Landmines and UXO in Somaliland, Puntland and Central & Southern Somalia

A feasibility study

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**Glossary:**

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<tr>
<td>AP(M)</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel (Mine)</td>
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<td>AT(M)</td>
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<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle Area Clearance</td>
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<td>Community Awareness</td>
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<td>Community Ordnance Awareness</td>
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<td>COSONGO</td>
<td>Consortium of Somali NGOs (Hargeisa)</td>
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<td>CSZ</td>
<td>Central &amp; Southern Zone</td>
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<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group (Somaliland)</td>
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<td>ECSU</td>
<td>European Commission Somalia Unit</td>
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<td>HAVOYOCO</td>
<td>Hargeisa Voluntary Youth Committee</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person/People</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>Information, Education, Communication</td>
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<td>RMO</td>
<td>Regional Mine Officer (SMAC)</td>
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<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket-Propelled Grenade</td>
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<td>Rahanweyn Resistance Army</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<td>WSP</td>
<td>War-Torn Societies Project</td>
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PART ONE

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Background

Somalia has been the site of a range of military and paramilitary conflicts during the last 30 years. Such conflicts have left in their wake ordinance contamination in the form of landmines and of the wider range of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

During the 1977-79 Ogaden conflict with Ethiopia, Siad Barre’s regime imported considerable numbers of mines (one estimate as high as 8 million assorted items). While one of the principal legacies of that war today is a series of more and less extensive and intact minefields along the Somali-Ethiopia border, it should not be assumed that the number of deployed items corresponds with the numbers reportedly purchased and shipped in.

In the aftermath of Ogaden, the flare-up of a relatively extensive and protracted conflict between SNM interests and Barre in the north-west resulted in further ordnance contamination. Here, though, there was more sporadic, random and disruptive mine-laying inland from the border (specifically against Isaaq nomads backing the SNM), in addition to the maintenance of formal fields in defense of strategic sites (towns, military bases, airports, water sources, key roads and routes etc.). This period also saw perhaps the height of a deposit of battlefield ordnance (especially artillery shells, mortars, grenades), which today considerably outweigh landmines as the majority of contamination in the region.

Following Barre’s effective defeat in the north-west, clan conflicts spread and diversified into the central and southern regions of the country. These conflicts continue today, or have achieved variously steady and unsteady settlements. Mine-laying in this region has been predominantly anti-technicals, and thus involves almost exclusively anti-tank rather than anti-personnel types. Mines have been used selectively, sporadically (disruptive handfuls, rather than extensive fields), and have been taken up as well as laid as front-lines have shifted. UXO deposits are somewhat limited, but include grenades, RPGs and bazookas.

B. Contamination

Somalia is sometimes described as one of the world’s most heavily mined countries. On the balance of evidence, it is not. Some numerical estimates of mine contamination here – characteristic of 1990s donor- and media-oriented landmine hyperbole (Bottiglieri, 1999, Geneva) – are questionable and implausibly high.

Landmines: The number of landmines deployed in Somaliland is often quoted at between 1 and 2 million; the reality may be as low as 50-100,000. Puntland has been attributed up to 1 million; again, a more realistic figure would be 25-50,000. There are no formal estimates for the fragmented centre and south (for obvious reasons), but while common association with the northern zones – and the evidence of historical and ongoing conflict – have allowed the informal assumption of major contamination, the mine problem appears, once again, to be relatively small-scale and sporadic. In addition to political and economic incentives to inflate landmine numbers, surveys have been partial and sometimes of poor quality with regard to the critical evaluation of reports and over-reporting.

A distinction should be made between landmines in minefields along the Somali-Ethiopia border, and mines laid elsewhere in the eastward interior. Defensive border fields constitute a relatively high density of mined land, while further into Somalia – along roads, rivers, routes, tracks, and around villages, towns and strategic sites – formal fields are somewhat replaced by nuisance, random mine laying, and actually clear land unused due to suspicion of contamination. Local awareness of formal border and other minefields appears to be high and effectively protective of local population engaged in viable daily livelihoods. Awareness of
random and nuisance mining is disputed – ultimately, for these, awareness is unreliable. Thus with landmines in Somalia, the major risk and hence target for awareness is represented by the fewer number of mines, and ones in broadly unanticipable locations.

UXO: Somaliland, Puntland and CSZ all contain considerably higher numbers of UXO than of deployed landmines (running into hundreds of thousands of items). The commonest of these are: grenades, fuze units, artillery shells, RPGs and mortars. UXO constitutes a danger to population predominantly as surface contamination. It is visible and accessible – particularly (according to accident profiles) to children. It is ranged fairly randomly throughout local environments – collected in substantial stocks at former camps, scattered over large areas in the aftermath of attacks on depots, and deposited or dumped in the backwards and forwards motions of battlefield campaigns.

Awareness of formal minefields is high, and community impact consequently relatively low (though in many cases retarding socio-economic development); awareness of random mine clusters is low with respect to location; awareness of UXO is high with respect to location but low with respect to the threat it poses. In terms of overall socio-economic impact, mines may be said to be the major issue. In terms of specific loss of life and limb, UXO is at least as great a threat.

- Somaliland

Contamination Assessment: There are known and reported minefields along the Ethiopia border, partial and partially-intact fields inland, and evidence of random mine laying both on- and off-road. Mining of roads appears on available evidence to be quite limited, with injuries also occurring in domestic, agricultural and pastoral areas. AP appears to outweigh AT mines, constituting, therefore, the greater threat to pedestrian population (farmers, pastoralists, nomads); UXO ranges from stocks of shells and smaller munitions to increasingly dilapidated SAMs. Contamination intensities are higher along the southern and western borders with Ethiopia, decreasing inland up to the northern coastline, and eastwards (on available evidence) into Sanag and Sool (SMAC is currently initiating Level 1 surveys here). High contamination spots in the interior include Burao, around Hargeisa (especially the airport), and Adadley.

Impact: Overall accident rates are comparatively low (see, e.g. Cambodia Mine Action Centre 1999-2000). Figures are fragmentary, and accidents are almost certainly under-reported, but present estimates suggest a confirmed rate of under 50 a year. Not enough is known about specific accident profiles (through effective record-keeping, monitoring and analysis) reliably to identify a major victim group, though children (according to more recent evidence) are a significant part in certain areas (particularly areas with high UXO content), and accidents include both AT and AP type incidents.

Ongoing Interventions: Somaliland is the only region of Somalia where demining agencies are active. A UNDP-supported Somali Mine Action Centre (SMAC) is also newly operational, and there is an official government body devoted to the issue of mines (and ordnance) – the National Demining Agency (NDA). Some surveys have been carried out, and the survey process is currently being formalized. There are four operational demining organisations in-country (see below). There is a relatively strong presence of international and national NGOs – the latter being comparatively well-experienced and -organised.

Awareness: Qualitative local awareness of landmines (threat/risk) is high, but quantitatively incomplete (e.g. random mine presence). Awareness with respect to specific types of UXO is lower. There have been some (short-term) COA interventions, through UN, international and Somali channels, though the impact of these is difficult to detect.

- Puntland
Contamination Assessment: Puntland is the least contaminated of the three zones. Removed from conflicts in the north-west and CSZ, most of the northern and eastern seaboard, and the interior to a narrow western band along the border with South Mudug, Ethiopia, and Sanag/Sool, is reported to be very substantially uncontaminated.

There are claims of mine and UXO contamination west of Bosaso (to Qow village) and down the western side of Bari (from the Al-Itaxaad insurgency) but evidence of actual contaminants was not available. If there is ordnance in this area, it is largely located over the border in the disputed districts of Sanag and Sool. In general, Bari and Nugaal have experienced little in the way of ordnance and less in the way of injury and socio-economic impacts. There were 2 recalled ordnance-related incidents in the last 3 years in Gardo. Both were UXO-related.

Contamination and impact intensity centre on the Galkayo-Goldogob-Ethiopian border triangle. This includes protective formal minefields, urban and peri-urban mine-laying (especially Galkayo, and probably including a degree of emphasis on AP), and reports of mine-laying along the (currently unused) road between the two towns, and along satellite and feeder roads in the area. There are also reports of mining south of Galkayo along the border between North and South Mudug.

Impact: Puntland’s mine and UXO-related accidents are lower than Somaliland’s, according to available statistics (and in absolute terms very low indeed, with the possible exception of Galkayo). In the last year, a Department for Demining census recorded 17 accidents. Garowe hospital had registered 2 mine-related accidents in a 10-month period in 1999. However, figures for Galkayo-Goldogob appear to be somewhat higher, indicating an area-specific impact on life and limb. Impact on transport/markets/agricultural life is limited, confined largely to loss of livestock, and some (limited) reports of land (especially border pasture) and road denial.

Ongoing Interventions: There is no mine action work currently ongoing – either in clearance or in COA – in Puntland.

Awareness: Awareness of the issue of mines and UXO is comparatively low in both urban and rural communities assessed. This, however, is the result of an extremely limited experience of ordnance. The low awareness is the result of unfamiliarity, itself the result of generally very low levels of contamination. It is probable that awareness will rise dramatically in the area of Galkayo-Goldogob, but that such awareness will be neither comprehensive, nor sufficiently articulate, to ensure adequate risk avoidance behaviour at the community level.

- Central and Southern Zone

Contamination Assessment: Rapid assessment in the CSZ concentrated on Lower Shabelle, Bey, and Bakool. Unlike Puntland and Somaliland – where to all intents and purposes mine laying and UXO deposits have reached their ceiling – mines and (to a limited degree) UXO continue to be deployed in the CSZ. Mining most recently focuses on the RRA/ISC front-line stretching north-east to south-west in a band from Burhakaba to Buale, and south of Baidoa down to Lower Shabelle’s Qoryoley and Kurtunwaarey Districts. North of Baidoa into Bakool, RRA has been consolidating its control at Xuddor.

The majority of mines in this area (not including as yet unassessed suspected border minefields) are road-based, and AT rather than AP mines. This limits and defines the threat to civilian population, and consequent parameters of any COA work planned or undertaken. Recent AT mine-laying has been limited to handfuls deployed along satellite and feeder roads around and between Qoryoley and Kurtunwaarey district towns. Some of these have already been cleared by ISC. To the north, similarly, AT mines have been laid in small clusters, many of which are locally known and avoided (or actually lifted and replaced around the passage of authorized vehicles).

In Bakool, RRA reports main roads comprehensively mined, but the main Tayeglow-Xuddor-Wajid-Baidoa road (and the one south through Qansadheere and Dinsor to the coast) remain
traversable, as, according to available evidence, do other roads and routes east-west and north-south. Minefields are reported north of Rabdure and El Barde. In Hiiraan, the area around Belet Weyn, and from Belet Weyn to Bulo Burto is reported suspect; in Galgaduud, the border between Matabaan, Balanbale and Cabudwaq (and inland north of Cabudwaq) is reported mined. In Gedo, the main area of reported contamination is the border area, and the stretch between Gaberhare and Belet Xawo.

**Impact:** Reliable statistics are not available. However, evidence from Baidoa and Marka hospitals shows a recent rise in AT accidents (from virtually nil in Marka in 1998-99) involving civilian transport and agricultural vehicles in the front-line area around Burhakaba and the region between Qoryoley and Kurtunwaarey. Accidents have involved multiple victims, relatively high death to injury ratio, and loss of livestock and vehicles. While road-mining is disruptive, routes are rarely completely closed. Instead, new small-scale diversionary routes are created, slowing traffic and transport and maintaining a level of (somewhat risky) mobility for e.g. market purposes. There are reports throughout Bey and Bakool of children being injured in accidents involving UXO (specifically grenades and mortars). Again, reporting is probably low, but evidence is also limited.

**Ongoing Interventions:** Many of the principal protagonists in conflict appear not only to have laid mines defensively and offensively, but to have lifted them with the shifting of operational front-lines, and to have organized post-conflict, or calm period demining. UNOSOM II cleared in the CSZ, but there are no current demining or COA agencies operational in the region.

RRA has stated that no guarantees of safety will be extended to agencies working in demining or COA within the front-line area (i.e. south of Baidoa down to the Shabelle). Moreover, while RRA claims to have indigenous demining capability (mine ‘experts’), certain roads remain mined (e.g. Tayeglow → Burhakaba). The administration in this area clearly still values deployed mines (and stocks) and would not welcome interventions that attempted to clear or demarcate certain areas.

**Awareness:** Local knowledge and avoidance in most cases (away from the dynamic and therefore proportionately more dangerous front-line area) is good. In and around the front-line area, there are clear problems of small-scale, random and shifting road-mining, and consequent route denial, high-risk transport, and high-impact/high-cost accidents.

**B. Community Mine Awareness**

In Somaliland and Puntland, communities seem to be substantially self-informed and informing with regard to minefields and some of the random mine clusters (though by no means all). However, accidents still occur, and communities are not always proactive or conscientious in maintaining local awareness (through minefield marking and word-of-mouth advisory networks). Confidence in indigenous mine ‘expertise’ (location, handling techniques) is high (though this may encourage high-risk behaviour). Communities prioritise clearance over awareness-raising if resources are to come from the international community.

Indigenous ‘awareness’ can actually increase risk-exposure, where it constitutes straightforward over-confidence. Further, awareness does not cover random mine clusters comprehensively – leaving some unknown and unsuspected. Local awareness does not address the changing cost-benefit evaluations of communities through e.g. periods of good and bad harvest; and awareness does not sufficiently cover the problems and risks of UXO. In Somaliland, there have been a few relatively small-scale campaigns in mine-awareness. These have had limited impact. People in urban and rural areas are familiar with mines and UXO – both in discussion and in physical recognition. Government has not taken on a significant role in advising local communities about danger and risk mitigation; this has been left to international and national NGOs, whose work has been of variable approach and standard.

In Puntland, no significant COA work has been done – largely due to a broad lack of awareness of the actual scale and specifics of Puntland’s UXO and mine status, and a
consequent general feeling of its low priority in the ranking of development needs. The Puntland administration has established a Department of Demining which has been conducting census work in the three regions. In the course of this, it is claimed that basic safety advice has been provided for communities.

In the Central and Southern Zone, there has, again, been no discernible COA impact. There is a significant lack of local SNGOs with appropriate capacity to work as implementers or partners, and other international agencies have either focused on straight clearance work (UNOSOM) or on more emergency-oriented interventions (feeding, EPI etc.). Awareness in settled areas of the CSZ is relatively high, but in combat zones falls behind shifting front-line mine areas, which causes periodic disjuncture between new danger areas, and the local level of safety-enabling knowledge.

CMA work to date in Somalia has been non-direct contact (distance) communication-oriented, and mostly short-term (though interesting and high-quality direct community contact work is presently being carried out by Mine Tech in Somaliland). Mine awareness campaigns have mostly followed conventional forms of poster, pamphlet, teaching aids etc.. Approaches have been diverse and contradictory. They have focused on landmines (to the substantial exclusion of UXO), and on images and messages that emphasise the negative aspects of ordnance contamination (as opposed to the positive aspects of community-government-international agency responses to that contamination).

The major issues for awareness in Somalia are:
- The need for proper landmine and UXO contamination surveying and impact mapping;
- The need for full impact assessment, including community knowledges and behaviours with regard to mines and UXO;
- The development of ordnance contamination health and socio-economic impact profiles for Somalia; and the consequent development of parameters for ordnance safety messages and communications;
- The need for an institutional-level unit to coordinate the above activities, and feed them – through guidance and stakeholder liaison – into effective and harmonised mine-awareness campaigns and clearance operations.

C. Executive Conclusion

The situation regarding landmines and UXO contamination is not at crisis or emergency level in Somalia\(^1\). Numerical levels of mines are relatively low. Accident rates are relatively low. And communities are employing indigenous awareness to mitigate ordnance-related environmental constraints (such as land and transport denial), living with ordnance, with a significant degree of success and safety. Clearly, however, there are still humanitarian issues concerning life and limb and socio-economic development. Mine action is without question a legitimate area of Somali programming.

However, a current fashion for COA in such programming should not act as a springboard or lever by which lead agencies such as Unicef leap or are drawn into knee-jerk intervention. Mine awareness may be seen as the easier end of mine action, but that is precisely why a certain part of community mine (or ordnance) awareness has produced quick, formulaic, unthought-out, low-quality, low-impact work. With a couple of specific provisos, Somalia does not provide the rationale or the opportunity for yet another standard mine awareness campaign-style intervention.

\(^{1}\) With the possible exceptions of specific ‘hot-zones’ such as Adadley in Somaliland, Galkayo-Goldogob in Puntland, and Burhakaba in the CSZ.
2. OBJECTIVES

The objective of the present feasibility study is to help to determine whether mine/UXO awareness programme is required in Somalia, and whether it can be integrated within overall mine action.

3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The specific objective of the study is to offer a preliminary overview of:

- the extent of the threat related to the existence of mine/UXO in Somalia;
- the location and size of the areas affected;
- the severity of the impact on the population;
- the scope of existing mine action initiatives, and;
- the need and urgency for additional programmatic responses.

4. METHODOLOGY

The general focus of the study was of qualitative nature, as the issues addressed lend themselves better to qualitative as opposed to purely quantitative investigations. Therefore the implementation of the study was guided by a qualitative research techniques and methods. In conformity with qualitative research and the general and specific objectives the study focused on interviews with programme designers and implementers, and review of existing information. During the study few focus group discussions were carried out in some specific location with local communities in order to better understand behaviours and practices occurring, people’s perceptions, feelings, opinions, and other socio-cultural factors which could have relationships with the objectives of the study.
PART TWO

Situation Analysis

1. Somaliland

Contamination
Contamination includes both landmines (anti-tank (AT) and anti-personnel (AP)) and UXO (artillery, ammunition, fuzes, to surface-to-air missiles (SAM)). UXO are typically ground-surface presence, ranging from bunker stores in former military camps through scattered ordnance from destroyed bunkers, to fired but unexploded items in battlefield areas.

High estimates for deployed landmines range between 1 and 3 million (AT and AP). These are usually off-the-ground figures, or estimations based on surveys of questionable quality and scope. Estimates tend to fall significantly among currently operational agencies, ranging from 1 million downwards, including 4-800,000 (UNDP 1997), 2-400,000 (DDG), and reaching a low of 40,000 (HALO Trust). NDA has reported a total of 405 minefields and mined roads. If each of these sites contain 1,000 land mines, the total for the country comes to 405,000 – considerably lower than the lowest high-level estimate. An average of 1,000 landmines per suspect site is highly questionable (an average of 100 or less would be more realistic).

Much of the Level 1 survey work conducted to-date is acknowledged to be of partial or poor quality. Incentives for villagers to report high contamination levels include the perception of economic or employment benefits of clearance operationalisation. Regional Mine Officers (both NDA and SMAC) may report higher figures on the basis of valuable job protection and maintenance. Another obvious incentive to high-figure reporting (at the level of would-be implementing agencies) is perception of donor motivation².

Contamination in Somaliland ranges from relatively high intensity of landmines (border areas, defensive minefields around towns, military camps and strategic sites), to regions with both high and low areas of contamination. In part of Burao Town, 7 items were discovered in 2-400,000sq.m; at the same time, Burao is considered by SMAC to be its next priority in terms of intensity of contamination. The Hargeisa-Berbera road has been reported mined, but in the course of recent clearance operations, no more than a handful of items have been found. There are also areas which are unused due to the suspicion of mines, but where, in fact, there is minimal or no ordnance at all.

In other words, mine contamination comes in three principal forms: formal minefield (found largely at along the Somali-Ethiopian border, also at former military camps, airports etc.); random mine clusters (evidence from accidents suggests less in the way of road-based AT and more random AP mining); and ‘rumour’ or propaganda mines, where actually clear land is denied use through historical rumours of contamination (contributing significantly to the overall inflation of contamination estimates).

Clearance evidence suggests that UXO is by far the larger proportion of all contaminant ordnance in Somaliland (DDG have, during their operations, cleared some 32,000 items, of which less than 200 were AP and AT, the rest being UXO). The variety of types of UXO constitutes an as great – if not greater – threat to community safety (accident profiles suggest that children are legitimately a significant victim group with regard to UXO, see below). Some argue that in spite of the numerical difference, mines still constitute the bigger problem, since

² See, e.g. ‘120 Million Landmines Deployed Worldwide: Fact or Fiction?’, Ilaria Bottigliero, Pro Victimis Foundation, Geneva 1999. There is increasing debate over accuracy of country-level and international estimates of landmine contamination. Is indicated elsewhere, during the early and mid-1990s, it may be argued that there was a tendency to pitch the figure excessively high to attract attention and funding. This may have created the perception of a level of contamination of effectively inoperable levels. Conversely, more recently, the trend is to attempt to focus on more realistic estimates derived from on-the-ground operational agency experience.
the suspicion of a single landmine’s presence can deny access to a considerable stretch of road or area of land. The argument is sound, but ultimately irrelevant, since clearance will have one way or another to deal with both. The question of relative problems posed by mines and UXO has more material relevance to the question of appropriate Community Mine Awareness interventions, their approaches and messages.

Specific Sites:
Border areas east and west of Boroma have considerable formal minefields. It is likely that border areas further east and west will be similarly contaminated. The northern coast-line has not shown much ordnance – Zeila is reported relatively clear according to surveys conducted so far (which may impact positively on return rates of Djibouti refugees). Gabiley district (west of Hargeisa) indicates some areas of mine contamination, and Adadley (site of military camp to the east) shows significant minefield contamination, and a major problem of camp-based surface UXO (with relatively high accident rates predominantly among children). Hargeisa airport has seen relatively frequent accidents. East of Burao, where resettlement has been continuing without high levels accident rates, Sanag and Sool will be surveyed in May-June 2000.

There are a relatively high number of reported minefields in the interior of Somaliland, of mined roads, and a number of roads not in use across all districts. However, as above, these have in many cases yet to be verified by better Level 1 (and subsequent Level 2) surveys.

Suspected Mined Areas:
Somaliland is generally considered the most heavily ordnance-affected area of Somalia. Reports of widescale mining are, however, often contradicted by the experiences of demining agencies, where considerably smaller areas and quantities of contamination are found to be the norm. However, due to the particularities of the conflicts in this zone, with specific government attention to disrupting the socio-economic livelihoods of the SNM-supporting Isaaq nomads (using more AP mines than in the east and southwards, and using more random, land-denial deployment), mine action agencies will need to take such reports seriously.

While actual levels of land use inhibited by community suspicions of mine contamination are difficult to assess, some areas, routes and roads are accounted presently unused (leading to land-wastage and obstruction of trans-regional traffic).

Impact
Death/Injury:
Injuries are not comparatively that high (see Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosnia etc.). Across Somaliland, NDA reports 30,134 ‘mine victims’ between 1988 and 1998. 3,146 people killed; 3,637 injured – a total 6,783 victims, or 1.85 victims per day over the decade. By 2000, indicators suggest that the rate of mine- and UXO-related accidents has dropped to 43 per year (reported and recorded). A disaggregation of the NDA decade statistic shows that this breaks down into relatively high rates in the early-to-mid 1990s (in the immediate post-conflict period), falling dramatically in the late 1990s (as indigenous awareness and some clearance progress), to a more recent rate of closer to 3 or 4 a month.

One of the core problems in an analysis of ordnance impact on life and limb is that of probable low reporting rates. Where injuries are light, victims may self treat; where injuries are exceptionally heavy, they may become fatalities before records are taken; in many accidents fatality is immediate, in which case reporting is not possible; alternatively, where there are witnesses or relatives, there may be no compelling incentive to travel distance to report what is effectively a fait accompli.

It is often claimed that women and children are a large proportion of victims. In some areas, children are indeed considerably affected (Adadley UXO-contaminated area; Gabiley Mine Tech COA statistics). However, Somali Red Crescent Society records a total of 679 people treated between 1994 and 1999, of whom 258 were ‘victims of landmines or bombs’. This breaks down as 222 male and 36 female, and across age ranges records 17% between ages
0 and 19, and 56% between ages 20 and 39. This contradicts the classical (media- and
donor-friendly) assertion that the majority of victims occur among women and children. In
specific instances (e.g. UXO and herding), children are high-risk and high impact victims.
Girls and women are not a demonstrable high-risk group. Representations of injury and
fatality impact of mines and UXO should pay more attention to available evidence and truth.
Overall, as above, accident rates are low, but there are specific pockets and areas where
rates are higher. It is clear from available evidence that random AP mines threaten the
people-community, while AP and AT mines threaten people, vehicles and (valuable) livestock.
UXO appears often to pose a specific threat to children.

In Somaliland, many ‘victims’ are livestock. This in itself constitutes a considerable impact on
household and community economic well-being. Of the NDA’s 30,134 ‘victims’, the remaining
23,351 are livestock: 5,630 camels; 2,414 cattle; 12,998 sheep; 91 horses; 1,345 donkeys;
and 867 vehicles. Given that up to 60% of the population of Somaliland is principally
pastoralist, and that livestock trade is one of the more significant contributors to the national
economy, the economic impact of UXO and landmines on livelihoods, trade and growth may
be substantial.

Land Denial:
For nomads, impact of pastoral denial can be mitigated by changing routes. However, it
should be remembered that where this happens, different nomadic groups, simultaneously
diverted from their normal or traditional route patterns, may coincide in a particular area,
potentially leading to conflict for resource access and use. Hence the ultimate impact of
successfully mitigated land denial in this group may actually be increased inter-group tensions
with the potential for conflict.

Among sedentary communities there is an issue for refugees and resettlement, where
awareness of local conditions – including ordnance contamination – may be low. However, it
should be noted that one aspect of current refugee camp COA work (Ethiopia-/Djibouti-side)
is that in its negative – and possibly exaggerated – view of the ordnance situation in
Somaliland it may actually discourage successful repatriation and resettlement of those
refugees.

As for already-existing sedentary farmers, there is some (limited) evidence of arable land
denial. There are recorded cases where land cleared (or certified uncontaminated) has been
immediately taken back into community use (Greenfields, SBF, Mine Tech, DDG). While
population density is not high in Somaliland, percentage of agricultural land to land coverage
is very limited. Thus even small-scale denial can be expected to have a high impact.

Movement Inhibition:
As indicated above, contamination – real or rumoured – has rendered certain roads unusable
(or rather, unused). However, in most cases, as elsewhere in Somalia, adaptable local
communities and nomadic groups have trodden or driven out new by-passing routes. This is
not by any means ideal, and can involve significant detours; however, contamination does not
appear to have impacted absolutely on mobility.

Market Inhibition:
Hargeisa markets, and other regional markets such as the border post at Togwajaale, appear
to be well-supplied and trading actively. It is probable that major market trade would be
enhanced by the certification of arterial connecting roads (such as Berbera-Hargeisa, and
Boroma-Zeila) as ordnance-free.

Infrastructural Inhibition:
Building and rebuilding work is going on in Hargeisa and in other rural areas visited. However,
this work – especially where ruined buildings, which can contain and conceal ordnance, are
being rehabilitated – is hazardous. Once again, where community liaison forms a part of COA
work, impact assessment can be improved.

Note the reported impact of bans on suspect livestock exports from Somaliland to Saudi Arabia in
recent years.
Fear/Community Development Deceleration:
Along the Ethiopian-Somaliland border, many villagers expressed the view that their awareness of contamination was high, and that they felt able to operate in the contaminated environment. What they asked for was clearance. However, several villagers expressed the view that in spite of good levels of awareness, they experienced a low-intensity, but permanent level of fear or uncertainty in the conduct of their daily lives. As above, one unusual aspect of COA as it is needed in Somalia, is reassurance to communities, as opposed to the conventional ‘warning’ orientation of mine awareness, where suspect land can be confirmed (through Level 2 surveying) to be clear and usable.

Small Arms and Security:
Weapons (hand guns, rifles/assault rifles, ammunition, munitions) are not openly available in Hargeisa through market channels (though procurement can be arranged through private traders). A demobilisation project (EC/GTZ) is in its start-up phase at the moment, and will focus on decommissioning a proportion of the alleged 15,000-strong Somaliland army. It is not expected that this will eventuate a significant hand-in of weapons since most are privately owned.

A (partially-armed) police force is operational throughout Hargeisa itself, and appears to be reflected in a representative force in the districts. Few people walk openly in town during the day or the evening with weapons (including the majority of INGO compound guards). Three timed transect walks (10am, 4pm, 11pm) bore very little evidence of public disturbance or disorder. Public security – functioning restaurants, shops, barber services, taxis well into the evening – seemed relatively well-established and stable.

Conflicts are still occasionally settled by resort to arms in Hargeisa itself. In late 1999 and early 2000, there were a few incidents of grenades being thrown into international organisation and government compounds. The latter are associated by some informants with a rising level of dissatisfaction with Egal’s leadership. In one instance earlier this year, AK and small arms rounds were fired into the HALO Trust compound. Noone was injured, and the perpetrator (a disgruntled ex-employee) was jailed. Conflicts outside Hargeisa – particularly among the nomadic groups – are still reportedly the cause of exchanges of fire and bullet injuries. Checkpoints have largely been reduced to (armed) gatekeepers on arterial roads.

Although apparently more easily and openly accessible through markets in Las Anod, the price of AK rounds had dropped, during the first quarter of 2000, from 8,000SS, to 1,000SS. It is not clear whether this substantial reduction is the result of an over-supply (reportedly some arms are being reimported through Puntland, from Yemen; shipments of ordnance and arms have also been reported coming in via Marka from Eritrea, though this is not confirmed), or the result of a major drop in demand. Prices are also falling eastwards to Bosaso (see below).
2. Puntland

Contamination:
The highest reported number of landmines deployed in Puntland is 1 million (**DG, Department of Demining**). Using the same analysis used for the NDA’s assessment of Somaliland, there would have to be 330 minefields or mine sites in each of Puntland’s three regions (Bari, Nugaal and Mudug), each field containing a minimum 1,000 landmines. This is highly improbable. For low estimates, War-Torn Societies project (WSP) calculate 7,500 mines in North Mudug. On the unlikely speculation that the northern regions have experienced the same levels of conflict, strategic importance and mining, this would bring the total for Puntland to 22,500. This, of course, as elsewhere, does not include numbers of items of unexploded ordnance, which may be considerably higher in localised contamination patterns.

Specific Sites:
The focus of mine and UXO contamination is Galkayo town and the surrounding rural area. Both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines are reported to be present, and a range of types of UXO. As with Somaliland, the dispersal of UXO (other than cases of bunker or artillery storage) is random, and predominantly ground-surface. Mines are reported to have been laid majoratively in formal minefield patterns. However feeder and arterial roads south, west and east of Galkayo town are also reported to have been mined. Further, there are reports of some purely informal mine laying by Galkayo residents around their properties for defense prior to and during the period of their refugee departure. Much of this may be expected to have been cleared by those responsible on their return, and to be the subject of a relatively high level of awareness. However, there may be random items remaining in the urban environment (see, e.g. Burao, Somaliland, March 2000).

In the wider Galkayo-Goldogob area, mines are reported to the south along the border between North and South Mudug, and along local roads (some of which are currently unused). To the west, defensive minefields similar to those encountered in Somaliland were reportedly laid during the Ogaden conflict. These may be expected to be largely formal minefield, to be capable of relatively straightforward clearance, but also probably the subject of relatively high local awareness and avoidance. Land denial – in terms of cropping, grazing and market trading routes – may continue to be issues, though known routes for cross-border traffic are functional. Beira is also reportedly affected, as are the first 100km of road between Galkayo and Cheribanan, and Galkayo airport.

Suspected Sites:
There are claims that mines were laid in Nugaal along the Somali-Ethiopian border, and along the Puntland-Somaliland border. There were a few reports of mine and UXO contamination in West Bari (west of Bosaso towards Qow village), following the Al-Itaxaad insurgency and ensuing conflict with the SSDF after 1992. For both Nugaal and Bari, high-end contamination reports included reference to sites in Sanag and Sool regions of currently disputed affiliation between Somaliland and Puntland. For all practical purposes, these need to be included under an appraisal of Somaliland’s contamination profile. These reports concentrate on Las Koray, Elayo and Salid. Independent (and as yet unpublished) reports from demining agencies with on-the-ground experience in eastern Somaliland suggest that while there are minefields in Sool, they are of limited number and content.

Impact:
Death/Injury:
Ordnance-related accidents (injuries and fatalities) are relatively very low in Puntland. As elsewhere, the rate varies over the post-conflict period – classically starting high and dropping as clearance (accidental or purposive) and local awareness develop.

However, in 1998 Galkayo hospital was seeing between 5 and 12 ordnance-related accident victims a month, indicating a relatively high-rate hot-zone. The director of Garowe hospital reported that UXO and mine accidents are currently low in Nugaal. In April 2000, 13 ‘wounds’ were admitted, and 8 ‘trauma’. The trauma cases tend to be vehicle accidents, while of the wounds, an estimated 20% are said to be UXO or mine-related. Thus, according to these
Injuries are not restricted to people. As in Somaliland, informant references to ordnance-related accidents tend to include people, livestock and vehicles. Numbers of injured or killed livestock are not available.

In the case of amputees, there are no reliable figures. Street-level evidence from Bosaso, Gardo and Garowe (but not Galkayo or Goldogob) suggests that incidence of accident and amputation is not very high. Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) has been running a Rehabilitation Centre in Galkayo for the last year. The Vice-President claims that almost 50% of amputees and candidates for prosthesis are mine-accident victims, and that of these, perhaps 10% are children. However, his figures are suggestive of guesswork. Further, reports of accidents often reflect the effect of UXO rather than landmines, with injuries to chest, head, hands and arms rather than lower legs.

Land Denial:
There is little evidence of land denial in Bari and Nugaal; North Mudug, however, may constitute a more serious problem in this respect. There are reports of areas of cultivable land that remain unused, of areas of usable pasture that remain ungrazed and of routes and roads untraversed. The impact of the suspicion of mines presence is very real, whether there is actual contamination or not. However, one indicator may be the low level of engagement in Puntland of the World Food Programme. WFP does not run any major feeding programmes in the country, which may indicate adequate levels of agricultural productivity and food security. This in turn may indicate adequate access to land, suggesting a relatively low level of pressure on land use, and therefore the viability of conducting daily life around contaminated areas without incrementally feeling the need to encroach on them for land use expansion.

Movement Inhibition:
As above, road routes (arterial and feeder) in North Mudug are considered suspect, and in some cases are now unused. However, alternative routes are generally available. The major problem in this respect will be returnees and non-local travellers. However, people continue to move around the country. In the case of returning refugees, where policy encourages them to go back to their former villages, local knowledge – and local access to awareness – will be relatively high, reducing the expectation of a landmine and UXO impact.

Market Inhibition:
Again, the core area appears to be Galkayo-Goldogob and their environs. Galkayo has traditionally been seen as a trade axis for routes between north and south Somalia. Reports of continuing trade activities from supply and transit of fresh fruits to livestock suggest that markets and market supply are functional. However, closer Level 1 survey data-collection is required to confirm this and to establish specific market-related ordnance problems as and where they are evident. The Ministry of Public Works is currently planning a survey of road routes (arterial and feeder) in North Mudug. Their contention is that establishment of an
enhanced feeder road system (including survey and mine-clearance) will ‘unblock’ rural resources, ultimately enhancing scale and scope of local market activity.

Infrastructural Inhibition:
Construction appears to be viable in Bosaso and south towards Gardo and Garowe. New construction is ongoing; operational agencies have (apart from Galkayo and Goldogob) not reported significantly high levels of ordnance encounters.

Fear/Community Development Deceleration:
As with Somaliland – and mine and UXO-contaminated regions more broadly – one of the principal impacts may be said to be one of the least tangible. Questions hang over contaminated communities and their environments about what might have been done – what socio-economic development might have been pursued – in the absence of contamination. However, brief interviews with community informants in Bosaso, Gardo and Garowe did not suggest particularly high levels of community development stasis resulting from fear of unknown areas or suspicion of minefields.

Small Arms and Security:
Weapons are more openly in evidence in Bosaso (though less so through Gardo and Garowe), among compound guards, militia-turned-police, and private citizens. Bosaso market presently has only a small arms stalls section. One trader offered two AKs and an M-16, along with individual rounds (but no magazines). In the last quarter of last year, AK prices fell from around $150USD to $90USD. In April 2000, the asking price for the AK was $45USD. The trader explained that there simply wasn’t any demand. As with Hargeisa, AK rounds have fallen in price to around 3,000PS; small arms rounds, by contrast, were maintaining a relatively high value at 8,000PS (possibly indicating a current fashion for small arms over larger assault weapons (see CSZ, Xuddor, below). Even if the drop in the market price of ammunition indicates a drop in demand, it is still the case that the lower cost now brings the price of one shot in a dispute into the negligible cost range of a couple of cups of tea. This may be expected to make weapon firing a more affordable option.

There were disturbances in Bosaso and Galkayo earlier this year, with demonstrations both for and against the Djibouti peace process. It is notable that demonstrators – even in close proximity to police and their opponent groups – used stones and spray paint rather than weapons. Shots fired came from the militia-police, killing two in Bosaso. As with Somaliland, there is no present government initiative to disarm people at the household level – the right to domestic ownership of weapons is considered too volatile an issue. Garowe Hospital records one bullet injury for December 1999, and the Director confirmed that for Nugaal, the number of shooting incidents and victims had fallen significantly.
3. Central & Southern Zone

Contamination:
Estimation for Bay and Bakool calculates several thousand mines, and an indefinite number of pieces of UXO. This does not cover Gedo, Hiiraan, and Galgaduud, where further significant levels of mine-laying are reported. These landmine figures probably under- rather than over-play the minefield contamination along the northern border with Ethiopia.

UXO includes ammunition rounds, grenades, bazooka shells, mortars and larger artillery shells; there is perhaps a slight emphasis on grenades in the Central and Southern Zone, and on reports of anti-aircraft and recoilless rounds around some of the major towns (Baidoa, Belet Weyn, Xuddor). In and around Kismayo, there are reports of remnants of a marine presence including stocks of torpedoes (though these may already have been removed in the course of export for scrap4). As elsewhere, UXO tends to be relatively randomly scattered, but occurring in concentrations around battlefield areas and strategic (stockpile) sites.

The vast majority of landmines are AT. Most of the recently reported accidents have involved vehicles with injury confined to passengers and drivers of whom the large part are male adults. Such accidents including children and women are relatively rare.

South of Belet Weyn, Xuddor and Luuq, mines, due to the nature of their target, are predominantly laid along road routes (arterial and feeder). Along the northern strip to the border with Ethiopia, mines – again predominantly anti-tank, though possibly including APs – are reported in formal (and locally well-known) minefields. Farming land, water access points (apart from stretches of the Shabelle River), and rural community residential areas, are not reported to be significantly affected by mine-laying, though clearly rural livelihood is disrupted from the point of view of ease, safety, cost and time of access and transportation.

History:
A major distinction between Central and Southern Zone and Somaliland or Puntland is that to a large extent contamination in the latter two areas can now be said to be at its upper limit, and to be stable. In the absence of renewed fighting, then, the future for Somaliland and Puntland will see a gradual reduction in contaminants. In the CSZ, on the other hand, a variety of conflicts persist (with perhaps a concentration of fighting between RRA and Islamic Sharia Courts (ISC) along a front-line running from Burhakaba south west towards Buaale, and south and south-east to Kurtunwaarey, Qoryoley and Welaweyne in Lower Shabelle). Mines continue to be laid, lifted, and re-laid as lines of conflict and areas of dominance shift. UXO may also be expected to continue to be deposited – though on a considerably lighter scale than in previous periods of conflict.

The mines/UXO picture for CSZ, then, is a dynamic one, and one that consequently will for the time being elude effective delineation. This means that while it is possible to assess the general impacts and effects of conflicts to date, we cannot accurately pin down the risk areas and the levels of contamination in those risk areas, making prioritised demining, and impactful and accurate community awareness or education – in the classical forms – highly difficult propositions. While demining might be safely and effectively operationalised along the Ethiopian border5, it is unlikely that many agencies would be able to offer value for money clearing in an active mine-laying context.

In Gedo, Ethiopians supported SNF mine-laying to counter Al-Itaxaad cross-border insurgencies. At the same time, Al-Itaxaad used mines as one of a range of coercive measures against local communities. The northern borders of Bakool, Hiiraan and Galgaduud

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4 Note that while there is evidence of a viable market in scrap metal – particularly aluminium – that market operated historically at the level of decommissioning whole and part aircraft and vehicles with munitions. Thus it is not estimated that small amounts of UXO would or will represent monetary trade value to local communities, that might provide incentives to handle dangerous items, thus increasing risk.

5 In a meeting with the Supreme Council, the RRA specifically ruled out guarantees of security to demining personnel attempting to operate south of Baidoa.
are reported to have been mined by Siad Barre during the Ogaden conflict (1977-79). Apart from Kismayo, there was reportedly little mine-laying in Lower (and to an extent Middle) Juba up to the mid-1990s. Equally, prior to the 1999-2000 conflict between the RRA and ISC, mines were largely unheard of in Lower Shabelle, with a limited amount of mines laid by the SNA. Mogdishu itself is reported to have experienced very little in the way of mines (though UXO continue to pose a problem).

Belet Weyn, around the former military camp under Siad Barre at Lamagalayo, is one of the most frequently cited contamination areas both with regard to landmines and UXO. During the civil conflicts following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, mines are reported to have been periodically laid along most of the major roads (see below) in Bey and Bakool; on the main route north from Mogdishu, and north-east toward Matabaan and Dusanmareb (passing Balanbale) towards Galkayo in Puntland's Mudug Region.

One advantage of the present period of mine-laying is that – with mines in some factions a scarce resource – relatively few are laid (along roads, for example) to disrupt traffic. Further, when front-lines shift, militia lift mines they have laid and move with them (possibly deploying them elsewhere later, but ultimately performing a kind of auto-clearance). Much of the current mine-laying is sufficiently well-known and advertised not only among those laying mines but to the wider population, that even roads still suspected of contamination are traversed daily. In some cases, factional ‘experts’ can be seconded to vehicles travelling on suspect routes, to lift mines in the course of passage, and re-lay them afterwards (see, e.g. south of Burhakaba).

Specific Sites:
One of the main sites in the CSZ for both landmines and UXO is Belet Weyn – specifically the former Lamagalayo camp on the bank of the Shabelle River. Defensive (anti-personnel) mines are reported to have been laid along this stretch of river bank, causing a high rate of casualties when militiamen took over the camp after Siad Barre's defeat. Subsequently the accident rate dropped, rising again in the aftermath of Aideed's brief occupation after 1994, when mines were laid defensively along the Belet Weyn-Bulo Burto road, and along feeder roads running east from Belet Weyn (including the Belet Weyn-Matabaan road).

Baidoa has also been a centre of conflict, with particular emphasis placed on camp areas approximately 7km to the north of the town at El-Door and Habare villages, east to Awdiinile, and immediately south of town. Kismayo, as above, is reported to be heavily mined, though much of that may already have been cleared.

Suspected Mined Areas:
Most suspected mined areas are: Ethiopian border minefields; roads; or front-line areas. Front-line areas are, by their nature, mobile and therefore susceptible (as mentioned) to auto-clearance as militias move forwards or back. Not much is known about the status of the border minefields, though not much clearance has been reported over the last decade. In the case of roads, many are suspected of mining, but most of these are (as above) presently in daily use. Either there has been a significant element of indigenous clearance, or sites of mines are well known and avoided.

In Gedo, The road between El Waq and Gaberhare is reported mined; as are areas around Luuq and Dolow. A more recent report cites the road between Gaberhare and Belet Xawo (December 1999). In Bey District, roads running north and west from Baidoa to Qansadheere and Baardheere, and to Wajid, Xuddor, and Tayeleglow respectively are reported to be mined, though all of them are in current use. Along the Wajid-Xuddor stretch, reports are limited to two or three landmines (two of known location, one unknown). The road from Qansadheere through Dinsor south to the coast at Brawe and up to Marka is reported to be being kept clear by agreement between RRA and Habergedir.

Impact:
Death/Injury:
Ordnance-related injuries and fatalities in the CSZ may follow peak-and-trough periods of high and low intensity (mirroring periods of heightened conflict and shifting (mined) front-lines,
and subsequent periods of calm). At present there is a peak in accidents around Burhakaba, Qoryoley, and Kurtunwaarey. Because the vast majority of mines laid are AT, accidents involve drivers and passengers, with a weight towards adult males. Women and children are less at risk in this context. Additionally, where there is an AT incident, a relatively high number of injuries and fatalities per event may be expected.

In Lower Shabelle, around Marka there have been few or no reported mine or UXO accidents for a decade; there has been a sudden increase since start of 2000, with the RRA-ISC conflict. This may constitute a ‘crisis’ situation with relatively low awareness and risk-reduction strategies at community level, and relatively high rates of injury impact. Further, with a flow of IDPs moving from further north into Qoryoley and Kurtunwaarey, there may in the near future be increased exposure to risk.

In Qoryoley and Kurtunwaarey Districts, while mine accidents affect women and children less, children are reported as a high proportion of the limited number of UXO-related incidents. Xuddor presents a similar picture of vehicle/passenger/livestock mine injuries and deaths, and UXO-related child accidents.

**Land Denial:**
This does not appear to be a major feature of mine/UXO contamination in the areas assessed. Mine contamination (as mentioned above) is road-based. Negligible AP use means that most non-route or -road areas can be considered relatively safe. UXO contaminates more broadly, but again without much evidence of land denial. According to WFP, Lower Shabelle is not food insecure, which reduces pressure on land use, and agricultural/pastoral expansion into new (and potentially unknown areas). However, communities to the north in Bakool (e.g. Rabdure), are reported presently food insecure, which may affect their land-use behaviour or options in an environment of possible border minefields.

**Movement Inhibition:**
Because of the focus of mine-laying, there is much reporting of roads and routes interdicted and closed. However, transport systems remain functional (if obstructed, slower, possibly more costly, and at a degree of hazard) throughout the region. Actual roads may be closed, but alternatives are being found, diversions created. A number of road mine sites are known or controlled by local militia/expert assistance. Passage is then either negotiated by drivers or cleared and relayed by authorities. It is clearly the case, however, that some vehicles have failed to avoid mines. Interviews with mine-injured patients at Baidoa Hospital suggest that their awareness of mines on the road in question was inadequate. In other words, they were not simply taking a risk – as a majority of traffic does – but were unaware of the presence of risk.

**Market Inhibition:**
The presence of mines certainly slows transport of goods, and arguably drives up retail or market prices through increased fuel and time/labour costs. But supplies to market in Baidoa and Marka appear good and regular, and prices remain within conventional limits (e.g. no major inflation). Xuddor and Tayeglow markets remain functional though not carrying a wide range of goods. Trade routes extending from Bosaso through Bakool and Bey into Moqdishu remain open and used, but slow and potentially costly. Even around Kismayo where things have been unsettled, ingoing and outgoing trade traffic is reported to be continuing. Road clearance and development would be a very good thing here. However, there is a question over the viability of clearance (or indeed any awareness-raising work) in the RRA-ISC front-line area. There is also a question about the political-military will in the RRA to have mines even north of Baidoa towards Tayeglow removed. The perceived value of deployed mines remains high, and the value of lifted mines is indicated by domestic stockpiles in, for example, Tayeglow. These are not being held for trade, but for possible re-laying in the event of renewed fighting.

**Infrastructural Inhibition:**
The establishment and maintenance of reasonable quality transport infrastructure (especially during the rainy season) is a major problem in the CSZ. Mines do not appear significantly to affect water access and infrastructure development. Work is ongoing on canal and riverbank
rehabilitation\textsuperscript{6}, though there is reportedly still some limited mining along stretches of the Shabelle.

\textit{Fear/Community Development Deceleration:} 
Landmines and UXO certainly constitute an issue and a problem for local communities in the CSZ, as they do to varying degrees in the northern zones. However, given their limited spread, restriction mainly to roads, and continuing military usefulness, mines come relatively low on community needs agendas. According to a March 2000 PRA exercise in problem ranking conducted by ADRA in Bakool, the problem of mines did not appear at all on two of the five districts’ ranking charts, and on the other three charts, appeared as 8 or 9 out of a possible 10, falling below water, food, health, education, infrastructure, unemployment, livestock, shelter, hyena attacks, famine and agriculture. There are problems associated with mines and UXO – but they are current-use social-military items: familiar, accepted, negotiated. Awareness work, therefore, may encounter difficulties trying to find a broad-base consensus of communities for whom contamination is a matter of significant concern.

\textit{Small Arms and Security:} 
The public ownership, carriage (and use) of weapons is considerably more prevalent in the CSZ than in either Puntland or Somaliland. Militia members go armed in public, as do guards for international organisations. Reports of shootings, looting, car-jacking, checkpoints and banditry are still common in Jowhar, Belet Weyn, and Moqdishu – though under RRA and ISC administrations respectively, Bey/Bakool and Lower Shabelle appeared relatively calm. Demobilisation has been of extremely limited scope (concentrating on Lower Shabelle, and Marka, where approximately 130 checkpoint militia have been persuaded to hand in their weapons and re-train, in the 3 years of the project’s life). Elsewhere, in areas with no dominant administration, competing clans and factions exchange fire periodically, while at a private level, blood vendettas continue to be prosecuted through the medium of the bullet. Where militia are still (formally) engaged in conflict, they remain fully armed, taking their weapons with them when they withdraw from front-line areas into home towns, for leave or during rains, increasing the concentration of weaponry and unemployed adult males in those towns.

The market at Marka offered a limited open trade in munitions – full (30-round) AK magazines (the sale of these on their own presupposing the common ownership of the weapons themselves), for 60,000SS (or 2,000SS a round, similar to the price in Las Anod). Smaller-caliber rounds were on sale, again at a significantly higher price (8,000SS), appeared more in demand as in Puntland. Indeed, reports in Xuddor suggest that the most popular weapon available through the open market is currently the Makharov 9mm. It is overly-speculative to see here a shift in domestic arms ownership from assault rifle to hand gun (especially where hand guns (privately) have for long been popular and popularly owned).

\textit{Implications of Contamination and Impact for COA:} 
- The problem of mines and UXO is not that great in Somalia. Consequently, the need for awareness is limited. However, where mine action is going on or starting up, forms of awareness (not just to village communities, but throughout the networks of stakeholders) will be of use;
- Minefields are known and negotiated or avoided (but could be better marked and community-tended (see CARE Somalia project proposal, May 2000));
- Random mine clusters are sometime unknown and cannot be avoided, and blanket suggestion of danger may simply increase socio-economic impact on communities;
- Mines in the north threaten off-road pedestrians as well as vehicles/livestock; in the CSZ, the threat is very largely confined to on-road vehicles and livestock.
- UXO (particularly in relation to children) has specific impacts and needs to be treated in its own right;
- COA needs not only to warn communities about actual mined areas, but to reassure them about areas that can be certified safe (mines have been removed or were no more than

\textsuperscript{6} Water for Life have been working in some 27 villages around Marka, in riverbank and canal rehabilitation, and have encountered no mines.
rumoured); COA can also work positively (as opposed to negatively) with communities to advocate proactive community ownership of the problem and realistic, time-bound solutions – this includes enhancing relations of understanding and cooperation between communities, government offices, and demining agencies.
Landmine/Unexploded Ordnance Situation Assessment for Mine Awareness,
Unicef, April/May 2000

TOR:
• Somaliland, Puntland, Centre/South Somalia landmine and UXO contamination situation analysis; Assessment of small arms and security situation;
• Mine action ongoing and operational/institutional agencies;
• Mine/UXO awareness analyses and Unicef options.

Meetings, Briefings Attended/Facilitated & Documents Read:

Nairobi:

Meetings/Briefings:
Unicef:
• Manuel Fontaine, SPO: Overview briefing for mission;
• Edouard Beigbeder, Emergencies Officer;
• Marcoluigi Corsi, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer;
• Geeta Verma, Education Section;
• Julia Spry-Leverton, Information Section;
• Bill Condie, Security;

EC:
• Eddie Boyle (Landmines and Water);
• Paul Simkin (Demobilisation Project);

Life and Peace Institute:
• Elias Habte Selassie (Telephone Briefing);

NCA:
• Petros Wortamo (Telephone Briefing);

SCF-UK:
• Claire Meytraud (Telephone Briefing);

SCR:
• Ingalisa Tornblom (Telephone Briefing);

UNDP:
• Bernard Harbourne;
• Andrea Tamanini;
• Randolph Kent;

UNDOS:
• Runeka (Mapping Section);

UNHCR:
• K. Lutato (Telephone Briefing);

Action Nord Sud (Handicap International):
• Philippe Lepere (Telephone Briefing);

AMREF:
• Dr. John Batten (Telephone Briefing);

CARE:
• Scott Faia (Telephone Briefing);
• Rick Henning;
Documents:

- Somalia Emergency Country Profile, Unicef, Jun. 1998;
- Causes and Consequences of the Somalia Conflict, Unicef 1999;
- Rebuilding from the Ruins: A Self-Portrait of Somaliland, Draft, Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development, Hargeisa, October 1999;
- The Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa, Workshop 23-24 Nov. 1999, Institute for Practical Research and Training;
- Somalia Mine Action Programme’s Cross-Border Mine Awareness Activities, Final Report, CARE Somalia;
- SORRA Fact Sheet, Executive Summary, 1999;
- Level 1 Survey Reports, Mine Tech, 1999-2000;
- Level 1 Survey Form, SMAC IMSMA 2000;
- Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey – North East Zone, Unicef, 1998;
- Preliminary Report on Effects of Mines in Mudug Region, War-Torn Societies Project (WSP), June 1998;
- War-Torn Societies Project – North-East Somalia Regional Reports (Bari, Nugaal, North Mudug Regions), War-Torn Societies Project (WSP), March 1998;
- Project Proposal: Demolition of 5,554 Explosives Around Galkayo Town; Localisation of Land Mines in Mudug and Nugal Regions and Anti-mines Dissemination Programs, Environment and Community Development Organisation (ECO). March 1997;
- Puntland State Policy on Landmines, Office of the Vice-President, Puntland State of Somalia, January 1999;
- Proposal for a Workshop, General Directorate of Demobilisation and Reintegration, Puntland State of Somalia, February 1999;
- Emergency Rehabilitation of Water Points, Bakool Region, Somalia; Project Proposal, March 2000;
- International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education, United Nations
Briefings:

**Unicef, Hargeisa:**
- Romanus Mgerenke, RPO: Overview and Mission Schedule;
- Hassan Adan Ahmed, Information Section (contact person);
- Mohamed Ali Bile, Education Section;

**UNHCR, Somaliland:**
- Anthony Mogga;

**Somali Mine Action Centre (SMAC), Hargeisa:**
- Jab Swart, Somali Civil Protection Programme, Programme Manager;
- John Dingley, SMAC Mine Action Advisor;
- Ali Gurey, SMAC Manager;
- Mohamed Osman Ahmed, SMAC Mine Awareness Officer;

**Somaliland National Demining Agency (NDA):**
- Ismail Madar, Director;

**Deputy Speaker, Somaliland Parliament:**
- Abdilgadr Haji Ismail;

**Mine Tech, Somaliland:**
- Hugh Morris, Project Manager;
- Mike Laban, Community Mine Awareness (CMA) Manager;
- Abdul-Kadir Mohamed, Mine Tech COA Team;
- Yassin Osman Dhimbil, Mine Tech COA Team;
- Roada Jaamal, Mine Tech COA Team;

**HALO Trust, Somaliland:**
- Matthew Hovell, Programme Manager;
- Charlie Puddicombe, Technical Advisor;

**Danish Demining Group (DDG), Somaliland:**
- Erik Willadsen, Programme Manager;
- Technical Advisor;

**Santa Barbara, Somaliland:**
- Brian Barnes, Programme Manager;
- Liaison Officer;

**Action Nord Sud (Handicap International), Somaliland:**
- Karen Perrin;

**International Rescue Committee, Hargeisa:**
- David Murphy;

**Danish Refugee Council, Somaliland:**
- Programme Advisor;

**Somali Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SORRA), Somaliland:**
- Ahmed Mohamed Modar, Director;
- Hussain Dualeh, Director;
- Mohamed Abdi Dhimiil, Director;

**Havoyoco, Somaliland:**
• Ahmed Mohamed, Director;
• Abdi Ali, Programme and Planning Department;
• Ahmed Geedi, ‘Circus’ Manager;
• Hussain Ismail, Vocational Training Officer;
• Ifah Rashid, Women’s Development Officer;
• Khamal, HIV Awareness Project Manager;

Somaliland War Veterans Association (Sooyaal):
• Hussain Guure, Chairman;
• Essa Mohamed Hassain, Board;

COSONGO, Hargeisa:
• Director;

Somali Red Crescent Society (and Centre for Rehabilitation), Somaliland:
• Ali Sheikh Mohamed, Director;

BBC Somalia, Hargeisa:
• Mohamed Abdilehi;

Somaliland Document Registration Project:
• John Drysdale;

Unicef Bosaso:
• Sven Jonssen, OIC Unicef Puntland;
• Dr Abdi Rahaman Yussuf Muse, Health;
• Abdizirak Haga, Health;
• Mahamoud Ali Yussuf, Education;
• Said Mohamed, Education;

CARE Puntland:
• Abdijabar Dini, Team Leader;

AAH, Gardo, Puntland:
• Sister Margaret, Project Officer;

Diakonia, Garowe, Puntland:
• Mohamed Abshir Waldo, Consultant;

Life and Peace Institute, Bosaso/Garowe, Puntland:
• Abdiilehi Sheikh Ahmed, Director;
• Abdulahi (Nairobi representative);

Somali Red Crescent Society, Puntland:
• Abdi Nurr Yussuf, Vice-President, Somalia;

Somali Relief Society (SORSO), Puntland:
• SORSO team;

Kaalo, Puntland:
• Mahamoud Sheikh Alamid, Director;

Hart Group Ltd:
• Ron Temperley, Project Manager;

KaahaBari (Weekly Newspaper – Puntland):
• Khalif Mohamed Barre, Editor/Proprietor;

World Bank/York University Peace Studies Department:
• Dr. S. Barakat, Director;

*Department of Demining (Puntland):*
• Mohamed Soofe, Director;

*Ministry of Public Works (Puntland):*
• Mr. Kulmeer, Deputy-Minister;

*Police (Puntland):*
• Said Samantha, Commissioner;

*Garowe Hospital, Puntland:*
• Abdulahi Ersi, Director;

*Unicef Baidoa:*
• Jonathan Veitch, RPO;
• Charles Lolika, Operations Officer;
• Roger Carter, Security Officer;
• Ayisha Maulana, Health;
• Dr Talhil Farah, Health;
• Dr. A. Mulugeta, Health;

*RRA Protocol Administration Liaison Officer:*
• Mahmoud Mohamed Isaaq;

*RRA Council Executive, Baidoa:*
• Mohamed Ibrahim, Acting Chairman;
• Mohamed Abdi, minister of Defence;
• Ibrahim Gituk, Vice-Minister of Defence;
• Dr. Ali Iman, Attorney-General;
• Chief of staff;
• Head of Security;

*RRA Supreme Council:*
• Sharti Gadud;

*RRA Security:*
• Abdi Malik Hussein, RRA Security Officer;

*Baidoa Hospital:*
• Dr Abdulahi, OIC;

*Unicef Moqdishu:*
• Guled Yussef;

*Islamic Sharia Court (ISC), Marka:*
• Sheikh Talhil Mohamoud Ibrahim, Head;

*CEFA:*
• Nasir Abdi Arush;

*COSV:*
• Odiko, COSV (EC) Coordinator, Demobilisation Project;

*Cooperative New Ways:*
• Verena Karrer, Coordinator;

*CARE Somalia (Marka):*
• John Miskell, Southern Somali Team Leader;
Water for Life:
• Hassan Mustaf Mohamed;

IIIDA:
• Howa Erik, Chairperson;
• Ms. Karthouma, Health Officer;

WFP:
• Mohamed Ali Mohamoud;

Renaissance:
• Abdirizak Dirir, Chairman;
• Ali Mohamoud, PR;

Islamic Sharia Court, Qoryoley:

Islamic Sharia Court, Kurtunwaarey:

Marka Hospital:
• Hassan Mohamed, Chairman of Hospital Board;
• Dr Omar Dheere, Medical Director;

International Medical Corps, Xuddor:
• Georgiana Platt, Country Director;
• Dr. Ahmed Jiamma Musser;

ADRA:
• Douglas Abuurru;

Xuddor RRA Administrative Council:
• Yussef Mohamed Abdi, Governor;
• Mohamed Moalin Ahmed, DC;
• Abdulahi Mohamed, Acting Governor;
• Sheikh Abduraman Ismail, Acting DC;
• Abdulahi Ibrahim Hassan, Social Affairs;
• Sheikh Hussein Ali Aden;
• Sheikh Hassan Yuya, Deputy DC;
• Abdulahi Hassan, Finance Officer;
• Mohamed Reri, Vice, Social Affairs;

Tayeglow RRA Administrative Council:
• Ali Malin, Mine Expert;
• Ali Ali Yow, Elder, RRA Central Committee;
• Mohamed Yussef, Elder;
• Gudo Hassan Bage, Executive Chairman of RRA, Deputy Chairman of Interior;
• Ibrahim Bulle, Elder;
Meetings/Workshops:
- SMAC Technical Coordination Body (TCB), 15 Apr. 2000;
- SMAC Mine Awareness Working Group, 15 Apr. 2000;
- Mine Awareness Materials Development Workshop, 18-19 Apr. 2000;
- Final Mission Debrief (S. Taylor) to: Unicef; DDG; HALO; Santa Barbara; Mine Tech; SMAC; NDA; SORRA; Havoyoco; SRCS; Sooyaal; CARE Somalia; Action Nord-Sud.

Field Visits:
- Hargeisa → Gabiley – Gabiley East minefield level 2 survey site, Somaliland;
- Gabiley → Arabsiyo minefield level 2 survey site (completed), Somaliland;
- Mine Tech COA School Session;
- Mine Tech COA Community Discussion Meeting;
- Hargeisa → Adadley minefield clearance site, Somaliland;
- Hargeisa → Adadley Military Camp UXO clearance site (completed), Somaliland;
- Addebadley → Gedbaladh → Togwajaale, Galbeed, Somaliland (Somaliland-Ethiopia border area);
- Bosaso → Gardo → Garowe, Bari/Nugaal, Puntland;
- Marka → Qoryoley District, Lower Shabelle;
- Marka → Kurtunwaarey District (inc. Mombasa village), Lower Shabelle;
- Baidoa → Xuddor → Tayeglow, Bay/Bakool;

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