduces the viability of an organization.
In the case of UNICEF, its dependence on one bilateral donor for almost a decade increased its financial vulnerability and reduced its know-how related to resource generation.

The results of a capacity building initiative are more likely to be sustained if the initiative is mainstreamed within the targeted entity, if it supports one-time rather than ongoing costs, if exit strategies are defined and used, if sustainability issues are identified and addressed in timely ways, and if individual capacities are supported in tandem with (as opposed to in isolation of) institutional capacity building.
In the case of UNICEF PCO, the absence of a clear strategy for sustainable capacity building contributed to mixed sustainability of its capacity building results. Corporate definitions and parameters for capacity building within UNICEF would support national strategies in this regard.
## Appendix I  CPC 5 and CPC Projects

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<th>Components</th>
<th>CPC 5 PROJECTS (19)</th>
<th>CPC 6 PROJECTS (18)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Advocacy for policy, implementation and resource allocation</td>
<td>Child Rights Advocacy and Participation</td>
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<td>Media Advocacy and Mobilization</td>
<td>Media Advocacy and Mobilization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Community communication</td>
<td>Communication for Behaviour Change</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Information management &amp; research</td>
<td>Goals Monitoring and Advocacy</td>
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<td>Local Policy and Institutional Development</td>
<td>Legal &amp; policy advocacy</td>
<td>Local Law, Planning and Policy Advocacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Institutional &amp; capacity building</td>
<td>Local Institutions for Child-Friendly Governance</td>
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<td>Child rights monitoring</td>
<td>Local Accountability for Children</td>
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<td>Health and Nutrition</td>
<td>Maternal &amp; child health and nutrition</td>
<td>Adolescent and Maternal Health</td>
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<td>Micronutrients deficiency control</td>
<td>Child Health and Sanitation</td>
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<td>Under-Nutrition and Micronutrients Deficiency Control</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>Child friendly integrated early childhood care and development</td>
<td>Early Childhood Care and Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Meeting learning basic needs of families</td>
<td>Basic Education for All</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decentralized school-based management</td>
<td>Support System for Child-Friendly School System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children in Need of Special Protection</td>
<td>Preventive actions / early intervention against child abuse / exploitation</td>
<td>Protective Services for Children Affected by Abuse, Exploitation and Trafficking</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rescue / recovery / reintegration</td>
<td>Upholding the Rights and Well-being of Children Affected by Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>Building networks and systems for child protection</td>
<td>Legal Protection and Justice System for Children</td>
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<td>A comprehensive system of justice for children</td>
<td>Networks and Systems for Child Protection</td>
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<td>rescue/recovery/reintegration</td>
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## Components

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<th>CPC 5 PROJECTS (19)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender and Development</strong></td>
<td>Assuring the rights of women &amp; girls against all forms of discrimination, violence and exploitation</td>
<td>Improving self-esteem &amp; strengthening role &amp; capacity of women and girls</td>
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<td>HIV/AIDS Prevention</td>
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<td><strong>HIV/AIDS</strong></td>
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<td>Sector support</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-sectoral Support</strong></td>
<td>Coordination, monitoring and evaluation</td>
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Appendix II  List of Findings

Finding 1: CPC 5 and 6 objectives were relevant to the needs and priorities of the Philippines over the decade.

Finding 2: CPC 5 and 6 were well aligned with UNICEF’s corporate developmental priorities as well as the priorities of other key developmental agencies in the Philippines between 1999 and 2009.

Finding 3: Over the decade, UNICEF made notable contributions to enhance local and national government capabilities to implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Philippines.

Finding 4: UNICEF has made valued and recognizable contributions to strengthen the institutional capabilities of LGUS in reviewed focus areas.

Finding 5: The Child Friendly Movement was a remarkably bold and innovative approach for UNICEF in the Philippines, but UNICEF missed some opportunities to learn from this experimental approach.

Finding 6: Due to lack of data and some faulty assumptions in program design, it is not possible to quantify the impacts of CPC 5 and 6 on reducing disparity among children in the Philippines.

Finding 7: While UNICEF has leveraged resources for children in the Philippines over the past decade, its effectiveness has been limited by the dominance of service delivery in its organizational culture and by the absence of systematic attention to leveraging in its program management practices.

Finding 8: UNICEF and UNICEF PCO management practices pay insufficient attention to sustainability of results.

Finding 9: Capacity building was central to both CPC 5 and 6, but the absence of a common understanding, clear strategy, and systematic approach to capacity building within the UNICEF PCO contributed to its mixed performance in supporting sustainable capacity building results.

Finding 10: The evaluation supports the findings on efficiency identified in the 2009 program review and the global staff survey.

Finding 11: While UNICEF and its key stakeholders invest considerable time and resources in planning and reporting, they typically under-invest in analyzing the results of UNICEF investments and managing for results.

Finding 12: The absence of systematic approaches to capacity building, leveraging resources, and sustainability in UNICEF PCO reduces the potential cost-effectiveness of its investments.
Finding 13: Delays in addressing recommendations of previous reviews and evaluations reduce the UNICEF PCO’s organizational efficiency and effectiveness.

Finding 14: The effectiveness of UNICEF CPC 5 and 6 were hampered by the absence of clearly articulated program theories.

Finding 15: While the CFM espoused an integrated multi-sectoral approach, this was not sufficiently supported by the program design or by UNICEF and GoP contexts.

Finding 16: UNICEF has a multi-faceted role in the Philippines and will be challenged in the future to identify its niche – i.e., the role(s) in which it has greatest comparative advantage.

Finding 17: The absence of clear and appropriate country program results frameworks has hindered meaningful assessments of CPC 5 and 6 performance and UNICEF’s ability to claim success.

Finding 18: UNICEF’s systems pay insufficient attention to tracking the country program’s cumulative performance.

Finding 19: UNICEF has made some modest progress in harmonizing with other UN agencies in the Philippines.

Finding 20: UNICEF has effective and mature partnerships with the GoP at national and provincial levels and with several CSOs; however, its partnerships with other donors are underdeveloped.

Finding 21: UNICEF has been very effective in generating increased financial support for its programs (although not its administrative and operational needs) over the past decade. However, its support from traditional sources (bilateral development organizations) has been waning in recent years, reflecting changing donor funding patterns, and raises financial risks for UNICEF’s continued programming in the Philippines.