EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Mozambique flood emergency was a classic example of a sudden onset disaster; UNICEF’s positive response should be considered a model. A large already poor and vulnerable population was displaced and destitute and UNICEF reacted rapidly and boldly to minimise threats, provide care and protection and establish the means for an early return to normalcy in a co-ordinated manner. Many lives were saved, the groundwork for reconstruction was laid and opportunities to stimulate development and reduce future vulnerability were initiated. UNICEF’s strategy of water/sanitation programming, hygiene education, health, immunization and nutrition response was effective, addressing three of the major immediate needs (the threat of epidemics such as cholera and infectious diseases and malnutrition), the other two needs being food and shelter. The review of the Mozambique experience was important for UNICEF to test the core commitments and principles of the Martigny response and the country office strategy and response mechanism validated this process.

LESSONS LEARNT

Key amongst the positive elements were:

* The emergency response focused on the immediate threats to the survival and wellbeing of children using an integrated planning approach.
* UNICEF supported a rapid situation analysis and prioritisation of inputs which was backed up by resources at hand.
* A consistent emphasis on capacity development and support to responsible national institutions, government and NGOs.
* The importance of good quality field assessments, monitoring and reporting tools for both programme planning and informing donors, national committees, media and other partners in UN system.
* Support for co-ordination mechanisms and provision of different modalities to provide technical assistance to government partners; in health, water and education.
* An innovative use of the private sector both for assessments and delivery of inputs such as educational materials.
* Support to local authorities through provision of communications equipment and facilitation of access to affected communities.
* The decision by the office to streamline operational procedures for management, procurement and recruitment.

Factors and areas requiring further attention include:

* An absence of contingency planning and disaster preparedness by UNICEF and the UN system as a whole.
* The need for an earlier investment within Country Programme of nutritional surveillance and vulnerability monitoring.
* The need for earlier assessment of operations needs and capacities and early involvement of national staff to help decrease workload and stress on office.
* Better management by UNICEF at the global level of information and advisory support on emergency supplies, services, technical resources, standards etc.
* Recognition that shelter is also a key threat to children’s well being and therefore a more proactive role in ensuring that it was provided for displaced populations and advocating for support to UNDP to fulfil its obligation.
There are some clear recommendations that emerge from these lessons:

1. Ensure that strong components on disaster preparedness, vulnerability monitoring and contingency planning are included within the next UNDAF and UNICEF country programme.

2. Ensure adequate planning and technical capacity to develop and oversee the implementation of the post flood recovery programme, and ensure its full integration with other UNICEF supported activities. This will entail taking a few key activities/strategies to scale such as Community Capacity Development for HIV/AIDS prevention and emergency preparedness; the integrated (multi-sectoral) approach to prevention of malaria and cholera has been well used within the programme, and should be expanded to other parts of the country. Even though the decentralisation process is taking time, UNICEF should see this as a means to support CCD and other community level support. The additional funds available to the Country Programme also mean UNICEF can explore the potential to support the development of a nutrition strategy, enhancing community surveillance and support capacity building at central and provincial level.

3. The well advanced UNDAF process in Mozambique has clearly added-value to coordination among the UN Agencies in the flood emergency, and UN coordination of the emergency worked fairly effectively for the Mozambique floods. The fielding of a Special Envoy was in particular important support for the DMT, and facilitated involvement of senior Government officials in the leadership of the relief effort. However, the relationship between the UNDAC and UN Country Team needs to be reviewed in the UN Lessons Learnt exercise. Insufficient attention appears to have been paid to the need for definition of clear roles and responsibilities (an operational plan – a CHAP) which questions the adaptation of the CAP process to natural disasters such as the Mozambican floods.

4. UNICEF Mozambique has shown its leadership in a number of different sectors, and will be expanding programmes with the more than doubling of the Country Programme brought about by funds through the CAP. Major amounts of funding will be channelled through Government for the reconstruction programme. Clearly, UNICEF should be involved at the policy level in advocating for the allocation of the reconstruction resources for children in the coming years.

5. For UNICEF globally, there remains a need to review operational support lessons learnt through the Crisis Preparedness Group on PROMs, supply issues; communications and recruitment. There is also a need to clarify where field offices access technical support - such as providing best practices/advice in water and sanitation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The team would like to thank the staff of the UNICEF Mozambique office for all their help and assistance during the course of this review at a time when they should have been starting on a well deserved rest after the pressures and hard work they had all gone through. We would particularly like to recognise the dedication, commitment and extreme professionalism that the country office possesses and to congratulate them and their counterparts on a job well done to protect and save the lives of Mozambican children.
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PART 2

IMPLICATIONS OF THE POST FLOOD RECOVERY AND COUNTRY PROGRAMME PROCESS FOR 2000/2005

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND EARLY WARNING

RECOMMENDATIONS

HEADQUARTERS

SUPPLY DIVISION
Part One:
Introduction and Rationale

1. Heavy rains from Cyclone Connie hit southern Mozambique from 4-7th February 2000 causing flooding, isolating Maputo city and damaging thousands of houses in Maputo and Gaza provinces. The rains filled dams and rivers in southern Africa causing large scale flooding of the Limpopo, Incomati and Umbeluzi rivers. Cyclone Eline hit the central Mozambique on 22 February, flooding the Save river and ultimately causing massive flooding along the Limpopo river valley. The rains continued throughout much of March.

2. The crisis resulted in the displacement of 250,000 people, with 950,000 in need of humanitarian assistance of which 190,000 were children under the age of five. Hundreds of children were separated from their families. 14,800 people were rescued by helicopter in one of the most dramatic and well-covered air rescue missions in media history.

3. UNICEF responded rapidly to the emergency, working with government and NGOs in health, nutrition, water and sanitation, education and child protection. A UN consolidated appeal was launched 23 March 2000. UNICEF requested a total of US$11.7 million and has received contributions totalling US$22.7 million, doubling the country programme budget. 57 temporary staff and consultants joined the team. The country office is therefore reviewing its overall country programme priorities and strategies in light of the additional resources and the long term implications and consequences of the flood disaster.
4. For UNICEF globally, the Mozambique floods are an opportunity to review the “Martigny Principles” and Core Corporate Commitments (that aim to integrate emergency preparedness and response into the Country programme) and their appropriateness to address a natural disaster such as in Mozambique. Additionally, it was also felt to be an opportunity to review progress in the DfID-supported emergency capacity building project. To this end, the Mozambique office requested a review whose overall objectives were to:

- Review the efficiency and effectiveness of UNICEF’s Phase I Flood Emergency Operations in Mozambique with a view to strengthen them.
- Review UNICEF’s operation plan for Phase II (April-September) for the re-establishment of social services and make recommendations for improvement.
- Suggest a possible strategic role for UNICEF in post-flood reconstruction following the Rome conference, linking the post-flood recovery strategy to the UNDAF and the UNICEF Country Programming Exercise processes.
- Set out lessons learned and clear actions for improving programme implementation and focus.
- Identify integration possibilities and areas where programmes can be taken to scale.
- Review management implications and needs for technical assistance to ensure fund utilisation and work plan implementation.
- Draw conclusions for UNICEF globally, examining the Mozambican experience as an example of the application of the “Martigny Principles”.

The review took place between June 19 and July 7. The team consisted of Dr. Angela Raven-Roberts of the Feinstein International Famine Centre, Tufts University (Boston) and Geoff Wiffin of Office of Emergency programs (New York) who were able to travel to UNICEF supported projects in Xai-Xai and Chokwe (Gaza) and conduct a series of meetings with district, provincial and national government counterparts as well as with UN, donors and NGO partners in Maputo and in the field. At the same time a series of discussions and meetings were held with UNICEF staff at all sites.

**Background and Context**

5. Mozambique is classified as one of the ten poorest countries in the world (UN Human Development Report). Characteristics of its human vulnerability profile include widespread poverty and low per capita income, high infant, child and maternal mortality, low literacy, increasing rates of HIV infection and limited access to health, education, safe water and sanitation. A series of environmental risks and hazards also make up its physical vulnerability profile, these include a history of seasonal floods, cyclones, and droughts. Colonial records and oral testimonies refer to a series of disasters affecting the region dating back to the fifteenth century. Environmental degradation, poor river system management and protection as well as the complexities of a volatile global weather system will continue to pose a threat to Mozambique and the region. The floods have highlighted the ongoing structural problems and difficulties faced by poor communities and households in Mozambique as well the weak capacity of early warning and disaster preparedness systems, especially at district and local level.

6. The United Nations system in Mozambique began the process of moving to a common framework for country programme planning (the UNDAF process) in 1997. Common priorities and programmes have been identified to support the Government’s Medium-Term Strategy targeting the overall alleviation of poverty, facilitating rapid growth to the economy, improving equity in the distribution of income and access to jobs and improving social conditions and human resource capital. Common strategies focus on capacity building, advocacy and policy dialogue, technical assistance, promotion of co-ordination and participatory planning, diversification of new partnerships and resource mobilisation.
7. UNICEF’s Country Programme (1999 to 2001) was specifically designed to support the Government of Mozambique’s own strategic priorities for women and children and to be in line with the UNDAF framework. Support is provided through five programmes: Child Rights Mobilisation and Protection; Health and Nutrition; Basic Education; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion; and Country Programme Support. A key principle of UNICEF’s programme was to build capacities of government partners at local and national level. A strategy that was to pay off as it enabled management of a sudden acceleration of programmes to deal with the flood emergency.

8. The UN system had not met to consider potential hazards and outline possible contingency plans since early 1998. The UNDP capacity building project and recent training in disaster management targeted localised seasonal emergencies such as drought and cholera outbreaks. Despite commitments to the International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) - disaster preparedness and response had ceased to be of significance for the UN system and international NGOs. Though a disaster management theme group exists within the UNDAF, it functions more as a discussion group and had no operational links to the DMT/CMT system. The DMT was not fully functional. During this period, the Government also changed its approach to disaster preparedness and mitigation.

9. Previously, the Departamento Para a Prevencao e Combate as Calamidades Naturais (DPCCN) had been the Government co-ordinator with NGOs and UN agencies dealing with emergencies. The DPCCN had a countrywide operational mandate, a staff of 3,000, warehouses and a trucking fleet. The DPCCN had over the years benefited from a series of workshops and training by UN agencies including UNICEF to develop both vulnerability analysis and appropriate responses targeting nutrition and special needs of children and women.

10. In November 1999, shortly before the onset of the rainy season, the government issued legislation replacing the DPCCN with the Instituto Nacional de Gestao de Calamidades (INGC), with a non-operational mandate of co-ordination. INGC was in the process of establishing new institutional arrangements with line government ministries when the flood emergency occurred and initially, the policies for the provision of emergency support were not clear to many organisations. The loss of institutional memory and operational and logistical capacity was a major constraint to address the emergency. Additionally, despite the stated government policy of decentralisation, capacity to plan an emergency response at provincial and district level needed support.

11. This report concurs with the UN System Working Paper on Review of Lessons Learnt, that despite warnings, both the UN system and the government were not prepared for an emergency of the magnitude of the floods in February 2000. Even though floods and cyclones were seen as being real risks they appear to have been overshadowed by a concentration on preparedness for food insecurity and drought. This review joins other recent reviews of the Mozambique emergency in calling for a more concerted effort to assist the government’s disaster preparedness strategy and a better and more institutionalised UN emergency preparedness and contingency planning system at country-level. The contribution of UNICEF to this process especially in the area of vulnerability analysis and sensitisation to protection and risk mitigation will be important and recommendations are offered later in this report.
UNICEF’s Emergency Planning and Response

Programme Objectives

12. UNICEF adopted a two-phased approach aiming to strengthen and support capacities to protect health, nutrition and the welfare of children affected by the floods. Phase one focused on search & rescue and relief - for the:
   • protection of health and prevention of disease outbreaks
   • protection of the nutritional status of children
   • identification and reunification of unaccompanied children
   supporting the earliest return to normalcy

13. Phase two focused on resettlement and re-establishment of basic services - aiming at:
   • re-establishment of basic services in health, water, sanitation and education.
   initiating actions to reduce vulnerability and utilise programming opportunities.
UNICEF Mozambique defined and agreed early on basic principles to provide a clear framework in which to work. In sum, the emergency response should reflect comparative advantages, competency, core corporate commitments; be based on national policies and standards; focus on a limited number of “doable” interventions - including defining what UNICEF will not do and facilitate/advocate with partners from a child-rights perspective to meet unmet needs. These are further elaborated in the box below.

14. Phase two focussed on resettlement and re-establishment of basic services - aiming at:
   - re-establishment of basic services in health, water, sanitation and education.
   - initiating actions to reduce vulnerability and utilise programming opportunities.
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### Emergency Principles

- Use the Country Programme to “inform” the emergency response
- Do not establish a separate program. Expand the Country Programme’s objectives and strategies to encompass the emergency response
- Priorities should be defined by sectoral co-ordination structures
- Normalising strategies such as education should commence as early as possible
- Support the capacity of duty bearers to carry out their responsibilities (at national, provincial, district levels)
- Ensure that the major strategy works to support the capacity of local government institutions and NGOs through longer term ownership and understanding of response
- Support government capacity and second technical staff with national/local authorities
- Always assess the opportunity cost of not acting.
- Target programme support towards the most affected areas of the country.
- UNICEF should play a lead role in facilitating co-operation between government and NGOs
- The emergency response must reflect comparative advantages, competencies and core corporate commitments; be based on national standards
- Programmes should be based on and follow UNICEF global emergency programme strategies
- Programmes should use existing collaborative modalities such as the global MOU between WFP and UNICEF.
- Support should be based not only on need but also on the capacity to deliver.
- Where possible, integrate long term development focus into the planning of emergency response.
- Programmes should be based on fact and have accompanying information systems.
- Programmes should not be constrained by UNICEF rules and procedures but should be adapted or made to be flexible.
Management and Team Building

15. To manage and control emergency planning and response, the Mozambique office established an Emergency Management Team (EMT) during the third week of the crisis. The EMT was specifically created to protect the continuity of priorities such as HIV/AIDS, whilst accelerating appropriate portions of the Country Programme to address the emergency and was initially composed of Section Heads that met daily; it soon expanded to include other relevant programme and operations staff. Two immediate management decisions were made:
- No separate emergency programme would be created within the programme structure to channel Consolidated Appeal funds
- To use in-hand resources to front-load capacity and launch the initial emergency response

16. Some UNICEF staff were directly affected by the floods. Early consultations between the Staff Association, JCC and the Representative ensured that UNICEF facilitated staff travel to flood areas to take care of families or property. All staff were offered 3 months salary advances. It was also agreed that the office would work throughout weekends in the first weeks of the emergency.

17. The emergency necessitated strengthened operational capacity for UNICEF and the UN system in general. The entire office was mobilised when the floods began. Many staff have emergency experience either from other emergencies or Mozambique itself. Some national officers stated that Mozambique experienced staff could have been used more extensively, but it is clear that the offices used well existing human resources prior to bringing 57 additional staff (either seconded from other offices or consultants) to support the office address the emergency. UNICEF Mozambique did strengthen the operations team by deploying two Senior Operations Officers, who facilitated updating the management plan and provided advice and support on the mainstreaming of emergency operations. A human resource-monitoring table greatly enhanced the management of staff, and of note, terms of reference (TOR) and performance evaluations appear to have been carried out rigorously by the office.

18. Twice-weekly Contract Review Committee (CRC) meetings were instituted to handle the expected increase in special service agreements and institutional contracts. However, some staff did experience some delays in finalising contracts for supplies and cash advances. Reasons for this include the lack of time for planning, lack of information (decisions taken at the EMT were not transmitted clearly to key members of the operations team) and systems such as PROMS.

19. Experience of the programme management system (PROMS) showed that it is unsuitable for emergencies such as Mozambique, with the large and multifaceted number of transactions needed. The number of steps that it takes to process payments, draw up supply lists and order supplies, allocate funds, raise travel authorisations and CRQs in PROMS was time consuming and “clerical” when managers in the office had more pressing and important matters to deal with. The restrictions on the amount of supplies to be included on one-SRQ, and the “out-of-date” information on prices of supplies was also problematic. As seen in the TRIPLEX exercise, the restriction on the use of multiple PBAs for one requisition also creates unnecessary work. In short, many staff in the office spent valuable time processing PROMS transactions when they should have been
20. The supply section, initially with no additional staffing, coped well with the increase in supply turnover. Supply Division – Copenhagen airlifted significant emergency supplies very efficiently in the first days/weeks of the crisis. The office agreed in the first weeks that the majority of supplies should be procured in South Africa or Mozambique, to cut down delivery time. Two additional staff were recruited for the Pretoria office (funded by UNICEF Mozambique), but recruitment took too long. However, some programme staff were frustrated by perceived delays in the arrival of supplies. Unrealistic target arrival dates (TAD), compounded expectations that some partners had been given. But a major impediment to good supply planning in Mozambique was that UNICEF only had two supply catalogues, which had to be shared between Maputo sections and Gaza field operations, and the catalogues were not available on the Internet/INTRANET (as stated by Supply Division – Copenhagen). Access to basic information such as supply catalogues must be addressed through the Crisis Preparedness Group.

21. Many staff said that operations could have been strengthened earlier. Relations among the operations staff and programme also became tense during March/April. Although this is not as big an issue now, the lesson from this is the need to identify a focal point “stress-buster” within the EMT to deal with this.

22. The Materiality Analysis (a risk assessment carried out by the auditors) exercise in May/June 2000 facilitated a revision of some key work processes, which have already been implemented. The office would have benefited from overlap between the auditors and the review team; and from a more in-depth risk assessment exercise. However, the supply section is being strengthened. Better supply planning has started with support of the Pretoria supply staff who helped the health section finalise its supply lists. This will be essential given the huge supply operation planned over the next few months. Cash flow planning will also have to be strengthened given the amount of funds generated during for the next eighteen months.

**Assessments**

23. Within UNICEF, it was agreed that no response should be taken until rapid assessments were complete, (thereby avoiding doing things for the sake of being seen to do something). UNICEF initially provided technical support to government for rapid and inter-sectoral joint assessments, which facilitated an effective response. UNICEF also agreed an early and clear definition of operational objectives, based on comparative advantages and priorities for children; rapid surveys showed the major threats to life of children and women as being cholera, vaccine preventable diseases, malaria and malnutrition. UNICEF worked with a number of partners to use existing information (such as WFP’s VAM), and interpret this for programmes in UNICEF supported sectors and supported updating INE’s figures to be in line with INE’s 2000 projections. As shown in the UN lessons learnt exercise, UNICEF also consolidated information from various sources on populations in camps and isolated areas which was then used by INGC and compiled detailed information on water and sanitation in each place.

24. As shown in the UN lessons learnt working paper, the UN system and NGOs did not use the UNDAC devised forms for assessment. Rather existing systems such as the WFP VAM and UNICEF vulnerability analysis were expanded. This report agrees with the lessons learnt working paper that there is a need to forge links to the various agency (donor, NGO and UN) systems currently in place.
25. UNICEF put considerable resources into strengthening a comprehensive information network based on assessments that was to serve the planning process and provide information for donors and the media. These data, the involvement of UNICEF across sectors and its close liaison with government, NGOs, the UN agencies and the military, meant that UNICEF also served as an unofficial “information hub” – and was able to influence this in favour of a focus on prioritising children and women. The media were therefore able to get solid contextual as well as programme information about Mozambique, the floods and other related issues.

26. All information collected through assessments was shared throughout the office using the computer network. UNICEF also drew on participatory communications methodologies used in the Country Programme in previous years for water/sanitation assessments – and will continue to use this for future opportunities.

**Communication and information systems and strategies**

27. The EMT meetings have been extremely well documented in action oriented notes (action plans that were monitored). The office have used the M&E officer to monitor this, write up meetings with monitoring tables to ensure actions are carried out. All information coming through the EMT is available on the LAN for all staff to access. The office should ensure the continuity of this system, as it will be very useful for later reporting and impact analysis.

28. Strong telecommunications systems were also essential. Use of satellite telephones and cell-phones that made all the difference, not least because they benefited UNICEF and partners. These were given to partners in Gaza and Maputo; and to all staff involved in the emergency. This meant UNICEF and partners could be contacted continuously. Given that UNICEF was co-ordinating different sectors to WFP, use of the MOU and joint systems would not have provided similar services. However, UNICEF did benefit from WFP’s network of VHF and HF systems.

**Donors and National Committees**

29. After the initial rescue and relief operations, donors were heavily criticised for acting too late to address the flood emergency. This led to a huge expansion of support for the emergency response, which initially overwhelmed Mozambique; Ultimately therefore, donor response to the emergency was strong. UNICEF benefited from this – although a significant amount of UNICEF’s bilateral support was actually received or agreed in-principle, before the media outcry over a delayed international response.

30. The major donors actively participated emergency programme co-ordination meetings of NGOs and agencies facilitated by UNICEF early in the emergency, and continued to participate in the water and health sectoral meetings. Strong information meant that donors would regularly contact UNICEF for the latest situation. Donor support to UNICEF was strong because it carried-out the role it had outlined, specifically to accelerate its Country Programme – where UNICEF had comparative advantages. DFID for example, saw UNICEF’s programme as being successful because “UNICEF was delivering a development framework through an emergency window”.

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31. Of the US$ 22.7 million in funds received by UNICEF to date, 43% has been through bilateral donors, and the rest through contributions from the public through National Committees (Natcoms).

32. High visibility was particularly important to National Committees for UNICEF (Natcoms) in support of fund raising and public information campaigns. UNICEF Mozambique prioritised “servicing” Natcoms through regular written updates, feature stories and pictures using Email and telephones. Timely information dissemination also enabled Natcoms to do their own interviews on what UNICEF was doing in Mozambique. Later in the emergency, the visits of UNICEF personalities such as Helmut Lotti (Belgian Natcoms Goodwill Ambassador), Lord Richard Attenbourough and, in mid-May, Robbie Williams (UK Natcoms Special Representative) also provided impetus to the Natcoms work and ensuring that Mozambique remained in the public eye in donor capitals.

**Media and Information**

33. UNICEF Mozambique devised a strategy of:

- maintaining low visibility until UNICEF’s on-the-ground programme response was in place – thereby avoiding local criticism
- using existing in-country communication and information competencies in office to ensure high quality and reliable data and information systems
- ensuring a seamless linkage between programme response and media – the main spokesperson to be seen as a programme staff (emergency co-ordinator)
- providing regular updates to UNICEF Geneva DOC and National Committees
- giving Natcoms what they want: direct access to information, telephone contact with communication staff; feature stories, pictures
- ensuring good use of digital photography for immediate use by DOC and, in particular Natcoms.

34. UNICEF Mozambique made good use of the Communication Officer who had experience of emergencies and who led a large cross-sectoral programme section. The EMT decided that the Communication Officer would have responsibility to provide substantive backup to the Representative/SPO including reporting requirements and to serve as liaison with UN agencies and the INGC. This re-enforced the role of being the principal contact for media and all public information.

35. A stated above, a key feature of the work with the media was not just focussing on the floods themselves but on linking this to the situation of children and women in Mozambique in general and its own on-going development vulnerabilities. UNICEF therefore had an advantage in relation to media relations, which was reflected in the large coverage received. For the media it meant that there was an accessible spokesperson speaking substantively on a full range of programme issues, and providing the context and situation of Mozambique. In addition many trips were made to the field to strategic locations where media were focussing (and hence, “interview opportunities were coincidental”). The mobile phone system in
Mozambique enabled the Communication Officer to be available nearly 24 hours a day for interviews - 90 percent of telephone interviews were conducted on the mobile phone line.

**Government Co-ordination**

36. Co-ordination took some time to be created. The second UNDAC mission supported the government to set up a co-ordination centre in the INGC whose aim was to ensure co-ordination between the government, the UN system, international organisations and NGOs. Six co-ordination desks were set up in INGC, with UNDAC support to facilitate this.

37. For UNICEF, however, a priority agreed with government was to support both national and provincial level co-ordination structures to address the flood needs of children and women, and all programme partnerships were defined within this framework. At provincial level in Gaza, UNICEF is supporting the provincial delegations of health, water and education through seconding technical staff for six months. Thereby ensuring responsibility remained firmly under the government structures. Support was provided through NGOs in other flood affected provinces and in Maputo, technical support was given for assessments to provincial authorities. Additional capacity was required at provincial level to ensure that Provincial governors and district staff could communicate. UNICEF provided communication equipment and facilitated access of provincial staff to air assets so they could visit flood affected areas. This was important to ensure coherent and effective planning and to ensure government took and were seen by the affected communities as being involved in relief operations.

38. The lack of operational capacity in central government proved to be an initial impediment, but allowed provincial level line authorities to focus on re-establishing health, water and educational systems. However, it is understood from other lessons learnt exercise that for food and shelter one of the greatest weaknesses was loss of warehousing and government operational capacity.

39. The co-ordination structures ensured that national policies should be adhered to in all sectors. At the same time efforts to introduce and use operational standards such as the Sphere standards in health, water and nutrition were introduced during these meetings.

**UN Co-ordination and the Consolidated Appeal Process**

40. The UN was largely unprepared for the emergency. WFP had in-country stocks and was able to divert and distribute these the day after the floods. UNICEF began the first assessment the same day, and began programmes after it had completed the rapid assessment exercise that aimed at identifying the main risks to children and women. NGOs accelerated programmes rapidly during the first few days. The UN tried initially to use the existing DMT chaired by the Resident Co-ordinator, but it soon became clear that higher level support was needed. The arrival of the UN Special Envoy proved essential to gain access to senior government officials, and to provide the leadership required.

41. Four UNDAC missions were launched, the second of which resulted in the establishment of sectoral co-ordination groups. UNDAC’s support to INGC was also useful, particularly with respect to capacity building. This facilitated strong sectoral co-ordination. Generally there were positive work relations among the small number of UN staff, and good co-operation and
co-ordination with NGOs. UNDP support to the government in preparation for the Rome meeting was well planned and proved to be successful. Inter-Agency relations worked relatively well. The fact there were four UNDAC missions is instructive, however. There is a feeling that UNDAC could have provided more appropriate support to the UN country team at critical times. For example, TORs and priority tasks were not agreed by UNDAC with the UN country team. UNDAC and the Country Team did not provide early warning of the second flood and, in future, early warning must be a basic function of all UNDAC teams. As has been shown in the recent TRIPLEX simulation undertaken in Sweden earlier this year, UNDAC teams tend to focus on assessing infrastructure and logistics rather than considering humanitarian needs.

42. When an operational plan is needed, as was the case in Mozambique, the system of “flying in” temporary teams to provide co-ordination (with their set agendas to produce an appeal) certainly needs to be addressed in a wider inter-agency fora. This issue will be taken up through the IASC sub-working group on CAP.

43. There was also some initial confusion and misunderstanding related to the CAP, both in terms of a fund raising strategy and as a planning mechanism. The CAP should be first and foremost, a planning process bringing agencies together to plan an operational framework of response, reviewing the nature of the crisis, establishing objectives and strategies; identifying resources, gaps and developing a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) out of which a financial requirement is then presented. WFP and UNICEF both felt it would have been more important to develop an operational plan within the overall framework of the CAP. When the CAP was launched, it would have benefited greatly if it had included an operational plan (CHAP), a detailed situation analysis outlining the nature and characteristics of the crisis and a prioritised and phased strategy of needs and responses. For example instead of gender issues being mainstreamed into all programme priorities it was added as a sector item on its own with responsibility to UNFPA. There was no analysis of the real risks to the civilian population (cholera, epidemics, infectious diseases and malnutrition), and therefore no prioritisation of assistance. As stated in the UN lessons learnt working paper, “an operational plan would have removed some of the uncertainty that later arose over agency mandates and roles”.

44. What was developed in Mozambique was, instead, a resource mobilisation request. The first appeal document was turned down by the government due to the misunderstanding of its purpose and function. Some of the difficulties encountered by the lack of operational planning were in the co-ordination of logistics. For example, JLOC became a ‘cattle market’ for negotiating access on a bilateral and personal basis. No division of responsibility was defined between the prioritisation function and the tasking of assets within JLOC. This resulted in much of the prioritisation focussing on food and, for example, shelter was inadequately addressed. UNDP had to reluctantly “accept” responsibility (both WFP and UNICEF had no additional capacity) but gaps remained in this key area.

45. On 10 February, the government launched appeal for $ 2.7 million. In response to this, UNICEF requested US$ 1,354,600 on 11 February and WFP appealed for US$ 4.2 million on 17 February 2000. On 23 Feb a UN CAP was launched for $ 13,631,885. When the updated CAP was launched on 23 March, UNICEF had already received 83% of funding of its request in that CAP. Neither WFP nor UNICEF could await the OCHA mission and utilised appropriate rapid fundraising mechanisms standard to each agency to initiate emergency action. There has been some criticism of these decisions that are based on a lack of understanding of the appropriate internal fundraising avenues available to WFP and UNICEF.
It is important to note that the actions of both WFP and UNICEF in responding to the appeal by the government were proper and alerted donors early to some of the very initial needs (and most importantly established a mechanism through which funds to address the flood emergency could be channelled).

46. When the floods began, UNICEF used re-programmed Regular Resources and Emergency Programme Funds to initiate emergency operations. This enabled supplies to be airlifted through Supply Division within the first week. WFP likewise used its Immediate Response Account (IRA). This facilitated a strong UN response, enabling needs assessments and covering initial needs.

Support from RO/HQ

47. There is a mixed feeling within the office about the extent of support received from the Regional and HQ offices. The Regional Emergency Adviser supported the preparation for the UN wide lessons learnt exercise. Additionally, ESARO facilitated identification and deployment of staff within the region. NYHQ was also able to facilitate the deployment of key staff from other offices on a short-term basis. However, both RO/HQ were unable to provide sufficient technical advice to the office, on issues such as water. One recommendation is that when an emergency breaks-out, the Regional Office and NYHQ technical sectors/clusters should link up with UNICEF project officers to discuss priorities and any support requirements. Additionally, a checklist of support requirements will be updated by EMOPs to include this important aspect. On balance, the inter-divisional conference calls were seen as being useful and facilitating support.

48. Despite relatively good human resource support for UNICEF Mozambique from other offices, this was seen to result from good networking rather than systematic rosters and information on available staff within UNICEF.

49. It was also felt that other resources and information on emergency response (such as the UNICEF emergency handbook) would have been useful, had they been available locally. It would be useful for EMOPs to assemble this type of information together with lists of other related emergency materials such as the SPHERE standards, and links to web-sites such as Nutrition Works, CDC Atlanta, UNHCR and other organisations that have emergency resources available.

Martigny and the Core Corporate Commitments (CCC)

50. In addressing the emergency as they did the UNICEF Mozambique office operationalised the core corporate commitments of UNICEF emergency programming which are built on a recognition of the main impact and consequences of emergencies on communities. They were not used for the planning of the Mozambique emergency per se but were later referred to as a check list against which to measure the response. The CCCs fall into four main areas:

a. Rapid Assessment
b. Coordination
c. Programme Commitments
d. Operational Commitments
51. Rapid assessment and coordination activities were carried out exceptionally well by the UNICEF Mozambique office, and the approach was absolutely appropriate to the situation and needs on the ground. Of the programme commitments, the Mozambique plan of action included all of the minimum activities required; which also reflected priorities within the Country Programme. Again, even though the office was not fully cognizant of the CCCs, they were able to meet the commitment.

52. CCC implementation entails accountability for preparedness at all levels of the organisation; assigning responsibilities to the Country Office, Regional Office and HQ.

53. Reviewed against responsibilities, the Country Office has: assessed and responded in the country; liaised and co-ordinated with other UN Agencies, and OCHA; strengthened relations and shared information with donors; identified specific support requirements from RO/HQ; contributed to regional and global efforts to provide support for crisis in other countries; developed collaboration with partners and formulated effective mass media strategies; provided timely M&E and reporting. The Country Office and sister UN Agencies in Mozambique, will be doing more on early warning and preparedness.

54. Reviewed against responsibilities, the Regional Office has: contributed to global efforts to provide support for crisis; identified human resources for rapid deployment. However, the RO has not: facilitated through standby agreements critical inputs; identified specific areas where support is required from HQ, including Supply Division; provided oversight of programmatic response; did not support preparedness and co-ordinate response; integrate vulnerability analysis and preparedness into CP processes; and co-ordinate provision of training in early warning preparedness and response.

55. Reviewed against responsibilities, the Headquarters has: prepared global standby agreement of critical inputs; provided some guidance on the content of the CAP; provided some support with human resources; identified specific areas where support is required; co-ordinated efforts of operational support divisions; liaised with other UN agencies; provided some advice/guidance and assurance of capacities in CO for effective UN co-ordination. Headquarters did not support preparedness and provision of training in preparedness and response, did not provide programme guidance in a consistent manner and did not integrate vulnerability analysis and preparedness into the CP processes. Once crisis had broken, HQ provided insufficient support to CO/RO in analysis of early warning of potential or impending crisis.

56. The CCCs have not been adequately disseminated to the field. Apart from representatives few field staff have seen them or are fully cognisant of the processes and debates that have led up to them. As they are currently presented, the emphasis is weighted towards the facilitation role of UNICEF in Humanitarian crises and there is no component aimed at helping ALL UNICEF staff to understand the major causes and consequences of risk and mortality in natural as well as complex political crises situations and the existence of basic programmatic interventions to be able to address these.

57. There is also insufficient dissemination to the field on the basics of emergency programme management. Whereas security and communications are identified as priority issues, the accompanying process of learning about operational and logistics procedures as management issues are missing. The processes themselves for operationally and logistically supporting
Martigny and the Core Corporate Commitments through the Crisis Preparedness Group need to be better disseminated to the field.

58. There is no single source/resource area where country offices can access and link into information networks providing technical data on health, nutrition, water sanitation and other programme and operational information relating to UNICEF or other agencies such as Oxfam, UNHCR etc.

**Highlights of the Emergency Programme of Government and NGOs with UNICEF**

**Control of Communicable Diseases**

- Measles and cholera epidemics or large outbreaks were avoided (37,000 children under 5’s were protected)
- Other vaccine-preventable diseases were controlled: more than 60,000 were vaccinated against meningitis (including adults)
- Malaria epidemics were prevented through spraying of tents, buildings, schools and other structures as well as blankets and provision of nets. Improved case treatment was effected through provision of drug supplies, health worker training and change of first line treatment. At the same time opportunities were used to promote education on malaria prevention, treatment and referral. In all over 100,000 people were protected against malaria by spraying in the IDP settlements.

No new cholera outbreaks were recorded in the IDP settlements. Cholera treatment centres were established in all the settlements as well as ensuring safe water and sanitation facilities. A hygiene education campaign was promoted throughout the camps and settlements. 40,000 hygiene kits were distributed, 23,000 people were involved in hygiene promotion mobilisation using printed materials, radio programmes, and local drama groups. In addition a fast and effective clean up of the major towns was implemented through donations of tractors, garbage containers and other tools to the municipality authorities. UNICEF previous experience of community based participatory techniques in both evaluating water programmes and mobilising support to planning were found to be effective in the emergency response as well.
Control of Malnutrition

The nutrition status of children was protected through the provision of supplementary feeding for under 5’s and pregnant and lactating women, through the establishment of therapeutic feeding centres and setting up of nutrition surveillance programmes. Community mobilisation on nutrition issues and training of community health activists was well co-ordinated into the emergency response system. The impact was tracked through comparisons to pre flood levels. The operational implementation of this programme was done through the existing MOU between WFP and UNICEF, and agreements with NGOs.
Other child protection activities were implemented through the reunification of separated children. 500 children were re-unified with their families making up 90% of those who had become separated, the rest were put under the care of responsible families and organisations as the process continues to locate their families.

A land mine education programme was undertaken in the camps and settlements both to remind people of the dangers of mines and to make them aware of the possibilities that the flood waters could have displaced and moved mines from known mined areas. Children’s’ access to education was protected by establishing 55 tented schools in the displaced settlements, cleaning and repairing damaged schools, providing equipment and supplies for 630 schools and 3,200 teachers and new learning materials for 210,000 pupils. In addition a mobilisation campaign with the assistance of Mrs, Graca Machel was launched to “Get Children Back to School” and to advocate for the benefits of schooling in general. Reports from the field (Gaza, Inhambane, Manica & Sofala) have since suggested that more children are in school in the affected areas than before the floods.
Lessons Learned

- Emergency response was focused on the immediate threats to survival and well-being of children and actions to help the most rapid return to normalcy (education). This choice of priorities was based on a good and rapid situation analysis and priorities once chosen were supported with resources.
- Timely and bold response made possible because these were based on strengths of the Country Programme, building on comparative advantages, competencies and capacities of UNICEF.
- Consistent emphasis on capacity development and support for responsible national institutions - government and non-governmental. Various strategies developed to strengthen capacities and support for co-ordination: different modalities used to support the water and sanitation sector from that for health; technical assistance (again different modalities developed based on requirements: the need to have a team in Gaza; technical assistance to the MoH, support for GTZ Sofala, private sector assessments in education; logistics and facilitation (access to helicopters, communications, vehicles, office equipment; support for local authorities running costs. Emphasis was to identify capacity constraints of government and others and address these, rather than substituting or assuming government's role – seconding staff to government rather than setting up duplicative field offices.
- Demonstrated effective partnerships with Government, NGOs (national and international) and private sector (e.g. logistics and supply). Strategy was to mobilise appropriate resources across all partnerships against common objectives.
- Importance of good quality field assessments and monitoring, situation analysis and use of basic data, and good information and reporting tools for informing, monitoring and reporting on situation and actions taken; recognition that strong communication system an essential component of the management of emergency by the office.
- Importance of effective liaison with government, partners and media in ensuring both consistency with external partners, and internally within UNICEF by having a consistent overall view.
- Decision by the office to streamline some operational procedures for procurement, recruitment and management.
- The absence of emergency preparedness and disaster mitigation plans within UNICEF and the UN and, resulted in initial delays in mobilising an adequate response.
- Early rapid assessments and ongoing vulnerability monitoring would have been greatly facilitated had UNICEF invested more, within the Country Programme in strengthening nutrition surveillance and vulnerability monitoring systems and capabilities.
An earlier assessment of operations needs and capacities, and perhaps stronger earlier involvement of national operations staff, could have resulted in even more timely delivery of essential supplies and services and contributed to a reduction of work and stress levels within the office.

UNICEF’s marshalling and management of information and advisory support at the global level - on emergency supplies, services, technical resources etc. was found to be weak/deficient. Precious time could have been saved, earlier decisions made and actions taken if information through the Intranet, advice on useful websites, manuals and guides were made more available and if technical advice at headquarters and regional levels was provided.

Recognising that exposure poses a significant threat to displaced and vulnerable children, UNICEF could have played a more active role in ensuring shelter was provided for displaced populations (although not necessarily, taking on the responsibility for co-ordination and resource mobilisation). Perhaps a stronger role could have been played exposing the problem, and advocating that support be provided to UNDP to fulfil its obligation.

Enhancing and empowering government and key line ministries to do their work effectively Placing staff in Ministries and not setting up separate offices, at the same time focusing on the provincial and district levels of government ministries should serve as a model for other UNICEF offices. The importance of enabling government counterparts to be “seen to be doing” their job - which is a great morale booster to the affected populations but strengthens overall contact between state and populace in arenas which are often dominated by foreigners and foreign aid giving agencies

The major management lesson is the importance of leadership and experience within the country office which had three senior international staff with emergency experience and several national staff who had attended several regional emergency management workshops. There was also an appreciation within the office of working for children in vulnerable and volatile environments. Those staff who lacked emergency experience were able to rapidly identify appropriate resources for help and assistance.

The floods provided a context in which NGOs and the civil sector came together to work for the good of the community, Mozambican NGOs and community organisations at village and provincial and urban areas were active in the rescue and relief and in the resettlement process. There are opportunities to further enhance these relationships and twin government and civil society in various advocacy and mobilisation campaigns and initiatives, particularly involving child-related activities and goals in future.

Emergency situations that provide a ‘sitting audience’ of beneficiaries - provided opportunities that were taken to conduct health, education and other promotional activities relating to the well-being and development of children.
There were a number of innovative actions taken by the UNICEF Maputo office that could be used by other offices in emergency situations. The office initially decided that some UNICEF procedures would have to be fast-tracked to ensure emergency assistance was delivered in a timely and appropriate manner. The office notified NYHQ of this, and agreed they would ensure these were appropriately documented. These included:

- Providing cell-phones to key partners and UNICEF staff also streamlined communications. It meant that UNICEF staff was available 24 hours a day and undoubtedly contributed to fund raising and a strong profile for UNICEF.
- Strong communications/information systems are an essential component of any emergency response. UNICEF Maputo recognised this early, created a secretariat to ensure information was disseminated. The water team also used the Internet to download global water standards (the Sphere standards) used with all partners. By contrast, UNICEF’s Supply Catalogue was not available on the Internet. UNICEF must make more use of the Internet as a means of disseminating key materials to all staff.
- The office decided that where possible and ensuring value for money, supplies should be procured as close to the beneficiaries as possible - thereby cutting down on transport costs and delays. UNICEF Maputo has therefore relied heavily on procurement through the Pretoria supply office, and locally in Mozambique. (WFP also did this). UNICEF Mozambique has also expanded procurement through NGO partners, on a case by case basis verifying value for money. UNICEF has therefore been largely successful in delivering emergency assistance in a timely manner.
- UNICEF has sub-contracted two commercial companies to (a) manage supplies and warehousing, and (b) distribute to beneficiaries. This system again appears to have contributed immensely to the overall success in getting supply inputs to locations when required.
- The office had to recruit a number of local consultants quickly. With a limited pool of suitably qualified staff, and competition among agencies and NGOs for additional staff, UNICEF had to take rapid decisions to recruit and deploy consultants. This meant that single-sourcing of consultants had to be used to ensure the best consultants were recruited in a timely manner (this was done by a number of other agencies).
- The decision to second staff to local authorities led to local authorities retaining responsibility but also operationally for UNICEF it also meant that costly, difficult to manage, and ultimately non-sustainable Sub-Offices were not created.
- The emergency necessitated a large increase in travel to flood affected areas. At times, travel could not be planned, when for example partners suggested visiting floods areas the following day. To manage this - monthly Travel Authorisations were issued
- The overtime limit of 40 hours per month was also dropped to meet the increased workload during the time of the emergency.
Part Two:

A consideration of the impact of the floods and their implications for the new country programme must first begin with a review of Mozambique’s development process since the end of the war. Mozambique is generally held up as an example of post-conflict success. Progress in the macro-economy and certain levels of political and governance issues bear this out. However, the “loud emergency” of the war largely overshadowed the “silent emergency” arising from poverty for many Mozambicans, especially women and children. This was further exacerbated by economic reforms and social changes made during the recovery period. The implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic as the greatest threat to child survival and to Mozambique’s development in general has to be at the forefront of all policy and planning priorities. An essential part of the planning process will depend on the availability of context specific and nuanced studies of community and household vulnerability with specific data on gender and life cycle implications. The issue to consider now is what new factors/ vulnerabilities have been exposed and what new opportunities for partnerships and programme coverage has the flood experience provided, and what operational capacities does the office have to sustain and support a major expanded programme and increase in funds. A transition and exit-strategy will be needed to pass from the emergency programme and dovetail back into the normal programming. However, there are areas which have been out of reach or cut off and where nutritional and health status could still be under threat. Additionally, there is a need to ensure that outstanding emergency needs and deliveries are met.

The issue of equity of geographic coverage is important to consider. There is a perception that the UNICEF office made a deliberate choice to confine its emergency coverage to certain areas and there has been some criticism of this. The fact that UNICEF supported activities in Sofala and other flood affected provinces perhaps did not come through clearly enough needs to be addressed. In the second phase of the recovery and planning, it would be a good time to consider a wider complementary targeting of other flood and non-flood affected areas.

The office has begun a planning exercise that will expand to scale the limited number of interventions UNICEF has prioritised within the CP. Constraints will include the local counterpart absorption capacity. A major focus will therefore be capacity building both in terms of providing training, but also basic needs of equipment for local counterpart structures. It will also require further expansion of partnerships with governmental structures at provincial and district level, and non-governmental partnerships, particularly national organisations.

The more than doubling of financial resources available to the Country Programmes as a result of the CAP will provide a tremendous jumpstart for the next Country Programming exercise and could mean total funds available until the end of the CP cycle could be as high as US$ 56 million. Implementation rates of the CP 2000 are relatively high for the first six-months of the year at 43% (53% for emergency funds).

The mid-year programme review revealed that the levels of programme implementation were relatively good and that the emergency provided a number of opportunities for the further enhancement and expansion of outreach. The opportunities for integration of ongoing CCD strategies with the emergency are immense. For example to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Opportunities exist to integrate into all sector activities, strategies that address this pandemic,
especially to develop community capacities to monitor at village level the situation of children in order to follow and respond to the impact of the pandemic. A further example would be to link up nutrition strategies to enhance HIV/AIDS affected communities. Following on from this, as part of a wide geographical coverage, this kind of integrated programme approach (i.e. the CCD) should be expanded to the HIV/AIDS vulnerable areas such as the Beira corridor and other locations of high prevalence.

**Emergency Preparedness and Early Warning**

The UN system is in process of reviewing where best to target inputs and capacity building to the Government of Mozambique. For UNICEF there are three areas to consider:

- What needs to be integrate within its own programmatic structure and staff development
- Where it could play a part in contributing towards both the UN systems own ability and that of the Government of Mozambique
- In line with its focus on capacity development at provincial and district level, is there a role that UNICEF could play here?

Disaster Preparedness and Vulnerability Mapping are implicit processes and outcomes of the new UNICEF Human Rights Approach (HRAP) to Community Capacity Development (CCD). The identification and relationships between risks, vulnerabilities and their major causes are critical to analysing a country situation. Addressing the claims and rights and needs of children has to be matched by the identification of the capacities of household, community, national and international institutions ‘duty-bearers’ to respond to these claims.

The actions and strategies of the Mozambique country team in responding to this emergency serves as a good role model for further developing this framework of analysis and introducing it as a planning mechanism to work with partner agencies especially at district and provincial levels. It can also serve as a framework that can be integrated within the UNDAF system as a way of identifying areas that the UN system can target for capacity development.

UNICEF Mozambique has in the past provided training to the former DPCCN and NGOs in disaster preparedness, vulnerability mapping and risk management. A major gap appears to be in the area of Public Nutrition and vulnerability analysis based on child related indicators. This is a possible area for UNICEF to consider expansion through public advocacy and support to the government to help develop a comprehensive nutrition strategy and to provide the necessary capacity at ministry level to implement such a strategy.

**Recommendations**

Building on some of the opportunities outlined in the mid year review these are some recommendations for the country office to help support their programme over the next few months:

1. Personnel should be identified to assist the country office over the next three-six months to ensure the emergency programme meets its commitments, links to the transition phase and the CPE.
2. Secure technical support for CPE
3. Recruit a national officer in the M&E unit to act as focal point for emergency preparedness, ensure link between all sectors in issues related to vulnerability mapping, mitigation;
4. Ensure that CCD strategy incorporates emergency preparedness.
5. Train in contingency planning and emergency preparedness for all sector International and National officers to ensure permanent core of “historical memory” in office.
6. Above mentioned officer should also help develop in conjunction with ESARO and EMOPS, strategy paper on vulnerability and risk assessment as part of the UNICEF contribution to the UNDAF capacity development of the National Disaster Preparedness Strategy.
7. Strengthen monitoring, reporting and impact analysis of emergency programme inputs through continuation of emergency information system.
8. Develop case studies for the water section (in collaboration with NGOs) on the applicability of using SPHERE standards in emergency of this kind.
9. Develop opportunities for management & planning training for provincial partners intersectorally - especially in HRAP and CCD methodologies. Strengthen inter-sectoral planning and assessments through joint work e.g. OPS people to travel to field together with program at least once during emergency and more during follow-up phase to help plan future program together and work out rate of requisitions etc. This not only helps them build stakes in program they would also be of use to identify information of resources, etc., at local level.
10. Gender is currently implicit in all programmes, but needs to be highlighted more especially in reporting, monitoring and impact analysis. Again using links with local universities undertake community based studies and cases on issues such as girl enrolment in schools.
11. Explore potential for UNICEF to support the development of a Nutrition Strategy for Mozambique. Help enhance Ministry of Health Nutrition capacities to introduce Public Nutrition methodologies and strategies, enhance community surveillance capacities; identify local University or training establishment that can be capacitated to develop curricula in Public Nutrition and train local nutritionists.
12. UNICEF should monitor progress being made to address shelter in the resettlement areas, (perhaps existing water/sanitation or health/education teams in the provinces can report on this) and advocate with appropriate authorities and UN to ensure gaps are addressed.

**Headquarters**

13. Ensure a new Representative is appointed rapidly to ensure smooth transition
14. (New York.) Disseminate CCC to all offices.
15. (New York/ESARO) Ensure country offices develop Contingency Plans.
16. (New York) through IASC - encourage UN country teams that have not done so to do joint Contingency Planning exercise. (See recent example of exercise in NEPAL as model).
17. (New York) Make more use of the EMOPs web page and include lists of resources and other web links on emergency information, Codes of Conduct technical data from UNICEF and other agencies. (Opscen). Disseminate to all emergency prone offices.
18. (New York) to raise discussion on issue of Shelter at IASC level in order to clarify future roles and responsibilities of agencies in different emergency scenarios and enable IASC to issue guidelines to agencies on this sector.
19. (New York) to explore with OCHA ways of enhancing dissemination of guidelines on CAP/CHAP processes, getting clarity on role and TOR of UNDAC support to country offices and improving inter-agency planning and prioritisation in emergencies. Work with IASC to address more coherently the vulnerability analysis, situation analysis and assessment aspect of planning to ensure priority needs of the most vulnerable are recognised and being addressed.
20. (New York) to organise discussion meetings with WFP and FAO to further clarify roles on nutrition and household food security issues and to help strengthen existing MOUs -
especially to mainstream children's/gender issues into all agency responses. Explore joint training on assessment/distribution methodologies.

21. New York (EMOPS) to review and analyse recommendations of recent reviews of Triplex Exercise; Hurricane Mitch; Crisis Preparedness Group and others for on-going programme, operational and co-ordination implications.

22. The UN system in general to consider as to why it was so difficult to get access to the many global and regional early warning systems and why there was no co-ordinated attempt to channel this kind of information for use in country.

**Supply Division**

23. Supply Division/Copenhagen to review the information it has on the availability of Rapid Response stocks and ensure it is available to all UNICEF offices through the Internet/Intranet.

24. List external normal agencies where usual UNICEF stocks are kept so they can stockpile emergency stocks directly and perhaps list them on web site.