MARTIGNY II — WHERE ARE WE NOW? A REVIEW OF UNICEF HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE CAPACITY
EVALUATION
WORKING PAPER

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A REVIEW OF UNICEF HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSE CAPACITY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to provide a quick overview of where the organisation is in terms of humanitarian response capacity. With this comes an overview of the critical challenges faced. The review will focus on a few broad questions: What evidence is there that capacity has changed? What measures are there of current capacity? What are the perceived current constraints and concerns? The paper is structured to examine what we do — looking specifically at UNICEF response vis-à-vis the programme commitments, including its advocacy role — and how we do that, covering the core support functions.

The review draws on a range of existing information and new data collection, including previous reviews and desk reviews on UNICEF humanitarian response capacity, preliminary results of an EMOPS survey on Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning undertaken in October 2002, data from Country Office audits, annual reports (2002), data from different offices’ monitoring systems, survey of DFID Phase II emergency focal points, interviews with 13 staff (See Appendix A), correspondence and fact-checking with a wide range of regional and headquarters staff.

Very concrete and indisputable changes have occurred in UNICEF humanitarian response capacity since the time of the Martigny Consultation. This is in no way attributed to Martigny alone. Changes in external context have been just as dramatic in bringing about change. However, it is clear that the organisation is different.

• **Shift in organisational culture.** A growing proportion of UNICEF staff, including those working in stable contexts, ROs and headquarters, understand and accept their responsibility in ensuring that the organisation responds to humanitarian crisis in line with the Core Corporate Commitments (CCCs). There is also an increasing understanding by UNICEF headquarters and field staff of the ethical and legal standards that underpin the work of UNICEF in humanitarian action and response.

• **Advocacy role expanded.** The breadth and reach of UNICEF advocacy continues to expand. UNICEF has contributed to defining the agenda for Children Affected by Armed Conflict and has extended its advocacy to an increasingly broad range of fora. This is not only the headquarters face of UNICEF. There is an increasing connection between high-level political advocacy on CAAC, in the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies, and field office positioning and advocacy work with national partners. This has been observed in relation to country-specific issues that have come before the Security Council, as well as on implementation of SC Resolutions 1261 and 1314, on the humanitarian impact of small arms on children and landmines action, among others. Both headquarters and ROs have been active in building up networks of allies. Increasingly, COs are equipped with guidance and tools for this range of advocacy issues and almost half of COs are engaging in advocacy on difficult issues to some degree, some very strongly.

• **Emergency preparedness and response planning.** 75 COs, six ROs and 10 headquarters divisions, units or functions have undertaken initial Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) exercises. "Mainstreaming" of the preparedness planning has been advanced both in policy and in practice. EPRP processes are widely considered to have contributed greatly to clarity about CO and individual staff accountabilities, to motivation and a culture shift.

• **Organisation-wide core training for better humanitarian response.** Training packages on humanitarian principles and the human rights-based approach to programming and on emergency preparedness and response have been established as part of UNICEF’s core learning strategy. A significant cadre of staff are now trained as trainers in both. This is the point where investment to date will start to pay off with wider coverage of training.

• **Security infrastructure and standards.** A clear UNICEF security policy has been issued, including Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), establishing clear accountabilities and
implementation targets. The Operations Centre (OPSCEN) provides a range of services to the field, including monitoring of security situations and a reliable 24-hour information and communications hub: 88 field sites are connected to the UNICEF Global Wide Area Network through SITA, and 59 additional country sites are functioning with VSAT.

- **Selected advances in human resources management.** Surge capacity through both internal and external rosters have been advanced by ROs (TACRO, ROSA, ESARO starting), as well as globally for external communications staff and logisticians. Similarly, ROs have pushed ahead with peer counselling and stress counselling services for staff (CEE/CIS, WCAR, ESARO and now TACRO), though DHR now has staff in place to support globally with policy and guidance.

- **Interagency coordination.** Contrary to its persisting image as a loner, UNICEF is present and active in interagency collaboration and coordination.

Significant changes are also in the offing in a number of other areas.

Despite some of the hugely significant changes mentioned above, constraints remain, some of which unfortunately are not new.

- **Clarity on implications of CCCs.** Especially as the organisation considers proposals to refine and essentially expand the CCCs, clarity on the implications is vital. Are the CCCs a minimum response always, in every region? What are the implications for preparedness planning at COs and ROs, particularly in terms of human resources?

- **Lack of consistency in advocacy role.** While UNICEF has become a more active advocate on a wider range of challenging issues, there continues to be a range of positions in COs and ROs on how to balance this advocacy position with our relationship with national government partners and even whether to try in some cases. This challenge emerged in the early 1990s, and has become more acute as some parts of the organisation have become more active on child rights issues in the context of humanitarian response. The issues include attitude change, understanding of, and skills/knowledge in, developing advocacy strategies, as well as common positions and interpretation of policy at the level of senior management in COs, ROs, and headquarters.

- **Level of preparedness.** While EPRP has advanced, the lag in implementing preparedness activities continues. It will be important to establish clearly what level and scope of preparedness is expected and to find incentive systems to ensure it happens.

- **Early warning, rapid assessment.** The organisation continues to be weak in accessing and processing information for early warning, including political/vulnerability analysis, as well as in rapid assessment. These information analysis functions are critical because they have the potential of triggering and directing early humanitarian response. These gaps have been identified from the time of the initial Martigny. Some elements are there, but there is no global structure or framework, or clear technical lead in headquarters for any of these functions.

- **Results-based management.** No significant change in CO M&E capacity has come about. The organisation has no practice of or system for assessing humanitarian response to crisis. There are critical support functions for which the organisation cannot easily take a measure of performance. There is little or no guidance on monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response programmes in many of the newer programming areas.

- **Information/analysis of the impact of emergencies on children.** While ROs and selected COs have advanced on a number of country and regional studies on the impact of war and natural disaster on children, there continues to be no global leadership. Current efforts to mend this gap
are urgent if UNICEF is to protect its image as a leader in global knowledge development on the situation of children.

- **Security as a constraint to humanitarian response.** While MOSS and the advances toward its compliance are generally well-received, there is a concern that the UN security system continues to constrain rather than support humanitarian assistance. There is also a concern that attention to security infrastructure not take away attention to knowledge and practices of staff and COs.

- **Human resource management systems.** DHR is about to roll out important human resource management systems: the skills inventory, the web-roster, both based on the newly completed competency profiles. Making these systems work at all, including for HRM for humanitarian response, will require significant work by headquarters divisions in concert with ROs. If these systems are to bring any benefit to humanitarian response capacity any time soon, it is critical that they be prioritised. This needs to be followed. Similarly, in terms of getting an overall view of how HR gaps are to be filled, it seems that some overall assessment is needed as to what different options – internal and external surge capacity, recruitment, and training – will be used to respond to which gaps. It will be important also to ensure continuity of DHR leadership on the issue of staff counselling after DFID Phase II.

- **Mainstreaming.** While staff have little difficulty with the vision of mainstreaming emergency preparedness and humanitarian response at the level of COs, what this will mean for headquarters and RO structures and staffing is the cause for many questions and angst. It is generally agreed that the organisation will always require a set of triggers and a mechanism to gear up an effective and timely humanitarian response. The issue is to ensure that the organisation, from headquarters to RO to CO, has enough and the right triggers, including back-ups, and a gear box that is sufficiently powerful. The vision of what that should look like remains unclear.
RESUME ANALYTIQUE

L’objectif de ce document est de fournir une vue d’ensemble rapide de la situation de l’organisation pour ce qui est de sa capacité à mettre en œuvre une réaction humanitaire. Cela s’accompagne d’une vue d’ensemble des grandes difficultés rencontrées. Cet examen portera sur quelques questions de nature générale : quelles sont les preuves que sa capacité a évolué ? Quelles mesures a-t-on de sa capacité actuelle ? Quelles est la perception de ce que sont les contraintes et préoccupations actuelles ? Ce document est structuré pour étudier ce que nous faisons (examiner spécifiquement la réaction de l’UNICEF vis-à-vis des engagements du programme, parmi lesquels son rôle de plaidoyer) et comment nous le faisons, en couvrant les fonctions de soutien fondamentales.


Des changements très concrets sont incontestablement intervenus dans la capacité de réaction humanitaire de l’UNICEF depuis l’époque de la consultation de Martigny. En aucun cas on ne peut l’attribuer à Martigny seul. Les changements du contexte extérieur ont été tout aussi spectaculaires dans l’avènement du changement. Toutefois, il est clair que l’organisation est différente.

- **Changement de culture institutionnelle.** Un nombre croissant d’employés de l’UNICEF, dont ceux qui travaillent dans des contextes stables, les bureaux régionaux et le Siège, comprennent et acceptent leur responsabilité : s’assurer que l’organisation réagit à la crise humanitaire en conformité avec les Principaux engagements collectifs (PEC). Il y a également au Siège de l’UNICEF et parmi le personnel sur le terrain une compréhension de plus en plus nette des normes éthiques et juridiques qui sous-tendent le travail de l’UNICEF dans l’action et la réaction humanitaires.

- **Expansion du rôle de plaidoyer.** L’envergure et la portée du plaidoyer de l’UNICEF continuent à s’élargir. L’UNICEF a contribué à la définition d’un ordre du jour pour les enfants touchés par les conflits armés (CAAC), et a élargi son plaidoyer à un éventail de plus en plus vaste de forums. Ce n’est pas là seulement le visage du Siège que nous montre ici l’UNICEF. De plus en plus, les liens se resserrent entre le plaidoyer politique de haut niveau pour les CAAC, au Conseil de sécurité et dans les autres organismes gouvernementaux, et le positionnement et le travail de plaidoyer du bureau local auprès des partenaires nationaux. On a observé cela en relation avec les questions propres aux pays qui ont été référées au Conseil de sécurité, ainsi que, entre autres, à propos de la mise en œuvre des résolutions 1261 et 1314 du Conseil de sécurité sur l’impact humanitaire des armes de petit calibre et des mines terrestres sur les enfants. Le Siège comme les bureaux régionaux ont contribué à l’édification de réseaux d’alliés. De plus en plus, les bureaux de pays sont équipés de consignes et d’outils pour tout cet éventail de questions qui relèvent du plaidoyer, et presque la moitié des bureaux de pays s’engagent dans un plaidoyer sur des questions difficiles d’une manière ou d’une autre, certains le faisant avec beaucoup d’énergie.

- **Planification de l’état de préparation aux urgences et des mesures de réaction rapide.** 75 bureaux nationaux, six bureaux régionaux et 10 divisions, unités ou fonctions du Siège se sont lancés dans des exercices initiaux de préparation/réaction. L’ « intégration » de la planification de l’état de préparation a connu des progrès à la fois sur le plan des politiques et sur celui des pratiques. On considère le plus souvent que les procédures de préparation/réaction ont
beaucoup contribué à clarifier les responsabilités des bureaux de pays et du personnel au niveau individuel, à motiver le personnel et à favoriser la nouvelle orientation de la culture de l'organisation.

- **Formation de base dans toute l'organisation pour améliorer la réaction humanitaire.** Les formations sur les principes humanitaires et la méthode de programmation fondée sur les droits de l'homme ainsi que celles qui traitent de l'état de préparation aux urgences et des mesures de réaction rapide, ont été placées au cœur même de la stratégie d'apprentissage en vigueur à l'UNICEF. Une bonne partie des membres du personnel a reçu une formation de formateurs dans ces deux volets. C'est le moment où l'investissement consenti à ce jour va commencer à payer, avec une formation qui aura un champ d'application plus grand.

- **Infrastructure et normes de sécurité.** L'UNICEF a présenté une politique claire sur les questions de sécurité, dont des Normes minimales de sécurité opérationnelle (« MOSS »), qui établit des responsabilités et objectifs de mise en œuvre clairs. Le Centre des opérations fournit un ensemble de services aux personnes sur le terrain, y compris le suivi des situations ayant trait à la sécurité, et un Centre d’informations et de communications fiable ouvert 24 heures sur 24. Quelque 88 sites sur le terrain sont connectés au « UNICEF Global Wide Area Network » au moyen du SITA, et 50 sites supplémentaires de pays fonctionnent avec le système VSAT.

- **Quelques progrès dans le secteur de la gestion des ressources humaines.** Les bureaux régionaux, à commencer par ceux d’Amériques/Caraïbes, Asie du Sud, Afrique orientale et australe, ont fait progresser les capacités au moyen de listes internes et externes, de même qu’au niveau mondial pour le personnel des communications et de la logistique. De même, les bureaux régionaux ont progressé avec des services d’entraide et de conseils au personnel sur le stress (Europe centrale et orientale/CEI, Afrique centrale/Afrique de l’Ouest, Afrique orientale et australe, et maintenant Amériques/Caraïbes), bien que la Direction des ressources humaines dispose désormais de personnel en mesure d’aider au niveau mondial avec des politiques et des consignes.

- **Coordination interorganisations.** Contrairement à l'image de franc-tireur qui « lui colle à la peau », l'UNICEF est présent et actif dans la collaboration et la coordination interorganisations. Des changements significatifs s’annoncent également dans un certain nombre d’autres secteurs.

En dépit des quelques changements extrêmement importants mentionnés ci-dessus, des contraintes subsistent, dont certaines, malheureusement, ne sont pas nouvelles.

- **Clarté sur les implications des PEC.** Surtout au moment où l'organisation envisage des propositions pour affiner et essentiellement étendre le champ des PEC, il est vital que l’on soit clair sur leurs implications. Les PEC sont-ils toujours une réaction minimum, dans toutes les régions ? Quelles en sont les implications pour la planification de l’état de préparation aux urgences au niveau des bureaux nationaux et régionaux, particulièrement dans le secteur des ressources humaines ?

- **Manque de cohérence sur le rôle de plaidoyer.** Bien que l’UNICEF milite plus énergiquement sur un éventail plus large de questions difficiles, il continue à y avoir toute une série de positions différentes dans les bureaux nationaux et régionaux sur la manière d’équilibrer ce rôle avec les relations que nous entenpons avec nos partenaires des gouvernements nationaux, et dans certains cas sur l’opportunité même d’essayer. Ce problème a surgi au début des années 1990, et il a revêtu une acuité plus grande au fur et à mesure que certaines parties de l’organisation devenaient plus actives sur les questions des droits de l’enfant dans le contexte de la réaction humanitaire. Les problèmes qui se posent sont le changement des attitudes, ainsi que les positions et interprétations communes concernant les politiques au niveau de la direction des bureaux nationaux et régionaux et du Siège.
Niveau de préparation. Bien que la préparation/réaction ait progressé, le décalage avec la mise en œuvre des activités de l’état de préparation se poursuit. Il sera important d’établir clairement quel niveau et quelle ampleur sont attendus de l’état de préparation et de trouver des systèmes d’incitation pour s’assurer que les choses se passent comme prévu.

Alerte rapide, évaluation rapide. L’organisation continue à connaître des faiblesses dans l’accès et le traitement de l’information relative aux alertes rapides (analyse politique et analyse de vulnérabilité comprises) et dans les évaluations rapides. Ces fonctions d’analyse de l’information sont cruciales parce qu’elles ont le potentiel de déclencher et de piloter des mesures de réaction humanitaire rapide. Ces lacunes ont été identifiées depuis l’époque de la première consultation de Martigny. Certaines éléments sont là, mais il n’y a pas de structure ou de cadre global pour aucune de ces fonctions, et le Siège n’exerce aucun leadership technique dans ce domaine.

Gestion axée sur les résultats. Aucun changement significatif n’est intervenu dans la capacité du bureau de pays pour le suivi et évaluation. L’organisation ne dispose d’aucun système ou pratique permettant d’évaluer la réaction humanitaire à une crise. Il y a des fonctions de soutien cruciales pour lesquelles l’organisation ne peut pas mesurer les performances aisément. Il y a peu ou pas du tout de consignes sur le suivi et l’évaluation des programmes de riposte humanitaire dans beaucoup de secteurs nouveaux de la programmation.

Informations/analyse relatives à l’impact des urgences sur les enfants. Bien que les bureaux régionaux et certains bureaux nationaux choisis aient progressé dans un certain nombre d’études nationales et régionales sur l’impact de la guerre et des catastrophes naturelles sur les enfants, il n’y a toujours aucune prise d’initiative au niveau mondial. Les efforts déployés actuellement pour combler cette lacune revêtent une certaine urgence si l’UNICEF veut protéger son image de chef de file dans le secteur du développement des connaissances sur la situation des enfants dans le monde.

La sécurité : une contrainte qui pèse sur la réaction humanitaire. Bien que les Normes minimales de sécurité opérationnelle et les progrès accomplis pour s’y conformer soient généralement bien reçus, on craint que le système de sécurité des Nations Unies ne continue à restreindre plutôt que soutenir l’aide humanitaire. On craint également que l’attention accordée à l’infrastructure de sécurité ne s’exerce aux dépens des connaissances et des pratiques du personnel et des bureaux nationaux.

Systèmes de gestion des ressources humaines. La Division des ressources humaines est sur le point de mettre en œuvre d’importants systèmes de gestion des ressources humaines : inventaire des compétences, listes sur Internet, tous deux basés sur les descriptions de compétences récemment mises au point. Faire marcher tant soit peu ces systèmes, y compris pour la gestion des ressources humaines en vue de la réaction humanitaire, demandera beaucoup de travail de la part des divisions du Siège, en collaboration avec les bureaux régionaux. Si ces systèmes doivent un jour ou l’autre bénéficier à la capacité de réaction, il reste essentiel qu’ils soient mis en ordre prioritaire. C’est impératif. De même, pour ce qui est d’avoir une vue d’ensemble de la manière dont les lacunes doivent être combles, il semble bien qu’il faille faire une sorte de bilan global des différentes options qui seront utilisées (capacité interne et externe d’intervention rapide, recrutement et formation), et établir quelles lacunes elles combleront. Il sera également important d’assurer la continuité du leadership de la Division des ressources humaines sur la question de l’encadrement du personnel après la phase II du DFID.

Intégration. Bien que le personnel ait peu de problème à concevoir l’intégration de l’état de préparation aux urgences et les mesures de réaction humanitaire au niveau des bureaux nationaux, ce que cela signifiera pour le Siège, les structures régionales et le recrutement du personnel provoque bien des questions et angoisses. Il est généralement convenu que l’organisation aura toujours besoin d’une série de déclencheurs et d’un mécanisme de préparation à une réaction humanitaire efficace et opportune. La question est ici de s’assurer que
l’organisation, du Siège aux bureaux de pays en passant par les bureaux régionaux, dispose de bons déclencheurs en nombre suffisant, ainsi que de solutions de rechange et d’une boîte à vitesses assez puissante. La vision de ce que cela peut bien être demeure imprécise.
RESUMEN EJECUTIVO

El objetivo de este documento es ofrecer una rápida visión de conjunto sobre la situación en la que se encuentra la organización en lo relativo a capacidad de respuesta humanitaria. Ello obliga a ofrecer una panorámica general de los retos importantes a los que se enfrenta. El examen se centrará en unas cuantas preguntas de carácter general: ¿Qué pruebas existen de que la capacidad ha cambiado? ¿Qué medidas existen de la actual capacidad? ¿Cuáles son las limitaciones e inquietudes que se perciben actualmente? El documento está estructurado de forma que examine lo que hacemos –detrás de esa función de promoción– y cómo lo hacemos, abarcando las funciones esenciales de apoyo.

El examen se basa en una serie de informaciones ya existentes y en nuevas recopilaciones de datos, inclusive en exámenes anteriores y exámenes documentales sobre la capacidad de respuesta humanitaria del UNICEF, en los resultados preliminares de una encuesta que la Oficina de Programas de Emergencia realizó sobre Planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en casos de emergencia en octubre de 2002, en datos procedentes de las auditorías de las Oficinas Nacionales, en informes anuales (2002), en datos de los diferentes sistemas de observación de las oficinas, en un estudio de los centros de coordinación para situaciones de emergencia de la Fase II del Departamento para el Desarrollo Internacional, en entrevistas con 13 miembros del personal (véase el apéndice A), en la correspondencia mantenida y en verificaciones de datos realizadas con una amplia variedad de miembros del personal regional y de la Sede.

Desde la época de la Consulta de Martigny, la capacidad de respuesta humanitaria del UNICEF ha experimentado cambios muy concretos, que nadie puede negar. Esto de ninguna manera puede atribuirse exclusivamente a Martigny. Los cambios que se han dado en el contexto externo han sido igualmente drásticos en términos de influencia. No obstante, está claro que la organización es diferente.

- **Cambios en la cultura de la organización.** Una proporción creciente del personal de la ONU, inclusive los que trabajan en contextos estables, en las Oficinas Regionales y en la Sede, entienden y aceptan su responsabilidad de garantizar que la organización responda a las crisis humanitarias ateniéndose a los compromisos institucionales básicos. También existe una comprensión cada vez mejor, en la Sede del UNICEF y entre el personal sobre el terreno, de los criterios éticos y jurídicos mínimos que sustentan las tareas del UNICEF en las actividades y respuestas de carácter humanitario.

- **Ampliación de la función de promoción.** El aliento y el alcance de las actividades de promoción del UNICEF continúan en expansión. El UNICEF ha contribuido a definir el programa relativo a los niños afectados por conflictos armados y ha llevado sus actividades de promoción a un conjunto cada vez más amplio de foros. Esta no es sólo la cara del UNICEF que proyecta la Sede. Existe una interconexión creciente entre la promoción política de alto nivel sobre niños afectados por conflictos armados, en el Consejo de Seguridad y en otros órganos intergubernamentales, y las posiciones adoptadas por las oficinas sobre el terreno y las tareas de promoción realizadas con los asociados en el país. Esto se ha observado en relación con temas específicamente relativos al país que se han sometido al Consejo de Seguridad, así como en la aplicación de las resoluciones 1261 y 1314 del Consejo de Seguridad, entre otras, sobre la repercusión humanitaria de las armas pequeñas en los niños y las actividades de remoción de minas. Tanto la Sede como las Oficinas Regionales han desarrollado una gran actividad en lo relativo a construir redes de aliados. Cada vez más, las Oficinas Nacionales cuentan con asesoramiento y herramientas relacionadas con esta variedad de cuestiones relativas a la promoción, y casi la mitad de las oficinas nacionales participan en alguna medida en actividades de promoción sobre temas espinosos, y algunas de ellas lo hacen con verdadero ahínco.

- **Planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en casos de emergencia.** Un total de 75 oficinas nacionales y 10 divisiones, dependencias o funciones de la Sede han emprendido ejercicios preliminares de planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en casos de emergencia. La “integración” de la planificación de la preparación se ha promovido tanto en las políticas como en
la práctica. Se considera en general que los procesos en materia de planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en casos de emergencia han contribuido de forma fundamental a aclarar las responsabilidades de las oficinas nacionales y del personal a título individual, a mejorar la motivación y a producir un cambio de cultura organizativa.

- **Capacitación básica a nivel de toda la organización para una mejor respuesta humanitaria.** Como parte de la estrategia básica del UNICEF en materia de aprendizaje, se han creado carpetas de capacitación sobre principios humanitarios y sobre el enfoque de la programación basado en los derechos humanos, así como sobre preparación y respuesta en casos de emergencia. Una parte importante del personal está actualmente recibiendo formación en ambas materias para poder capacitar a su vez. Este es el punto en el que la inversión realizada hasta la fecha va a empezar a dar sus frutos, lográndose una mayor cobertura de capacitación.

- **Infraestructura y criterios en materia de seguridad.** Se ha dictado una política clara del UNICEF en materia de seguridad, que incluye Normas Mínimas sobre Seguridad en las Operaciones, y que establece responsabilidades y metas de ejecución claras. El Centro de Operaciones ofrece una amplia gama de servicios sobre el terreno, inclusive supervisión de las situaciones sobre el terreno y un centro solcente de información y comunicaciones que opera las 24 horas del día. A través de la Sociedad Internacional de Telecomunicaciones Aeronáuticas (SITA), 88 emplazamientos sobre el terreno están conectados a la Red de Zona Amplia Mundial del UNICEF y otros 59 emplazamientos en los países funcionan con una terminal de apertura muy pequeña (VSAT).

- **Progressos concretos en gestión de recursos humanos.** Las Oficinas Regionales han promovido la capacidad de reacción a través de listas de candidatos tanto internas como externas (en la Oficina Regional para las Américas y el Caribe y en la Oficina Regional para África Meridional, siendo la primera la Oficina Regional para África Oriental y Meridional) así como a nivel mundial, en lo que atañe a personal externo de comunicaciones y especialistas en logística. De forma similar, las Oficinas Regionales han seguido promoviendo el asesoramiento por homólogos y los servicios de ayuda en situaciones difíciles (en la Comunidad Económica para Europa/Comunidad de Estados Independientes, en la Región de África Oriental y Central, en la Oficina Regional para África Oriental y Meridional y ahora en la Oficina Regional para las Américas y el Caribe), si bien la División de Derechos Humanos tiene personal asignado para dar apoyo mundial en materia de políticas y orientación.

- **Coordinación interorganismos.** Contradiciendo su imagen persistente de organización que actúa en solitario, el UNICEF mantiene una activa presencia en tareas de colaboración y coordinación interorganismos.

En diversas otras zonas, hay también importantes tareas a la vista.

A pesar de los cambios importantes mencionados anteriormente, sigue habiendo obstáculos, algunos de los cuales, desgraciadamente, no son nuevos.

- **La claridad de las repercusiones que conllevan los compromisos institucionales básicos.** Teniendo en cuenta que la organización estudió propuestas para afinar y ampliar de forma importante los compromisos institucionales básicos, es esencial que las repercusiones estén claras. ¿Son los compromisos institucionales básicos una respuesta mínima siempre, en cada región? ¿Cuáles son las repercusiones que tiene la planificación de la preparación en las oficinas nacionales y oficinas regionales, especialmente en términos de recursos humanos?

- **La falta de coherencia en las funciones de promoción.** Si bien el UNICEF se ha convertido en un promotor más activo de una amplia gama de cuestiones, las Oficinas Nacionales y las Oficinas Regionales siguen manteniendo un amplio espectro de posiciones sobre cómo conciliar esta actitud de promoción con nuestra relación con copartícipes públicos nacionales e incluso, en algunos casos, sobre la conveniencia de siquiera intentarlo. Esta problemática surgió a principios
de la década de 1990 y se ha vuelto más acuciante a medida que algunos sectores de la organización han asumido una mayor actividad en relación con las cuestiones relativas a los derechos de la infancia en el contexto de la respuesta humanitaria. Algunas de estas cuestiones son el cambio de conducta, la comprensión de la necesidad de crear estrategias de promoción, los conocimientos especializados y las aptitudes conexas, las posiciones comunes y la interpretación de las políticas a nivel de la gestión superior en las Oficinas Nacionales, las Oficinas Regionales y la Sede.

- **Nivel de preparación.** A pesar de que se ha progresado en cuanto a la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en casos de emergencia, continúa existiendo un desfase por lo que respecta a la puesta en práctica de las actividades de preparación. Será importante determinar con claridad qué nivel de preparación se espera y cuál es su alcance, así como encontrar sistemas de incentivos para asegurarse de que ello sucede.

- **Alerta temprana, evaluación rápida.** La organización continúa mostrando debilidad a la hora de acceder a información y procesarla en relación con la alerta temprana, inclusive en términos de análisis de vulnerabilidad, así como en materia de evaluación rápida. Estas funciones de análisis de la información son esenciales, porque tienen el potencial de desencadenar y encaminar la respuesta humanitaria temprana. Estos desfases se detectaron ya en la primera reunión de Martigny. Algunos elementos están ahí, pero no existe una estructura o marco mundiales, o una dirección técnica clara en la Sede en relación con ninguna de estas funciones.

- **Gestión basada en los resultados.** No se ha logrado ningún cambio importante en lo relativo a la capacidad de las Oficinas Nacionales en términos de supervisión y evaluación. La organización no tiene una práctica ni un sistema para evaluar la respuesta humanitaria a las crisis. Existen funciones esenciales de apoyo sobre las que la organización no es capaz de tomar con facilidad una medida de desempeño. Hay una escasa o nula orientación sobre supervisión y evaluación de programas de respuesta humanitaria en muchas de las esferas de programación más novedosas.

- **Información y análisis sobre la repercusión de las situaciones de emergencia en los niños.** Si bien las Oficinas Regionales y determinadas Oficinas Nacionales han progresado en la elaboración de algunos estudios nacionales y regionales sobre la repercusión de la guerra y los desastres naturales en los niños, sigue sin existir un liderazgo mundial. Los esfuerzos que se desarrollan en la actualidad para colmar esta brecha deben considerarse urgentes si el UNICEF quiere proteger su imagen de líder mundial en desarrollo de conocimientos sobre el estado de la infancia.

- **La seguridad como obstáculo a la respuesta humanitaria.** Si bien las normas mínimas de seguridad operacional y los progresos conseguidos en aras de su observancia son en general bienvenidos, existe la preocupación de que el sistema de las Naciones Unidas continúe obstaculizando, antes que apoyando, la asistencia humanitaria. Preocupa también que la atención prestada a la infraestructura de seguridad no vaya en detrimento de la atención que debe prestarse a los conocimientos y prácticas del personal y de las Oficinas Nacionales.

- **Sistema de gestión de los recursos humanos.** La División de Recursos Humanos está a punto de poner en marcha importantes sistemas de gestión de recursos humanos: el inventario de conocimientos y la lista de candidatos en la web, basados ambos en los perfiles de competencia que acaban de ponerse a punto. Hacer que estos sistemas funcionen, inclusive en lo relativo a la gestión de los recursos humanos aplicada a la respuesta humanitaria, exigirá un trabajo importante por parte de las divisiones de la Sede, en concierto con las Oficinas Regionales. Si estos sistemas están llamados a mejorar de alguna forma la capacidad de respuesta humanitaria en un futuro próximo, es esencial que se les dé prioridad. Tiene que hacerse un seguimiento de esta cuestión. Igualmente, a fin de lograr hacerse una idea de cómo se van a colmar las lagunas en cuanto a recursos humanos, parece que se necesita una cierta evaluación global de cuáles
de las diferentes opciones – capacidad de reacción tanto interna como externa, contratación y capacitación – se utilizarán para colmar los desfases y cuáles de ellos se colmarán. Será importante también garantizar que la División de Recursos Humanos siga teniendo funciones rectoras en relación con la cuestión del asesoramiento para el personal tras la Fase II del Departamento de Desarrollo Internacional.

- **Incorporación a la corriente principal.** Aunque la idea de incorporar a la corriente principal la preparación para las situaciones de emergencia y de la respuesta humanitaria es algo que todo el mundo entiende a nivel de las Oficinas Nacionales, lo que esto va a significar para la Sede y las Oficinas Regionales en términos de estructuras y personal es origen de muchas preguntas y gran desazón. Hay acuerdo general en que la organización siempre necesitará un conjunto de desencadenantes y un mecanismo para gestionar una respuesta humanitaria efectiva y oportuna. La cuestión estriba en garantizar que la organización, desde la Sede hasta las Oficinas Nacionales, pasando por las Oficinas Regionales, cuenta con los desencadenantes correctos y suficientes, incluyendo apoyos, y con una *caja de cambios* que tenga la suficiente potencia. Lo que no está claro es qué forma debería adoptar todo ello.
INTRODUCTION

Background

In September 1998, UNICEF held a global Consultation of UNICEF Representatives in Emergency Countries on Humanitarian Response to Children in Martigny, Switzerland. The meeting was spurred by the recognition of the need to enhance the organisation’s capacity to predict and respond to humanitarian crises and unstable situations. The key was seen to be definition of the elements of a minimum response that partners could count on UNICEF to fulfil and for which CCOs could count on the organisation as a whole to provide the necessary backing. Related to this was the need to ensure vulnerability analysis feeding into preparedness and response.

Martigny started a number of internal changes within the organisation. The follow-up to Martigny included defining the organisation’s Core Corporate Commitments in emergencies, presented to the Executive Board in May 2000. Follow-up also covered a much wider analysis of the functions supporting CO response, not only in the immediate phase after an emergency, but in unstable contexts and chronic emergencies in general. Not all was new. The follow-up to Martigny took up and gave new energy to initiatives of earlier years to strengthen humanitarian response, placing them in the context of a concerted programme of work cutting across divisions and regional offices. A series of increasingly more coherent programmes of cooperation with British Department for International Development (DFID) stretching from 1999 through to date have helped finance this broader effort to strengthen the organisation’s humanitarian response (DFID Phase I and II).1 Wide-ranging work plans have been monitored by the cross-divisional New York Crisis Preparedness Working Group later superseded by the DFID emergency capacity building focal points, as well as at the division director level by the Interdivisional Standing Committee (IDSC) on CAAC.

Guiding this follow-up process was an overriding concern to “mainstream programming in unstable situations within the overall context of the Country Programme [and] avoid “verticalising” emergency programming” (Memorandum, Martigny Follow-up and DFID Funding, Carol Bellamy, 31 August 1999).

Much progress has been made since Martigny I. However, critical internal and external constraints to humanitarian response remain and the changing external context calls for new policies and strategies. This context led to the preparation of “Martigny II — Global Consultation on UNICEF’s Humanitarian Response to Children and Women in Crisis Situations” held in Copenhagen June 2003. The focus of Martigny II is:

- Adjustment of existing CCCs in the light of the MTSP priorities, the Millennium Development Goals and the World Fit for Children goals;
- Identifying key challenges and constraints to delivering on these commitments;
- Achieving consensus on clear achievable and practical proposals to respond to these and follow up processes for their implementation.

One of the inputs into Martigny II will be this review of the organisation’s humanitarian response capacity and performance.

1 The first proposal covered a three-year programme of cooperation with three projects: Children Affected by Armed Conflict, Humanitarian Response and Landmines and was approved in 1999 (USD 15 million). Separate PBR exercises were undertaken in September to allocate funding across headquarters divisions and regional offices. Implementation did not effectively get underway until 2000. As workplans for 2000 were discussed with DFID, additional funds (USD 4 million) were sought to cover strengthening of operational support functions and a so-called DFID 2 project was submitted in March 2000. The so-called Phase II project covering eight goals related to different programme, advocacy and operational support functions was submitted and partially approved for USD 15 million, May 2002 – April 2005.
Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to provide a quick overview of the organisation’s current humanitarian response capacity and the critical challenges faced.

How we assess where we are

The review will focus on a few broad questions: What evidence is there that capacity has changed? What measures are there of current capacity? What are the perceived current constraints and concerns?

The organisation has attempted to identify what capacities UNICEF needs to ensure timely and effective humanitarian response, as well as where the weaknesses and constraints lie. These attempts include the original Martigny Consultation and assessments leading up to the development of proposals for both UNICEF-DFID Programme of Cooperation Strengthening UNICEF Humanitarian Response Phases I and II, as well as the analysis of necessary accountabilities for the CCCs. These tend to converge, identifying two key performance areas — programme commitments and advocacy — as well as a number of supporting functions:

- Emergency preparedness and response planning (EPRP)
- Vulnerability analysis, early warning and rapid assessment
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Data and information on children affected by emergencies
- Supply
- Policy and guidance on programming
- Security and telecommunications
- Human resources management
- Building staff skills and knowledge
- External communications
- Financing humanitarian response
- Interagency co-ordination.

The review draws on a range of existing information and new data collection, including:

- Previous reviews and desk reviews on UNICEF humanitarian response capacity
- Preliminary results of an EMOPS survey on Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning undertaken in October 2002
- Data from Country Office audits, annual reports (2002)
- Data from different offices’ monitoring systems – Division of Human Resources, Programme Funding Office (PFO), Supply Division (SD), Programme Division (PD), Information Technology Division (ITD)
- A survey of DFID Phase II emergency focal points
- Interviews with 13 staff (See Appendix A)
- Correspondence and fact-checking with a wide range of regional and headquarters staff.

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2 Above is the short title. The full title is Strengthening UNICEF Programming as it applies to Humanitarian Response.
WHAT WE DO

Only two evaluative exercises provide an overview of UNICEF humanitarian response: an external evaluation of Kosovo in 2000 and an internal review of Mozambique flood response in 2000. Other evaluations covered projects within the humanitarian response and do not give an overview perspective on what UNICEF is doing in emergencies and whether we are doing the right thing. This lack of synthesis information is a serious issue in and of itself, and is dealt with here under Monitoring and Evaluation.

Programme Commitments

A fairly common perspective is that the range of what UNICEF does in humanitarian response has not radically changed over the years. The CCCs by definition do not represent a significant extension of UNICEF programming activity. At least all that is included in the CCCs was being undertaken by some COs before the CCCs were introduced.

However, there is a sense that there has been a shift in orientation and degree. Different interviewees and respondents have noted a greater attention to child protection in general, a shift in psychosocial programming from a treatment focus to more integrated approaches as is consistent with the evolution of programme guidance in this area, and more attention to education in later stages of emergency response.

Analysis of global distribution of expenditure in emergencies and rehabilitation by programme field supports some of this. Figures suggest a significant increase in allocations to child protection (from 4% of funding in 1998 to 40% in 2002). However, this must be interpreted carefully as at least some of this can be due to shifts in how the same type of activity is coded.

Funding figures also show a notably lower level of spending on CCCs in nutrition (ranging between 2 percent in 1998 and 0.1 percent in 2002) and water, environment and sanitation (WES, ranging between 8 percent in 1998 and 2 percent in 2002).

Table 1: UNICEF Programme Expenditure on Emergency and Rehabilitation
By Programme Field 1998-2002
(in millions USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME FIELD</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A - Communication for development</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C - Community Organization</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D - Early childhood care</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E - Education</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H - Health</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I - Integrated rights-based programme</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L - Household Food Security</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M - Emergency &amp; Rehabilitation</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N - Nutrition</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P - Cross-sectorial cost</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S - Child protection</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T - Assessment, analysis, M&amp;E*</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W - Water, environment and sanitation</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z - Area Based</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Programme Sectors</td>
<td>132.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>154.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>152.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Monitoring and Evaluation
Source: PIMU data; data adjusted by rounding off

That the organisation does respond more reliably on the CCCs is the perception consistently expressed in questionnaires and interviews, though it has not been substantiated by any systematic evaluation, nor was it possible to verify with partners’ perspectives.
Another common perception among respondents and interviewees is that the CCCs have established a much better awareness of the expected humanitarian response, including in offices not currently in unstable or crisis contexts.

However, some concern remains over what the CCCs represent. They are presented as “a minimum set of CCCs that constitutes the organization's initial response to protection and care of children and women in unstable situations” (E/ICEF/2000-12) where there is need. However, even those closely involved with strengthening humanitarian response or COs question whether they truly represent the minimum or rather a more narrowed range of options. The questions arise particularly where COs do not have the programme expertise on staff to cover programme commitments — nutrition and WES being the notable example. If the CCCs were intended as a clear reference on what the organisation would support the CO to act on, including ensuring resources, systems, staffing to do so, this has not been fully understood globally. Further, as the CCCs are used as a reference in preparedness efforts, it is unclear what the implications are for building up staffing; again nutrition and WES is the sticking point in some regions.

The question as to when the CCCs apply is also related to how we define emergency and humanitarian response. For Latin American regions, as well as parts of Asia, recent experiences with dramatic economic collapse and ensuing or interrelated civil unrest represent a different but equally dramatic and rapid onset emergency than may have been anticipated in thinking on UNICEF humanitarian response in 1998.

As the organisation seeks to revisit the CCCs, it will be important to ensure clear and effective communications throughout the organisation on the intent and implications.

Advocacy

The scope of UNICEF advocacy work has evolved considerably over the 1990s. This was reflected in and supported by the January 1996 adoption of the Mission Statement by the Executive Board (E/ICEF/1996/1), which stated that UNICEF should be guided by the international standards set in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In the area of humanitarian action, in the early nineties, UNICEF had already established itself as an advocate on a range of issues: protection for humanitarian assistance and humanitarian personnel; humanitarian principles, especially issues of access and terms of engagement with non-state entities; protection of children from the effects of sanctions; Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); ending the use of child soldiers; unaccompanied children and psychosocial response. UNICEF’s positions on these issues were very much shaped in the context of CO response in Operation Lifeline Sudan, Haiti, and Rwanda, among others.

The scope of advocacy for humanitarian action has continued to evolve, with UNICEF playing an active role globally in defining the agenda for Children Affected by Armed Conflict. UNICEF advocacy now extends also to include: HIV/AIDS in conflict, protection against sexual abuse and exploitation, landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) action, control of small arms, adolescent participation, international standards for child protection, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building and mechanisms for seeking truth and justice. The scope of issues is wide and complex. UNICEF is increasingly taking its advocacy to a wider range of fora.

Under the Peace and Security Agenda for Children, UNICEF has increasingly moved into high-level political advocacy in intergovernmental fora while trying to build links with CO-level advocacy. A pivotal headquarters function has been established since 1999 to identify and prioritise opportunities for advocacy in relevant reports to and discussions in the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and its mechanisms, and other relevant inter-governmental fora. Guided by this overview, UNICEF has been able to cover Security Council issues fully and has contributed to debates on thematic issues (protection of civilians, prevention of armed conflict, Brahimi report follow-up, children and armed conflict, small arms, women and peace and security) as well as on country-specific issues. This headquarters function builds on and strengthens Country and Regional Office capacity to engage in Security Council

3 Presented by the Executive Director at the Security Council Open Briefing on the Protection of Civilians, February 1999.
activities that involve UNICEF priorities, to provide input to the Security Council, as well as to enlist support for the practical implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1261, 1314 and 1379 at country level. UNICEF has also tried to influence and has provided input to various reports by the Secretary General, Special Rapporteurs and others. Similarly, UNICEF has provided input to fora such as the annual meeting between UN and regional organisations on collaboration in the area of children and peace building. UNICEF was also able to use its assigned lead role in the preparation for the UN Special Session on Children, to integrate content on CAAC, including in the preparation of the End-Decade Review and the Outcome Document.

Both headquarters and ROs have also been active in strengthening networks of allies and experts at different levels. Headquarters is engaging more actively with DPKO, DPA and the SRSG, as well as global networks with NGO partners such as the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers and the coalition around the International Criminal Court. ROs have built up relations with and/or promoted various regional networks, including those rallied more generally around CAAC (TACRO), as well as on more specific issues such as child soldiers and the Optional Protocol (MENA, ROSA, EAPRO, TACRO), psychosocial response (EAPRO), cross-border coordination (ESARO) and monitoring the violation of children's rights in conflict situations (through the NGO Watchlist supported by all ROs and headquarters). ROs have also strengthened ties with regional organisations (Organisation of Africa Unity regarding small arms, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe regarding humanitarian dimensions).

Both headquarters and regional offices have worked to provide a range of policy guidance backing advocacy work as well as some communication and training materials in the different areas:

- On promoting ratification of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, TACRO and ROSA have produced advocacy kits and a global kit is being developed, all designed to help COs understand their role and provide materials for use with national actors.
- In collaboration with various other bodies including DPKO, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and Swedish Save the Children, UNICEF developed a training package for peacekeepers on child rights and associated issues, which was piloted in DRC.
- Under the aegis of the IASC, UNICEF developed jointly with the NRC an IDP training package intended for staff of all operational agencies. This has being used by OCHA's IDP unit in over 20 countries.
- Current work on training on sexual abuse and harassment with staff is also reaching wider audiences, crossing between an advocacy role and learning initiative.
- UNICEF EMOPS and Innocenti have produced a publication, "International Criminal Justice and Children", which usefully outlines the issues around the International Criminal Court and alternative justice mechanisms and has made a useful contribution to the dialogue in the international community around this issue.
- UNICEF Programme Division (PD) has produced an advocacy brochure on Children and HIV/AIDS in conflict.

Other tools are being developed, including an advocacy toolbox on landmines for COs and a child rights guide to the Landmine Ban Treaty for internal and external audiences.

This broadened and challenging advocacy agenda is being taken up by COs. In 2002, of 127 offices submitting Country Office Annual Reports, 47 reported carrying out some form of advocacy work on Children Affected by Armed Conflict (the first year in tracking this). Advocacy on behalf of Internally Displaced Persons was reported most often, followed by child soldiers and/or Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) efforts, and HIV/AIDS in conflict (25, 15 and 12 offices respectively.)

Focal points in headquarters and regional offices suggest that this represents significant

4 Responses to question 14 in the Child Protection Annex in Country Office Annual Reports.
under-reporting. At least in the areas of landmines/UXOs, headquarters information suggests that in addition to the four COs reporting advocacy on landmines/UXOs in the Annual Reports, 10 COs have strong advocacy interventions and another 19 – 20 have some level of activity.\textsuperscript{5} This would bring to 60 the total number of COs engaged in some form of advocacy on CAAC. Similarly, there appears to be underreporting on advocacy on DDR and child soldiers, and advocacy on sexual abuse and exploitation was not itemised explicitly in the data requested in the Annual Reports and may not be reflected.

However, just as significant is widespread concern over the lack of consistency in UNICEF advocacy response. It is well acknowledged that formulating advocacy responses can entail a difficult judgement call where there is a perceived risk for implementation of other programmes. There is a concern however that the variation from country to country in levels and types of advocacy on issues with which national partners are uncomfortable is not the product of consistent analysis of options and this undermines UNICEF credibility.

- While a significant culture change is beginning, some RO staff still highlight the need to change the attitudes of Representatives before even being able to reach outside the organisation. Respondents/interviewees refer variously to Representatives perceiving advocacy on CAAC issues as a time-costly extra not central to UNICEF mandate and/or not feeling comfortable with or supported to take risks. At the same time, headquarters and RO emergency focal points have frequently noted that Representatives with experience in conflict settings seem more willing to push “sensitive issues” with their national counterparts. One staff member with experience as a Representative in emergency contexts reported feeling very much supported both in taking more risky advocacy positions vis-à-vis the national government, as well as when recommending back-door options where UNICEF promoted other bodies to make statements.

- CO Representatives and senior management in headquarters and ROs do not have a common vision as to what UNICEF advocacy response should be, particularly on “sensitive issues”. Perceptions vary as to the degree to which UNICEF can be an advocate in difficult cases while protecting UNICEF’s relationship with national governments as an intergovernmental body.

- Exactly what advocacy on sensitive issues involves seems to be up for debate. Many staff equate advocacy with bold statements to the media and confrontation as opposed to a wide range of options, including quiet behind-closed-doors work influencing decision-makers. Similarly, experiences under DFID Phase I and II suggest the need to look beyond advocacy events to longer-term strategies. There appears to be a need to build up a general understanding of advocacy options and strategy, including not only entry-points for the CO at country level (e.g. with national government, civil society, and the donor community present), but also for the RO at country level and in regional fora, and for headquarters in international fora, with missions, etc. Some have long called for building Representative’s skills in negotiation and one-on-one advocacy. There also seems to be a need for more specific skill and knowledge in advocacy strategy design at different levels of the organisation.

The overall challenge for UNICEF advocacy in humanitarian action is to build up a consistent and coherent advocacy response to the various issues, with headquarters, regional and country offices working together to identify advocacy opportunities and strategy at the corresponding levels. In essence, the same capacity that is being built up linking global and country level advocacy on issues before the Security Council is needed more broadly.

\textsuperscript{5} Data from Landmines Team/EMOPS.
Emergency Preparedness Response Planning

An Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) process has been widely introduced in the organisation, especially at CO level. As of May 2003, 75 country and 10 state offices, six ROs and 10 HQ Divisions, units, or functions have initiated an EPRP process. This is a significant change. UNICEF had experimented with forms of contingency planning or preparedness planning as early as the Rwanda crisis, but this was not a widespread practice. Where COs did contingency planning, it tended to focus on building up a rough listing of most likely needed supplies. By contrast, there is consensus that the EPRP process contributes significantly to clarifying organisational commitments on humanitarian response, building ownership of these and articulating them in terms of office and individual accountabilities. Previous reviews also suggest that it has contributed to changing attitudes about preparedness and heightened staff motivation in this area. RO and headquarters staff report feedback from COs that the EPRP process does make a difference in the emergency response of UNICEF: examples cited include El Salvador, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Haiti, Honduras, India, Kenya, Malawi, Panama, Vietnam, as well as Iraq and surrounding countries. However, such reports do not tell us whether improvement in response is sufficient or what factors have limited response.

The “mainstreaming” of EPRP has been advanced in both policy and practice. As of 2002, annual updates of the EPRP were a mandatory part of the programme process, linked to the development of the Country Programme Management Plan, the Annual Management Plan and the Annual Management Review. Concerns about the EPRP tool/format used to date prompted an intensive review in November 2002, involving staff from ROs and headquarters and producing an agreement on a revised version. The first stage of revisions is still to be finalised by EMOPS. The EPRP format eventually will be on an interactive CD that will allow COs to refer to relevant policy and best practice recommendations derived from experience to date. Recommendations supporting the “mainstreaming” of EPRP, including a strong policy statement and development of some form of standard benchmark — not for planning but for actual preparedness — are still pending.

ROs are all making efforts to reinforce integration of the EPRP process as a systematic part of the mainstream programme process. Approaches have included: timing first EPRP exercises before the Mid-Term Review to allow recommendations to CO and partners to be taken up in that forum (CEE/CIS); introducing EPRP into regional milestones for the programme process (ESARO); integration of CCCs into CO Project Plans of Action (WCARO); quality review of Situation Analysis, Common Country Assessments, Consolidated Appeal Process and new Country Programmes (variously CEE/CIS, ESARO, ROSA, TACRO, EAPRO), and raising EPRP status at Regional Management Team (RMT) meetings (CEE/CIS, and ESARO done, MENA, EAPRO and WCARO planned). All of these efforts go towards bringing preparedness planning and implementation into ongoing analysis and programming. More can be done to integrate analysis stemming from EPRP in different stages of programme planning and reporting, for example in the CO Annual Reports (additional to the management indicators already included).

It is also significant that the Copenhagen Meeting on Accountabilities identified support to emergency preparedness as a key new accountability both at the level of the Regional Director and EMOPS/Programme Group. Recommendations have been made that appropriate roles in emergency preparedness should also be included in standard job descriptions and PERs, among RO advisors and heads of office. This remains to be taken up by EMOPS and DHR.

In terms of CO practice of “mainstreamed” EPRP, in the 2002 Country Office Annual Reports, 79 offices reported having updated their preparedness plan, though this included a number referring specifically to interagency preparedness plans.
However, despite focused efforts by ROs in the above-mentioned oversight and support, a reportedly consistent lag exists between the externally facilitated CO preparedness planning exercises and the actual implementation of preparedness activities identified in the EPRP. The initial preparedness planning exercise is fairly labour intensive, and generates a number of preparedness activities that the CO must undertake. These are often not integrated into CO work plans initially and even after updates, leaving the preparedness plan non-operational. ROs identify a number of constraints: lack of prioritisation within identified preparedness activities, competing priorities at CO level, the degree of commitment of the Representative, challenges in covering the supply component of preparedness where this requires financial investment, the labour-intensive nature of other preparedness activities, and lack of clarity about what level of preparedness is expected. The latter reaffirms the need for the planned standards and a strong, clear policy statement. It should be noted that implementation of preparedness activities for the Iraq crisis by the CO and its neighbouring COs was extremely positive. However, the general concern about implementation of preparedness activities and adequacy of actual preparedness remains.

An additional concern has been raised regarding the future of EPRP in the context of UNDAF countries. UNICEF EPRP is of course stronger where there is an interagency preparedness process. CCA/UNDAF guidelines currently include a reference to planning for conflict mitigation, but hazard/risk analysis and emergency preparedness do not figure in the process. At best this is an opportunity lost. At worst, there is a concern that the CCA process in particular does not favour or give sufficient space for good vulnerability/capacity analysis (discussed further below). A UNDG/ECHA Transition Working Group is focusing on refining the nexus between the CAP and the CCA/UNDAF processes with particular concern for transition countries. There is equally a concern to ensure mainstreaming of EPRP in the CCA/UNDAF context in stable countries.

**Vulnerability Analysis, Early Warning, Rapid Assessment**

The initial Martigny meeting also gave great importance to rapid assessment — one of the CCCs. It also identified vulnerability analysis and early warning as capacities necessary for more timely humanitarian response. With better vulnerability analysis/EWS, humanitarian response need not wait for crisis of gross magnitude. Rather, UNICEF could take early action — including advocacy, getting better data on the situation (rapid assessment) and possibly preventative action. Progress on vulnerability analysis/EWS and on rapid assessment, all critical analysis and information functions, has been limited and disparate.

**Vulnerability Analysis/Early Warning**

Some elements have been advanced in vulnerability analysis and early warning. Vulnerability analysis has been highlighted as a necessary facet of the SitAn in the PPPM and a tool — the vulnerability/capacity analysis matrix — has been included in the PPPM ‘Toolbox’ since 2001. Training materials on its use are included in the UNICEF M&E Training Resource (see below under M&E). This is an important step in refining UNICEF analysis of how different population groups are made vulnerable. On early warning systems — both as a support to national partners and for the organisation itself — UNICEF COs are encouraged to define roles according to comparative advantage within the UNCT (PPPM, 2001 and 2003).

For a brief period following Martigny, PD Geographic Section focused on political analysis of country situations providing an analysis of implications for UNICEF COs from secondary early warning data. In restructuring headquarters divisions, this function was phased out. EMOPS and PD Field Support and Interagency Collaboration (FSIAC) are now active in the Interagency “Framework Team” — composed of senior managers (D1/D2) from ten UN participating departments, programmes, offices and agencies — which has evolved to act as a mechanism for early warning and preventative action in a joint review and analysis process. This forum has not however contributed greatly to strengthening UNICEF vulnerability analysis or EWS.

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6 DPA, OCHA, DPKO, UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, FAO and WHO.
OPSCEN identifies and compiles political and security information from media, interagency sources and ROs and COs, feeding this to headquarters divisions, but also relaying information to ROs and COs, including sometimes providing first news to COs of incidents in their country. TACRO uses OPSCEN analysis, RO country profiles and other sources to provide COs with weekly and monthly analyses of security and vulnerability. ESARO has piloted use of sentinel sites for early warning in five of six countries in southern Africa and UNICEF has taken on a critical role in supporting nutritional surveillance monitoring for the southern Africa countries. ROSA has and uses access to a wide range of good regional sources on early warning. Each of these regions represent interesting but very different approaches to political analysis/early warning.

And while all of the above elements contribute something, there is widespread agreement that there are significant gaps and disconnects. There remains a general uncertainty as to when and from where the trigger to shift programming strategy or focus will come when needed.

- Early warning information collected and processed in the organisation at different levels and from different parts of headquarters in general is not connected, does not fit into a common framework of analysis or system, and does not feed into a clear flow of information to decision-makers. This is not a new issue.\(^7\)

- While CO SitAns may be refined in terms of attention to which population sub-groups are vulnerable and why, there seems to be little or weak political analysis of country situations that could help to trigger UNICEF response at CO level. “Sensitive” political analysis/EWS of this nature does not of course fit in programme process with national partners, nor is there currently the space for this in internal processes or structures (e.g. AMP, CMT, QA systems). Similarly, it seems that capacities of the UN Country Team (UNCT) are equally weak and may be mired by different agencies’ operational perspective, when some are more or less active in the field. This is not a systematic function in ROs or in any one part of headquarters, though OPSCEN provides significant inputs. The issue here is not heavy EWS and indicators, but critical timely analysis that helps the CO to look beyond the status quo. It is also not altogether clear at what level this political analysis function would be ideally situated. Previous evaluative exercises have highlighted some inherent limitations to CO capacity for political analysis and early warning. CO staff under stress may need an outside trigger to see the evolution of the situation around them (J. Richardson, 1995; Alley, Richardson and Berard, 1996). Even headquarters actors involved are clear that their outside perspective has certain limitations.

Finally, as mentioned above, there is some concern over the future of even vulnerability/capacity analysis. CEE/CIS, which has recently been through 11 CCAs, has highlighted weaknesses in this area and constraints in ensuring better identification of vulnerable population groups in the UNDAF context. It will be extremely important to ensure that integration of preparedness planning is built more explicitly into UN processes in stable contexts.

**Rapid Assessment**

While rapid assessment is a CCC, it has repeatedly been identified in EPRP processes as an area of weakness for COs. No explicit focus on strengthening rapid assessment has been part of either Phase I or Phase II proposals. Nonetheless some work has been advanced.

ESARO undertook work specifically on identifying core data collection needs across sectors/issues corresponding to SPHERE modules as well as Protection. This work stalled due to staffing issues, but had been reoriented to focus on two tracks addressing immediate emergency assessment within the first 48 hours after a major crisis and broader emergency assessment at a longer delay. Similarly, CEE/CIS has adopted a set of indicators for rapid assessment in the case of natural disaster, adapted from the

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Turkey CO experience. Tools and corresponding training materials have also been developed in the M&E Training Resource mentioned further below, covering the work of framing information needs for emergency assessment, data collection and the broader management of rapid assessment. All of these pieces provide a basis for development of global tools, but still need to be pulled together as a package including a model framework to guide data collection for the CCCs.

The key and most immediate concern on this issue is that technical leadership on rapid assessment in headquarters is dispersed across several divisions. This has been raised to the Programme Group Management Team and a commitment has now been made for an interdivisional effort to finalise guidance in the second half of 2003. This is urgently needed.

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

Monitoring and evaluation was identified at Martigny as being weak and continues to be a concern. Data on M&E practice for the organisation as a whole are already sufficiently alarming. OIA’s 2002 Summary Report on Basic Programme Management Controls in UNICEF Field Offices indicates that only three of 28 offices audited provided any guidance on what field visits should cover or their frequency. Other findings of the same report point to significant concerns over the quality of reporting (OIA, 2002). This lack of systems for field monitoring in stable contexts does not bode well for monitoring in unstable and crisis contexts, where field visits should become such a critical means of monitoring the situation and programme performance. EO’s recently commissioned review of the quality of evaluations supported by UNICEF COs found that while one in five evaluations could be considered excellent, one third of evaluations are of poor quality (EO, 2003). In M&E in crisis and unstable contexts, there is little to suggest that the situation at CO level has changed since Martigny.

Efforts to strengthen M&E in unstable and crisis contexts have not yet reached COs effectively. Following Martigny, the activities taken up to strengthen M&E were all by nature “slow starters”, i.e. likely to require significant work before any difference would be seen at field level. Activities included methodology and indicator development for assessing the effects of emergencies on children (funded under DFID Phase I and discussed below) and M&E policy and training.

Since 2000, guidance in the PPP Manual has recommended that following a major humanitarian crisis, externally facilitated Country Programme level evaluation be carried out, i.e. exploring issues of appropriateness of the overall CO response, comparative advantage, interagency coordination, etc., as opposed to narrowly focused project evaluations. However, Country Programme Evaluation even in stable contexts is still an evaluation tool under development. Since 1998, only the Kosovo response in 2000 was evaluated in this way with the support of DFID. It appears clear that CO capacity to initiate and manage evaluation of this kind is limited in these contexts not least because of staff overload and stress.

Training materials on M&E in emergencies were made available to COs in 2000 in draft form. Informal feedback was positive, but the only available figures refer to test workshops in Amman and Nairobi. The M&E training resource with final materials on M&E in emergencies including rapid assessment is currently in the final stages of assembly on a development website.

Funding under DFID Phase II has allowed a number of initiatives with greater potential to make a difference over the next two years. To carry the M&E Training Resource forward, a training of training facilitators in M&E in emergencies was carried out with 18 participants in New York, June 2003. Training of this nature will of course be slow to have effect. More promising for faster change, are the eight external consultants that have been selected and prepared as a corps of highly experienced on-the-job coaches in M&E to work with COs in unstable contexts/ chronic emergencies on specific M&E tasks already in the CO work plan, combining technical support and an opportunity to build staff skills and knowledge. Similarly, to address the absence of evaluation in humanitarian crisis contexts, EO/OIA are developing some form of quick externally facilitated evaluative exercise (drawing from Real-time Evaluation experience by other agencies) that the organisation could undertake systematically within the first three months of a major humanitarian crisis that would immediately feed back to the CO.
Areas not yet tackled and of significant concern are the following:

- Guidance on how to monitor and evaluate specific humanitarian response programmes, especially in the newer areas of child protection, are absent and are very labour-intensive to develop. This work entails identification of useful performance monitoring indicators as well as evaluation frameworks. Where CO’s basic M&E capacities are weak, there should be no expectation that they will be able to tackle these new areas of evaluation without support. The scope of work is far beyond the capacities of EO alone, even with the engagement of regional M&E Advisors. Not all sectoral clusters have the capacity to advance this on their own.

- Finally, of great significance for follow-up to Martigny II, we do not have simple administrative monitoring systems that allow measurement of baseline performance or progress for many of the key organisational functions identified as critical to effective and timely humanitarian response. Human resources management is one key example. Similarly, without the proposed real-time evaluative exercise under development, there is no mechanism to assess UNICEF humanitarian response.

Data and Information on Children Affected by Emergencies

Both advocacy and programme response capacities of UNICEF in crisis and unstable contexts rely on solid information through research and monitoring of the situation of children and women. At the time of the initial Martigny meeting, UNICEF had done little work on research and monitoring in these contexts, especially on the more sensitive child rights issues, as was true of other allies for child rights. There was a sense that UNICEF, with its experience in global monitoring of the situation of children in stable contexts, including difficult work on indicators for some areas of child protection, could contribute greatly and even take a leadership role. Knowledge development on children affected by armed conflict (CAAC) was included in the DFID Phase I project as a key area for strengthening.

On the whole, while ROs and selected COs have carried out a significant number of reviews and studies, this has still not come together in a broader UNICEF global perspective on data coverage, quality and gaps, a research agenda shared with potential partners and/or advances in methodological guidance — all of which are still needed. The lack of headquarters co-ordination and development of guidance has been striking.

Action in this area by UNICEF headquarters, especially the Division of Policy and Planning (DPP), was initially seriously constrained by the demands of the UN End-Decade Review process. UNICEF did collaborate at the interagency level with the Office of the Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) for Children and Armed Conflict on the Florence Workshop, 2001, “Filling Knowledge Gaps: A Research Agenda on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”, providing inputs on the proposal presented, as well as background papers. EMOPS, PD and the Division of Policy and Planning (DPP) UNICEF have collaborated to catalogue documentation amassed for the Graça Machel Study "The Impact of War on Children" in electronic searchable format, as a research tool. DPP also has just recently carried out field visits to assess data potential in three pilot countries — Angola, Sri Lanka, and Colombia — identifying a great weakness in potential for improved data collection, as well as contributing to analytical frameworks to guide data collection. However, overall progress has been slow. UNICEF headquarters and Brussels are working with the United States-based Social Science Research Council to develop a proposal to move forward on data collection on CAAC.

EMOPS is also working with COs on a series of case studies to identify good practices, lessons and eventually programme guidance on youth participation in contexts of conflict (11 case studies under way with a possible inclusion of two more).

ROs and COs have undertaken various country studies and/or synthesis reports on CAAC. Under DFID Phase I, synthesis studies were undertaken in MENA, covering Algeria, West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq; in ROSA, covering Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; and in EAPRO, specifically on child soldiers, in Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New
Guinea and the Philippines (EO, 2001). EAPRO has also developed a research methods guide “Children caught in conflict: Assessing the impact of conflict on children in East Asia and the Pacific” (EAPRO, 2003), including guidance on participation of children in research. TACRO has focused on integrating monitoring of CAAC issues in Child Info8, for which indicators were developed and validated at a workshop with UNICEF field colleagues and members of the Regional Coalition against the Recruitment of Child Soldiers and data collection from countries is now underway. Other studies are underway and/or planned in CEE/CIS (on North Caucasus), ROSA (on Bangladesh), EAPRO (on impact of natural disasters on children), as well as in TACRO, MENA and WCAR. Regions have also been active in building interagency networks both in data collection and more often to share data and information.

Advances in this area have been hampered at a couple of levels:

- COs are often hesitant to engage in research on CAAC or children affected by emergencies both for the complexities of the work — it is a groundbreaking area, methodologically complex and labour intensive — and for the sensitivity of the issues. Both in Asia and in the Balkans, COs have been reluctant to push for data collection in this area. Perversely, some progress on the data collection itself is needed to break these barriers.

- Work in this area has advanced so far at regional level without much technical guidance and/or coordination from headquarters. Particularly given the complexities of the data collection work, it does seem likely that more leadership at headquarters could further RO efforts.

- A more political than technical concern is that UNICEF could lose credibility among donors and international partners if its global expertise and leadership on data collection on children is not extended to encompass children affected by emergencies.

**Policy and Guidance on Programming in Humanitarian Action**

While programme policy and guidance for humanitarian response is generally considered to have improved significantly, advances have been mixed across different sector/issue areas.

Headquarters issued general guidance in 2000 in the form of the “Technical Notes: Special Considerations for Programming in Unstable Situations” providing the general rationale and principles, priorities and technical guidance on a range of topics covering but extending well beyond the CCCs — health, nutrition, education, separated children, IDPs, landmine awareness, gender, early childhood development, adolescents, sexual violence, child soldiers, children in detention, psychosocial needs, impact of sanctions, water, sanitation, shelter. This was the culmination of a long drawn-out effort that in essence served to update the programmatic aspects of UNICEF’s “Blue Book” on emergencies.

In addition, UNICEF headquarters worked with regional and country offices to compile a compendium of activities and “good practices” in protection of children affected by armed conflict — "UNICEF Activities on Behalf of Children Affected by Armed Conflict". This was prepared as an advocacy piece for the 2000 Winnipeg International Conference on War-Affected Children, and then updated for the 2002 UN Special Session on Children. It was also intended and has reportedly served as a reference for field staff on the potential range of approaches in different areas of child protection.

Under the aegis of the IASC Reference group on Human Rights and Humanitarian practice, UNICEF contributed to developing “Growing the Sheltering Tree”, a compendium of field practice in protecting human rights intended for both UN and NGO staff. Completed in 2002, this has been widely disseminated.

More detailed analysis of programme experience and development of technical guidance has been slow, though progress has been made more recently. In the last year:

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8 ChildInfo is a simple database with GIS software developed by UNICEF and used in at least five regions in COs and with national partners. It is powerful in presenting data for decision-makers.
• A manual on psychosocial programming has been produced in draft form, resolving at least on paper an increasing divergence in the field between two types of programme response: holistic vs. clinical. At regional level, EAPRO has established a network with external experts for COs to share further levels of guidance and provide a forum for practical exchange on psychosocial programming. The network has a website and active e-mail exchange, and may be extended to ROSA.

• UNICEF launched its Mine Action Strategy in March 2003. The headquarters Landmines Team has worked with Mine Risk Education (MRE) focal points from regional and 13 country offices to build a common approach to implementing the Strategy. Further, a lessons-learned study was conducted on a series of countries in which UNICEF is active in mine action (draft format).

• EMOPS has developed draft guidance on engagement with non-state entities based on 13 mini country case studies and a technical workshop held in 2002. This will feed into an OCHA-led initiative to develop an interagency manual on engagement with non-state actors.

Martigny II will of course further work on development of guidance on shelter, displaced persons, HIV/AIDS, education, gender-based violence and the original CCCs.

Policy and guidance on programming under humanitarian principles and response to specific country cases of child rights violations have been developed over the years through headquarters and, more recently, ROs’ support to specific COs.

One key area of concern emerges in this area. In the area of policy advice on specific country cases, as well as on other issues, distribution of roles and coordination between UNICEF headquarters and ROs has been raised as a concern. Examples have been identified where ROs or headquarters provide a lead on advising COs without much communication with the other. In particular on policy interpretation and advice on country-specific cases, there is a need for coherence and consistency across the different levels. It seems that at minimum, some form of accessible repository or database, or a section of the existing Learning Web could be usefully introduced to create a reference for all staff.

Supply

The general perspective is that the supply function has improved in UNICEF over recent years.

Delivery of Supplies

The Copenhagen warehouse has had a 24-hour to 48-hour response capacity in most major emergencies in recent years. Suppliers have been identified for long-term agreements covering a list of key items (to date, vehicles, tented accommodation and therapeutic milk have been covered). New warehouse operations, including stocking newly defined core supplies for shelter, household, and educational items, were set to be up and running by 30 June 2003. At the same time, the Copenhagen safety emergency stocks were to be increased. With this initiative, total global inventory of supplies were to increase from US$ 600,000 to US$ 2.5 million. Streamlining work processes in response to field realities and better communications with COs are still issues.

A number of important initiatives should have a significant effect when complete. In an effort to reduce global supply delivery time at the outset of an emergency, based on a recent feasibility study, SD is introducing decentralised stockpiling. The study recommended that capacity be expanded by establishing regional hubs: Johannesburg, SA to support the southern Africa region, Dubai to cater for Middle East and East Africa, Panama for the TACRO region, and possibly Bangkok for EAPRO. Pilot hubs in South Africa and Panama were to be up and running by August 2003, and operational procedures are being developed. In Panama, implementation is supported by arrangements already developed by the RO with IFRC. Given the geographical location of the hubs, substantial cost savings are expected.
Logistics

In-country logistics continues to be a struggle at field level. UNICEF COs in stable countries do not typically have any logistics management capacity, as this is usually undertaken by national partners. In emergencies, where national partners are typically overwhelmed, COs are expected to take on this function themselves. Logistics capacity is one of the key areas that have been a focus for MOUs with both DFID and NRC (19 since 1999) and for building up the DHR roster. However, COs continue to be faced with developing warehouse and inventory management systems on a case-by-case basis. Even where the simplest of systems have been the answer, the lack of guidance to COs means reinvention and potential management risks. It is notable that DFID Phase I & II network meeting records show a marked difference in engagement by Supply Division on finding solutions to the issue of in-country logistics. A policy on how and when UNICEF gets involved in logistics is still pending. However, one was set for July 2003 and much of the practical guidance and support tools are under way. As begun under DIFD Phase I, a draft logistics handbook is in production, including model contracts for standard logistics services frequently contracted out by COs. Warehouse and inventory management software systems are being tested, as are training materials that have been developed based on training provided by SD, WHO, PAHO and GTZ logistics experts in WCAR, Rwanda, Burundi, and Madagascar.

Security and Telecommunications

The general consensus is that a significant change has been made in security and telecommunications. The Minimum Security Telecommunications Standards (MISTs), adopted at the interagency level were endorsed in 2000 in the IASC, integrated into UNICEF policy and enhanced with further recommendations. This served to establish a reference for field level on the minimum capabilities, technical equipment standards and procedures for wireless and emergency telecommunications. This has served as a basis for pushing forward telecommunications upgrades, which were a significant focus for DFID Phase I funding. Corresponding standardised supply requests and standing agreements with suppliers have been established to facilitate global compliance. To date, 88 field sites are connected to the UNICEF Global Wide Area Network through SITA\(^9\), and 59 additional CO sites are functioning with VSAT (satellite dish communications systems)\(^10\). Installation is under way at another nine sites. Emergency response telecommunications kits for assessment missions and re-establishing an office are available at headquarters and in one Regional Office (CEE/CIS)\(^11\). In five regional offices, dedicated telecommunications officers have been hired to further the work on assessments, installations and training.

Interagency security standards, the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) have been established since 2000 and the system of security planning has been established at the level of the UN Country Team, at least in policy. Until recently, EMOPS-Security has worked primarily to support COs in carrying out security assessments as well as provide training, but capacity was severely limited and a decentralisation strategy unclear. The situation dramatically shifted in early 2003. In November 2002, the UN General Assembly endorsed the Secretary General’s report on establishing a framework for accountability within the UN Security Management System. Following this, in January 2003, UNICEF issued its own Security Policy, outlining how the broader accountability framework was to be applied within the administrative structure at Headquarters, Regional and Country levels. Under this policy, compliance with MOSS is now an accountability of all UNICEF Regional Directors and Country Representatives. Refining the policy environment further, EMOPS-Security has developed and disseminated guidelines on the entitlements and dilemmas of National Staff. UNICEF has also pushed with UNDP at interagency level for attention to security of female staff, providing a discussion paper as

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9 SITA is traditionally the provider of connectivity to the world’s airports and travel agents, now serving a wider range of clients, including UNICEF and other UN agencies.

10 Standards on VSAT technology vary significantly across organisations, including PKO and World Bank, depending at least in part when each organisation made its first major investment. UNICEF and UNDP have invested more recently and are using the same standards.

11 The CEE/CIS kit is ready for immediate use and allows reestablishment of office telecommunications functions — PROMS, cc-mail, etc. — in the event of an office being destroyed.
preparation for a scheduled discussion at the Interagency Security Management Network (IASMN) meeting that was to be held May 2003.

A more concerted focus has been placed on training. A security module for EPRP training has been developed and a Security Training CD ROM, "Basic Security in the Field — Staff Safety, Health and Welfare", is being disseminated to all field locations. The CD has been introduced in an addendum to the Security Policy with all staff being required to complete the training before 31 October 2003. Security training has also been delivered throughout countries in the Middle East and a comprehensive programme is being developed to continue this globally. At the level of UNSECOORD, a Security Management Team (SMT) training plan has been finalised in liaison with UNICEF and other IASMN partners, giving priority according to security phases and staff turnover. A new Security Training Officer started work in January 2003.

The EMOPS Operations Centre (OPSCEN) was established as a 24/7 communications centre in 1999, but the services provided by it were more narrowly defined. OPSCEN services were expanded under DFID Phase I and are now 75 percent covered by EMOPS regular resources. The range of services includes operational support to the field, especially to ROs and COs in emergencies, global monitoring of emergency and security situations, security and early warning analysis, related information dissemination, a telecommunications hub for the field and a focal point for general information enquiries from the field. In a recent user survey, all but the last role were ranked as very important to staff and services were ranked very high for relevance, reliability, responsiveness, professionalism and quality. Analysis of the qualitative responses in the survey suggests a strong relationship between the 24/7 nature of the service and a sense of security for staff. The survey also suggested some refinements are necessary in the targeting of different information products to users, general awareness of these products and a need for expansion in services, specifically in the provision of early warning analysis and mapping and geographic information. The latter is an area where OPSCEN has more recently expanded its services with hardware and software installations.12 In response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, OPSCEN services are now assured with an external back-up system in an alternate site in case of an evacuation of the UNICEF NYHQ facilities.

Under the current policy environment, monitoring of the status of security compliance is easier, at least in theory. EMOPS data shows that 14 percent of COs are MOSS-compliant and 64 percent are partially compliant. Of the latter, all but 11 are reported as at least “half way there” or better. Reporting on MOSS compliance in CO Annual Reports paints a slightly better picture: 36 offices or 29 percent reported MOSS compliance OIA’s Country Office Audit Reports present similar findings. Data from 2000 and 2001 Audit Reports show that of 78 negative observations — high and medium risk — only 13 observations affecting 10 offices referred to issues likely to require significant investment in equipment or infrastructure. These referred to telecommunications equipment, physical infrastructure achieved. However, this may be more due to lack of understanding on criteria that were not reproduced in the CO Annual Report Guidelines.

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<td>Total COs</td>
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More importantly, EMOPS data highlights that the issues requiring attention do not require large financial resources. The following are the only resource-intensive issues identified where compliance was lacking:

- Emergency power supply – 36 offices
- Emergency communications systems – 8 offices
- Satellite telephone – 7 offices

OIA’s Country Office Audit Reports present similar findings. Data from 2000 and 2001 Audit Reports show that of 78 negative observations — high and medium risk — only 13 observations affecting 10 offices referred to issues likely to require significant investment in equipment or infrastructure. These referred to telecommunications equipment, physical infrastructure of offices or equipment for vehicles.

The major constraints identified in the area of security stem from the wider UN system:

- The most significant issue is how to ensure that security systems serve and do not drive or constrain humanitarian response. This is a concern expressed by interviewees/respondents from headquarters, ROs and COs. The mindset revealed in both policy and the practice of UN security officers in the field is criticised as being insufficiently oriented towards ensuring maximum access of humanitarian response to populations in need.

- As supported by the data above, a similar range of interviewees/respondents highlighted that while security systems have improved in terms of hardware, the real challenge is in the ‘software’, i.e. knowledge, attitudes and practices in COs.

**Human Resources Management**

Getting people with the right skills in place at the right time was one of the issues addressed in Martigny. It has long been a challenge in emergencies. There is a general sense that there has been some improvement, though this is not seen with any certainty as an improvement in DHR systems. Rather, issues mentioned were greater flexibility in use of TFTs, faster processing when COs had identified candidates and focused support for staffing for the major spotlight emergencies. However, without painstaking manual calculations, no organisation-wide statistics on performance trends in this area are available. Lack of such critical data is a significant capacity gap in and of itself.

**Management Systems**

This said, DHR has advanced a number of exercises and systems intended to improve human resources management. The following are near completion:

- A skills inventory system using a web version of the Human Resources Information System (webHRIS). This was pilot-tested in the e-Rotation exercise 2002 – 2003. Set up to allow staff to input and update their own skills, training and short-term assignments, this structure has the potential to allow more systematic tracking of emergency-related learning activities and thus to serve as a tool for internal regional surge capacity systems.

- A web-roster for external candidates, including facilities for recording assignments and internal technical reviews. Work is planned with all technical units to help populate the roster, as has already begun with the Division of Communications and Nutrition, Health and WES clusters. The roster will serve as a tool for regional rosters and regional and CO recruitment processes.

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13 The breakdown by phase is as follows: emergency power supply – 36 offices (No phase – 16, Phase I – 12, Phase II – 2, Phase III – 4, Phase IV – 2); Emergency communications systems – 8 offices (No phase – 6, Phase I – 2); Satellite telephone – 7 offices (Not phase – 5; Phase I – 2) Source: EMOPS data, 7 January 2003.
14 Source: “Issue Track” OIA’s audit reports database.
• Competency profiles. An exercise was carried out to develop standard competency profiles for key managerial and technical areas, intended to serve as a reference for building generic job descriptions, recruitment and strengthen professional development.

Other major initiatives designed to complement the above systems have been put on hold or slowed. The E-Recruitment system, intended to link up the external website web-roster, an expanded e-Rotation system implemented in 2002 – 2003 (webHRIS and internal vacancy management system) and the internal skills inventory (webHRIS), has been significantly slowed due to lack of funding for 2003. Similarly, a facet of the Young Professionals Programme, specifically the Assessment Centre, was cancelled for 2003 for lack of funding. A succession planning system has also been slowed for lack of funding.

It is also a positive step that in the newly proposed accountabilities for ROs, there is an explicit reference to RO responsibility for ensuring human resources support to COs in unstable and crisis contexts. In fact, some ROs have advanced considerably in establishing both external and internal surge capacity. TACRO has established a list of 27 UNICEF staff from operations, logistics and other functions to act as a temporary SWAT team, as well as a regional task force covering a range of programmatic expertise (health, nutrition, education, communications, etc.) to provide periodic oversight visits to assess risk-prone countries.

TACRO has also linked with the Central American Disaster Prevention Centre (CEPREDEDENAC), establishing a joint emergency roster of 160 experts in humanitarian response, which is already accessible on the Internet. ROSA and ESARO have established intra-regional rosters for surge capacity, both regions giving extra attention to CO commitments for release of staff and experience and training of staff on the roster. ESARO like TACRO is also organising technical missions to key COs and plans to establish a roster of consultants for short-term surge capacity. CEE/CIS, EAPRO, MENA have plans to develop surge capacity mechanisms later in the year. Several regions have emphasised the ongoing demand for RO emergency staff to act as a form of surge capacity.

Finally, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with different organisations have been pursued to provide surge capacity through secondments from other organisations. MOUs exist with Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and British DFID. A previous MOU with Danish Refugee Council (DRC) has expired, but may be revived. Together these global MOUs do not fill a very significant part of staffing needs in emergencies: COs have used a total of 128 secondments (with NRC primarily as well as seven with DRC and 15 with DFID) since 1999. There are other MOUs including apparently an ill-defined number at CO levels. DHR and EMOPS are conducting a review of the experience with these MOUs in order to establish a clearer division of labour for the global management of such arrangements — “one-stop-shopping” to simplify use by COs, more effective management and use of such resources, and more deliberate efforts to situate these arrangements more clearly within UNICEF’s overall strategy for meeting human resource requirements in emergencies.

However, concerns remain:

• It is unclear whether and when current headquarters initiatives in developing systems that rely on widely dispersed implementation responsibilities will effectively improve getting the right people in place at the right time for emergencies.

• It is equally unclear that the specificities of human resource requirements for emergencies remain sufficiently distinguished in “mainstreamed” competency profiles and “roll out” of the skills inventory and web-roster.

• Finally, while the organisation is pursuing a diversity of mechanisms — internal surge capacity, external surge capacity through consultants rosters and MOUs, external recruitment and training (dealt with in more detail below) — as underlined in a 2001 desk review, it is unclear which mechanism is expected to fill which human resources needs; i.e. what type of human resources

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15 This refers to a draft initially worked out in a meeting of HQ and ROs on accountabilities, Copenhagen, May 2003.
gaps, of what magnitude and at what point in the emergency is best filled with which mechanism (Freedman, 2001).

Caring for staff

UNICEF response to the effects of emergencies on staff well-being has been mixed. Globally the organisation has seemed slow to take up initiatives in ESARO in the early 1990s in providing stress counsellors and training in stress management. However, ROs have continued to press for a more systematic response to this issue. ESARO attempted to identify institutions available to provide stress counselling services, but judged the effort unsuccessful initially. MENA has carried out (and CEE/CIS has begun preparations for) a training of peer support volunteers that was to be held in July. WCARO still maintains and promotes a network of external counsellors for staff and has trained and supports a peer counsellors’ network. RO efforts have until recently been developed without any clear global guidance and there remains no clear outline of headquarters, regional and country responsibilities in this area. However, under DFID Phase II, DHR has taken up the issue seriously. DHR appointed a Stress Counsellor in January 2003 who has already begun work on developing a network of counselling resources and coordination of interagency staff counselling services, as well as providing direct counselling services.

DHR policy unit has also taken on humanitarian response as one of its foci for policy review work. In January 2002, a "Compendium of HR policies related to emergencies" was produced and disseminated and work is progressing on several different policy revisions — Malicious Acts Insurance, security phasing, R&R and Special Operations Approach.

The main issues of concern in this regard are whether the full range of policy and guidance development needed on stress counselling can be completed under the short-term funding by DFID under Phase II and how longer-term functions in this area will be maintained.

Building staff skills and knowledge — learning

It is generally agreed that in terms of resources to build staff skills and knowledge, the organisation is much better off, as it is now seeing the work of several years come to fruition. Training and Training-of-Trainers (ToT) packages are either completed or all but complete for:

- Humanitarian Principles: A Child Protection Approach to Complex Emergencies (produced in 1998 and soon to be updated),
- Human Rights and Humanitarian Principles Training of Trainers manual, and

These are core global training packages that figure in the Programme Learning Strategy recently proposed by OLDS/DHR. Finalising the EPRT in particular has been significantly complicated given that many policy references for the training were in flux or poorly defined, and different perspectives of regions had to be reflected. However, the development process initially undertaken by ESARO and taken up later by OLDS enlisted inputs from a wide range of headquarters and RO staff and the product is generally considered to be of high quality and well-rooted in the field realities. The ToT completed in early 2003 seems already to be feeding into concrete plans for follow-up. The EPRT is of course a natural complement to EPRP processes. To date, EPR training has reached a mixture of programme and operations personnel primarily from almost all regions.

16 The strategy presented by OLDS/DHR to the Programme Learning Task Group among others outlines and prioritises the core training staff should undertake, building from the broad elements that all staff must master (programme preparation process and human rights-based approach to programming) using broad training related to humanitarian response (humanitarian principles and emergency preparedness and response training) and eventually through sector and issue-specific training depending on job description (for example, nutrition and health, child protection, operations).
Also, a wide range of training materials more specific to technical sectors or issues has been developed, most as packages that can be taken up by ROs and/or COs in decentralised training. They include:

- Materials covering policies and possible strategies to protect against sexual abuse and exploitation suitable as stand-alone activities or as part of existing training packages.
- A training programme on communications to build communications officers’ skills in dealing with complex issues from a child protection/ “rights advocacy” perspective.
- A training package/module on crisis management/crisis communication module for senior managers.
- A stand-alone training package on Public Health and Nutrition in Emergencies developed and tested in 2002 and soon to be finalised.
- An Education in Emergencies training package.
- A one-off training on and validation of a Technical Note on HIV/AIDS in emergencies.
- An M&E Training Resource that integrates material on rapid assessment and M&E in crisis and unstable contexts.

In recent months, new materials have been developed for a stress management module to be included in the EPRT.

Table 3: Partial\textsuperscript{17} Summary of Emergency-related Training Activities for UNICEF Staff 1998-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Global/ Region</th>
<th>No. of COs</th>
<th>No. of participants</th>
<th>Training intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EPRT (1 week)</td>
<td>ESARO (Feb, Oct, Nov 2001)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Knowledge and skills in EPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESARO (Somalia)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CEE/CIS Jun 2002</td>
<td>14 COs</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CEE/CIS (Jul 2000)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAPRO (Aug 2002)</td>
<td>12 COs, 3 RO</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROSA (Pakistan sub-offices)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York staff (Dec 2002)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York staff (Feb 2003)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Basic knowledge and skills in EPR (1 day condensed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPR content integrated</td>
<td>Global – Senior leaders (2000-2003)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Basic knowledge and skills in EPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global – Senior Programme and Operations Officers (2000-2003)</td>
<td>30 est.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Basic knowledge and skills in EPR (condensed session)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPR TOT</td>
<td>Global (Mar 2003)</td>
<td>16 COs, 2 ROs, 3 HQ</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Training in knowledge and skills in EPR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{17} Note: Table includes the best data available at the time of writing. It does not include training in security, Education in Emergencies, HR/HP as carried out by ROs alone, and basic emergency training carried out for the Young Professionals Programme.
UNICEF has also contributed to the development of interagency training materials and provided training to UN agencies and NGOs in support of advocacy as outlined above, under “Advocacy”.

Also, OLDS has launched and expanded the emergency portal for the Intranet Learning Web, which ranks eighth in all sites, third among substantive sites, and has been identified as a valuable resource by a number of headquarters and RO colleagues. ROSA is also launching emergency resources to the regional website. It is not clear how well the Intranet will reach COs in emergencies, but OLDS is planning a dissemination strategy for its Learning Web. UNICEF learning strategies are also being expanded to include interactive training on CD-ROM, as well as distance learning, mentors, twinning, exchanges, etc. OLDS and RO colleagues are still grappling with how learning can be rewarded.

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18 Data was known to inadequately cover decentralised CO-managed training activities and has led to a concerted effort to strengthen reporting on training globally.
A few key underlying concerns remain:

- A narrow training response to staff capacities is problematic. Training workshops only reach a small proportion of our staff, and we are often targeting the same staff with several different training efforts. This is particularly challenging for smaller COs or for staff in pivotal roles.

- There has been no systematic learning needs assessment or creation of global or region specific baselines. Different regions prioritise training efforts differently. Advances in use of core training materials in the different regions vary significantly. The variation appears to depend more on regional prioritisation of scarce time and resources rather than on needs. Unfortunately, a planned learning needs assessment that was intended initially as a basis for pushing learning priorities more appropriately across regions has been postponed. This was in part due to work overload and in part due to a reassessment based on the high cost necessary to get sufficiently solid region-specific assessment.

- Monitoring and evaluation of the effects of training activities is still inconsistent. Work is pending on a common standard for exit and follow-up evaluations for training activities and the DHR skills database has just recently been set up so that it can be used for tracking trainees.

External communications

External relations, particularly handling of the media, are both more challenging in humanitarian crisis as opposed to stable contexts, and more critical to UNICEF resource mobilisation. While external communications were not identified as one of the supporting accountabilities for enabling the organisation to fulfil the CCCs, both field and headquarters interviewees and respondents (outside Division of Communications, DOC) signal that communications is a necessary part of the initial humanitarian response. The focus of the CCCs is considered by many to be an advantage for public image and fundraising.

Policy and guidance are available. DOC has developed an emergency communications strategy clarifying the role of communications officers, regional offices and DOC in emergencies, and detailing how communications fits in emergency preparedness and response. An emergency communications handbook was developed. The above-mentioned training materials also support building up common references for staff on emergency communications.

A pool of skilled communications staff with experience in emergencies has been built up by DOC as a surge capacity for large emergencies and works effectively in deploying communications staff rapidly in initial stages of the emergency. This is generally well appreciated in the field. DOC also notes better coordination between Geneva, headquarters and the field.

DOC notes concerns about funding for emergency communications and timid engagement with media by some COs. The flip side of the latter issue is a concern about over-selling UNICEF response in such a way that the communications message is in fact better than programme reality.

Financing Humanitarian Response

In the second half of the nineties and since the initial Martigny meeting, UNICEF has continued to expand options and simplify procedures for financing humanitarian response.

One of the efforts over recent years has been to improve the flow of funding from the earliest stages of humanitarian crisis. The four basic mechanisms for immediate funding are: diversion of funding from general programmes, reprogramming of regular resources with RO, PFO, donor and government approval and use of the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF). In 2000, the limits for diversion were increased from US$50,000 to US$100,000/75,000 depending on whether the regular resources allotment is above or below US$ 2 million (CF/PD/PRO-2000-02). Procedures for EPF, which range between
US$200,000 and $2 million, have been greatly simplified with fewer signatures required (Freedman, 2001:48). Given the numbers of COs using EPF, this is an important mechanism. Outside of UNICEF, COs may also access the UN Central Emergency Revolving Fund for advances for up to six months for sums ranging between US$ 1 million to 5 million.

### Table 4: Use of Emergency Programme Fund 2000 – 2002 (USD millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of COs</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Funds</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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PFO has issued a quick guide to COs on the options and corresponding procedures. The time delay for issuing Programme Budget Allocations (PBAs) has improved.

Collaboration between PFO, EMOPS, PD’s Humanitarian Response Unit, Geneva and Brussels, is better, with weekly conference calls on emergency fundraising.

Emergency income in 2002 was at an all time high at US$250 million, including significant funding for Afghanistan (US$94 million), southern Africa and Iraq (CHECK). Looking at patterns over the 1990s, this figure should be seen as another peak as opposed to an upward trend (see Table X). There appears to be no significant trend in figures on funding against CAPs. Global averages for funding against the CAP vary between 45 and 68 percent over between 1998 and 2002 with the peak being in 1999. This average captures a wide range across countries. Over the same period, each year there are one or two cases of country CAPs with less than 25 percent funding and similarly a few cases with funding of over 90 percent and even over 100 percent of the CAP. While the total funding under CAPs has doubled since 1998, there is still a consistent trend that by mid-year, only half of funding has been received.

### Table 5: Emergency Income 1990 – 2003

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</table>

Source: PFO figures for internal monitoring of funding flows, 2003.

The diversity of funding has fluctuated up and down over the last 10 years, with a peak in 1999 where 33 percent of funding came from National Committees. In 2002, that proportion was 12 percent.

Despite the many procedural improvements, many of the same constraints prevail:

- Funding for the forgotten emergencies continues to be a challenge.
- Flow of funding under the CAP continues to be slow.
- Either COs continue to present inflated figures in the CAP or are operating with dramatically low funding against need. If the latter is the case, it is not clear that the organisation is making the case about lost opportunities and unmet needs as a result of underfunding.
- Funding flows force COs to choose between giving staff full 12-month contracts or purchasing supplies. Representatives and COs are still often reluctant to use EPF to cover the gaps.
Interagency co-ordination

In the CCCs, stronger liaison and coordination with UN agencies and mechanisms involved in humanitarian response is seen primarily as a CO function with support roles in headquarters. The general impression is that this has strengthened.

Interagency coordination as a function has not been an explicit goal in DFID Phase II, however it cuts across all other functions. This interagency dimension is apparent across the board, whether UNICEF is contributing to coordination mechanisms for effectiveness sake or to push a child rights agenda.

- UNICEF staff helped establish and co-chair the IASC Task Force (TF) on Preparedness and Contingency Planning. Over the past year, as part of this working group, UNICEF actively supported UN preparedness for the Iraq crisis. There are examples of UNICEF COs where advances in EPRP helped them to better contribute to the interagency process on the ground and, in at least a couple of cases, to take the lead (Maldives, Central America).
- UNICEF security policy, procedures and mechanisms build on the interagency MOSS, as well as UNCT security management at CO level.
- Decentralisation of stockpiles for emergency supplies has built on strong interagency relations in particular in Panama.
- Learning strategies and materials development is carefully linked to and feeding into work at interagency level.
- Human resources management now includes a number of MOUs, with other agencies and options for expanding this being explored. Similarly, ROs have used external networks and partnerships to give COs access expertise (EAPRO, TACRO).
- Work on building up information and analysis of impact of emergencies on children has been advanced with partnerships with academia (ROSA, EAPRO).
- Similarly, programming work has developed with strong interagency coordination. For example, UNICEF is active in interagency networks in education (Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies), in health (there is an active interagency network), etc.
- UNICEF advocacy work has of course an enormous interagency dimension. UNICEF promotes child rights perspectives through IASC and its working groups as it does in other fora, including in interagency guidance.
- UNICEF has also been quite active in the IASC at very senior levels, the Director of EMOPS and the Executive Director both to further a child rights perspective through interagency mechanisms and more broadly to strengthen a better coordinated humanitarian response.

UNICEF has also contributed to IASC development of guidance on difficult operational issues which increasingly shape the space for humanitarian response in complex emergencies with the presence of the military. UNICEF was active in developing the Guidelines on Use of Military Escorts and Guidelines on Use of Military, Civil and Defence Assets. In the currently rapidly evolving context of humanitarian response, presence and active involvement on the development of thinking in the interagency arena is clearly critical.
Mainstreaming

Since the early nineties, there have been policy statements emphasising the need to avoid parallel programming. As mentioned in the introduction, this was a major concern expressed explicitly by the Executive Director that has guided much of Martigny follow-up. There are however fairly consistent questions as to what mainstreaming means or what direction it is taking the organisation.

Different interviewees have made a number of important distinctions in analysing the issue and status of mainstreaming. Few challenge mainstreaming the mechanics of emergency preparedness in CO programme process. It may not be fully achieved. Policy and tools can be tweaked. Some of our working tools such as PROMS still create problems. Practice can be improved. However, it is not challenged as a concept or approach. The “mainstreaming” challenges are elsewhere.

- At CO level, mainstreaming some of the policy developments on child rights issues that have emerged in the context of humanitarian response is a greater challenge. Staff without emergency experience are less knowledgeable about and comfortable with humanitarian principles and a range of child protection issues. There is a certain resistance. This attitude gap affects of course the breadth of analysis and planning in EPRP and programming in general. This issue is reflected in the discussion of advocacy work above.

- There are concerns as to what mainstreaming humanitarian response means for RO staffing and structure. Some of this stems from the DFID Phase I and II projects, under which an Emergency Project Officer position was formed in each RO. One RO has since covered an EPO post with regular resources. There is pressure to plan for a mainstreaming of these and other DFID-funded emergency functions at RO level. While this does not necessarily mean a creation of posts in every RO, the EPOs still seem to fulfil a vital role in galvanising overall RO attention to emergencies and emergency preparedness.

- Similarly, there is concern over what mainstreaming means at headquarters. The 2001 restructuring was originally couched in terms of mainstreaming. RO and CO staff fairly consistently criticise the lack of clarity and/or effectiveness of the distribution of roles and responsibilities between headquarters divisions. The shift of the Humanitarian Response Unit is frequently questioned and one field interviewee reported that given the confusion, it was more effective for a field office to contact the Director of EMOPS directly.

- There is also a broader issue of mainstreaming in headquarters strategy, policies, systems and procedures. The ideal is that the special considerations for humanitarian response are integrated throughout. The fear is that attention to humanitarian response will disappear or that concrete solutions to urgent problems will be shelved until a solution is found for all COs. The Medium Term Strategic Plan is widely considered an example of the former. There is reason to fear that the human resources management systems under development will become an example of the latter.
CONCLUSION

The number of very concrete and indisputable changes in UNICEF humanitarian response capacity since the time of the Martigny Consultation is in no way attributed to Martigny alone. External factors have been just as dramatic in bringing about change. However, it is clear that the organisation is different.

- **Shift in organisational culture.** A growing proportion of UNICEF staff, including those working in stable contexts, ROs and headquarters, understand and accept their responsibility in ensuring that the organisation responds to humanitarian crisis in line with the Core Corporate Commitments (CCCs). There is also an increasing understanding by UNICEF headquarters and field staff of the ethical and legal standards that underpin the work of UNICEF in humanitarian action and response.

- **Advocacy role expanded.** The breadth and reach of UNICEF advocacy continues to expand. UNICEF has contributed to defining the agenda for Children Affected by Armed Conflict and has extended its advocacy to an increasingly broad range of fora. This is not only the headquarters face of UNICEF. There is an increasing connection between high-level political advocacy on CAAC, in the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies, and field office positioning and advocacy work with national partners. This has been observed in relation to country-specific issues that have come before the Security Council, as well as on implementation of SC Resolutions 1261 and 1314, on the humanitarian impact of small arms on children and landmines action, among others. Both headquarters and ROs have been active in building up networks of allies. Increasingly, COs are equipped with guidance and tools for this range of advocacy issues and almost half of COs are engaging in advocacy on difficult issues to some degree, some very strongly.

- **Emergency preparedness and response planning.** 75 COs, six ROs and 10 headquarters divisions, units or functions have undertaken initial Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) exercises. "Mainstreaming" of the preparedness planning has been advanced both in policy and in practice. EPRP processes are widely considered to have contributed greatly to clarity about CO and individual staff accountabilities, to motivation and a culture shift.

- **Organisation-wide core training for better humanitarian response.** Training packages on humanitarian principles and the human rights-based approach to programming and on emergency preparedness and response have been established as part of UNICEF’s core learning strategy. A significant cadre of staff are now trained as trainers in both. This is the point where investment to date will start to pay off with wider coverage of training.

- **Security infrastructure and standards.** A clear UNICEF security policy has been issued, including Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), establishing clear accountabilities and implementation targets. The Operations Centre (OPSCEN) provides a range of services to the field, including monitoring of security situations and a reliable 24-hour information and communications hub: 88 field sites are connected to the UNICEF Global Wide Area Network through SITA, and 59 additional country sites are functioning with VSAT.

- **Selected advances in human resources management.** Surge capacity through both internal and external rosters have been advanced by ROs (TACRO, ROSA, ESARO starting), as well as globally for external communications staff and logisticians. Similarly, ROs have pushed ahead with peer counselling and stress counselling services for staff (CEE/CIS, WCAR, ESARO and now TACRO), though DHR now has staff in place to support globally with policy and guidance.

- **Interagency coordination.** Contrary to its persisting image as a loner, UNICEF is present and active in interagency collaboration and coordination.
Significant changes are also in the offing in a number of other areas.

Despite some of the hugely significant changes mentioned above, constraints remain, some of which unfortunately are not new.

- **Clarity on implications of CCCs.** Especially as the organisation considers proposals to refine and essentially expand the CCCs, clarity on the implications is vital. Are the CCCs a minimum response always, in every region? What are the implications for preparedness planning at COs and ROs, particularly in terms of human resources?

- **Lack of consistency in advocacy role.** While UNICEF has become a more active advocate on a wider range of challenging issues, there continues to be a range of positions in COs and ROs on how to balance this advocacy position with our relationship with national government partners and even whether to try in some cases. This challenge emerged in the early 1990s, and has become more acute as some parts of the organisation have become more active on child rights issues in the context of humanitarian response. The issues include attitude change, understanding of, and skills/knowledge in, developing advocacy strategies, as well as common positions and interpretation of policy at the level of senior management in COs, ROs, and headquarters.

- **Level of preparedness.** While EPRP has advanced, the lag in implementing preparedness activities continues. It will be important to establish clearly what level and scope of preparedness is expected and to find incentive systems to ensure it happens.

- **Early warning, rapid assessment.** The organisation continues to be weak in accessing and processing information for early warning, including political/vulnerability analysis, as well as in rapid assessment. These information analysis functions are critical because they have the potential of triggering and directing early humanitarian response. These gaps have been identified from the time of the initial Martigny. Some elements are there, but there is no global structure or framework, or clear technical lead in headquarters for any of these functions.

- **Results-based management.** No significant change in CO M&E capacity has come about. The organisation has no practice of or system for assessing humanitarian response to crisis. There are critical support functions for which the organisation cannot easily take a measure of performance. There is little or no guidance on monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response programmes in many of the newer programming areas.

- **Information/analysis of the impact of emergencies on children.** While ROs and selected COs have advanced on a number of country and regional studies on the impact of war and natural disaster on children, there continues to be no global leadership. Current efforts to mend this gap are urgent if UNICEF is to protect its image as a leader in global knowledge development on the situation of children.

- **Security as a constraint to humanitarian response.** While MOSS and the advances toward its compliance are generally well-received, there is a concern that the UN security system continues to constrain rather than support humanitarian assistance. There is also a concern that attention to security infrastructure not take away attention to knowledge and practices of staff and COs.

- **Human resource management systems.** DHR is about to roll out important human resource management systems: the skills inventory, the web-roster, both based on the newly completed competency profiles. Making these systems work at all, including for HRM for humanitarian response, will require significant work by headquarters divisions in concert with ROs. If these systems are to bring any benefit to humanitarian response capacity any time soon, it is critical that they be prioritised. This needs to be followed. Similarly, in terms of getting an overall view of how HR gaps are to be filled, it seems that some overall assessment is needed as to what
different options – internal and external surge capacity, recruitment, and training – will be used to respond to which gaps. It will be important also to ensure continuity of DHR leadership on the issue of staff counselling after DFID Phase II.

- **Mainstreaming.** While staff have little difficulty with the vision of mainstreaming emergency preparedness and humanitarian response at the level of COs, what this will mean for headquarters and RO structures and staffing is the cause for many questions and angst. It is generally agreed that the organisation will always require a set of triggers and a mechanism to gear up an effective and timely humanitarian response. The issue is to ensure that the organisation, from headquarters to RO to CO, has enough and the right triggers, including back-ups, and a gear box that is sufficiently powerful. The vision of what that should look like remains unclear.
APPENDIX A — INTERVIEWEES AND QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS

Interviewees

The following were interviewed in the context of the annual DFID Phase II review intentionally touching on a number of issues for this report:

   Peter Crowley
   Yoshimi Muto
   Bo Viktor Nylund
   Reiko Nishijima
   Hanaa Singer
   Geoff Wiffin

Additional interviews carried out specifically for this report were:

   Steve Allen
   Shamsul Farooq
   David Gressly
   Nils Kastberg
   Philip O’Brien
   Chris Maxfield
   Geeta Narayan
   Leila Pakkala
   JoAnna Van Gerpen

Respondents to Questionnaires

This review also draws on a two-part questionnaire sent to emergency capacity-building focal points. Some responded with the input of colleagues from their office in which case the focal point teams are listed. Respondents from this network were:

   Hanaa Singer
   Viktor Nylund
   Geoff Wiffin
   Hamish Young
   Tanya Chapuisat
   Sarah Norton-Staal
   Jacqueline Peters
   Razan Azoka
   Thomas Davin
   Nidya Quiroz
   Reiko Nishijima
   Jim Arnold
   Yoshimi Muto
   Jenni Wolfson
   Manuel Fontaine
   Polly Brennan
   Ole Boye
   Everett Ressler
   Bill Gent
   Chris Maxfield
   Pilar Aguilar
APPENDIX B1 — QUESTIONNAIRE ON GENERAL ISSUES, APRIL 2003:
PROGRESS REPORT ON DFID PHASE II

Instructions
We would like you to reconsider many of the same questions, with reference to your analysis last October. Your original response will be in grey font. This gives you the opportunity to simply add to or revise your previous assessment.

- If in reviewing your responses you want to delete text, please use the font ‘strikethrough’.
- If you want to add text, do so in **RED text**.
- In some cases, we have added questions for clarification on your October response. These are **highlighted in yellow**.
- Two new questions have been added (G&H) that relate to issues identified in the Review of DFID Phase I.

A. **What are the results achieved to date that you feel have the greatest potential impact on UNICEF humanitarian response capacity?** For each one, indicate whose capacity (what unit, office, post) the results achieved will influence most directly.

B. **What are the areas where you are most concerned about lack of progress in implementation (i.e. progress is slow and this is a pivotal activity)?** And what can/should be done to address this problem in implementation?

C. **How would you rate planning for this year in terms how ambitions matched realistic implementation expectations?** Mark an ‘X’ in the appropriate box.

| Plan very much exceeds realistic expectations |  |
| Plan exceeds realistic expectations |  |
| Plan matches realistic expectations |  |
| Plan comes below realistic expectations |  |
| Plan comes very much below realistic expectations |  |

D. List, and briefly explain, up to 5 of the top constraints to progress in your workplan (in order of importance)
1. (most important)
2.
3.
4.
5.

E. List any of the top 5 constraints that you think can be relatively easily resolved, by your own unit/office or another.

*Constraints my unit/office can resolve*

•
•
•
•

*Constraints other units/offices can resolve*

•
•
•
•
F. What are the key lessons learned so far this year? (Please attach any monitoring or trip reports, studies or other that substantiate these lessons if possible)

G. After the first year of DFID Phase II, how well do you think we are performing on the following management issues identified as key areas for attention?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building ownership of the Phase II process and general capacity building for humanitarian response; dispel the image that it is an “EMOPS project”.</td>
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<td>Comments:</td>
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<td>UNICEF global oversight of DFID-supported capacity building process must be strengthened.</td>
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<td>Strengthen global coordination and information-sharing.</td>
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<td>Strengthen intra-regional sharing of information and experiences.</td>
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H. After the first year of DFID Phase II, how well do you think we are performing on the following strategy issues identified as critical?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bringing humanitarian response issues into discussions in &quot;mainstream&quot; technical networks e.g. human resources, planning and M&amp;E, child protection, and sectoral networks etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening regional roles and responsibilities in both support to and oversight of CO humanitarian response capacity (Emphasis needed on clarifying accountabilities and translating policy and guidance into practical tools for RO support to COs.)</td>
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</table>

(Note questions ‘G’ and ‘H’ do not attempt to explore all management and strategic issues; only the more intangible or widely cross-cutting issues that cannot be assessed simply through progress reporting on workplans.)
I. For ROs only: For each of the goals, please identify any major capacity constraints affecting COs in your region which are not being addressed in the 2003 Consolidated Workplan. Please provide bullet point answers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal 1: Enhance UNICEF capacities for preparedness planning and response to emergencies, as an integral part of CP process, ensuring protection and promotion of child rights are central to humanitarian efforts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal 2: To improve UNICEF management of, and operational readiness in financial, supply, logistics, telecommunications, external communications and stress management/counselling elements of humanitarian response in emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal 3: To improve the availability of appropriate staff at the appropriate time for all emergencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goal 4: To improve staff competencies for advocacy, programmatic and operational support in emergencies, reflecting the human rights based approach to programming and the normative framework of UNICEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal 5: To increase UNICEF capacity to protect staff and assets in emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal 6: To improve UNICEF’s knowledge base on the situation of children affected by armed conflict with particular attention to the differential impact of armed conflict on girls and women.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Goal 7: To enhance UNICEF capacity to advocate for the promotion and protection of the rights of children affected by armed conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goal 8: To increase UNICEF capacity to develop co-ordinated policy and programme guidance to protect children affected by armed conflict with a consistent gender perspective in all policy and programming</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX B2 — QUESTIONNAIRE: CHANGE IN UNICEF HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE CAPACITY POST-MARTIGNY

Are you from a RO or HQ office?  
RO  
HQ  

Was this filled out with input from other colleagues in your office?  
Yes  
No  

The first 6 questions are intended to take a measure of where we are in relation to key CO, RO and HQ accountabilities that were identified as necessary to ensure implementation of the CCCs. Space is included for comment on performance in relation to each accountability at each level. Please specify if there is a particular aspect of an accountability identified that is either especially strong or weak.

1. If you are an RO respondent, how would you rate COs performance in your region in relation to the following accountabilities?  
If you are an HQ respondent, how would you rate COs performance globally in relation to the following accountabilities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Very weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early warning, assessment, preparedness and response in the country</td>
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<td>Assessment of the preparedness and response capacity of partners:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liaison and coordination with other UN agencies involved in emergency response and the inter-agency coordination mechanisms established in emergency-affected areas and in capitals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintaining and strengthening relations with donors at the country level, in order to share information and increase collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification of specific areas where support is required from RO and HQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contribution to regional and/or global efforts to provide support for crises in other countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of closer collaborative arrangements with partners, and formulation of effective mass media strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely monitoring and evaluation, and reporting on developments and response mechanisms.</td>
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2. In general, globally, how do you feel CO performance in relation to each accountability compares to 5 years ago, i.e. at the time of Martigny?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early warning, assessment, preparedness and response in the country</td>
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<td>Assessment of the preparedness and response capacity of partners:</td>
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<td>Liaison and coordination with other UN agencies</td>
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involved in emergency response, including OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, WHO and the inter-agency coordination mechanisms established in emergency-affected areas and in capitals
Maintaining and strengthening relations with donors at the country level, in order to share information and increase collaboration
Identification of specific areas where support is required from RO and HQ
Contribution to regional and/or global efforts to provide support for crises in other countries
Development of closer collaborative arrangements with partners, and formulation of effective mass media strategies
Timely monitoring and evaluation, and reporting on developments and response mechanisms.

3. If you are an RO respondent, how would you rate your own ROs performance in relation to the following accountabilities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Very weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<tr>
<td>Preparedness and coordination of response in the region (e.g., cross- or multi-country emergencies)</td>
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<td>Coordination or provision of training in emergency early-warning preparedness and response for country offices</td>
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<td>Integration of vulnerability analysis and preparedness into the country programming processes (including situation analyses and UNDAFs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation of regional standby arrangements and/or stockpiles of critical inputs needed for rapid deployment</td>
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<td>Identification of human resources in the region, and maintenance of a roster of available staff and consultants, for rapid deployment</td>
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<td>Identification of specific areas where support is required from HQ (including Supply Division in Copenhagen)</td>
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<td>Contribution to global efforts to provide the support required for crises in other regions</td>
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<td>Oversight, monitoring and evaluation of the programmatic response at country level.</td>
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If you are an HQ respondent, how would you rate ROs performance globally in relation to the following accountabilities?

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<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Very weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Average</th>
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<th>Very good</th>
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<tr>
<td>Preparedness and coordination of response in the region (e.g., cross- or multi-country emergencies)</td>
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<td>Contribution to global efforts to provide the support required for crises in other regions</td>
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<td>Oversight, monitoring and evaluation of the programmatic response at country level.</td>
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Comments:
4. In general, globally, how do you feel RO performance — in relation to each accountability — compares to 5 years ago, i.e. at the time of Martigny?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preparedness and coordination of response in the region (e.g., cross- or multi-country emergencies)</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination or provision of training in emergency early-warning preparedness and response for COs</td>
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<td>Integration of vulnerability analysis and preparedness into the country programming processes (including situation analyses and UNDAFs)</td>
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<td>Identification of human resources in the region, and maintenance of a roster of available staff and consultants, for rapid deployment</td>
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<td>Contribution to global efforts to provide the support required for crises in other regions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oversight, monitoring and evaluation of the programmatic response at country level.</td>
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5. How do you rate HQ performance in relation to the following accountabilities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination or provision of global training in emergency preparedness and response</th>
<th>Very weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<td>Comments:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation of global standby arrangements for critical inputs so that they are available for rapid deployment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provision of appropriate programme guidance and support, including review of programme content and clearance of the Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integration of vulnerability analysis and preparedness into global guidelines for country programming processes (including situation analyses and UNDAFs)</td>
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<td>Comments:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification of global human resources and maintenance of a roster of available staff and consultants, for rapid deployment when needed</td>
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<td>Comments:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Definition of UNICEF global policies, rules/regulations and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification of specific areas where support is required from various regions and headquarters offices</td>
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<td>Coordination of the efforts of operational support</td>
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</table>

Comments:
5. How do you rate HQ performance in relation to the following accountabilities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountabilities</th>
<th>Very weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>divisions (Division of Financial and Administrative Management, Division of Human Resources, Division of Communication, Information Technology Division, Supply Division, Office of Internal Audit) required during crisis situations in all regions</td>
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<td>Comments:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provision of liaison and coordination with other United Nations agencies involved in emergency responses, including OCHA, UNHCR, UNHCHR, WFP, WHO, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the inter-agency coordination mechanisms in NY and Geneva</td>
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<td>Comments:</td>
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6. How do you feel HQ performance in relation to each accountability compares to 5 years ago, i.e. at the time of Martigny?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
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<th>Same</th>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination or provision of global training in emergency preparedness and response</td>
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<td>Preparation of global standby arrangements for critical inputs so that they are available for rapid deployment</td>
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<td>Provision of appropriate programme guidance and support, including review of programme content and clearance of the Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<td>Integration of vulnerability analysis and preparedness into global guidelines for country programming processes (including situation analyses and UNDAFs)</td>
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<td>Identification of global human resources and maintenance of a roster of available staff and consultants, for rapid deployment when needed</td>
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<td>Identification of specific areas where support is required from various regions and HQ offices</td>
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<td>Coordination of the efforts of operational support divisions (Division of Financial and Administrative Management, Division of Human Resources, Division of Communication, Information Technology Division, Supply Division, Office of Internal Audit) required during crisis situations in all regions</td>
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<td>Provision of liaison and coordination with other United Nations agencies involved in emergency responses, including OCHA, UNHCR, UNHCHR, WFP, WHO, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the inter-agency coordination mechanisms in NY and Geneva</td>
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7. **Do you feel that there are other accountabilities that need to be strengthened to strengthen UNICEF humanitarian response capacity?**

8. **Where do you see the greatest progress in relation to the organisation’s humanitarian response capacity and the CCCs?**

9. **Where do you see the least progress in relation to the organisation’s humanitarian response capacity and the CCCs?**

10. **What effects (positive or negative) do you think that the effort to ‘mainstream’ humanitarian action has had on the organisation?**

11. **What has contributed to or limited ‘mainstreaming’ humanitarian action in the organisation?**
Children Affected by Armed Conflict, Humanitarian Response and Landmines, 1999
OPSCEN (2003) OPSCEN User Survey