SUMMARY

EVALUATION OF UNICEF’S PEACEBUILDING, EDUCATION, AND ADVOCACY PROGRAMME (PBEA)
Evaluation Summary


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The PBEA outcome evaluation was conducted by Avenir Analytics with Brian Majewski as Team Leader, and the evaluation comprising of Anna Seeger, Covadonga Canteli, Katherine George, Kerstin Tebbe, Nick Petten, and Zehra Rizvi. Kathleen Letshabo was supported by Tina Tordjman-Nebe in the management of the evaluation process. The evaluation received invaluable inputs from UNICEF country teams in 14 PBEA countries, the PBEA management team, UNICEF advisors based in regional offices and headquarters (UNICEF Programme Division), as well as partners from the Peacebuilding Support Office and Search for Common Ground.

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CONTENTS

1 BACKGROUND ........................................................................ 2

2 EVALUATION FEATURES ................................................... 5

3 FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS ............................................. 9

4 RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................... 12
This section provides the context and rationale for the PBEA, its design and implementation, against UNICEF’s mandate for promoting the rights of children and safeguarding their well-being.
In too many parts of the world, conflict has been putting children and young people at risk and, all too often, taking their lives. Around the globe, conflict has swept people from their homes, spread hunger and disease and destroyed the facilities and infrastructure needed to support lives and livelihoods. Conflict has in many places wiped away the gains made through decades of development effort and blocked the path towards future progress and prosperity.

An estimated 20 million adolescents that are out of school were living in countries affected by conflict, and while the number of out-of-school children is estimated to have dropped by 42 percent between 2000 and 2012, they are becoming increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected countries. Recent studies also show that 1 in 4 of school-aged children – 462 million – now live in countries affected by crisis. Of these, 75 million are children aged 3-18 years, living in 35 crisis-affected countries, and in desperate need of educational support. They also show that incidents of military use of schools and other targeted attacks on education are occurring in far more countries, and far more extensively than previously documented. Under these circumstances, there is a pressing need in the development and humanitarian communities to find effective solutions that address the root causes of conflict, and to promote peace, resilience and human security.

Given its mandate to safeguard and improve the well-being children, UNICEF has a role to play in pursuing peace for the children today and for future generations of children. UNICEF’s role in peacebuilding is guided by its own mandate and Strategic Plan (2014-2017), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), a number of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and indeed, the broader mandate of the UN system.

The Charter of the UN establishes its aim to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to maintain international peace and security.” And while UNICEF’s mandate is the

3 http://www.educationcannotwait.org/the-situation/
4 GCPEA, Education Under Attack, 2014
mainly to protect and safeguard children’s rights, its mission also includes the responsibility to ensure “special protection for the most disadvantaged children – victims of war, disasters, extreme poverty, all forms of violence and exploitation and those with disabilities.”

The CRC, for which UNICEF has a convening role, establishes that children’s rights are not subject to derogation at any time, and apply both in peace-time and in conflict when children are most vulnerable. Hence UNICEF’s most recent Strategic Plan gives special emphasis on equity and resilience, with one of the programmatic outputs focusing on “building the evidence base on education and peacebuilding and on the mechanisms through which education contributes to resilience”, and on using this knowledge to support countries in assessing and managing risks to ensure sustainability of achievements for girls and boys.

To that end, UNICEF received funding from the Government of the Netherlands to implement a programme that provided an opportunity to test whether a social service such as education can be successfully harnessed to promote peace. The aim of the programme Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (2012-2015) was to strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in 14 countries recovering from conflict or at risk of falling into conflict.

The extent to which social services (in this case education) can be used for peacebuilding is an area of work that has not previously been tested at scale in UNICEF. Hence PBEA represented an unprecedented effort for UNICEF to go beyond conventional development and humanitarian approaches to try out solutions that interrupt cycles of violence by addressing the root causes of conflict. PBEA opened up the space for learning about peacebuilding processes, and required UNICEF staff to overcome conceptual and practical challenges.

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Learning from Peace Programme Design

VISION
Strengthened resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-affected contexts achieved

STRATEGIC RESULT
Strengthened policies and practices for education and peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts

The PBEA implementation targeted FIVE outcomes areas:

1. The inclusion of education into peacebuilding policies, and vice versa
2. Increasing institutional capacities to supply conflict sensitive education services
3. Increasing capacity of children, parents, teachers and duty bearers to cope, reduce, and prevent conflict and promote peace
4. Increasing access for children to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace
5. Generating evidence and knowledge on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding, and evidence upon which programming practice can be based

TARGET COUNTRIES

West & Central Africa
- Chad
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Liberia
- Sierra Leone

East & Southern Africa
- Burundi
- Ethiopia
- Somalia
- South Sudan
- Uganda

Middle East & North Africa
- State of Palestine
- Yemen

East Asia & Pacific
- Myanmar

South Asia
- Pakistan
This section lays out the rationale for conducting an outcome evaluation of the PBEA, provides a summary of the evaluation themes and objectives, as well as the evaluation approach and methodology.
PBEA has benefitted from two other independent evaluative activities – an evaluability assessment in 2013, and a developmental evaluation underway in two PBEA sites. This report focuses on the outcome evaluation, the purpose of which was to systematically assess the extent to which UNICEF has achieved PBEA programme outcomes and made identifiable contributions to peacebuilding, social cohesion and/or resilience at the individual, community, institutional and/or systems levels.

**Evaluation themes and objectives**

The evaluation had five themes and corresponding objectives:

- **UNICEF’s approach to peacebuilding relative to its positioning**: To assess UNICEF’s approach to peacebuilding, whether outcomes and pathways to achieving results are articulated clearly, and to assess PBEA programming choices against global best practices and benchmarks in peacebuilding relative to UNICEF’s position and comparative advantage.

- **Achievement of outcomes**: To evaluate the extent to which PBEA has achieved intended outcomes of strengthening the education system for peacebuilding programming, built institutional and personal capacities of UNICEF education staff, key partners and beneficiaries, and increased knowledge on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding.

- **UNICEF-wide collaboration and learning**: To determine the extent to which PBEA collaborated and coordinated internally with respective divisions, sections and offices in UNICEF to advance goals and objectives in peacebuilding/resilience programming.

- **External Partnerships**: To examine whether UNICEF has formed the right partnerships for its peacebuilding work, and how UNICEF’s partnership strategy contributed to advancing PBEA goals and intended outcomes.

- **Management and governance**: To determine the extent to which UNICEF’s governance and management arrangements coalesced around PBEA programme goals and accountabilities to maximize the likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes.

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9 Major partnerships at the global level are PBSo, INEE. Partnerships at the country level include Search for Common Ground.
The evaluation was also an important data point in determining whether PBEA should be funded through a follow-up programme to extend its learning trajectory, and/or whether peacebuilding programming should be repositioned under other components of UNICEF’s agenda. To that end, five evaluation criteria were used, namely:

- **Relevance**, whether the PBEA goals were in line with national goals and priorities, and consistent with intended effects;
- **Coherence**, assessing the consistency within different components of the PBEA approach and whether programme policies and guidance take into account human rights standards and considerations;
- **Effectiveness**, measuring the extent to which PBEA activities resulted in intended outputs or other levels of results;
- **Efficiency** and indication of the ratio of outputs achieved to the total inputs contributed (cost efficiency, timeliness, and comparison to other alternatives); and,
- **Scalability**, considering the ability of an intervention implemented on a small scale to be expanded to reach a greater population while retaining effectiveness.

**Evaluation methodology**

A review of documents from all 14 PBEA implementing country offices\(^\text{10}\) was conducted. The review also included documents on PBEA activities conducted by the Education Section, as well as activities supported by PBEA collaborating units at Headquarters and Regional Offices.

Working with UNICEF country staff and implementing partners through an “outcome harvesting”\(^\text{11}\)” exercise the evaluation identified changes that have occurred as a result of PBEA inputs, and articulated them as ‘results statements’. The outcome harvesting exercise afforded PBEA staff an opportunity to think about the different levels of results, from outputs to outcome level results - the highest level of results achieved, and work backwards to identify how the PBEA contributed to each of these results. PBEA teams and implementing partners engaged in an iterative process to refine and validate result statements.

Complementary data collection stage comprised field visits to three PBEA implementing countries (Burundi, Pakistan and South Sudan). Key informant interviews were conducted with UNICEF staff, partners in country offices, regional offices and the global level. In all, 285 informants contributed documents and information to the evaluation.

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\(^{10}\) Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Pakistan, State of Palestine, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen.

\(^{11}\) Outcome harvesting is designed to be a participatory process, often over an extended period of time with facilitated in-person workshops and dialogue. The approach was modified for brevity and the remote nature of engagement with the 11 COs not visited.
Mapping of sample PBEA activities

In NYHQ, UNICEF commissioned a comprehensive research initiative whose results built an evidence base illustrating that social services, such as education, do matter in building peaceful communities.

In the State of Palestine, the rollout of the Nonviolence in Schools Policy led to more inclusive learning environments that are more inviting to girls, children with disabilities, and nomadic Bedouin children.

In Pakistan, engaging children and youth from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds in weekly sports and play-based activities resulted in increase in sense of belonging, tolerance of “the other,” and friendship.

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Key informant interviews with country, regional and global level stakeholders

Document review

OUTCOME HARVESTING

Validation of results with key implementing partners
Evaluation analysis framework

RESULTS
Evaluations theme 1
Accountability / summative

Global outcome areas
1. Policy
2. Institutional capacities
3. Capacity of children, parents, teachers and duty bearers
4. Access to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education
5. Learning: generation of evidence and knowledge
6. Other unexpected

Expected Finding
Actual Finding

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Evaluation theme 2, 3, 4, 5 Learning / formative

Programme
- Peacebuilding Approach
- External Partnerships
- Management and Governance
- UNICEF-wide collaboration

Strength Finding
Weakness Finding

LESSONS
Accountability and Learning, Future guidance

Conclusions and Recommendations
- Is approach fit for purpose?
- Are pathways and concepts clear and understood?
- Did PBEA programming choices establish or follow good practice?
- Do UNICEF’s position and comparative advantages support PBEA?
This chapter summarises the evidence produced in the evaluation regarding PBEA’s contribution to its vision, and the factors that explain results. It also presents conclusions.
PBEA represented an unprecedented effort for UNICEF to link aspects of development and humanitarian approaches together to address the root causes of conflict in order to interrupt cycles of violence. It operated in very challenging contexts, including a number of countries where there was on-going conflict or a newly erupted epidemic as in the case of the Ebola virus disease in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Given that peacebuilding is still very much an under-defined area of work in UNICEF, PBEA had to overcome many conceptual and practical challenges. As a result, innovation, adaptation and learning were designed into the programme. Inevitably, developing and improving approaches takes time. However, the evaluation found notable results and progress.

Conclusions on achievement of PBEA outcomes

**CONCLUSION 1:**

PBEA has, by and large, achieved substantial results in each of the five PBEA outcome areas and is following the most promising practices for peacebuilding programming. However, a number of important lessons were learned about programming choices that are required for UNICEF to increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable results in peacebuilding.

Key successes in PBEA programming included completion of conflict analyses, establishment of an operational model, and integration of peacebuilding into country programmes. Hence all 14 PBEA country programmes completed their conflict analyses. 11 country programmes indicated that they used the conflict analysis substantially in their programme design, influenced country programmes, and subsequently the programmes of other development partners, national governments and/or other actors. Given the importance of risk assessment and risk management in education sector planning, this is a significant achievement.

Furthermore, selected countries mainstreamed peacebuilding across sectors (Burundi) and established a direct reporting line to senior management.
(Burundi and Sierra Leone). Such championing of the PBEA programme by senior management was key to mobilising other sector specialists and in achieving results, as were recruitment of peace-building experts (Uganda, Burundi, and Somalia) and in-country and remote technical support from ROs on programming and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

Other than the work on conflict analyses and mainstreaming, most country offices did not demonstrate substantive results in the areas of learning and evidence generation. Rather, they focused their resources on activities aimed at achieving results for beneficiaries, creating partnerships, and monitoring of results. However, UNICEF and its partners learned more about how to work ‘in conflict’ and ‘on conflict’ as a result of PBEA research, peer-to-peer learning and individual learning by doing. Evidence and learning from these efforts emerged in the last year of PBEA programming, and beyond.

As noteworthy as these milestones are, UNICEF learned important lessons from implementing the programme without full conceptual understanding of peacebuilding and capacity to realize results within the short allotted timeframe. For instance, an evaluability assessment (EA) conducted in 2013 concluded that country programmes missed an opportunity to define a more reasonable scope and concrete plan for peacebuilding—that is, the timing between the commencement of the PBEA programme and the renewal of multi-year country programmes, which vary across countries, were misaligned.

A few countries whose country programme planning cycle coincided with the PBEA programme lifetime, such as South Sudan (2016-2018) and Uganda (2016-2020), integrated conflict prevention and conflict-sensitive education into the country programme design. For the majority of countries, planning for new CPD cycles was to occur within 12 to 18 months of the close of the PBEA, thereby presenting an opportunity to build on the gains of PBEA.

There is broad understanding that peacebuilding is an ambitious goal involving significant change across many levels of society, sectors and actors beyond UNICEF’s direct reach. PBEA’s achievement of outcomes should be considered within that reality, and understood within the short timeframe it has been implemented, hence the evaluation concluded that it is too early to expect sustainable large-scale outcomes (lasting peace, high social cohesion and resilience) in any PBEA country. However, a foundation has been established to enable UNICEF to build on PBEA lessons, and to make discreet but meaningful contributions to turn what seems to be aspirational goals to concrete quantifiable achievements if efforts and investments continue.
PBEa demonstrated the potential for education to contribute to peacebuilding, with a higher likelihood of more significant results as programming practices improve (elaborated in subsequent sections of the report) are sustained and scaled, and COs focus efforts where they can achieve the most substantive results. For the foreseeable future, UNICEF will pursue education programming that covers both downstream results (building schools and providing services such as access to schooling, equipping schools, training teachers, and enhancing the quality of education) and upstream results (advocacy, policy and systems strengthening).

Programming for education service delivery will continue in priority countries, typically low-income countries where the majority of out-of-school children reside. Many of these countries also happen to be involved with humanitarian programming, either because they are experiencing conflict or are transitioning out of one. Hence one of the important lessons of the PBEa was around mainstreaming peacebuilding approaches in the rest of the activities of the education programme. These efforts should be carried forward through education sector planning processes.

**Conclusions on UNICEF’s approach**

The evaluation concluded that, in pursuing context specific programming that seeks to address drivers of conflict, PBEa is following the most promising practice for education and peacebuilding—that is, administering a conflict analysis that provides a critical conceptual underpinning. Cumulative evidence shows that country offices guided by a solid theory of change—i.e., the “why” of programming as depicted in Figure 1 (Figure 5 from PBEa evaluation synthesis report)—achieved the greatest scale, substance, and verifiability of results. Although the increasing body of guidance and support from Regional Offices and Headquarters helped improve the programme’s effectiveness, consultations with stakeholders in the local contexts based on well-founded analysis and theory of change proved most useful in defining pathways of the programme.
Figure 1 is, in effect, a description and affirmation of good result-based management programming. Fidelity to the results-based management process depicted in Figure 1 was observed in Uganda and Burundi, and to some extent, South Sudan. Country programmes that followed this logical programming cycle closely also tended to develop more innovative, cross-sector and non-traditional tools, and better beneficiary focus and partnerships to achieve peacebuilding results.

The process of conducting a conflict analysis was itself important because it potentially opened up space for constructive dialogue about attitudes, practices and/or behaviours that propagate conflict. It should be noted, however, that conflict analyses (both the processes and products) are often complex and sometimes even contested, as was the case in Ethiopia and Pakistan. A lesson from PBEA is that decisions about identification of the entity that will conduct the conflict analysis (consultants, company, etc.), communities or geographical areas to target, or informants all needs to be handled in a conciliatory manner. Also, adequate time should be planned for dissemination and consultations on the results of the conflict analysis so as to maximise its acceptance and utility.

**FIGURE 1: ELEMENTS OF A HOLISTIC PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT CYCLE**
CONCLUSION 4:
UNICEF is well-positioned to engage in peacebuilding work based on its mandate and institutional strengths. However, the organisation needs to navigate sensitivities, identify entry points, focus resources on high risk environments to achieve scale and emphasise the primacy of context specific programming.

UNICEF is well positioned to play a significant role in peacebuilding. Its mandate for promoting child rights and focus on equity relates well to prevalent conflict drivers. With programming that spans emergency response and development UNICEF has the credibility and relationships to more proactively engage in conflict prevention through peacebuilding work. Also, no other actors with the institutional capacity to do so at scale are focused on contributing to peacebuilding through social services.

However, investments necessary to appropriately identify conflict drivers, articulate the programme design, and assemble adequate levels of programme implementation capacities were vastly underestimated in the original global programme design. Faced with this reality, country programmes sought other entry points, and began implementing a finite set of activities, while devoting the initial years of the programme to establishing a foundation for PBEA work. As could be expected, programme coherence was compromised in cases where intervention selection preceded conflict analysis (in Palestine and Yemen, for instance).

More importantly, education's potential roles both as a conflict driver, and a means to address conflict drivers was previously unrecognised in many contexts. Finding entry points to change the attitudes and perceptions of the peacebuilding community and education practitioners to ensure that education's role in peacebuilding was defined and education was positioned as a strong enabler of peace was a sensitive endeavour in some countries, especially in the first two years of the programme. With time and effort, most country offices were able to overcome this sensitivities due to UNICEF’s strong position in the education sector. Also, UNICEF staff became better at identifying and navigating these entry points. A good example of these efforts is Myanmar’s identification of mine risk education or the Ethnic Language Policy, as an existing mechanism through which UNICEF can engage both NSAs and the Government of Myanmar in collaborative peacebuilding work.
Conclusions on positioning of UNICEF

**CONCLUSION 5:** Programme implementation partnerships, including new partners, have enabled UNICEF to increase its reach and access and deliver peacebuilding results. High level advocacy partnerships and management of implementing partners for better knowledge exchange across organisations are required.

UNICEF was successful in forming partnerships with the many of the right national and local partners who played a critical role in effectively achieving results. This required looking beyond UNICEF’s traditional sector based partnerships to identify organisations with expertise in peacebuilding and community relevance in sensitive environments, including community and faith-based organisations. For instance, the types of interventions used and beneficiaries reached by UNICEF through PBEA included expanding emphasis on youth and adolescents, and establishing community engagement mechanisms and partnerships with community and faith-based organisations.

Coordination with other major international and regional peacebuilding actors is also a critical area for improvement given the scale and multi-generational nature of the root causes of conflict. External partnerships are critical at knowledge and innovation, policy and advocacy and programme implementation levels to leverage the knowledge, skills, access and credibility of other actors.

UNICEF was less successful in coordinating with partners and managing across implementing partners – many partners worked in isolation and the evaluation identified missed opportunities for synergies that would have improved programme efficiency and effectiveness. Future programming would benefit from improved partner coordination and management and synergy based on holistic programme design.

**CONCLUSION 6:** PBEA demonstrated that conflict-sensitive and/or peacebuilding programming that attempts to address drivers of conflict requires strong leadership support to enable cross-sectoral collaboration, and ultimately mainstreaming of peacebuilding solutions.

The evaluation found that strong country leadership support was instrumental in mainstreaming peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity into other sectors, mainstreaming being defined as integrating peacebuilding into programmes of one or more sectors. Successful mainstreaming is expected to result in adjusting organisational structures, systems, strategies, and/or policies, and leadership commitment to staffing funding support.
The degree and form of mainstreaming varied across PBEA countries, the most common form being incorporation of conflict analysis into UNICEF planning cycle. Conflict analyses were integrated into UNICEF’s Situation Analysis process and used to inform country programme planning in 7 of the 14 country offices. This shift was supported by elements of the Strategic Plan related to resilience and a long-running process to develop an organisational policy paper on resilience with peacebuilding as a core component. Early stages of mainstreaming peacebuilding approaches was reported by PBEA participating sectors at UNICEF headquarters in sector/thematic concept notes, theories of change and research at varying levels of development. Strong evidence of mainstreaming peacebuilding into ‘education in emergencies portfolio in WCARO. Building on the work of the Humanitarian Action, Resilience and Peacebuilding team (HARP) in ESARO, efforts to mainstream conflict sensitivity into institutional and individual capacity building and humanitarian and development response were being realigned with the broader resilience agenda. All these efforts, and HATIS work to develop a capacity development package on peacebuilding presented potential for greater institutionalisation, and were believed to transformative influence in UNICEF programming.

Conclusions on PBEA programme management

CONCLUSION 7:
PBEA programme management has developed well to support accountability and learning and to mobilise support of multiple sectors. Adjustments to allow more flexibility for country offices to focus on local needs and increased capacity for backstopping in regional offices improved performance. Dedicated programme staff with peacebuilding expertise significantly improve country office programme management.

Managing PBEA as a global programme allowed greater accountability to the donor and greater learning. It also highlighted inherent challenges with designing common programme objectives and aggregating data on results for peacebuilding programmes across highly contextualised country-level programmes. Systems developed to enable PBEA global reporting unintentionally promoted linear focus on individual outcome areas and simple output measures rather than holistic programme design and more meaningful context specific outcome measures. Development of tools for measuring context specific results, such as knowledge, attitude, and perception (KAP) surveys and proxy indicators and indices represent positive developments for future peacebuilding monitoring and reporting.

PBEA programme management has evolved over time to better balance these factors, but future peacebuilding programming may require an approach that continues to support learning and capacity development from global and
regional levels while allowing country offices to design, implement and measure performance in context specific ways. While global aggregation of results without undermining the need to engage key stakeholders in programme design and focus on national and local priorities may still not be possible, work on Sustainable Development Goal 16 (to promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies) will provide an opportunity to expand knowledge in this area.

**CONCLUSION 8:**
The PBEA resource allocation process was, by and large reasonable, transparent, and communicated clearly. However, utilisation and management of funding was not as efficient as it should have been, mostly due to the fact that donor accountability and accountability for funding decisions was at the global level, while accountability for results was decentralised.

Based on learning from PBEA’s predecessor, Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition (EEPCT), the funding was managed by the Programme Management Team within the Education section of UNICEF New York Headquarters (NYHQ), who, upon review of proposals and funding appeals disbursed funds to country offices, regional offices, and other NYHQ sections. The lesson learned from PBEA implementation is that a balance must be found that places the right resources and accountabilities at appropriate levels of UNICEF’s organisational structure to both enhance learning and allow for context specific programming.

An alternative resource allocation model for consideration would be a programme-based financing mechanism such as the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) of the Peacebuilding Fund. With this model, funding could be allocated on a preliminary basis and disbursed directly to the programme country to conduct in-depth conflict analysis. This would be followed by proposals to fund implementation that require clear articulation of context specific outcomes, theories of change, partnership arrangements, staffing commitments and clear leadership support. An expert committee could review proposals and select among them based on pre-identified criteria for coherence and quality. Such a funding mechanism would be open to any country office wishing to pursue peacebuilding programming, leading to greater self-selection that is more aligned with UNICEF’s decentralised accountabilities.

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12 [http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/]
The recommendations presented in this chapter draw from the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, and attempt to identify key actions for UNICEF at different levels.
Recommendations were validated by a reference group consisting of key PBEa stakeholders from HQ, ROs and COs, on their soundness and possible utility, and whether it would be feasible for UNICEF to come up with practical follow-up actions.

1. Articulate **CLEARER VISION** for peacebuilding, and integrate it into corporate strategies, programme policies and strategies, and key messages.

2. At minimum, institutionalise **CONFLICT ANALYSIS** as part of programme cycle and adherence to ‘do no harm’ principles.

3. Consolidate **LESSONS LEARNED** from programming, and use them to develop resources for education sector planning.

4. Develop **PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY** to heighten likelihood of achieving peacebuilding results for children and youth.

5. Continue to **MOBILISE RESOURCES** to facilitate global visibility and learning, while ensuring financial and results accountabilities.

6. **SECURE FUNDING** for continuation of critical activities and to incorporate lessons into the next programme cycle.

7. Update country level result statements for **FUTURE LEARNING**, and complete research and knowledge management initiatives.
Recommendations on PBEA results and strategic choices

According to the UNICEF Strategic Plan (2014-2017), UNICEF’s mandate extends across the development-humanitarian continuum. This means that for the foreseeable future the organisation will continue to work in fragile and conflict affected contexts where a majority of children live in poverty, are essentially underserved by their states, and are therefore susceptible to all kinds of vulnerability. Indeed, the share of resources that are channelled towards countries that are experiencing or recovering from conflict, both ODA and national resources, has increased exponentially in the past two decades.

However, a lack of due diligence in the management of resources has become part of the problem by some accounts. Hence, in order for any long lasting improvements in the lives of children, there is a renewed sense of urgency for UNICEF and all its partners to use the foundation laid by the PBEA to embark on development and humanitarian programming that seeks to disrupt cycles of violence by addressing the root causes of conflict. This is probably the primary message of the evaluation. Associated with Conclusions 1 and 2, the first recommendation addresses the need to articulate a clear vision for peacebuilding work and the role of UNICEF leadership in championing this work.

**Recommendation 1:**
UNICEF should articulate a clearer vision for its role and contribution to peacebuilding in conflict affected and fragile contexts, and integrate this vision into corporate strategies, global programme policy, country programme strategies, and in key messages from UNICEF leaders.

UNICEF’s mandate and accountabilities vis-à-vis the people it serves, the organisation’s refocus on the equity agenda and various commitments to “strengthen involvement in systematic reduction of vulnerability to disaster and conflicts through risk-informed country programmes that help build resilience”, all provide support for engagement in building social cohesion that is required for communities to live and relate peacefully. And while PBEA brought invaluable resources that helped to illustrate that UNICEF has an important role to play in harnessing their work in social sectors for purposes of promoting long lasting peace, it has also heightened awareness to the layers of complexity in peacebuilding work, and a realisation that peacebuilding efforts have to be sustained over a long period of time with a predictable and sustainable stream of funding.
Peacebuilding processes are, in essence, one aspect of risk-informed programming and a potentially sustainable means of reducing vulnerability and disruptions due to conflict and/or natural disasters. On the other hand, peacebuilding results are a tangible way to deliver on the commitment of building resilience to conflict for individuals, families, and communities. UNICEF has to make the necessary connections and distinctions between all these processes and strategies. More importantly, there seems to be clarity and a foregone conclusion among all levels of UNICEF staff that conflict-sensitive programming is required in all contexts as a minimum programme of action. It is less clear, however, whether UNICEF leadership is willing to expend the necessary reputational resources on seeking peacebuilding results, even though UNICEF documentation is not lacking of pronouncements on the organisation’s commitment to programming for resilience.

It is important to confirm and emphasise the perception that peacebuilding programming will by definition introduce additional complexity to already difficult programming contexts, and that concerns about UNICEF’s reputation are not misplaced. However, UNICEF has been found by this evaluation to be well positioned in terms of its reach, and its institutional strengths and partnerships (both existing and new ones formed under the PBEA) to facilitate meaningful contribution to peacebuilding results. Indeed, explicit commitment to peacebuilding work should be accompanied by additional resources in terms of global programme guidance and expertise to incorporate the necessary elements into country programme designing processes, as well as deploying the necessary expertise to the countries that require the most assistance in this regard. The role of Representatives and Deputy Representatives will be critical in carrying forth explicit commitments to peacebuilding, hence it would benefit the organisation immensely if senior positions in high risk countries were to be filled with personnel with heightened awareness of, and/or experience in working in conflict environments.
Recommendations on PBEA programming approach

Recommendation 2:
As a minimum programme of action, UNICEF should institutionalise conflict analysis approaches as a part of the programme development cycle, and ascertain the use of conflict analysis findings in adaptation and design of programmes and policies, including mandating strict adherence to “do no harm” principles.

Since UNICEF is already engaged in developing ‘risk-informed’ programming strategies for all contexts, it should be possible to differentiate between enterprise risk and shock-based risk (conflict, disaster, disease outbreak). In cases of the latter, adhering to conflict sensitivity and “do no harm” principles are considered as minimum good practice for development and humanitarian work, with “do no harm” principles having been considered as mandatory since the late 1990s. UNICEF’s own mandate supports these principles, and in practice this means that the Situation Analysis should include an analysis of the drivers of conflict, to be derived from existing, updated, or new conflict analyses commissioned by UNICEF or other UN partners.

PBEA processes and investments at UNICEF Headquarters, regional offices and country offices have yielded substantial tools and strengthened peacebuilding technical expertise among education sector specialists, including commissioning and/or conducting conflict analyses. These efforts should be complemented by partners’ tools and frameworks to establish a minimum standard to be applied to programme planning and implementation. Still, resources will be required in terms of UNICEF staff time to guide the conflict analyses process, and to build up a cadre of peacebuilding experts in cases where peacebuilding programming is a key component of the Country Programme, as well as external expertise to shore up UNICEF internal peacebuilding capacities at all levels. An institutional commitment is required in order to move all these plans and good intentions to implementation.

Recommendation 3:
UNICEF should consolidate lessons learned from the two areas of mainstreaming peacebuilding into the education programmes and using education to deliver peacebuilding results in fragile contexts, and use them to develop resources for education sector planning.

UNICEF education sector programming has been enriched by the experiences of the PBEA in all 14 PBEA implementing countries in that peacebuilding processes have been mainstreamed into the education sector response, albeit to varying degrees. Where these gains are sustained, they will require education sector specialists to incorporate conflict analysis information to shape
up the development of their programme components. Nonetheless, there is a great potential to spread these benefits more widely and to consolidate the learning and practice.

Incorporating conflict analyses information into education sector planning processes facilitates a more holistic coverage of conflict drivers in the education sector response in that it opens up the dialogue on the relative merits of implementing different programming strategies, and/or build in redundancies where necessary. Enriching education sector processes in this manner could be the key contribution of the PBEA to education sector practice, and yet another opportunity to consolidate learning on how social sectors can target their own outcomes while also programming for peacebuilding results.

Recommendations on UNICEF’s positioning for peacebuilding work

Recommendation 4:
UNICEF should develop a partnership strategy that will set parameters for its engagement with peacebuilding work, determine how to better leverage the capacities, experiences and skills of its partners (traditional and potential), and unleash the organization’s influence to heighten the likelihood to achieve peacebuilding results for children and youth.

PBEA has worked with many of the right partners during its implementation, and in some cases, built new relationships with non-traditional partners. While the evaluation cannot claim to have conducted a full skills audit, there is a realisation that a substantial amount of the capacities required for conflict-sensitive programming and/or peacebuilding work will almost always reside outside UNICEF.

In order to build the capacities required to bring conflict-sensitive programming and/or peacebuilding work to scale, and to ensure that the enormous risks associated with such initiatives are assumed by a wide array of development actors, the organisation needs to consider more strategic and lasting partnerships that cover all four categories of UNICEF’s partnership strategy (programme implementation, policy and advocacy, knowledge and innovation and resource mobilisation partnerships), and delineate explicit goals for the its involvement in the partnerships, and an exit strategy.
Recommendation 5:
For the next generation of peacebuilding programmes, UNICEF should continue to mobilise funding, earmarked, pooled, or other resources, to a level that will facilitate global visibility and learning, while ensuring proper financial and results accountabilities at the decentralised (country office) level.

UNICEF will always have a responsibility to work with the donor community to mobilise resources to develop aggressive solutions to problems that undermine efforts to ensure that children live in environments where they can survive, develop and thrive. Mobilising resources for EEPCT and the PBEA for peacebuilding and to strengthen education in fragile contexts are good examples of such efforts.

While the evaluation accepts that peacebuilding and similar programming should eventually be integrated into UNICEF planning and funding processes, there is a need for a sustained focus and global appeal to consolidate global learning on peacebuilding programming and practice, at least in the medium-term. From the lessons of both the EEPCT and the PBEA, UNICEF should consider a more regulated global resource mechanism with clear programme parameters and funding requirements for its young but promising peacebuilding work.

Recommendations for remaining period of PBEA implementation

Recommendation 6:
Secure funding (new or unspent PBEA funding) to enable continuation of critical activities in PBEA implementing countries that are presently facing conflict and/or humanitarian crises, and to afford the rest of the country offices the opportunity to incorporate key PBEA lessons into their next UNICEF regular programming cycle.

A responsible conclusion of PBEA programme activities requires availing the necessary resources to allow each PBEA implementing country office to complete major activities, consider the lessons, and effect the necessary adjustments and transition into the development of their next country programme. Also, some PBEA countries laid a foundation for peacebuilding work only to be interrupted by crises (e.g., Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, State of Palestine and Yemen). The investments made in these countries can be safeguarded if new or remaining funding is made available to implement restorative peacebuilding activities once the operating environment is conducive. In fact, the relevance of peacebuilding work in the wake of such crises will likely be greater.
Recommendation 7:
The PBEA team at HQ should identify a mechanism to update country level result statements developed in this evaluation to ensure a full and final compilation of results for future learning, as well as make proper institutional arrangements for completion of PBEA research initiatives and management of knowledge products.

A significant amount of ongoing research and evidence collection commissioned by the PBEA programme represents a potential opportunity to contribute to the body of knowledge on the role of education, social services and child and youth centred approaches in peace-building. Completing, publishing and disseminating these results for internal and external audiences is important. This would support UNICEF, its multi-level partners and the peacebuilding community to increasingly engage around consideration of child centred social services for peacebuilding.

As noted in the evaluation, some country programmes only had one full year of PBEA implementation by the time of this outcome evaluation. Having COs update the result statements from this evaluation will afford PBEA staff time and space for reflection in the remaining months of the programme to draw lessons from programme successes and challenges. This effort could also contribute to any future efforts to synthesise the results of this and other evaluations and lessons learned if UNICEF chooses to do so.

UNICEF efforts to enhance capacity and awareness of peacebuilding concepts remain an important input for conflict-sensitive and risk informed programming—a non-negotiable minimum that is required to ensure that UNICEF adheres to ‘do no harm’ principles. To that end, a scalable knowledge management function to build on the evidence and learning generated from PBEA also remains important for efficiency and effectiveness.
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