
Part of UNICEF’s Evaluative Work on the Response to the Syrian Crisis
AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF UNICEF’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN TURKEY, 2012–2015

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United Nations Children’s Fund
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New York, New York 10017

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Note from the Authors ii
Acronyms iii
Executive Summary v

SECTION 1: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT x
  1.1 General context 1
  1.2 Host country context 3
  1.3 UNICEF’s response in Turkey and the Syrian sub-region 4
  1.4 Evaluation purpose and approach 6

SECTION 2: FINDINGS ON UNICEF’S ROLE AND STRATEGY 9
  2.1 Overview and general issues 10
  2.2 Refugee education: Role and strategy 14
  2.3 Refugee child protection and psychosocial support: Role and strategy 17
  2.4 Other sectors: Health, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene 20

SECTION 3: FINDINGS ON UNICEF’S PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 22
  3.1 Overview and criteria for evaluating performance 23
  3.2 Refugee education programme performance 24
  3.3 Refugee child protection and psychosocial support programme performance 28

SECTION 4: FINDINGS ON UNICEF COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION 34
  4.1 Context 35
  4.2 Collaboration with Government of Turkey authorities 35
  4.3 Collaboration with other agencies 36
  4.4 UNICEF’s coordination role 38

SECTION 5: FINDINGS ON UNICEF MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS 39
  5.1 Context and general issues 40
  5.2 Management and operational support 41
  5.3 Human resources 43
  5.4 Supply and procurement 45
  5.5 Financial management and fundraising 47
  5.6 Communications 48

SECTION 6: SUSTAINABILITY, FUTURE PERSPECTIVES AND LESSONS LEARNED 49
  6.1 Overview 50
  6.2 Future perspectives on education 51
  6.3 Key lessons learned and best practices in education 53
  6.4 Future perspectives on child protection 53
  6.5 Some key lessons learned and best practices in child protection 54

SECTION 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55
  7.1 General conclusions 56
  7.2 Sector-specific conclusions 58
  7.3 Management, finance and support conclusions 59
  7.4 Recommendations 60
NOTE FROM THE AUTHORS

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This report is the result of an evaluation by independent consultants. The views expressed in the report are those of the authors, and should not be interpreted as representing the views of UNICEF.
# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3RP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFAD</td>
<td>Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAM</td>
<td>Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE/CIS</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFS</td>
<td>Child-friendly spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>Fixed-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACT</td>
<td>Harmonized approach to cash transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3</td>
<td>Level 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENARO</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Regional Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFSP</td>
<td>Ministry of Family and Social Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoNE</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoRES</td>
<td>Monitoring Results for Equity System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD/DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>Refugee response plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSOP</td>
<td>Simplified Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Temporary assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRCS</td>
<td>Turkish Red Crescent Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Safety and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOBIS</td>
<td>Education management information system for Syrians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 1  General map of Turkey showing the Syrian Arab Republic and other neighbouring countries
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This evaluation was jointly commissioned by the UNICEF Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) Regional Office, the Turkey Country Office and the Evaluation Office at UNICEF Headquarters (HQ) in New York. The evaluation covers UNICEF’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey between 2012 and early 2015. A team of six evaluators (four international and two Turkish nationals) conducted the evaluation between March and May 2015, including a three-week in-country mission. Interviews with UNICEF staff, partners, government officials and donors were supplemented with field visits and focus group discussions with Syrian refugees. Consultations were also held with staff members of the CEE/CIS and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional offices and staff at UNICEF HQ in New York.

2. While this is a standalone evaluation, it should also be read in conjunction with the sub-regional evaluation of the wider UNICEF response to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, to which it is closely related. Note that this evaluation of the situation in Turkey does not cover cross-border assistance into the Syrian Arab Republic.

3. Now in its fifth year and showing no signs of abating, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic has, to date, caused some 4 million Syrians to flee their country and seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Of these, Turkey hosts the largest number of any host country, with more than 1.7 million refugees, including over 900,000 children. While the generosity of the Turkish response is remarkable, it is coming under increasing strain as the number of refugees grows and the situation becomes more protracted.

4. The extent of the Government of Turkey’s ownership of and control over the response to the refugee crisis is one of the defining features of the situation. UNICEF’s response and that of the wider international community must be understood in light of this.

5. The wider geopolitical situation, including hostile relations between Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the unresolved political conflict with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or PKK), and Turkish and international concern regarding immigration and the potential for radicalized elements coming into Turkey from the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, are all part of the context within which the refugee situation and the response to it should be understood.

FINDINGS

6. The space for UNICEF operational engagement was limited in the early stages of the crisis, and was initially confined to the camps. UNICEF has in general established a good working relationship with the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı or AFAD), the lead government agency for the response; and has built effectively on its existing country programme.
relationships with the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and the Ministry of Family and Social Policy (MoFSP). UNICEF has been slower to establish relationships at the provincial and district levels, though this is now changing, particularly in regard to education policy and child protection coordination.

7. In addition to collaboration with AFAD and these ministries, UNICEF forged an important partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), notably in the establishment of child-friendly spaces (CFS) in camps and in some urban locations. This partnership should continue and be expanded. UNICEF has few partnerships with the limited number of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) present in Turkey, although some of these organizations, for example the International Medical Corps (IMC), hold potential for more extensive collaboration in partnership with Turkish NGOs.

8. With regard to the relevance and appropriateness of the UNICEF response, the evaluation concludes that UNICEF essentially established the right role for itself in this context with its strategic focus on education and child protection. Basic needs, including water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), were well met by others in government camps. UNICEF played an important role in the polio vaccination campaigns conducted by the Government in border areas, however, in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), following the polio outbreaks in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013–2014. The overall levels of vaccination coverage among Syrian refugees are low enough to raise significant concerns about potential future disease outbreaks, including measles. The evaluation therefore recommends that UNICEF collaborate further with WHO and the Government of Turkey on this agenda. Chronic malnutrition demands similar vigilance, particularly in regard to risks associated with micronutrient deficiencies.

9. In the education sphere, UNICEF supported school construction and supplied educational equipment. The organization also helped to shape crucial policy concerning refugee education (e.g. on Syrian curricula) and established a teacher compensation payment scheme in collaboration with MoNE and the Turkish Post Office. The establishment with MoNE of YOBIS, an education management information system for foreign students and teachers in Turkey, has been slow but is an important innovation that will help fill a vital data gap.

10. UNICEF now faces an immediate challenge regarding the sustainability of the teacher compensation scheme. Although this has allowed Syrian teachers to practice, teacher retention will depend on teachers securing proper salaries and job security – an issue that constitutes an advocacy priority for UNICEF.

11. In the area of child protection, UNICEF has successfully used the CFS model to provide psychosocial support and protective environments for refugee children. Its ‘adolescent empowerment and participation’ approach, which involves youth leaders, appears to have been highly effective in the camps and was particularly well suited in this context. The main limitation of this approach seems to be the absence of prospects for youth volunteers over the age of 18; a gap that UNICEF now recognizes. Greater attention must be paid to the vulnerabilities of children outside of the camps, including child labour, child marriage and living on the streets. Each of these issues requires the
availability of specialized case management and related referral mechanisms.

12. To date, UNICEF has tended to be ad hoc in its response and has lacked an overall strategy for uniting its two main programme strands. Combined with the separation of the emergency response from the regular programme (now reversed), and the separation of the education and child protection responses, this has adversely affected the coherence of the response. The No Lost Generation initiative still provides a useful conceptual framework for this purpose, though its full potential has not yet been realized in Turkey. A joint approach with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to working with the Government of Turkey on this agenda – which is widely recognized as pivotal in the current situation – could go a long way towards helping to shape policy and practice and supporting the scaled-up coverage required.

13. UNICEF has been hampered by a number of factors in the implementation of its programmes, including major constraints related to funding and human resources. During the period 2013–2014, UNICEF received on average only 56 per cent of its required funding. The organization was perhaps too reliant on specific donors and the evaluation questions why advance financing, using the UNICEF Emergency Programme Fund, was not used to kick-start the programme earlier.

14. With regard to human resources, the relative lack of capacity and emergency experience in the Turkey Country Office had to be compensated for with surge deployments, resulting in high staff turnover, discontinuity of external engagement and high transitional costs. UNICEF’s Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOP) for Level 3 (L3) emergencies, which offer significant flexibility, were not sufficiently utilized. Most notably, there was a lack of investment at the field level (Gaziantep), which meant that UNICEF lacked the continuity of senior staff presence and engagement with local and provincial actors. In general, UNICEF’s programme struggled to keep pace with the scale and nature of the evolving needs, and UNICEF underestimated the related support requirements. The Turkey Country Office is now addressing the staffing imbalance between Ankara and Gaziantep.

15. Despite these limitations and the difficulty of the operating environment, UNICEF was able to deliver substantially on its core objectives and programme outputs were generally of good quality. Slow implementation affected some aspects of the programme, though this was often related to factors beyond the organization’s control. Overall, UNICEF has done what it could to make sure that its Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs) were addressed, although the organization’s reach and influence have been limited, particularly outside of the camps. The evaluation concludes that UNICEF’s programme fulfilled a vital role, both in terms of enabling Syrian children (at least those in camps) to access appropriate education and protection services, and establishing appropriate policy frameworks in both areas.

16. The biggest strategic challenge that UNICEF is currently facing is scaling up its education and protection support outside of camps. On the education side, only some 30 per cent of refugee children in host communities are enrolled in school, leaving 400,000 out of school (not including those who fail to attend). In regards to protection and psychosocial support, little provision is being
made for refugee child protection outside of the camps. The evaluation makes a range of related recommendations, including developing a much closer strategic alliance with UNHCR in education and protection, as well as a joint advocacy agenda, and forging a more distinct role for UNICEF in child protection. The evaluation supports the current strategy of strengthening links at the provincial and local levels while maintaining close collaboration with both MoNE and MoFSP in Ankara. Regarding protection and psychosocial support coverage, although extension of the CFS model in multiservice centres is recommended, given the scale of the challenge, this will need to be supplemented with other approaches. The link with schools will be key to this.

17. There remain critical gaps in information, both about the programme and more generally about the situation and priorities of refugees and host communities. Greater emphasis on programme monitoring is required, together with a renewed push on joint needs assessment to help fill the major gaps in data and community profiling, without which the programme cannot be properly targeted or equity-focused. More could be also done to support NGOs through social mobilization, information and awareness raising about access to services, particularly given the language barrier. Youth mobilization was the right strategy for protection in the camps and remains a crucial strategy for tackling the community awareness agenda. Working with youth will also be key to reducing tensions between refugee and host communities and tackling social cohesion more generally.

18. In summary, the report makes the following recommendations:

• UNICEF should articulate its strategies on education and child protection in regards to the ongoing refugee crisis in Turkey within a single overarching strategic framework. This should build on the No Lost Generation agenda and should identify areas of synergy between the two sectors. It should establish short, medium and longer-term objectives and provide a clear basis for programming, monitoring and fundraising, while being flexible enough to accommodate changes in priorities over time and new opportunities as they arise.

• UNICEF should include components on refugee health, nutrition and WASH in its overall strategy, based on a re-assessment of needs and of UNICEF’s comparative advantage in these areas.

• An evolving advocacy strategy should be an integral part of both the overall strategy and its sector-specific components.

• The strategy design should be informed by a process of consultation, including, in particular, the Government of Turkey, other agencies working in the same field and refugee communities themselves. It should be designed in collaboration with UNHCR, underpinned by a renewed strategic partnership between the two agencies and a country-level letter of understanding.

• Specific programme elements should be designed in collaboration between the education and child protection sectors to address the growing social cohesion agenda in refugee-hosting communities.

• UNICEF should seek to increase the priority given to the refugee child protection agenda and should itself take a more leading role on that agenda.

• UNICEF should continue to increase its emphasis on collaboration at the provincial and local levels, and to scaling up both programmatic and operational support.

Staffing in the Gaziantep/south-eastern Turkey intervention area.

- UNICEF should **strengthen its role as the link between international NGOs and the Government of Turkey**.

- The report sets out what the evaluators believe to be areas of best practice in the UNICEF response to the refugee crisis in Turkey. These should be **properly documented** for sharing with others.

- UNICEF should adopt a more rigorous and systematic approach to **programme monitoring**, with direct feedback to programme implementation. This should include monitoring the quality and continued relevance of programme outputs, as well as target achievements.

- Building on the No Lost Generation initiative, a **global awareness campaign** highlighting the plight of Syrian refugee children in host communities in Turkey should be undertaken as part of a wider campaign on the situation of child refugees in the region.

- UNICEF should use the experience of the Turkey refugee crisis response to **review the guidance provided on applying the CCCs and SSOPs**, particularly in regard to contexts where the humanitarian role played by UNICEF is non-operational or only semi-operational.

- Based on a review of the experience from Turkey and elsewhere in the Syrian sub-region, **UNICEF should review the adequacy of its advance financing mechanisms**, specifically the Emergency Programme Fund, to meet response demands in gradually emergent crises of this kind.
SECTION 1
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
1.1 GENERAL CONTEXT

The conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic – which is now in its fifth year – and Iraq show no signs of abating and continue to generate large numbers of refugees throughout the sub-region. The history and dynamics of these conflicts are well documented elsewhere.¹ This report focuses on the particular aspects relating to the refugee crisis in Turkey, and specifically on the Syrian refugee crisis.

As of March 2015, 1,738,448 refugees from these conflicts were living in Turkey. Of these, approximately 54 per cent were children.² Some 253,101 of these refugees (15 per cent) were living in camps and 1,485,347 (85 per cent) were living outside of camps.

As shown in the chart below, the number of people fleeing the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic has increased steadily since the end of 2012. While the number of refugees in camps has remained fairly stable for the past two years, the increase is largely attributable to the growth in the number of non-camp (mainly urban) refugees settled among host communities. It is this aspect of the refugee situation that now poses the greatest strategic challenge to those seeking to respond to the crisis.

The majority of the refugees in Turkey are Syrian Arabs fleeing the conflict in the north and west of the Syrian Arab Republic, coming from what are largely opposition-held areas. Their places of origin are shown in the table in Annex A. The majority come from Aleppo (Halab) (35 per cent) and Idlib (21 per cent) governorates, followed by Ar-Raqqah (11 per cent), Latakia (8 per cent), Hama (7 per cent) and Al-Hasakah (5 per cent) cities.

1 See, for example, the Active Learning for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action Syria Evaluation Portal for Coordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning (CALL), available at <www.syrialearning.org>, accessed 7 January 2016.
2 Data provided by UNHCR and AFAD, as of 10 April 2015.
3 Data provided by UNHCR.
In addition to the Syrian Arab refugees, there are significant numbers of Kurdish, Turkmen and Yazidis (from Iraq). The major influx of Kurdish refugees from Kobanî in the Syrian Arab Republic to Suruç in Turkey in September 2014 illustrates not only the continued volatility of the situation in the north-west of the Syrian Arab Republic, but also the indiscriminate nature of the conflict: all ethnic groups are affected. The situation confronting these refugees in exile varies somewhat according to ethnicity and the extent of existing family or cultural ties. However, all refugees face the problem of being in a country where they are in the minority and the official language is not their own. Thus language and cultural factors play a major part in the challenges faced by the refugees.

Figure 3 below shows the breakdown of the refugees by age and gender. It also shows the number of children currently enrolled in school, broken down by camp and non-camp refugees. The continuing low level of school enrolment outside of camps (30 per cent) is particularly striking.
1.2 HOST COUNTRY CONTEXT

Turkey is an upper-middle-income country approaching high-income status. At the end of 2014, the population was approximately 77 million. Turkey is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), currently chairs the Group of Twenty (G-20), and wields considerable influence internationally. The economy of Turkey is larger than the economies of most other refugee-receiving countries in the region and Turkey has invested heavily in the response. That said, wealth and development are unevenly enjoyed within Turkey and most refugees are living in the relatively poorer south-eastern areas of the country. While the overall ratio of refugees to Turkish citizens is low compared with Lebanon and Jordan, the concentration of refugees in particular areas has resulted in ratios approaching 1 to 1 in some places, such as Kilis in the south-east. This is creating considerable social, political and economic stress.

Turkey has been generous in welcoming and providing for refugees. From a protection perspective, this has included maintaining an open border policy and granting temporary protected status to Syrian refugees, which has now been formalized as a law. This includes access to essential services and potentially work (subject to the passing of enabling legislation). At the time that this report was written, however, no such legislation appeared likely to be passed. Thus, while not optimal from a legal perspective, the overall protection and assistance afforded to Syrian refugees is stronger in practice than that offered by most other countries in the Syrian sub-region.

The Government of Turkey has asserted strong ownership of and control over the refugee response from the outset, and this is one of the defining characteristics of the response context. Although in 2011, the Government indicated that it had sufficient capacity to confront the influx alone, by April 2012, the significant rise in the numbers of refugees prompted the Government to accept support from international organizations, in the form of core relief items for Syrian refugees in camps and subsequently, for the needs of refugees living outside of camps. The Government has, however, resisted most calls for needs assessment by international agencies.

The Government of Turkey’s emergency response has been relatively centralized. AFAD has led the response in coordination with the relevant ministries and with the newly-created Directorate General of Migration Management in the Ministry of Interior. Given that the various government bodies involved have different and somewhat overlapping roles, approaches are not always consistent. To add to this complexity, there are significant areas

20 The refugees, initially called ‘guests’ by the Government of Turkey, are now referred to as ‘people under temporary protection’.

21 The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does not apply in Turkey to refugees from outside of Europe. The issuing of the Temporary Protection Regulation in October 2014 – under the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (April 2013) – formalizes the grant of temporary protection to Syrian refugees, protecting them from deportation or refoulement, as well as guaranteeing them access to services (the Regulation does not extend to refugees from Iraq). It does, however, in effect, prevent Syrians from claiming refugee status and asylum for as long as the Regulation is in force (see Ineli-Ciger, Meltem, ‘Implications of the New Turkish Law on Foreigners and International Protection and Regulation no. 29153 on Temporary Protection for Syrians Seeking Protection in Turkey’, Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, vol. 4, no. 2, December 2014). The same article goes on to note that: “The 2014 Regulation does not guarantee an explicit and unlimited right to work, education, and social assistance for temporary protection beneficiaries. The 2014 Regulation indicates that access to primary and higher levels of education and other language and vocational training, access to labour market and social assistance may be provided to temporary protection beneficiaries... but the Council of Ministers is free to decide whether these rights will be provided or not... Article 29 of the 2014 Regulation makes clear that the Council of Ministers can limit access of temporary protection beneficiaries to certain sectors, professions or geographical areas (UNHCR Operational Update, p. 4)."
of decentralized decision-making and responsibility at the provincial, district and municipality levels. Altogether, this makes it difficult for external agencies seeking to assist the refugee response to find ways to engage. Securing agreement at one level does not necessarily entail agreement at another. That said, AFAD’s lead role has created a clear focus for leadership and coordination that has brought a number of benefits.

Of the various non-governmental bodies involved in the response, TRCS is the most significant. As a support to the Government of Turkey, TRCS has been central to the response. Where United Nations agencies and international NGOs have sometimes struggled to define a role for themselves, TRCS has played a comprehensive role in both camp and non-camp settings. The organization occupies a pivotal position and serves as a very important partner for UNICEF and others, especially given the actual and potential scope of TRCS operations.

One characteristic of the Turkey context that distinguishes it from most other emergency contexts is the comparatively low-key and small-scale role played by international NGOs, including many of UNICEF’s traditional partners. Few have registered with the Government of Turkey.22 Many NGOs have not been granted permission to work in the refugee camps and have only limited reach in host communities, where they are often dependent on partnerships with Turkish NGOs to deliver services. As with the TRCS, Turkish civil society has played a vital role in the response and its role is likely to increase in importance as greater attention is paid to the situation of refugees in host communities.

The role of the United Nations and its various agencies is covered in more detail in the following sections. Although the situation was declared a system-wide L3 emergency in January 2013, a humanitarian country team has not been established. Instead, the United Nations Country Team fulfils this role, with the Resident Representative serving as the de facto Humanitarian Coordinator heading the United Nations Syria Task Force in Ankara. Given the nature of the crisis, UNHCR has the lead coordination role among the international agencies,23 working in tandem with the Government of Turkey and other agencies to lead particular sectoral working groups.

Coordination of and fundraising for the international response has been largely conducted under the umbrella of a series of inter-agency regional refugee response plans (1-6) for the regional crisis as a whole.24 The current iteration of this is the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), which reflects the new focus on the protracted nature of the crisis and its impact on refugee hosting communities.

1.3 UNICEF’S RESPONSE IN TURKEY AND THE SYRIAN SUB-REGION


22 Only nine had done so at the time of writing.
23 Currently shared with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) under the 2015 3RP.
24 Not including the response inside the Syrian Arab Republic, which has its own planning process, the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan.
Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey. The annual funding requested and received for the UNICEF refugee response in Turkey specifically is shown in the chart below:

![Figure 4: UNICEF Turkey funding 2012–2015 (US$ millions)](chart)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Required</th>
<th>Funded</th>
<th>% Funded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015 (as of 17 May 2015)</td>
<td>60.35</td>
<td>17.38</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>64.96</td>
<td>32.47</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>21.07</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>165.63</strong></td>
<td><strong>71.91</strong></td>
<td><strong>43%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the funding deficits shown are largely in line with the wider regional picture for 2014–2015, in 2013, UNICEF Turkey fared significantly worse than other UNICEF offices in the region, which achieved approximately 90 per cent of requested funding (see Section 5). This was reportedly a challenge shared by other United Nations agencies in Turkey that year.26

In January 2013, UNICEF in collaboration with other United Nations agencies declared the Syrian crisis, including the situation in Turkey, an L3 corporate emergency. The organization took the unusual step of appointing dual global emergency coordinators for the response – the Director of the Office of Emergency Programmes at New York HQ and the Regional Director for the MENA region. Unlike the other countries listed above, which all fall within the MENA region, Turkey falls within the CEE/CIS region. The response has therefore been coordinated between two regional offices, with some attendant complications that are considered in the following sections.

As was the case for most other UNICEF country offices in the Syrian sub-region, the pre-crisis profile of the Turkey Country Office was that of a relatively small, upstream, policy-focused programme, with an annual programme budget of approximately US$8 million.27 The Turkey Country Office did not have the full spectrum of UNICEF specialist capacities (for example, it did not have a health section), and had little emergency specialist capacity. This changed quite radically in order to meet the needs of a large-scale emergency response programme, albeit one that was only partially operational. Along with this came a substantial change in the number and profile of staff employed, and the need to open a new field office. The related operational support issues are explored in Section 5 below.

A timeline for the refugee emergency response in Turkey is provided in Annex C. The timeline shows how the situation and related UNICEF response has evolved since 2012 – when numbers of refugees were relatively limited and largely confined to camps – to today’s situation, in which Turkey hosts more refugees than any other country in the region and the majority of refugees are living outside of camps in host communities in south-eastern parts of the country.

UNICEF has a long history of educational involvement in Turkey, though little experience in the country with emergencies of this kind.28

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25 Figures provided by the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO), May 2015.
26 According to the Turkey Country Office during the drafting of this report.
28 UNICEF has had recent experience with emergency response in Turkey, with the response to the October 2011 Van earthquake, for which the organization collaborated with the Government of Turkey and the TRCS. See the related evaluation of UNICEF’s psychosocial support work: Evaluation of Psychosocial Support Programs Implemented After VAN-ERCIS Earthquake, UNICEF and Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2015.
The organization has a history of effective collaboration and established relationships with the MoNE, as well as with other players in education. At the onset of the crisis, UNICEF was the United Nations agency assigned responsibility for education and early childhood development under the 2011 United Nations Turkey Contingency Plan – an appropriate and relevant role that UNICEF now shares with UNHCR, and which is in line with the CCCs and the UNICEF Strategic Plan 2014–2017.

In regards to child protection, UNICEF has a history of promoting child rights in Turkey and has established and constructive partnerships with the MoNE, the MoFSP and the Ministry of Justice. In the emergency sphere, UNICEF supported the Government in the response to the 2011 Van earthquake by rolling out an ambitious psychosocial training programme for teachers and social workers and providing temporary shelter and safe educational spaces for affected children. This contribution strengthened UNICEF’s relationship with the MoFSP and TRCS.

One question that has come up in the Turkey response is how the response should be categorized, and therefore what criteria should be used to judge it. For all of the reasons outlined in Section 1, this is far from being a typical emergency, although there are emergency elements within it, including the influx of refugees from Kobanî to Suruç at the end of 2014. The overall situation deserves to be categorized as a protracted crisis, but one that has developmental aspects and implications. In short, neither the standard humanitarian nor development paradigms fit this case. The situation is structural in many ways, but has a high degree of urgency and acute vulnerability associated with it. Crucially, the Government itself has asserted strong ownership and control over the response.

The question of how the CCCs are to be achieved is therefore largely a question of how the Government and others can be encouraged and supported (directly and indirectly) to fulfil the standards in question. In party, this can only be a matter of how far UNICEF has itself delivered on the commitments.

1.4 EVALUATION PURPOSE AND APPROACH

Background, scope and purpose of the evaluation

This evaluation was commissioned by the UNICEF CEE/CIS Regional Office and the Turkey Country Office. It was conducted in parallel with a wider evaluation of the overall UNICEF response to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and it shares the same basic logic as that evaluation. This evaluation therefore effectively constitutes the ‘Turkey component’ of the evaluation of the response to the Syrian crisis. The current evaluation is distinct in kind from the wider evaluation, however, in that it provides a more in-depth analysis of a specific country context and UNICEF’s response.

29 UNICEF and UNHCR are listed as providers within the education sector, but only UNICEF is allocated responsibilities in basic needs and services. See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2013 Syria Situation Inter-agency Refugee Contingency Plan – Turkey Period: September - December 2013, p. 19.


to it. The evaluation terms of reference are contained in Annex B.

The evaluation is intended to serve both an accountability function (historical/summative) and a learning function (forward-looking/formative). As described in the terms of reference, the purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of UNICEF’s overall response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey against its own mandate and standards, its stated objectives, and the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. This is intended to generate lessons and recommendations for UNICEF’s future humanitarian responses both in the sub-region and elsewhere. It is also intended that it should help inform the new Turkey country programme strategy for 2016–2020.

The main focus of the evaluation is on the period from mid-2012 to March 2015, though it includes some analysis of future scenarios and future strategic options for UNICEF. Reflecting the balance of the programme, the sectoral focus is on education and child protection, though some analysis is also made of other areas of intervention, including health and nutrition.

Approach and methodology

After scoping visits to the Turkey Country Office in September 2014 and January 2015, followed by a period of documentary review and preliminary interviews, the in-country component of the evaluation was undertaken from 15 March 2015 to 3 April 2015. This involved 12 days in Ankara and six days in the field, based out of Gaziantep. Key informant interviews were held with UNICEF staff, government officials and other agencies and informants in each location. Between them, the team visited refugee camps and host community refugee facilities in Gaziantep town, Nizip, Kilis, Suruç, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, Nusaybin, Islahiye, Osmaniye, Adana and Cevdetiye. Informal focus group discussions were held with refugees at UNICEF-supported facilities, particularly CFS. Discussions were also held with (mainly Syrian) teachers, who were themselves refugees and parents.

The site visits were chosen to give a reasonably representative sample of UNICEF-supported work in both camps and host communities. The geographical spread allowed visits to refugee communities of different ethnicities (including Arab and Kurdish) and varied places of origin within the Syrian Arab Republic.

A full list of those interviewed for the evaluation (inside and outside of UNICEF) is contained in Annex E. The interview format and guiding questions are included in Annex F. UNICEF’s ethical guidelines were used to guide informant interviews and focus group discussions.

The evaluation considers the response under four main headings:
1. UNICEF’s role and strategy
2. Programme performance
3. Working with others
4. Internal management and process.

Based on issues raised by initial findings, the evaluation went into greatest depth on the first two of these topics, the findings for which are contained in Sections 2 and 3 of this report. Under the fourth heading, the effectiveness of the global, regional and country-level UNICEF management arrangements are evaluated only to a limited degree. The primary focus is on the role that UNICEF has played and continues to play in this (atypical) emergency context, the effectiveness of the approaches that it adopted, and the lessons that can be learned from this.

A modified version of the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria is used to assess UNICEF’s response in terms of relevance and appropriateness, timeliness, effectiveness, efficiency,
coverage, coherence and sustainability (or connectedness).\textsuperscript{32} It was not possible to evaluate the wider impact of UNICEF’s interventions, although consideration of impact is included in the analysis of sustainability. In parallel with the use of these criteria, the evaluation considers the question of the quality of UNICEF’s response, judged largely against internal and external best practice standards. In this context, performance monitoring is considered partly in regard to UNICEF’s Monitoring Results for Equity System (MoRES) framework,\textsuperscript{33} but more specifically in regard to UNICEF’s humanitarian performance monitoring (HPM) system. Beyond these generic criteria, the CCCs are used as key benchmarks. Against this backdrop, the evaluation considers the achievement of the specific programme objectives that UNICEF set for itself. The evaluation questions are set out in an evaluation matrix included in the Annex to this report.

The applicability of emergency standards to the current situation in Turkey is discussed in the following sections. The evaluation found that although the CCCs provided a sound basis for programming and were used by the UNICEF team, they had to be understood in context. For the most part, the issue was less about whether UNICEF had delivered on the commitments, and more about how the organization tried to ensure that children were provided with the assistance and protection that the commitments embody.

Limitations

As with any evaluation, the team was highly dependent on the availability of existing data. There is a striking absence of needs assessment data and information about the situation of refugees living in host communities. This reflects the Government’s reluctance to allow assessments to be conducted, although some progress is now being made in this respect. The lack of assessment data affects every part of the programme and constitutes a major strategic challenge.

Data relating to UNICEF’s own programme also proved patchy in some areas, which was in part a reflection of the relatively weak monitoring and reporting systems. This is discussed further below. Attempts to evaluate specific aspects of the overall programme, including the extent to which it was responsive to gender issues, were significantly hindered by lack of data.

\textsuperscript{32} These criteria are based on the list of modified OECD/DAC criteria used in the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) guide to Evaluating Humanitarian Action (Overseas Development Institute, 2006).

\textsuperscript{33} "MoRES is based on a determinant framework to identify barriers, bottlenecks and enabling factors which either constrain or advance the achievement of desired outcomes for disadvantaged children. MoRES emphasizes strengthening the capacity of government and partners to regularly monitor intermediate outcomes (between outputs and higher level outcomes/impact) to enable more effective programme implementation and timely course corrections in plans and strategies at all levels." Source: United Nations Children's Fund, ‘Briefing Note: Enhanced Programming and Results through Monitoring Results for Equity Systems (MoRES)’, UNICEF, 1 February 2013, <www.unicef.org/about/employ/files/MoRES_Briefing_Note.pdf>, accessed 8 January 2016. With regard to humanitarian emergencies, “in major humanitarian situations (e.g. where appeals exceed US$15 million in emergency funding for UNICEF), country offices will need to prioritize and redirect their monitoring efforts in line with the CCCs. Humanitarian Programme Monitoring (HPM) is the specific adaptation of MoRES for these contexts.” Source: United Nations Children's Fund, ‘CCC E-resource: Humanitarian Performance Monitoring (PM) Toolkit’, UNICEF, 2013.
SECTION 2
FINDINGS ON UNICEF’S ROLE AND STRATEGY
2.1 OVERVIEW AND GENERAL ISSUES

As noted in Section 1, the evaluation team used a range of criteria to assess UNICEF’s programme performance, including the OECD/DAC criteria (modified), the CCCs and the programme objectives, as stated in the refugee response plans (RRPs) and elsewhere. In this section, we consider the relevance, appropriateness, coverage and coherence of the role and strategy adopted by UNICEF, in view of the priority needs of Syrian refugees, UNICEF’s own mandate and capacities, the role and capacities of the Government and other actors, and other relevant contextual factors.

The strength of the Government of Turkey’s ownership of the refugee situation and its leadership of the response since the outset is one of the defining features of the context; and given the generosity of the country’s response, this should be considered a major positive factor. The Government declined initial offers of assistance from United Nations agencies and subsequently restricted the role of the agencies to assistance in camps. It was not until March 2013 that the Government asked for help outside of refugee camps, acknowledging the massively escalating scale of the problem of refugees hosted within existing (largely urban) Turkish communities.

By that time, the country fell within the ambit of the United Nations L3 declaration of January 2013, under which the situation in Turkey became a corporate response priority for UNICEF and other United Nations agencies, with related changes to management arrangements and applicable procedures.

Apart from its many positive aspects, the position adopted by the Government has created a challenging operating environment for international agencies, and one that is far from the typical L3 emergency context, in which government capacity is assumed to be largely overwhelmed. This is a highly controlled environment, as evidenced by the restricted access granted to international NGOs, including some of UNICEF’s more established partners. This has constrained UNICEF’s ability to engage in operational response programmes, as well the scope for policy and advocacy work. It also determined the way in which the CCCs were interpreted: more as an overall agenda-setting framework, less as an accountability framework for UNICEF’s own programme.

The result of the Government’s interventions in collaboration with the TRCS, the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNHCR has been that the basic needs of camp refugees – including food, water, shelter and health care – have generally been well met, and the need for international assistance (financial, technical or otherwise) has been relatively low. In other areas, including education and child protection, the scope for such assistance has been greater. Meanwhile, the challenge of meeting the needs of non-camp refugees has steadily escalated over the past two years as the number of non-camp refugees has increased (see Figure 1). Non-camp refugees now outnumber camp refugees by approximately 8 to 1. However, the lack of any systematic needs assessment and socio-economic profiling for refugees in different host communities means that their assistance requirements are still largely undefined and un-quantified.

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34 See the evaluation matrix included in the Annex.
35 Specifically, the management of UNICEF’s Turkey refugee emergency response fell under the responsibility of the dual global emergency coordinators, which in day-to-day practice meant that the Country Representative answered to the Regional Director for MENARO.
36 Evidence for this conclusion came both from direct observation and from interviews with UNHCR, TRCS and other agencies. It is a view corroborated by key donors, including the European Union.
Meeting the needs of non-camp refugees, and addressing the growing strains on already over-stretched services for the local Turkish population, now pose the biggest strategic challenges both for the Government and for agencies such as UNICEF. The needs of refugees have to be understood as part of the wider political, social and economic reality of the communities in question. There are major stability, social cohesion and security aspects to this, particularly given the proximity of the conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq. Many of the refugee settlements are concentrated near border areas.

Although UNICEF developed various strategy documents over the period in question (as described below), the organization lacked a clear (written) overarching strategy to inform programme choices and policy advocacy. This has, we believe, hampered its ability to make strategic judgements, influence agendas and seize opportunities as they arose. Although this is hard to demonstrate, the overall impression is of a programme that evolved somewhat ad hoc and in response to available resources and political space, rather than based on a clear vision and proactive approach to programming and resource mobilization.

The most clearly strategic aspect of UNICEF’s overall advocacy effort is the No Lost Generation initiative (see Box 1), which was initiated as a communication and advocacy strategy. Its central purpose is to keep the issues of education and child protection high on the agenda of donors and host governments in the Syrian sub-region. While Turkey appears to have benefitted less from the resulting funds than other recipient countries, the Turkey Country Office has used opportunities offered by the initiative. The initiative had considerable success as a fundraising platform but less as a policy/advocacy platform at the country level. Largely defined at the HQ level, each country was left to interpret the initiative in its own way. In Lebanon, a major push on education (supported by the World Bank) was one result. In Turkey, the initiative appears to have had less traction. The evaluation team believes that the initiative remains a powerful and highly relevant framework for advocacy and programming in the current context in Turkey. The team therefore proposes that UNICEF take steps to update and deepen the No Lost Generation analysis in relation to the current and likely future developments of the refugee situation, and seek to breathe new life into the initiative in collaboration with the Government, UNHCR and others.

**Box 1  The No Lost Generation initiative**

Prompted by UNICEF’s own two-year report on the regional crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and the sub-region, United Nations agencies, NGOs and leading governmental donors (including the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) launched this multi-partner initiative in October 2013. The purpose was to put a spotlight on two relatively neglected but critical areas of the response: education and child protection, including psychosocial well-being. The aim was both to generate more resources for these sectors and to raise their policy profiles by creating a consortium of partners and providing a basis for common advocacy. The initiative combined elements of both humanitarian and development analysis, consistent with a move towards resilience that prefigures the 3RP approach.

The initiative had considerable success as a fundraising platform but less as a policy/advocacy platform at the country level. Largely defined at the HQ level, each country was left to interpret the initiative in its own way. In Lebanon, a major push on education (supported by the World Bank) was one result. In Turkey, the initiative appears to have had less traction. The evaluation team believes that the initiative remains a powerful and highly relevant framework for advocacy and programming in the current context in Turkey. The team therefore proposes that UNICEF take steps to update and deepen the No Lost Generation analysis in relation to the current and likely future developments of the refugee situation, and seek to breathe new life into the initiative in collaboration with the Government, UNHCR and others.

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37 The relevant sections of the RRP:s do not constitute a UNICEF strategy, but rather a list of priority activities within a more general inter-agency humanitarian strategy.


39 Turkey received 43 per cent of the funding requested, being in fourth place among the six countries that applied. See further charts in Annex A. This is also indicative of the lower percentage that Turkey received in terms of overall funding from the RRP (see Section 5.5.4).
and the launch of the 3RP in Berlin to advocate for education within the Government.\textsuperscript{40} Overall, the evaluation concludes that the No Lost Generation initiative has more potential than has been realized to date, and that it could be used to raise global awareness about the threat not only to a generation of Syrian children, but also to host populations, overstretched systems and services, and social cohesion.\textsuperscript{41} The initiative can also be said to relate to issues of national and international security.

Although no comprehensive theory of change has been documented for either education or child protection, it is possible to identify a partial theory of change for the overall education response, mostly limited to more immediate goals and their direct means of achievement.\textsuperscript{42} For example, in the adjusted education strategy for 2014, the main outcome statement appears to be the following: the education response strategy in 2014 will continue to focus on ensuring that Syrian refugee children have access to formal and non-formal education both in camps and in host communities. In the Suruç strategy of December 2014, the objective for education is defined as: Syrian children and youth have access to relevant education activities in Suruç camps and host community areas.

Most such documents focus on more immediate goals, which is justifiable for an emergency response strategy. One exception is in the proposal to the Department for International Development (DFID), which refers to the possibility of Syrians returning home. This kind of forward-looking vision is absent in most of the strategy documents, and is not comprehensively addressed in any one place. Outcomes are better articulated in donor documents and RRP, but these do not constitute UNICEF’s overall strategy. The result is a series of documents containing sets of activities against short-term objectives rather than a strategic vision with medium- to longer-term goals. Apart from outcome statements, the other components that make up a theory of change (analysis of contributory factors, change pathways, working assumptions, etc.) are hard to find in the documentation and are not consolidated in one place.

The lack of a clear overall strategic framework is partly a reflection of the Government’s own multi-faceted response. More directly, it reflects an internal fragmentation that affected the coherence of UNICEF’s response. There are two dimensions to this: first, the separation of the child protection and education responses (which were initially conceived together); and second, the separation of the emergency response from the regular programme.

The changes in UNICEF’s approach over time can be traced as follows:

- \textbf{2012 to August 2013: An integrated approach}
  The funding proposal submitted to the European Union in late 2012\textsuperscript{43, 44} envisaged a close and reciprocal relationship between the education and child protection sectors.

\textsuperscript{40} This has been accomplished by supporting specific government personnel to attend these meetings, accompanied by UNICEF senior staff from the Turkey Country Office.
\textsuperscript{41} Erdogan, M. Murat, \textit{Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research}, The Hacettepe University, Migration and Politics Research Centre, November 2014.
\textsuperscript{43} The concept note was developed in November 2012 and the proposal was approved on 21 March 2013.
\textsuperscript{44} The title of the proposal, ‘Increasing Resilience of Syrian Children under Temporary Protection in Turkey’, reveals the underlying UNICEF strategy. On the one hand, it qualifies the intervention in psychosocial terms (the term ‘resilience’ originates in the psychosocial sector in reference to individuals, and has been in recent years extended to families and communities). On the other hand, it also anticipates the forward-looking approach to strengthening existing systems in the project’s two sectors.
This initial emphasis on creating synergies between the two sectors demonstrated a solid contextual understanding of the operating environment in Turkey. Given the reluctance of governmental authorities to prioritize child protection actions, and the high priority allocated to education by the same actors, establishing a permanent link between the two sectors laid the foundation for using education as an entry point for child protection actions, both in camps and in host communities.

**August 2013 to October 2014: Two-track approach**

In August 2013, a decision was made to separate the child protection and education components of the European Union-funded project, for reasons that are unclear. In parallel, the functional separation of the emergency response from the regular programme resulted in a strategic disconnect between the emergency programme on the one hand and the Turkey Country Office Child Protection Section and the CEE/CIS Regional Office on the other. Meanwhile, the integration of the emergency response in Turkey with the overall UNICEF regional response led by the MENA Regional Office (MENARO) was progressing.

**October 2014 to date: Reunification of the emergency response and regular programming**

The process of reunification of the emergency response and regular programming was driven by the programme and budget review process and multiple reflections by the Turkey Country Office team, with the support of the CEE/CIS Regional Office. Some elements of the 2014 emergency work plan were already conducive to this, for example, the Family Parenting Training Programme carried out in collaboration with MoFSP and the child rights committees’ outreach to Syrian children. In November 2014, the Child Protection Section produced the first draft of the Child Protection in Emergency Strategy. However, the formerly integrated child protection and education strategy was not reactivated. This appears to be a missed opportunity.

Against this backdrop, and given its mandate and capacities, UNICEF has had – and continues to have – an essential role to play in the refugee response. While space has opened up for UNICEF to scale up its support, the constraining factors are now as much financial and resource-related as they are political. As argued below, this effort will require a revitalized and ambitious plan of action and enhanced

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45 An example was the development of a joint education and child protection assessment package, presented to AFAD and relevant ministries in February 2012.
46 Documentary evidence concerning this decision is scarce. Interviews with Turkey Country Office staff suggest that the change was made by the previous country representative on pragmatic grounds, including increased management efficiency.
47 This was also seemingly done on grounds of management efficiency. See: UNICEF, ‘Organization Chart’ (internal document), 2011; and UNICEF, ‘Organization Chart pre-programme budget review’ (internal document), 2014.
48 For example, MoFSP was not included in UNICEF’s press release about the European Union Emergency Project. This created resentment on the side of MoFSP and efforts were needed from the Country Office Child Protection Section to normalize relations. Source: United Nations Children’s Fund, Minutes of the Emergency Meetings, 3 April 2013.
49 Interviews with UNICEF staff in Ankara, Amman and Geneva reported decreasing involvement in strategic thinking on the emergency response on the part of regular child protection staff in Ankara and the Child Protection Advisor in the CEE/CIS Regional Office, and the increased involvement of MENARO.
50 Interview with UNICEF staff in Ankara.
collaboration with the Government at national, provincial and district/municipal levels; as well as with UNHCR, TRCS and other key non-governmental actors. The conceptual framework set out in the No Lost Generation initiative remains valid but needs updating in relation to the current realities in Turkey.53

The development of UNICEF’s sectoral strategies over the past four years is reviewed in more detail below against the context and needs, UNICEF’s own standards (the CCCs, etc.) and other key benchmarks.

2.2 REFUGEE EDUCATION: ROLE AND STRATEGY

UNICEF has played key roles within the education sector over the time period under review: as an education partner within the United Nations Country Team and RRP (a responsibility currently shared with UNHCR); as a main fundraiser for the United Nations education response; and as a provider of emergency supplies, technical assistance for key interventions/ pillars for the education of Syrians in Turkey, and material and coordination support to the Government. UNICEF has also been a significant policy advocate, engaging in dialogue with the Government that has led to legal and policy developments in support of Syrians.55 International NGOs see UNICEF as having provided a ‘framework’,56 that is, a set of related components and standards that they too can work towards.

UNICEF’s education interventions to date provide an internally coherent set of programme components in line with the CCCs and the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies guidelines.57 The interventions can be grouped as follows:

- Provision of school places and facilities attractive to children in the form of

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**BOX 2**

**UNICEF Core Commitments for Children – education**

**Commitment 1:** Effective leadership is established for education cluster/inter-agency coordination (with co-lead agency), with links to other cluster/sector coordination mechanisms on critical inter-sectoral issues.

**Commitment 2:** Children, including preschool-age children, girls and other excluded children, access quality education opportunities.

**Commitment 3:** Safe and secure learning environments that promote the protection and well-being of students are established.

**Commitment 4:** Psychosocial and health services for children and teachers are integrated in educational response.

**Commitment 5:** Adolescents, young children and caregivers access appropriate life skills programmes and information about the emergency, and those who have missed out on schooling, especially adolescents, receive information on educational options.

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53 The section on the ways forward in No Lost Generation Initiative: Protecting the Futures of Children Affected by the Syria Crisis - One Year Report (UNICEF, September 2014) does this to some extent, but lacks specificity with regard to Turkey.

54 Documentation and interviews with education actors inside and outside of UNICEF.

55 Interviews with key government personnel, UNICEF and others.

56 Interviews with Save the Children and Concern Worldwide. UNHCR (Ankara) also commended some of these interventions, particularly those under the Education Personnel Management Strategy.

57 These are discussed in more detail in Section 3 (performance).
prefabricated buildings (classrooms and libraries), school materials and supplies and library readers (for Grades 1-6);

- **Data** for planning,\(^{58}\) through the establishment of YOBIS;

- Support for **teachers**, including emergency training of Syrian teachers; psychosocial support teacher training; technical assistance provided to the Government for the Education Personnel Management Strategy, which addresses teacher compensation, code of conduct and recruitment;

- An adjusted Syrian **curriculum** enabling children to learn in their own language (UNICEF contributed by engaging in early dialogue with United Nations and NGO partners), drawing on many of the elements mentioned above to enhance programme quality.\(^{59}\)

The benefits of these interventions have largely been felt in the camps. The major improvement in enrolment levels within the camps (from 60 per cent in 2013 to 89 per cent in April 2015)\(^{60}\) reflects UNICEF’s success with Back-to-School campaigns, the provision of prefabricated school buildings to replace tented schools, and the facilitation of sufficient numbers of teachers and school supplies. However, an estimated 70 per cent of school-aged refugee children in host communities remain out of school.\(^{61}\)

Despite early recognition by UNICEF and the United Nations as a whole that children outside of camps needed support,\(^{62}\) UNICEF’s efforts to assist education outside of the camps were limited to the provision of some basic supplies to a limited number of schools in host communities until the Government granted the United Nations permission to work in host communities in 2013.

UNICEF now faces the challenge of needing to help shape and deliver the scale and type of educational support required by the majority of Syrian families living outside of camps. In this respect, the collective response has been slow to evolve to meet the new challenges; and while UNICEF was able to predict and support changes to policy (as evidenced by their donor proposals, e.g. to DFID) the parameters for operation were only spelled out in the MoNE circular of September 2014.\(^{63}\) Together with a range of operational constraints, this has considerably delayed a collective response outside of the camps. In addition, UNICEF’s strategy does not appear to be completely defined or understood by other agencies.

Given this evolving and unpredictable situation, there appear to be different views as to what the strategy for education is or should be.\(^{64}\)

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\(^{58}\) Complaints from education managers in the provinces that any available data was not readily shared are contained in the summary of provincial meetings.

\(^{59}\) Interviews with key education staff. For more on this debate, see later in this Section and Section 4.


\(^{61}\) This can only be an estimate because the population outside of camps is not known. Of the 1.6 million refugees, it is estimated that there are 576,000 school-aged children (aged 6-17 years), with 65,000 in schools in camps, 45,000 in host communities, and 7,500 in Turkish schools. See United Nations Children’s Fund, *UNICEF Annual Report 2014: Turkey*, <www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Turkey_Annual_Report_2014.pdf>, accessed 9 January 2016; *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 in Response to the Syria Crisis*, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3RP-Report-Overview.pdf>, accessed 9 January 2016.

\(^{62}\) Reflected in the RRP revision of September 2012. However, although the possibility was reflected in March 2013, the United Nations was not given permission until July 2013.


\(^{64}\) Respondents answered this question in a variety of ways, including: “[The strategy] is reflected in the RRP’s”; “UNICEF does not need a strategy if the Government of Turkey has one”; consultant reports outlining a strategy or an approach to develop one; internal strategy notes with limited documentation of a Theory of Change and possible alternative routes to achieving outcomes.
Various strategy-type documents exist for education and these have been updated over the course of the crisis. While it is common practice to have consultants advise on the formulation of strategy, a review of those particular documents reveals many pertinent questions left for UNICEF to answer. Some of these are addressed in donor proposals and subsequent strategy notes; the consultant reports themselves, however, do not constitute a strategy, institutionally owned and finalized by UNICEF, and specifically by the Turkey Country Office. These should be used to assist the Government to formulate a strategy based on sound analysis and theory of change and drawing on the relevant perspectives in Section 6.2.

There is scant evidence available to determine whether UNICEF considered alternative options for programme components and approaches in the overall education strategy. However, the chosen options are aligned with UNICEF’s comparative advantage, both globally and in Turkey. One of UNICEF’s pillars in the regular programme is education. This, combined with the organization’s global experience in education-in-emergencies response on the ground, its experience with the education cluster, and the recent experience with the response to the Van earthquake, gives UNICEF a comparative strategic advantage in the response to the current refugee crisis. The teacher compensation scheme is notable, given that UNICEF researched alternative approaches to the issue globally, and researched alternative mechanisms for making payment within Turkey.

Despite the best efforts of UNICEF and UNHCR, no assessment of refugee education needs has been carried out with United Nations involvement. These efforts included the development of a cross-sectoral tool for rapid needs assessment (education and child protection) that was submitted to MoNE. Permission was not granted to conduct an assessment using the tool, however. It is unclear how the 2013 government needs assessment or other sample survey assessments and studies were utilized for UNICEF programming. There remains a pressing need for a collaborative assessment of educational needs and existing capacities, particularly for the refugees living outside of camps in host communities. In this regard, the UNICEF-supported MoNE initiative to develop provincial plans for the education of Syrian children based on needs assessment is a positive step.

In terms of advocacy, strategy notes from the UNICEF country team describe advocacy priorities and activities, suggesting that UNICEF was closely following political and legal developments and the opportunities they afforded. Staff respondents reported that, using UNICEF’s pre-existing, close relationship with MoNE (based on the regular programme), much advocacy was conducted behind the scenes. As

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66 Ministry of National Education, Management Strategy for Education Personnel Providing Services to Syrian Children Under Temporary Protection in Turkey, August 2014, Section V.

67 Two joint UNICEF-UNHCR education missions were carried out in April and October 2012. Documentation was only made available following the October mission to Kilis and Islahiye camps. The report recommended a needs assessment. See: United Nations Children’s Fund and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Joint UNHCR/UNICEF Education Mission Turkey, Kilis and Islahiye Camps October 8-9 2012: Report and Recommendations.

68 This tool is mentioned in several documents, including: United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Education/Protection Rapid Assessment of the Situation of Children in Camps at the Turkish Border with Syria, February 2013.

69 For example: International Medical Corps, IMC/ASAM rapid needs assessment of Gaziantep based Syrian refugees survey results, 2014; AFAD Needs Assessment 2013; Dorman, Stephanie, Educational Needs Assessment for Urban Syrian Refugees in Turkey, September 2014. It is hoped that YOBIŞ will provide some on-going information to satisfy on-going needs assessment of those in education facilities.

70 For example, Amnesty International.

one staff member noted, “It is very difficult to make the results of our (mostly behind-the-scenes) upstream policy work tangible. Often we planted the seeds of ‘ideas’ ... How can we ‘prove’ the almost daily visits to [MoNE], the many times [we were] called for advice, the various joint field visits and trainings we conducted, and the conferences and trainings MoNE attended, [which] contributed to building their capacity to achieve equitable results for children? We think we have used the little space we had as best as we could.”

2.3 REFUGEE CHILD PROTECTION AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT: ROLE AND STRATEGY

UNICEF’s child protection interventions in support of Syrian refugee children can be grouped as follows:

- **General child protection-in-emergencies**: translating and disseminating child protection international standards; training and capacity development of the Government and TRCS in this area; contributing to the development of the Government’s national psychosocial support response plan; transformed engagement task force on child-focused humanitarian action.

- **Child-friendly spaces**: establishing CFS in camps and host communities; developing the capacity of TRCS in this area; establishing a web-based monitoring system; facilitating youth-led evaluations and planning; preparing, participating in and facilitating the 19th World International Play Association Conference (2014) with partners, youth workers and children.

- **Establishing child protection-in-emergencies systems and supporting protective communities**: developing child protection-in-emergencies training packages adapted to the Turkish context; conducting local trainings; supporting local child protection-in-emergencies mechanisms to enhance the identification and protection

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**BOX 3 UNICEF Core Commitments for Children – child protection**

**Commitment 1**: Effective leadership is established for both the child protection and gender-based violence cluster areas of responsibility, with links to other cluster/sector coordination mechanisms on critical inter-sectoral issues. Support is provided for the establishment of a mental health and psychosocial support coordination mechanism.

**Commitment 2**: Monitoring and reporting of grave violations and other serious protection concerns regarding children and women are undertaken and systematically trigger response (including advocacy).

**Commitment 3**: Key child protection mechanisms are strengthened in emergency-affected areas.

**Commitment 4**: Separation of children from families is prevented and addressed, and family-based care is promoted.

**Commitment 5**: Violence, exploitation and abuse of children and women, including gender-based violence, are prevented and addressed.

**Commitment 6**: Psychosocial support is provided to children and their caregivers.

**Commitment 7**: Child recruitment and use, as well as illegal and arbitrary detention, are addressed and prevented for conflict-affected children.

**Commitment 8**: The use of landmines and other indiscriminate or illicit weapons by state and non-state actors is prevented, and their impact is addressed.
of children at risk; supporting MoFSP to develop the parenting training programmes; conducting parenting training programmes in camps.

- **Strengthening substitute care**: supporting the formal care system applied to Syrian children through the Child Protection Working Group and local initiatives.

- **Child rights committee outreach to Syrian children**: Phase I: raising awareness of Syrian children and the importance of reaching them in host communities (out of camps); Phase II: capacity-building of child rights committee members and adult focal points to work with Syrian children; Phase III: developing activities with Syrian children; Phase IV: facilitating the children’s festival/forum.

- **Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism**: documenting grave child rights violations committed in the Syrian Arab Republic based on refugee interviews.

The evaluation found that overall, the child protection role played by UNICEF was consistent with the CCCs (see Box 3). The CCCs guided the Turkey Country Office’s strategic child protection sectoral analysis72 and the overall child protection analysis at the regional73 level, which fed into the interagency No Lost Generation strategy. However, some commitments were acted on only to a limited extent, namely the leadership and coordination role and sexual and gender-based violence. As a member of the United Nations Country Team, UNICEF has taken on an active role in representing children’s rights in the relevant working groups: protection (UNHCR-led), sexual and gender-based violence (UNDP) and mental health and psychosocial support (International Organization for Migration (IOM)). The overall impression of the evaluation team, however, is that the child protection agenda has not had the leadership and prominence it deserved.

Considerable advocacy has been conducted with the Government of Turkey in the area of child protection. Despite the initial reluctance of governmental counterparts, particularly AFAD, to acknowledge child protection risks and concerns,74 UNICEF consistently used its influential position to keep child protection and psychosocial support on the Government’s agenda. For example, advocacy for adequate alternative care for unaccompanied and separated children75 included a study visit to Jordan for MoFSP decision makers.

The separation between the child protection and education responses might have slowed the influencing process, however (see below).76 That said, the systematic use of child protection cases identified in CFS to raise child protection issues in the field, in parallel with advocacy actions at the central level,77 led in 2014 to the involvement of AFAD officials across Turkey in a series of trainings on child protection78 and psycho-

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72 Confirmed by multiple sources through interviews and documentary review.
73 Confirmed by several interviews conducted with the Turkey Country Office and MENARO.
74 As is the case in many other contexts, child protection is extremely sensitive in Turkey. The need to protect children is understood as an implicit allegation of existing threats that the State is not able to address. For that reason, in many cases, child protection is referred to merely as ‘psychosocial support’, which has been found to be a less threatening term for channeling concerns related to child well-being.
75 This was carried out in parallel with UNHCR, although with different modalities and reciprocal perceptions. Source: interviews with UNHCR.
76 Separation between education and child protection in emergency programming may have unintentionally reinforced the Government of Turkey’s perception that child protection was not a priority.
77 In an interview with AFAD in Ankara, UNICEF was said to have engaged in “too much insisting” on child protection since the very first day of the crisis.
social support. One indication of the success of these initiatives is the recently signed UNICEF-AFAD Working Plan on Psychosocial Support.79

The provision of CFS in camps proved to be an optimal way of providing inclusive psychosocial support to children, given the growing size of the population. Alternative options (e.g. providing counselling services) were analysed by UNICEF child protection staff in the early days of the Syrian influx. The CFS methodology was selected based on the likelihood that the number of Syrian children would increase.80 The evaluation team found that this was the appropriate choice.

In addition to providing psychosocial support services, CFS also offered a ‘soft’ mechanism for the identification of child protection cases. This in turn provided UNICEF with opportunities to raise the awareness of local governmental authorities (e.g. AFAD camp management, district directorates of MoFSP, etc.) on the need to set up specific child protection systems to prevent and respond to emerging protection issues. For example, in the Cevdetiye camp in Osmaniye province, youth workers recognized that several youth had been urged by their families to return to the Syrian Arab Republic to join the conflict. Advocacy with camp authorities to protect those children’s rights led the authorities to prevent those children from returning.81

The use of the CFS methodology in host communities proved to be more difficult82 and had limited reach, especially for girls83 and children with disabilities. The integrated operational model (interaction between schools and CFS) was used to the extent possible and needs to be boosted, given that the education system could ensure wider protection coverage in the medium- and long-term at least.84 That said, enrolment rates of Syrian refugee children have (to date) been so low as to limit the suitability of this approach as a primary strategy.

The selection of the adolescent empowerment and participation methodology – already positively tested and used within the regular programme85 to engage youth volunteers in CFS – was extremely relevant not only in responding to psychosocial support needs but also in preventing serious child protection incidents.86 This was particularly the case in regards to the recruitment of adolescents in camps by armed groups and early marriages.

79  AFAD and UNICEF working plan on psychosocial support, 2 March 2015.
80  Interviews with UNICEF staff in Ankara and Geneva.
81  Interviews with CFS youth workers in Cevdetiye camp, Osmaniye Province.
82  Challenges related to operating CFS in urban areas were reported in several interviews with CFS staff in Ankara, Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa. Challenges included: difficulties in reaching out to the child population, distrust from parents, difficulties engaging youth volunteers and limited attendance of children due to protection concerns on the way to the CFS, especially for girls. However, operating the CFS within a multiservice centre model, as in the IMC, Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers (ASAM) and TRCS cases, was reported as a way to mitigate some of these difficulties, especially those relating to building trust.
83  Document review, interviews and focus group discussions confirmed that there is a widespread sense of insecurity for women and children living in host communities. Harassment on the street has been reported as a serious concern especially for girls. At the family level, the most common protection strategy is restricting girls to the home.
84  As described in a number of reports (See ‘IMC/ASAM Rapid Needs Assessment of Gaziantep Based Syrian Refugees’ and Concern Worldwide and Mavi Kalem, ‘Needs Assessment Report of Syrian Non-Camp Refugees in Şanlıurfa/’Turkey’, December 2013) at the beginning of the crisis, education was not perceived as a priority for Syrian families who believed their displacement would be short-term. This perception changed gradually, though in non-camp situations, other factors such as lack of school buildings, transportation and increasing protection concerns along the route to school continued to challenge school enrolment/attendance. These protection concerns, in particular, were mentioned in different focus group discussions with Syrian teachers and Syrian women in Şanlıurfa.
86  Confirmed by multiple sources, including focus groups discussions with youth volunteers in Nizip and interviews with TRCS staff in Nizip, Şanlıurfa and Osmaniye.
2.4 OTHER SECTORS: HEALTH, NUTRITION AND WATER, SANITATION AND HYGIENE

UNICEF's decision to devote relatively less attention to health, nutrition and WASH – normally areas in which it would be expected to play a major role in an emergency setting – was largely justified by the circumstances.

The recent findings from nutrition monitoring activities indicate that there is no major acute malnutrition problem, although levels of chronic malnutrition (relating to life inside the Syrian Arab Republic) are relatively high. Given the chronic nature of the refugee situation, discussion with WFP and the Government about the potential for school feeding programmes is warranted – for nutritional reasons as well as for its potential to act as an incentive for school attendance. More generally, discussion should be held with WFP and the Government about refugee children’s dietary and micronutrient requirements, including vitamin A supplements to help boost their immunity and reduce vulnerability to diseases like measles.

The WASH needs of refugees in camps have been well covered, though UNICEF is right to have established a WASH working group at field level, particularly given the identified gaps in hygiene promotion. Whether those living outside of camps have access to adequate WASH services is less clear. An assessment of WASH needs is needed, particularly in the more overcrowded host communities such as Kilis town. This represents an area of potential future cooperation with municipal authorities and other agencies. As recommended by a recent consultant’s report, UNICEF should pay particular attention to hygiene facilities and practices.

In regard to health, UNICEF played an important role in the polio vaccination campaigns conducted by the Government in border areas in collaboration with WHO, as part of a region-wide initiative following the polio outbreak in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013–2014. The Government decided to end supplementary campaigns in favour of routine immunization to maintain vaccination levels among Syrian refugees. This shift in strategy carries some risks given the overall levels of vaccination coverage among Syrians, which are low enough to raise significant concerns about potential future disease outbreaks, including measles. The risks involved are compounded by high levels of chronic malnutrition and low rates of breastfeeding.

Health coordination structures are not active in Turkey. Coordination meetings at the Ankara level are reportedly irregular, though they take place in Gaziantep; and health sector coordination and response is said to be correspondingly weak. This sets an advocacy agenda for UNICEF: to seek to strengthen WHO leadership and secure the systematic involvement of the Turkish Ministry of Health on the Syrian issue. Without such engagement, space for UNICEF involvement on health issues is relatively limited.

Although the lack of an existing health section in the Turkey Country Office at the outset of the crisis hampered consideration of UNICEF’s role in health, this was largely offset by support from the regional offices. The CEE/CIS Regional Office conducted a total of 12 technical support visits on health, WASH and nutrition. In the latter stages of the response, a health specialist was employed in Ankara, and a WASH consultant was contracted to advise on UNICEF’s WASH role, both as an implementer and a sector coordinator.

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87 It should be noted that existing data about immunization coverage among Syrian refugees is very limited and out of date.
88 Interviews with the CEE/CIS Regional Office.
SECTION 2: FINDINGS ON UNICEF’S ROLE AND STRATEGY

BOX 4  UNICEF’s evolving approach to the refugee crisis

The development of UNICEF’s approach to the refugee crisis could be broadly characterized in terms of four overlapping phases:

**Phase 1: Direct service provision** (mid-2012 to present)

Given the immediate needs and the support requested by the Government, UNICEF has undertaken a series of interventions in camps, including: the provision of school materials, support for the construction of prefabricated schools, and the establishment of CFS. This ‘foot-in-the-door’ approach gave UNICEF credibility with the Government and opened a channel for dialogue on additional coverage in host communities. However, this has also led to a perception that UNICEF will continue to provide material support in this way (e.g. school construction) and it is unclear whether UNICEF has an exit strategy for this.

**Phase 2: Extending support to more sustainable approaches** (education: late 2013 to present)

Provision of supplies and facilities has continued, although in education the focus has changed to providing technical assistance to key pillars of education-in-emergencies, including: the teacher incentive scheme, the recruitment of Syrian teachers and the teacher code of conduct; Turkish language for high school graduates to support university matriculation in Turkey; and dialogue on curriculum and certification. These have wider application than service delivery, and will contribute to a more sustainable approach by the Government. This phase also coincided with the possibility of working in host communities by constructing and equipping temporary education centres and supporting double shifting in existing Turkish education facilities.

In contrast, UNICEF’s child protection work for refugees shows little evidence of this ‘sustainability’ approach. This is partly a reflection of the lower priority given to refugee child protection interventions by the Government. The current CFS-based approach may not be sustainable or sufficient, particularly outside of camps.

**Phase 3: Embedding system-wide approaches** (2014 to present)

This is the most recent phase and includes: training teachers to recognize the psychosocial needs of students; establishing YOBIS and generating government reports; operationalizing the teacher incentive scheme; piloting and expanding facilities and responses in host communities; and supporting provinces to plan and manage the response locally. To a limited extent, other elements of child protection work also fit under this heading (e.g. the MoFSP Family Training Programme).

**Phase 4 (future and medium-term): Gradual transition from service delivery, stronger policy advocacy role, focus on social cohesion** (2016 onwards)

While in the short-term, substantial involvement in service delivery may be required, this phase, which is partly reflected in current UNICEF thinking, would involve re-strategizing based on future scenarios for Syrian children and host communities. It would include developing strategies that allow for a gradual transition to more sustainable approaches and strengthening national systems to reach vulnerable Syrian and Turkish children as per the 3RP. It would also involve working with the Government and NGOs to model and promote cost-effective solutions to the education of Syrian children in communities, articulating and promoting strategies to address social cohesion, and providing support and a framework for international NGOs operating in the education and child protection sectors, in areas such as negotiating the same rate for teacher incentives and harmonizing approaches to psychosocial support.
SECTION 3

FINDINGS ON UNICEF’S PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
3.1 OVERVIEW AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PERFORMANCE

A number of different criteria need to be considered in evaluating the performance of UNICEF's programme of response to the refugee crisis. The main focus of this section is on the timeliness, effectiveness and quality of UNICEF's interventions, and issues related to programme delivery. The evaluation uses the CCCs, UNICEF and sector-wide best practice standards, and UNICEF's own stated objectives as benchmarks.

A number of factors made it difficult to assess performance in any consistent way across the range of different programme interventions. The first is the lack of clarity on purpose and intended outcomes. The stated objectives vary across different documents and years. The second factor is the lack of baseline and other data against which to gauge progress, reflecting a relative absence of needs assessment. The third factor is the lack of consistent programme monitoring against objectives, which means that the documentary record on programme delivery is patchy and incomplete. A fourth factor is that the programmes themselves evolved according to context and available resources. While some degree of flexibility was both necessary and desirable given the fluctuating context, the lack of a settled, resourced programme made planning and programme management difficult.

In terms of the CCC commitments on assessment, monitoring and evaluation, while commitment 3 on evaluation is partly met by the current evaluation, the ability to assess progress and impact was hampered by the inability to achieve commitments 1 and 2 on assessment and monitoring. This is largely, but not entirely, due to external constraints. The Government has not allowed systematic assessment of the situations either in the camps or in non-camp settings, though the space to conduct such assessments may be opening up to some extent, as the joint nutrition assessment suggests. The lack of monitoring is less explicable and the implications of this are considered below.

Where delays in implementation occurred, these are sometimes attributable to external bureaucratic factors, for example the time taken to get approval from either the Government or donors. The funding constraints that slowed UNICEF's response at various times deserve further consideration. While the fundraising environment for the Turkey response has been difficult – in part because of the Government's initial declaration of self-sufficiency – UNICEF appeared to lack the means to underwrite what appeared to be essential early interventions in child protection and education. It is not clear whether this was because the Turkey Country Office did not push for such funding, or that there simply were not sufficient funds available, through the Emergency Programme Fund or otherwise, to kick-start the Turkey programme.

The problem of underfunding has had a very significant effect on UNICEF's ability to deliver on its objectives. The figures cited in Section 1 (see Figure 3) show the extent of the problem. With funding running at only about half of the requirement, shortfalls in the achievement of objectives were inevitable, although those shortfalls cannot always be attributed to lack of funds. Programmes could only commence once funding was secured: for example, as reported in the 3RP progress report in June 2015, programmes planned for 100,000 children or adolescents had not started due to lack of funding. The uncertainty over funding also

89 This is uncertain: the results of the assessment have yet to be released, and the Ministry of Interior has recently issued a new regulation prohibiting any data collection on Syrians under temporary protection without prior approval from relevant Ministries.
had implications for UNICEF’s ability to hire the necessary support staff, and more generally for its ability to plan ahead.

3.2 REFUGEE EDUCATION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Overall, UNICEF has addressed the five CCC education commitments within the prevailing constraints mentioned above. Some major deficits remain, particularly in regard to access to education for children in host communities (commitment 2) and much remains to be done to integrate education and psychosocial support services (commitment 4). We consider here the effectiveness of UNICEF’s interventions judged both against the agenda set by its core commitments and by its specific programme targets.

In regard to commitment 1, although no cluster was formed (this situation is being covered by the UNHCR refugee response coordination model), UNICEF supported the Government to lead and develop appropriate coordination mechanisms consistent with the UNHCR model. On the international side, the United Nations Country Team assigned the lead coordination role jointly to UNHCR and UNICEF (currently in collaboration with UNDP). Overall, coordination between UNICEF and UNHCR on education was weak in the earlier stages of the crisis and uncoordinated approaches to donors and government bodies suggest a degree of unhelpful inter-agency competition. This hampered prospects for joint advocacy and strategic thinking on the critical topic of refugee access to education. Coordination between the two agencies is now reportedly strengthening, and the evaluation found some evidence of this (see below).

The Education Working Group is a forum for discussing needs and responses. Initially limited to coordination at the Ankara level between the Government (MoNE, AFAD and later the Directorate General of Migration Management), TRCS and United Nations agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM), the model has now been extended to include a working group that meets at the field level (Gaziantep, etc.) and which involves Turkish and international NGOs. This has the potential to strengthen the response as more actors become involved. At present (at least at the field level) it appears less a strategic planning and joint action forum than an information-sharing one.

Access to education (commitment 2) remains severely unbalanced between camp and non-camp refugees, with the latter (who constitute the great majority) having much lower levels of enrolment at approximately 30 per cent, compared with more than 85 per cent in camps. This is due to a number of factors, including: limited school and teacher capacity in host communities, lack of accurate data concerning the scale of the issue in host communities, and the rapid increase in the number of Syrians coming to Turkey. It also reflects the time taken to situate international assistance (including that of UNICEF) in the response outside of camps and the limited scope and pace of registration of NGOs working in this field.

UNICEF has been able to have more impact within the camps. UNICEF has assisted AFAD to provide school facilities better suited to the needs of children by replacing original tent schools with prefabricated structures, and has met its targets, first by managing the process itself and then by providing cash assistance to AFAD. This has considerably enhanced the

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92 Based on direct observation of an Education Working Group meeting. See further information in Section 4.

93 MoNE regulation, September 2014.
attractiveness of school for both children and parents. Overall, school access in camps has improved through the Back-to-School campaigns\(^{94}\) and with the placement of prefabricated structures outside of the main residential areas of the camps.\(^{95}\)

It is difficult to obtain data on the achievement of UNICEF targets largely because of the different methods of reporting used during the evaluated period. Annex A provides the available data by outcome, as reported for RRP 5 and 6 and in reports on the No Lost Generation initiative. There are a number of reasons for shortfalls against targets, in addition to those noted above, including (for UNICEF) funding gaps, the ever growing number of refugees, and the lack of technical staff capacity to support the programme adequately and consistently.

The cumulative total number of Syrian children reported by MoNE to be enrolled in school in host communities and camps as of the end of June 2015 is 215,000. Of these, UNICEF reports having enabled access for 99,766. The basis of this figure is unclear.

The code of conduct signed by all Syrian teachers is a useful instrument for facilitating the provision of safe and secure learning environments (commitment 3). However, the Education Working Group\(^{96}\) and UNICEF\(^{97}\) have, separately, noted the use of corporal punishment, which has been reported to the Evaluation Team on more than one occasion. At the time of finalizing this report (June 2015), UNICEF and UNHCR had drafted a concept note to address the issue.\(^{98}\) Syrian children also appear to be vulnerable to bullying in double shift schools.\(^{99}\) These are clearly areas for joint child protection and education work.

Psychosocial support training for teachers (commitment 4) has reportedly been carried out for 11,000 Syrian teachers.\(^{100}\) The subject was only one part of the initial one-day training provided to Syrian teachers in 2013 and was the main theme of another round of training that took place in November 2014, which is late in the overall timeline. More traction could have been gained by better integration with the child protection psychosocial programme.

In regard to Communication for Development, the evaluation team was told that efforts to inform young people and their parents of all the educational opportunities available to them will take place in the near future (UNICEF in partnership with UNHCR). This will involve “[developing] clear messages and information about schooling opportunities available for Syrian children in Turkey, and [disseminating] brochures/information leaflets to Syrian families and children via local educational authorities and registration offices prior to the new school year”.\(^{101}\) It is unclear whether caregivers (in this

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94 Conducted in 2013 for the 2013-2014 school year.
95 AFAD took the team to the residential areas in one camp and witnessed the previous site of the school in very cramped conditions, which now houses a pre-school.
97 UNICEF internal correspondence, 25 April 2015.
99 Interview notes.
100 Turkey Country Office.
101 Interviews with UNICEF and UNHCR staff in Turkey. In providing feedback on an earlier draft of this report, Turkey Country Office staff noted: “In 2015 the Country Office has made scaling up of non-formal/informal educational opportunities and life skills a priority, carrying out assessments of over 10 possible non-governmental partners. Via such new partnerships, as of July 2015, UNICEF is supporting the establishment of three new community centres in Gaziantep; one in Şanlıurfa and one in Mardin, which will offer a set of comprehensive life skills, including critical language classes, psychosocial services and peer-to-peer support for out-of-school adolescents and youth. Some 52,500 children and adolescents are expected to benefit from these programmes over the next 12 months. In Şanlıurfa, two new safe spaces for adolescent girls will address their specific gender-related needs through specialized multi-sectoral support services.”
case, teachers) and young people have access to life skills education, or indeed what that means in this context; though it is reflected in the Education Section work plan for 2015 (commitment 5).

Delivery of programme inputs

The timeliness of the delivery of programme inputs has been an issue for some elements of the education programme. Complaints came from those interviewed both in AFAD and MoNE in Ankara and the provinces regarding UNICEF’s implementation capacity, particularly the time taken to construct schools, order photocopiers, etc. A common response from these interviewees was that if they had known that it would take so long, they could have done it themselves more quickly. Indeed, a library building visited in one camp that had been provided by AFAD was operational and had more books than those visited that were supported by UNICEF. In other cases, promised library buildings had not materialized up to nine months after the completion due date.

Implementation problems affected UNICEF’s school construction activities. The construction of schools should have been handed over to AFAD earlier: it took seven months (May–November 2013) for the first two schools to be constructed, in part because of delays in securing AFAD permissions. The third school was similarly slow. From 2014, UNICEF handed over responsibility for construction to AFAD (January 2014), providing the necessary finance through the harmonized approach to cash transfers (HACT) mechanism. In the opinion of AFAD, the various delays represented a “loss of valuable time during which the refugee children could have been in school”. The construction of CFS in the camps has also suffered delays for a combination of reasons.

This complaint of slow delivery is apparently levelled against at least one other agency, suggesting some underlying factors. In fact, an examination of timelines (see Annex B) suggests that delays have occurred on all sides, including seeking and granting permission for and ordering time for books, submission of project proposals and granting of donor funds. When put together, these represent long lead times for delivering some inputs, especially supplies. Although some of the factors involved may be outside of UNICEF’s control, the organization needs to ensure that the amount of time devoted to project development and approval is minimized. This will depend partly on adequate staffing and prioritization, as illustrated by the YOBIS example below.

MoNE has raised concerns over the delivery of YOBIS. UNICEF has also recognized the issue and has undertaken a bottleneck analysis to identify the blockages. On UNICEF’s part, the analysis highlights the delay in making timely payments to the contractor and indicates the need for more timely release of terms of reference, calls for tender, contracts and payments. It is recommended that a similar analysis be conducted for other persistently problematic components of the programme and that corrective action be taken accordingly.

As with other elements of the UNICEF response, programme monitoring of the education component has been somewhat piecemeal. Elements of monitoring are found in a variety of documents, including donor reports,

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102 For data on reported achievement against targets for UNICEF interventions under the RRP, see Annex A.
103 Irrespective of who did the construction, AFAD needed to approve school designs, allocate the land and give necessary permissions.
104 Interviews in Ankara.
RRP monitoring reports, situation reports and (recently) the education dashboard for which UNICEF is apparently responsible. Despite the lack of an overall monitoring system, important pillars of such a system are in place (for example, YOBIS and teacher compensation tracking through the Turkish postal system (PTT) and the evaluation team strongly endorses the intention of the Turkey Country Office to develop one comprehensive system.

The lack of needs assessment or explicit vulnerability criteria mean that it is unclear how the most vulnerable children have been identified. According to one education officer, “all children are somewhat vulnerable in this situation.” From the available data, some specific vulnerabilities in education can be identified, for example youth of high-school age,106 disabled children,107 and those living outside of camps. Another group frequently mentioned are young girls who are married early, which takes them out of school. While this is largely unsubstantiated by hard data, girls do seem to be particularly vulnerable in this and some other respects. In some cases, the lack of provision of high school classes or post-high school opportunities (including work) can make girls vulnerable to forced or early marriage.

It was brought to the attention of the Education Working Group that some married girls had been asked to leave the temporary education centres.108 The interventions intended for children vulnerable to bullying and corporal punishment now need to be strengthened. A review of vulnerability among refugee children and their families is overdue. Such a review would present an opportunity for collaboration with national and international NGOs, combining education, child protection and other sectors.

Quality and equity issues

Overall, UNICEF has produced good quality work in the Education Sector. Despite some issues with the construction of prefabricated buildings, school accommodations are of a good standard, as compared with other refugee situations. UNICEF has followed international standards (including the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies) as well as the Government’s own standards for decision-making, although compromises have had to be made as refugee numbers increase. Some of the materials provided have been criticized for lack of quality (e.g. the school bags provided as part of the Back-to-School campaign were reported to be of poor quality).

Although a number of equity issues have arisen in relation to refugee children’s education, these have not usually been attributable to UNICEF. As already noted, access to education has been highly unequal between camp and non-camp populations. A very proactive head teacher in one double shift school told the evaluation team that there were 1,000 Syrian children waiting for a place.

UNICEF’s education work (in camp and non-camp settings) has largely been undertaken in the south-east, leaving out non-camp populations in Ankara and Istanbul, for example. Although this is understandable given

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106 More youth are out of school in host communities, and reports indicate that more girls than boys are out of school. Source: Mercy Corps, ‘Understanding the needs of Syrian and Turkish adolescents in Gaziantep, Turkey, to support personal resilience’, June 2014. However, dropout is also present inside the camps as young people, especially males, leave school to seek work.


government restrictions and limited resources, a review of vulnerability among refugee children and their families in these other contexts is overdue. It appears that there is now slightly more government openness in regard to the problems of refugees in Istanbul and Ankara. UNICEF should use this as an opportunity to address the issues of children’s needs and vulnerabilities in the cities.

UNICEF has made efforts to address the issue of equity between different groups. One access-related measure supported by UNICEF was the issue of Turkish language education for Syrians, a bottleneck to school participation and university entrance. Another measure was training Syrian teachers to teach students in Arabic, their native language.

What is less clear is the relationship between the needs of refugee children and those of host communities, for whom poverty and exclusion from the Turkish education system also exist. Among other factors, this creates a problem of perceived inequity, with supplies and services (e.g. education supplies, school uniforms and access to education in their own language) being given to Syrian children when some Turkish children are also in need. This perception has the potential to harm community relations and needs to be addressed as part of a wider social cohesion strategy.

There are indications that in non-camp settings, more girls than boys are out of school and that children with disabilities are not generally gaining access to school. Therefore, any programming in non-camp communities, for example Back-to-School campaigns and support to facilities, should incorporate appropriate responses for girls and boys and children with disabilities, as much as possible. Syrian teachers with experience with special needs should be identified through the recruitment process. Early marriage and participation should be monitored as much as possible.

**Participation**

There is some evidence of community participation in key UNICEF programme interventions. For example, teachers were consulted on the compensation scheme during focus group discussions while they were training. It is not clear to what extent young people have had a voice or been consulted in the design and implementation of programmes. Syrian people need a voice in their education options, which will have a serious impact on their future life chances.

### 3.3 REFUGEE CHILD PROTECTION AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

**Effectiveness in relation to the Core Commitments for Children and programme targets**

UNICEF has made sustained efforts – both through direct programming and through advocacy – to ensure that the protection-related CCCs are delivered. Analysis of the CCCs in the Turkey political and humanitarian context has led UNICEF to prioritize child protection commitments 1 and 3-6, while commitment 2 on the

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109 For example, Mercy Corps, ‘Understanding the needs of Syrian and Turkish adolescents in Gaziantep, Turkey, to support personal resilience’, June 2014.

110 In one government-run double shift school visited by the evaluation team, a small group of children, some of whom could not hear and others who could not speak, were being taught by Syrian teachers through sign language as well as books. These children reported that this was the first time they had had an opportunity to go to school. This example indicates that such instruction is possible.

111 See for example, Mercy Corps, ‘Understanding the needs of Syrian and Turkish adolescents in Gaziantep, Turkey, to support personal resilience’, June 2014.
monitoring and reporting mechanism is being coordinated at the regional level with a contribution from the Turkey programme.

In regard to commitment 1 on leadership and coordination, UNICEF has played an important role in supporting the Government (specifically the MoFSP) to undertake an overall leadership role on child protection coordination both at the national and local levels. Within the international coordination model, the picture is less clear. Responsibilities for leading and coordinating work on protection, sexual and gender-based violence, and mental health and psychosocial support are assigned to UNHCR, UNDP and IOM, respectively. Within these wider sectors, UNICEF has been responsible for representing children’s rights with the overall assumption that a coordinated response on the broader sector would benefit children as well. However, this assumption proved to be incorrect; child protection does not appear to have been given the prominence it deserves within the wider protection agenda, and broader protection responses have not benefited children as they should. This indicates the need for a more specific focus on child protection within the coordination mechanisms.

During the evaluation period, UNICEF programme efforts concentrated on strengthening child protection mechanisms (commitment 3) by establishing CFS, adolescent empowerment and participation, family parenting training programmes and peer-to-peer social cohesion and peacebuilding among Syrian and Turkish adolescent and youth programmes. While those efforts were mostly effective in...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE 5</th>
<th>Child protection results as reported against Rapid Response Plan 5 and 6 and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RRP 5, 2013</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned targets</strong></td>
<td><strong>Achieved results</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153,000+107,100</td>
<td>19,704 (8% of the annual target)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td><strong>Funding received</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$10.41 million (as per the end of the year dashboard)</td>
<td>US$6.39 million (61% of requested funding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RRP 6, 2014</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned targets</strong></td>
<td><strong>Achieved results</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103,500 children/adolescents with access to psychosocial support services</td>
<td>37,542 children/adolescents with access to psychosocial support services (36% of the annual target)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,175 children receiving specialized services from qualified front-line workers (from the dashboard).</td>
<td>2,714 children receiving specialized services from qualified front-line workers (52% of the target)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td><strong>Funding received</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$17.65 million</td>
<td>US$5.32 million (34% of the required funding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3RP, 2015</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(January-March)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned targets</strong></td>
<td><strong>Achieved results</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 conflict-affected boys and girls with equitable access to psychosocial support services, including in CFS and mobile units</td>
<td>11,594 (23% of the annual target achieved in the first quarter of the year)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

112 Interviews with UNICEF staff in Ankara.
113 This is one of several apparent shortfalls in the coordination of the humanitarian response. Sectorial working groups were considered by many of those consulted to be essentially venues for sharing information, with only limited effectiveness in coordinating strategy and programme responses. This is considered further in Section 4.
ensuring prevention of and response to child protection risks in camps, more needs to be done to address child protection needs in host communities.\textsuperscript{114}

UNICEF made considerable effort to advocate with AFAD and MoFSP\textsuperscript{115} to promote family-based care for unaccompanied minors (commitment 4) during the evaluation period. Nevertheless, achievement against this benchmark was extremely limited. Difficulties in collaboration with UNHCR on this issue (see Section 4) may have influenced the credibility of United Nations agencies and negatively impacted the advocacy process with the Government.

Early marriage and child labour remains largely unaddressed, especially in host communities (commitment 5). This is mostly due to the erroneous assumption described above that responses under the broader protection and sexual and gender-based violence agendas would have necessarily benefitted children. Renewed commitment to addressing those emerging protection concerns is already envisaged in the Turkey Country Office child protection-in-emergency strategy (November 2014), which urgently needs to be put into action.

In regard to providing psychosocial support for children and their caregivers (commitment 6), CFS, coupled with the family parenting training programme in camps, proved to be an optimal and efficient way of providing inclusive psychosocial support to children and their families. In host communities, the model of incorporating CFS into multiservice centres has demonstrated positive potential, although its reach capacity needs to be further boosted in order to meet the degree of current needs.

Although not originally prioritized,\textsuperscript{116} the prevention of child recruitment (commitment 7), appears to have been very effectively addressed by the adolescent empowerment and participation methodologies used in the implementation of CFS through youth volunteers. In the focus group discussion in Nizip Camps 1 and 2, boys openly declared that the leadership role they could play thanks to the activities in the CFS was a determining factor in their decision not to return to fight in the Syrian Arab Republic.

**Delivery and quality of programme inputs\textsuperscript{117}**

The specific components of the emergency child protection programme were implemented with varying degrees of timeliness. The psychosocial intervention in camps – originally planned for December 2012 and delayed until the end of March 2013 due to late approval of the European Union proposal\textsuperscript{118} – has since


\textsuperscript{115} Unaccompanied and separated Syrian children were initially referred by AFAD to the state residential care system. Since July 2014, a pilot residential care unit was built in Adana Camp, offering an institutionalized type of care. UNICEF strongly advocated with AFAD and MoFSP for the development of an alternative care system (family-based care) and promoted a study visit to Jordan. MoFSP AFAD, UNICEF and UNHCR participated in the visit. However, no change in the Government policy on this issue has been demonstrated so far. In March 2015, UNICEF submitted a proposal to the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) specifically targeting unaccompanied minors, thus showing full accountability on the issue.

\textsuperscript{116} RRP3 (2012), RRP5 4 and 5 (2013) and RRP 6 (2014).

\textsuperscript{117} For data on reported achievement against targets for UNICEF interventions, see Annex A.

\textsuperscript{118} The concept note was developed in November 2012 and the proposal was approved on 21 March 2013.
been implemented without major delays.\textsuperscript{119} Psychosocial support activities for non-camp populations only started in July 2014,\textsuperscript{120} more than one year after permission to work in hosting communities was granted in March 2013. The family training programme was implemented with no major delays.

While the target achievement for 2014 broadly reflects the funding received, the low delivery figure for 2013, shown in Figure 4 (8 per cent of target achieved; 61 per cent of funding received), appears to reflect the start-up delays noted above. This raises questions that require further explanation, however, about how the use of funds is accounted for publicly.

As with education, there remain major deficits in regard to the scope of coverage beyond the refugee camps. Given the initial reluctance of the Turkish authorities to prioritize child protection actions,\textsuperscript{121} considerable advocacy and influencing efforts were needed throughout the response. Even so, some of the main child protection concerns are still not addressed. For example, no consolidated information on child protection trends exists, child protection and psychosocial referral mechanisms are in a very embryonic stage, and sexual and gender-based violence has only recently been systematically tackled.\textsuperscript{122}

The delivery of psychosocial support services integrated into the education programme (i.e. teacher training on psychosocial support) was not timely enough. Psychosocial support was one of the topics addressed in the one-day training provided to 76 teachers in November 2013.\textsuperscript{123} A stand-alone psychosocial support teacher training was not conducted until November 2014.

Lack of baseline information and inconsistent collection of monitoring data\textsuperscript{124} made a comprehensive analysis of programme coverage impossible for the period under examination. Available data shows that the coverage of the psychosocial support component through CFS in camps has been remarkable: since 2013, CFS were able to (progressively) reach up to 80 per cent of children in camps by March 2015. Coverage in host communities remains extremely limited, however, with only a very small proportion of children covered by CFS in multiservice centres in Gaziantep, Istanbul and Şanlıurfa.

Translating the main international child protection standards and best practices into Turkish and training relevant actors (including AFAD, camp managers and UNICEF partners) provided a sound basis for ensuring the quality of the overall child protection response. Judged against these standards, the overall quality of

\textsuperscript{119} The slight delay in the opening of CFS in camps (three months) was due a relatively lengthy process of setting up the project steering committee composed by UNICEF, AFAD, MoNE and TRCS, and formalizing the Memorandum of Understanding with TRCS (UNICEF, Minutes of emergency meetings, March-August 2013). Further minor delays were created by the difficulties in recruiting Arabic speaking youth workers. Occasional exceptions of very late opening also exist (e.g. Viransehir Camp and Nusaybin Camp). (UNICEF, 2013-2014 evaluation location selection criteria, child protection inputs.)

\textsuperscript{120} United Nations Children’s Fund, International Medical Corps, Simplified programme cooperation agreement, 10 July 2014. This included two CFS, one in Gaziantep and one in Istanbul. In 2015, a CFS was opened in Şanlıurfa in partnership with TRCS.

\textsuperscript{121} Confirmed by multiple sources in interviews with AFAD, TRCS, MoFSP, IMC, ASAM and UNICEF staff in Ankara, among others.


\textsuperscript{123} Training topics included: on classroom management and techniques, the impact of war on children and how to address it, lesson planning and mentoring.

\textsuperscript{124} Targets for the period under evaluation differ in that they are calculated from year to year and are not available for all years. In addition, approaches to calculating the number of children benefitting directly and indirectly from the UNICEF child protection response are not consistent across the years and no disaggregated data are available. The online monitoring system was only launched in 2014.
the services provided by the different components of the emergency programme was found to be very good.

The use of a sector-based approach in the emergency response had an impact in terms of the equity of the overall child protection programme. The CFS approach could not in fact ensure equal coverage in camps and host communities. Children in host communities have remained largely excluded from receiving psychosocial support and other child protection services. An integrated strategy between child protection and education could have ensured increased access to those services.

The innovation in the online CFS monitoring system\(^{125}\) also introduced an element of quality monitoring: activity progress is tracked through an online monitoring system that links youth workers to partner organizations. Although initially established as a basic reporting system, it now allows agencies to monitor trends and support youth workers to identify and solve problems and take timely higher-level action on issues that cannot be resolved by front-line workers.

The family parenting training programme is an adaptation of the existing programme of the same name that MoFSP provides to Turkish families. The training modules were selected, tailored and enriched with content relevant to the Syrian population, including newly-developed modules on child protection in emergencies, based on the contents of the translated standards and best practices.

The programme for peer-to-peer social cohesion and peacebuilding among Syrian and Turkish adolescents and youth aimed to enable meaningful child participation in society. In 2014, the child rights committees\(^{126}\) created under the regular programme initiated several projects to address the role of children in emergencies, and it was decided that the main theme of this year’s children’s forum would be children and emergencies. In collaboration with MoFSP and Parliament, UNICEF supported the 15th Children’s Forum in Ankara in November 2014 with the participation of Syrian children from host communities.\(^{127}\)

UNICEF experience in Turkey and the wider region gives it a comparative advantage in terms of combining emergency relief and resilience-related approaches. Although there were initial inconsistencies in the strategic approach (i.e. separation of the regular and emergency programmes, different approaches towards cross-sectoral reinforcement), the child protection emergency response was to be integrated into the regular country programme with a view to the medium-/long-term, in close collaboration with the Government.

An illustration of this longer-term view is the two-year rolling work plan 2014-2015, agreed to with the MoFSP Child Service General Directorate, which includes the family parenting training programme, a specific component for Syrian children and their families. This programme is also an example of best practice: it shows how UNICEF can support the Government to adapt and use its existing resources in different circumstances, thus strengthening existing child protection mechanisms, as envisaged in the No Lost Generation strategy.

\(^{125}\) UNICEF quarterly reports to the European Union between 2013 and 2015.

\(^{126}\) As one of the outcomes of the National Child Congress (2000) and upon the request of children, provincial child rights committees were established in 81 provinces in Turkey in collaboration with the Social Services Child Protection Agency (currently MoFSP) as the official coordinator of child rights committee implementation in Turkey. Since that time, children (aged 12 to 18 years) have organized several activities at the local level to promote child rights.

Lack of reliable baseline data and inconsistencies in the definition of child protection targets\(^{128}\) during the period under examination make it difficult to undertake a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the emergency child protection programme. In particular, the absence of a comprehensive child protection needs assessment\(^{129}\) has represented a serious obstacle to the clear identification and quantification of priority needs. Although UNICEF and other organizations have clearly identified priority areas of child protection concern in previous years,\(^{130}\) the need has not been clearly quantified. This has been made more difficult by the constant influx of new refugees and their migration to different parts of the country.

Within this framework, while child protection objectives included in the RRPs and 3RP for Turkey from 2012 to 2015 remain relevant, evaluating progress remains challenging. Specific components of the programmes, such as CFS, have proven to be extremely effective in providing psychosocial support in the camps. As of March 2015, 80 per cent of children in camps have been reached with psychosocial support activities\(^{131}\) and 3.1 per cent have been provided with specialized psychosocial support.\(^{132}\)

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\(^{128}\) RRP3 (2012), RRP 5 (2013), RRP 6 (2014) and the 3RP.

\(^{129}\) No needs assessment has been authorized by the Government so far.


\(^{131}\) UNICEF quarterly report to the European Union, March 2015; Turkey Country Office, ‘Data CFS’ (internal document).

\(^{132}\) Percentage is in line with international experience, IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support and WHO statistics.
SECTION 4
FINDINGS ON UNICEF COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION
4.1 CONTEXT
Many of the factors affecting response coordination and collaboration were described in Sections 1 and 2. These include the extent of government leadership and control of the overall response at Ankara and local levels; the lead coordination roles assigned by the United Nations Country Team to UNHCR and (recently) to UNDP; the absence of many of UNICEF’s usual international NGO partners; and the overall lack of established emergency programme partnerships between UNICEF and Turkish civil-society organizations, with the important exception of TRCS, a relatively new partner.

The Government-led sectoral coordination process has until recently been largely Ankara-based, though working group meetings are now being held for some sectors at the field level (Gaziantep, etc.). These working groups have not been supported by any consistent process of needs assessment or data gathering, making analysis of sectoral gaps and overlaps difficult. The few coordination meetings that the evaluation team observed were well run and had good attendance but did not appear to have a clear strategic agenda. This may change as they become better established.

4.2 COLLABORATION WITH GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY AUTHORITIES

Education
UNICEF has had an education programme in Turkey for many years and according to both ministry officials and UNICEF staff, has established a good working relationship with the central MoNE. During the Syrian response, however, UNICEF-MoNE relations have not been as strong, largely due to AFAD management of the response and the split between the regular and emergency programmes within UNICEF. UNICEF’s direct relationship with AFAD, necessitated by the imperatives of the emergency response, alienated MoNE. Recently, however, UNICEF has done a great deal to help bring the two bodies together.

The continued relevance of the standard (short-term) education-in-emergencies approach is questionable in the current context, when a longer-term, sustained strengthening of the Turkish education system is needed. UNICEF could have done more to build on the regular programme’s established relationships through stronger internal communication between regular and emergency programmes, and by presenting one ‘face’ to MoNE. The reintegration of the regular and emergency programmes, as well as the support of the UNICEF Representative, should help repair these relationships.

Field visit observations confirmed the strong relationship between UNICEF and MoNE at the provincial level, where UNICEF is hoping to

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133 Meetings of both the Education Working Group and the general inter-agency coordination group in Gaziantep in March 2015.
134 The situation was still fresh for MoNE, which more than once complained about the issue to the evaluation team. To some extent this is also an issue between MoNE and AFAD. MoNE is now in charge of the construction programme (Education Working Group Meeting, 12 January 2015) and UNICEF has had a Memorandum of Understanding with MoNE since September 2013.
135 The evaluation team was told about parallel approaches by UNICEF over certain issues in communicating with both AFAD and MoNE. There was insufficient coordination on the content of the message.
gain traction for education in host communities by promoting and supporting provincial education plans for Syrian children. UNICEF also needs to cement its relationship and work with municipalities.

Child protection

The relationship between UNICEF and MoFSP, the ministry in charge of child protection in Turkey, has gone through different phases. As with MoNE, the relationship has been somewhat challenged by the appointment of AFAD as the institutional entity in charge of the response overall. Despite the changes in UNICEF programme structure and the schism between emergency and regular programming, however, efforts have been made throughout the years to keep MoFSP as one of UNICEF’s main partners.

The two-year rolling work-plan with the MoFSP Child Services Directorate General, which includes a component relating to Syrian children and families, is an example of how UNICEF’s relationship with the Ministry has evolved over time. In addition to the joint plan of action, UNICEF has significantly invested in the capacity development of MoFSP through training on child protection in emergencies and the translation of international standards and best practices. UNICEF technical support for the adaptation and implementation of the family parenting training is another example of successful collaboration and the development of technical skills within the Ministry.

The kinds of partnerships that UNICEF has engaged in around child protection have implications for the sustainability of related programme modalities. The relationship with MoFSP is highly sustainable in that it builds on existing structures and focuses on strengthening ministry capacities. In contrast, the running of CFS in camps is not currently sustainable, and there is a need to develop transition plans and strengthen the capacities of TRCS to manage this programme moving forward.136 This could include supporting TRCS to develop an internal pool of trainers on child protection in emergencies and psychosocial support. Such a move is recommended in order to increase the sustainability of CFS in the camps.

As the Government has been reluctant to acknowledge the need to include psychosocial support and child protection in the emergency response, UNICEF has advocated with authorities on the importance of this sector. Providing AFAD, MoFSP and TRCS with training and relevant standards and tools has greatly contributed to building national capacities. These capacities should be further strengthened by establishing in-house training within AFAD, MoFSP and TRCS.

4.3 COLLABORATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

UNICEF was at first the only United Nations agency with capacity to work in the education sector. After UNHCR strengthened its education capacity in Ankara and Gaziantep, however, it was also able to play a meaningful role – for which UNICEF provided the entry point – in the sector. UNICEF has collaborated with UNHCR to bring about synergies in service delivery.137 The alleged differences in the philosophy of the two agencies on the integration of Syrian children in the Turkish education system caused friction

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136 Capacity-building is now included in the new programme cooperation agreement with TRCS.

137 In the camp schools, UNICEF supplies materials while UNHCR supplies teaching materials, by agreement. IOM also has some involvement in education, supporting school transportation.

SECTION 4: FINDINGS ON UNICEF COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION

that considerably harmed relationships at several levels. Although these relationships are now being rebuilt, the example reflects larger issues in regards to inter-agency coordination. In the case of UNICEF and UNHCR, the two organizations should develop a letter of understanding for their education response in Turkey, in line with the global-level Letter of Understanding and related guidance.

In the child protection sphere, UNICEF has struggled with its collaboration with UNHCR, in part due to the agencies’ different approaches to working with the Government. Although the evaluators did not identify any substantial differences in the agencies’ basic positions, differences in attitudes created friction. One example is the different approaches to pursuing the issue of unaccompanied minors. While UNHCR publicly criticized the Government for its performance in this area and accused the Government of not fulfilling its mandate, UNICEF adopted a more collaborative strategy, engaging the Government in dialogue and trying to influence decisions through other means, such as an exploratory field visit to Jordan.

Such tensions between UNICEF and UNHCR have remained unresolved, with negative consequences, including diminished joint advocacy and influencing potential of the two organizations. The situation has also left other actors with the impression that United Nations agencies have invested time and effort in contesting each other, rather than working together. This has impacted UNICEF’s reputation at times.

Although limited by official policy, UNICEF initially pursued informal relationships with international and Turkish NGOs, and subsequently helped provide the entry point for international NGOs to work in the area of refugee education in host communities. Increased collaboration with NGOs in regards to service delivery and to model new approaches would help establish UNICEF’s future role in strengthening sustainable system-wide approaches.

In the area of child protection, the partnership with TRCS was very appropriate for a number of reasons. TRCS was the only non-governmental body allowed to work in camps; the organization had substantial emergency capacity; it was well known to Turkish host communities; and it was able to achieve large-scale coverage in both camps and host communities. In addition, TRCS and UNICEF had already worked together on psychosocial support in the response to the Van earthquake and TRCS had recently established a psychosocial support department.

The partnership with IMC was also strategically relevant and appropriate. IMC registered with the Government early on and appears to have a highly effective standard operating model that involved working through multiservice centres in host communities.

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138 In interviews with UNHCR staff, interviewees expressed the belief that UNICEF is setting up a parallel education system by supporting the adjusted Syrian curriculum in Arabic and setting up temporary education centres in host communities, in contrast to UNHCR’s approach of promoting the integration of children into the Turkish education system. UNICEF, on the other hand, believes in giving children every opportunity to learn and is not wedded to one approach or the another. (Source: United Nations Children’s Fund CEE/CIS Regional Office, ‘Position paper on education of Syrian refugees in Turkey’, February 2015.) This argument became polarized and became the crux of the tensions between the two agencies.


140 Interviews with government authorities and civil society.

141 NGOs have not been permitted to work in the refugee camps.

UNICEF's engagement with Syrian children, adolescents and their families in camps has been strong. In March 2014, a youth-led assessment of the impact of CFS in camps was carried out. Although UNICEF has only a modest presence in host communities, its support for the XV Children's Forum held in Ankara in November 2014 with the support of MoFSP and the participation of Syrian children from host communities is an example of best practice in child participation and consultation.

**4.4 UNICEF’S COORDINATION ROLE**

The United Nations Country Team and the RRPs allocated the responsibility of the education sector to UNICEF until mid-2014, when UNHCR brought in a specialist; since then, the agencies have shared the responsibility. More importantly, in developmental terms, UNICEF supported MoNE to establish the Education Working Group at the beginning of 2014, and co-supports MoNE to chair it.

UNICEF has played a big part in bringing MoNE and NGOs together in education, and has supported the Government to meet with NGOs. This has been a key role for UNICEF; NGOs are looking to UNICEF for guidance on standards, teacher compensation and other aspects of their own response, for which UNICEF is negotiating sector-wide standards with MoNE.

Within the United Nations coordination system, leadership on child protection and sexual and gender-based violence was weak. UNHCR played the main coordination role and limited space was left for other actors. In this context, UNICEF assumed that discussing overall protection and sexual and gender-based violence issues would have benefited children as well. This was not true in the Turkish context, however. There were delayed coordinated actions on urgent protection concerns, including sexual and gender-based violence and early marriage.

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143 Globally, UNICEF coordinates the Education Cluster with Save the Children and leads many in-country Global Partnership for Education partnerships. Given this experience and its presence on the ground, UNICEF is an appropriate leader for the sector. This is complemented by UNHCR’s experience in refugee education.

144 UNICEF facilitated a meeting in Gaziantep between AFAD and MoNE in September 2013, ahead of the establishment of the Education Working Group in early 2014. Education Working Group members include: AFAD, MoNE, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM and the Türkiye Diyanet Foundation. TRCS has been included since the first meeting in 2015. (Source: Education Working Group, ‘Education Working Group Meeting’, Meeting minutes, 16 January 2014–5 March 2015.)

145 The Government requested that UNICEF provide this support. On 27 November 2013, UNICEF organized the first information sharing meeting with NGOs in Şanlıurfa, at the request of MoNE; and on 7 February 2014, UNICEF supported MoNE to hold a more comprehensive, nation-wide education information sharing meeting with NGOs in Gaziantep. (Source: United Nations Children’s Fund, Turkey Country Office, ‘Increased access to inclusive quality emergency education and basic health services for Syrian children living in host communities in Turkey: Progress report’.)
SECTION 5
FINDINGS ON UNICEF MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS
5.1 CONTEXT AND GENERAL ISSUES

This section considers the overall efficiency with which UNICEF managed its response to the refugee crisis, including the efficiency of operational support to the programme.

Turkey is an upper-middle-income country with a decent supply of educated, experienced human resources to draw on and a plethora of suppliers and transport companies to work with, in both Ankara and the south-east intervention area. Although the funding climate has been competitive due to the other ongoing L3 responses globally, funding for the response has to date provided adequately for key programmes, albeit with some reductions in activities. The funding situation has, however, limited the potential for expansion and for providing adequate support in some areas.

Operational support activities are reinforced both through the CEE/CIS Regional Office and through the Syria Hub within MENARO, based in Amman. One or the other of these offices has provided support as required and depending on needs. There appears to have been some confusion in regards to which office was responsible for providing technical support, however. Little support appears to have been provided (or requested) from the HQ level.

The Turkey Country Office has a number of very experienced national staff members within its operational support departments, some with more than 10 years of experience with UNICEF in Turkey. This foundation has enabled strong day-to-day management of the operational support departments. There have been some shortfalls, however, as described in Section 3.5.

The operational support functions have been working within a strong governmental structure where compliance with legal obligations must be strictly observed. The Government itself is the major player within the response; without government approval, very little can happen. Although this has some benefits related to clarity of regulation, the need to agree to all activities with governmental counterparts before they can be undertaken has led to some delays (e.g. in the delivery of winterization kits).

In terms of infrastructure and services, internal communications are well developed and roads and transportation infrastructure are of good quality. Furthermore, there are a number of experienced transport companies available to deliver goods and commodities to all locations. Facilities and services are available, and although the security situation (especially in the south-east) can be changeable, to date, staff security has been well managed under the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) umbrella.

From the perspective of the Turkey Country Office, the nature of the challenge posed by the refugee crisis only became apparent over time, in terms of the number of refugees, the duration of their stay and the predominantly non-camp, urban and dispersed nature of their settlement patterns. Having initially been confined to a role in the camps, it took time for the Country Office to adapt to the new opportunities that arose. As discussed below, the under-resourcing of the Gaziantep Office, the concentration of staff in Ankara and the time taken to recruit emergency staff reflect the difficulty that the Turkey Country Office has had in adapting its priorities to match the emerging reality of a massive refugee influx and an L3 corporate response expectation. These human resource factors in turn made it harder to respond to opportunities at the provincial/district level as they arose.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ The evaluation recognizes that steps are being taken to remedy this situation, including the recruitment of education field assistants to be located in the affected provinces.
The relatively low priority that UNICEF gave to resourcing the Turkey response – both in human and financial terms – compounded the difficulty of scaling up. The assumption that Turkey was largely self-sufficient arose in part from the Government’s own early stance, and the country’s relative wealth and state of development. While Turkey was part of the UNICEF regional planning process, it appears to have been of comparatively low priority in terms of support and fundraising from the Syria Hub/MENARO and HQ. In this respect, Turkey’s self-proclaimed ‘difference’ worked against it. Some respondents reported that lack of communication and some ideological differences between the two regional offices led to unclear and sometimes contradictory messages being sent to the Turkey Country Office. The evaluation team was unable to further substantiate this.

The evaluation concludes that, to some degree, a lack of ambition on the part of UNICEF in regard to the scale and coverage contributed to the programme’s slow evolution. This was far from being a typical emergency response, as the Turkey Country Office and the CEE/CIS Regional Office recognized. It took time for UNICEF as a whole to recognize the particular nature of the Turkey context, and the implications for UNICEF’s response. Nevertheless, the pressure from MENARO to scale up was understandable given the extent of the needs. While this was not for the most part a life-threatening situation, there was (and remains) a high degree of urgency to help meet the growing deficit in terms of refugee children’s access to education and protection services.

### 5.2 MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

As described in Section 1, for the purposes of the emergency response, the Turkey Country Office has reported to both MENARO and the CEE/CIS Regional Office since the L3 declaration was made, as well as to the Regional Director (joint Global Emergency Coordinator) in Amman and to the Syria Hub, as the regional coordinating mechanism. This proved to be problematic in the earlier stages of the intervention when the reporting hierarchy and lines of communication were not inherently clear. While some confusion about support roles persists, communications between the two regional offices are now reportedly functioning better than before.

For future interventions that cut across two or more regions, the country offices concerned should receive clear guidance from the very start. In this particular instance, it is not entirely clear whether or not the most efficient processes were used. For example, in regard to human resources, the recruitment of surge staff for the Turkey Country Office has been carried out by both the CEE/CIS Regional Office and the Syria Hub. Permanent staff recruitment, however, had to be routed through HQ in Geneva and then New York, with only technical oversight provided by MENARO. Time was inevitably lost while information was shared and approval received across the four offices, which was reflected in the lead times for some recruitments.

One clear shortcoming in the management of the Turkey Country Office was the seven-month gap between the departure of the former Representative and the arrival of his permanent successor.\(^\text{147}\) Although the Deputy Representative covered the representative position during this period, she continued to...

\(^{147}\) The person originally identified as successor was diverted to fill the representative post in Damascus.
have the deputy responsibilities. In addition, her ability to carry out the duties of the position was compromised by her lack of authority while serving on an interim basis. Decisions tended to be deferred in such circumstances, and the delay in filling the post slowed the evolution of UNICEF’s strategy and programme. This was evidenced in the under-resourcing of the Gaziantep Office, a situation that is now being rectified.

The capacity of UNICEF’s education team was compromised by the departure of the regular programme Chief of Education at roughly the same time as the Education in Emergencies Chief. This placed an extra burden on other education staff and may have created a gap in UNICEF’s relationships with government counterparts. All of this also placed additional burden on the Deputy Representative, who took on some of the related responsibilities.

The day-to-day functioning of UNICEF’s operational support departments was generally well managed considering the resources available. However, despite the hard work and dedication of experienced operational support staff, there were some problems with respect to the operational support provided. These were due, in part, to the reticence shown by the Turkey Country Office to add additional operational support staff members.

The Turkey Country Office has recruited more than 50 new staff members over the last two years. While the recruitment timescales for emergency staff have been reasonable,148 this, combined with the high numbers of surge staff coming and going,149 has meant a high volume of staff turnover (described in more detail below). Although the quality of the staff recruited seems to have been good, high staff turnover has caused discontinuity in programme support and additional time spent at all levels inducting and training new staff on their arrival.

The stationing of approximately 70 per cent of programme staff in Ankara, rather than in south-eastern Turkey, where the bulk of the programme has been conducted, has hurt programme performance. While there are crucial functions to be performed in Ankara (including liaising with government departments), and Ankara-based staff do travel to the provinces, as of March 2015, there were only four programme staff based in Gaziantep. The two field coordinators (both on relatively junior-level national contracts) are tasked with monitoring and reporting on all UNICEF operations in the 25 refugee camps, as well as on activities in host communities, while also carrying out a number of other functions. That this is an impossible task is reflected in the frustration shown by some governmental officials based in the camps150 who question UNICEF’s performance, commitment and lack of presence.

The Gaziantep Office lacks a senior manager, and apart from one education officer, has relied on visits from Ankara for technical support. The evaluation team believes that the lack of regular technical staff contributed to the programme’s slow evolution and probably led to missed opportunities at the local level. It certainly meant that UNICEF was not well placed to influence the policy agenda at the provincial and district levels. The out-posting of an education officer to Gaziantep proved useful both in building and maintaining relationships with the provinces and in monitoring progress.

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148 There have been more issues with respect to the recruitment of non-emergency staff than the recruitment of emergency staff.
149 This was compounded by the fact that, given the high number of L3 emergencies ongoing worldwide, surge staff were not easy to find.
150 Interviews conducted in camps in Kilis.
problem has now been recognized and the Country Office plans to substantially increase its capacity at the Gaziantep level.

The monitoring and evaluation team in Ankara does not seem to perform the standard monitoring and evaluation role in regard to humanitarian programme monitoring, being more focused on reporting than on learning and accountability. This needs to change, as little post-distribution monitoring work is currently being undertaken, with significant implications both for accountability and programme quality. Instead of having monitoring and evaluation field staff, the two Gaziantep-based field coordinators are expected to perform this function, which has involved (temporarily) covering 27 school construction sites, along with their other responsibilities, including being the frontline responders for any new refugee influxes. This is neither realistic nor appropriate, given the need to keep the monitoring function separate from the delivery function.

Overall, the evaluation team noted a tendency towards inadequate scale up of operational support staff, an issue that extended to the Ankara Office. For example, the human resources unit in Ankara has only ever had one officer allocated to it. It would appear that additional support in this department would have been beneficial. Future interventions should allocate sufficient resources to operational support roles, beyond minimum staff levels, ensuring additional capacity to cover sickness and statutory holiday entitlements, as well as the ability to cope with increased programme demands.

### 5.3 HUMAN RESOURCES

More than 50 new staff members have been recruited during the response period, including for a number of senior staff positions that can be difficult to fill. A common complaint expressed by Turkey Country Office staff during the evaluation was the high staff turnover and excessive time taken to recruit new staff, although this seems to have been worse for non-emergency staff than for those recruited specifically for the emergency.

For each new recruitment or surge deployment, time is required for training on in-house software, administrative procedures and security awareness, as well as briefing on sectoral responsibilities. High staff turnover has clearly meant extra time spent on induction that could have been better spent elsewhere, not to mention the negative effects that the discontinuity of staffing has had in terms of programme continuity and external representation.

Figure 6 (next page) illustrates the time taken to recruit the 24 emergency staff members recruited in 2013 and 2014. Five emergency staff members took more than three months (the expected recruitment standard) to recruit. Overall, however, performance in this area was in line with expectations.

The announcement of an L3 emergency in March 2013, and the related application of the human resources SSOPs, generated some benefits related to the recruitment of surge staff, the development of human resource strategies, and staff being brought in through standby partners. However, there were only five instances of staff being recruited by desk review; this approach only tended to work well when the

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151 This was due to the lack of a supervising construction engineer between March and May 2015.
152 A decision to rectify this was made as a part of the 2014 programme budget review; however, this is yet to be acted upon as of June 2015.
153 Ten staff members recruited in 2013 took more than 120 days to recruit.
154 UNICEF key performance indicator.
candidates were already known to the Turkey Country Office.

It has been difficult to attract emergency staff to work on temporary assignment (TA) contracts. Figure 7 illustrates that fixed-term (FT) contracts were used far more for programmatic and operational support staff than for emergency staff, based on a sample of 54 staff members recruited in 2013 and 2014. In 2013, all emergency staff members were brought in on TA contracts and in 2014, once the long-term nature of the crisis was clear, two FT contracts were issued.

The Turkey Country Office’s reluctance to move towards FT contracts for emergency staff is understandable, given the uncertain funding picture. However, this also made recruitment more difficult at a time of great competition for new staff among United Nations agencies, some of which had already started to offer (more attractive) FT contracts. This is linked to the slow realization within the Turkey Country Office that the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey was going to be a long-term commitment, and that such roles should be budgeted for accordingly.155 A compounding factor was the need for

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155 Refugee numbers started to rise significantly in the second quarter of 2013.

FT staff to be approved by either the CEE/CIS Regional Office (for national officers) or New York HQ (for international staff), which seems to be a cumbersome administrative requirement in an emergency context.

Figure 8 illustrates the emergency intervention staffing levels during the response period, as compared with the total refugee numbers. The camp population has remained more or less constant since the second quarter of 2013 when there were only 20 camps, until the time of writing this report (mid 2015), when 25 camps were in operation. The population in the camps has only increased marginally during this period, from approximately 200,000 in the second quarter of 2013 to 220,000 in the first quarter of 2015.

At the same time, the number of refugees remaining in host communities rose from approximately 200,000 in the second quarter of 2013, to 380,000 in the first quarter of 2014, to more than four times that figure in the first quarter of 2015, and has continued to rise since. In this regard, UNICEF has been slow to expand in response to the escalating scale of the overall refugee crisis.

5.4 SUPPLY AND PROCUREMENT

The volume of procurement undertaken by the Turkey Country Office has increased significantly over the last few years, from US$6 million in 2013 to US$13 million in 2014 to US$28 million as of March 2015. However, the efficiency of the procurement process has at times been questionable. The provision of winterization kits was late in both 2013–2014 and 2014–2015. 156 Although the latter delay was attributed to the late arrival of final government figures on refugee numbers (received in December 2014), better forward planning and the pre-positioning of stocks based on estimates of required needs, could have helped to avoid this. Instead, refugees received the needed assistance only as the winter was coming to an end. A solution to this problem, possibly involving a switch to cash distribution, must be found for the coming winter. However, since this is a programming area that already falls under the remit

FIGURE 8  Staffing levels compared with refugee figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

156 Items were delivered in January/February 2014, and in February 2015.
of UNHCR and IOM, it is suggested that these organizations take responsibility for the entire caseload, leaving UNICEF to focus its attention on its areas of distinct competence.

To date, the vast majority of purchasing has been undertaken at the Ankara level, and has significantly increased in volume over the last three years. The August 2014 audit report highlighted some concerns in terms of documentation protocols and the use of the Virtual Integrated System of Information tracking software, but in general concluded that procedures were being followed correctly.

Although the correct procedure appears to have been followed, there is concern that at times the procurement process took too long, even after the L3 emergency was announced. The situation improved during the second half of 2014 with the establishment of a number of long-term agreements with identified suppliers (e.g. for diapers and school furniture). According to senior procurement staff, this reduced transaction times by two to three months. This is to be welcomed, although perhaps such time savings could have been achieved earlier.

All procurement department staff are currently on TA contracts, including the Supply Officer, and the department has experienced high staff turnover, including a number of surge placements. It should be noted that international placements, while helpful in strengthening the procurement processes under L3 emergency operations, can take longer to adapt to and understand local purchasing environments. Wherever possible it would be preferable to employ local procurement officers, even in temporary roles, with adequate supervision.

Medical supplies have tended to be purchased overseas and are stockpiled within the Ministry of Health. These and high-energy biscuits seem to be the main items treated in this way. Considering the tardiness of the procurement of winterization kits, it might be worth considering stockpiling these items as well (unless a cash distribution is substituted).

Perhaps more could be done to ensure that UNICEF is paying the correct prices for purchased items. Cost comparisons are analysed using the United Nations common services system, although not all United Nations agencies are fully contributing to this. The supply department could look further afield to monitor what international NGOs are paying. AFAD reported that it is paying less than UNICEF for the same school building designs even though AFAD paid tax and UNICEF did not. This may be due to factors like economies of scale, but suggests the need for vigilance. It may also be useful to compare procurement costs between different countries in the Syrian sub-region to ensure that funds are being used efficiently.

One example of a contract that appears inefficient is the contract for the use of outside interpreters at US$600 per day. While it may be difficult to find potential employees with the relevant Arabic, Turkish and English Language skills, it would appear to make better economic sense to employ someone on an FT contract (even if not fully utilized) than to pay external interpreters, who may have little idea of the work UNICEF does and who may therefore be less well placed to interpret on UNICEF’s behalf. The lack of an in-house translator also has a detrimental effect in terms of communications capacity.

As much as L3 SSOPs have been used in procurement, some delays have still occurred. As is the case during standard operations, the

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157 The November 2014 programme budget review proposed changing these positions to FT.
158 With an expanded team and increased activities expected in Gaziantep, the need for a regular translator can only increase.
requirement for a contract review committee to authorize purchases over US$50,000 has been responsible for some of the delays, and the level of this requirement would appear to be too low. Although there are a number of long-term agreements now in place, these should have been organized earlier in the intervention.

5.5 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND FUNDRAISING

Day-to-day financial operations have been well managed, with authorization levels and the delegation of authorities distributed and adhered to as per standard accounting practices. The only real area of concern, as mentioned in the August 2014 audit report, is the AFAD school construction activities that are being implemented under the HACT system. These require an independent audit in the near future, as do the operations of other implementing partners working under this system. This is being followed up on with the necessary government departments.

Although HACT is an accepted UNICEF implementation strategy, the possibility that some contentious issues may arise within the audit process should be anticipated, given the relatively high risks associated with this type of work (e.g. misappropriation, use of cheap materials). Should such risk materialize, it could strain relations with the Government. It should also be noted that HACT transfers should normally be reported on within three months (in a one-page explanation of what the funding was spent on) before another transfer can be made. Exceptions have had to be made for AFAD in this respect.

Annual planning and monitoring of expenditure by project is well managed, with spending shortfalls highlighted in advance. There have been difficulties aligning reporting on spending with the consolidated reporting system adopted in MENARO/the Syria Hub. This has now been resolved and spending figures to date can now be consolidated by sector for each of the emergency programme activities.

There does seem to be some difficulty, however, in producing overall funding situation information on an annual basis due to the need to re-phase unspent funds. As of the end of 2014, US$17.4 million in funds from 31 grants received in 2014 remained unspent and needed to be inserted into budget plans for 2015. All grants were reported to have been utilized fully before their expiry date, however.159

A funding strategy was in place for 2014–2015, whereby fundraising was primarily done through regionalized consolidated appeals, although resources were also acquired through a number of individual proposals to the United States Agency for International Development, the European Union and DFID. The Turkey response received 62 per cent (US$21 million out of the US$34 million requested) of its regional appeal in 2013, and 50 per cent (US$32 million out of the US$65 million requested) in 2014. Although a number of respondents did not believe that underfunding was a significant constraint for the Turkey Country Office, these were the lowest percentages of funding received against the appeals, as compared with the other four countries included in the appeal. In 2013, each of the other four countries were at least 90 per cent funded. Where a shortfall has occurred, activities highlighted in the plans were prioritized, and less urgent or less important activities were cancelled or reduced. There is no indication that budgets were inflated nor is there any indication of lack of donor confidence in UNICEF.

159 Turkey Country Office.
UNICEF appears to have been highly dependent on individual donor proposals to kick start its response, notably the European Union proposal approved in March 2013, which also allowed UNICEF to open the office in Gaziantep. In that case, the gap between submission of the concept note and approval of the project was roughly four months. In an emergency context, four months is too lengthy. The evaluators question whether UNICEF’s capacity for advance (self-) financing is adequate for such contexts. The implementation delay in this case was considerable, and might have been avoided had it been possible to underwrite at least the initial stages of the intervention from UNICEF’s own funds.160

As the response expands into host communities, the need to identify new funding sources will increase. More could be made of the presence of the Turkish National Committee for UNICEF office located in Ankara, which, although generating some funds for the Turkey Country Office intervention, could potentially produce more. Similarly, although generally provided on a loan basis, more could have and perhaps should be made of the UNICEF Emergency Programme Fund. Funding from the Central Emergency Response Fund has been successfully applied for and utilized.161

5.6 COMMUNICATIONS

Media communication activities are carried out by an experienced team within the Turkey Country Office, supported by both the Syria Hub and Geneva HQ. Of these two, the Syria Hub has the greater capacity to support activities both financially and in terms of time availability. The Geneva communications team covers 21 countries and as a result, only has time for technical guidance and oversight, as required.

As a communications vehicle, the No Lost Generation initiative appears to have had some impact, although international awareness of the scale and volatility of the situation of the 1.7 million refugees in Turkey appears relatively low, particularly in regard to non-camp populations. As Turkey Country Office operations move towards a greater focus on such communities, and the need for funding grows accordingly, there should be renewed effort to raise awareness both in the donor and public domains.

Within Turkey, UNICEF does well in regard to social media attention, although some feel that the Turkish public is losing interest, despite the ever-increasing numbers arriving and the associated social issues. Again, a renewed effort should be made in this area – perhaps in collaboration with the Turkish National Committee for UNICEF.

160 Although some funds were accessed from the Emergency Programme Fund in 2012, neither these, nor the funds mobilized through the Central Emergency Response Fund, were on a scale that allowed for significant scale up.

161 US$325,280 was received at the end of 2012, and a further US$840,000 was received in 2015.
SECTION 6

SUSTAINABILITY, FUTURE PERSPECTIVES AND LESSONS LEARNED
6.1 OVERVIEW

This section addresses the sustainability and connectedness evaluation criteria and the related resilience agenda. In this context, the evaluation offers perspectives to help guide UNICEF thinking about future strategy and approaches in response to the refugee crisis. The situation poses challenges in both the short- and medium-terms, regardless of which of various possible scenarios actually materialize (return, local settlement, etc.). Some of these reflections are in the form of guiding questions rather than answers.

This section also pulls together the key lessons learned from the UNICEF response to the Turkey refugee crisis. Documenting these lessons (see Section 7.4) is an important step in the process of organizational learning.

After almost four years, there is general recognition that the refugee crisis is not going to be resolved soon and that a shift in the approach from emergency to longer-term assistance must be made. This is complicated both by political factors and by the available funding sources, although donors are also beginning to take a longer-term perspective.\textsuperscript{162} The No Lost Generation initiative provides a framework for a common response to the needs of Syrian children across the region. Initially focussing on emergency response actions, the one-year review of the initiative acknowledges the need to re-think the strategic goals into a longer-term vision.\textsuperscript{163} The present evaluation confirms this view.

In undertaking this strategic exercise in Turkey and in other countries in the region there is a need to analyse possible future scenarios for Syrian families and their children (i.e. return, integration, resettlement), to assess which child-related issues are likely to arise in each of the scenarios and what would be the impact and repercussions if these issues are not addressed.

The 3RP makes the following projection concerning the evolution of the crisis: “The projected number of Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2015 is 2.5 million of whom 300,000 will reside in 25 camps and 2.2 million people will live among communities. In addition, it is estimated that 8.2 million people in refugee hosting areas will be impacted.” The impact on the people concerned (Syrian and Turkish) will likely be felt across generations.

As understood in the 3RP, the resilience agenda demands consideration of how the presence of refugees is impacting host communities: “The resilience-based response will enable the international community to extend its support to the most affected local populations with reference to basic needs, public water and waste management, health care, education and livelihood initiatives, jointly devised with the relevant authorities.” This poses a considerable challenge to UNICEF in defining its priorities, given the available resources, but is consistent with its equity focus and demands proper consideration.

As described earlier in the evaluation, the social cohesion agenda is likely to be of continuing importance and UNICEF has a significant role to play in this regard. This is particularly true in terms of access to jobs and services. Several studies have highlighted the impact of Syrian refugees on Turkish communities, especially with regard to access to services.\textsuperscript{164} Medical care

\textsuperscript{162} Interviews with donors, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{163} United Nations Children’s Fund, No Lost Generation Initiative: Protecting the Futures of Children Affected by the Syria Crisis - One Year Report, September 2014.
is an example that the evaluation team encountered in its field visits. Under the Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014, Syrians have free access to medical care and medicines. Contradictory perceptions about the practical reality of this appeared widespread: on the one hand, host communities reported that Syrian patients were prioritized over Turkish patients; on the other hand, Syrians reported being discriminated against by health authorities in favour of Turkish families.  

UNICEF’s education and child protection programmes provide a unique opportunity to work on social protection. The establishment of preschool education that brings Turkish and Syrian children together (as proposed by the Turkey Country Office) is a good example of a concrete social cohesion activity, and UNICEF should collaborate and advocate with NGOs to scale up this approach. Consideration should be given to jointly working on peer activities within the school environment (for both teachers and students); and removing the objects of accusations against Syrians, particularly those related to cleanliness and aggression, for example by compensating school cleaners in double shift schools. Staff with programme experience in social cohesion and peacebuilding in the two sectors should be retained and recruited, and advice should be sought from specialists in UNICEF HQ.

UNICEF should work through NGOs and others to carry out service provision and modelling on the ground, and rebalance its strategy in favour of policy, advocacy and knowledge management.

Meanwhile, UNICEF is facing more immediate challenges regarding the sustainability of its current approaches. Perhaps the most pressing is the question of teacher remuneration, discussed below. The current compensation scheme has allowed Syrian teachers to practice but is not a substitute for a properly paid job. If teachers are to be retained, it is crucial that they are able to secure a salary and job security. The question of whether they will be permitted to work as salaried teachers in the Turkish system is therefore a pivotal one, and a priority area for UNICEF advocacy.

In regard to the sustainability of child protection approaches, the current reliance on the CFS model as the entry point for protection leaves much to chance, including the willingness of donors and the Government to continue to support this model. Demonstrating the importance and effectiveness of this approach in the camps is essential if support is to be maintained; hence our recommendation below concerning evaluation of the CFS programme. Whether the same approach provides a scalable model outside of the camps is less clear, although it provides a clear entry point in conjunction with the multi-service centre approach. New ways of reaching vulnerable children (including unaccompanied minors and those living on the street) will be required and adapted to the urban environment in which many are located.

### 6.2 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION

**Education and accreditation** are fundamental to the life chances of Syrian children, yet many children have not been to school for a few years, there are not enough places for them in schools, and apart from the few who gain access to Turkish universities, many will not achieve certification and so will be cut off from further study and work. If the educational needs of Syrian refugee children are not addressed quickly, the next generation will suffer: global

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165 Interviews in Gaziantep.
evidence suggests that the education of children (particularly girls) is influenced by the level of education of their parents (particularly mothers).

The type of education needed depends on a number of uncertain factors, particularly whether Syrians will return home and if so, when. Education therefore needs to be discussed in the context of integration into Turkish society, habitation within the country, return to the Syrian Arab Republic or, in some cases, third country resettlement. Although most refugees will wish to return home at some stage, and have a right to do so, this may not happen for some years. Meanwhile, they need to function in Turkish society, for which the acquisition of Turkish language is especially important.

What skills will the refugees need in order to function in the short-term in Turkey while learning and maintaining skills to rebuild their country and their communities in the medium to longer term? Does the latter justify a region-wide education programme?

In terms of integration, if the Government broadly intends to integrate Syrians into the Turkish system, what will be the nature of their particular needs? What will this mean in terms of curriculum, qualifications, physical facilities, human resources and support services? What will it mean for the Turkish system as a whole, in terms of places, capacity and social cohesion processes?

Various principles apply here and should be reconciled: the best interests of the child, the right to a quality education, the right to an identity and to learn in their mother tongue and the aspirations of Syrian young people and their families. How are these resolved? Who decides? Will there need to be a variety of education paths from which parents and young people can choose?

Another key issue is equity in relation to all population groups, including host population communities and other refugee groups. What are the equity challenges for education? What opportunity does this crisis present in Turkey for making the Turkish education system more inclusive?

In regard to social cohesion, the evaluation team encountered attitudes towards Syrians, especially in double-shift schools, regarding ‘aggressive’ behaviour and the poor condition in which facilities are left after classes. Simple measures like the remuneration of Syrian cleaners might help address such perceptions. More generally, the goodwill of the Turkish people towards Syrians is showing signs of diminishing as problems like rent increases and job shortages are attributed to Syrian refugees. The evaluation team found some positive approaches to addressing social tensions, such as sports events that brought Syrian and Turkish children together, and the presence of Turkish language teachers (who had clearly befriended Syrian teachers) during Syrian shifts. However, the enormous material gulf between the two groups was evident, especially when discussing their accommodation and certain cultural differences relating to family circumstances.

Education can and should address social cohesion at several levels. What can be done to lessen the potential damage to the fabric of

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166 UNHCR predicts that refugees in a crisis like this will spend at least five years in a new host country.
167 AFAD reports that 56 per cent of Syrian refugees in camps and 63 per cent of Syrian refugees in host communities will return to the Syrian Arab Republic when the conflict ends; 25 per cent of those in camps and 15 per cent of those in host communities will return when the regime changes; and only a small number of Syrians will stay in Turkey: 5 per cent of those in the camps and 8 per cent of those out of the camps. Those estimates were made in 2013 and may have changed since. Source: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey, 2013: Field Survey Results*, AFAD, 2013. Refer also to Mercy Corps, ‘Understanding the needs of Syrian and Turkish adolescents in Gaziantep, Turkey, to support personal resilience’, June 2014.
Turkish society? What role can education play in positively enhancing social cohesion?

### 6.3 KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES IN EDUCATION

UNICEF has piloted several education-related initiatives in the refugee response in Turkey that provide useful lessons and potential models for wider application:

(i) The code of conduct for teachers, which is signed by all Syrian teachers at the end of their training, sets out standards for behaviour. This has given the authorities an instrument with which to address corporal punishment and other behaviours, and strengthen training in these areas.

(ii) Incentive payments under the compensation scheme for Syrian teachers have been introduced with an innovative modality. All teachers can access payments through a Post Office account, an approach that may also be of use for payment of personnel in other sectors. While the level of remuneration was criticized by some Syrian teachers during field visits, it was generally appreciated. The success of this approach will depend on its sustainability; the programme has perhaps one more year of funding to support the payments. However, there is the possibility that a specified number of work permits for Syrian teachers could be granted, following dialogue on the issue, which would allow for salaried remuneration on Turkish system scales.

Both the code of conduct and the compensation scheme are part of the Management Strategy for Education Personnel and have use beyond UNICEF-supported programmes. In particular, the NGO community can use this strategy as a framework. Practice relating to teacher compensation and levels of remuneration, the code of conduct and recruitment practices should be agreed to sector-wide. UNICEF is currently in negotiations over the level of teacher compensation, which varies widely across agency-supported programmes.

The development of YOBIS for foreign teachers and students in Turkey will fill a critical data gap, and could be considered in other refugee contexts where alternative methods of needs assessment are problematic. One of the key pillars is the system’s compatibility with the existing Education Management Information System, and the potential of YOBIS to be applied to all foreign students and teachers, rather than Syrians alone, increasing the inclusivity of the system. This also demonstrates the use of non-traditional modes of partnership.

### 6.4 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD PROTECTION

Despite the lack of consolidated and systematically collected data on child protection, a number of outstanding protection issues are evident in the Turkish context. Early marriage is one of these. During the evaluation, multiple sources – including focus group discussions with girls and women in Nizip and Şanlıurfa – confirmed an increasing trend of early marriage among Syrian girls.

Although early marriage is not a new phenomenon among Syrians, conflict-related

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168 Interview with UNHCR in Ankara.

169 According to Article 16 of the Syrian Arab Republic’s personal status law, the age of marriage in the country is 18 for males and 17 for females, with an exception in Article 18 to decrease the age of the girl to 13 years if three conditions are met: puberty, the approval of a judge, and the consent of a guardian, father or grandfather. Source: International Rescue Committee, *Are We Listening? Acting on our commitments to women and girls affected by the Syrian conflict*, IRC, September 2014.
drivers contribute to girls marrying at increasingly younger ages. Economic pressures on the family and weaker social and community protection mechanisms are the main underlying causes of girls marrying young. In the TRCS centre in Şanlıurfa, a mother confirmed that when resources are scarce, early marriage is a viable alternative available to families. “Mothers are now eager to give away their female children as soon as they can”.

Besides the effect that early marriage is having on the current generation of girls, the repercussions of this phenomenon on the next generation of children should be analysed. Specific to the context in Turkey is the increasing trend of girls being married as second wives to Turkish men. The potential for discrimination and limited access to rights for the children born in these informal marriages should be carefully considered.

Economic and security concerns among families are driving other harmful practices. Although the extent of child labour is unclear, it appears to be widespread and leaves the children concerned – particularly street children – vulnerable and lacking in education. Similarly, family protection strategies that take children (especially girls) out of school and keep them at home have negative implications for the well-being of children today, and for their role as the future parents of tomorrow.

Child protection staff in the Turkey Country Office have rightly identified social cohesion as a priority and it forms one of the components of the 2015 strategy. The peer-to-peer social cohesion programme is a first and concrete attempt to address the issue from a child protection perspective. Turkish child rights committees are engaged in peer-to-peer social cohesion programing with the support of MoFSP and UNICEF in 10 provinces.

There is scope for education and child protection social cohesion initiatives to be better aligned in the process of designing an overarching strategy.

6.5 SOME KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES IN CHILD PROTECTION

Some of UNICEF’s child protection interventions provide lessons and potential best practice models:

(i) The adolescent empowerment and participation methodology has the potential to become a standard operational methodology for CFS in the region. Its approach and impact on youth volunteers and children should be thoroughly examined so as to provide lessons for the use of a similar model in other contexts in the region. Based on what the evaluators saw, it is recommended to extend the age group of youth leaders up to 24, as suggested in the one-year review of the No Lost Generation initiative.

(ii) The online monitoring platform also has the potential to be replicated in similar contexts. Benefits and challenges in adopting the platform need to be evaluated and to be documented.

(iii) Particularly since it is a new model of response for emergency actors in Turkey, the CFS experience in the camps needs to be evaluated in its own right and the results used for different purposes (e.g. advocacy with the Government, learning for TRCS, etc.)

(iv) The family parenting training programme is another example of best practice: it shows how UNICEF can support the Government in adapting and using its existing resources in different circumstances, thus strengthening existing child protection mechanisms.

170 Including children living and working on the street.
SECTION 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

With regard to the relevance and appropriateness of UNICEF’s response to the refugee crisis, the evaluation concludes that UNICEF established appropriate priorities for itself by focussing on education and child protection. This reflected both the priority unmet needs and the comparative advantage of UNICEF in Turkey, particularly given its pre-existing relations with the relevant ministries. The response has been slow to evolve in relation to the growing problem of non-camp refugees, largely due to resource constraints and limited operating space, but is now being appropriately re-focused to address this dominant challenge.

An overarching UNICEF written strategy is needed to unite the different strands of the organization’s thinking. The Turkey Country Office should ‘own’ this strategy, or country-based approach to strategic planning, which the regional offices should have supported and encouraged from the outset (this was likely constrained by the emphasis on regional planning). In the case of Turkey, the crucial link between the education and child protection strands of UNICEF’s response was lost during the earlier response, resulting in a significant loss of overall coherence. This link needs to be re-established, both conceptually and programmatically. The decision to re-unite the emergency and regular programmes (after a period of separation) is the right one. The separation of the two caused problems, including lack of coordinated engagement with ministries, and the loss of programme coherence and quality.

The decision to devote relatively less attention to health, nutrition and WASH – normally areas in which UNICEF would be expected to play a major role in an emergency setting – was largely justified by the circumstances. The WASH needs of refugees in camps have been well covered, but whether those living outside of camps have access to adequate WASH services is less clear. An assessment of WASH needs is needed, particularly in the more overcrowded host communities. In regard to nutrition, while acute malnutrition is not prevalent among the refugees, levels of chronic malnutrition are high. Given both the general developmental implications for children and the specific health risks associated with micronutrient deficiency (e.g. vitamin A deficiency), UNICEF should continue to collaborate with the Government, UNHCR and WFP on this issue.

Regarding health, UNICEF played an important role in the polio vaccination campaigns conducted by the Government in the border areas, in collaboration with WHO, as part of a region-wide initiative following the polio outbreak in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013–2014. The Government’s decision to end those campaigns appears risky, and the overall levels of vaccination coverage among Syrian refugees are low enough to raise significant concerns about potential future disease outbreaks, including measles.

Although the evaluation concludes that UNICEF’s strategic choices were the right ones, UNICEF programming has struggled to keep pace with the scale and nature of the evolving needs. This has been largely related to restricted operating space and limited data, as well as the limited availability of financial and human resources. At the time that the evaluation was conducted in March 2015, the emphasis on camp and non-camp work was roughly equal in programme terms, although the ratio of camp to non-camp refugees was around 1 to 8. Yet for two years – since March 2013 – the option of working outside of camps had been open, in principle, suggesting that the reasons for the slow evolution of the programme and its coverage go beyond the question of operating space and governmental permission.

The evaluation can draw only limited conclusions about the effectiveness of the programme.
A variety of factors lie behind this, in particular: the lack of clear or consistently stated objectives; the lack of baseline and assessment data; weak and inconsistent programme monitoring; and inconsistent reporting against objectives. In some cases, targets appear to have been missed by a wide margin, and this cannot simply be attributed to lack of funding. Some of the targets set were probably not realistically achievable in the prevailing context. The differences between targets for which UNICEF had direct responsibility for delivery and those for which it had either joint or indirect responsibility challenged the evaluation of performance. This was particularly significant when evaluating performance against achievement of the CCCs. Overall, the evaluation concludes that in most respects, UNICEF did what it could within the constraints of the operating environment and the available resources to ensure that the CCCs were met.

While slow delivery has affected the timeliness of some of UNICEF’s interventions, the bigger issue has been the lack of coverage. Specifically, UNICEF (and others) have not been able to ensure access to essential services such as education and child protection for non-camp refugees. While this has largely been due to circumstances beyond UNICEF’s control, including the Government’s reluctance to accept the need for help with this agenda, opportunities now exist for significantly increasing the scope of UNICEF’s work in this area, assuming that funding can be secured. This may require an approach quite different from that adopted inside the camps.

The efficiency with which the programme was implemented was affected by some of the factors described above, and UNICEF appears to have underestimated the support requirements of a programme of this scale. Human resource limitations, including high levels of dependence on temporary surge staff over a long period, negatively impacted delivery and quality. Slow implementation affected some aspects of the programme, though this was often related to factors beyond UNICEF’s control.

In regard to the sustainability of UNICEF’s interventions, progress has been made in the latter stages of the response as UNICEF has increasingly focused on encouraging system-wide changes in policy and practice. That said, a number of its more direct interventions (including paying teacher incentives) are dependent on external funding that is unlikely to continue in the medium-term. The sustainability of these interventions may depend on the Government including them in its own spending plans. The sustainability of the CFS model, and its viability outside camps, is also in question.

Concerning the connection with the wider country programme, Syrian refugee issues have been included in the new country programme document and integrated into the analysis and outcomes of the regular Turkey Country Programme. This is a significant step forward in the attempt to integrate responses to the Syrian crisis into the regular programme and needs to be followed by appropriate management and implementation arrangements. While donors are likely to require separate proposals and reporting for refugee-related programmes, the case should be made for an integrated approach.

Although UNICEF made good use of the limited space and resources available, and worked hard and creatively to influence government policy, it tended to be reactive rather than proactive in some aspects of its response, including fundraising. UNICEF has tended to do what it can with the available resources (internal and external) – often with considerable ingenuity. The evaluation team suggests that a more proactive approach is now needed, based on a re-formulation of the strategic case for providing greater assistance in Turkey. The No Lost Generation initiative still provides a sound conceptual
framework for this, but requires updating and elaboration in relation to the particular circumstances now prevailing in Turkey.

Overall, UNICEF has taken a conservative approach to risk in the Turkey context. On the one hand, the organization has taken what the evaluation concludes were some appropriate risks on the programme side, including the initial commitment to the construction of schools. On the other hand, as noted above, UNICEF has been risk averse in terms of advance financing and underwriting of programme expenditure. The SSOPs that apply in L3 contexts were only used to a limited extent and could have been used more.

One factor that affected not only UNICEF but also the wider response was the extent of knowledge gaps regarding the living conditions and profile of the refugee population, particularly those living in host communities. The Government’s initial reluctance to allow international agencies to conduct needs assessments may now be changing. UNICEF has an important role to play in collaboration with the Government, UNHCR, TRCS and NGOs in shedding new light on the needs of refugee children. This should be an organizational priority. UNICEF advocated strongly with the Government in the early stages of the response for joint, cross-sectoral needs assessments (education/child protection). So far, only sample surveys and qualitative studies exist, and these are largely carried out by other agencies such as international NGOs. These provide helpful insights but are no substitute for the more comprehensive needs assessments now urgently required.

7.2 SECTOR-SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

Education conclusions

Given the political and operational constraints of the context, UNICEF established an appropriate role for itself within the education response, both within the United Nations and with the Government of Turkey. The organization has both the mandate and comparative advantage to do so, given its global experience and credibility in emergency education. However, the longer-term education strategy is unclear to the evaluation team.

UNICEF has substantially addressed the five core commitments in education in regard to camp-based populations and has continued to demonstrate leadership in the sector, despite some differences in approach and ‘turf battles’ with UNHCR. As noted in Section 2, there have been some gaps. Most importantly, while good coverage of needs was possible in the early stages of the crisis when the majority of school-age children were housed in camps, UNICEF and others have been unable to extend coverage to the majority of children in non-camp settings for the reasons described above.

Some outstanding elements of the response deserve special mention. One is the Education Personnel Management Strategy, which includes the much-needed components of teacher compensation and the teacher code of conduct. These and other areas of best practice are detailed in Section 6.

On the question of programme performance, UNICEF’s close relationship with MoNE was an asset, particularly in policy terms, though it sometimes struggled to reconcile this relationship with its relationship with AFAD in the emergency response. Implementation delays were a source of some frustration for AFAD, although the fault for these does not lie solely with UNICEF. Procurement lead times and the time taken to secure funding from donors to work in newly opened space prevented UNICEF from responding as early as it could have. As noted above, there is a significant human resources dimension to this.

Overall, UNICEF has been responsive to the specific factors relating to the education needs
of Syrian children in Turkey, particularly the issues of language and curriculum. Their needs relate both to the immediate future in exile, and to the longer-term future either in Turkey or back in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the transition, students need to be enabled to learn, and much remains to be done to equip these children for life in Turkey (e.g. through extra Turkish language classes), while pursuing activities related to preserving their own culture and preparing them for return.

Child protection conclusions
Considering the challenges in the operating environment, UNICEF’s child protection response to the Syrian crisis has been an appropriate one. That said, in some areas, the UNICEF comparative advantage has not been fully utilized. UNICEF played only a limited leadership role in the area of child protection, opportunities for joint advocacy with UNHCR were not always taken, and the link between child protection and education was not used to its full potential. As noted above, the de-linking of these two strands has now been tackled, which has already produced promising synergies, including a longer-term approach to the response.

An example of longer-term thinking is the two-year child protection strategy proposed to MoFSP at the end of 2014. One of the strategy components is the further strengthening of the institutionalized national child protection and coordination mechanisms under MoFSP in the southern provinces. This should reinforce the ability of the provincial directorates of child services to prevent and respond to child protection concerns for Syrian and Turkish children.

Providing psychosocial support through CFS proved to be an optimal solution to addressing the psychosocial needs of children in the camps. However, more urgently needs to be done to scale up the presence in non-camp situations where the majority of Syrian children live. Embedding CFS into multiservice centres in non-camp settings is an effective model for attracting children and building trust with their families, although other options may need to be explored to achieve the scale of coverage required.

Child protection advocacy actions aimed at the Government of Turkey have played a substantial role in the changing attitudes of governmental actors. The general realization that the Syrian refugee crisis is a protracted one paves the way for an increased emphasis on preventing and responding to specific child protection concerns (e.g. child labour, street children, early marriage) that require the establishment of specialized case management and referral mechanisms.

The use of the adolescent empowerment and participation methodology to engage adolescents and youth as leaders in CFS appears to have been highly successful. However, no impact evaluation of this component of the programme has yet been undertaken. The main limitation of this approach seems to be the absence of prospects for youth volunteers after the age of 18. This is already being corrected in line with the No Lost Generation initiative. In this context, UNICEF also needs to concern itself with the 18 to 25 age group.

7.3 MANAGEMENT, FINANCE AND SUPPORT CONCLUSIONS
In general, the day-to-day functioning of the operational support departments was well managed within the expected operational protocols that exist. This was facilitated by the experienced core members of the operations support team. Issues have been raised, notably with respect to high staff turnover, the type of contracts onto which staff are recruited, the late delivery of some winterization items, and
the lack of conventional monitoring and evaluation activities undertaken from Ankara. Some of these issues – for example, the regional financial reporting issue and the need for more local staff in the procurement department – have already been identified and are being rectified.

Overall, it would appear that the Turkey Country Office has scaled up emergency sectoral staff without undertaking the equivalent (necessary) increase in operational support staff. In terms of the overall structure of the response, more staff should have been dedicated to the south-eastern Turkey field of intervention much earlier than they were. Staff levels in Gaziantep at the time of the intervention were well below what would be required to match an emergency of this scale, although efforts are underway to address this. To a certain extent, UNICEF’s reputation has been diminished because of this, which needs to be rectified. Increased programmatic presence and a diversified response that supports both camp and host community refugees will support this process.

Supply activities increased substantially over the intervention period, and although these were generally well managed considering the high staff turnover in this department, efforts need to be made to ensure that UNICEF knows it is getting the best price and quality for their expenditures. The financial management of payments has been well controlled; the only cause for concern is the audit report of AFAD construction activities, which needs to take place in the near future according to HACT procedures. The on-going monitoring of actual costs against budgets has been well managed and controlled.

The management team carried out fundraising activities as a unit; allocating the responsibility to one person may have been beneficial. Communications activities have also gone well with support from both MENARO and Geneva HQ.

The financing of the response in Turkey suffered two significant drawbacks. One was the uncertainty and delay in financing the proposed programme budgets, which made forward planning difficult. Less reliance on specific donor proposals and greater availability of advance financing would have significantly helped. The second main reported problem was that, with funds channelled through the separate emergency section in the Turkey Country Office, only limited funds were available for exploring options for expansion beyond the refugee camps to meet the needs of the majority of refugees living in host communities.

7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1A: Overall UNICEF strategy (Turkey Country Office, near-term)

UNICEF should put together an overarching strategy for its response to the refugee crisis, covering short, medium and longer-term objectives.

- This should be complementary to sector-specific strategies for child protection, education and other sectors, providing a common contextual analysis for the sectors (scenarios, etc.), identifying areas of synergy between them, and providing a framework for identifying programme and advocacy priorities. The No Lost Generation framework could be used as a basis for this.

- The strategy should be consistent with the priorities set out in the country programme document.

- The strategy should be based on a stock-taking of the current situation, including likely future scenarios; perspectives of the Government and international and local agencies; and the aspirations of Syrians themselves. It should be underpinned by a
theory of change that properly reflects the variable factors at work.

- The strategy needs to define any new direction for UNICEF inputs and interventions and detail an exit strategy from any components already established that have been overtaken by new needs. Particular discussion is necessary in relation to the creation of new facilities (e.g. temporary education centres, CFS), or adaptation of existing facilities.

- The strategy should be accompanied by costed action plans and a related fundraising strategy. It should also include a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan, such as to test the direct and indirect benefits of interventions.

- This strategy should be designed in collaboration with UNHCR and in full consultation with the Government. It is recommended that UNICEF and UNHCR jointly conduct a short series of consultations with key actors in education and child protection, culminating in a high-level round table discussion. These consultations should in turn be informed by evidence about the wishes and intentions of the refugees themselves, indicating a need for collaboration with NGOs.

- An evolving advocacy strategy should be an integral part of both the overall strategy and its sectoral sub-components (described below).

- The strategy should be flexible enough to accommodate changes in priorities over time and to allow new opportunities to be seized as they arise.

Recommendation 1B: Education strategy (Turkey Country Office, near-term)

UNICEF should put together a short, medium and longer-term strategy for supporting the education needs of refugees in Turkey.

- The strategy should centre on the need for UNICEF to scale up its support to the Government to tackle the challenge of meeting the education needs of school-aged children in host communities.

- The strategy should include a specific component on Syrian teacher compensation.

- The strategy should be done jointly with UNHCR based on consultation and needs assessment. UNICEF and UNHCR should jointly assist the Government to formulate a plan of action on refugee education for discussion with a wider group of stakeholders, making clear their respective support roles.

- The strategy should encompass education outcomes including access to quality education within Turkey, as well as consideration of the core skills that would serve Syrians both for their time in Turkey and upon their return to the Syrian Arab Republic.

- All modalities need to be considered for delivery of education services, as there are not enough places for all school-aged refugee children in existing facilities. Those who have missed out on years of schooling will need options, including distance education, double shifting in existing facilities, catch-up education and other non-formal and formal options.

- An inclusive approach that takes proper account of the gender and equity dimensions of the problem is needed. Meeting the needs in both secondary and vocational education is crucial, but rather than implement in this area (apart from perhaps language and life skills), UNICEF should play a convening role.

- Emphasis should be placed on Turkish language acquisition, maintenance of Arabic (or other language), preservation of identity
within the new situation, adaptation of existing Syrian culture to the new Turkish environment, and social cohesion within the local and broader Turkish community.

Recommendation 1C: Child protection strategy (Turkey Country Office, near-term)

UNICEF should review its current child protection strategy in light of the proposed strategic consultation.

- As a matter of urgency, UNICEF should explore ways of expanding the coverage of protection and psychosocial support services to non-camp situations. To do this, partnerships with civil society organizations and the field presence of UNICEF child protection staff must be strengthened.

- In particular, the strategy should review options for combined education and child protection initiatives in non-camp settings. Specific programme elements should be designed in collaboration between education and child protection, to address the growing social cohesion agenda in refugee hosting communities. The child protection and education sections should also collaborate to address areas of obvious overlapping concern such as the issues of corporal punishment and bullying.

- Options should be explored for continued support to TRCS to develop its capacity and increase the sustainability of CFS in both camps and host communities. This might include supporting TRCS to develop an internal pool of trainers on child protection in emergencies and psychosocial support. The age group of youth leaders should be extended up to 24 as suggested in the one-year review of the No Lost Generation initiative.

Recommendation 1D: Health, nutrition and WASH strategy (Turkey Country Office, with technical support from the regional offices, near-term)

UNICEF should include components relating to refugee health, nutrition and WASH in its overall strategy, based on a re-assessment of needs and of UNICEF’s comparative advantage in these areas. This may require a primarily advocacy-based approach, and should be done in close collaboration with UNHCR, WHO and other relevant international actors, as well as with national and local government authorities.

Recommendation 2: UNICEF’s contribution to social cohesion (Turkey Country Office, with technical support from New York HQ)

Education and child protection sections should collaborate on the design of specific programme elements that address the growing social cohesion agenda in refugee hosting communities. UNICEF is well placed to spearhead social cohesion and both the education and child protection programmes provide a unique opportunity for this. The establishment of preschool education for Turkish and Syrian children together, which was proposed by the Turkey Country Office, is a good example of a concrete social cohesion activity. UNICEF should collaborate with NGOs to scale up this approach.

Recommendation 3: Enhanced collaboration with UNHCR (Turkey Country Office and regional offices, near/medium-term)

UNICEF and UNHCR in Turkey should conclude an letter of understanding outlining their respective roles and proposed areas of collaboration in relation to the refugee crisis. This should be consistent with the global Letter of Understanding between the two agencies and should provide a framework for the joint strategies and action plans in education and child protection proposed above.
Recommendation 4: Child protection leadership (Turkey Country Office, medium-term)

UNICEF should seek to increase the priority given to the refugee child protection agenda and should itself take a more leading role on that agenda within the existing protection working groups and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Working Group, at central and field levels. Joint advocacy strategies should be designed with UNHCR.

Recommendation 5: NGO liaison (Turkey Country Office)

UNICEF should strengthen its role as the link between international NGOs and the Government in the current climate of increased collaboration with international NGOs for service delivery and modelling approaches. This will help to establish UNICEF’s role in promoting sustainable, system-wide approaches for the future.

Recommendation 6: Field presence and staffing structure (Turkey Country Office, near-term)

As a matter of priority, the Turkey Country Office should scale up both programmatic and operational support staffing in the Gaziantep/south-eastern Turkey intervention area. The evaluation strongly supports current plans to increase the level and seniority of management in the Gaziantep office, and to out-post province-level education monitors. The evaluation team also recommends that Turkey Country Office section staff are reorganized not along regular or emergency lines, but in some other configuration covering both regular and refugee needs.

Recommendation 7: Evaluation and learning (Turkey Country Office, with support from regional offices and HQ in disseminating, replicating and adapting best practices, medium-term)

Best practices in responding to the refugee crisis in Turkey should be properly documented for sharing with others. Suggested areas of best practice are set out in Section 6. Specifically, evaluation of the use of the adolescent empowerment and participation and CFS methodologies are proposed. Lessons should also be documented concerning the application and interpretation of the CCCs in upper-middle-income countries where UNICEF’s humanitarian response is largely non-operational.

Recommendation 8: Monitoring (Turkey Country Office, near/medium-term)

As a matter of priority, the Ankara-based monitoring and evaluation department should revert to a more standard monitoring and evaluation role supporting field activities through independent monitoring, including post-distribution monitoring. UNICEF should adopt a more rigorous and systematic approach to programme monitoring, with direct feedback to programme implementation. This should include monitoring of the quality and continued relevance of programme outputs, as well as target achievements. Options for sharing lessons on experience in programme and situational monitoring across the wider Syrian response should be investigated.

Recommendation 9: Communications (Turkey Country Office, regional offices and HQ, near/medium-term)

Building on the No Lost Generation initiative, a global awareness campaign highlighting the plight of Syrian refugee children in Turkish host communities should be undertaken, as part of a wider campaign on the situation of child refugees in the region. The Turkish component of this should be led by the Turkey Country Office Communications Department, with support from MENARO and CEE/CIS Regional Office
communications teams. It should be linked to a fundraising drive to support new host community interventions.

**Recommendation 10: Review the application of the CCCs and SSOPs in an upper-middle-income context (HQ)**

UNICEF should use the experience of the Turkey refugee crisis response to review the guidance provided on applying the CCCs and SSOPs, particularly in contexts where the humanitarian role played by UNICEF is non-operational or only semi-operational.

**Recommendation 11: Review of advance financing mechanisms (regional offices and HQ)**

Based on a review of the experience from Turkey and elsewhere in the Syrian sub-region, UNICEF should review the adequacy of its advance financing mechanisms, specifically the Emergency Programme Fund, to meet response demands in gradually emergent crises of this kind. Both the scale and efficiency of the mechanisms should be considered, together with their interaction with external mechanisms like the Central Emergency Response Fund. Comparison should be made with the mechanisms used by other agencies, including UNHCR and WFP.