EVALUATION OF DFID-UNICEF PROGRAMME OF COOPERATION:
Investing in Humanitarian Action
Phase III, 2006–2009
EVALUATION OF DFID-UNICEF PROGRAMME OF COOPERATION:

Investing in Humanitarian Action

Phase III (2006–2009)
United Nations Children’s Fund
Three United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA

February 2010

The independent evaluation of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation was undertaken to provide direction to further UNICEF efforts to strengthen its humanitarian response and preparedness capacity.

The evaluation was carried out by a team of consultants from Results Matter and included Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Team Leader, Lewis Sida and Moira Reddick. Krishna Belbase, Senior Evaluation Officer in the Evaluation Office at UNICEF New York Headquarters, managed the evaluation with the support of Suzanne Lee, and with the involvement of the Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Colombia, Ethiopia and Sudan Country Offices.

An inter-divisional reference group was engaged to provide overall direction to the evaluation.

The purpose of the report is to facilitate the exchange of knowledge among UNICEF personnel and with its partners. The content of this report does not necessarily reflect UNICEF’s official position, policies or views.

The designations in this publication do not imply an opinion on the legal status of any country or territory, or of its authorities, or the delimitation of frontiers.

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PREFACE

The scale of humanitarian action has increased steadily over the last twenty years. The frequency of humanitarian crises and their chronic nature have tested the response capacity of UNICEF and its partners to meet the needs of children, women and the population at-large. Given UNICEF’s mandate and Core Commitments to Children in Emergencies, its humanitarian efforts are focused largely in the areas of child protection, education, health, nutrition and water and sanitation.

In response to the Martigny consultations of 1998, which put forth recommendations to improve UNICEF’s emergency responsiveness to children in crisis, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) supported a Programme of Cooperation with UNICEF aimed at strengthening the organization’s global capacity for humanitarian preparedness and response. This Programme (lasting from 2000–2009) has consisted of three phases: Phase I (2000–2002): humanitarian preparedness and response, children and armed conflict and mine action; Phase II (2002–2005) provided a coherent capacity-building strategy and addressed issues of sustainability; and Phase III (2006–2009) was intended to strengthen investments in improved humanitarian preparedness and response, building on progress made in Phases I and II.

In 2006, Valid International was commissioned to undertake an evaluation of the first two phases, resulting in findings that informed Phase III. In 2009, UNICEF’s Evaluation Office commissioned this present independent evaluation in collaboration with UNICEF’s Office of Emergency Programmes for the purpose of assessing the results and outcomes of the Programme of Cooperation from 2006–2009 (Phase III). The evaluation was conducted by a team of three consultants and has benefited from the guidance and support of an inter-divisional Reference Group established at its onset.

It is our hope that the findings and recommendations from this independent evaluation will positively inform UNICEF’s future capacity-building efforts and strengthen its humanitarian preparedness and response.

Finbar O'Brien
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Evaluation Office
UNICEF New York Headquarters
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Dozens of people have played an important role in assisting during the research and field work for this evaluation. The list is too long to name everybody, but the evaluation team would be remiss in terms of giving credit where it is due if we did not mention the following people in particular: Tom White of UNICEF Addis Ababa, Zulfikur Ali Khan of the Bangladesh Country Office, Raquel Perczek of Colombia, Juan Camilo Kuan Medina of Central African Republic and Nawshad Ahmed of the Sudan Country Office for organizing all the logistics for the evaluation team and for arranging all the meetings during the country visits.

Our sincere thanks are also due to all the staff at UNICEF as well as others who gave their valuable time to speak to us during the field work and research, which were carried out between June and August 2009. The assessment team would like to acknowledge the huge efforts on the part of the UNICEF Evaluation Office (EO) staff in organizing the entire exercise, which enabled the evaluation team to carry out our work. A very special thank you to Krishna Belbase, Senior Evaluation Officer, for his guidance during the evaluation; and to Suzanne Lee and Keiko Yamamoto who organized our schedules and made all travel arrangements.

Finally, the team is very grateful to all the external interlocutors we spoke to during the course of this evaluation and to community members for the time and effort they put into expressing their views and giving us the opportunity to listen.

It is sincerely hoped that this evaluation will contribute to UNICEF strengthening its humanitarian capacity.
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<tr>
<td>APSSC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Shared Service Centre</td>
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<td>CAAC</td>
<td>Children Affected by Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Cluster Coordination</td>
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<td>CEE/CIS</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe / Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>Child Protection Working Group</td>
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<td>Division of Finance and Administrative Management</td>
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<td>Department for International Development, United Kingdom</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>EAPRO</td>
<td>East Asia and Pacific Regional Office</td>
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<td>Office of Emergency Programmes</td>
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<td>EPRP</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan</td>
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<td>ESARO</td>
<td>East and Southern Africa Regional Office</td>
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<td>Human Rights-based Approach to Programming</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-agency Network on Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>McRAM</td>
<td>Multi-cluster Rapid Assessment</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MRM</td>
<td>Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism</td>
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<td>Medium Term Strategic Plan</td>
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<td>OR</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Programme Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>West and Central Africa Regional Office</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has supported UNICEF through the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation to strengthen UNICEF’s capacity for humanitarian response and preparedness since the year 2000. This is the second and final evaluation of the Programme, which has been implemented in three main phases: Phases I and II covered the period 2000–2005, while Phase III ran from July 2006 to the end of 2009. The first evaluation, assessed Phase I and Phase II of the Programme of Cooperation, and was carried out at the end of Phase II in 2006.

This independent evaluation was commissioned by UNICEF’s Evaluation Office to assess the implementation of Phase III of the Programme of Cooperation. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess progress against the aims and results outlined in the Phase III Global Proposal of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation and to provide direction for further UNICEF efforts to strengthen its humanitarian preparedness, response capacity and role in the inter-agency humanitarian reform process. The evaluation was undertaken by two independent consultants, with support provided by a third consultant for a limited period of time.

Key evaluation questions and methodology

The evaluation was based on standard methodology, which involved key informant interviews, semi-structured group discussions, field observations through visits to five countries, distance surveys, secondary research and data analyses. The field work for this evaluation was carried out during June–August 2009.

The broad questions examined during the evaluation were derived from UNICEF’s overarching framework for its capacity-building programme that formed the basis of the Phase III proposal and subsequent agreement between DFID and UNICEF. These questions were as follows.

1. Did the capacity-building project strengthen knowledge and capacity to fulfill the UNICEF mandate, including its Core Commitments for Children (CCC) in humanitarian action?
2. Did the capacity-building project strengthen early warning and preparedness activities?
3. Did the capacity-building project strengthen emergency response, performance and monitoring?
4. Did the capacity-building project strengthen contributions to inter-agency humanitarian response?
5. Did the capacity-building project strengthen humanitarian advocacy and communications?

Summary of findings and key lessons

The overall conclusion of this evaluation is that UNICEF has improved its emergency capacity on many fronts during the 2006–2009 Phase III programme. This is particularly the case in its cluster responsibilities, despite having taken on three clusters and two sub-clusters – the largest by any single

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1. From January 2006, UNICEF received GB£1.9 million (US$3.4 million) as ‘bridge funding support’ to carry out ongoing and essential activities until there was greater clarity regarding Phase III of the project. The ‘Bridge Funding Phase’ was oriented as the ‘start-up phase’ of the larger 3½ year Phase III Programme of Cooperation.
organizational weaknesses. Whereas the 2006 Phase I/II evaluation found UNICEF weak on reliably delivering humanitarian response, this evaluation concludes that UNICEF’s response is mostly reliable. The evaluation has also found that UNICEF has made good progress in implementing its cluster commitments, although there remains a need for a more coherent vision of what cluster lead means for the organization at a corporate level.

There are still indications that humanitarian action is not viewed as a core activity within the wider organization. Responses remain largely dependent on the skills and experience of the country representatives and other key staff, and humanitarian experience is still not an essential requirement for these positions. Whilst there has been good progress in streamlining administrative and financial systems and there are encouraging signs of change to come – where it counts, on the ground in day-to-day work – there are still bureaucratic delays at the expense of timely response. There is a need for greater clarity in accountability for UNICEF’s humanitarian action, and the new risk management framework being put in place should give more room for creative decision-making.

The improvements in UNICEF capacity for humanitarian response over the 10-year period of the DFID programme have been largely due to personal championing, first by the Executive Director and latterly by the Deputy Executive Director, strongly supported by a core group of donors. A sounder institutional footing is needed if the organization is to consolidate these gains. This evaluation has concluded that a real evolution is required and that humanitarian action needs to be made a strategic priority by the Board through the vehicle of the Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP). With the revision of the MTSP being planned, now is the time to consider making humanitarian action a core strategic focus rather than an important but supporting activity of UNICEF as it is currently configured.

The revised Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies (CCCs) and accountability framework being developed to support these are welcome measures, and Country Offices (COs) are continuously developing their understanding of CCCs. As UNICEF moves into the next phase of strengthening its capacity in playing a leading role in the humanitarian world, it needs to embed this role in the shared values and the leadership style it adopts.

The main lesson that emerges from this review is that UNICEF’s capacity building has put a significant focus on structure, strategy and systems, and to some extent on skills and staff during Phase III of the Programme of Cooperation. Greater emphasis is needed in the humanitarian capacity-building initiative on two key dimensions of organizational capacity building: shared values (corporate culture and work ethic that support emergency response) and leadership style. This evaluation calls for devoting organizational energies in the coming years to these two areas in addition to continued reinforcement of what has been achieved so far.

**Recommendation**

R1. The humanitarian programme needs to be integrated into the MTSP as a core area of UNICEF’s work.

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6 UNICEF’s cluster lead responsibilities have changed over the period of the Phase III capacity-building programme. Originally UNICEF was cluster lead agency for WASH, for Nutrition, for Education jointly with Save the Children, and for Emergency Telecoms jointly with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It also had responsibility for Child Protection under the broader Protection cluster. In May 2008, with the establishment of the Gender-Based Violence area of responsibility within the Protection cluster, UNICEF assumed co-lead with United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). In June 2009 UNICEF agreed that OCHA would lead the Emergency Telecoms cluster and they would no longer co-lead. This report uses the current situation with regard to UNICEF cluster responsibility for convenience and consistency throughout the report, namely cluster lead agency for three clusters and two sub-clusters.

7 UNICEF defines humanitarian action to include preparedness, response and early recovery.
Detailed findings and recommendations

1. Knowledge and capacity to fulfil humanitarian mandate

Findings

*Leadership and accountability for humanitarian role*

Leadership for humanitarian action within UNICEF during the period under examination by this evaluation has been strong. During this time the cluster system has been introduced and has shown some promising progress. The emergency fund available to Country Offices to kick-start responses has almost tripled to US$85 million, and during the three-year period of the DFID Phase III capacity-building programme the organization has responded to over 30 major emergencies. One strong factor in the increased level of performance has been the boosting of capacity of the Regional Offices (ROs). The Regional Emergency Advisers and their teams have been able to support Country Offices in scaling up and preparing for emergencies.

The increased role of the ROs in humanitarian response has also made the task of assigning accountabilities for response within the organization more complex. This means that accountabilities for humanitarian action remain dispersed at different levels, and there is still a sense that some parts of the organization (noticeably service functions) are not held accountable for emergency response in the same way as others. This may relate to the current risk-management framework that has traditionally prioritized audit compliance over programme excellence. A new risk-management framework under development is encouraging in this regard.

Within headquarters, UNICEF has made significant gains in inter-divisional cooperation with the creation of a new task force. Driven partly by the introduction of the cluster system, this has brought the technical programme advisers and the Office of Emergency Operations closer, a trend that has been ongoing for some time.

The leadership and accountability question has been further complicated within UNICEF with the advent of the humanitarian reform process. The responsibility to partners and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) through the cluster system means that UNICEF often has to balance the pace of change internally and externally. Wider internal initiatives are underway on partnerships and information management at the same time as wider external initiatives, both moving at different speeds with different expectations and demands.

Recommendations

R2. UNICEF urgently needs policy guidance for the whole organization on the implications of the cluster approach and in particular the provider of last resort clause. This should ideally take the form of a directive from the Executive Director. While doing so, it needs to also clarify:

- the links between UNICEF’s humanitarian action and cluster approach;
- the links between cluster lead staff and other humanitarian staff and programme sections;
- the relationship between emergencies and programme divisions and the role of each in UNICEF’s humanitarian action and cluster leadership.

R3. Senior management needs to endorse a results framework for UNICEF’s humanitarian objectives as set out in the new CCCs and make clear how all relevant departments, COs and ROs will be held accountable for achieving these. (Note: Evaluators have noted that work is now underway to develop such a system across the organization.)
2. Early warning, preparedness and risk reduction

Findings

Whilst the DFID Phase III capacity-building project did not expressly support preparedness, this has nevertheless been an important ongoing part of UNICEF’s strategy to improve humanitarian action. This evaluation has found that preparing the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) has led to widespread comprehension of UNICEF’s role in humanitarian action. The organization has also recently created a senior position to work on risk reduction and is in the process of investing research resources in this area. Going into the future, greater investment in disaster risk reduction (DRR) will be needed to promote DRR as a core component of country programming, and the organization appears to be moving in this direction.

Recommendation

The evaluation is not making any recommendation in this area as significant initiatives are already under way.

3. Strengthened emergency response, performance and monitoring

Findings

Human Resources
UNICEF has improved its performance in the deployment of both regular staff and Cluster Coordinators over the three-year period of the DFID capacity-building project. In 2008, surge deployments met the CCC standards in 75 per cent of cases, up from 65 per cent the previous year. There has also been good progress in recruitment and training of Cluster Coordinators, and the organization looks set to meet indicators agreed in the DFID Phase III logframe. These are significant achievements.

Whilst UNICEF’s ability to deploy skilled humanitarian staff has undoubtedly improved over the period, these gains are fragile, as there is a concern that without dedicated human resources (HR) support for emergencies globally, these gains will be lost. A challenge confronting the organization going forward is where the balance of efforts should be placed in the maintenance of reserve or surge capacity. Regional capacity has been critical in resourcing response quickly, as have innovative tools such as the standby partnerships. Rosters have, for the most part, proven less effective.

Emergency standard operating procedures (SOP), programme quality and monitoring
There has been positive movement in designing standard operating procedures for response. An emerging system of categorization of responses as country, regional or global is a positive trend, although this system is not yet officially formalized.

Quality of programming, too, has improved in some areas, notably in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), connected partly to the increased cluster responsibilities. Revision of the CCCs to include benchmarks is a major step forward in the search for more consistent quality of programme work. Despite this, oversight and monitoring of information management in emergencies is still weak at country level. This is largely a resource issue – where UNICEF has the resources to deploy technical expertise at scale, quality is excellent; unfortunately this is not always or often the case, with the typical situation being one where the quality of the partner organizations’ work is the determining factor.

In terms of integrating gender equality approaches in UNICEF, there are several positive initiatives ongoing, including a new community of practice and a gender in emergencies pilot project that aims to integrate gender equality in humanitarian action across a range of sectors by developing targeted interventions in the areas of WASH, non food items, education, protection and health. This has yet to bear fruit on the ground, however, where gender programming is still seen as a specialist subject and not part of everyday programming.
The cluster system has meant that UNICEF staff often has additional responsibilities and challenges in humanitarian action. Induction needs to take account of this and other new areas such as gender integration.

**Business process issues for emergencies**

Many previous evaluations have highlighted the issue of UNICEF’s business process as an impediment to a reliable humanitarian response. During the time period of the DFID Phase III programme significant efforts have been made to resolve this issue, notably through the publication of a new handbook on using procedures in emergencies and accompanying training, much of this financed by the capacity-building programme.

Whilst some managers have reported improvements in timeframes around administration as a result of these initiatives, and an internal survey confirms this picture, this evaluation has found that there remain significant shortcomings in the procedures. The reality on the ground is still of routinely over-long approval procedures for everything from procurement of supplies to contracting of temporary staff to agreements with partners. The Division for Finance and Administration (DFAM) has long maintained that the issue is not one of rules *per se*, but their interpretation. A rigid auditing procedure may have contributed to an overly cautious interpretation of the rules. It is also hoped that new initiatives deriving from the change management process, such as the revision of programme management and accounting software and the new enterprise risk management system, will help.

**Recommendations**

R4. UNICEF needs to develop a simplified system for information management and monitoring in emergencies, based on the new CCC benchmarks, and ensure that trained information management and M&E staff are deployed in all emergency operations.

R5. Clusters and gender integration need to be part of induction and training programmes for all staff members, particularly senior country management staff.

R6. Humanitarian experience should be made a mandatory requirement in all country representative recruitments.

R7. UNICEF needs to continue to strengthen the global web roster and standby roster and invest in HR capacity in ROs with emergency focal points.

R8. Systematic induction and regional- and country-based training should be put in place for Cluster Coordinators.

R9. Countries with regular emergencies ought to have pre-positioned supplies for rapid response. Additionally, COs must have framework agreements with suppliers for local and regional procurement.

R10. A best practice review should be undertaken on administrative and associated contract management systems in the context of emergency response in different countries and lessons drawn from these for replication.

**4. Inter-agency humanitarian response**

**Findings**

*Cluster leadership*

A key focus of the DFID Phase III capacity-building programme was on the implementation of the cluster approach. This has been largely successful. UNICEF has made major commitments to the cluster approach.
approach globally and has invested significantly in delivering cluster accountabilities in all major emergencies where clusters were deployed.

The WASH cluster has made the most progress at global, national and operational levels in terms of providing effective leadership, followed by the Nutrition cluster and Child Protection cluster (via UNICEF’s role in its sector working group), although the progress on the ground has been uneven. The Education cluster is just beginning to come together as a coherent entity.

Based on the experience in implementing the cluster approach in the past two and a half years, several critical issues and lessons are emerging that need addressing:

- There are weak linkages between global cluster initiatives and country realities.
- Whilst clusters often exist at a national (capital-based) level, they are often not as strong at a sub-national level where the emergency operation is then taking place.
- There is still ongoing work in ensuring that the position of cluster coordinator should be a separate function of internal technical staff and that it stresses the skills needed for cluster leadership.
- There are unresolved resource issues, in terms of both how cluster leadership is funded and how cluster members access funding through UNICEF.
- Accountabilities for Cluster Coordinators are not consistent across responses.
- UNICEF has dutifully implemented clusters, but appears to be lacking a coherent vision for what the new approach might mean.
- There is no shared understanding of the ‘provider of last resort’ provision.
- Information and knowledge management for UNICEF-led clusters remains a challenge.

Apart from its lead responsibilities, UNICEF has been a key player in all other clusters and has played a very significant role in supporting the Health cluster, which is led by the World Health Organization (WHO). Additionally, UNICEF plays a key role in facilitating inter-agency response through its management of supplies of non-food items (NFI) in several major emergencies.

**Partnerships**

UNICEF’s predominant mode of working is through and with partners, whether governmental or non-governmental, and humanitarian action is no exception. The cluster system has made humanitarian partnership even more central to UNICEF’s role, and improved partnership between the major actors in response was a central tenet of the humanitarian reform process.

In 2008 the Office of Emergency Programmes invested considerable energy into a new dialogue with its global humanitarian partners, an initiative that led to a menu of reforms and was widely welcomed. This year the Board approved a new partnership strategy, and this once again offers potential for a better humanitarian partnership. A key indicator of success will be whether UNICEF is able to successfully implement its new programme cooperation agreement (PCA), the main vehicle through which it funds other organizations.

UNICEF partners extensively with the governments in all of the countries where it works. The majority of government partners interviewed for this evaluation were highly complementary about UNICEF work, and there are many examples of significant change occurring through such partnerships.

**Recommendations**

R11. UNICEF needs to make better use of partners to lead clusters at sub-national level and provide more of a focus at the strategic level – e.g., preparedness, resources and, contingency stocks, etc. It also needs to make greater efforts to establish cluster coordination closest to the affected area rather than simply in the capital.

R12. UNICEF needs to have in place the capacity for directly managing programmes in the case of ‘last resort’ operations. This would mean having enhanced surge capacity and logistics and supplies systems.
R13. UNICEF and other cluster lead agencies need to have a joint dialogue with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to clarify for agencies the responsibilities, accountabilities and limits of the ‘provider of last resort’ principle.

R14. UNICEF needs to document the actual cost of clusters so that it can have a sensible dialogue with donors about how to resource them. A short study outlining the costing implications should be prepared by UNICEF as a first step to engaging in larger inter-agency dialogue with donors.

R15. As UNICEF completes the PCA revision process currently under way, systems for disbursing and administering funds to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also need to be streamlined. A follow-up process to the global consultation in 2008 should be initiated, and NGOs need to be more consistently involved in strategic partnership dialogue.

R16. UNICEF needs to engage in an internal debate involving country managers on how to deal with the issue of delicately balancing a constructive relationship with governments with the organization’s ability to provide impartial and neutral humanitarian response when children are affected by natural disasters and conflict.

5. Humanitarian advocacy and the monitoring and reporting mechanism

Findings

UNICEF has, with DFID Phase III resources, made reasonable progress in implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM). There is certainly more to be done in terms of professionalizing the data collection – in many ways the current situation represents a promising beginning rather than a finalized system. There are two key constraints to the MRM being the powerful tool that it has the potential to be: the extreme sensitivity of governments and armed groups listed; and, more importantly, the limited resources available for this kind of work.

In terms of more general humanitarian advocacy, while UNICEF continues to be a high profile advocate for the needs of marginalized and vulnerable children, many partners and staff would like to see the organization being more proactive in advocating for humanitarian access and protection of children.

Recommendations

R17. UNICEF should play a greater advocacy role with donors (like DFID and others), who are advised to recognize that well-functioning clusters and UN technical agencies alone cannot take care of humanitarian needs, and that donors have a strong role to play in engaging with governments when it comes to humanitarian access in situations where the government itself is unable to meet the humanitarian needs.

R18. The tools to undertake the MRM need further development. Examples like the Sudan database and the Colombia baseline study are encouraging, but a suite of tools is needed that countries such as the Central African Republic can offer to partners.

R19. UNICEF and donors need to commit to resourcing UNICEF’s role in the monitoring and reporting mechanism on a long-term basis.

R20. UNICEF needs to do more to inform partners about its advocacy successes such as the release of the Sudanese child combatants.
RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUE

Introduction

Par son Programme de coopération en place depuis 2000, le Ministère britannique du développement international (Department for International Development - DFID) a aidé l’UNICEF à renforcer sa capacité de préparation et d’intervention en cas de catastrophe. Le présent document constitue la seconde et ultime évaluation de ce programme, qui a été mis en œuvre en trois phases principales : les Phases I et II ont couvert la période 2000-2005, la Phase III celle de juillet 2006 à la fin de 2009. La première évaluation portait sur les Phases I et II de ce Programme de coopération et a été effectuée à la fin de la Phase II en 2006.

La présente évaluation a été commandée par le Bureau de l’évaluation de l’UNICEF pour analyser les résultats de la Phase III de ce Programme de coopération ; son objectif était de mesurer les progrès accomplis en les comparant aux buts et aux résultats à atteindre exposés dans la proposition pour la Phase III du Programme de coopération DFID-UNICEF faite au niveau mondial, ainsi que de fournir une orientation à des efforts supplémentaires que l’UNICEF consentira dans les domaines du renforcement de sa préparation aux crises humanitaires, de sa capacité d’y répondre et de son rôle dans le processus de réforme de l’action humanitaire interorganisations. L’évaluation a été entreprise par deux consultants indépendants qui ont bénéficié pour une période limitée de l’aide d’un troisième consultant.

Principales questions d’évaluation et méthodologie

L’évaluation se fondait sur une méthodologie standard, avec des entretiens avec des informateurs clés, des discussions de groupes semi-structurées, des observations sur le terrain effectuées au cours de visites dans cinq pays, des enquêtes menées à distance, des recherches documentaires et des analyses de données. Le travail de terrain a été entrepris aux cours de la période juin-août 2009.

Les questions très générales examinées au cours de l’évaluation ont été inspirées par le cadre prioritaire que constitue le programme de renforcement des capacités de l’UNICEF qui formait la base de la proposition de Phase III, ainsi que de l’accord subséquent conclu entre le DFID et l’UNICEF. Ces questions étaient les suivantes :

6. Est-ce que le projet de renforcement des capacités a enrichi les connaissances et consolidé les capacités nécessaires à l’UNICEF pour remplir sa mission d’action humanitaire, y compris en ce qui concerne les Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d’urgence ?

7. Est-ce que le projet de renforcement des capacités a amélioré les activités d’alerte rapide et de préparation ?

8. Est-ce que le projet de renforcement des capacités a amélioré l’intervention en situation d’urgence, les résultats et le suivi de cette action ?

1. À partir de janvier 2006, l’UNICEF a reçu 1,9 millions de livres sterling (3,4 millions de dollars) au titre de « crédits-relais » destinés à financer ses activités essentielles en cours jusqu’à ce que la conception de la Phase III du projet soit plus clairement définie. Cette « Phase de crédits-relais » était conçue comme « phase de démarrage » de la Phase III du Programme de coopération prévue pour une période de 3 ans et demi.


9. Est-ce que le projet de renforcement des capacités a amélioré les contributions à l’intervention humanitaire au niveau interorganisations ?
10. Est-ce que le projet de renforcement des capacités a amélioré l’action d’information et de sensibilisation et les communications ?

Résumé des conclusions et des principaux enseignements

La conclusion globale de la présente évaluation est que l’UNICEF a amélioré ses capacités d’intervention en cas d’urgence sur de nombreux fronts au cours de la Phase III 2006-2009 de ce programme. C’est particulièrement net en ce qui concerne les responsabilités sectorielles ; et cela malgré le fait que l’UNICEF a pris la direction de trois Groupes sectoriels (Cluster) et de deux sous-groupes – l’engagement le plus important pris individuellement par une organisation12. Alors que l’évaluation de 2006 des Phases I et II avait jugé que la capacité de l’UNICEF de mener une intervention humanitaire était faible en termes de fiabilité, la présente évaluation conclut que l’intervention de l’UNICEF est globalement fiable. L’évaluation a également constaté que l’UNICEF avait fait de bons progrès pour remplir ses engagements envers les Groupes sectoriels, ceci en dépit du fait qu’il reste nécessaire pour l’organisation dans son ensemble de concevoir une vision plus claire de ce que signifie le rôle de chef de Groupe sectoriel.

Il existe encore bien des indications selon lesquelles l’action humanitaire n’est pas considérée comme une activité fondamentale au niveau le plus général de l’organisation ; les interventions restent largement tributaires des compétences et de l’expérience des représentants et du personnel du pays concerné, et une expérience dans le domaine de l’action humanitaire ne constitue toujours pas une exigence essentielle pour remplir ces postes. Bien que des progrès aient été faits pour rationaliser les systèmes administratifs et financiers et qu’il y ait des signes encourageants des changements à venir – là où cela compte, sur le terrain, dans les activités quotidiennes – des délais administratifs continuent à freiner la rapidité nécessaire aux interventions. Il est nécessaire que les procédures utilisées par l’UNICEF pour rendre compte de son action humanitaire soient d’une plus grande clarté et le nouveau cadre de gestion des risques qui est en train d’être mis en place devrait offrir plus de liberté à une prise de décision créative.

Les améliorations apportées aux capacités d’intervention humanitaire de l’UNICEF au cours des dix ans couverts par le programme du DFID sont à mettre largement au crédit des efforts personnels faits en leur faveur, d’abord par la Directrice générale et dernièrement par le Directeur général adjoint, et qui ont été vigoureusement soutenus par un groupe rassemblant les principaux donateurs. L’organisation a besoin d’une plus solide base institutionnelle pour consolider ces gains. La présente évaluation a conclu qu’une réelle évolution est nécessaire et que l’action humanitaire doit être élevée au rang de priorité stratégique par le Conseil d’administration par le biais du Plan stratégique à moyen terme (PSMT). La révision du PSMT étant en cours de préparation, c’est actuellement le moment approprié pour envisager de faire de l’action humanitaire un objectif stratégique de base plutôt que de ne lui accorder que le rôle d’une activité importante mais d’une simple activité d’appui pour l’UNICEF, dans la configuration actuelle.


7. L’UNICEF considère que l’action humanitaire inclut la préparation aux interventions, les interventions et la phase de relèvement rapide.
La révision des *Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d’urgence* et la mise en place du cadre de responsabilisation actuellement engagées dans ce sens sont des mesures positives et les Bureaux de pays pour leur part continuent à améliorer leur compréhension des *Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d’urgence*. Au moment où l’UNICEF passe à l’étape suivante du renforcement de ses capacités pour jouer un rôle de pointe dans le monde de l’action humanitaire, l’organisation doit ancrer ce rôle dans le cadre de valeurs communes et dans le style de direction qu’elle adopte.

Le principal enseignement qui émerge de la présente évaluation est que le renforcement des capacités de l’UNICEF a mis fortement l’accent au cours de cette Phase III du Programme de coopération sur les questions de structure, de stratégie et de systèmes ; et dans une certaine mesure sur celle des savoir-faire et du personnel. Dans le cadre de cette initiative de renforcement des capacités, il est nécessaire de se concentrer sur deux dimensions clés du renforcement des capacités organisationnelles : les valeurs partagées (culture d’entreprise et discipline de travail dans le contexte de l’intervention humanitaire) et style de direction. La présente évaluation suggère que l’organisation consacre dans les années qui viennent une partie de son énergie à ces deux domaines tout en continuant à renforcer ceux où des résultats positifs ont été obtenus à ce jour.

**Recommandation**

R1. Le programme humanitaire doit être intégré dans le PSMT à titre d’activité de base du travail de l’UNICEF.

**Conclusions et recommandations détaillées**

1. **Connaissances et capacités nécessaires à l’UNICEF pour remplir sa mission humanitaire**

**Conclusions**

*Leadership et responsabilité dans son rôle humanitaire*

Les prises d’initiatives et le leadership en faveur de l’action humanitaire au sein de l’UNICEF ont été importants durant la période examinée ; c’est dans cette période que le système des Groupes sectoriels a été introduit et qu’il a permis des progrès prometteurs. Le fonds d’urgence mis à la disposition des Bureaux de pays pour lancer les interventions a quasiment triplé pour atteindre 85 millions de dollars et au cours de la Phase III du programme de renforcement des capacités du DFID, l’organisation est intervenue dans plus de 30 situations d’urgence de première importance. Un des facteurs qui ont le plus contribué à l’amélioration des résultats de l’organisation a été la consolidation des capacités des Bureaux régionaux. Les Conseillers régionaux pour les situations d’urgence et leurs équipes ont été à même de soutenir les Bureaux de pays à se préparer aux situations d’urgence et à y intervenir à une échelle élargie.

Le rôle élargi joué par les Bureaux régionaux dans les interventions humanitaires a aussi rendu plus complexe la tâche d’attribution des domaines de responsabilité au sein de l’organisation dans le cadre de ces actions. Ceci se traduit par la persistance d’une certaine dispersion, à différents niveaux de l’organisation, des responsabilités induites par l’action humanitaire, ainsi que par le sentiment qu’on n’exige pas de certains secteurs de l’organisation (notamment ceux chargés des fonctions de service) qu’ils rendent compte de leur action dans le cadre des interventions d’urgence de la même manière que d’autres. Ceci pourrait être un effet du cadre de gestion des risques actuel qui a traditionnellement donné priorité au respect des normes comptables plutôt qu’à la qualité des programmes. Le nouveau cadre de gestion des risques qui est en train d’être mis au point est de ce point de vue une évolution encourageante.
Au niveau du siège, l'UNICEF a obtenu des gains importants dans le domaine de la coopération entre ses divisions grâce à la création d'une nouvelle équipe spéciale. En partie stimulée par l'introduction du système des Groupes sectoriels, cette évolution a rapproché les conseillers techniques des programmes et le Bureau des opérations d’urgence (EMOPS), une tendance à l’œuvre depuis un certain temps.

La question du rôle de direction et des responsabilités a été encore plus compliquée au sein de l’UNICEF par le lancement du processus de réforme de l’action humanitaire. Les responsabilités envers les partenaires et le Coordonnateur des secours d’urgence entraînées par la mise en place du système des Groupes sectoriels a pour conséquence que l’UNICEF doit fréquemment s’efforcer d’équilibrer le rythme du changement au niveau interne avec celui du niveau externe. Des initiatives élargies sont en train d’être engagées au niveau interne dans les domaines des partenariats et de la gestion de l’information, et elles coïncident avec des initiatives élargies au niveau externe, le changement se faisant à ces deux niveaux à des vitesses différentes et en fonctions d’attentes et d’exigences différentes.

Recommandations

R2. L’UNICEF a un besoin urgent de conseils d’orientation, pour l’ensemble de l’organisation, sur la question des implications du principe de la responsabilité sectorielle, et en particulier en ce qui concerne la clause de prestataire de dernier recours. Cela devrait idéalement prendre la forme d’une directive de la Directrice générale. Il importe également de clarifier les points suivants :

- les liens entre l’action humanitaire de l’UNICEF et le principe de la responsabilité sectorielle,
- les liens entre le personnel de l’organisation chef de Groupe sectoriel et le personnel des autres organisations humanitaires et des programmes sectoriels,
- les relations entre le Bureau des programmes d’urgence et la Division des programmes et le rôle de chacun d’entre eux dans l’action humanitaire et le rôle de chef de Groupe de l’UNICEF.

R3. Il est nécessaire que la direction avalise un cadre de résultats portant sur les objectifs humanitaires de l’UNICEF, comme celui fixé par la nouvelle version des Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d’urgence, et qu’elle explique clairement que tous les départements concernés, les Bureaux de pays et les Bureaux régionaux seront tenus de rendre compte des efforts entrepris pour atteindre ces résultats. (Note : les évaluateurs ont noté que la mise au point d’un système de ce type est actuellement en cours au sein de l’organisation.)

2. Alerte rapide, préparation et réduction des risques

Conclusions

Bien que la Phase III du projet de renforcement des capacités du DFID ne contribue pas expressément à la préparation aux situations d’urgence, cette question est un élément important de la stratégie de l’UNICEF concernant l’amélioration de son action humanitaire. La présente évaluation estime que la mise au point du Plan de préparation et d’intervention en cas d’urgence (EPRP) a conduit à faire mieux et plus largement comprendre le rôle de l’UNICEF dans l’action humanitaire. L’organisation a également récemment créé un poste de cadre supérieur pour diriger le travail de réduction des risques et est en train d’investir des ressources dans la recherche concernant ce domaine. En ce qui concerne l’avenir, il sera nécessaire d’investir de manière plus importante dans la réduction des risques de catastrophe afin de faire de ce champ d’action une composante essentielle des programmes de pays. L’organisation semble d’ailleurs être en train d’agir dans ce sens.

Recommandation
L'évaluation ne fait aucune recommandation dans ce domaine étant donné que des initiatives importantes ont déjà été lancées.

3. Renforcement des interventions en cas d'urgence, amélioration des résultats et du suivi

Conclusions

**Ressources humaines**

Au cours des trois ans couverts par le projet de renforcement des capacités du DFID, l'UNICEF a amélioré ses résultats en ce qui concerne aussi bien le déploiement du personnel normal que celui des Coordonnateurs de Groupe sectoriel. En 2008, les déploiements en phase de montée en puissance ont satisfait aux normes des *Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d'urgence* dans 75 % des cas, en augmentation par comparaison avec les 65 % de l'année précédente. De bons progrès ont également été accomplis dans le recrutement et la formation des Coordonnateurs de Groupe sectoriel, l'organisation semble sur la bonne voie pour respecter les indicateurs inscrits dans le cadre logique de la Phase III du projet du DFID. Tout ceci constitue des succès importants.

Bien que l'UNICEF ait sans conteste amélioré au cours de la période concernée sa capacité de déployer un personnel humanitaire qualifié, ces gains sont fragiles. Il est à craindre que, faute de consacrer aux situations d'urgence des ressources humaines spécifiques au niveau mondial, ces gains ne soient remis en question. Un défi susceptible de faire obstacle aux progrès de l'organisation est de trouver le point d'équilibre entre les efforts à consacrer au maintien de capacités de réserve par opposition aux capacités d'intervention pour les phases de montée en puissance. Les capacités régionales se sont révélées cruciales pour soutenir rapidement les interventions, comme l'ont été des outils innovants tels que les partenariats en attente. Les fichiers de personnel à disposition se sont révélés dans la plupart des cas moins efficaces.

**Procédures opérationnelles permanentes pour les urgences, qualité et suivi des programmes**

La conception des procédures opérationnelles permanentes gouvernant les interventions a connu une évolution positive ; le système en train d'apparaître de catégorisation des interventions à entreprendre par niveau national, régional ou mondial est une tendance positive malgré le fait que ce système ne soit pas encore officiellement mis en place.

La qualité de la programmation a également fait des progrès dans certains domaines, notamment dans le secteur Eau, assainissement et hygiène (WASH), en partie en raison des responsabilités accrues imposées au niveau des Groupes sectoriels. La révision des *Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d'urgence* pour y inclure des critères d'évaluation et de référence est un pas en avant important pour obtenir une meilleure qualité des activités de programme. En dépit de cela, le contrôle et le suivi de la gestion de l'information dans les situations d'urgence est un point faible au niveau des pays ; il s'agit en l'occurrence d'une question de ressources – là où l'UNICEF a les moyens de déployer son expertise technique à l'échelle requise, la qualité est excellente, malheureusement ce n'est pas toujours ou souvent le cas, la situation habituelle étant que la qualité des organisations partenaires est le facteur déterminant.

En termes d'intégration des approches d'égalité des sexes à l'UNICEF, plusieurs initiatives positives sont en cours, dont un nouveau réseau de praticiens et un projet pilote sur l'égalité des sexes dans les situations d'urgence, qui vise à intégrer la question dans le cadre de l'action humanitaire et sur un éventail de secteurs en mettant au point des interventions ciblées dans les domaines de l'eau, de l'assainissement et de l'hygiène, des articles non alimentaires, de l'éducation, de la protection et de la santé. Il reste cependant à ces initiatives à porter leurs fruits sur le terrain, où la programmation sur la question de l'égalité des sexes reste perçue comme un sujet de spécialiste qui ne fait pas partie de la programmation au quotidien.

Le système des Groupes sectoriels a pour conséquence de donner au personnel de l'UNICEF des responsabilités supplémentaires et de poser de nouveaux défis à son action dans le domaine
humanitaire. L’intégration des nouveaux membres du personnel devra tenir compte de ceci et de certaines questions nouvelles comme celle de la prise en compte de la problématique de l’égalité des sexes.

**Les questions du mode de fonctionnement de l’organisation dans les situations d’urgence**

De nombreuses évaluations précédentes ont souligné la question des procédures de l’UNICEF qui entravent la fiabilité de l’intervention humanitaire. Au cours de la période couverte par la Phase III du programme du DFID, des progrès importants ont été accomplis pour résoudre ce problème, notamment par la publication d’un nouveau manuel sur la manière d’appliquer les procédures dans les situations d’urgence accompagnée de la formation nécessaire, initiative financée en grande partie par le programme de renforcement des capacités.

Bien que certains responsables aient signalé que ces initiatives ont apporté des améliorations aux calendriers résultant des procédures administratives et qu’une enquête interne confirme ce fait, la présente évaluation a constaté que ces procédures comportaient toujours des défauts importants. La réalité sur le terrain est toujours celle de procédures d’approbation entraînant systématiquement des délais excessifs dans tous les domaines, de celui de la commande des approvisionnements à ceux de l’engagement sous contrat de personnel temporaire ou des accords avec les partenaires. La Division de la gestion administrative et financière (DFAM) soutient depuis longtemps qu’il ne s’agit pas en soi d’un problème de règles administratives, mais de la question de leur interprétation. Une procédure de vérification rigide peut avoir contribué à une interprétation trop prudente de ces règles. On espère aussi que de nouvelles initiatives suscitées par le processus de gestion du changement, telle que la révision des logiciels de gestion et de comptabilité et le nouveau système de gestion des risques de l’organisation, aideront à résoudre cette question.

**Recommandations**

R4. L’UNICEF doit mettre au point un système simplifié pour la gestion et le suivi de l’information dans les situations d’urgence en se basant sur les nouveaux critères de référence définis pour les *Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d’urgence*, et assurer qu’un personnel qualifié dans les domaines de la gestion de l’information et du suivi et évaluation soit déployé dans toutes les opérations d’urgence.

R5. La problématique des Groupes sectoriels et celle de l’égalité des sexes doivent être prises en compte dans l’intégration de tous les membres du personnel et pour les programmes de formation qui leur sont destinés, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les cadres supérieurs au niveau national.

R6. Une expérience dans l’action humanitaire doit être une qualification obligatoire dans toutes les procédures de recrutement concernant les représentants de pays.

R7. L’UNICEF doit continuer à renforcer son fichier de personnel au niveau mondial ainsi que son fichier de personnel à disposition et investir des capacités en ressources humaines dans les Bureaux régionaux qui ont des points focaux chargés des situations d’urgence.

R8. La nomination et la formation des Coordonnateurs de Groupe sectoriel doivent être organisées de manière systématique au niveau régional et national.


R10. Un examen des meilleures pratiques dans le domaine des systèmes administratifs et des systèmes de gestion des contrats associés en contexte de situation d’urgence doit être entrepris dans les différents pays, et des enseignements doivent en être tirés pour permettre de les appliquer ailleurs.
4. Intervention humanitaire au niveau inter-organisations

Conclusions

Direction des Groupes sectoriels
Un axe central de la Phase III du programme de renforcement des capacités du DFID était la mise en œuvre du principe de la responsabilité sectorielle et les résultats en ont été globalement positifs. L’UNICEF a pris des engagements importants au niveau mondial en ce qui concerne cette approche et s’est largement investi pour assurer la responsabilisation des Groupes sectoriels dans toutes les situations d’urgence graves où ces groupes sont mis en place.

Le Groupe sectoriel Eau, Assainissement et hygiène (WASH) est celui qui a fait le plus de progrès au niveaux mondial, national et opérationnel en termes de l’efficacité de son rôle d’animation et de direction, il est suivi par les Groupes sectoriels Nutrition et Protection de l’enfant (par l’intermédiaire du rôle joué par l’UNICEF au sein du groupe de travail sectoriel), alors que sur le terrain les progrès sont restés inégaux ; le Groupe sectoriel Éducation commence tout juste à se constituer en instance cohérente.

Sur la base de l’expérience fournie par la mise en œuvre du principe de la responsabilité sectorielle au cours des deux ans et demi passés, plusieurs questions et enseignements critiques doivent être pris en compte :

- Les liaisons entre les initiatives sur les Groupes sectoriels au niveau mondial et les réalités des pays concernés sont faibles.
- Bien que les Groupes sectoriels existent souvent au niveau national (basés dans la capitale), ils sont rarement aussi présents au niveau infra-national, qui est celui auquel se déroulent les opérations d’urgence.
- Il reste beaucoup de travail à faire pour assurer que le poste de Coordonnateur de Groupe sectoriel soit établi comme fonction autonome au sein du personnel technique de l’organisation et pour que l’accent soit mis sur les compétences nécessaires pour diriger un Groupe sectoriel.
- Des questions de ressources non résolues persistent en termes à la fois de la manière dont le rôle de direction du Groupe sectoriel est financé et de celle dont les membres peuvent obtenir un financement par le truchement de l’UNICEF.
- Les responsabilités définies pour les Coordinateurs de Groupe sectoriel ne sont pas les mêmes d’une intervention à l’autre.
- L’UNICEF a scrupuleusement mis en place les Groupes sectoriels mais semble ne pas avoir de vision cohérente de ce que cette nouvelle approche peut impliquer.
- Il n’existe pas de compréhension partagée de la clause de « prestataire de dernier recours »
- La gestion de l’information et des connaissances représente toujours un défi à surmonter pour les Groupes sectoriels animés par l’UNICEF.

En dehors de ses responsabilités de direction, l’UNICEF a joué un rôle clé dans tous les autres Groupes sectoriels et un rôle très important dans l’appui au Groupe sectoriel Santé qui est dirigé par l’Organisation mondiale de la Santé (OMS). De plus, l’UNICEF a également joué un rôle clé en facilitant les interventions inter-organisations par sa gestion des approvisionnements en articles non alimentaires au cours de plusieurs situations d’urgence de première importance.

Les partenariats
La principale méthode de travail de l’UNICEF est d’intervenir par l’intermédiaire de partenaires ou de collaborer avec des partenaires, qu’il s’agisse d’instances gouvernementales ou non gouvernementales, et son action humanitaire ne fait pas exception. Le système des Groupes sectoriels a donné aux partenariats humanitaires une importance encore plus centrale pour le rôle de l’UNICEF, et l’amélioration des partenariats entre les principaux intervenants a été l’un des piliers du processus de réforme de l’action humanitaire.
En 2008, le Bureau des programmes d’urgence a investi une énergie considérable dans un nouveau dialogue avec ses partenaires humanitaires au niveau mondial, une initiative qui a abouti à tout un menu de réformes et qui a été accueillie de manière largement favorable. Cette année, le Conseil d’administration a approuvé une nouvelle stratégie pour les partenariats qui offre de nouvelles possibilités de conclure des partenariats humanitaires de meilleure qualité. Un indicateur clé de succès sera de voir si l’UNICEF réussit à mettre en œuvre efficacement son nouveau dispositif d’Accords de coopération au titre des programmes (ACP), son principal véhicule de financement des autres organisations.

L’UNICEF travaille fréquemment en partenariat avec les gouvernements des pays où l’organisation intervient. La majorité des partenaires gouvernementaux interrogés au cours de la présente évaluation avaient une appréciation très élogieuse du travail de l’UNICEF, et il existe de nombreux exemples de changements significatifs obtenus par la mise en œuvre de tels partenariats.

**Recommandations**

R11. L’UNICEF doit faire un meilleur usage de ses partenariats en donnant à ses partenaires la direction de groupes sectoriels au niveau infra-national et mieux faire porter l’effort sur le niveau stratégique – mesures de préparation, ressources, stocks de réserve, etc. L’organisation doit aussi faire de plus grands efforts pour rapprocher les instances de coordination des Groupes sectoriels des zones affectées plutôt que de simplement les laisser siéger dans la capitale.

R12. L’UNICEF doit mettre en place des capacités lui permettant de gérer directement les programmes dans les cas d’opérations de « dernier recours » ; ce qui implique d’avoir des capacités améliorées de montée en puissance et sur le plan des systèmes de logistique et d’approvisionnement.

R13. L’UNICEF et les autres organisations dirigeant des Groupes sectoriels doivent engager un dialogue conjoint avec le Comité permanent inter-organisations (CPI) dans le but de clarifier les responsabilités, la nécessité de rendre compte des actions entreprises et les limites du principe du « prestataire de dernier recours ».

R14. L’UNICEF doit documenter le coût réel des Groupes sectoriels afin de pouvoir mener de manière raisonnable le dialogue avec les bailleurs de fonds sur les moyens de les financer. L’UNICEF devrait préparer une courte étude présentant les grandes lignes de ce qu’ils impliquent en termes de coûts, une première étape pour ouvrir un dialogue inter-organisations élargi avec les donateurs.

R15. Alors que l’UNICEF complète le processus de révision des Accords de coopération au titre des programmes (ACP) actuellement en cours, les systèmes régissant le décaissement et l’administration des fonds destinés aux organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) devraient également être rationalisés. Un processus de suivi de la consultation mondiale organisée en 2008 devrait être lancé, et les ONG devraient être impliquées de manière plus systématique dans le dialogue sur les partenariats stratégiques.

R16. L’UNICEF doit organiser un débat interne impliquant les responsables de niveau national sur la manière de traiter la question de l’équilibre délicat à réaliser entre la mise en place de rapports constructifs avec les autorités gouvernementales et la capacité de l’UNICEF à organiser une intervention humanitaire impartiale et neutre quand des enfants sont victimes de catastrophes naturelles ou de conflits.
5. La communication et la mobilisation humanitaires et le Mécanisme de surveillance et de communication

Conclusions

L’UNICEF a, grâce aux ressources fournies par la Phase III du programme du DFID, réalisé des progrès raisonnables dans la mise en œuvre du Mécanisme de surveillance et de communication établi par la résolution 1612 de l’ONU. Il reste certainement plus à faire pour professionnaliser la collecte de données – sous de nombreux aspects la situation actuelle représente un début prometteur plutôt qu’un système finalisé. Deux contraintes importantes empêchent le Mécanisme de surveillance et de communication de devenir l’outil puissant qu’il est potentiellement : l’extrême sensibilité des autorités gouvernementales et des groupes armés impliqués, ainsi que le facteur plus important constitué par les ressources limitées qui sont disponibles pour ce genre de travail.

En termes plus généraux d’action de communication et de mobilisation humanitaires, bien que l’UNICEF continue à être un acteur important de la défense des enfants marginalisés et vulnérables et de la sensibilisation à leurs besoins, de nombreux partenaires et membre du personnel de l’organisation souhaiteraient qu’elle soit plus proactive dans sa défense du droit à l’accès à des fins humanitaires et de la protection des enfants.

Recommandations

R17. L’UNICEF devrait exercer une plus grande influence auprès des bailleurs de fonds (comme le DFID et autres instances), auxquels il est recommandé de prendre acte que les Groupes sectoriels qui fonctionnent efficacement de même que les agences techniques des Nations Unies ne peuvent à eux seuls satisfaire tous les besoins humanitaires, les bailleurs de fonds ont donc un rôle important à jouer auprès des gouvernements quand il est question d’assurer un accès à des fins humanitaires dans une situation où les autorités gouvernementales sont elles-mêmes incapables de satisfaire ces besoins humanitaires.

R18. Les outils nécessaires à la mise en œuvre du Mécanisme de surveillance et de communication ont besoin d’être mieux développés. Des exemples comme la base de données sur le Soudan et l’enquête initiale sur la situation en Colombie sont encourageants, mais il est nécessaire de disposer d’un ensemble d’outils comme celui que la République centrafricaine est à même d’offrir à ses partenaires.

R19. L’UNICEF et les donateurs doivent s’engager à financer sur le long terme le rôle que l’organisation joue dans le Mécanisme de surveillance et de communication.

R20. L’UNICEF doit faire plus pour informer ses partenaires des succès qu’obtient son action de communication et de mobilisation, comme par exemple dans le cas de la libération des enfants soldats soudanais.
RESUMEN EJECUTIVO

Introducción

Desde 2000, el Departamento para el Desarrollo Internacional del Reino Unido (DFID) ha apoyado a UNICEF por medio del Programa de Cooperación DFID-UNICEF para fortalecer la capacidad de UNICEF en materia de respuesta y preparación humanitarias. Ésta es la segunda y última evaluación del programa, que ha sido ejecutado en tres fases principales: las Fases I y II abarcaron el periodo 2000-2005, mientras que la Fase III se llevó a cabo desde julio de 2006 hasta finales de 2009. La primera evaluación, que examinó la Fase I y la Fase II del Programa de Cooperación, se llevó a cabo en 2006, al final de la Fase II.

Esta evaluación independiente fue encargada por la Oficina de Evaluación de UNICEF para evaluar la ejecución de la Fase III del Programa de Cooperación. El objetivo de la evaluación fue examinar el progreso en comparación con los objetivos y resultados previstos en la Fase III de la Propuesta Global del Programa de Cooperación DFID-UNICEF y para proporcionar mayor orientación en los próximos esfuerzos de UNICEF para fortalecer su preparación humanitaria, la capacidad de respuesta y la función que debe desempeñar en el proceso interinstitucional de reforma humanitaria. La evaluación fue llevada a cabo por dos consultores independientes, con el apoyo de un tercer consultor durante un período limitado de tiempo.

Preguntas clave y metodología de la evaluación

La evaluación se basó en la metodología estándar, que incluye entrevistas a informantes clave, discusiones en grupo semiestructuradas, observaciones sobre el terreno por medio de visitas a cinco países, encuestas a distancia, investigación secundaria y análisis de datos. El trabajo de campo para esta evaluación se llevó a cabo durante el periodo de junio-agosto de 2009.

Las preguntas generales examinadas durante la evaluación se derivan del marco general del programa de UNICEF para fortalecer la capacidad, que sirvieron de base de la propuesta de la Fase III y del acuerdo posterior entre el DFID y UNICEF. Estas preguntas fueron las siguientes.

1. ¿Reforzó el proyecto para fortalecer la capacidad los conocimientos y la capacidad para cumplir el mandato de UNICEF, incluidos sus Compromisos Básicos para la Infancia en la acción humanitaria?
2. ¿Reforzó el proyecto de fortalecimiento de capacidad las actividades de alerta temprana y preparación?
3. ¿Reforzó el proyecto para fortalecer la capacidad la respuesta de emergencia, el desempeño y la supervisión?
4. ¿Reforzó el proyecto para fortalecer la capacidad las contribuciones a la respuesta humanitaria interinstitucional?
5. ¿Reforzó el proyecto para fortalecer la capacidad la promoción y las comunicaciones humanitarias?

15 Desde enero de 2006, UNICEF recibió 1,9 millones de libras esterlinas (3,4 millones de dólares) como “puente de apoyo financiero” para llevar a cabo actividades en curso y esenciales hasta que hubiera mayor claridad con respecto a la Fase III del proyecto. La “Fase de Financiación Puente” se orientó como la “fase inicial” de la Fase III del Programa de Cooperación, que era de mayor duración, tres años y medio.
Resumen de las conclusiones y las lecciones clave

La conclusión general de esta evaluación es que UNICEF ha mejorado su capacidad de emergencia en varios frentes durante la Fase III del programa en 2006-2009. Este es particularmente el caso de sus responsabilidades relativas a los grupos temáticos, a pesar de haberse hecho cargo de tres grupos y dos subgrupos, el mayor número por parte de una sola organización.20 Considerando que la evaluación de las fases I/II de 2006 revelaron insuficiencias en la manera en que UNICEF realizaba de forma fiable la respuesta humanitaria, esta evaluación concluye que la respuesta de UNICEF es en su mayoría fiable. La evaluación también ha llegado a la conclusión de que UNICEF ha hecho grandes progresos en la realización de sus compromisos con los grupos temáticos, aunque sigue habiendo la necesidad de una visión más coherente de lo que significa para la organización dirigir un grupo temático en el plano institucional.

Todavía hay indicios de que la acción humanitaria no se considera como una actividad fundamental dentro de la organización en general. Las respuestas siguen dependiendo en gran medida de las aptitudes y la experiencia de los representantes y el personal de los países, y tener experiencia en actividades humanitarias no es aún un requisito esencial para este puesto. Si bien se han producido progresos aceptables en la racionalización de los sistemas administrativos y financieros, y hay signos alentadores de que se producirán cambios en el futuro —allí donde más importa, sobre el terreno en la labor cotidiana— aún hay demoras burocráticas a expensas de una respuesta oportuna. Es necesaria una mayor claridad en la rendición de cuentas de la acción humanitaria de UNICEF, y el nuevo marco de gestión de riesgos que se está poniendo en marcha debería dar más espacio para la toma de decisiones creativas.

Las mejoras en la capacidad de UNICEF para la respuesta humanitaria en el período de 10 años del programa de DFID se han debido en gran parte a una promoción personal, primero por la Directora Ejecutiva y posteriormente por la Directora Ejecutiva Adjunta, fuertemente apoyadas por un grupo básico de donantes. Se necesita una base institucional más sólida para que la organización consolide estos logros. Esta evaluación ha llegado a la conclusión de que se requiere una evolución real y que la Junta tiene que dar carácter de prioridad estratégica a la acción humanitaria por medio del Plan Estratégico de Mediano Plazo (PEMP). Con la revisión del PEMP que se está planeando, ahora es el momento de considerar la posibilidad de lograr que la acción humanitaria sea un objetivo estratégico central en lugar de una actividad de UNICEF importante pero de apoyo, tal como está configurada actualmente.

Los Compromisos básicos para la infancia en situaciones de emergencia revisados y el marco de la rendición de cuentas que se está elaborando para apoyarlos son medidas que es preciso acoger con satisfacción, y las Oficinas de País están profundizando continuamente en su comprensión de los Compromisos básicos. A medida que UNICEF avanza a la siguiente fase del fortalecimiento de su capacidad desempeñando un papel destacado en el ámbito humanitario, es necesario integrar esta función en los valores compartidos y el estilo de liderazgo que adopte.

La principal lección que surge de este examen es que el desarrollo de la capacidad de UNICEF se ha centrado considerablemente en la estructura, la estrategia y los sistemas, y en cierta medida en las actitudes y el personal durante la Fase III del Programa de Cooperación. En la iniciativa de

20 Las principales responsabilidades en materia de grupos temáticos de UNICEF han cambiado durante la Fase III del programa de fortalecimiento de la capacidad. Al principio, UNICEF era el organismo coordinador del grupo temático de Agua, Saneamiento e Higiene, de Nutrición, de Educación en colaboración con Save the Children, y de Telecomunicaciones en Situaciones de Emergencia conjuntamente con el Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA) y la Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios (OCHA). También tenía la responsabilidad en materia de Protección de la Infancia dentro del grupo más amplio de Protección. En mayo de 2008, con el establecimiento de la esfera de Violencia por razones de Género en el grupo temático de Protección, UNICEF asumió la codirección con el Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas (FNUAP). En junio de 2009, UNICEF aceptó que OCHA coordinara el grupo de Telecomunicaciones en Situaciones de Emergencia y dejó de codirigirlo. Este informe utiliza la situación actual con respecto a la responsabilidad de UNICEF en los grupos temáticos porque resulta más conveniente y para lograr una uniformidad, a saber, organismo coordinador de grupos temáticos para tres grupos y dos sub-grupos.

21 UNICEF define la acción humanitaria para que incluya la preparación, la respuesta y la recuperación temprana.
fortalecimiento de la capacidad humanitaria es necesario hacer un mayor hincapié en dos dimensiones clave del fortalecimiento de la capacidad de la organización: valores compartidos (cultura institucional y ética de trabajo que apoye la respuesta de emergencia) y el estilo de liderazgo. Esta evaluación pide que la organización dedique una mayor energía durante los próximos años a estas dos esferas, además de seguir reforzando lo que se ha logrado hasta ahora.

Recomendación

R1. Es preciso integrar el programa humanitario en el PEMP como una esfera básica de la labor de UNICEF.

Conclusiones y recomendaciones detalladas

1. El conocimiento y la capacidad para cumplir el mandato humanitario

Conclusiones

Capacidad de liderazgo y rendición de cuentas para la función humanitaria

La capacidad de liderazgo para la acción humanitaria de UNICEF durante el período que se examina en esta evaluación ha sido sólida. Durante este tiempo, se ha iniciado el sistema grupos temáticos, que ha mostrado algunos progresos prometedores. El fondo de emergencia a disposición de las oficinas de país para poner en marcha las respuestas casi se ha triplicado hasta 85 millones de dólares, y durante el periodo de tres años de la Fase III del programa de fortalecimiento de capacidad del DFID, la organización ha respondido a más de 30 emergencias graves. Un factor importante en el aumento del nivel de rendimiento ha sido el impulso de la capacidad de las Oficinas Regionales. Los Asesores regionales para situaciones de emergencia y sus equipos han sido capaces de apoyar a las oficinas de país en la ampliación y la preparación para situaciones de emergencia.

El creciente papel de las Oficinas Regionales en la respuesta humanitaria también ha llevado a que la tarea de asignar responsabilidades para la respuesta dentro de la organización sea más compleja. Esto significa que las responsabilidades de la acción humanitaria siguen dispersas en diferentes niveles, y aún queda la sensación de que algunas partes de la organización (notablemente las funciones de servicio) no son responsables de la respuesta de emergencia de la misma manera que otras. Esto puede estar relacionado con el marco de gestión del riesgo actual, que tradicionalmente ha dado prioridad al cumplimiento de los requisitos de los auditores sobre la excelencia del programa. Es alentador por tanto a este respecto que se esté preparando un nuevo marco de gestión del riesgo.

En la sede, UNICEF ha logrado importantes avances en la cooperación entre divisiones, con la creación de un nuevo grupo de trabajo. Impulsado en parte por la introducción del sistema de grupos temáticos, esto ha llevado a que los asesores técnicos del programa y la Oficina de Operaciones de Emergencia (EMOPS) hayan establecido una mayor coordinación, una tendencia que lleva en marcha por algún tiempo.

La capacidad de liderazgo y la cuestión de la rendición de cuentas se han complicado aún más en UNICEF con el proceso de reforma humanitaria. La responsabilidad de los aliados y del Coordinador del Socorro de Emergencia por medio del sistema de grupos temáticos a menudo significa que UNICEF tiene que equilibrar el ritmo de los cambios internos y externos. Hay en marcha iniciativas internas más amplias sobre alianzas y gestión de la información al mismo tiempo que otras iniciativas externas más amplias, y ambas avanzan a velocidades diferentes, con distintas expectativas y demandas.
Recomendaciones

R2. UNICEF necesita urgentemente una orientación de políticas para toda la organización sobre las consecuencias del enfoque de grupos temáticos y, en particular, la cláusula del "proveedor de último recurso". Esto debería adoptar la forma en teoría de una directiva de la Dirección Ejecutiva. Al hacerlo, es necesario también aclarar lo siguiente:

- los vínculos entre la acción humanitaria de UNICEF y el enfoque de grupos temáticos;
- los vínculos entre el personal de la organización que dirige el grupo temático y otro personal humanitario y secciones del programa;
- la relación entre las situaciones de emergencia y las divisiones de programas y el papel de cada uno en la acción humanitaria de UNICEF y la dirección de los grupos temáticos.

R3. Los directivos superiores deben apoyar un marco de resultados para los objetivos humanitarios de UNICEF, según lo establecido en los nuevos Compromisos básicos, y dejar claro cómo todos los departamentos pertinentes, oficinas de país y Oficinas Regionales, tendrán que rendir cuentas para lograrlo. (Nota: Los evaluadores han observado que el trabajo ya está en marcha para establecer este sistema en toda la organización.)

2. Alerta temprana, preparación y reducción de riesgos

Conclusiones

Mientras que la Fase III del proyecto para fortalecer la capacidad de DFID no apoyó expresamente la preparación, esto ha sido sin embargo una parte importante de la estrategia en curso de UNICEF para mejorar la acción humanitaria. Esta evaluación ha llegado a la conclusión de que la preparación del Plan de preparación y respuesta ante situaciones de emergencia ha generado una comprensión más amplia de la función de UNICEF en la acción humanitaria. La organización también ha creado recientemente un puesto de alto nivel para trabajar en la reducción de riesgos y está en el proceso de financiar recursos de investigación en este ámbito. Con miras al futuro, se necesitará una mayor inversión en la reducción de riesgo en caso de desastres para promoverla como un componente central de la programación por países, y la organización parece estar avanzando en esta dirección.

Recomendación

La evaluación no hace ninguna recomendación en este ámbito ya que hay varias iniciativas importantes en marcha.

3. Fortalecimiento de la respuesta de emergencia, el desempeño y el seguimiento

Conclusiones

Recursos Humanos

UNICEF ha mejorado su desempeño en el despliegue de personal de plantilla y de coordinadores de grupos temáticos en el período de tres años del proyecto de fortalecimiento de la capacidad de DFID. En 2008, el aumento de los despliegues cumplió con las normas de los Compromisos básicos en el 75% de los casos, un aumento con respecto al 65% del año anterior. También ha habido avances considerables en la contratación y capacitación de los coordinadores de grupos y temáticos, y la organización parece que va a cumplir con los indicadores acordados en el marco lógico de la Fase III del DFID. Estos son logros significativos.

Si bien la capacidad de UNICEF para desplegar personal humanitario calificado ha mejorado sin duda durante el período, estos logros son frágiles, ya que existe la preocupación de que sin un apoyo de recursos humanos dedicado a las situaciones de emergencias a nivel mundial, estos beneficios se...
perderán. Un desafío que enfrenta la organización con miras al futuro es dónde se debe situar el equilibrio de los esfuerzos en el mantenimiento de la capacidad de reserva o de aumento de personal. La capacidad regional ha sido fundamental en la dotación de recursos de respuesta rápida, al igual que mecanismos innovadores como las alianzas en reserva. Las listas de reserva para la contratación han resultado ser, en su mayor parte, menos eficaces.

**Procedimientos operativos generalizados de emergencia, calidad y seguimiento de programas**

Ha habido avances positivos en el diseño de procedimientos operativos generalizados para la respuesta. Un nuevo sistema de categorización de las respuestas según sean de país, regionales o mundiales es una tendencia positiva, aunque este sistema todavía no está oficialmente formalizado.

La calidad de la programación también ha mejorado en algunas esferas, especialmente en Agua, Saneamiento e Higiene (WASH), un hecho relacionado en parte con el aumento de las responsabilidades en el grupo temático. La revisión de los Compromisos básicos para incluir puntos de referencia es un gran avance en la búsqueda de una calidad más constante en la labor del programa. A pesar de ello, la supervisión y el control de la gestión de la información en situaciones de emergencia sigue siendo deficiente a nivel de país. Esto se debe en gran medida a una cuestión de recursos: cuando UNICEF tiene los recursos para aplicar conocimientos técnicos a escala, la calidad es excelente; pero lamentablemente esto no siempre es el caso, y la situación típica es que la calidad de la labor de las organizaciones aliadas es el factor determinante.

En cuanto a la integración de los enfoques de igualdad de género en UNICEF, hay en curso varias iniciativas positivas, como una nueva comunidad de práctica y un proyecto piloto de la perspectiva de género en situaciones de emergencia que tiene por objeto integrar la igualdad de género en la acción humanitaria en una amplia gama de sectores mediante el desarrollo de intervenciones específicas en las esferas de WASH, artículos no alimentarios, educación, protección y salud. Sin embargo, esto todavía tiene que dar sus frutos en el terreno, donde se sigue considerando la programación de género como un tema especializado y no como parte de la programación cotidiana.

El sistema de grupos temáticos ha llevado a que el personal de UNICEF tenga a menudo responsabilidades adicionales y desafíos en la acción humanitaria. La inducción tiene que tener en cuenta ésta y otras esferas nuevas, como la integración de género.

**Cuestiones relativas a los procesos institucionales para las situaciones de emergencia**

Muchas evaluaciones anteriores han puesto de relieve la cuestión de los procesos institucionales de UNICEF como un impedimento para una respuesta humanitaria eficaz. Durante el período de la Fase III del programa del DFID se han realizado importantes esfuerzos para resolver este problema, en particular mediante la publicación de un nuevo manual sobre el uso de procedimientos en casos de emergencia y la capacitación asociada, en gran parte financiados por el programa de fortalecimiento de la capacidad.

Si bien algunos directores han informado de mejoras en los plazos en torno a la administración como consecuencia de estas iniciativas, y una encuesta interna confirma esta imagen, esta evaluación ha constatado que sigue habiendo importantes deficiencias en los procedimientos. La realidad sobre el terreno es que siguen en marcha largos procedimientos de aprobación para todo, desde la adquisición de suministros a la contratación de personal temporal o a la puesta en marcha de acuerdos con los aliados. La División de Finanzas y Administración (DFAM) ha mantenido durante mucho tiempo que la cuestión no depende de las normas en sí mismas, sino de su interpretación. Un rígido procedimiento de auditoría puede haber contribuido a una interpretación excesivamente prudente de las normas. También se espera que sirvan de ayuda las nuevas iniciativas derivadas del proceso de gestión del cambio, como la revisión de la gestión de programas y los programas informáticos de contabilidad y el nuevo sistema de gestión del riesgo.

**Recomendaciones**

R4. UNICEF necesita establecer un sistema simplificado para la gestión de la información y el seguimiento en situaciones de emergencia, sobre la base de los puntos de referencia de los nuevos
Compromisos básicos, y garantizar que en todas las operaciones de emergencia se envíe personal capacitado de gestión de la información y de seguimiento y evaluación.

R5. Los grupos temáticos y la integración de género deben formar parte de los programas de inducción y de capacitación para todos los miembros del personal, especialmente el personal superior de gestión a nivel de país.

R6. La experiencia humanitaria debe ser un requisito obligatorio en todas las contrataciones de representantes de país.

R7. UNICEF necesita seguir fortaleciendo la lista de reserva para la contratación en la web mundial y la lista de reserva e invertir en la capacidad de recursos humanos en las Oficinas Regionales donde haya funcionarios de enlace para situaciones de emergencia.

R8. Es preciso establecer una inducción y una capacitación basada en las regiones y los países de manera sistemática para los coordinadores de grupos temáticos.

R9. Los países donde se producen situaciones de emergencia habitualmente deberían preponer suministros para una respuesta rápida. Además, las oficinas de país deben establecer acuerdos marco con los proveedores para las compras locales y regionales.

R10. Debería realizarse un estudio sobre las mejores prácticas en los sistemas administrativos y de gestión de contratos asociados en el contexto de la respuesta de emergencia en diferentes países y lecciones aprendidas para reproducirlas en otros países.

4. Respuesta humanitaria interinstitucional

Conclusiones

Grupos temáticos
Uno de los puntos centrales de la Fase III del programa de fortalecimiento de la capacidad de DFID fue la aplicación del enfoque de grupos temáticos. En general, ha sido un éxito. UNICEF ha asumido compromisos importantes en el enfoque por grupos temáticos a nivel mundial y ha invertido significativamente en la rendición de cuentas de los grupos temáticos en todas las emergencias graves donde interviniendo estos grupos.

El grupo temático de WASH ha logrado el mayor progreso a nivel mundial, nacional y operativo al ofrecer una capacidad de liderazgo eficaz, seguido por el grupo de Nutrición y el grupo de Protección de la Infancia (por medio de la labor de UNICEF en el grupo de trabajo sectorial), aunque el progreso sobre el terreno ha sido desigual. El grupo de Educación está comenzando a convertirse en una entidad coherente.

Sobre la base de la experiencia en la aplicación del enfoque por grupos temáticos en los últimos dos años y medio, es necesario abordar varias cuestiones y lecciones fundamentales:

- Hay una escasa vinculación entre las iniciativas de los grupos temáticos mundiales y las realidades del país.
- Si bien a menudo existen grupos a nivel nacional (con sede en la capital), no son tan fuertes a nivel subnacional, donde se lleva a cabo la operación de emergencia.
- Todavía queda trabajo por hacer para asegurar que la posición de coordinador de grupo deba ser una función separada del personal técnico interno, y hacer hincapié en las capacidades necesarias para dirigir el grupo.
Hay problemas de recursos sin resolver, tanto en términos de cómo se financia la capacidad de liderazgo del grupo y cómo tienen los miembros del grupo acceso a la financiación por medio de UNICEF.

La rendición de cuentas para los coordinadores de grupo no son uniformes en las diferentes respuestas.

UNICEF ha aplicado debidamente los grupos temáticos, pero parece que no tiene una visión coherente sobre lo que el nuevo enfoque podría significar.

No hay un entendimiento común sobre la disposición del “proveedor de último recurso”.

Sigue siendo problemática la gestión de la información y los conocimientos en los grupos temáticos dirigidos por UNICEF.

Además de sus responsabilidades de dirección, UNICEF ha sido un participante fundamental en los demás grupos temáticos y ha desempeñado un papel muy importante en el apoyo al grupo temático de Salud, dirigido por la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS). Además, UNICEF desempeña un papel clave para facilitar la respuesta interinstitucional a través de su gestión de los suministros de artículos no alimentarios en varias situaciones de emergencia graves.

Alianzas

El modo predominante de trabajo de UNICEF es por medio de las alianzas, ya sean gubernamentales o no gubernamentales, y la acción humanitaria no es una excepción. El sistema de grupos temáticos ha hecho que las alianzas humanitarias sean incluso más importantes para la función de UNICEF, y mejorar la colaboración entre los principales actores en la respuesta fue un elemento central del proceso de reforma humanitaria.

En 2008, EMOPS invirtió una energía considerable en un nuevo diálogo con sus aliados humanitarios mundiales, una iniciativa que dio lugar a un conjunto de reformas y fue muy bien acogida. Este año, la Junta aprobó una nueva estrategia de colaboración, y esto ofrece una vez más el potencial para mejorar las alianzas humanitarias. Un indicador clave del éxito será si UNICEF es capaz de aplicar con éxito su nuevo acuerdo de cooperación para programas (PCA), el principal instrumento para financiar a otras organizaciones.

UNICEF entabla alianzas con los gobiernos en todos los países donde trabaja. La mayoría de los aliados gubernamentales entrevistados para esta evaluación elogiaron en gran medida la labor de UNICEF, y hay muchos ejemplos de los cambios considerables que se producen por medio de estas alianzas.

Recomendaciones

R11. UNICEF tiene que hacer un mejor uso de los aliados para dirigir grupos temáticos a nivel subnacional y centrarse mejor a nivel estratégico, como por ejemplo en materia de preparación, recursos y reservas de emergencia, etc. También hay que hacer mayores esfuerzos para establecer una coordinación de los grupos temáticos que esté más cerca de la zona afectada, y no sólo en la capital.

R12. UNICEF tiene que tener la capacidad de gestionar directamente los programas en el caso de las operaciones de “último recurso”. Esto significaría disponer de una mejor capacidad de aumentar la dotación de personal, así como mejorar los sistemas de logística y suministros.

R13. UNICEF y otros organismos que dirigen grupos temáticos deben tener un diálogo conjunto con el Comité Directivo Interinstitucional (IASC) para aclarar las responsabilidades de los organismos, la rendición de cuentas y los límites del principio del “proveedor de último recurso”.

R14. UNICEF necesita documentar el costo real de los grupos temáticos para poder tener un diálogo razonable con los donantes acerca de cómo dotarlos de recursos. UNICEF tiene que preparar un estudio breve describiendo las implicaciones en materia de costos como una primera medida para realizar un diálogo interinstitucional más amplio con los donantes.
R15. A medida que UNICEF concluya el proceso de revisión de los PCA actualmente en curso, es preciso simplificar los sistemas para el desembolso y la administración de los fondos a las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG). Es preciso iniciar un proceso de seguimiento de la consulta mundial de 2008 y, si es preciso, incorporar de manera más uniforme a las ONG en el diálogo sobre las alianzas estratégicas.

R16. UNICEF tiene que participar en un debate interno e incorporar a los gestores de país sobre cómo abordar la cuestión de equilibrar delicadamente una en relación constructiva con los gobiernos y la capacidad de la organización de proporcionar una respuesta humanitaria imparcial y neutral cuando los niños están afectados por los desastres naturales y los conflictos.

5. La promoción humanitaria y el mecanismo de seguimiento y presentación de informes

Conclusiones

UNICEF, con los recursos de la Fase III del DFID, ha realizado un progreso razonable en la aplicación del Mecanismo de Seguimiento y Presentación de Informes 1612 (MRM). Sin duda hay mucho por hacer en términos de la profesionalización de la recopilación de datos, ya que en muchos aspectos la situación actual es más bien un comienzo prometedor que un sistema finalizado. Hay dos limitaciones fundamentales que impiden que el MRM sea el instrumento de gran alcance que tiene el potencial de ser: la sensibilidad extrema de los gobiernos y los grupos armados mencionados, y, más importante aún, los escasos recursos disponibles para este tipo de trabajo.

Por lo que se refiere a la promoción humanitaria de una manera más general, aunque UNICEF sigue siendo un promotor de alto nivel de las necesidades de los niños marginados y vulnerables, muchos aliados y el personal desearían que la organización fuese más proactiva en la promoción del acceso humanitario y de la protección de la infancia.

Recomendaciones

R17. UNICEF debería desempeñar un mayor papel de promoción con los donantes (como el DFID y otros), a quienes se les ha aconsejado que reconozcan que los grupos temáticos y los organismos técnicos de las Naciones Unidas con un desempeño eficaz no pueden ocuparse por sí solos de las necesidades humanitarias, y que los donantes tienen un papel importante que desempeñar en la relación con los gobiernos cuando se trata del acceso humanitario en situaciones en las que el propio gobierno es incapaz de satisfacer las necesidades humanitarias.

R18. Es preciso desarrollar aún más los instrumentos para llevar a cabo el MRM. Ejemplos como la base de datos del Sudán y el estudio de referencia de Colombia son alentadores, pero se necesita un conjunto de instrumentos que países como la República Centroafricana puedan ofrecer a los aliados.

R19. UNICEF y los donantes deben comprometerse a financiar el papel de UNICEF en la MRM a largo plazo.

R20. UNICEF necesita hacer más esfuerzos para informar a sus aliados sobre sus éxitos de promoción, como la liberación de los niños soldados sudaneses.
1. Introduction, objectives and methodology

1.1 Background to the evaluation

This is the second and final evaluation of the Programme of Cooperation established between the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to strengthen UNICEF’s capacity for humanitarian response and preparedness. The Programme of Cooperation aimed at ensuring reliable, coordinated, timely and effective emergency response and preparedness, and has been implemented in three main phases: Phases I and II covered the period 2000–2005, while Phase III ran from July 2006\(^\text{22}\) to the end of 2009. The first evaluation\(^\text{23}\) was carried out at the end of Phase II in 2006.

This evaluation was commissioned by the UNICEF Evaluation Office to focus primarily on the implementation of Phase III of the Programme of Cooperation. The intention to conduct an independent evaluation was part of the agreement between DFID and UNICEF. Given that Phase III is also the last phase of this Programme, it will serve de facto as an end-of-Programme evaluation.

1.2 Purpose, objectives and scope

The purpose\(^\text{24}\) of the evaluation is to measure progress against the aims and results outlined in the Phase III Global Proposal of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation\(^\text{25}\) and to provide direction to further UNICEF efforts to strengthen its humanitarian preparedness, response capacity and role in the inter-agency humanitarian reform process. The evaluation will be used to shape future efforts to strengthen humanitarian action and will support UNICEF’s future capacity-building efforts to enhance national capacity development. It will provide lessons to guide organizational capacity-building partnerships at both the government and humanitarian actor levels, particularly focusing on UNICEF’s contributions to inter-agency humanitarian response.

The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- make an objective and independent assessment of the current status of UNICEF’s capacity in humanitarian action, highlighting systemic issues and gaps to provide recommendations on priorities and strategies for future capacity building;
- provide an overall assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of Phase III of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation; and
- draw lessons on policy and programming for building the capacity for humanitarian action.

The scope of the evaluation has been essentially global, looking at the three tiers of UNICEF’s organization – Headquarters (New York and Geneva), regional (the Regional Offices) and at the country level (Country Offices).

\(^\text{22}\) From January 2006, UNICEF received GB£1.9 million (US$3.4 million) as ‘bridge funding support’ to carry out ongoing and essential activities until there was greater clarity regarding Phase III of the project. The ‘Bridge Funding Phase’ was oriented as the ‘start-up phase’ of the larger 3½ year Phase III Programme of Cooperation.
As Phase III of the Programme of Cooperation coincided with the introduction of key humanitarian reforms, and DFID has been a key proponent of these reforms, the evaluation particularly focused on the three objectives of the programme that relate to inter-agency response, namely:

- **Outcome 1**: Effective and reliable cluster lead in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene; Nutrition; Emergency Telecoms and Education in all cluster countries.
- **Outcome 2**: Effective and reliable UNICEF sector coordination in Child Protection in all major emergencies.
- **Outcome 3**: Adequate people with adequate competencies for coordination and response vis-à-vis programme Core Commitments to Children (CCC) in place in a timely manner.

1.3 Organization of the evaluation

The evaluation was commissioned and managed by the Evaluation Office of UNICEF. An internal steering committee consisting of representatives from the Evaluation Office and the Office of Emergency Programmes guided the evaluation process, and an Evaluation Reference Group, chaired by the Director of the Evaluation Office, was also formed. Its accountabilities were to:

- ensure the evaluation process adequately involved key stakeholders to ensure ownership of analysis and recommendations;
- review and critique key intermediate products and the draft report; and
- agree to a management response to the evaluation.

### The evaluation team and evaluators’ bias

**Abhijit Bhattacharjee** (Team Leader) is an independent evaluation and strategy expert with over 25 years of senior management and consulting experience in international organizations in various parts of the world. With extensive experience in NGOs, the United Nations and Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, he has carried out short-term consulting assignments for UNICEF from time to time.

**Lewis Sida** is an independent consultant in humanitarian policy, practice and evaluation. He has led multi-sector and programme evaluations for donors, UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and international NGOs. He has worked for DFID, as well as has carried out short-term consulting work for UNICEF.

**Moira Reddick** is an independent consultant who has participated in and led multi-sector programme and strategic evaluations for UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, the Disaster Emergency Committee, donors and INGOs. She has worked for DFID and has also had short-term contracts with UNICEF.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 UNICEF’s humanitarian capacity-building framework

The principal strategy for building UNICEF’s humanitarian response capacity flowed from the Martigny Agenda. The aim was to mainstream humanitarian response as the responsibility of all staff, at all times. Conceptually, this involved integrating humanitarian action into all key processes: *programme processes* (annual planning processes, early warning, reinforcing the oversight function of Regional Offices, etc.); *human resources* (career development, succession planning, rapid staff deployment); *learning* (training plans, emergency preparedness and response training, regular meetings); *security* (staff safety into management plans, security in consolidated appeals); and *policy and advocacy* (advocacy strategies, policy papers/guidelines).

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26 It followed on from a key 1998 conference in Martigny, Switzerland, that sought to enhance UNICEF’s responsiveness to children in unstable situations.
The evaluation has used the above model\(^27\) as a reference point for its analysis of the capacity-building programme since its inception. This has been followed up in the conclusions section of this report. As its main analytical framework, the evaluation has used a ‘non-strategy’ paper\(^28\) developed by the Office of Emergency Programmes in late 2005. This paper formed the basis for UNICEF’s priorities in building its capacity for humanitarian action. The Phase III proposal and subsequent agreement between DFID and UNICEF drew on this non-strategy paper and its priorities, although in the end it concentrated on a narrower base. Drawing on the first evaluation of the Programme of Cooperation, and the Humanitarian Response Review,\(^29\) this non-strategy paper set out five key areas to be strengthened to improve overall response:

- Key area 1: Strengthened knowledge and capacity to fulfil UNICEF’s mandate, including the CCCs.
- Key area 2: Strengthened early warning and preparedness activities
- Key area 3: Strengthened emergency response, performance and monitoring
- Key area 4: Strengthened contributions to inter-agency humanitarian response
- Key area 5: Strengthened humanitarian advocacy and communications

The DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation\(^30\) subsequently defined six outcomes for this Programme of Cooperation. It needs to be noted here that although DFID funds did not go toward early warning and preparedness activities, these areas were examined in the evaluation since they are critical to any humanitarian capacity and were key areas in the non-strategy paper. The outcomes were:

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\(^{27}\) Security has not been covered in this evaluation as this was not part of the Phase III programme objectives, nor was it included in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation.


Outcome 1: Effective and reliable cluster lead in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene; Nutrition; Emergency Telecoms and Education in all cluster countries.

Outcome 2: Effective and reliable UNICEF sector coordination in Child Protection in all major emergencies.

Outcome 3: Adequate people with adequate competencies for coordination and response vis-à-vis programme CCCs in place in a timely manner in all new major emergencies.

Outcome 4: UNICEF staff has basic knowledge of CCCs and key tools to operationalise them ensuring timely, effective and reliable response.

Outcome 5: Internal systems and procedures for finance, Admin and Supplies streamlined and put into practice in country offices (CO) with HQ/RO support mechanisms.

Outcome 6: Improved (evidence-based) advocacy in relation to violations against children in a minimum of 15 countries.

The evaluation team examined these six outcomes within the framework of the non-strategy paper, as the framework was wider in scope than the six outcomes that flowed from it. In order to address the purpose of the evaluation, namely whether UNICEF had made progress towards a more reliable and predictable humanitarian response, the evaluation treated the findings of the Phase I/II evaluation as the benchmark. This approach was subsequently endorsed by the Evaluation Reference Group through production and approval of the Inception report.

In brief, the evaluation used the following logic to construct its specific areas of enquiry and draw conclusions. Martigny laid down the overall framework for humanitarian capacity building over a decade ago, and the five key areas (in the non-strategy paper) and six outcomes (DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation) formed the basis of the work done during the period under evaluation.

Figure 2: Five key areas and six outcomes flow from the Martigny Agenda

1.4.2 Key issues/questions examined in the evaluation

The key questions for the evaluation were identified in the inception report that was prepared by the evaluation team and agreed with UNICEF. The questions were based on the Terms of Reference and the initial briefing provided by UNICEF to the team.
1.4.3 Data collection

The overall methodology was based on both inductive and deductive approaches using quantitative and qualitative data gathered from a carefully selected range of sources as indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>Areas of enquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Did the capacity-building project strengthen knowledge and capacity to fulfil UNICEF’s mandate, including the CCCs? | • degree to which CCCs are known by entire organization  
• degree to which technical and qualified staff are effectively deployed for emergency response  
• degree to which humanitarian action is prioritized in policy and strategy  
• structures, routines for response in place and well known  
• management structures in place and accountabilities clear between Country Offices, Regional Offices, and Headquarters  
• resources dedicated to supporting humanitarian action |
| 2. Did the capacity-building project strengthen early warning and preparedness activities? | • extent to which the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process engages the office in preparing for a response  
• progress made on the early warning – early action system and linkages to advocacy and response  
• progress made on streamlining supply and procurement  
• progress made on disaster risk reduction work (and how this has been incorporated as a strategy with emergency preparedness and response). |
| 3. Did the capacity-building project strengthen emergency response, performance and monitoring? | • degree to which Country Offices are able to effectively scale up progress made in reinforcing Regional Offices to support Country Office scale up for response  
• role of Headquarters, Regional Offices and Country Offices in oversight of quality  
• timeliness of HR support for emergencies from Regional Office and Headquarters (tools and procedures for rapid deployment in place and known, such as rosters of pre-screened and available Cluster Coordinators)  
• progress made on developing benchmarks and monitoring performance against these  
• progress made on streamlining support systems including finance and supply |
| 4. Did the capacity-building project strengthen contributions to the inter-agency humanitarian response? | • degree to which cluster approach is mainstreamed and supported within organization  
• progress through cluster system and reform generally toward more reliable response in the areas that UNICEF leads  
• degree to which cluster systems, policies and personnel have been developed  
• culture shift within UNICEF and other organizations toward genuine partnership |
| 5. Did the capacity-building project strengthen humanitarian advocacy and communications? | • progress made toward 1612 monitoring mechanism  
• evidence of UNICEF work on children affected by armed conflict (CAAC) advocacy  
• degree to which expertise and knowledge have been developed in CAAC advocacy |
The evaluation drew on previous reviews of Phase I and II as well as country-level monitoring missions and real-time evaluations undertaken during the duration of the Programme. In addition, the evaluation drew on information obtained from organizational reviews, pertinent evaluations, and concurrent UNICEF studies to inform National Capacity Development in Humanitarian Action.

The evaluation employed the normal range of social science research methods common to humanitarian evaluation:

- A briefing and scoping visit to UNICEF Headquarters (New York and Geneva offices) and preliminary desk research, followed by production of an Inception report outlining the key questions and methodology for the evaluation (agreed with the Evaluation Reference Group);
- A comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, correspondence, data and reports of emergency response/preparedness evaluations carried out by UNICEF between 2006 and 2009 (a full list of key documents reviewed can be found in Annex 3);
- Country visits and observations, from which country case studies were produced for this evaluation to draw on (visits to five countries and telephone interviews with their Regional Offices);
- Statistical analysis of data, including data generated through two surveys conducted during the evaluation;
- Questionnaires/online survey; two sets of questionnaires, one for external key informants and another for internal (UNICEF) key informants;
- Key informant interviews in UNICEF Headquarters (New York and Geneva) and Regional Offices.
- Semi-structured and structured interviews, both face-to-face and by telephone, with a range of stakeholders including beneficiaries, UN agencies, NGOs, partners, donors, international organizations and governments; and
- Focus group discussions and semi-structured group discussions with external stakeholders during country visits.

1.4.4 Key informant interviews and focus group discussions

Key informants were selected on the basis of discussions with the Evaluation Office, the Office of Emergency Programmes and other stakeholders during the briefing process in the early days of the evaluation as well as during discussions on the Inception report. Further stakeholders were identified by UNICEF after the first draft of the evaluation report was submitted. Key informants included:

- key managers and stakeholders in UNICEF New York office, Geneva office, Regional Offices and Country Offices;
- regional emergency advisers and key regional staff involved in humanitarian action;
- UNICEF staff in five Country Offices visited as case studies and in selected emergency countries;
- participation in a joint Cluster Coordinators’ global meeting on cluster mainstreaming in UNICEF;
- government officials in five countries selected for case studies;
- donor representatives, especially DFID;
- UN agencies active in humanitarian action in thematic areas that are central to UNICEF’s humanitarian response: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH); Nutrition; Education; and Child Protection (relevant cluster leads/focal points, humanitarian directors and relevant managers);
- other humanitarian actors such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs with which UNICEF has had partnerships/working relationships in humanitarian response;
- people, families and communities who have received assistance partly or wholly supported by UNICEF; and
- focus group discussions and semi-structured group discussions with mixed groups of stakeholders in countries visited (cluster members involving NGOs, UN agencies and UNICEF).
A total of 281 key informants were interviewed (Annex 4) between June and August 2009, of which 150 (54 per cent) were UNICEF internal and 131 (46 per cent) were external. A full breakdown of the interviewees and focus group discussions held is given below:

Table 1: Breakdown of key informants and interviews held

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of key informant</th>
<th>No. of interviewees/ focus group discussions</th>
<th>Percentage of total no. of interviewees (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF: HQ/Geneva</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF: Regional Offices</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF: Country Offices</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other UN agencies – HQ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other UN agencies – field</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs/UNICEF partners – HQ</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs/UNICEF partners – field</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID /other donors</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group and semi-structured discussions with cluster members/partners</td>
<td>4 in Ethiopia; 5 in Sudan; 2 in Bangladesh; 3 in Central African Republic; 1 in Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.5 Survey

Two survey instruments were designed, tested and administered in order to take inventory of the perceptions of key external stakeholders, and gather views and feedback from a number of UNICEF staff and partners in different countries. These supplemented the information gathered through the in-depth interviews that were conducted with both internal and external stakeholders. The purpose of the surveys was two-fold:

(a) **External survey:**\(^32\) To take an inventory of the perception of external stakeholders (partners, Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator, other UN cluster leads, UN agencies, NGOs, etc.) of UNICEF’s strengths and competencies, and its leadership and participation in various clusters. It was administered to 60 individuals and 22 responses (38 per cent) were received; two were invalid and the remaining 20 were analysed. The survey was also sent out through two international NGO networks – ACT and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) – and three international NGOs sent the survey to all of their Country Offices.

(b) As the field visits took place in a limited number of Country Offices and Regional Offices, the evaluation sought the views of UNICEF staff through an internal survey on the progress made in terms of the objectives in the Phase III proposal. In short, the internal survey complemented the data gathered from direct observations and field visits. It was designed to elicit individual views and feedback from staff on the changes to decision-making and communication during emergencies, the effectiveness of emergency preparedness and response plans (EPRP), awareness and use of the CCCs within countries, and the changes in finance, administrative, procurement and HR capacity. A total of 111 pre-selected staff were administered the survey instrument, and 50 responses (44 per cent) were received.

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\(^32\) The survey questionnaire was developed and tested in June and July 2006. It was tested by sending it to six individuals who returned the questionnaire with comments. Two currently work in Emergencies Departments in international NGOs, one works for the Red Cross Movement, one works for the United Nations, one works for a donor and one is a consultant who used to work for a donor. One of the testers failed to return the questionnaire. The questionnaire was revised in light of the comments. The external survey questionnaire was approved by the UNICEF Evaluation Office on 5 August and emailed out to 60 potential respondents on 8 August.
The internal survey was approved by UNICEF Evaluation Office on 5 August 2009 and sent out on 8 August 2009 to the pre-selected staff members. The initial deadline for responses was 24 August 2009. There were four reminders sent during August by the Evaluation Office, and the closing date was extended to 1 September. There were 49 responses by 1 September, giving a final response rate of 44 per cent. The internal survey had 10 questions, each divided into two parts. The first part contained a series of positive statements (which captured the desired state in so far as humanitarian capacity was concerned) about how UNICEF managed its business processes in relation to a timely and effective emergency response. Respondents were invited to give a score based on their perception of the validity of the statements. The second part invited respondents to share their views and/or expand on particular aspects of emergency response capacity. The sample was analysed using Zoomerang for the “A” multiple choice questions. While all the 49 respondents filled in the second part providing qualitative information, only 38 returns were valid when the information contained in the first part was analysed.

The breakdown of internal respondents was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Representative (CR)/Deputy CR</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Programme Officer/Specialists</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support staff (Country Office)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support staff (HQ/Geneva)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: Internal survey regional spread**

![Regional representation: DFID-UNICEF PH III internal survey](image)

Source: Zoomerang responses to the internal survey disseminated for this evaluation, 2009.

**1.4.6 Country visits – selection, observations and interviews**

As part of the primary data gathering process, five countries were selected for intensive field visits by the evaluation team. The countries were selected by the evaluators from a matrix of countries based on typology of emergencies, cluster approach activation, recent evaluations or studies; this matrix was produced by the Evaluation Office and the Office of Emergency Programmes and provided the basis for discussion with the evaluation team to determine the short-list of countries. Regional Offices and Country Offices were then consulted concerning the emergency situation in each country, as well as to determine
availability of staff for interviews before final countries were agreed upon. The selection of Colombia came at a later stage as the various other options that were preferred choices\(^{33}\) of the evaluators were ruled out due to the timing of the visits. Timing was a challenge as four of the five countries could be visited only during August because the visits had to be cleared by Regional Office levels, which was a lengthy procedure.

**Table 2: Selection of countries for field visits**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rationale for selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Complex emergency, cluster approach, small Country Office with limited capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sudan</td>
<td>Complex and big emergency, established in-country capacity, cluster approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Natural disaster, well-established in-country capacity, regular emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Complex, slow onset emergency; large Country Office, strong government; early activation of cluster in 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Protracted crisis as well as natural disasters; cluster approach in early 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5 Triangulation

The team used the different data sources and various meetings throughout the process of the evaluation to triangulate information – checking and corroborating findings to ensure they were consistent. In particular:

i) The country case studies were all validated by the Country Offices, usually in two stages: (a) an exit debriefing held at the end of each country visit where the main findings were presented to the country management team; and (b) a draft country case study report sent to each Country Office to check factual accuracy.

ii) The team met regularly to review telephone interview findings and to review key documents for the purpose of consolidating findings, checking consistency and identifying gaps. Teleconferences were also held at the end of key visits such as the New York briefing, Geneva office visit and attendance at the global meeting of Global Cluster Coordinators.

iii) As different Country Office visits and Regional Office interviews were undertaken by different individual consultants, the team met at the end of the country case study process to triangulate their individual findings and explore commonalities and patterns in the data gathered.

iv) A validation workshop was held in New York, attended by key stakeholders from UNICEF Headquarters and Geneva office following the production of the first draft of the report to review findings and ensure accuracy, logic and consistency.

(v) Two rounds of draft reports were extensively commented upon by evaluation reference group members, Evaluation Office and selected Regional and Country Offices.

1.6 Limitations and constraints

There were a number of constraints. The principal difficulty was one of attribution related to DFID funding in particular for two reasons: first, humanitarian capacity building has been a global programme funded by

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\(^{33}\) The preferred choices were Haiti, Myanmar, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan and Philippines.
several donors; and second, the Programme of Cooperation was an ambitious project that sought to influence the behaviour of a very large organization with a relatively small but strategic input.

There were also a number of practical constraints:

(a) UNICEF’s humanitarian capacity is evolving and changes are being made to different aspects of the organization’s functioning at different levels. As this evaluation was under way, several change initiatives were either being launched or were under active consideration. The evaluators have noted some of these where relevant; however, the evaluators have consciously refrained from assessing or commenting on the potential of these changes on future outcomes.

(b) The team was not able to visit its first choice of countries for case study material, meaning that rapid onset natural disasters were under-represented in the analysis. All country studies except one were conducted in countries facing protracted crises; case studies and primary data could not be collected for any country with ongoing rapid response operations.

(c) The survey instruments were administered during the busy summer months but the initial deadline was extended so people had a total of 24 days, a little over three weeks, to complete and return the survey. On the external survey in particular, the number of returns was small (22), and given that many of the respondents chose to provide their feedback only on some aspects of the questionnaire (mostly on the WASH cluster), findings were patchy. However, as the survey data did not constitute the main basis of analysis in this evaluation, and was only used to supplement qualitative and quantitative data gathered through other processes, this did not affect the overall findings.

(d) The timing of the evaluation coincided with summer holidays in most countries, and this has meant that most of the country visits and interviews, including administration of the survey instruments, were undertaken over a five week period in order to make sure that key interlocutors were available during the Country Office visits.

1.7 Format of the report

The report is presented in nine sections, with Section 2 providing a description of the overall context of the humanitarian capacity building programme within UNICEF. This section includes a summary of the previous evaluation findings as well as background to Phase III of the DFID-UNICEF Cooperation programme. Sections 3-7 present the findings of the evaluation against the five key areas that underpin this programme as described in section 1.4 above:

- Section 3: Knowledge and capacity to fulfil UNICEF’s mandate, including the CCCs.
- Section 4: Early warning and preparedness activities.
- Section 5: Emergency response, performance and monitoring
- Section 6: Strengthened contributions to inter-agency humanitarian response
- Section 7: Strengthened humanitarian advocacy and communications

In these sections (3-7), key conclusions based on the six outcomes defined in the DFID-UNICEF Programme have been drawn from the findings of the evaluation. Section 8 analyses the overall findings and conclusions against the OECD/DAC34 criteria.

In the final section (9), the evaluators summarize the findings based on the DFID-UNICEF Programme outcomes and present their overall conclusions and strategic recommendations for the organization in terms of its humanitarian capacity and programming.
2. The context: humanitarian capacity building and DFID-UNICEF cooperation

2.1 Humanitarian capacity building within UNICEF

As discussed in the methodology section, this report took the Martigny model as one element of its analysis in trying to determine the degree to which capacity has been built over the entire time period of the DFID support. As can be seen from Figure 4, the initial actions focused on what Martigny called programme processes (preparedness, CCCs, the operations centre, mine action), security and human resources (establishing the regional emergency advisers and focal points within the Programme Division). Later, the advocacy agenda was also developed around children in armed conflict (CAAC), and lessons learned initiatives were put in place. It needs to be noted again that although Martigny provided the overarching framework for UNICEF’s subsequent humanitarian capacity-building work, DFID funds did not go towards preparedness and security.

Figure 4: Elements of the capacity-building programme as reported by the Office of Emergency Programmes
2.2 History of capacity-building support by DFID

The Programme of Cooperation (Phase I) between DFID and UNICEF started in 2000. Following on from the 1998 Martigny Conference, it integrated three main components: humanitarian preparedness and response, children and armed conflict and mine action. The funding was initially for £10 million over two years.

Phase II of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation focused on eight goals: preparedness and response, operations, human resources, learning strategy, security of staff and assets, knowledge base for CAAC, advocacy for CAAC and policy and guidelines for CAAC. Like Phase I, its key strategy was to mainstream emergency response into the responsibilities of all staff. Phase II ran from 2002 to 2005 and programmed £12.2 million for capacity building as well as grants of £2.63 million for operations (principally telecommunications and supplies) and £1.5 million for mine action.

Following Phase II there was a delay in formulating the priorities for Phase III. This was partly because funding was contingent on the outcome of the Phase I/II evaluation, and partly because in 2005 the humanitarian reform process was underway and DFID was switching its capacity-building focus from individual agencies to a system-wide strategy. As a result, there was a ‘bridging’ grant to close Phase II and allow time to develop the objectives for Phase III. The ‘bridge’ ran from January 2006 to March 2007, was allocated £1.9 million and had three goals:

- strengthen knowledge and capacity to fulfil UNICEF’s mandate in humanitarian crises;
- strengthen UNICEF capacity to meet inter-agency accountabilities; and
- strengthen humanitarian advocacy.

During this time, the Phase III outcomes were decided on as outlined in section one of this report. These reflected a balance of focus, with the first three outcomes focused around the DFID agenda of inter-agency (cluster) response and the second three objectives focused on improving UNICEF internal capacity. Phase III spanned the period March 2007 to 2009 and was worth just over £14 million. The total DFID support to UNICEF through the lifetime of the Programme of Cooperation has been £56 million (or roughly US $86 million).

During Phase III, 50 per cent of the funds went directly to building the capacity of Regional Offices and 10 per cent went to the Office of Emergency Programmes. Amongst the sectors/clusters, WASH, Child Protection and Nutrition took 8, 7 and 6 per cent respectively, as can be seen from Figure 5.

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Figure 5: Breakdown of DFID allocations by category of spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure in US$, in thousands</th>
<th>Breakdown of DFID expenditure 2007 - 09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of Emergency Programmes</td>
<td>EMOPS 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EMOPS)</td>
<td>WCARO 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHR</td>
<td>CAR &lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>ROPO 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>MENA 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>TACRO 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WES</td>
<td>NESP 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Protection</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITD</td>
<td>MENA 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Division</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAM</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE/CIS</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPRO</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESARO</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSA</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACRO</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCARO</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>MENA 12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNICEF, Programme Division, 2009

2.3 Lessons from Phase I and II evaluation as the basis of Phase III project

In its overall conclusion, the evaluation of Phase I and II of the Programme of Cooperation found that:

“UNICEF has made important advances in building capacity supported by the CB [capacity-building] Programme and there are some examples of very effective response. However, UNICEF remains some distance from achieving the goal of reliably delivering humanitarian response as the rights-based approach the CCCs require.”

The evaluation identified a number of ‘principal achievements’ for the programme, including progress on emergency preparedness and response planning, CCCs, high level advocacy, child protection, UN reform, security management, supplies, the emergency response teams, technical capacity at regional level, better human resources and better training. It also identified a number of constraints, both internal and external. Principal amongst these was variable quality leadership in the decentralized model that placed a high emphasis on the Country Offices. Other internal constraints included weak human resources planning at Regional Office and Country Office levels, technical capacity in CCC areas was not guaranteed, gender integration was not effective, learning and training was weak in child protection, finance and administration was cumbersome and bureaucratic, too much focus on ‘excellence’ when developing tools and guidelines, not enough strong partners, CCCs were not well known throughout the

organization and a lack of strategic leadership in the capacity-building programme. Variable coordination skills and pre-positioning of supplies and discouraged and inadequate staffing were also identified as internal constraints. External constraints included growing demand for humanitarian response, lack of reliable funding (especially for capacity building), deteriorating security environment and the diminishing humanitarian space.

Experience during Phases I and II of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation, and the evaluation of capacity-building efforts in humanitarian preparedness and response, highlighted a series of lessons that were taken into consideration in the development of the proposal for Phase III. 37 The key lessons, which were taken into account during this evaluation, included:

**Capacity to operationalise CCCs:** While UNICEF staff recognized the CCCs as the framework to guide humanitarian preparedness and response, the ability of staff to assimilate and operationalise these commitments at all levels of the organization was a challenge. Hence, more needed to be done to reinforce the organisation’s capacity to mobilize appropriate human resources to meet UNICEF’s humanitarian commitments at all levels of the organization.

**Shortcomings of mainstreaming:** The mainstreaming approach to capacity building for emergency preparedness and response was successful in raising the awareness of humanitarian issues across the organisation. However, this approach was not so successful in ensuring that all offices had the capacity to respond when a crisis occurred, nor did it bring to bear systematic support for national preparedness capacity building or transition requirements. There were demonstrated needs for dedicated technical support for sector response within UNICEF and to meet UNICEF’s inter-agency obligations. 38 Hence, there was a need to systematically improve human resource planning and response through expanded technical surge support and better use of rosters and stand-by arrangements with partners.

**Organisational structure geared to emergency response:** With the decentralized nature of UNICEF’s structure, emphasis is placed on the Country Offices to manage emergency response, but country-level managers do not always have the expertise or resources to assess when and how humanitarian action should be initiated. An institution-wide early warning system was needed to identify crises early on and put in place a series of mandated actions at different levels of the organization, namely the development of a regional trigger mechanism was required that would allow Regional Offices to initiate necessary emergency response measures when a Country Office was not in a position to do so.

**Monitoring and evaluation:** Effective emergency preparedness and response needed to be supported by stronger monitoring and evaluation. The aim was to achieve this through strengthened monitoring of emergency programmes particularly in areas where UNICEF was sector lead, a strong focus on real-time evaluation (including at the inter-agency level) and a more systematic roll out of lessons learned initiatives.

**Partnerships:** Based on the cluster leadership system established in the Humanitarian Reform context, UNICEF would seek to broaden its partnerships and also draw on new mechanisms for humanitarian financing.

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38 The Humanitarian Reform Project was being launched at the time of the evaluation of Phase I and II. Subsequently, UNICEF defined with greater clarity what precisely its obligations would be in terms of the cluster approach and associated reforms.
2.4 Humanitarian context – humanitarian reforms and cluster approach

2.4.1 Trends in humanitarian crises

The number of disasters and the scale of humanitarian action have both been increasing steadily for the last decades. In the period since the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation started, the number of people affected by disasters has continued to rise steadily, although the numbers of natural disasters at least appears to have levelled off (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Trends in disaster occurrence and number of victims

Donor funding has also steadily risen from around US $6 billion in 2000 to US $10 billion in 2008. UNICEF, too, has been receiving an increasing amount of resources for humanitarian programming, totalling around US $875 million in 2008. This, of course, does not reflect what monies are spent from ‘regular resources’ (un-allocated income); even so, it represents 25 per cent of the overall US $3.4 billion UNICEF raised in 2008.

The trend graph (Figure 7) also shows that emergency funding has not only increased by a factor of four over the period of the Programme of Cooperation, but it has also been increasing as a percentage of the overall income received.

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UNICEF has identified what it considers to be key trends in disasters and emergencies that will shape the landscape of humanitarian action in the decade to come. These are:

- climate change;
- increased risk of conflict;
- increasing national ownership;
- diminishing humanitarian space;
- increasing accountability within institutional reform including in the humanitarian sector.

The issue of climate change, in particular, suggests that the number and impact of natural disasters may well continue to increase, and that conflict associated with increased pressure on resources and changed patterns of agriculture could mean ever more people in need of humanitarian assistance.

### 2.4.2 Humanitarian reform

One of the most significant changes to the architecture of international humanitarian action in the last decade has been the process that came to be known as ‘humanitarian reform’ which sought to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response by ensuring greater predictability, accountability and

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partnership. It originated with a wide-ranging review in 2005 of global humanitarian architecture. The ‘cluster’ system was perhaps the most ambitious aspect of this reform aimed at overhauling the system of technical coordination and the division of labour amongst agencies. UNICEF actively participated from the outset of the reform process (one of the authors of the influential Humanitarian Reform Review was a seconded UNICEF staff member). The launch of Phase III of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation coincided with the implementation of the reform process.

The reform agenda has three pillars – humanitarian coordinators, cluster approach and financing – and the cross-cutting theme of partnerships. The Phase III project laid a strong emphasis on enabling UNICEF to play a crucial role in the entire reform process, particularly in the cluster approach. The approach was adopted as a way of addressing gaps and strengthening the effectiveness of humanitarian response through partnership building. Moreover, it ensures predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies by clarifying the division of labour among organizations and better defining their roles and responsibilities within the different sectors of the response.

The cluster approach aims to strengthen overall response capacity as well as the effectiveness of the response in five key ways:

- First, the approach aims to ensure **sufficient global capacity** is built up and maintained in all the main sectors/areas of response, with a view to ensuring timely and effective responses in new crises;
- Second, the approach ensures **predictable leadership** in all the main sectors/areas of response. Cluster lead agencies are responsible for ensuring response capacity is in place and that assessment, planning and response activities are carried out in collaboration with partners and in accordance with agreed standards and guidelines. Cluster leads also act as the “provider of last resort”;
- Third, the approach is designed around the **concept of partnerships** (i.e. clusters) between UN agencies, the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, international organizations and NGOs;
- Fourth, the approach aims at strengthening **accountability**. Cluster lead agencies are accountable, at the global level, to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). At the field level, in addition to their normal institutional responsibilities, cluster lead agencies are accountable to humanitarian coordinators for fulfilling agreed roles and responsibilities for cluster leadership; and
- Fifth, the approach aims at improving **strategic field-level coordination and prioritization** in specific sectors/areas of response by placing responsibility for leadership and coordination of these issues with the competent operational agency.

Ongoing reviews by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and other agencies have shown that the cluster approach globally has made a difference in strengthening accountability in humanitarian action. However, there remain several ongoing challenges for all agencies in effective delivery of cluster-lead roles. While an individual lead agency’s internal capacity determines the effectiveness of its role in the cluster approach, external factors like inter-cluster/inter-agency coordination, overall commitment and accountability of all humanitarian agencies to cluster approach, predictability of funding, and harmonization of tools and guidance through IASC have a strong bearing on overall performance of a single agency in cluster approach.

Cluster leads were designated for 11 clusters. Originally UNICEF was cluster lead agency for WASH, Nutrition, Education (jointly with Save the Children) and Emergency Telecoms (jointly with the World Food Programme, WFP, and Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA) and had responsibility for Child Protection under the broader Protection cluster. In May 2008, however, with the establishment of the Gender-Based Violence area of responsibility within the Protection cluster, UNICEF assumed co-lead

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with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). In June 2009, UNICEF agreed that OCHA would lead the Emergency Telecoms cluster and they would no longer co-lead. This report uses the current situation with regard to UNICEF cluster responsibility for convenience and consistency throughout the report, namely the cluster lead agency for three clusters (WASH, Education, Nutrition) and two sub-clusters (Child Protection and Gender-Based Violence).

It was in recognition of this significant inter-agency role that the Phase III Programme of Cooperation focused on clusters. The humanitarian reform process was heavily supported by the Government of the United Kingdom, which made large investments in the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and supported the initiation of clusters through contributions to some of the global appeals. This support also influenced the design of the Phase III capacity-building project, which was under negotiation at around the same time that the impact of the reform process was being felt. Eventually three of the six objectives of Phase III focused on cluster implementation, and these accounted for roughly half the funding, at least in the proposal.

This has meant that a large part of Phase III has focused on enabling UNICEF to fulfill its cluster functions, supporting global cluster responsibilities in WASH, Nutrition and Child Protection. In addition to the DFID capacity-building support, the global cluster lead agencies and work plans have been supported through a series of appeals (see Table 3), and costs at a country level are largely incorporated in consolidated and flash appeals.

**Table 3: Global cluster appeals by UNICEF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>GBP*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>5,438,533</td>
<td>2,988,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>5,974,400</td>
<td>3,282,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DataComs</td>
<td>3,164,947</td>
<td>1,738,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>927,000</td>
<td>509,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$12,339,933</td>
<td>£8,519,165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Exchange rate used is £1 = $1.82 as of 27 June 2006

** Exchange rate used is £1 = $1.98 as of 29 July 2008


The humanitarian reform process has also been of benefit to UNICEF in terms of funding, with CERF now the single largest contributor of humanitarian funding to the organization at US $97.5m in 2008.

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43 It should be noted that no UNICEF-led/co-led clusters received funding from DFID through the global cluster appeals.

44 For Nutrition, no DFID funds were used to support global cluster coordination costs. However, funds were used for training activities in the Global Nutrition Cluster work plan.

2.5 Key elements of the Phase III support – summary of expected outcomes

The logframe for the programme kept changing frequently, and the final version was agreed only in 2008, which meant that there was uncertainty over which indicators were being used. However, the outcomes remained the same as agreed originally presented:

**Outcome 1:** Effective and reliable cluster lead in WASH, Nutrition, Emergency Telecoms and Education in all cluster countries.

**Outcome 2:** Effective and reliable UNICEF sector coordination in Child Protection in all major emergencies.

**Outcome 3:** Adequate people with adequate competencies for coordination and response vis-à-vis programme CCCs in place in a timely manner in all new major emergencies.

**Outcome 4:** UNICEF staff has basic knowledge of CCCs and key tools to operationalise them, ensuring timely, effective and reliable response.

**Outcome 5:** Internal systems and procedures for finance, administration and supplies streamlined and put into practice in COs with HQ/RO support mechanisms.

**Outcome 6:** Improved (evidence-based) advocacy in relation to violations against children in a minimum of 15 countries.

The key elements of the support will be discussed at length in this report. The following two pie charts give an indication of how the (DFID-funded) resources were programmed by sector and by category.

**Figure 8: Spending (%) by sector**

**Figure 9: Spending (%) by category**
3. Key area #1: Knowledge of CCCs and capacity to fulfil UNICEF’s humanitarian mandate

**Key questions/issues examined:** (i) degree to which CCCs are known within the entire organisation; (ii) operating procedures for response in place and well known, and management structures in place with clear accountabilities between Country Offices, Regional Offices and Headquarters; (iii) degree to which operational guidance exists on gender**  
46 **in emergencies and gender is integrated in humanitarian programming.**

3.1 Core Commitments for Children in humanitarian action

The CCCs were introduced in the aftermath of the Martigny process in 2000 when they were called the ‘core corporate commitments’; the organization was required to follow these commitments in all emergencies. They were revised in 2004, and the current version establishes a timeframe for response and accountability of relevant actions in both rapid and protracted humanitarian situations. The relevant timeframes for the CCC are:

- Conduct a rapid assessment (inter-agency or otherwise) within the first 48–72 hours;
- Undertake a variety of responses in health and nutrition, WASH, child protection, education and HIV/AIDS in the first six to eight weeks; and
- Beyond the initial response, undertake further responses in the key programme areas.

In light of humanitarian reforms that have been ongoing since 2005–2006, and based on the lessons learned in the past few years, UNICEF revised its CCCs earlier this year and integrated cluster approach accountabilities.  
47 The revised CCCs now establish a clear results framework in delivery of the humanitarian mandate in different stages of an emergency (preparedness, response and early recovery) and define clear measurable benchmarks for UNICEF’s commitments.

The Phase I/II evaluation of the Programme of Cooperation observed: “the CCCs and standards for humanitarian response are not well known by UNICEF teams”. Only just over half of country management teams considered that their staff were familiar with the CCCs in 2005. However, in the internal survey for this evaluation, some 87 per cent of staff thought the teams were familiar with the CCCs and how they should be used in planning response. There were also repeated positive mentions of the CCCs in comments in the internal survey that suggested that the commitments had been transformational in terms of understanding individual and team responsibility. This represents good progress during Phase III, and in particular on outcome 4, which was designed to ensure that UNICEF staff had basic knowledge of CCCs.

In the country case studies, too, it was evident that UNICEF staff had a good understanding of the CCCs. In all five countries – Bangladesh, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Ethiopia and the Sudan – all senior staff demonstrated an in-depth understanding of CCCs, including the recent changes made to these.

Senior staff in the Colombia Country Office acknowledges that three years ago the office had not been equipped to respond to a natural disaster, but they say that now there has been strong culture change within UNICEF with regard to emergency response. A combination of leadership, committed personnel and a strong awareness of the needs on the ground has resulted in a culture where all personnel are

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46 As per the inception report, the evaluation was also supposed to examine operational guidance on HIV/AIDS and mine risk awareness as they constituted a key element of the CCC. However, these issues were not central in all the case study countries and regions visited and there was scant data available; hence the evaluation could not examine these.

are aware of and responsive to the responsibilities outlined in the CCCs. All interviewed staff understood their personal responsibility with regard to emergency response.

Outside of the Country Office (and especially in remote regions), although staff interviewed had less detailed knowledge of the CCC document, there was certainly a good understanding of UNICEF’s commitment to emergency response and the timelines within which it ought to be delivered. In countries where there are protracted crises and large ongoing humanitarian programmes, staff naturally had a better understanding of the CCCs at sub-national level than in countries where emergencies were not so prevalent. In the Sudan, almost 500 staff and partners have been trained in emergency preparedness and response during Phase III (see Table 4), whereas in Madagascar, the Joint Monitoring Mission found that many staff were not conversant with the CCCs and how to meet them in an emergency.48

### Table 4: Emergency Preparedness and Response training in the Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Training/simulation</th>
<th># of Trainings</th>
<th># Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Sudan</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>EPR training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>EPR training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>EPR training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>EPR training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Education in Emergencies (EiE)</td>
<td>1 day workshop</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>EPR training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>WASH EPR training</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on document review and/or interviews during the Sudan country visit, 2009.

The 2005 Phase I/II evaluation found that technical capacity in all CCC sectors was not yet guaranteed. Water and sanitation capacity was found to be particularly weak. This evaluation has found that progress has been made over the course of Phase III. UNICEF has particularly built its capacity in WASH, and although there is still a lot of work to be done to ensure true depth of capacity in the WASH sector, there has certainly been a major improvement since 2005. The advent of the clusters has played a major part in this, and four of the five country case studies had WASH programmes. One of the reasons why the 2005 evaluation had found weak technical performance was that there had not been adequate emphasis on technical training. This, too, has changed in the past four years, with revised training materials and protocols in areas such as Nutrition, WASH, Education and Child Protection.

In order to strengthen capacity for emergency response as well to provide leadership to clusters, Country Offices have set up field presence in areas where UNICEF historically did not have this. For example, in Ethiopia UNICEF has set up new field offices in Gode, Ethiopia, (2006) specifically to address emergency humanitarian needs. In the Central African Republic there has been good work in setting up offices in the hinterland, in backing national health campaigns and in improving emergency response times. A similar discussion regarding setting up field offices is also taking place in Colombia, although resource constraints do not always allow UNICEF to expand its field operations capacity. In Bangladesh, UNICEF already has nine field offices across the country, and this local presence (mostly with local staff) enables the Country Office to mobilize a speedy response. All these examples indicate that Country Offices are beginning to give increasing importance to humanitarian response as part of their Country Programme strategy.

Conclusion

1. There is a greater understanding and knowledge of CCCs in Country Offices, and greater appreciation of UNICEF’s role in humanitarian response as part of Country Programmes. The Phase I/II evaluation of the Programme of Cooperation observed: “the CCCs and standards for humanitarian response are not well known by UNICEF teams”. In the internal survey for this evaluation, some 87 per cent of staff thought the Country Management Team was familiar with the CCCs and how they should be used in planning response. This appears to represent good progress during Phase III.

3.2 Leadership, structure and accountability for CCCs

3.2.1 Leadership and structure for humanitarian response

The first evaluation of the DFID Programme of Cooperation found that there had been strong leadership from the top pushing for effective emergency response, but this was more variable at regional and country levels. This evaluation has found that the situation has improved since then, with greater capacity and stronger leadership at the regional level and greater numbers of Country Offices with humanitarian capacity.

During the period under review UNICEF was involved in substantial humanitarian response in over 30 countries. A significant achievement of UNICEF with regard to its humanitarian capacity has been the strengthening of financial predictability in crisis by increasing the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) from US $25 million to $85 million (2008). As a member of the IASC, UNICEF has prioritized and focused considerable efforts on supporting humanitarian reform. Apart from ensuring UNICEF’s leadership role in the three clusters and two sub-clusters for which it is the lead agency, UNICEF has also worked to ensure that it plays a strong partnership role in the Health, Protection, Logistics and Early Recovery clusters at global and country levels.

UNICEF management has made a commitment to mainstreaming clusters into the organization’s core programme and budgets. This would mean making a commitment to allocating human and financial resources – both regular resources (RR) and other resources (OR) – to all relevant sections/divisions to support cluster work as a core function.

Leadership for humanitarian action within UNICEF has resided with the Office of Emergency Programmes throughout the 10-year period of the DFID capacity-building programme, and with the position of its Director. Initially the Executive Director was closely involved in large-scale humanitarian crises; this has changed over time with one of the Deputy Executive Directors becoming more involved in supporting humanitarian action.

Despite these positive developments, humanitarian action still does not appear to be a core part of the organisational culture. While countries with regular and protracted major emergencies have seen significant, positive change in their leadership and operational capabilities, there are many countries for which emergencies are not central to the core business (see ‘mainstreaming’ analysis below). Strategic links between UNICEF’s humanitarian action and its work on post-crisis recovery, long-term development and disaster risk reduction work are weak at the global level. Stronger directives are needed from senior management on the interaction between the Office of Emergency Programmes and Programme Division, although the evaluators acknowledge that progress is being made in this direction.

49 The issue of mainstreaming clusters was discussed at a joint global cluster donor meeting on 22 October 2008, and the concept was agreed in that meeting.
Whilst the job of championing humanitarian action within UNICEF has fallen on the Office of Emergency Programmes (and increasingly on Programmes Division), the responsibility for emergency response lies with the Country Offices and country Representatives. This, in part, derives from UNICEF’s decentralized structure whereby the Representative has authority and responsibility for UNICEF work in a given country, with oversight by the Regional Office.

As a result of the division of responsibilities for response among the Country Office, Regional Office and Headquarters, it has, at times, been challenging to know who should be accountable for different aspects of the response. This has historically also been true within Headquarters, with the division between technical oversight support sitting in the Programmes Division and the Office of Emergency Programmes responsible for other aspects of response.

Interviews with country staff and Cluster Coordinators reveal that until now there has been a weak inter-departmental mechanism for coordination of major emergency responses. The programme structure is ‘siloeed’ around traditional “sectoral divides, with little cross-unit sharing and integration. For example, effective and sustainable approaches to reducing infant mortality can include components addressing immunizations, improved water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS transmission prevention, health services infrastructure, and girls’ education among others.” Several country interviews with senior staff found that the definition of roles between regional advisers and technical experts in Headquarters Programmes Division is generally not clear or not well understood, leading to gaps and overlaps in the provision of technical assistance and poor linkages between programme technical leadership in New York and advisory capacity in Regional Offices and the field.

“…there is still confusion and overlap between DHR/EMOPS/ROHR/ROEO and it is the CO that has to juggle between all these offices.”

A survey respondent

In the past two years, there have been regular monthly meetings of the inter-departmental task force facilitated by the Office of Emergency Programmes and Humanitarian and Transition Interface Support. This mechanism looks at strategic issues such as how UNICEF engages in inter-agency initiatives on humanitarian issues and how Headquarters can support the Regional Offices and facilitate inter-departmental planning. It is slowly beginning to bring about changes in the inter-departmental collaboration.

As the role of the Regional Offices in emergency response has increased, the balance of the Office of Emergency Programmes efforts has shifted, and the latter has taken on a more policy- and standards-setting role. A 2004 paper noted, “The Regional Director has the accountability for recommending the triggering of organizational Surge Capacity in response to a crisis. The Office of Emergency Programmes, working with Programmes Division, leads the process for preparing an organizational decision on when a situation constitutes an emergency and when an emergency ends.”

In practice the role differentiation between the Headquarters, Regional Offices and Country Offices continues to be one of the most difficult aspects of response within UNICEF and a major challenge to the mainstreaming strategy (see below for more on this). In theory, Country Offices should have the tools to trigger an emergency response, but in practice their closeness to the situation can mean “not seeing the wood for the trees”. In such situations, the role of the Office of Emergency Programmes and the regional emergency advisers is to push for rapid response. This appears to be working better in regions with a robust regional emergency capacity than where there is less capacity. Increased clarity on accountabilities in this field would improve response.

The same is also true of support functions. In practice, the Office of Emergency Programmes and Regional Offices often take on quite significant responsibility for a range of support functions, from human resources to resource mobilization. Increased clarity on who is accountable (Headquarters, Regional


51 This issue is explained in greater detail in the section on clusters later in the report.

52 Meeting on Accountabilities in UNICEF, 9–12 March 2004, Nyon, Switzerland.
Offices, Country Offices) for certain support functions, such as human resources and finance, would also streamline response, eliminating time-consuming debates about who should do what and improving timeliness.

There is a general sense among the operations and programme staff, including at senior management level, that while the Country Office and Regional Office management and operations staff are being asked to be more accountable for the CCCs and the cluster requirements, these accountabilities are not directly put at the door of service functions (human resources, procurement, finance, etc.). For these service departments, their frame of reference continues to be the principles and standards defined by the organization independent of the CCCs and the cluster approach. In other words, individuals and departments still continue to operate at the conventional pace, with little consideration of humanitarian commitments that the organization has made. A lack of detailed analysis of the implications of the cluster approach and limited understanding of UNICEF’s cluster lead role and responsibilities beyond the Cluster Coordinators and emergency focal points are reflections of this.

The accountability framework within the organization, especially with regards to humanitarian action, is weak. During the field visits, the evaluators saw examples of excellent work and some poor examples, which existed side by side in some countries. This raises the question of how UNICEF measures and values performance. Although the evaluation has not examined the performance management system, which was beyond its scope, the evaluators agree with a core finding of the Human Resources Review that UNICEF undertook in 2006. This found that as the organization’s performance management system was not working to differentiate performance, a significant degree of underperformance or non-performance was not being addressed. It is difficult to measure performance if the results expected are not clear, and the emphasis has been on compliance with procedures and delivering a list of activities. It is hoped that the new CCC benchmarks will change this.

The evaluation team was informed that the management is currently working on developing a unified accountability framework that will integrate accountability for UNICEF’s humanitarian mandate at various levels.

Conclusion

2. The accountability framework within the organization has been weak, especially with regards to humanitarian action, but is now being revised and strengthened on an organisation-wide basis.

3.2.2 Regional Office oversight of emergency response

The increased humanitarian capacity of the Regional Offices over the course of the period under examination has been one of the major factors in the improvement in performance noted in this evaluation. Since the last evaluation of the Programme of Cooperation, which recommended more resources in humanitarian action for Regional Offices, more emergency officers and more technical staff (especially linked to clusters) have been taken on, boosting the teams of the regional emergency advisers. Over this time period, two former heads of the Office of Emergency Programmes have become Regional Directors and other appointees have considerable humanitarian experience. Two former Regional Emergency Advisers have become country Representatives, taking forward another recommendation from the Phase I/II evaluation.

With the Regional Offices taking on ever more responsibility for oversight of Country Offices, there is also greater senior management involvement in ensuring that UNICEF takes timely decisions during an emergency and is able to launch a rapid response.

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During Cyclone Sidr, the Regional Office worked closely with the Country Office to ensure that rapid deployments were made. After Cyclone Nargis, the Regional Office encouraged the Country Office to take a lead on the clusters right from the beginning, and the Representative ensured that the clusters functioned properly. When the cluster approach was introduced in eight countries in East and Southern Africa, the Regional Office provided surge support and technical guidance through field missions, provision of the cluster-developed initial rapid assessment tools, and identification and the facilitation of recruitment of the country-level Cluster Coordinators.  

In Bangladesh, Ethiopia and the Sudan, the Regional Office deployed regional staff and technical specialists to support cluster work in WASH and Nutrition in particular. In the Central African Republic, faced with significant humanitarian need, the Regional Office deployed a '90-day' team to help scale-up. Without this support, the office would not have been able to meet this challenge.

The role of the regional emergency advisers (UNICEF now has six) has been critical in preparedness planning, simulations and roll-out of clusters in these countries. Simulations were developed in the West and Central Africa Regional Office (WCARO) with DFID funding and used in there as well as in most other regions, for instance in Turkmenistan as an inter-agency exercise and in Uzbekistan with the Government. The Asia Pacific Shared Service Centre (APSSC), which houses the support and technical functions including emergency focal points for both the South Asia and East Asia Pacific regions, has built considerable deployable capacity in WASH (three senior international specialists) that has been deployed in dozens of emergencies in the region over the past three years. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has held training linked to global WASH cluster products at regional and in-country level and deployed prepared WASH managers and trainers.

The critical role the Regional Office plays in the event of a major disaster was demonstrated in the Central & Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) region after the South Ossetia crisis in the summer of 2008. With no experience of any disaster in the previous 10 years or so, there was little capacity to respond to the major humanitarian crisis. Due to it being a major conflict between two States, the Regional Office declared it a level three 'global' emergency, meaning that support to the Country Office would entail both Regional Office and Headquarters support and that Headquarters would be involved from the outset. The Regional Office took the lead in ensuring support to the Country Office to shift from its long-term programme to rapid response, and the Regional Director established specific task forces within the Regional Office to better coordinate and carry out support to Country Offices (with two Country Offices, namely Georgia and Russia, involved on either side of the border).

The DFID Capacity-building Programme has been critical in expanding and supporting this Regional Office capacity, with the majority of funds going through Regional Offices in Phase III. Despite this generally positive assessment, there are still some areas where further work is needed. Broadly, these are properly agreeing the procedures and accountabilities in emergencies and harmonizing capacities across the Regional Offices as far as possible.

In terms of accountabilities, one of the ongoing frustrations is where authority for response lies. As outlined in the previous section, and analysed in the section below, the expanded Regional Office capability has improved the reliability of response, but has still left gaps. Country Offices have a great deal of authority in the decentralized system, and in situations where there is no ongoing humanitarian programme or recent humanitarian experience there is potential for their lack of authority and experience to slow or compromise response. Regional Offices, especially those with capacity, monitor potential emergencies and try to work with Country Offices to ensure they are prepared, as in Gabon when a civil unrest was foreseen earlier this year and the Regional Office went in to help the Country Office prepare for emergency response. There is still in theory a 'global trigger' that allows the Headquarters to intervene

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when there is a global scale emergency as in the Indian Ocean tsunami, but this is hardly used in practice (only and one other time, in Darfur) and is a blunt instrument.

A 2008 draft procedure sought to clarify how the responsibilities of the various levels of the organization might work. In this scheme, Regional Directors become accountable for responding to emergencies. The procedure\textsuperscript{56} outlines three gradations of emergencies depending on the level of support that is needed to respond effectively:

(i) emergencies requiring limited Regional Office support;
(ii) emergencies requiring significant Regional Office support; and
(iii) emergencies that surpass the capacity of Regional Offices and require Headquarters support.

Currently however, there is no clear ‘trigger’ for emergencies, apart from the global one referred to above. The Executive Directive that introduced the revised CCCs states, “In other emergencies that requires large-scale but not an organization-wide response, the Director of the Office of Emergency Programmes will liaise with Regional Directors, Supply Division and other relevant divisions to trigger timely response by the necessary UNICEF offices and Divisions”.\textsuperscript{57}

Country Offices without emergency experience or resources rely on Headquarters and Regional Office support, but there is no clear procedure for activating this, or to ensure that they use such support in a timely fashion. In addition, there is a lack of clarity about where support should be located for many of the key functions (for instance, resource mobilization or surge capacity) between Headquarters and Regional Office.

This is exacerbated by different capacities and models of emergency support in the Regional Offices. The APSSC has separate technical advisers for emergencies within one ‘hub’ serving South Asia and Asia Pacific. The WCARO office has made emergencies a responsibility of the programme unit, meaning there is an Emergency Technical Adviser reporting to the Head of section. These arrangements have not been in place for long enough to make a clear judgement on which is best, but they will certainly help in clarifying who should respond and how.

A recent report to the UNICEF Executive Board\textsuperscript{58} states that “on accountability humanitarian contexts, UNICEF programmatic accountability is guided by the CCCs, ensuring a minimum standing capacity to address the humanitarian needs of children and women and working with country programme partners to streamline disaster risk reduction measures in national policies”. Whilst this may well be the case, it is noted that the annual report of the Executive Director to the Board is made against the Medium-Term Strategic Plan (MTSP), and not the CCCs. This is picked up in the next section.

3.2.3 Mainstreaming

The key strategy for improving performance in humanitarian action within UNICEF has been one of mainstreaming as set out in the original Martigny framework discussed earlier in this report. This has continued throughout the period of the capacity-building programme, as illustrated by recent efforts to mainstream clusters. The success of this strategy or otherwise forms a large part of the analysis in this report and is intimately connected with the success of the DFID Capacity-building Programme. This is also a timely moment for the organization to reflect on whether the continuation of mainstreaming will deliver the required results.

What mainstreaming meant in the context of humanitarian action was set out in a memo from the then Executive Director. Programming in unstable situations was to be situated within the overall context of the country programme, was not to be ‘verticalized’, but was to provide a “predictable humanitarian response driven by strengthened programmatic capacity”.

The key to reliable response in the UNICEF system is the Country Office. Most are quite autonomous, with the biggest ones the most autonomous. This means that the Country Offices need to be ‘response-ready’, or at least ready to acknowledge their role in humanitarian action and ask for help if they do not have the required resources.

The planning process for Country Offices starts with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UN Common Country Assessment, but at its heart is the legal cooperation agreement between UNICEF and the national authorities, or the Country Programme Document. From the Country Programme Document, the Country Programme Action Plan, the Board-approved budget and the Annual Work Plans are developed. The Country Programme Document and the Country Programme Action Plan are based on the MTSP focus areas. Thus, country programmes are oriented around these focus areas, chosen jointly with government, and are measured against progress on them. The focus areas are:

Focus area 1: Young child survival and development
Focus area 2: Basic education and gender equality
Focus area 3: HIV/AIDS and children
Focus area 4: Child protection from violence, exploitation and abuse
Focus area 5: Policy advocacy and partnerships for children’s rights

Because humanitarian action is mainstreamed, it does not appear as a focus area in the MTSP. Instead it is mentioned in each of the MTSP focus areas, which are further broken down into approximately five ‘key results areas’ (twenty in all). Only three of the key results areas mention humanitarian action explicitly, essentially referring to the CCCs. There are also four MTSP support strategies and nine ‘cross-cutting’ strategies. None of these is specifically about humanitarian action.

The effect of this has been predictable. Budgetary resources and management time is lined up against the focus areas of the MTSP as per the Country Programme Document at Country Office level. Unless there is an ongoing protracted crisis, and therefore a consolidated appeal, meaning a regular budget for sustaining humanitarian programmes and personnel, or the country is subject to such regular natural disasters (Bangladesh) that it maintains significant capacity as a matter of course, there is little focus in the Country Office on humanitarian action. The sole exception to this is the preparedness planning process, which is analysed in greater detail later in this report.

When an emergency strikes, especially if it is an unanticipated emergency at scale, most Country Offices are not well equipped to deal with it and the Regional Offices and Headquarters step in.

Field visits and interviews noted a surprising lack of integration of emergencies into the work of Country Office and Regional Office Advisors. There is still a tendency – in practice though not in theory - to view emergencies as the responsibility of the emergency specialists in the team, or of the emergency focal point.

Smith, M, et al., Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation to Strengthen UNICEF Programming as it Applies to Humanitarian Response,
to provide support – money, people and expertise. As has been noted throughout this report, this strategy has been increasingly successful over the period of the Programme of Cooperation, getting UNICEF to a point where they are responding better. This has been achieved with dedicated capacity, largely outside the mainstream of regular Country Office programming. There are global, regional and country level emergency experts throughout the system and these resources form the core of effective response. Without them, UNICEF would only be able to respond in those countries where it already had humanitarian programmes. Far from being the norm, emergency response and humanitarian action generally is still ‘exceptional’ and ‘add on’ to the regular programme in most countries.

As mentioned in section 3.2.1, there is relative lack of clarity about who is in charge. The Country Office has the ‘accountability’ in the first instance, the Regional Office theoretically next and Headquarters after that; however, this is not written down and not agreed upon (see preceding section for more on this).

If UNICEF truly wishes to get to the point where it provides predictable and high quality humanitarian response in the vast majority of situations of crisis, it has two broad strategies it can employ. First, proper mainstreaming would see humanitarian action elevated to the status of a focus area within the MTSP, meaning that every Country Office would have to consider with government its role in emergency response and allocate resources from the regular budget to programmatic capacity.

The second route it can follow is to move away from mainstreaming to a situation where one part of the organization – almost certainly the Office of Emergency Programmes – is responsible (‘accountable’) for the CCCs and (critically) has the authority to over-rule country and regional (and support function) managers in situations where it feels these commitments are not being met. Trying to finesse the current situation where humanitarian action is one of many competing frameworks and priorities and the CCCs are, theoretically, owned by all (meaning diffused accountability) will not ensure the predictability to which UNICEF has committed itself. Given the continual increase in emergencies and humanitarian crises, resolving these outstanding strategic issues is a necessity.

Conclusions

3. The Regional Offices have played a critical role in supporting Country Offices in delivering response as well as in proactive engagement in clusters.

4. Headquarters and Regional Offices are making serious commitments to strengthening Country Offices’ capacity and country leadership to effectively deliver on UNICEF’s humanitarian mandate. However, at the operational level, there is need for greater clarity on authority, role differentiation, relationships and responsibility of various departments/sections/units in Headquarters and Regional Offices, which are gradually being addressed through an inter-divisional task force and revisions to organizational accountability systems.

5. Whereas the previous evaluation of the DFID capacity-building project found response uneven, the evidence from country studies (Bangladesh, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and the Sudan) during this evaluation indicates a significant culture change where emergency response is high on the management agenda.

6. The humanitarian agenda does not figure as a core component of UNICEF’s institutional strategy embedded in the MTSP that is approved by its Governing Board.

3.3 Rapid response capacity and standard operating procedures in emergencies

3.3.1 Decision-making, standard operating procedures for rapid response

Regional Directors are now accountable for responding to emergencies. UNICEF was able to fast-track its decision-making on rapid response and deployment immediately after the onset of the Georgia crisis due
to the clear lines of communication and coordination it had developed between the Headquarters, Regional Office and Country Office. With leadership taken by the Regional Office, clear protocols exist in this case for communication and decision-making involving the NYHQ/Geneva, Regional Office and Country Office.

The timeliness of action on the ground depends on in-country leadership. UNICEF’s response in Haiti in 2008, for example, was slow and inadequate according to several accounts. On the other hand, the Bangladesh Country Office has been consistent with its timely emergency response through its fairly robust preparedness mechanisms that enables it to launch a rapid response. Pre-existing arrangement with suppliers, NGO partners, government agencies, and its simplified (small) funds disbursement mechanism (SSFA) enable UNICEF to take speedy decisions there and ensure timely action. Pre-positioning of supplies has been vital for UNICEF’s ability to provide effective emergency response in large emergencies in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and the Sudan. In the case of one of the world’s largest humanitarian operations in Darfur, preparedness for further displacement, disease outbreaks and nutritional crises is generally good. UNICEF’s stocks of supplies and relatively large technical cadre in the Sudan mean it can quickly deploy both people and goods either in anticipation of, or in the aftermath of, an incident. In the internal survey, 95 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement “the speed of decision-making during emergency response and the communication of decisions had improved”, and gave examples of the Zimbabwe cholera response, North/South response to the Sudan 2008 crisis, advocacy on the Gaza crisis, etc.

### 3.3.2 Assessment tools

In the past two years, UNICEF has led the process of developing various inter-agency assessment tools and processes. In an effort to have an IASC-endorsed rapid assessment tool, UNICEF has contributed to the development of a consolidated one for Nutrition, Health and WASH, known as the Multi-sectoral Initial Rapid Assessment (IRA) tool for emergencies. This has been piloted in six countries: Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Sri Lanka. In Pakistan, UNICEF has adapted the IRA into a country-specific Multi Cluster Rapid Assessment (McRAM), which was used in two emergency responses: the internally displaced persons crisis and the Balochistan earthquake. It is important in that the analysis of lessons from the McRAM facilitated by the APSSC and Pakistan Country Office was used to feed that experience back into the ongoing discussions on IRA needs assessment in general. The experience provided significant learning on the preparedness for and management accountabilities around needs assessment. In the Central African Republic, visited by the evaluation team, UNICEF contributed to the Humanitarian Needs Assessment and regularly uses rapid assessment forms adapted from cluster and internal tools. Similar processes regularly take place in other major emergencies in different countries.

### 3.3.3 Improved capacity for gender in emergencies

The Phase I/II evaluation noted weak gender integration in UNICEF programming, despite strong policy commitments. An organization-wide gender mainstreaming evaluation carried out in 2007–2008 underscored the need for Country Office recognition of the link between gender mainstreaming and the human rights-based approach to programming (HRBAP). It recommended that the implications of diversity on gender mainstreaming should be more coherently addressed within the current strategy. Country Offices generally defined gender mainstreaming in the context of programme planning, monitoring and evaluation, sex-disaggregated data, gender analysis, gender-sensitive language and

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gender parity, but did not necessarily relate it to organizational functions such as operations and human resources.\textsuperscript{64}

The 2007 evaluation of UNICEF’s implementation of gender policy globally noted that despite a number of available tools and guidelines to ensure high-quality, gender-sensitive, humanitarian programming; humanitarian operations have consistently neglected to incorporate sufficient gender analysis of emergencies and needs assessment in designing services for girls, boys, women and men more in line with their rights, specific needs and capacities. The evaluation recommendations included a call for strengthened programme design and emergency field staff capacity in order to ensure that humanitarian action benefits girls, boys, women and men.

Subsequently, with generous funding from the Government of Norway, UNICEF’s Office of Emergency Programmes began to address some of these challenges through the initiative: ‘A Strengthened Response to Gender Equality and Women and Girls’ Empowerment in Emergencies’. In early 2007, UNICEF prepared a concept note that described the key conceptual basis and strategies for promoting gender equality in humanitarian preparedness, response and recovery programmes. Building on this, UNICEF launched a pilot project in 2008 to strengthen response to gender and women and girls’ empowerment in emergencies. The initiative adopted a framework for action that encompassed a range of interrelated activities at Country Office, Regional Office and Headquarters levels. Overall coordination was provided by a Gender Policy Adviser based in the Office of Emergency Programmes at Headquarters who worked closely with UNICEF Regional Offices in East and West Africa, and South and East Asia, and with UNICEF Country Offices in six ‘model’ countries – Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal and Pakistan – to pilot gender equality measures in emergency response.

The initiative centred on field-based activities by providing surge capacity, technical advice and capacity-building support to select existing emergencies and new emergency responses. Participating UNICEF Country Offices identified and implemented practical, targeted, sector-specific programme interventions with a view to demonstrating results in gender equality programming, and to serve as a catalyst for further gender-sensitive programming in emergency preparedness, response and recovery. The case studies and related lessons learned from the ‘model’ countries were documented and will be used to inform and improve existing UNICEF guidance and policies, as well as inter-agency tools. Key inter-agency guidance tools, notably the IASC’s \textit{Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action}, were used to support knowledge and capacity building at the country-level. Following a Global Consultation meeting held in February 2009 to review progress and lessons learned, five new ‘model’ countries joined the initiative: Bangladesh, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji and Guinea-Bissau. Currently, UNICEF is working on Phase II of the project, which will focus on consolidating and systematizing gender equality programming in humanitarian action in select Country Offices, including work through humanitarian clusters.

In the past two years, UNICEF has taken a series of measures to focus on organization-wide gender mainstreaming: the appointment of a senior staff member to coordinate the follow-up to the gender evaluation; the launching of a Gender Task Force that includes all regions, headed by the Director of Policy and Practice; the expanded use of sex-disaggregated data and situation analysis across the organization; the drafting of an updated gender policy; and the special allocation of US $4.25 million for the implementation of the 2009 gender action plan at regional and Headquarters levels.

The MTSP sets a key performance indicator on gender mainstreaming, with a target that at least 70 per cent of all country programmes should have been assessed from a gender perspective by 2009. However, only 31 per cent of country programmes had been assessed in their current cycle by the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{65} The number of new country programmes applying gender mainstreaming stood at 44 per cent at the end of 2008, which is far from the target of 75 per cent set for 2011.\textsuperscript{66}


\textsuperscript{65} Veneman, A., Memo to Representatives and Global Management Team, CF/EXD/2009-005, 3 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{66} Statement by HE Mr. Per Orneus, Charge d’Affaires a.i. of Sweden at the UNICEF 2009 Annual Session, 8 June 2009.
The discussions on gender issues in Country Offices have by and large remained confined to gender focal points who, in a typical Country Office, are junior staff with limited access to senior management or related decision-making forums. In emergency response, ‘integration’ of gender was traditionally limited to, for example, ensuring women-headed households are included as beneficiaries and sanitary napkins are provided for women. Almost one-third (29 per cent) of the respondents to the internal survey were not sure whether the country management team had the necessary knowledge about HIV in emergencies and gender integration and were able to apply these in their humanitarian programming. Of all the areas in the survey, this was the area that reflected greatest uncertainty of views among the internal respondents. The comments specifically about gender reflected a negative view, such as “not tested in practice” or “total lack of operational example”.

The gender in emergencies pilot project mentioned above aims at integrating gender equality in humanitarian action across a range of sectors by developing targeted interventions in the areas of WASH, Non-Food Items, Education, Protection and Health. The lessons learned from these interventions will inform a follow-up effort to promote systemic application and institutionalization of gender equality programming across all sectors of country-level humanitarian response and related cluster work. The pilot project began rolling out training and related capacity-building activities in select Country Offices. The absence of a coordinated training programme has resulted in infrequent and sparse training on the subject, however, mainly targeted to gender focal points or those working on gender-related activities, rather than a graduated and universal training programme considered necessary for all staff.

UNICEF plays a key role in the development and/or revision of (inter-)agency guidance and tools on gender in emergencies. Through participation in inter- and intra-agency forums, UNICEF contributed to drafting and/or disseminating key documents, including the Inter-Agency E-Learning Tool on Gender in Emergencies, the Inter-agency E-learning Tool on Gender Equality and UN Coherence, UNICEF’s revised Gender Policy, UNICEF’s Follow up Plan to the Gender Evaluation, and the IASC Handbook on Gender in Emergencies. The latter document served as a key tool in country level work, and an adapted version was used in trainings and capacity-building activities as well as in reviewing assessment, planning and monitoring tools.

**Conclusions**

7. Protocols and procedures in draft form have been developed and these need to be agreed so as to establish clear lines of communication and coordination involving Headquarters, Regional Office and Country Office that could help UNICEF to take fast management decisions in times of emergencies.

8. The discussions on gender issues in Country Offices have by and large remained confined to gender focal points. Gender integration in emergency response is still weak, and the organization is making investments in addressing this.
4. Key area #2: Strengthened early warning and preparedness activities

*Key questions/issues examined:* (i) How effective is the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process in gearing up the Country Offices to be *response-ready*? (ii) How are Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans monitored and Country Offices supported to ensure their operationalization? (iii) What is the current level of understanding and involvement of Country Offices in disaster risk reduction?

4.1 Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans and related tools and processes

The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan is the main vehicle through which UNICEF promotes preparedness for humanitarian emergencies, and was one of the first initiatives promoted by the DFID-UNICEF Capacity-building Programme. Every office is required to produce an annual Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan that is overseen by the Regional Office. The Regional Office also regularly conducts emergency preparedness and response workshops in countries and at a regional level.

4.1.1 Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan and Country Office capacity building

Over time, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan has gone through quite a few changes and, as a result of the Phase I/II evaluation, it is now closely aligned to the CCCs. This makes it a powerful tool for use by Country Offices. UNICEF has also been expanding the range of tools it uses on preparedness, both internally and at an inter-agency level. One of the tools gaining more and more usage is ‘simulation’, carried out for the most part by the Regional Office. Simulations are increasingly being undertaken at an inter-agency level too, often with WFP and OCHA and sometimes involving host governments (Ethiopia, for example). Inter-agency preparedness and simulation has taken place in such diverse contexts and geographical regions as Benin and Colombia (both involving government).

In addition to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process, UNICEF also maintains an early warning – early action system that maintains a watch on countries and produces quarterly global updates. This system in theory allows the Office of Emergency Programmes and others within the organization to pick up on countries where there is greater likelihood of an emergency. The system updates are also aimed at facilitating reflection on emergencies as Country Offices reassess country-specific emergency risk for children and review the status of their emergency preparedness.

The role of the Regional Office in Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan training, process and oversight is critical. Preparedness is one of the core activities of the Regional Emergency Officers and teams, and it provides a key entry point to engage with Country Offices on emergencies. The need for an Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan to be produced also allows for regular training on this, CCCs and other technical aspects of emergency response. It also provides a natural ‘hook’ for inter-agency dialogue on preparedness and, as mentioned above, simulations are run with sister UN agencies and governments, resourced and supported by UNICEF Regional Office personnel.

Phase III of the DFID Programme of Cooperation did not explicitly focus on preparedness (in the same way as the first two phases), but given that the majority of the DFID funds went to the Regional Offices, which enabled them to invest in staff capacity for emergency preparedness training, it can be said that a lot of the DFID capacity-building support has continued to be focused around the area of emergency preparedness and response. More than that, as a central plank of the Regional Offices’ engagement with
the Country Offices, emergency preparedness remains at the core of the way the organization attempts to build and maintain capacity to respond to emergencies.

**The benefits of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process were demonstrated in several emergencies in the last two years:**

1. The Bangladesh Country Office undertook its Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process and training in 2006 and then two simulations in early 2007. A year later, Cyclone Sidr battered the southeast coast of the country and the Country Office response was fast.

2. The Syria Country Office went through emergency preparedness and response training in late 2005 and early 2006, and undertook a revision of its Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan. In March 2006 UNICEF ran a simulation there using the quake scenario (as a less-sensitive proxy for the more likely civil unrest scenarios). Some four months later, when Israel's invasion of Lebanon pushed nearly one million Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian civilians across the border into Syria, the Country Office was primed to react with rapid humanitarian response initiatives.

3. In Nepal, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan and Flood Contingency Plan were in place and a simulation exercise was conducted with the Country Office. UNICEF staff and partners were better prepared as a result of emergency training and orientation conducted at the beginning of 2008 to respond to the floods in line with the CCCs. UNICEF responded more rapidly than in previous flood emergencies.

3. Zimbabwe Country Office went through Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan, emergency preparedness and response training and drought simulation in early 2005. Less than one month after the Country Office passed the simulation test, President Mugabe initiated his ‘Operation Clean Up’, which demolished shanty-town homes, displacing 10,000 people onto the streets of Harare. UNICEF Country Office was one of the humanitarian agencies to react rapidly on the ground.

Whilst the preparedness work has been one of the most important and sustained initiatives in the decade-long process of improving UNICEF’s emergency response capacity, the evidence from the country case studies and other reviews and evaluations suggests that the plans themselves may be the least important factor in a Country Office being prepared.

One of the best prepared UNICEF offices – as a result of the frequent natural disasters the country experiences – is Bangladesh. A fairly sophisticated Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process exists that is updated every year well before the floods and cyclone season starts. Real, practical preparedness there has meant:

- pre-positioned supplies worth $4.3 million, which can be drawn on by the Government or partners at very short notice;
- a large number (39) of pre-qualified NGOs with whom agreements can be signed at very short notice;
- small-scale funding agreement grant mechanism;
- long-term agreements with suppliers whereby relief items can be speedily purchased;
- streamlined internal mechanisms such as a ‘virtual’ contract review committee and small-scale funding agreement; and
- an in-country roster that allows for quick recruitment of emergency staff.

Some of these arrangements were in place in several of the countries reviewed by the evaluation team. In the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and the Sudan, the Country Offices maintained stocks of relief supplies able to service from 20,000–250,000 people. In the Central African Republic the office is also putting in place standby arrangements with NGO partners to expedite an otherwise over-long process of signing agreements. In the Sudan, the fact that it is the world’s largest humanitarian emergency means that there are enough
experienced staff to be able to deploy in anticipation of an emergency. During the evaluation, a flare up on the border between north and south saw UNICEF deploy a team to the trouble spot along with supplies in case there was fighting and subsequent population movement. The majority of staff interviewed there felt that the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan document itself was not terribly useful as they were dealing with preparedness in an everyday, practical way.

In Ethiopia, the Country Office had the largest stock of relief supplies of the countries reviewed as case studies – enough for 250,000 people; in addition, they helped the Government support a stock for a further 100,000 people. The commitment of the Country Office is to be able to respond within 72 hours, as per the CCCs. They have a highly evolved Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process, involving federal and regional governments as well as NGO partners. The decentralized regional Emergency Preparedness and Response strategy in Ethiopia has been a unique process. Because of the UNICEF-led process, government authorities now have their own Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan and there is consciousness among key government officials of the need to keep referring to this even before a disaster strikes. UNICEF’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process has also engaged all the other UN agencies in the country. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan in the Somali region was high commended both by the local government and the UNDAF review.

With additional responsibilities as outlined in the revised CCCs, and particularly those in the preparedness phase, the importance of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan in every UNICEF office, or as a minimum in each Country Office, becomes even more pronounced. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan will need to be re-formatted to encompass these additional accountabilities included in the new CCCs. In addition, the complementarity of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan with other plans such as Early Warning – Early Action and inter-agency contingency plans of the UN system are now being reviewed. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan and the Early Warning - Early Action system are being streamlined as part of harmonization of the emergency risk management initiative. The main objectives are harmonizing the different emergency risk-based planning processes (Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan, Business Continuity, Security), integrating them with the Country Office annual work planning cycle and the Early Warning - Early Action system and aligning them with the various UNICEF change management initiatives.

It is also important to ensure the CCCs are linked to disaster preparedness plans at national and provincial level, down to community level where applicable. In the new version of the Early Warning - Early Action system there is a section called Key Actions that is meant to measure the operationalisation of Country Office preparedness by monitoring whether the actions listed in preparedness plans are being implemented.

4.1.2 Limitations of Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans

In Colombia, the country case study found that the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan was not terribly meaningful, in part because there were no resources to follow up on the planned activities that could have led to practical preparedness. This is a challenge facing emergency preparedness in many organizations, not just UNICEF. It is indeed difficult to identify resources to operationalise preparedness plans, including with donors. This is evident on review of many of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans. Where a Country Office is in the middle of a protracted crisis, or in a country like Bangladesh that suffers from natural disasters on an almost annual basis, preparedness is practical and can result in very speedy response. Having pre-positioned stocks, experienced personnel, streamlined procedures, contingency funds and pre-agreements with partners and suppliers means that UNICEF can move very quickly and help affected children, families and communities within hours or a few days. Where an office does not have any of these elements in place, or has only recently experienced a disaster, this

is less likely – for instance, the 2007 Joint Monitoring Mission in Madagascar found the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan had not been used in recent responses.68 In the Philippines, the 2008 Joint Monitoring Mission69 found that the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan had no minimum response level and had not particularly detailed the types of responses in which the Country Office might practically engage. This seems to be a common failing of some of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans reviewed by the evaluation – there is a reasonable analysis identifying the hazards and risks, but the types of responses identified are not discussed in terms of these hazards, and instead plans tend to outline a generic reiteration of the CCC. The Philippines Joint Monitoring Mission also found that the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan did not properly address UNICEF’s cluster responsibilities, surge capacity and rapid response capacity. The report found that the Country Office had under-estimated the surge needs during the super typhoon response of 2006 and recommended this also be included in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan. In the harmonization initiative that is currently being developed, particular attention is given to developing country-specific scenarios as well as planning assumptions so as to identify the main features of UNICEF response for which the Country Office needs to prepare.

With regard to cluster obligations within the emergency preparedness and response process, a majority of the plans mention cluster and the obligations, but there is not much detail on what this might mean beyond a statement that extra human resources will be needed.

**Issues related to Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans in middle-income and non-regular emergency Country Offices:**

There remains an issue in how the current and new Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan system is to be made appropriate for many UNICEF Country Offices in middle-income and non-regular emergency countries. These countries have different characteristics and architecture to the usual UNICEF Country Offices. Most offices are small and doing ‘upstream policy work’. They are situated in countries where there is strong government capacity and the UN country team itself may be small. In addition, UNICEF staff have limited capacity and experience of emergency work and there may also be limited partners (e.g., NGOs) with emergency expertise or mandate. The evaluation team reviewed several Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans from these kinds of countries to understand how they are helping Country Offices prepare for action in the event of an emergency. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan format remains intimidating and each country must spend a substantial amount of time working on it. Some of the issues found were as follows:

(a) The Russian Federation Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (July 2009) outlines possible scenarios in the context of various ongoing conflicts in the country (e.g; public health emergency such as influenza A/H1N1 epidemic). It notes the limitations of UNICEF in a country like this with a strong government, and concludes that the organization will not get involved in any large-scale disaster in a big way as the Government is capable of handling any emergency. In other words, no role is envisaged for UNICEF.

(b) The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan for the Ukraine (August 2009) is another example of poor understanding of the humanitarian mandate of UNICEF. This has the requisite section on potential hazards, but apart from a random list of things the office might buy, it is impossible to work out what the response might be. The document is full of the typical development-speak ‘advocate for children’s rights’ and ‘ensure a coordinated response’, rather than what UNICEF will do and what other organizations will do.


(c) The Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean (August 2009) identifies a number of scenarios at the outset, but does not differentiate the response later in the document. There is very little on operational strategy and it is unlikely this document will help UNICEF respond in an emergency.

(d) A great deal of thought and work has gone into the Kosovo Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (May 2009). However, beyond allocating responsibilities within the office, it is likely to be of little help. The document identifies and ranks a range of hazards and threats but it does not outline possible response accordingly. The response to swine flu (ranked 5 or almost certain) will be much different to violent separation of the Serb enclave and accompanying displacement. Yet there is no “well if this happens we’ll do that, and if that happens we’ll do the other”, just a list of the possible sorts of things one might generically do in Nutrition or Child Protection. Moreover, the Country Office has no WASH programme and there was no recognition in any documents of the dire need to have an experienced person in WASH in the event that a major emergency broke out. They did, however, have a list of buckets they might buy in an emergency situation indicating that it was obvious that without the Country Office having a WASH programme, they did not know what supplies might be needed in an emergency.

4.1.3 Lessons learned on Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans and Early Warning - Early Action

Over the last few years, UNICEF has developed and implemented a number of emergency risk management plans, including the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan, inter-agency and UNICEF-specific contingency plans (including pandemic contingency plans), business continuity plans and inter-agency security plans (which include agency-specific security plans as annexes). The above findings and analysis confirm the need to develop scenario planning and broad response plans for different types of emergency risks identified. This is one of the main features of the emergency risk assessments currently being developed in the harmonization initiative, which is itself linked to the annual work planning process where resources are decided and prioritized. The Office of Emergency Programmes is currently working with other divisions and the Change Management Office on what is currently known as the Harmonized Emergency Risk Management initiative. After a first trial in Colombia, the initiative will be further piloted in three additional countries before the end of 2009 before starting a global roll out in 2010. It is expected that this harmonized approach will lead to better results in the following areas:

- avoid duplication and overlaps and reduce the workload on the Country Office;
- integrate emergency risk management strategies, including prevention and mitigation and preparedness into the Country Programme Cycle and its key multi-year and annual planning and reporting documents;
- align emergency risk management with relevant change management initiatives (Enterprise Risk Management, Vision and rolling work plans specifically);
- equip Country Office senior management and Regional Office to monitor the status of Country Office emergency preparedness and guide initial emergency response;
- improve use of the Early Warning - Early Action system as an on-line planning and monitoring tool of emergency risk management;
- conduct regular harmonized testing of emergency risk management plans; and
- adopt different approaches based on whether countries are emergency-prone and/or have capacity to respond to emergencies.

Additionally the revised Early Warning - Early Action system, which integrates the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan and monitoring its operability through one portal, will ensure that Country Offices – especially those with limited capacity and where UNICEF is unlikely to be called upon to play a key role in response – will find the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan of practical

value. Senior managers will be able to measure a Country Office’s preparedness from the Key Actions section in the Early Warning - Early Action. Moreover, it is understood that from 2010 Country Offices will not have to produce cumbersome documents like the current Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans but will be able to keep updating various elements of the plan in the Early Warning - Early Action portal.

4.2 Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan and role of the Regional Office

One of the most significant aspects of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process has been the role played by the Regional Offices. In this critical area of response preparedness the role and function of the Regional Office appears to have made significant progress over the lifetime of the Phase III project. The 2006 Phase I/II evaluation recommended boosting the role of the Regional Office, and UNICEF has invested considerably in regional emergency personnel. In addition to regional emergency advisers, there are now regional emergency WASH advisers in the majority of Regional Offices and the number of both generalists and specialists continues to expand. WCARO has two emergency officers and emergency technical specialists in the programme teams. The East and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) also has two emergency officers and a number of technical specialists, and the East Asia Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO) has a ‘regional hub’, the Asia Pacific Shared Service Centre, that includes South Asia and significant response capacity.

Beyond the training and support for the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan, probably the most significant aspect of preparedness that the Regional Offices provide is surge capacity. In the immediate response the Regional Emergency Officers will deploy as will other regional emergency staff. In Central African Republic, following the 2007 decision to ‘scale up’, the Regional Office developed a 90-day response plan and staffed many of the key positions initially from that office. In the Sudan the Regional Office deployed people following the NGO expulsions earlier in 2009. These surge capacity issues and mechanisms will be discussed in more detail in the response performance section (section 5) of this report.

4.3 Disaster risk reduction

Disaster risk reduction is a new area for UNICEF, and it has rightly identified this as a thrust in the new humanitarian framework. UNICEF recognizes disaster risk reduction as a key strategy of climate change adaptation. The humanitarian framework is centred on national capacity building, which is the basis of all disaster risk reduction work. A small unit with one staff member (and two short-term staff) has been created in the Office of Emergency Programmes. Although understanding of disaster risk reduction is weak in most UNICEF Country Offices, it is expected that once the Disaster Risk Reduction Unit has developed tools and guidelines for country programming, Country Offices will find it a strong link to their development work. A Disaster Risk Reduction Concept Note is in the final stages of completion, and once this is adopted, UNICEF will start developing operational guidelines for Country Offices. A number of countries in Latin America and Asia are developing their capacity in this area. The CEE/CIS region has also been doing disaster risk reduction and education projects under a grant from Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) covering three countries in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Bangladesh, apart from the cyclone shelter work that is well known, UNICEF and cluster members are introducing risk-reduction strategies in their WASH work. New models capable of withstanding floods are being developed and the Bangladesh Country Office is developing a country-wide programme on disaster risk reduction at the community level. Disaster risk reduction has been mainstreamed in education recovery activities in the Philippines through the construction of earthquake and typhoon resistant school buildings.

Conclusions

9. Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans are now being produced by all Country Offices. As a central plank of the Regional Offices’ engagement with the Country Offices, emergency preparedness remains at the core of the way the organization attempts to build and maintain capacity to respond to emergencies.

10. Traditionally, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan documents have been cumbersome and not easily accessible during operations. With the new Early Warning – Early Action integrated portal, Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans in future (from 2010) will become a much more operational exercise that will constantly monitor and measure key elements of preparedness of Country Offices in areas like pre-positioning of supplies and/or framework agreements with suppliers; pre-selection of partners; rosters of skilled people (or agreements with the Regional Office to ensure internal redeployment); staff requirements for response and cluster role; knowledge of assessment tools and methods; streamlined procedure for cash release, etc. This would also make the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process and format lighter and ‘smarter’ by making Country Offices focus on the essential elements leading to practical action. The format now incorporates the revised CCC accountabilities.

11. Disaster risk reduction is a relatively new area for UNICEF Country Offices, and tools are now being developed to help in integrating this into UNICEF’s country programming. Going into the future, greater investment in disaster risk reduction will be needed to promote it as a core component of country programming.
5. Key area #3: Strengthened emergency response, performance and monitoring

*Key questions/issues examined:* (i) To what extent has human resources surge capacity (including for Cluster Coordinators) been strengthened through rapid response teams, pre-screened rosters and stand-by arrangements? (ii) What role is played by the Regional Office in enabling the Country Office to scale up and manage human resources surge? (iii) How far has the humanitarian response focus been mainstreamed in Human Resources and how does this affect results? (iv) Have finance, partnership funding, supply and human resources become more responsive since the last evaluation? (v) How effectively do the Regional Offices support the Country Offices in building their capacity in relevant administration, finance and IT systems for emergency response? (vi) What specific actions have been taken to streamline UNICEF’s emergency supply chain management and how effective has this been for rapid response? Are there framework agreements with suppliers centrally, within regions and in country to enable speedy procurement? (vii) On the whole, has the capacity-building initiative brought about a shift in the organization’s culture in terms of how it prioritizes humanitarian action?

5.1 Human resources in emergencies and rapid deployment

UNICEF has made considerable investments in developing human resources capacity for effective humanitarian response, some of which were noted in the last evaluation (Phase I and II). During Phase III, there has been a particular focus on recruiting and training Cluster Coordinators and specialist staff to work on the various clusters for which UNICEF is responsible. Over the past three years the development of web rosters, standby agreements with partners (whereby pre-selected candidates from partner agencies, mostly NGOs, are put on standby through an agreement with the agencies concerned), emergency preparedness and response training, and rolling out rapid response mechanisms in ESARO and WCARO have been the main focus of the emergency human resources system.

The establishment of an emergency focal point in the Division of Human Resources enhanced UNICEF’s human resources capacity in times of emergency. As part of UNICEF’s cluster responsibilities, and in order to strengthen surges in cluster lead areas, the Division of Human Resources had a full-time specialist dedicated to cluster surge in 2007 working with Programmes Division and the Office of Emergency Programmes.

In ESARO, UNICEF piloted the first regional emergency focal point for Human Resources, as was recommended in the 2005 DFID-UNICEF evaluation. The position was funded till the end of 2008 and then discontinued. During 2009, the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office (TACRO) has rolled out rapid response mechanisms.

However, with several changes in the Division of Human Resources emergency unit in Headquarters, and reduction in emergency human resources focal points in the regions, there is less capacity for managing surge capacity in future. There is some concern over this, as having the emergency focal points embedded in the Human Resources team previously meant that the knowledge and understanding of humanitarian operations these staff brought enabled the department to take fast actions. “Improvements made in recent years may decline and improved business processes may weaken…”

UNICEF’s first staffing response in emergencies is always internal. Unlike the two other pillars of the rapid response mechanism (external candidates and standby partners), internal redeployed staff bring organizational familiarity and knowledge that helps them to hit the ground running upon arrival in an emergency. UNICEF employs the regional rapid response mechanism in both ESARO and WCARO regions. Regional rapid response mechanisms were supposed to have been rolled out in all regions; but so far only these two have dedicated resources. The mechanism has proved effective in both regions as

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CCC compliance during 2008 has been 97 per cent and 89 per cent respectively. During the Myanmar response, UNICEF relied on a large number of regional deployments from the Asia-Pacific region.

UNICEF’s surge capacity in 2008 has met the CCC standards in 75 per cent of the cases (65 per cent in 2007), with 57 per cent of deployments within the first 28 days. In terms of external recruitment, short-term consulting/service contracts remain the fastest mechanism with 79 per cent deployed within the established CCC standards. As regards temporary fixed-term deployments, CCCs were met only in 36 per cent of the cases.\(^73\)

While UNICEF continues to work on getting the right people to the right place at the right time, a positive trend has emerged over the last year. UNICEF’s Global Web Roster has been revamped to include over 500 pre-screened profiles. The usage rate of the Global Web Roster has risen from 15 per cent in 2003 to 65 per cent in 2008 – meaning that more than half of all externally searched candidates deployed to emergencies are on the Global Web Roster.\(^74\)

UNICEF’s standby arrangements have been another mechanism by which surge capacity requirements can be fulfilled. A total of 109 new standby deployments were coordinated through UNICEF’s Standby Partner Officer in Geneva during 2007–2008,\(^75\) which benefited 31 Country Offices, 2 Regional Offices and 1 Headquarters division. Of these, 43 were in the area of Child Protection, 17 in WES,\(^76\) 9 in Emergency Telecoms, 7 in Education, 2 in Nutrition and 2 in Health.

A year ago in the Asia Pacific and ROSA regions combined there were only two regional emergency officers who were concentrating only on Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans. Now there are seven people dedicated to emergencies alone at the regional level. As will be discussed in section 6 on clusters, UNICEF has made phenomenal progress in its ability to recruit and mobilize trained staff in specific sectors, although progress has not been even in all sectors.

### 5.1.1 CCC compliance in deployment

CCC compliance in deployment means that surge capacity personnel are pre-screened (before the emergency), identified and deployed within the first six to eight weeks of the onset of emergency. In Myanmar, 44 (43 per cent) of deployments were made within 14 days, and another 40 (39 per cent) were deployed between 15–56 days. CCC compliance during 2008 for the four major emergencies (Bangladesh, China, Kenya and Myanmar) was 85 per cent – a marked improvement from 2007 at 65 per cent.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.
\(^{76}\) The water and environmental sanitation (WES) area subsequently became WASH.
During the flood response in Nepal in 2007, request for surge capacity from Headquarters yielded relatively few options. The recruitment process for both international consultant and district level nutrition coordinators took an indefinite time. UNICEF was not in a good position to take cluster lead for nutrition in affected districts.

During the flood response in Nepal in 2007, request for surge capacity from Headquarters yielded relatively few options. The recruitment process for both international consultant and district level nutrition coordinators took an indefinite time. UNICEF was not in a good position to take cluster lead for nutrition in affected districts. United Nations Children’s Fund APSSC, ‘Lessons Learned: Floods: Myanmar, Pakistan, Laos and Nepal’, UNICEF APSSC, undated.

In the case of Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, New York Headquarters and ROSA had already received an alert before the cyclone hit the country. The Country Office was able to immediately present a contingency plan with a request for additional deployment of 19 staff, and 12 (63 per cent) of all these deployments were made within the first 14 days, 6 within 15–28 days and 1 between 29 and 43 days. Most of them were through internal deployments, standby partners and consultants (SSAs). Nearly half of the internal redeployment requests were approved by the managers and most of them came from the region. Similarly after the South Pacific Tsunami (2 April 2007) hit Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, the Human Resources Emergency Unit was able to identify deployable candidates through internal redeployments, standby partners, temporary fixed term staff and consultants (SSA). The first deployment arrived in the region on 4 April. Five staff were deployed within the first 14 days, and another three were deployed within 15–42 days.

These were significant achievements. Before the rapid response mechanism and development of a surge mechanism, the release rate was one for every twelve requests. However, during the Myanmar response, staffing response was delayed due to communication being routed through too many levels and lack of adherence to established protocols. Of the 140 surge assignments requested, 116 were filled through internal redeployments and short-term contracts.


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78 Ibid.
for external recruitments. For first three weeks of the response, EAPRO did not have a rapid response mechanism with a dedicated surge capacity coordinator in the region. Deployments were also made difficult due to visa problems. In view of this, UNICEF decided early on that local staff would be employed as immediate support.

Internal redeployments remain a key pillar of deployment strategy. In the Georgia response, ability to deploy staff from neighbouring offices in the region was critical to the initial start up of the emergency operations. In the case of Myanmar, the overall release rate for requested internal redeployment was 77 per cent. In this crisis, the Director of the Office of Emergency Programmes sent a message to all Regional Directors to release staff, and this may have been the reason for such a high approval rate. However, during the Horn of Africa drought in 2006, only 18 per cent of offices who were requested to release staff for emergency internal deployment complied. Despite some of the progress in deployment in specific emergencies, there remains a high degree of scepticism within the organization on how robust the surge capacity is. Only 51 per cent of internal survey respondents agreed that “our human resources system works well during emergencies, and offices have the capacity and delegated decision-making authority to adapt the procedures to emergency requirements”. The overall tone of the comments was generally critical of progress made in this area.

5.1.2 Indicators for cluster deployment

In 2008, UNICEF deployed 10 Cluster Coordinators, 6 of whom (60 per cent) were deployed within the first two weeks. The DFID-UNICEF Institutional Strategy for 2009–2011 set the following targets for UNICEF-led clusters:

- 2009: 70 per cent of Cluster Coordinators deployed within 30 days of cluster activation;
- 2010: 80 per cent of Cluster Coordinators deployed within 30 days of cluster activation;
- 2011: 100 per cent of Cluster Coordinators deployed within 30 days of cluster activation.

The target for cluster deployment is quite realistic, and UNICEF may be already there, although detailed data for 2009 were not available for this evaluation. With the resources being invested in Cluster Coordinators’ training and better management of the web roster and standby partners, UNICEF ought to be able to deliver on its cluster commitments as per the above target.

However, delays still happen in recruitments as mentioned in section 5.1.1. With changes in the Division of Human Resources, there are concerns that future emergency recruitments may be under-resourced.

Conclusions

12. UNICEF’s surge capacity in 2008 has met the CCC standards in 75 per cent of the cases (65 per cent in 2007), with 57 per cent of deployments within the first 28 days. The internal redeployments and recruitments from standby partners have been critical for UNICEF’s surge capacity.

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79 One explanation could be that a slow-onset emergency like drought does not give the same sense of urgency as a rapid onset disaster.

80 In 2003, a survey of the roster system found that only 15 per cent of external deployments came from the roster, while a survey undertaken in 2008 showed that the corresponding figure had increased to 65 per cent.
13. There has been dedicated Human Resources staff for emergencies in Division of Human Resources-facilitated surge in the past three years. However, with this dedicated resource now being dismantled, it is unclear how the progress that has been made in surge capacity will be sustained in future.

14. UNICEF has made considerable progress in recruiting and training Cluster Coordinators in different sectors, and is close to meeting the indicator set for their deployment in the DFID-UNICEF Phase III logframe.

5.2 Support systems and procedures for emergency response

5.2.1 Finance and administrative procedures

The 2006 Valid evaluation\(^{81}\) (and several other evaluations) of the Programme of Cooperation recommended UNICEF to ensure that procedures for finance and administration support effective humanitarian response. As a result the Division of Finance and Administration undertook an analysis of where procedures could be simplified in emergency situations and developed a manual for Country Offices based on this analysis.

The Phase III proposal outlined two areas of internal systems and procedures for streamlining: (i) a culture change to ensure that effective humanitarian response is established clearly as the primary goal, with flexibility to adapt procedures as long as adequate controls are maintained appropriate to context; and (ii) establishing whether the current policies and procedures were adequate once they are widely understood at field level or whether policies, procedures and systems themselves must be streamlined and simplified.

The organization-wide review\(^ {82}\) of UNICEF systems and procedures, undertaken in 2006, noted that a preoccupation with administrative procedures crowds out time that would be better spent on programmatic work in Country Offices. The review notes that a “proliferation of management and consultation mechanisms tax country office performance. It is typical for Country Offices to have as many as 11 separate office committees, when many of these functions could be handled in a more nimble fashion…. Paradoxically, the layers of approvals and paperwork regulations, even on minute transactions, not only create excessive procedural burdens but may also create a false sense of comfort.”

Over the last two years the Division of Finance and Administration has invested in training and orientating Country Offices and field staff in financial and administrative risk management for emergencies. Division of Finance and Administration representatives have visited 31 countries and delivered interactive sessions to finance staff during regional meetings, operational staff meetings, etc. A communication strategy was also launched for orientation of programme staff. This evaluation finds that despite these efforts, field staff still finds the finance and administrative system cumbersome and not geared to rapid response. The short cuts in the systems, theoretically, are meant for faster decision-making, but these require the country representatives to take personal responsibility, which not all are willing to do.

During this evaluation, it was observed that while the leadership is committed to ensuring a coherent humanitarian response in line with UNICEF’s global humanitarian role, lower down the bureaucracy there is a strongly embedded procedures-over-action culture and mindset. One of the country representatives

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interviewed during this evaluation described an ongoing struggle with the Contracts Review Committee, which seemed to take pride in sending almost every programme request back once, even in acute emergency situations, to give the impression of due diligence. In the Ethiopia country case study for this evaluation, it was noted that while UNICEF senior management may have attempted to streamline and rationalize the tools and systems to make these more emergency response-friendly, at the operational level the staff administering the ‘systems’ may be too preoccupied with procedures and ‘tick box’ syndrome. A problem-solving and can-do culture could empower people to take action more rapidly and at the same time follow the established institutional procedure.

At the operational level, the analysis of the case studies and questionnaire data suggest that performance on this account is still not even. The Sudan operation is one where tools such as the new emergency finance and administration guidelines have proved useful. There is a high degree of decentralization within the Sudan operation, and this is seen to provide both a timely response and to improve the speed of response. Bangladesh and Nepal have put in place innovative practices like ‘virtual meetings’ (through email discussions) of contract review committees and small-scale funding agreements that have drastically reduced the time taken to approve and disburse funds to partners. Ethiopia, on the other hand, presents a logistical challenge, especially with regard to supplies and logistics in remote regions (Somali region, Afar, etc.), and UNICEF is aware of the need to revamp its system in the context of a complex country. Although several improvements have been made in Ethiopia in the past few years to speed up procurement, release cash to partners for speedy delivery of assistance, programme cooperation agreements, etc., there are still administrative issues that get in the way of timely response.83

As concluded by the 2007 Organizational Review, service standards on quality and timeliness of response have not been clearly defined for the key business processes in the organization. “Weak or absent service standards make it difficult to enforce accountability and manage for performance.” This evaluation found several examples indicating that the above observation made in 2007 is still valid, as illustrated by the following two: one from Headquarters, where decisions are made and standards set for the global programme, and the other from the Sudan.

(i) Save the Children, which is co-lead on Education, submitted a proposal for funds. The proposal took over seven months to be approved by UNICEF Headquarters.

(ii) One of UNICEF’s partner NGOs in the Sudan had to close its feeding centre and turn children away because UNICEF delayed the signing of a Programme Cooperation Agreement. It turned out that the staff member concerned had gone away on holiday and locked the Programme Cooperation Agreement in the drawer, and it could not be accessed until the person returned. The evaluation could not find out what effect the closing down of the centre had on children, or if any staff member was held responsible for this.

On the systems side, ProMS was often cited as a reason for delays in emergencies, especially when new staff tried to tackle what was a complex system. As already referred to in this section, UNICEF’s management is aware of these issues and its commissioned Organizational Review in 2007 that led to a significant change process. Two key elements of this are 1) ‘VISION – one ERP’ to replace the programme management software ProMS, and 2) ‘enterprise resource planning (ERP) a “systematic approach to support analysis and decision making”. Whilst the evaluation cannot make a judgement on evolving systems that are not in place, it is encouraging that action is being taken to resolve these long-standing issues.

5.2.2 Pre-positioning of supplies

The previous evaluation noted some significant improvements made by the Supply Division in bringing down delivery time for emergency supply items. To improve the logistics capacity in the field, UNICEF has continued the roll-out of UniTrack, a stand-alone warehouse and commodity management database

system that is specifically tailored for environments where UNICEF manages in-country logistics functions.\textsuperscript{84}

A review of the supply function within UNICEF (carried out in 2007) concluded that supplies are too slow and not well planned. Although there are some signs of progress,\textsuperscript{85} international procurement for emergency operations still takes a long time: the Ethiopia Country Office suggests anything between 3–6 months; the Sudan Country Office suggests 6–12 months – partly due to UNICEF bureaucracy and partly due to the government regulations. In countries with large and regular humanitarian operations (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the Sudan, etc), therefore, pre-positioning of supplies has been the norm and this has enabled UNICEF to provide rapid response. However, such pre-positioning is uneconomical for countries with smaller and irregular emergencies; additionally, donor funds for pre-positioning will be hard to access.

It is therefore important that UNICEF offices develop framework agreements with suppliers of standard relief items in different regions and pre-identity logistics solutions (freight and transport) within the regions wherever such capacity exists. While stockpiling is always an expensive option, especially for countries that do not see regular emergencies, pre-existing agreement with suppliers vetted through the standard procurement procedures could minimize the procurement time after an emergency.\textsuperscript{86}

### 5.2.3 Monitoring and evaluation

Previous evaluations concluded that UNICEF’s information management, monitoring and reporting in emergencies were weak.\textsuperscript{87} This evaluation has concluded that this largely remains the case. Information and reports seen on emergency operations during the evaluation were mostly activity and output oriented. Some progress has been made in reporting on impacts such as morbidity and mortality, but this is far from systematic yet. Cluster obligations demand a new level of analysis of impact and need too, but so far UNICEF has not reliably deployed this capacity. In Ethiopia and the Sudan UNICEF operates a good system of nutritional analysis on behalf of the sector.

Such data collection and analysis is expensive and difficult – more so in the most difficult contexts – and is also the greatest challenge for humanitarian actors in achieving impact. Needs assessment, monitoring performance, impact benchmarking and reporting (to ensure that the response actually met the needs of the affected population) requires significant strengthening in order to be able to report on UNICEF’s CCCs. This observation was also made by a Joint Monitoring Mission visiting one country during 2008.\textsuperscript{88} The new CCC benchmarks are designed to help in this regard, and this is an excellent innovation. Whether UNICEF will be prepared or able at the Country Office level to deploy resources for this is an open question.

In terms of evaluations as a learning tool, while UNICEF undertakes a substantial number of evaluations, most of these are thematic. Only a small number\textsuperscript{89} of real-time evaluations (RTEs),\textsuperscript{90} which could help country teams obtain real time learning, have been undertaken. For instance, in the Sudan – the largest humanitarian programme in the world – there has not been an evaluation of the humanitarian programme since the onset of the Darfur crisis in 2004. The Country Office’s Emergency Response Team would benefit by including an monitoring and evaluation (M&E) Officer who would ensure that necessary

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\textsuperscript{87} This was the conclusion of the Phase I/II evaluation.


\textsuperscript{89} Two RTEs were seen: Horn of Africa Drought and Georgia Crisis.

\textsuperscript{90} It may be noted here that tsunami response was evaluated well, both the relief/early recovery and later the recovery/early development phase.
mechanisms for quality assessment, monitoring and reporting are in place, or at the very least explicitly including emergencies in the Terms of Reference of M&E Officers. The absence of evaluation would be less significant if there was an ongoing programme monitoring process supporting the field teams in ensuring oversight of outcomes and relevance of activities to beneficiaries and learning. As discussed elsewhere in this report, this does not appear to be the case for emergency programmes.

Conclusions

15. Attempts have been made from Headquarters to streamline and clarify finance and administrative systems for emergencies. However, at the operational level, these are yet to make any significant difference and delays in funds release, Programme Cooperation Agreements and supplies remain common, except in a few countries.

16. UNICEF’s information management and monitoring and evaluation in emergencies are weak, although it needs to be noted that there are several initiatives currently under way that should bring about significant positive change in these areas in coming years.
6. Key area #4: Inter-agency humanitarian response

*Key questions/issues examined:* (i) The degree to which humanitarian reform and the cluster approach in particular has been accepted, adopted and mainstreamed within the organization. Has this new approach been well understood and resourced by the top leadership within the organization and key managers within Programme Department, Regional Offices and Country Offices? (ii) To what extent has UNICEF cluster leadership contributed to more reliable and predictable humanitarian response? (iii) How effectively does UNICEF coordinate its response with other field-based humanitarian agencies? (iv) How successful has UNICEF been in influencing governments’ policies and action on the priorities identified by the clusters and engaging them with the humanitarian system? (v) Has there been a culture shift in important areas such as attitude to NGOs, local partners, speed of deployment of cluster coordinators and effective financing of partners? (vi) What does 'provider of last resort' mean for UNICEF?

6.1 Performance in cluster approach implementation

As mentioned in section 2, UNICEF has taken the global lead on three clusters as well as two sub-clusters in Child Protection and Gender-Based Violence (these latter both co-chaired, with Save the Children and UNFPA respectively). In addition, in some countries, UNICEF has sometimes taken on the role of leading or co-leading the Health cluster with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the broader Protection cluster. Apart from the official cluster roles, UNICEF has played a vital role in enabling inter-agency rapid response in major emergencies through its management of the non-food item supply chain. In the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and the Sudan, which were visited during this evaluation, organizations rely on pre-positioned UNICEF Non-Food Item supplies and support for rapid response.

Specific cluster responsibilities are outlined in the IASC-Working Group *Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response* of 24 November 2006. Major coordination elements in the Terms of Reference for cluster lead agencies include: needs assessment and analysis; emergency preparedness; planning and strategy development; application of standards; monitoring and reporting; training and capacity building; advocacy and resource mobilization; and the provision of assistance or services as the ‘provider of last resort’.

Different clusters have evolved and developed at a different pace, with some like WASH and Logistics being far ahead of others globally. In the following paragraphs, the evaluation attempts to examine, based on available data, the progress made in each cluster for which UNICEF has lead responsibility.

6.1.1 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

The country studies and interviews with both internal and external stakeholders indicate that WASH has been one of the most successful clusters in terms of delivering the critical outcomes a cluster lead agency ought to deliver according to the IASC guidelines. This is also borne out in inter-agency evaluations in Mozambique91 and of the Pakistan earthquake and in the independent evaluation of the CARE Bangladesh response to Cyclone Sidr.92

In the external survey carried out for this evaluation, over half of the respondents either fully or partly agreed that WASH fulfilled its responsibilities and performed well as a cluster and that UNICEF assisted WASH cluster members on technical standards and operational guidelines for emergency response. It was notable that the clusters regarded as the most successful had seen a large investment by the cluster lead agencies. WASH has demonstrated its leadership to the cluster process through systematic development of several global tools such as:

• guidelines including the hygiene manual;
• global and regional workshops;
• a number of country reviews (lessons learned) undertaken including Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Myanmar and Uganda;
• the training of CCs (so far 121 people have been trained, of whom 30 per cent are UNICEF staff and the rest are from standby partners);
• agreement with standby partners across the world;
• building a WASH Rapid Response Team (comprised of three people – all from NGO standby partners – who can be deployed within 48 hours); and
• the mapping of global stockpiles of WASH emergency material (ongoing).

Since the middle of 2007, there have been regional WASH emergency advisers in six of the seven regions: two are funded by DFID and four by ECHO. Having these people in the regions has been critical in rolling out the WASH cluster and also in the UNICEF response. Additionally, it has developed and disseminated technical standards and guidelines for WASH response and trained various agency staff in headquarters and countries in these. This is a remarkable turn-around for UNICEF, given that the evaluation at the end of Phase I and II of the DFID capacity-building project found water and environmental sanitation (WES, as it was then called) to be UNICEF’s weakest humanitarian technical response area, as did several other key evaluations.

The DFID capacity-building project has been instrumental in this success. DFID funding paid for two critical WASH cluster positions globally, in New York and in Geneva. These two senior cluster staff proved critical in building up trust with partners and in quickly pulling together some of the essential personnel and experience needed to make the concept work.

Whilst WASH appears to have been the most successful cluster globally to-date, there remains much work to be done. UNICEF started from a low base in building its WASH capacity internally for emergencies, and this means that there are still emergency contexts where there are either no or limited WASH programmes. This especially affects the ability of UNICEF to reliably deploy WASH coordinators at a sub-national level.

The fact that UNICEF had virtually eviscerated its WASH global capacity prior to humanitarian reform may paradoxically have been a factor in the cluster’s success. Initially, the new cluster staff may have enjoyed institutional space that others did not – free, to a degree, to design the UNICEF engagement and attitude from the outset, without complex organizational history and baggage of pre-existing relationships. Another factor in the relative success of WASH may have been that there was already a well-functioning and relatively settled global coordination body for WASH, albeit an informal one. This simply became the WASH cluster. Finally, the fact that the two key individuals within UNICEF at the outset of the WASH cluster were from an NGO well known for its WASH expertise, and thus had the respect and trust of other partners in the cluster, may have been a further contributory factor.

Encouragingly the success of the WASH cluster appears to be acknowledged by UNICEF institutionally. The cluster’s work plan has been integrated into the departmental work plan, and from 2010 the position of WASH senior adviser (Global Cluster Coordinator) will be paid for from the organization’s core funds (‘regular resources’). Both of these facts suggest a long-term commitment by the organization to cluster and WASH.

6.1.2 Nutrition

UNICEF has been the global Nutrition Cluster Coordinator and has someone working in this capacity since February 2007. The Nutrition cluster has made good progress in developing global tools and guidelines and in harmonizing the feeding package and tool kit. The majority of the global cluster work to-date has been the funding of research, development of new methodologies (such as SMART), and production of technical guidelines, including the update to the ‘Infant and Young Child Feeding in
Emergencies’ handbook and of The Sphere Project chapter on Nutrition. The Global Nutrition Cluster has also funded and carried out training of Cluster Coordinators (most recently in Geneva in July) and has undertaken various regional training initiatives such as the Harmonized Training Package, which was developed by NutritionWorks.

Whilst the Nutrition cluster has included development of surge capacity, this is not as far advanced as that in WASH. The WASH cluster has an active roster for Cluster Coordinators and, crucially, a rapid response team, as well as internal UNICEF capacity in the Regional Emergency WASH Advisers. The Nutrition cluster has a roster, but it does not have the other components, nor has it been as successful in providing surge capacity to lead the cluster. This is particularly true at regional and country level, where UNICEF sometimes struggles to have robust nutritional capacity. One key donor source in West Africa rated UNICEF’s nutrition capacity as poor and the cluster as unable even to write funding submissions for capacity-building initiatives.

In Indonesia, the Country Office notes that there is limited awareness and capacity on emergency nutrition in field offices and the nutrition unit has a limited budget to fund cluster coordination meetings and preparedness plan activities. During field studies for this evaluation, it was found that even in Bangladesh, where the emergency response capacity is strong, nutrition in emergencies is not yet fully integrated into emergency response, and that UNICEF’s leadership has been weak on this. Only in Ethiopia and the Sudan did the evaluation find that UNICEF’s own nutrition programming in emergencies and its leadership of the cluster have been of a high standard.

The examples of Ethiopia and the Sudan are interesting. In the former, UNICEF is mostly praised for its nutrition work and is seen as setting a benchmark for quality in this area. In the latter, whilst there have been issues with pipeline supply, the nutrition data gathering and dissemination is much appreciated and well regarded. The Nutrition cluster there appears to have improved, and certainly UNICEF has responded well to the expulsion of key NGO partners by taking over their programmes (as a ‘last resort’ provider). Both Ethiopia and the Sudan have long-standing nutritional crises and this has given UNICEF time to develop capacity in these countries. In this sense, the capacity is ‘indigenous’ rather than related to global UNICEF capacity. With the capacity to run large-scale nutrition programmes, UNICEF has also been able to service cluster needs relatively well, although in the Sudan there is acknowledgement within the UNICEF team that they need separate, additional Country Coordinators.

One of the reasons why UNICEF has not shown the same leadership in Nutrition as it has in WASH may be an internal structural issue. The Nutrition Department has two separate units: nutrition in emergencies and a nutrition cluster unit, which is unique to this sector. The post of Global Nutrition Cluster Coordinator has been vacant since the beginning of the year and this division may be partly responsible for this. The Global Nutrition Cluster is managed by a team of two professionals with one temporary part-time support person and one admin person. The working arrangements between the Global Nutrition Cluster Coordinator, the Nutrition in Emergencies Senior Adviser and the Nutrition Section Head need clarifying, as these functions are not yet fully integrated, as do the lines of communication within UNICEF among the Global Nutrition Cluster Coordinator, the Nutrition Section Head and the Office of Emergency Programmes.

6.1.3 Child Protection

Unlike WASH, Nutrition and Education, Child Protection is not a ‘cluster’ but is a working group under the Protection cluster led by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). This distinction is semantic, however, as the Terms of Reference for the working group or ‘sub-cluster’ are similar to those for cluster lead agencies and entail similar levels of responsibility. The global Child Protection Working Group has, in fact, functioned in a similar fashion to other clusters and is in some respects further along. There is a Global Coordinator for the Child Protection Working Group based in UNICEF in Geneva and a strong and committed group of child protection agencies that attends regular meetings. As with WASH and

Education, this group pre-dates the formation of the Child Protection Working Group, although this has been slightly expanded. The Child Protection Working Group has produced a handbook for Cluster Coordinators and has carried out several regional trainings. It has conducted several lessons learned exercises of its responses and has updated some key sector texts. DFID funding has enabled several of these key achievements. The work of Child Protection Working Group overlaps to some extent with the monitoring and reporting mechanism recommendation from Security Council Resolution 1612; this will be discussed in a later section of this report since it received funding separately under the DFID Phase III project and was one of the six key areas of focus.

Despite a relatively strong showing at the global level, the Child Protection in emergencies work at the country level has been patchy. Much of this is related to resources – like Education, Child Protection has struggled sometimes to assert itself as a core humanitarian need. With scarce resources and often less tangible outputs than say Shelter or Health, it often does not receive sufficient resources. Child Protection in emergencies is also relatively new in UNICEF and, as such, is still building its capacity globally. Even in a country like Bangladesh, where UNICEF has had a strong humanitarian history, the Country Office needs orientation and capacity development to equip itself to discharge its role in this respect. This is partly due to the fact that this is also a sensitive and complex issue in many country contexts as governments may not be highly responsive to the issue (for instance, Ethiopia, Georgia or Sri Lanka).

Despite these limitations, there are examples where Child Protection in emergencies is beginning to develop as a cluster-like entity. The Inter-Agency Real-time Evaluation of Cyclone Nargis response noted that the Protection cluster was weak overall since its link to rights makes it a sensitive issue in Myanmar, although within that there was a distinct focus on Child Protection. When the clusters were initially established following Nargis, it was agreed that UNICEF would lead a Child Protection sub-cluster, later expanded to include women, which Save the Children agreed to co-chair.

UNICEF has identified 20 countries that require child protection support in emergencies. Staff capacity to provide strong leadership and support in Country Offices and some Regional Offices has been relatively undeveloped until recently. In the Middle East and North Africa, UNICEF has dedicated staff on child protection in emergencies. In APSSC, instead of relying on staff for this, they have established an institutional contract with another agency (Child Frontier) to provide support to Country Offices in the region.

In Madagascar, ESARO helped facilitate a workshop on Protection clusters and Child Protection in emergencies in June 2008, with an emphasis on protection in natural disasters, including primarily government partners. Following the political crisis, support was also provided to the Country Office in reviewing the cluster arrangements and establishment of gender-based violence and child protection in emergencies working groups in March 2009. The Great Lakes Child Protection/Emergency Cross Border meeting held in June 2007 brought together UNICEF and its partners from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania to monitor emergency and cross border protection issues, including child recruitment from refugee camps in Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and expulsions of Rwandan and Burundians from Tanzania.

6.1.4 Education

The Education cluster is unique amongst clusters as it is co-led with Save the Children and not uniquely led and resourced by UNICEF. Education in emergencies has also struggled to be recognized as a core humanitarian activity, having traditionally been viewed as a recovery and development response. It was started later than the other clusters primarily because it was not identified by IASC in the initial list of clusters – UNICEF, Save the Children and others had to advocate for an Education cluster to be established.

Given that the Education cluster is relatively new, it has made rapid progress in agreeing and setting standards – in effect, endorsing pre-existing Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) standards – mobilising support and advocating for the educational needs of children in emergencies at a global level. As with WASH, some of this pre-dated the formation of the cluster. The INEE standards have existed since the beginning of the decade and the agencies involved, including UNICEF, have been instrumental in putting education in emergencies on the agenda. Education in emergencies has now been accepted by the Central Emergency Response Fund and several donors, including DFID, have made large grants to furthering this important sector. An Early Childhood Working Group has been established, a Steering Committee is in place to provide oversight of the co-lead arrangement, and Task Teams were established (led by various Early Childhood Working Group members) and are working on the respective components of a global work plan.

Education cluster coordination training has been developed and piloted in 2009 (30 Cluster Coordinators trained), but surge capacity remains limited compared to that of WASH, there are no stockpiles, and there is not the same developed research agenda as for Nutrition. A mapping of UNICEF staff skills and interest in relation to education in emergencies has been undertaken in order to identify staff available for surge capacity.

As of mid January 2009, 28 out of 36 countries implementing the cluster approach (78 percent) had formally implemented an Education cluster.\(^95\) UNICEF was the cluster lead or co-lead in all countries, Save the Children served as co-lead in 15 countries, while in a couple of other cases other international agencies co-led.\(^96\)

Respondents to the external survey and interviewees report that at country level, UNICEF staff often lack field experience and are not proactive in coordination, joint planning or strategic thinking with partners. There are exceptions to this. For example, the Education cluster in Mozambique is reported to be working well, with both UNICEF and Save the Children working in concert as co-leads and with UNICEF going so far as to act as provider of last resort, underwriting proposals following flooding so that the cluster work could begin immediately.

The model of co-lead with Save the Children has been and continues to be challenging. It can work extremely successfully where there are well-established relations and mutual respect between the Country Offices and Save the Children officers concerned (once again, the example for this is Mozambique, where the Director concerned was the only Save the Children education staff member interviewed for this evaluation who was strong in his praise for UNICEF’s performance and attitude as cluster co-lead). Much more often, however, there appears to be a less equal relationship where Save the Children staff feel that UNICEF is not proactive enough in supporting and leading the cluster and remain critical of UNICEF’s repeated long delays in approval of proposals. At global level, there have been several Global Cluster Coordinators provided by UNICEF who, it has been suggested by a number of internal and external interlocutors, did not always have either the required technical background or the necessary personal commitment to provide the leadership required in this role. This has left an impression that within UNICEF there is not the same level of commitment to the Education cluster as to other clusters. One of the three biggest challenges identified last year as facing the Education cluster was “lack of clarity about how to operationalise the co-lead arrangement”\(^97\), and interviews conducted for this evaluation suggest that this problem continues.

### 6.1.5 Health

UNICEF is one of the agencies in the WHO-led Health cluster and has a close interest in the work of the group as a major actor in maternal and child health globally. As WHO has limited operational capacity in many countries, UNICEF takes a proactive role in providing operational lead on this cluster. The DFID

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\(^95\) Education Cluster Update. UNICEF. January 2009.
\(^97\) Ibid.
Phase III funding has paid for a Senior Health Adviser in Geneva, who contributes to the work of that cluster and has participated in Health cluster inter-agency missions. This work is seen as important by the Health section within UNICEF, which continues to partner with WHO to make the Health cluster work.

In Ethiopia, where public health emergencies (cholera, malaria, severe malnutrition, etc.) are common, UNICEF was asked by WHO to take the lead in the Health cluster. In addition, UNICEF led the Health cluster in Uganda for a year whilst WHO scaled up and led sub-national health clusters in Myanmar following Cyclone Nargis.

UNICEF has demonstrated its accountability as a reliable partner in the Health cluster through its strong and widespread participation at the country level in all global Health cluster activities. However, a significant number of offices have sometimes concluded that UNICEF has no role to play in the health response as WHO is the cluster lead agency, and this has sometimes resulted in missed opportunities to appeal for emergency health funds. While UNICEF may not be coordinating the health response, its Country Offices and Regional Offices need to ensure that the organisation is still fulfilling the commitments made on health in its CCCs. This also has structural implications for UNICEF, for instance in APSSC where there is no ‘health in emergencies’ adviser as a result of the cluster arrangements. There is a danger that this trend could decrease UNICEF’s longstanding strength to deliver health in emergencies.

6.1.6 Emergency Telecoms

UNICEF has recently ceased being a co-lead in the Emergency Telecoms cluster with WFP and OCHA. This was one of the recommendations of the first cluster evaluation, and with so many cluster commitments already it seems sensible. Prior to this decision DFID Phase III had funded a position to help train engineers from standby partners such that VSAT system operations could be started expeditiously.

6.1.7 Early recovery

An important point to be noted here is that the Phase III proposal did not explicitly address early recovery. Early recovery as an approach to humanitarian crises nonetheless has received increasing attention, resulting in heavier demands for performance and dedicated resources from UNICEF. UNICEF responded by establishing within the Office of Emergency Programmes a Recovery and Risk Reduction Section in 2008. The Recovery and Risk Reduction Section participates in the Global Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, develops tools and guidance, and provides direct support to Country Offices implementing early recovery (such as in the Gaza response in 2009). The Recovery and Risk Reduction Section works closely with UNICEF-led/ co-led clusters, which have also made strides in meeting their cluster accountabilities in this area. The WASH cluster, for instance, has developed a matrix that outlines roles and accountabilities to assist in the mainstreaming of early recovery throughout WASH responses. Similar matrices are being developed for other clusters for which UNICEF is a lead agency.

The pace of work in the Recovery and Risk Reduction Section’s post-crisis response is expected to increase dramatically as inter-agency processes become more fully developed and as UNICEF redoubles its commitment to national capacity development. For example, early recovery has been integrated into UNICEF’s Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action. The Office of Emergency Programmes must bolster its resource investments with increased capacity in order to capitalize on the progress made to-date and meet its inter- and intra-agency commitments.

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6.2 UNICEF’s overall performance in cluster lead roles

6.2.1 Issues emerging on clusters

There are several important issues that are emerging as patterns from the country case studies, inter-agency evaluations and interviews:

- There are weak linkages between global cluster initiatives and country realities.
- Clusters often exist at a national (capital-based) level but are often not as strong at a sub-national level where the emergency operation is taking place.
- There is still ongoing work in ensuring that the Cluster Coordinator should be a separate function to internal technical staff and has the skill set needed for cluster leadership.
- There are unresolved resource issues, both in terms of how cluster leadership is funded and in terms of how cluster members access funding through UNICEF.
- Accountabilities for Cluster Coordinators are not consistent across responses.
- UNICEF has dutifully implemented clusters, but appears to be lacking a coherent vision for what the new approach might mean.
- There is no shared understanding of the ‘provider of last resort’ provision.
- Information and knowledge management for UNICEF-led clusters remains a challenge.

Each of these issues is discussed below.

**Global to local**

In several of the country case studies\(^99\) and in interviews it was clear that cluster coordinators did not have access to the range of tools that had been developed at global level, or were not aware of them. This was not the case universally but emerged often enough to suggest a pattern. Cluster Coordinators are either UNICEF technical staff who are asked to take on this extra responsibility or are recruited specifically for the post but not necessarily given adequate induction or training. Often training opportunities do arise for Cluster Coordinators but these can be months after they have taken up the position. As a result, many of them did not fully understand the role, know about the resources available or have good links to global or similar Cluster Coordinators in other countries.

**Clusters at national and sub-national levels**

An issue that is coming up in several countries is the capacity to provide cluster leadership throughout the country, especially when there are major emergency situations in multiple locations (Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, etc.). In the Philippines, while UNICEF did attempt to lead the WASH cluster at the national level, there was much less capacity at the sub-national level where the response was actually taking place. UNICEF was largely absent from sub-national clusters/coordination mechanisms during Typhoon Reming. The Country Office felt that this was not a UNICEF responsibility and that capacity for this would remain weak, suggesting a difference in understanding of the role of a cluster lead agency in an emergency response. In Colombia and Ethiopia, it was observed during the country visits that even those clusters that worked well did so at the national level. In some of the regions/provinces, the process may be qualitatively very different. At the federal level in Ethiopia, the clusters have produced tools, standards and protocols for emergency WASH response. However, their uptake by different members in the regions varied. In Bangladesh, the WASH cluster has agreed on different operational co-leads in different districts depending on the capacity of agencies on the ground, while still ensuring that UNICEF provides the overall strategic leadership at the national level. In fact, this could be a strategic option in many countries for UNICEF as it is unrealistic to expect the organization to have resources to set up physical presence in all the disaster-prone areas, especially in large countries.

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\(^{99}\) See the Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Colombia and Ethiopia country case studies annexed to this report.
In past evaluations of humanitarian coordination, including real-time evaluations of the cluster approach,\textsuperscript{100} it was found that an agency must have some depth of field presence and programming capacity in order to be an effective coordinator.

**Cluster leads as a separate function**

In the Central African Republic, UNICEF has recently appointed a separate WASH cluster lead after finding the workload of managing the cluster and internal programmes too taxing for one person. In the Sudan the UNICEF Country Office has recently produced a list of 44 new positions it needs to separate cluster leadership from the regular internal programme work. Previously many partners have complained that UNICEF does not properly run clusters as staff do not have the time to dedicate to this role, which is seen as a full-time job. UNICEF has acknowledged this internally; however, the resource implications are enormous, with an L3 position costing US $200,000 when all costs are included. On this basis and with a few senior positions, clusters would cost UNICEF about US $9 million annually in the Sudan alone.

This debate on how to resource separate cluster leads is not confined to UNICEF or to Africa, but is one of the major ongoing concerns related to humanitarian reform. A subsidiary issue is the challenge of convincing UN country teams and agencies’ Country Offices of the necessity for separation and the skills and functions required. Separate cluster leads have time to do the job properly and are seen as independent and objective by other agencies in the cluster. Conversely, however, if they are too isolated from the lead agency, they may not have enough influence to progress the cluster agenda within the organisation.

**Resourcing clusters**

Closely aligned to the above issue, donors and UN agencies are currently in a rather unhelpful argument about how clusters should be funded. Donors tell UN agencies to pay for cluster leads with core funds (to which they contribute); UN agencies say they need extra funding. NGOs often cite financing as the reason for not being able to take on cluster co-lead responsibilities. The evidence of this study suggests that funding separate Cluster Coordinators costs UNICEF more than donors have made available through other means. Global appeals have paid for Global Cluster Coordinators and work plans. The Global Cluster Coordinators have been essential to progressing the cluster agenda both within UNICEF and externally. Some of the initiatives too have been essential such as surge capacity; some of the research and tools/ guidelines less so given their current penetration to the field. Nevertheless, (as noted above) it would cost UNICEF US$9 million to fund clusters in the Sudan to do a good job, and this would be US$2 million in Uganda. As there are about 20 consolidated, flash and other appeals in 2009, this suggests cluster coordination will cost UNICEF probably in the region of US $40 million to do thoroughly, far more than the combined funding of DFID, ECHO and others for capacity-building support has been annually, for example.

**Accountabilities for clusters**

UNICEF’s external accountabilities in relation to cluster lead responsibilities are generally clear. However, until recently these broad accountabilities were not seriously analysed for their implication for various divisions and levels within the organization. In the country case studies for this evaluation, it was noted that a majority of Cluster Coordinators reported to the Senior Programme Coordinator/ Deputy Representative. In several cases the Cluster Coordinators reported to their section Head. In the majority of cases, the link between the humanitarian coordinator and the Cluster Coordinator was tenuous, with them often hardly ever meeting. The line of accountability for a UNICEF Cluster Coordinator appears to be firmly through the

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line management structure of the organization, with the interaction with the humanitarian coordinator mostly in the UN country team through the UNICEF Representative.

Generally clusters are working at operational level, but a strategic inter-cluster interface at the organizational level is lacking. There is a need for greater strategic oversight from senior management on clusters. Many Representatives and Deputy Representatives do not understand the concept of clusters as anything beyond conventional coordination at best. There is a lack of institutional analysis of the implications of the cluster approach for UNICEF’s various other departments. This needs strong leadership from the top. Links between cluster lead staff and other emergency staff and Programmes Sections, relationships between emergencies and Programmes departments and the role of each department in UNICEF’s emergency response and cluster leadership need greater clarity.

The Country Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been involved in the cluster approach since 2006, indicates the need for greater clarity at the country level on UNICEF’s overall vision for the clusters and guidance regarding what is expected in terms of performance and output from Cluster Coordinators. In the absence of this organization-wide clarity, each cluster feels that it is determining its own priorities. There is not enough support at the Country Office level to develop/adapt tools and guidance for local level; rather, the emphasis is on testing globally developed tools and guidance through a top-down approach. For example, the IRA was field-tested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but has never been used by agencies there since. No dedicated Cluster Coordinators were brought in; Section Chiefs led the coordination.

In a workshop at the end of July 2009, UNICEF initiated a process of unravelling the accountabilities across UNICEF’s Headquarters divisions and sections, Regional Offices and Country Offices. This is a work-in-progress; once completed, it is expected that institutional implications of the cluster approach at various levels of the organization will be clarified.

Provider of last resort

In the country case studies UNICEF was found to have taken the role of provider of last resort seriously, interpreting it in both the Central African Republic and the Sudan as needing to ensure services are delivered even in the absence of partners. Following the NGO expulsions in the Sudan, UNICEF took over their programmes and in Nutrition is maintaining 35 odd feeding centres employing over 600 staff.

The ‘provider of last resort’ is a complex issue for all agencies. The operational guidance from the IASC states: “Where necessary, and depending on access, security and availability of funding, the cluster lead, as provider of last resort, must be ready to ensure the provision of services required to fill critical gaps identified by the cluster”. However, this does not make it clear where the limits of responsibility lie. Is it enough for UNICEF to advocate for starving children to be assisted, or should they step in and feed them if no one else (including the state) does? Should UNICEF divert funding from programmes that are not directly life-saving? If funds are available and UNICEF does not step in to save children, are they directly culpable if mistakes are made?

Apart from these largely unresolved policy issues, there are practical implications of the provider of last resort stipulation as currently being demonstrated in the Sudan. If no one else is able to do it, then the lead agency has to. This implies having an operational capacity that UNICEF does not have, as an organization most comfortable working through partners.

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Information and knowledge management for clusters

Another profound challenge for UNICEF in emergencies, already touched on in this report, is merging the internal and external context. This is most obvious in the cluster system. In the clusters UNICEF is responsible for, its role as convener makes it necessary to work in the way envisaged for UNICEF more widely as part of the change management process. UNICEF needs to be the ‘hub’ for a wider network rather than the sole provider. It needs in particular to be a ‘knowledge broker’; setting standards, making linkages between specialist agencies, providing resources to other actors in a particular sector, and monitoring key data and feeding this back to the sector to adjust programmes. This requires the same investment as UNICEF plans internally, the same shift in culture but perhaps in different areas and cutting across departments.

Information management for clusters is also an issue. For clusters where OCHA is deployed in significant strengths, a large proportion of information management work is done by that agency; however, where this is not the case, UNICEF struggles in this area. In Bangladesh (Sidr response), the WASH cluster deployed a cluster information manager, recognising that the information needs of clusters were different from UNICEF’s own internal information management needs. This had a remarkable effect on the quality of management information for monitoring and reporting. However, having such dedicated information management capacity for each cluster certainly raises a resourcing issue.

6.2.2 Overall performance

UNICEF has made good, albeit uneven, progress in implementing the cluster approach. WASH has made the most progress and Education probably the least. The organization has changed internal structures to accommodate the approach, hired core cluster staff on a permanent basis (one or two funded through core funds) and has invested much time and effort in bringing the cluster approach to its Country Offices. Much of this would not have been possible without DFID Phase III funding and institutional commitment by the UNICEF management to the approach. Some of the global Cluster Coordinator positions were initially funded through DFID before being taken onto core funding (WASH and Nutrition currently). This means that the DFID funding served as a catalyst in this process, much as was intended. DFID resources also enabled the development of surge capacity, tools and guidelines, research and much of the regional training.

Whilst the evidence is clear that UNICEF has made a serious commitment at central, global and organizational level to roll out clusters in its areas of responsibility, performance varies across clusters and according to the country context. The country case studies noted a high degree of variance in cluster implementation and approach. The Sudan has been slow to adopt the cluster approach. Once it was formally adopted late last year, UNICEF has been seen as a leader in planning and thinking around its implementation (in fact OCHA have asked them to hold back as they are seen as marching far ahead of others). The performance of the clusters in Bangladesh was very variable, with the WASH cluster being the most successful according to various interlocutors and review reports. UNICEF is generally perceived by most stakeholders in Ethiopia to be taking its cluster role seriously. Apart from the Country Office leadership, the support from ESARO in rolling out clusters and providing training to Cluster Coordinators, as well as in developing the capacity of the Country Office in Nutrition and WASH, in particular, are widely acknowledged. Emergency education has, for the first time, been included in the country’s June/July government-led National Emergency Needs Assessment.

The global cluster support appears to have had less impact on the operation in the Central African Republic. Clusters have been operating since 2007 but are still rather basic. They allow for sector coordination and act as a ‘hub’ for responses, but they do not proactively set sector strategies and monitor impact. The use of the ‘tools’ developed at a global level is minimal and only WASH has a separate Cluster Coordinator, who is new in the post.

During the 2007 floods, UNICEF played a pivotal role in Mozambique in linking government and NGO partners through the clusters in the field. UNICEF was able to provide a fast response as it had pre-positioned supplies with line ministry counterparts at national and decentralized levels. Equally
importantly, UNICEF’s local staff strength, their knowledge of local culture and ability to relate to local government officials was key to a successful relationship. The initiative taken by UNICEF in Madagascar during recent emergencies is well recognized by OCHA and partners – in facilitating inter-agency coordination throughout the contingency planning exercise as well as in coordinating response, preparing appeal documents and undertaking post-emergency actions.\textsuperscript{103}

UNICEF has made a serious commitment to the cluster approach and has been investing significant resources on it. In a workshop on mainstreaming cluster capacities held in July 2009, UNICEF clarified the reasons for mainstreaming clusters: (i) organizational commitment to the cluster approach; (ii) predictability and sustainability in UNICEF’s ability to meet cluster accountabilities; (iii) improved, faster and predictable preparedness and response in emergencies; and (iv) clarity on separation/integration between emergency programming and clusters.\textsuperscript{104} UNICEF has made a commitment to such mainstreaming, although there are several critical constraints identified in the process:

- lack of long-term vision and strategy, based on a full analysis of the implications of the cluster approach for different levels of the organization;
- lack of a clear accountability framework, including defined/systematic regional support role;
- limited understanding of UNICEF’s cluster lead agency role and responsibilities beyond the CCs/emergency focal points;
- lack of performance monitoring framework and mechanism for cluster accountabilities;
- lack of clear strategy to ensure funding for cluster approach costs, hampered by lack of predictable long-term donor funding; and
- weak linkage between humanitarian work and long-term development work.

Conclusions

17. UNICEF has made major commitments to the cluster approach globally and has invested significantly in delivering the cluster accountabilities in all major emergencies. It urgently needs policy guidance for the whole organization on the implications of the cluster approach that clarify the links between the approach and UNICEF’s emergency response/programme.

18. The WASH cluster has made the most progress at global, national and operational levels in terms of providing effective leadership, followed by Nutrition and Child Protection (sector working group), which have developed tools and guidelines at the global level, although progress on the ground has been uneven. The Education cluster is just beginning to come together as a coherent entity. While it is too early to draw conclusions on whether or not UNICEF’s cluster leadership has contributed to more reliable and predictable humanitarian response as a whole, this review concludes that UNICEF is moving in the right direction in terms of delivering its lead agency role.

19. Based on the experience in implementing the cluster approach in the past two and a half years, several critical issues are emerging that need addressing:

(a) There are weak linkages between global cluster initiatives and country realities.
(b) Clusters often exist at a national (capital-based) level but are often not as strong at a sub-national level where the emergency operation is taking place.
(c) There is still a debate on whether cluster lead should be a separate function to internal technical staff and on the skill set needed for cluster leadership.
(d) There are unresolved resource issues in terms of both how cluster leadership function is funded and how cluster members access funding through UNICEF.
(e) Accountabilities for Cluster Coordinators are not consistent across responses.
(f) UNICEF has implemented clusters but appears to be lacking a coherent vision for what the new approach might mean for the entire organization.

There is no shared understanding of the ‘provider of last resort’ provision.

Information and knowledge management for UNICEF-led clusters remains a challenge.

20. Apart from its lead responsibilities, UNICEF has been a key player in all other clusters and has played a very significant role in supporting the Health cluster, which is led by WHO. Additionally, UNICEF plays a central role in facilitating inter-agency response through its management of Non-Food Item supplies in several major emergencies.

6.3 Partnership

Partnership is key to the way UNICEF works both in development and humanitarian action, and recent humanitarian reforms have led to a greater emphasis on agencies working together. UNICEF partners with hundreds if not thousands of different entities in carrying out its work, from governments to businesses to NGOs, both international and national. Governments have been and continue to be key partners for UNICEF. NGOs too have been integral to UNICEF programming in humanitarian action for many years. This relationship has been a complex one on both sides, with many of the best outcomes being achieved in partnership; at the same time, the organization has often been criticized in the past for not being a reliable partner.

In 2006 UNICEF set in process a strategic review of its civil society relationships, culminating in the Board approving a new strategic framework for partnerships. The foundation for the review and the subsequent framework was the understanding within UNICEF that partnerships were critical both in achieving durable rights for children and in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. UNICEF was also acknowledged by partners as playing an important role in convening partnerships, brokering policy change and providing technical expertise and global reach. Despite this, the civil society review found that partnerships had been ad hoc in nature and often contractual.

6.3.1 Partnership with NGOs

In parallel to the organization-wide process, the Office of Emergency Programmes also started a process of strategic dialogue with its global humanitarian partners, culminating in a conference in Geneva in early 2008 where a number of key actions were agreed. The Office of Emergency Programmes created a new inter-agency and humanitarian partnerships section and also committed to a revision of the Project Cooperation Agreement, which is the main funding instrument that UNICEF has for civil society organizations. Enhanced partnership was originally one of the four pillars of ‘humanitarian reform’, later becoming an underlying theme. A Global Humanitarian Platform initiated by NGOs in Geneva developed principles of partnership to which UNICEF and other UN humanitarian agencies agreed. UNICEF has been seen as somewhat behind UNHCR and WFP in developing formal consultation mechanisms with its international NGO partners.

Progress on the action points agreed from the global dialogue has been slower than intended. Partly this has been due to the parallel Board process and the need for the wider framework to be in place. Partly it has also been due – as with the Project Cooperation Agreement revision – to the slowness of UNICEF

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105 For instance, the Convention on the Rights of the Child was initially championed by NGOs, but it was UNICEF action that put it on the international agenda.


109 Ibid.
internal bureaucracy; this process initially took time to be developed within the Division of Policy and Practice and subsequently became stuck in the legal approval process. This has led to one of the major NGO networks interviewed for this evaluation expressing dissatisfaction with the process on behalf of its members, finding UNICEF engagement and consultation patchy. They felt the new global strategic framework for partnership had been produced without sufficient consultation, and were frustrated at the slowness of the Project Cooperation Agreement revision process, although they acknowledged consultation on the new CCCs. With the Board approval of the strategic framework, however, these processes have received renewed impetus and the new humanitarian partnerships team has been trying to regain some of the lost momentum.

The evaluation has seen some excellent examples of partnership, with both governments and NGOs. In the Sudan, the partnership between UNICEF and the States Council for Child Welfare has led to new legislation and a new department for children within the national police force. Following the NGO expulsions in early 2009, UNICEF was able to mobilize key government partners to fill the gaps in service provision, especially in Nutrition and WASH.

For NGOs, the ‘cluster’ system has deepened the partnership with UNICEF. The WASH cluster at the global level is a genuine partnership, blending UNICEF’s convening power and global reach with the nimbleness and expertise of NGOs. In Bangladesh UNICEF convenes the WASH cluster at national level, but at regional level this responsibility is shared with NGOs, with ongoing WASH meetings facilitated by those NGOs best placed to do so.

Whilst there is genuine progress, issues remain with NGO partnerships at country level. Many NGOs still feel the relationship to be contractual. The majority of those interviewed during this evaluation find the UNICEF bureaucracy cumbersome and unhelpful, and feel that grants are not disbursed in a timely fashion. In Pakistan, a major UNICEF partner complained that monies were not disbursed for three months despite it being an emergency and despite UNICEF having received the funds from the donor. This in effect leads to NGOs having to finance the operations themselves, which is possible for large international NGOs with their own funds but not for smaller organizations. In South Sudan UNICEF has not disbursed mosquito nets in a timely fashion, as they do not have funds for distribution. NGOs offered to do this on their behalf without the funding, but UNICEF did not want them to.

Notwithstanding these comments, most NGOs interviewed appreciated the partnership with UNICEF. The majority sentiment appeared to be that partners liked UNICEF’s mandate and work, and for the most part found the staff committed, flexible and focused on the work, but they found the system and bureaucracy disabling. On the one hand they thought UNICEF staff were responsive and often valued the technical expertise; on the other, they complained that UNICEF systems are “inflexible”, bureaucratic and frequently do not adhere to the organization’s own obligations, such as providing timely provision of supplies, funding, other inputs or responses to partner requests for communication.

This lack of consistency in partnership approaches is not limited to humanitarian programming or country programmes. UNICEF appears to have an organizational culture that is challenged when working in partnership or collaborative work. Even in an area like corporate partnership, which brings in substantial funding for the organization as the 2008 Corporate Partnership Review report pointed out, UNICEF manages its relationship through “rigid” and “restrictive protocols” that cause “collaboration to suffer as a result”. The report noted that UNICEF staff were not trained or permitted to respond to partners’ needs in agile, constructive and individualized ways.

6.3.2 Partnership with governments

Whilst UNICEF has been working to improve the consistency of its partnerships with civil society organizations, it has over the years consistently laid strong emphasis on building governments’ capacity both at strategic and operational levels. Through this approach UNICEF has built trusting relationships with the governments in most countries in which it has offices. This has also provided UNICEF with the

leverage to negotiate and open up humanitarian space in some highly sensitive contexts such as Ethiopia and the Sudan where the organization is highly respected by the governments for its consistent support to various government authorities in delivering services for children and vulnerable communities.

Close working relationships with governments have their advantages as well as disadvantages. Balancing the proximity to government with UNICEF’s impartial and neutral role as a humanitarian agency can at times be difficult. UNICEF walks a tightrope in the Sudan: being a government partner, a humanitarian actor in a conflict to which the government is a party, and part of a larger political organization (United Nations) that has two separate peace enforcement missions in the country. In the context of the Darfur response, UNICEF has been criticized as being too reliant on government in the WASH sector, which compromises the perceived impartiality and independence of the response vis-à-vis affected communities. In Ethiopia as well, UNICEF was criticized in the past for not doing enough to advocate for humanitarian access, although in recent months it has been seen to be more proactive in engaging with the Government on some sensitive and long-standing humanitarian issues.

In the Philippines, UNICEF’s close relationship with the Government and lack of humanitarian independence came in for criticism from the Joint Monitoring Mission, which noted that it was difficult for UNICEF to fulfil its obligations as the IASC-appointed cluster lead for ensuring that emergency response is neutral, impartial and needs-based: “Some NGOs do not view UNICEF as a credible cluster coordinator because it is perceived to be too close to government and therefore not representing interests of NGOs or affected population in a disaster”.

A question therefore for UNICEF leadership is how it can continue to advocate through the CCCs and through the human rights-based approach without jeopardizing the government relationships that are key to development programmes. This issue relates to the role of the United Nations in a sovereign state with a strong government and with a humanitarian crisis to which the humanitarian community feels impelled to respond, but where the government does not wish to seek or receive international assistance at the level that the humanitarian community believes is appropriate.

UNICEF as a UN technical agency is limited in the extent to which it can influence a government. The role of resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator becomes crucial, and so does the role of donor governments in giving out a consistent message in their engagement with the governments. In Ethiopia, the Resident Coordinator has in recent years not been able to play a strong humanitarian coordinating role, and the donor governments and other players who can influence the Government have not been seen or heard to be raising any of the sensitive humanitarian issues. One of the premises underpinning the adoption of the cluster approach is that it provides predictable and reliable assistance to communities that need it. In complex situations such as those of Ethiopia or Sri Lanka, even though the clusters may be functioning well and ensuring effective coordination and technical support, the predictability and reliability of the response may depend on political factors that go beyond the remit of UN technical agencies alone.

Moving towards better, more responsive partnerships may be one of the most important challenges for UNICEF in its humanitarian programme in the next few years. UNICEF management is committed to significantly improve the situation and has already established a full team in its Inter-Agency Humanitarian Partnership Section to concentrate on this complex issue.

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112 Workshop Report: Asia-Pacific Regional Workshop on Children Affected by Armed Conflict, Khao Lak, Thailand, 2-4 June 2008.
113 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IASC Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation of the Pakistan Floods/Cyclone, OCHA, New York, October 2007.
Conclusions

21. UNICEF has been working hard to bring about a change in its approach to partnerships, especially with regard to humanitarian work. On the one hand, the NGOs find UNICEF staff responsive and often value their technical expertise; on the other, they complain that UNICEF systems are “inflexible” and bureaucratic and that UNICEF frequently did not adhere to its own obligations, such as timely provision of supplies, funding, other inputs or responses to partner requests for communication.

22. The Project Cooperation Agreement revision process, which began in early 2008 and had earlier stalled, is now completed. When this is rolled out, it should provide a platform for renewed engagement with humanitarian NGOs.

23. While recognizing that there will be no one solution that fits every country context, UNICEF needs to engage in an internal debate involving country managers on how to deal with the issue of a delicate balancing of constructive relationship with governments, without compromising the organization’s ability to provide an impartial and neutral humanitarian response when children are affected by natural disasters and conflict.
7. Key area #5: Humanitarian advocacy and communications

**Key questions/issues examined:** (i) What specific advocacy work has been carried out by UNICEF in emergencies during the past three years? What were the specific messages and targets and how effective were these? What difference have they made, or have the potential to make, to contribute to better outcomes for women and children? ii) Which countries have undertaken evidence-based advocacy on violations against children? Who were the partners, what were the targets and what was the outcome?

7.1 Humanitarian advocacy

UNICEF’s humanitarian advocacy takes place in a variety of ways, from visits of goodwill ambassadors (for example, Mia Farrow to Darfur in 2004), to the release of reports such as a recent study on violence against girls, to contributions to various Secretary General’s reports or the Economic and Social Council and so on. UNICEF helped draft General Assembly resolution 46/182 that arguably created the modern system of humanitarian response, and a UNICEF staff member was one of a team of three that undertook the 2005 humanitarian response review that led to the current humanitarian reform process.

As well as global advocacy, often using international media, UNICEF regularly undertakes programme-based advocacy. During a recent attack on Khartoum by the Darfur-based JEM rebel group, the Government captured approximately 100 child soldiers. UNICEF successfully advocated for the children’s release – they were given a Presidential pardon – and then helped rehabilitate them. In the Central African Republic, UNICEF negotiated with various rebel groups for the release of child soldiers, successfully advocating for a clause in the recent peace agreement that commits all groups to these actions. UNICEF is often involved in negotiating for humanitarian access. In its recently published advocacy guidelines there are two case studies (Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe) where UNICEF negotiated for access to conflict-affected areas so that programmes could be undertaken – WASH in the case of Zimbabwe and education in Côte d’Ivoire.

Despite these and many other examples of both high- and low-profile humanitarian advocacy, there remains a perception amongst partners (and staff) that UNICEF could be more outspoken. During the Georgia crisis last year as well the conflict in the Occupied Palestinian Territories earlier this year, UNICEF was hardly seen to be advocating for humanitarian access and for protection of children. In Ethiopia, there is a strong feeling among NGOs in particular that UNICEF has not in the past used its close relationship with the Government to advocate on the nutrition situation or for greater access for humanitarian agencies, although in recent months there have been some positive changes in this direction. One issue may be the knowledge base of UNICEF country representatives and senior managers with regard to the principles of humanitarianism. Issues of international humanitarian law and other relevant laws and principles should be mandatory in senior management training.

7.2 The monitoring and reporting mechanism, UNSCR 1612

In its ‘non-strategy’ paper, UNICEF highlighted its strong tradition of speaking on issues relating to children and armed conflict. The organization saw advocating for children’s protection, and the tools to be able to do this effectively, as one of the key areas to strengthen in its ongoing efforts to improve its humanitarian work. This included in particular putting in place the mechanisms to help the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 and its innovative monitoring and reporting mechanism launched in 2006.

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The Phase III project has as one of its six objectives to help UNICEF establish its part of the monitoring and reporting mechanism put forth in UNSCR 1612. UNSCR 1612 follows a line of Security Council resolutions on the protection of children in armed conflict, including 1261 in 1999, 1314 in 2000, 1379 in 2001, 1460 in 2003 and 1539 in 2004. What is different about 1612 is the monitoring and reporting mechanism, whereby countries where abuses against children are judged particularly severe are reported on in detail. The list of countries is generated by the Secretary-General’s Annual Report on Children in Armed Conflict (itself established under these previous resolutions). A Security Council working group receives detailed reports on six violations. These are:

- killing or maiming of children;
- recruiting or using child soldiers;
- attacks against schools or hospitals;
- rape or other grave sexual violence against children;
- abduction of children; and
- denial of humanitarian access for children.

These reports are received on an annual basis, but the Security Council working group meets relatively frequently (on average quarterly). UNICEF contributes to the reports through its work in the countries listed, and also reports to the Security Council working group through a process called a ‘horizontal note’.

There are currently 15 countries within the monitoring and reporting mechanism. Table 5 shows the countries being monitored and that are listed in annexes 1 and 2 of the Secretary-General’s report on children in armed conflict (the 8th report is the current list).116

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UNICEF is one of a number of key actors in the monitoring and reporting mechanism. As an organization with offices and large operations in the countries concerned, it is amongst the best placed to gather evidence for monitoring and reporting mechanism reports. This is sensitive work – the state can be the main violator of children’s rights in several of these countries, and UNICEF is an inter-governmental organization that operates on the basis of formal agreements and work plans with host governments.

Despite the sensitivities of the task, however, UNICEF has managed to scale up relatively well in the countries where the monitoring and reporting mechanism is operating. Three of the five countries that formed case studies for this evaluation were on the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, and the programme is very different in each of these. The reasons for this are partly contextual and partly about resources. In the Sudan, there is a very big UN operation with two peacekeeping missions as well as 19 UN agencies. As a result there are human rights monitors and child protection staff from both missions. UNICEF co-chairs the task force in the Sudan with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (and Humanitarian Coordinator), and the monitoring of the violations is split between the various agencies involved, with UNICEF monitoring child recruitment. This has become quite sophisticated, with a database and an emphasis on evidence. There is clear verification criteria, meaning that incidents reported are checked as far as possible before being entered.

This is not the case in the Central African Republic. Whilst there is a task force, UNICEF has only one international staff member in child protection compared to something like 19 in the Sudan. As a result, there is no systematic gathering of evidence against the six violations and very little capacity to put this in place. UNICEF is in the process of recruiting an international staff member specifically for the monitoring and reporting mechanism, but until this person is in place, reporting and data collection is only happening at a superficial level. In Colombia, the Government approved the implementation of the monitoring and

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**Table 5: List of countries under the monitoring and reporting mechanism**

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*The 3rd report lists only one annex.
reporting mechanism in October 2008 and it is being led by the Vice President’s Office. UNICEF is acknowledged by other UN actors as having shown leadership in discussions about the mechanism in the task force that comprises government and international agencies.

From this analysis it is clear that context and resources make a huge impact on how the monitoring and reporting mechanism is implemented. In the case of Colombia, a middle-income country with a democratic government, the role of UNICEF is very different to that in the Central African Republic, which is ranked 179 (of 182) on the 2009 Human Development Index. In the Sudan, the resources for humanitarian action and the presence of large UN missions makes a level of reporting detail possible that is not the case in the Central African Republic with limited resources. Nevertheless, whilst this evaluation was ongoing, the results were released of a study by Columbia University (commissioned by UNICEF) that took a public health approach to creating a set of baseline data for the 1612 monitoring in the Central African Republic. The study found that abductions and kidnappings were the most frequent violations. It also found that mortality levels were alarmingly high, suggesting a collapse of health care and basic services.

The Columbia University report demonstrates the way in which UNICEF has responded creatively to the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism. This was part of a global pilot exploring whether public health approaches could be used in gathering data on the 1612 violations. Its shocking results will present all humanitarian and development actors in the Central African Republic with a challenge in determining how to respond. That country also demonstrates some of the challenges inherent in the monitoring and reporting mechanism agenda. The potential is enormous and well acknowledged, but up to now the challenges have also been considerable.

The first challenge has already been touched on in this chapter and it is the sensitivity of governments who are under scrutiny. In countries like Colombia this can make it extremely hard for organizations such as UNICEF that will not wish to be perceived as part of a neo-colonial, external agenda. In countries like the Central African Republic and the Sudan, it can also be dangerous as armed groups or other violators may seek to target UNICEF staff if they feel they are connected to such mechanisms.

The second challenge is one of resources. Monitoring and gathering evidence is labour-intensive, slow and painstaking work. It is not ‘normal’ humanitarian work, meaning that donors are not always keen to fund such work through humanitarian budgets. Without skilled people and without the funds for partners, it is not possible to implement mechanisms such as the monitoring and reporting mechanism.

The third challenge is cultural and institutional for UNICEF. The monitoring and reporting mechanism agenda is a traditional human rights monitoring agenda, and UNICEF is more familiar with direct advocacy work with governments and other partners. The tools for the monitoring and reporting mechanism work have had to be created from scratch and the ways in which the data can be used are still unfamiliar. The denial of humanitarian access for children under the monitoring and reporting mechanism, for instance, is a potentially powerful lever in such places as Sri Lanka at the end of the recent conflict but was not used to put pressure on the Government, perhaps because the organization is not used to acting in this way.

Despite these challenges, both internal and external, the view of the majority of UNICEF partners interviewed in this evaluation was that the organisation is trying to push the 1612 agenda. In the Central African Republic UNICEF advocated for and accompanied a visit of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Children in Armed Conflict, Radhika Comaraswamy, as a way of kicking off the 1612 process. In a 2008 study, the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict looked at the implementation of 1612 in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka and Uganda. UNICEF generally features amongst the successes in these reports, co-chairing the task force, convening groups of NGOs

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to develop frameworks, formally and informally collecting information, providing training, and so on. In Uganda, UNICEF has trained dozens of community monitors and had success with community-based child protection committees in the north. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a UNICEF seconded (to MONUC) 1612 Reports Officer conducted training on monitoring and reporting for approximately 200 child protection and human rights staff in Bunia, Beni, Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira. In Colombia in 2005, UNICEF convened an inter-agency working group on child rights monitoring consisting of national and international NGOs, two state entities, and six UN agencies that eventually led to the current task force. In Sri Lanka, UNICEF acted as a hub to collect information from national and international NGOs and provided training.

In fact, the monitoring and reporting mechanism is the latest iteration of an increasingly ambitious agenda around children in armed conflict for UNICEF, starting with the first Graça Michel report and supported in large part initially by the DFID capacity-building project. Phase III has been no exception in this regard, funding posts at a global level that have overseen the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism and the development of the database. DFID funding has also paid for training at a regional level.

**Conclusions**

24. UNICEF has, with DFID Phase III resources, made reasonable progress in implementing the monitoring and reporting mechanism put forth in Security Council Resolution 1612. There is certainly more to be done in terms of professionalizing the data collection — in many ways the current situation represents a promising beginning rather than a finalized system. There are two key constraints to the monitoring and reporting mechanism being made a powerful tool that it has the potential to be: the extreme sensitivity and often belligerence of governments and armed groups listed; and, more importantly, the limited resources available for this kind of work.

25. In terms of more general humanitarian advocacy, while UNICEF continues to be a high profile advocate for the needs of marginalized and vulnerable children, many partners and staff would like to see the organization being more proactive in advocating for humanitarian access and protection of children.
8. Assessment against OECD/DAC criteria

Key questions/issues examined: Overall assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of Phase III of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation against Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) criteria.

8.1 Relevance

Relevance refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme and is concerned with assessing whether projects are in line with needs and priorities.

The original goal of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation was to "improve UNICEF's responsiveness to children in crisis". Humanitarian reform sought to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response by ensuring greater predictability, accountability and partnership. The Phase III project laid a strong emphasis on enabling UNICEF to play a crucial role in the entire reform process and more particularly in the cluster approach, which aimed at ensuring predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies by clarifying the division of labour among organizations and better defining their roles and responsibilities within different sectors of the response.

In this evolving humanitarian landscape, every agency leading the clusters faces the challenge of increasing its capacity to provide leadership to the humanitarian community. The goal of Phase III of the Programme of Cooperation was “a stronger UNICEF contribution to coordinated and effective humanitarian response”. It focused much of its attention on ensuring that UNICEF was able to meet its new cluster obligations globally. This was highly relevant given that UNICEF leads nearly a third of the IASC-nominated clusters, including acute life-saving clusters such as WASH and Nutrition. DFID support was essential in making progress on the cluster agenda within UNICEF, developing and rolling out tools and mechanisms to strengthen partnership and inter-agency response.

Phase III also supported surge capacity, streamlining systems and improving the knowledge of humanitarian action across the organization, the implementation of UNSCR 1612 on child protection and UNICEF’s advocacy capacity. These too were relevant areas to focus on, although in some cases the patchiness of their implementation may have diminished their impact.

Overall the six outcomes that constituted the foundation of the design for the Programme of Cooperation have been highly relevant, as taken together they have given UNICEF significant capacity to improve its own response as well as to start providing leadership to specific clusters, as discussed in section 7 above. The fact that most countries now consider that emergency response is something UNICEF ought to provide – although some staff still believe it is not a core function of the organization – is a testimony to the relevance of the capacity-building programme in bringing about a significant shift in mindset in an organization that, even as recently as the post-tsunami period, saw some COs expressing doubt whether emergency response was the right thing for UNICEF to do.

8.2 Effectiveness

Effectiveness measures the extent to which the activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs.

Good progress has been made during the past three years in building awareness of the CCCs in most Country Offices, building on earlier work in this regard. This evaluation found 87 per cent of staff who responded thought the CCCs were well known, up from 50 per cent in the previous evaluation of the

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119 As outlined in the Terms of Reference, only five elements of the criteria are examined in this evaluation: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability.
Programme of Cooperation. It is testament to the capacity-building programme that every Country Office is now required to produce an emergency preparedness plan, and the CCCs have become an organizational standard. Tools like the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan and simulations conducted in emergency-prone countries have brought home to country staff the importance of preparedness, although in some countries their effectiveness is questionable.

Two of the most effective interventions for UNICEF, supported through this programme, in the last three years have been: (a) building up UNICEF’s WASH leadership capacity, almost from scratch, in partnership with globally recognized organizations; and (b) strengthening the Regional Offices role and capacity to support Country Offices for effective humanitarian response. Development of tools and surge mechanisms in the WASH cluster globally as well as in some regions has also been highly effective. In both WASH and Nutrition, some of the cluster-supported initiatives have genuinely assisted in global cluster implementation – rapid response rosters and training for Cluster Coordinators, for instance.

The development of the Education cluster has been slow, and therefore its effect is yet to be felt in the humanitarian sector. The Child Protection cluster/subgroup has also been slow to roll out in-country operations; however, it has developed and disseminated effective tools that many organizations globally have begun to make use of.

UNICEF has tried to simplify its administrative systems and procedures for emergency response under the Programme of Cooperation. The effectiveness of this intervention, however, has been limited, and ‘bureaucratic’ delays still remain key constraints to timeliness in emergency response. Much partner goodwill is squandered through unpredictable and time-consuming grant processes. Another area where the evaluation found UNICEF not being effective is in learning and monitoring. The new CCCs have made a quantum leap in this regard, setting benchmarks for performance. It remains to be seen whether Country Offices will have the resources and skills to reliably monitor these. In the area of learning, despite good efforts to conduct reviews and evaluations, there are too few mechanisms to share experiences amongst staff. With the new responsibility of cluster leadership, this is likely to become an acute constraint.

8.3 Efficiency

*Efficiency measures how economically inputs (funds, expertise, time) have been converted into outputs.*

Measured in purely financial terms, the DFID programme has been efficient in its aim of boosting UNICEF humanitarian work. The organization is now approaching a billion dollars worth of humanitarian spending - a fourfold increase over the past ten years - and a higher percentage of the organization’s programme portfolio. At the same time the organization has gone from patchy to more reliable performance, albeit with more work to be done. Whilst attribution is always challenging, it is certainly an efficient outcome to have seen UNICEF both improve and grow its humanitarian portfolio with a comparatively small investment under the Programme of Cooperation.

Comments have been made in the evaluation about UNICEF’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process. Although it has enabled some offices to transform their humanitarian capacity, all offices find it cumbersome. The sections that are helpful in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan process and contribute to the most impact are simple; however, the full prescribed process and format is so cumbersome that many offices just go through the motions of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan because it is a requirement, knowing full well that they are not prepared in the event of an emergency. Offices that are better prepared for emergencies know that while some of the principles behind Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan have helped them in getting to where they are now, a large amount of time is spent on producing a detailed document that is an organizational requirement but not all of which is quite necessary or helpful for them when facing the next emergency.

If efficiency is about how economically inputs are converted into outputs, the same results (preparedness) can be achieved by a much lighter process, with considerably less investment, and tailored to specific
emergency contexts. However, as came out strongly during staff interviews, UNICEF has a tendency to go for nothing short of what looks like a 'perfect' document, at least in terms of making sure that all 'boxes have been ticked', even though this might cause delay or be costly for the organization. A consistent complaint from partners during this evaluation as well as in the past has been the time-consuming nature of UNICEF’s internal bureaucracy for decision-making even on issues that have life-saving consequences (the Sudan feeding centre example, for instance, or Ethiopia cholera supplies not reaching the communities that need them, as cited in the Ethiopia country case studies).

In order to overcome complex procedures that can cause delays, UNICEF sometimes uses partnership mechanisms – for example, the WASH Rapid Response Team is implemented in partnership with NGOs who are capable of delivering faster response. This was also done partly because of financial considerations as it is cheaper for projects to be managed by NGOs than to have staff on UNICEF payrolls.

**8.4 Impact**

*Impact looks at the wider effects of the project – social, economic, technical, and environmental – on individuals, gender, age groups, communities and institutions. It considers the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.*

The impact of the capacity-building programme on the organization has already been stated in the preceding sections. It has allowed UNICEF to build a considerable humanitarian programme portfolio and to increase this in both size and reliability. The funding from DFID and a host of other donors has been a significant factor that allowed the organization to invest in areas that have been essential for its capacity building.

The question of whether this enhanced capacity for humanitarian programming has made an impact on the lives of children in crisis is more difficult to answer, and goes beyond the scope and resources of this evaluation. At the institutional level, however, UNICEF has improved its emergency capacity on many fronts during the 2006‒2009 Phase III Programme of Cooperation with DFID. Whereas the 2005 Phase I/II evaluation found that “UNICEF remains some distance from achieving the goal of reliably delivering humanitarian response as the rights-based approach and the CCCs require”, this evaluation has found the UNICEF response *mostly reliable*. This evaluation has also found that UNICEF has made good progress in implementing its cluster commitments, although there is an urgent need for a more coherent vision of what cluster means from the senior leadership. There is also wide variance in the performance of different clusters both globally and locally.

**8.5 Sustainability**

*Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.*

The question as to whether the gains made under the nine years of the DFID Programme of Cooperation can be secured is one of the most pertinent. Despite a stated policy of ‘mainstreaming’ emergencies, there are indications that it remains separate and distinct in terms of budgets. Many of the emergency posts in Headquarters and in the Regional Offices are paid for from ‘other resources’, meaning distinct donor projects rather than core funds. Phase III of the capacity-building programme predominantly paid for staffing. Some of the funds were for the development of tools and guidelines, and it can be argued that once these are completed their impact will continue to be felt. Similarly, some of the DFID-funded posts will now move to ‘regular resources’, or core funding. However, many are not currently on core funding and it remains to be seen what will happen in the future. DFID funding is not being ceased, but it will instead be a general contribution to ‘other resources’ for emergencies, allowing UNICEF to choose how
this money is spent within the broad category of humanitarian programming. This will allow the Office of Emergency Programmes and the Regional Offices to maintain those posts in the short to medium term – the real question, however, is whether the organization will make the long-term commitment implied in the Martigny process a decade ago. This issue will be examined in greater depth in section 9.2 below.
9. Overall conclusions and recommendations

9.1 Assessment of DFID-UNICEF programme outcomes

As mentioned in section 2, the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation Phase III had six expected outcomes that informed the design of the project (logframe). Based on the conclusions drawn from discussions in sections 3-7, Table 6 provides a summary of overall assessment against these outcomes:

Table 6: Overall assessment against DFID-UNICEF proposal outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired outcome</th>
<th>(Conclusion no.)</th>
<th>Overall conclusions of the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1:</td>
<td></td>
<td>(17) UNICEF has made major commitments to the cluster approach globally and has invested significantly in delivering the cluster accountabilities in all major emergencies. It urgently needs policy guidance for the whole organization on the implications of the cluster approach that clarify the links between the approach and UNICEF’s emergency response/programme.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(18) The WASH cluster has made the most progress at global, national and operational levels in terms of providing effective leadership, followed by Nutrition and Child Protection (sector working group) which have developed tools and guidelines at the global levels, although the progress on the ground has been uneven. The Education cluster is just beginning to come together as a coherent entity. While it is too early to draw conclusions on whether or not UNICEF’s cluster leadership has contributed to more reliable and predictable humanitarian response as a whole, this review concludes that UNICEF is moving in the right direction in terms of delivering its lead agency role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2:</td>
<td></td>
<td>(19) Based on the experience in implementing the cluster approach in the past two and a half years, several critical issues are emerging which need addressing:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) There are weak linkages between global cluster initiatives and country realities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Clusters often exist at a national (capital-based) level but are often not as strong at a sub-national level where the emergency operation is taking place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) There is still a debate on whether cluster lead should be a separate function to internal technical staff and on the skill set needed for cluster leadership.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) There are unresolved resource issues in terms of both how cluster leadership is funded and how cluster members access funding through UNICEF.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Accountabilities for Cluster Coordinators are not consistent across responses.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(f) UNICEF has dutifully implemented clusters but appears to be lacking a coherent vision for what the new approach might mean for different parts of the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(g) There is no shared understanding of the 'provider of last resort' provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(h) Information and knowledge management for UNICEF-led clusters remains a challenge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

120 Numbers within brackets preceding each conclusion refer to the specific numbers assigned to each conclusion in the body of the text in section 3-7.
(20) Apart from its lead responsibilities, UNICEF has been a key player in all other clusters and has played a very significant role in supporting the Health cluster, which is led by WHO. Additionally, UNICEF plays a key role in facilitating inter-agency response through its management of Non-Food Item supplies in several major emergencies.

(21) UNICEF has been working hard to bring about a change in its approach to partnerships, especially with regard to humanitarian work. On the one hand, the NGOs find UNICEF staff responsive and often value the technical expertise; on the other, they complain that UNICEF systems are “inflexible” and bureaucratic and UNICEF frequently did not adhere to its own obligations, such as timely provision of supplies, funding, other inputs, or responses to partner requests for communication.

(22) The Project Cooperation Agreement revision process, which began in early 2008 and had earlier stalled, is now completed. When this is rolled out, it should provide a platform for renewed engagement with humanitarian NGOs.

(23) While recognizing that there will be no one solution that fits every country context, UNICEF needs to engage in an internal debate involving country managers on how to deal with the issue of a delicate balancing of constructive relationship with governments, without compromising the organization’s ability to provide impartial and neutral humanitarian response when children are affected by natural disasters and conflict.

| Outcome 3. Adequate people with adequate competencies for coordination and response vis-à-vis programme CCCs in place in a timely manner in all new major emergencies | (12) UNICEF’s surge capacity in 2008 has met the CCC standards in 75 per cent of the cases (65 per cent in 2007), with 57 per cent of deployments within the first 28 days. The internal redeployments and recruitments from standby partners have been critical for UNICEF’s surge capacity.

(13) There have been staff from Human Resources dedicated for emergencies in Department of Human Resources-facilitated surge in the past three years. However, with this dedicated resource now being dismantled, it is unclear how the progress that has been made in surge capacity will be sustained in the future.

(14) UNICEF has made considerable progress in recruitment and training of Cluster Coordinators in different sectors, and is close to meeting the indicator set for Cluster Coordinators deployment in the DFID-UNICEF Phase III logframe.

| Outcome 4. UNICEF staff have basic knowledge of CCCs and key tools to operationalize them ensuring timely, effective and reliable response. | (1) There is a greater understanding and knowledge of CCCs in Country Offices, and greater appreciation of UNICEF’s role in humanitarian response as part of country programmes. The Phase I/II evaluation of the Programme of Cooperation observed: “the CCCs and standards for humanitarian response are not well known by UNICEF teams”. In the internal survey for this evaluation, some 87 per cent of staff thought the country management team were familiar with the CCCs and how they should be used in planning response. This appears to represent good progress during Phase III.

(6) The humanitarian agenda does not figure as a core component of UNICEF’s institutional strategy embedded in the MTSP that is approved by its Governing Board.

(3) The Regional Offices have played a critical role in supporting Country Offices in delivering response as well as in proactive engagement in clusters.
(4) Headquarters and Regional Offices are making serious commitments to strengthen Country Office capacity and country leadership to effectively deliver on UNICEF’s humanitarian mandate. However, at the operational level, there is need for greater clarity on authority, role differentiation, relationships and responsibility of various departments/sections/units in Headquarters and Regional Offices, which are gradually being addressed through an inter-divisional task force and revisions to organizational accountability systems.

(5) Whereas the previous evaluation of the DFID capacity-building project found response uneven, the evidences from country studies (Bangladesh, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and the Sudan) during this evaluation indicate a significant culture change where emergency response is high on the management agenda.

(7) Protocols and procedures in draft form have been developed and these need to be agreed so as to establish clear lines of communication and coordination involving Headquarters, Regional Offices and Country Offices that could help UNICEF take fast management decisions in times of emergencies.

(8) The discussions on gender issues in Country Offices have by and large remained confined to gender focal points. Gender integration in emergency response is still weak, and the organization is making investments in addressing this.

(16) UNICEF’s information management, monitoring and evaluation in emergencies are weak, although it needs to be noted that there are several initiatives currently underway that should bring about significant positive change in these areas in coming years.

(9) Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans are now being produced by all Country Offices. As a central plank of the Regional Offices’ engagement with the Country Offices, emergency preparedness remains at the core of the way the organization attempts to build and maintain capacity to respond to emergencies.

(10) Traditionally, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan documents have been cumbersome and not easily accessible during operations. With the new Early Warning-Early Action integrated portal, Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans in future (from 2010) will become a much more operational exercise that will constantly monitor and measure key elements of preparedness of Country Offices in areas like prepositioning of supplies, and or framework agreements with suppliers; pre-selection of partners; rosters of skilled people (or agreements with the Regional Office to ensure internal redeployment); staff requirements for response and cluster role; knowledge of assessment tools and methods; streamlined procedure for cash release, etc. This would also make the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans process and format lighter and ‘smarter’ by making Country Offices focus on the essential elements leading to practical action. The format now incorporates the revised CCC accountabilities.

(11) Disaster risk reduction is a relatively new area for UNICEF Country Offices, and tools are now being developed to help in integrating disaster risk reduction in UNICEF’s country programming. Going into the future, greater investment in disaster risk reduction will be needed to promote it as a core component of country programming.
Outcome 5.  
Internal systems and procedures for finance, Admin and Supplies streamlined and put into practice in COs with HQ/RO support mechanisms.  

(15) Attempts have been made from Headquarters to streamline and clarify finance and administrative systems for emergencies. However, at the operational level, these are yet to make any significant difference and delays in funds release, Programme Cooperation Agreements and supplies are common, except in a few countries.

(2) The accountability framework within the organization has been weak, especially with regards to humanitarian action, but is now being revised and strengthened on an organization-wide basis.

Outcome 6.  
Improved (evidence-based) advocacy in relation to violations against children in a minimum of 15 countries.

(24) UNICEF has, with DFID Phase III resources, made reasonable progress in implementing the monitoring and reporting mechanism. There is certainly more to be done in terms of professionalizing the data collection – in many ways the current situation represents a promising beginning rather than a finalized system. There are two key constraints to the monitoring and reporting mechanism put forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1612 being made a powerful tool that it has the potential to be: the extreme sensitivity and often belligerence of governments and armed groups listed; and, more importantly, the limited resources available for this kind of work.

(25) In terms of more general humanitarian advocacy, while UNICEF continues to be a high profile advocate for the needs of marginalized and vulnerable children, many partners and staff would like to see the organization being more proactive in advocating for humanitarian access and protection of children.

The overall conclusion of this evaluation is that UNICEF has improved its emergency capacity on many fronts during the 2006–2009 Phase III programme. Whereas the 2006 Phase I/II evaluation found UNICEF weak on reliably delivering humanitarian response, this evaluation concludes that UNICEF response is mostly reliable. The evaluation has also found that UNICEF has made good progress in implementing its cluster commitments, although there remains a need for a more coherent vision of what cluster lead means for the organization at a corporate level.

Whilst the ability to deploy skilled humanitarian staff has undoubtedly improved over the last period, these gains are fragile, and the demand is increasing. There is a concern that, without dedicated HR support for emergencies globally, these gains will be lost, and hard-to-fill posts in protracted emergencies remain a challenge.

Despite the finding that UNICEF responds reliably to the majority of emergencies, there are still many areas for improvement. One area that stands out as being problematic, despite good work over the course of Phase III, is the business process of the organization. This is the biggest constraint to better partnerships, particularly with NGOs. Whilst the new handbook on emergency finance and administration and accompanying training are both excellent initiatives, there is an underlying culture of risk aversion that has yet to be tackled. In 2006 UNICEF undertook an ambitious organizational review that led to a number of changes in business process and structure.\(^\text{121}\) The review recommended a major overhaul of both strategic focus and culture, particularly management culture and performance management. It also emphasized the need to increase UNICEF’s partnerships with civil society. During the past three years, several initiatives have been launched by UNICEF management to address these issues.

9.2 Strategic issues and recommendations

9.2.1 Strategic issues

The Martigny process set the agenda for the humanitarian capacity-building programme of UNICEF, supported by DFID amongst others. Nine years later, at the end of DFID’s focused capacity-building support, it is legitimate to ask whether the strategy chosen at Martigny, and pursued through the three phases of DFID support, was the right one.

The core of the Martigny strategy was the idea of mainstreaming. This meant that rather than have a separate and stand-alone emergency capacity, UNICEF would ensure that all its offices and technical departments understood humanitarian programming and could respond to crises. The CCCs were the most important and visible aspect of the mainstreaming strategy, essentially laying out how Country Offices should respond. An Executive Directive was also issued in 2004 appending the new CCCs and clearly committing UNICEF to life-saving emergency response. The CCCs cover a broad range of sectors: health, nutrition, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, protection and education. UNICEF is not expected to provide for all of these sectors itself, but has committed to ensure that such provision is made. A timeframe for response establishes accountability of relevant actions in both rapid and protracted humanitarian situations.

Alongside the major policy instruments (CCCs and preparedness) were a number of structural measures. The Office of Emergency Programmes had its size, remit and authority enhanced, and a new post of regional emergency adviser was established in the Regional Offices. Both of these entities were to provide the resources – human, technical and, in the case of the Office of Emergency Programmes, financial – to help Country Offices respond. They were also to help mobilize Country Office response and Regional Office and Headquarters support.

The DFID capacity-building project under-wrote many of these initiatives, at least initially. It provided resources to enhance the authority of Office of Emergency Programmes, it paid for the posts of regional emergency advisers and it allowed for the development of policy instruments such as the CCCs and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan. Later donors such as ECHO, Norway and Sweden contributed to the capacity-building programme, and of course UNICEF committed its own resources from the outset.

The Phase I/II evaluation of the capacity-building programme noted that mainstreaming "has had some success. It has, however, been more problematic in the transition to and implementation of response". The evaluation also noted that the CCCs were not well known by UNICEF teams, and emergency preparedness was not used as an operational planning process. The Phase I/II evaluation also found that mainstreaming was relevant in view of the extensive coverage of UNICEF offices and the fact that UNICEF is present before, during and after emergencies. It added the important caveat that mainstreaming was "premised on the assumption that it is possible to enhance Country Office level capacity by reinforcing Headquarters capacity in policy guidance and Regional Office capacity in rolling out support and oversight".

This evaluation has found that UNICEF is more reliably responding to emergencies than in 2005 when the Phase I/II evaluation was undertaken. Arguably it is responding more reliably than at the beginning of the Martigny process. This suggests that to a degree the capacity-building programme has worked, in that over time the organization has got better at responding to emergencies. Several Country Office senior management teams are fully grounded in humanitarian response. This evaluation also found that the CCCs were well known by UNICEF staff and that the majority of Country Offices were aware that UNICEF would seek to respond to emergencies.

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There are several caveats to these observations however. Firstly, as Figure 8 in section 2 shows, the majority of the DFID funds were spent on staff and associated costs.

This is understandable. To respond properly, UNICEF needs people of the right leadership skills and technical competence, and to develop tools and policy guidance it is necessary to hire experts in those areas. The question is whether this is sustainable without the support of DFID (and ECHO and others). Has DFID built UNICEF capacity to respond to emergencies, or has it merely subsidized it? Whilst the funds are there, UNICEF can afford to keep the requisite people on staff, but once ‘Other Resource’ funds are gone, or the staff budgets are absorbed into the general pot (‘Regular Resources’), will the humanitarian programme receive adequate support?

UNICEF sets its budget according to its MTSP approved by the Board and the General Assembly. Humanitarian response does not appear as a separate entity within the MTSP. Instead, following the logic of mainstreaming, it is part of the five MTSP goals. “The overall objective of the MTSP for 2006–2009 is to focus the capacities and organize the work of UNICEF to make a difference for children by supporting the national and international implementation of the Millennium Summit Declaration and pursuit of the MDGs, and to ensure an effective UNICEF contribution to poverty reduction through advocacy and partnerships that generate sustained investments in children’s survival, development and protection”.

Humanitarian programming thus does not find any reference in the broad MTSP agenda, which is predominantly about poverty reduction and the other MDGs; hence, it is very difficult to see how at the level of the Board and General Assembly, UNICEF can continue to allocate substantial funds for humanitarian programming unless such funds came from ‘Other Resources’ sources.

The Phase I/II evaluation noted a surprising lack of integration of emergencies into the work of Country Office and Regional Office advisers, and a tendency to view emergencies as the responsibility of the emergency specialists in the team or of the emergency focal point. This was also the case for this evaluation, with the ‘specialist’ nature of humanitarianism perhaps accentuated by the cluster system and the move towards hiring separate cluster coordinators. In all but one of the five country case studies there was a dedicated emergency officer, and often there were technical staff for the humanitarian work and other technical staff for the development work. Whilst the representatives in big emergency countries generally had solid humanitarian experience, often section chiefs – even in countries such as the Sudan – did not have a humanitarian background. Typically emergency specialists would be junior to their development counterparts, or at least would be managed by someone with predominantly development experience. This was the case in the Central African Republic and the Sudan.

Thus if one examines one of the critical axes of the Martigny Agenda – mainstreaming humanitarian and emergency response into the policy agenda of UNICEF – it has been only partially successful. There are undoubtedly more staff for humanitarian response than at the outset, but a worrying percentage of these remain on temporary contracts, paid for from ‘project’ money (‘Other Resources’) rather than core budget (‘Regular Resources’). Whilst there are certainly more and better representatives with humanitarian experience, at the technical level there are far more ‘developmentalists’ than humanitarians. Encouragingly though, of the regional directors, two are former heads of the Office of Emergency Programmes and several others have solid humanitarian experience.

Thus on another of the Martigny Agenda’s main themes – building human resources for humanitarian response – it is again clear that progress has been made but it remains fragile. The other key components of Martigny – programme processes and learning – have also seen solid progress, with perhaps learning as the area that is less robust.

In addition to analysing progress against the Martigny Agenda, it seems a legitimate moment to ask whether Martigny was the right strategy. Was mainstreaming the best way to build UNICEF’s capacity

and, if so, were the Martigny components the best way to achieve mainstreaming? Once more, the simple fact that UNICEF is better at humanitarian response today than it was in 1998 indicates that to some degree it must have been the right strategy. On the other hand, it would be dramatic if after an investment of over US $100 million (if all of the various donor and UNICEF resources are added together), there was no significant achievement to show for it.

To summarize the overall conclusions, the evaluators have found the following McKinsey Model (popularly called McKinsey 7S Framework\textsuperscript{124}) appropriate to use in the UNICEF context (Figure 10). The model is based on the theory that for an organization to perform well, the following seven elements need to be aligned and mutually reinforcing:

- \textit{Strategy}: the plan devised to maintain and build competitive advantage over the competition
- \textit{Structure}: the way the organization is structured and who reports to whom
- \textit{Systems}: the daily activities and procedures that staff members engage in to get the job done
- \textit{Shared values}: these are the core values that are evidenced in the corporate culture and the general work ethic
- \textit{Style}: the style of leadership adopted
- \textit{Staff}: the employees and their general capabilities
- \textit{Skills}: the actual skills and competencies of the employees working for the organization

\textbf{Figure 10: McKinsey 7S framework}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{McKinsey_7S_Framework.png}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{124} Developed in the 1980s and used extensively in the corporate sector for developing organizational strategies and in guiding change processes.
UNICEF’s capacity building has put a significant focus on structure, strategy and systems, which are the hard elements of the McKinsey Framework, and to some extent on skills and staff elements of the framework during the Phase III of the Programme of Cooperation. Greater emphasis is needed on two key dimensions of organizational capacity building, namely shared values (corporate culture and work ethic that support emergency response) and leadership style, in the humanitarian capacity-building initiative. This evaluation calls for devoting organizational energies to these areas – leadership style and values – in the coming years, in addition to continued reinforcement of what has been achieved so far.

The revised CCCs and accountability framework being developed to support these are welcome measures. However, simply relying on tools and systems may promote compliance but not necessarily lead to results. As UNICEF moves into the next phase of strengthening its capacity in playing a leading role in the humanitarian world, it needs to embed its humanitarian role in the shared values and the leadership style it adopts. Towards this, this evaluation makes the following recommendations based on the conclusions drawn in different sections of the report.

9.2.2 Recommendations

Organizational vision and accountability for its humanitarian role:

R1. The humanitarian programme needs to be integrated into the MTSP as a core area of UNICEF’s work.

R2. UNICEF urgently needs policy guidance for the whole organization on the implications of the cluster approach and in particular the provider of last resort clause. This should ideally take the form of a directive from the Executive Director. While doing so, it needs to also clarify:
   - the links between UNICEF’s emergency response/programme and cluster approach;
   - the links between cluster lead staff and other emergency staff and programme sections; and
   - the relationship between emergencies and programme divisions and the role of each in UNICEF’s emergency response and cluster leadership.

R3. Senior management need to endorse a results framework for UNICEF’s humanitarian objectives as set out in the new CCCs and make clear how all relevant departments, Country Offices and Regional Offices will be held accountable for achieving these. (Note: Evaluators have noted that work is now underway to develop such a system across the organization).

Training, learning and evaluation:

R4. UNICEF needs to develop a simplified system for information management and monitoring in emergencies, based on the new CCC benchmarks, and ensure that trained information management and M&E staff are deployed in all emergency operations.

R5. Clusters and gender integration need to be part of induction and training programmes for all staff members, particularly senior country management staff.

R6. Humanitarian experience should be made a mandatory requirement in all country representative recruitments.

HR issues:

R7. UNICEF needs to continue to strengthen the global web roster and standby roster and invest in human resource capacity in Regional Offices with emergency focal points.

R8. Systematic induction and regional and country-based training should be put in place for cluster coordinators.
Administrative and procurements issues for emergencies:

R9. Countries with regular emergencies ought to have pre-positioned supplies for rapid response. Additionally, Country Offices must have framework agreements with suppliers for local and regional procurement.

R10. A best practice review should be undertaken on administrative and associated contract management systems in the context of emergency response in different countries, and lessons drawn from this for replication.

Cluster leadership:

R11. UNICEF needs to make better use of partners to lead clusters at sub-national level and provide more of a focus at the strategic level – e.g., preparedness, resources, contingency stocks, etc. It also needs to make greater efforts to establish cluster coordination closest to the affected area rather than simply in the capital.

R12. UNICEF needs to have in place the capacity for directly managing programmes in the case of 'last resort' operations. This would mean having enhanced surge capacity and logistics and supplies system.

R13. UNICEF and other cluster lead agencies need to have a joint dialogue with IASC to clarify for agencies the responsibilities, accountabilities and limits of the ‘provider of last resort’ principle.

R14. UNICEF needs to document the actual cost of clusters so that it can have a sensible dialogue with donors about how to resource them. A short study outlining the costing implications should be prepared by UNICEF as a first step to engaging in larger inter-agency dialogue with donors.

Partnership:

R15. As UNICEF completes the Project Coordination Agreement revision process currently underway, systems for disbursing and administering funds to NGOs also need to be streamlined. A follow-up process to the global consultation in 2008 should be initiated, and NGOs need to be more consistently involved in strategic partnership dialogue.

R16. UNICEF needs to engage in an internal debate involving country managers on how to deal with the issue of delicate balancing a constructive relationship with governments with the organization’s ability to provide impartial and neutral humanitarian response when children are affected by natural disasters and conflict.

Advocacy and monitoring mechanism:

R17. UNICEF needs to play a greater advocacy role with donors (like DFID and others), who need to recognize that well-functioning clusters and UN technical agencies alone will not take care of humanitarian needs, and that the donors have a strong role to play in engaging with governments when it comes to humanitarian access in situations where the government itself is unable to meet the humanitarian needs.

R18. The tools to undertake the monitoring and reporting mechanism need further development. Examples like the Sudan database and the Colombia baseline study are encouraging, but a suite of tools is needed that countries such as the Central African Republic can offer partners.

R19. UNICEF and donors need to commit to resourcing UNICEF’s role in the monitoring and reporting mechanism on a long-term basis.

R20. UNICEF needs to do more to inform partners about its advocacy successes such as the release of the Sudanese child combatants.
ANNEXES

Annex 1: Terms of reference


History of humanitarian capacity-building project

The DFID/ECHO/Sida-supported UNICEF Capacity Building Project (“Project”) contributes to the delivery of assistance and to the protection of human rights in emergencies, in particular the rights of the most vulnerable groups including children and women, within a coordinated approach to humanitarian response. The project aims to enable UNICEF and its key humanitarian partners to effectively meet their commitments as established in the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) in emergencies, and in the broader framework of the cluster approach in humanitarian crisis.

In alignment with UNICEF’S 2006–2009 Medium Term Strategic Plan, the overall project supports the Renewed Strategic Approach in focusing on the five following priority areas:

1. Strengthened knowledge and capacity to fulfil UNICEF’s mandate, including the CCCs.
2. Strengthened early warning and preparedness activities.
4. Strengthened contributions to inter-agency humanitarian response.
5. Strengthened humanitarian advocacy and communications.

Sida, ECHO and Norway collectively contributed 14 per cent to UNICEF’s 2006–2009 Renewed Strategic Approach, with DFID Phase III contributing 38 per cent and UNICEF 48 per cent, respectively, 125 for a total of £43.6 million (US$65 million) 126 furthering UNICEF’s Renewed Strategic Approach.

While the contribution from Sida 127 supports all of the five priority areas listed above, the contribution from DFID (Phase III) 128 supports specific outcome areas within the broader project framework as below, and as referenced in Annex A:

**Outcome 1:** Effective and reliable cluster lead in WASH, Nutrition, Emergency Telecoms and Education in all cluster countries.
**Outcome 2:** Effective and reliable UNICEF sector coordination in Child Protection in all major emergencies.
**Outcome 3:** Adequate people with adequate competencies for coordination and response vis-à-vis programme CCCs in place in a timely manner in all new major emergencies.
**Outcome 4:** UNICEF staff have basic knowledge of CCCs and key tools to operationalize them ensuring timely, effective and reliable response.
**Outcome 5:** Internal systems and procedures for finance, admin and supplies streamlined and put into practice in COs with HQ/RO support mechanisms.
**Outcome 6:** Improved (evidence-based) advocacy in relation to violations against children in a minimum of 15 countries.

Similarly, ECHO (Phase III) 129 focuses on the results in two key sectors: (a) partnerships, capacity assessment and coordination mechanisms; and (b) preparedness and response.

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126 Based on a currency exchange rate of 1.5 US dollars per British pound.
127 SEK 48 million (approx. US$6.5 million). Funding period from November 2006 to December 2009.
The global project is being managed by UNICEF’s Office of Emergency Programmes. Most of the direct support to Country Offices (COs) is provided through UNICEF’s Regional Offices, while global support such as global surge mechanisms and the development of cluster tools are being managed at the headquarter level. The regional office oversees and ensures that well-functioning operational systems and mechanisms are in place and used by COs.

The DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation

The DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation (Programme) was launched in 2000 against a general backdrop of increasing natural disasters and protracted complex emergencies that posed major challenges for UNICEF’s work and increased pressure for the organization to deliver quality humanitarian assistance to a growing number of affected people. Between 1998 and 2003, UNICEF’s spending on emergencies more than doubled and by 2005 stood at some 40 per cent of programme expenditure.

With each phase of the three-phase Programme building on the progress made from previously investing in improvements to UNICEF’s humanitarian preparedness and response, this 10-year humanitarian capacity-building programme has been supported by £55 million (US$81.4 million)\(^\text{130}\) of funding from DFID.

The first phase of this capacity-building programme began implementation in January 2000 with the overall objective of increasing UNICEF’s organizational capacity for reliable, coordinated, timely and effective programmatic and operational response for children in unstable environments. Phase I (2000 – April 2002) of the programme focused on children affected by armed conflict (CAAC), UNICEF’s humanitarian response and the impact of landmines on children and women. Under DFID Phase I the concept of Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning was new and considered to be a key element for preparedness. CAAC was a key priority coming out of the Graça Machel study, with its primary focus being on child soldiers and psychosocial response. Mine action was also a new line of work. The Programme of Cooperation was incorporated into the first DFID-UNICEF Institutional Strategy Paper (ISP), agreed in 2000.

Phase II of the Programme of Cooperation (May 2002 – December 2005) concentrated on the development and implementation of policy, improved operational systems, development and mainstreaming of an emergency preparedness planning framework, and increased understanding and awareness in UNICEF on the impact of armed conflict on children. Its eight goals focused on emergency preparedness and response planning, still seen as the lynchpin; the key support functions – security, staffing, learning, operations; and key functions around the CAAC response – programme guidance, knowledge acquisition and advocacy functions. The two phases of the Programme of Cooperation amounted to a total DFID contribution of £22.2 million (US$39 million) over five years.

The evaluation\(^\text{131}\) of Phase I and Phase II of the DFID Programme of Cooperation (July 2005) set out to provide an overall assessment of the Programme of Cooperation, track the changes and current status of UNICEF preparedness and response, provide recommendations on priorities and strategies for future response capacity, and draw lessons for partnership in organizational capacity building and on policy and programming for children affected by armed conflict.

From January 2006, UNICEF received £2 million (US$3.4 million) as ‘bridge funding support’ to carry out ongoing and essential activities until there was greater clarity regarding Phase III of the Programme. The ‘Bridge Funding Phase’ was oriented as the ‘start-up phase’ of the larger 3.5-year Phase III Programme of Cooperation. During this six-month period, progress was made on a number of key areas including UNICEF’s involvement in the IASC Cluster Approach, the development of benchmarking and assessment tools, and the hiring of essential staff to undertake UNICEF’s cluster commitments.


\(^{130}\) Based on a currency exchange rate of 1.5 US dollars to 1 British pound.

\(^{131}\) The full evaluation report can be referenced at http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_31129.html.
Both the Bridge Funding Phase and the current Phase III of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation fit within a broader UNICEF strategy for strengthening humanitarian preparedness and response globally. This strategy not only focuses on UNICEF’s internal capacities, but also looks strategically at its role within the changing wider humanitarian context including UN Reform and particularly the cluster approach to humanitarian response. The achievement of UNICEF’s global strategy is dependent upon both internal and external funding.

Based on recommendations from the Phase I/Phase II external evaluation of UNICEF’s capacity building efforts for humanitarian preparedness and response, Phase III of the Programme of Cooperation (January 2006 – December 2009) concentrates on strengthening UNICEF’s contribution to effective and coordinated humanitarian response, particularly vis-à-vis UNICEF’s CCCs and commitments under the cluster lead approach. Total DFID funding for Phase III, including Bridge funding, is £16million.

The Phase III Programme of Cooperation Global Proposal and its respective logistical framework were developed in 2006 and revised in 2007 in response to institutional review processes that resulted in refined Phase III implementation.

**Purpose**

The purpose of the evaluation is to measure progress against the purpose and results outlined in the Phase III Global Proposal of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation and to provide direction to further UNICEF efforts to strengthen its humanitarian preparedness and response capacity.

The evaluation will be used to shape future efforts to strengthen humanitarian action and will support UNICEF’s future capacity-building efforts to enhance national capacity development. It will provide lessons to guide organizational capacity-building partnerships at both the government and humanitarian actor levels.

**Objectives**

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Make an objective and independent assessment of the current status of UNICEF’s capacity in humanitarian action and responsibilities towards humanitarian reform, highlight systemic issues and gaps to provide recommendations on priorities and strategies for future capacity building;
- Provide an overall assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of Phase III of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation;
- Draw lessons on policy and programming for building the capacity for humanitarian action.

**Scope/Focus**

The evaluation will examine all of the six outcomes specified in Phase III of DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation. The scope will concentrate on UNICEF’s humanitarian response capacity across two levels of the organization – headquarters (including offices in New York, Geneva and Copenhagen) and the seven Regional Offices – to determine the extent to which capacity at these levels impacted country-level response and the impact of such changes on UNICEF’s responsibilities and policies. The evaluation will address the issue of ‘mainstreaming’ of humanitarian reform and response within UNICEF’s overall advocacy, programming and operations, including any spin-off effects on the wider organizational capacity. The evaluation will reflect UNICEF’s role in the context of the changes in humanitarian architecture that have been developed through the humanitarian reform process.

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132 'A Global Proposal for Phase III of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation, August 2008', is a revised version of the original proposal approved by DFID in September 2006. Given extensive changes made to the logframe in 2007, prior to the signing of the MOU between DFID and UNICEF in July 2007, it was felt that a revised project proposal was necessary to remain consistent with the approved logframe.
Given the changing humanitarian context, with the introduction of the cluster approach to humanitarian response and UNICEF’s role in clusters, particular focus will be on the following outcomes:

- **Outcome 1**: Effective and reliable cluster lead in WASH, Nutrition, Emergency Telecoms and Education in all cluster countries
- **Outcome 2**: Effective and reliable UNICEF lead in Child Protection in all major emergencies
- **Outcome 3**: Adequate people with adequate competencies for coordination and response vis-à-vis programme CCCs in place in a timely manner.

The evaluation will draw on previous reviews of Phase I and II as well as country-level monitoring missions and real-time evaluations undertaken during the duration of the Programme. In addition, the evaluation will draw on information obtained from commissioned and organizational reviews, pertinent evaluations, and concurrent UNICEF studies to inform National Capacity Development in Humanitarian Action.

**Limitations**

Assessment vis-à-vis all criteria will be limited by the absence of or gaps in baseline measures on capacities and performance in the different functional areas. The evaluation will necessarily focus more on effectiveness (i.e., results at the level of UNICEF performance in humanitarian response) rather than the impact of UNICEF response on the lives of children and women. The impact in particular might be difficult to assess over this current phase as it was characterized by inconsistent funding and hence short-term activities and objectives. Additionally, the corresponding logframe (objectives, indicators) were changed several times due to the request of donors. As such, there is no real firm baseline against which to measure impact over the last three years. However, the evaluation will attempt to draw on indications of impact through secondary data from previous reviews, or as available in the context of country case studies.

UNICEF’s Humanitarian Capacity Building Programme began with funding from DFID in 2000, but has since evolved into a multi-donor funded programme. As such, attribution of achievements and results of the wider programme can be difficult to ascertain. That is, achievements and results through funds given by other donors (ECHO, Sida, Norway) have impacted the results of the Phase III DFID-funded portion of the programme.

**Evaluation criteria**

The evaluation will be underpinned by the use of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance and address issues of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

While the evaluation will be guided by the indicators that appear in the Programme logical framework, the evaluation will also draw on existing frameworks on organizational change and from them will derive key indicators in the following four areas:

- **Policies and standards** that have been developed or strengthened guiding humanitarian performance;
- **Structures** that have been developed and/or strengthened at HQ and RO levels to support more timely, effective humanitarian action. These would include new structures such as those established under the cluster approach, and UNICEF’s role as cluster lead in various areas;
- **Systems and mechanisms** that have been developed and/or strengthened at HQ and RO levels to support more timely, effective humanitarian action; and
- **Tools and instruments** that have been developed and/or strengthened at HQ and RO levels to support more timely, effective humanitarian action.
Potential evaluation questions

The following evaluation questions form the basis for a discussion with the Evaluation Team to establish clear priorities.

- **Impact**

  What changes are observable in UNICEF performance in humanitarian response (including advocacy) and what can be attributed to the Programme? How has UNICEF responded in recent emergencies including both performance of the supporting functions addressed in the Programme and actual humanitarian response (based on a review of existing evaluations and selected country cases)? Are any negative effects on UNICEF performance identifiable? Are there any spin-off effects beyond UNICEF? Has the Programme had any effects on DFID? Has the Programme contributed to the broader strategic approach of investing in improved humanitarian preparedness and response, to the Humanitarian Reform process, and to wider UN Reform?

- **Relevance**

  How relevant was the focus and design of Phase III of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation (broad goals, objectives, actual activities and strategies selected) in view of:
  - the demands for and level of UNICEF engagement in humanitarian response – including number, size and different types of emergency contexts, initially and as these have evolved;
  - the inter-agency context as it has evolved, particularly vis-à-vis the implementation of the cluster approach;
  - the status of UNICEF humanitarian response capacity and priority capacity constraints/gaps;
  - UNICEF organizational priorities, policies and structure at the time, and as these have evolved;
  - accountability and availability of independent evaluation information.

  To what extent have the findings and recommendations of the evaluation of Phase I and II of the Programme influenced the design of Phase III? Have the issues and ‘blockages’ identified in that evaluation been successfully addressed?

- **Effectiveness**

  To what extent were the objectives of Phase III of DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation achieved? To what extent were the identified changes the result of strategies and activities selected?

  How effective was Phase III of the Programme in improving the reliability, timeliness, coordination and effectiveness of UNICEF’s humanitarian response? How prepared is UNICEF globally for humanitarian response, taking into consideration preparedness planning, operations support, staffing and both internal and external surge mechanisms, competencies, safety and security? How well developed are UNICEF’s knowledge base, humanitarian policy and advocacy functions, and programming guidance materials to support effective humanitarian action?

- **Efficiency**

  Has the Programme been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency? What measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are efficiently used?

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133 With regard to choices in strategy, consider in particular the choices between decentralization vs. centralization, mainstreaming vs. dedicated emergency functions, the use of regional emergency project officers for capacity building and differences in focus across regions.
Sustainability

What lasting changes have been achieved in UNICEF humanitarian response capacity and in UNICEF’s ownership of humanitarian reform responsibilities? What changes must be further sustained and with what level of effort? What changes are in course and need further attention, and among these which are most critical and which will have greatest impact?

Cross-cutting

How has UNICEF’s humanitarian response capacity and performance, and the effects of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation, differed across different types of emergencies (rapid/slow onset, natural disaster/complex emergency, size of country office), and for different phases of humanitarian response (preparedness, response, early recovery)? What other factors have influenced the reliability, timeliness, coordination, and effectiveness of UNICEF’s humanitarian response? Has the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation diversified or strengthened cluster partnerships given UNICEF’s global cluster leadership roles? Is UNICEF now able to better reflect and understand the gender dimensions of emergency response as a result of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation?

Focus on capacity for cluster coordination

How effective is UNICEF as global cluster lead agency and country-level cluster/sector lead?

At country level, where UNICEF is cluster/sector lead or co-lead, assess UNICEF performance vis-à-vis cluster lead terms of reference, especially: (a) coordination between the United Nations, government and NGOs (with special attention to effectiveness in mobilizing NGOs); (b) sectoral strategy development, planning and prioritization; (c) information management, monitoring and quality control; (c) inter-cluster coordination; and (d) cluster lead management of financing responsibilities including transparency in fund allocation/management. In addition, assess UNICEF’s ability to act impartially as cluster lead.

What lasting changes have been achieved in UNICEF cluster lead capacity? What changes must be further sustained and with what level of effort? What changes are in course and need further attention, and among these which are most critical and which will have greatest impact?

Focus on human resources

How relevant is the human resources strategy for UNICEF humanitarian response and in particular the UNICEF CCCs and commitments for cluster lead responsibilities?

What are the key factors that have promoted or limited effectiveness? How far has the humanitarian response focus been mainstreamed in HR and how does this affect results? How do UNICEF structures and HR processes help or hinder UNICEF’s humanitarian response, including respective roles of HQ and ROs? Has UNICEF achieved an appropriate balance in the use of international and national staff? How well have lessons on emergency deployments been identified and learned by the HR function?

Focus on measures to further strengthen UNICEF’s capacity in humanitarian action

Provide an overall assessment of the current status of UNICEF’s capacity in humanitarian action and recommendations on priorities and strategies for future capacity-building efforts, with particular reference to the evolving external context.

Process and timeline

It is important that the evaluation process contributes to developing a common, widely shared analysis within UNICEF of the organization’s humanitarian response capacity and the priority issues to be addressed. Similarly, the process should build ownership of recommendations.
The evaluation methodology will be developed with the involvement of the Evaluation Team and will include:

- Desk review;
- Questionnaires to country office management teams;
- Key informant and focus group interviews (face-to-face, telephone and conference calling, with video as necessary/feasible):
  - Headquarters staff involved in Phase III of the Programme and in humanitarian response in general (UNICEF and DFID)
  - UNICEF Headquarters staff/ex-staff covering key ‘mainstream’ functions over the period under study – strategic planning, programme guidance, etc.
  - Selected UNICEF RO staff – regional directors, senior emergency, planning and sectoral officers/advisers,
  - Selected UNICEF CO representatives, senior programme officers, operations officers, emergency project officers
  - DFID staff and selected external key informants;
- Consultation with a selection of staff from different levels of the organization for validation of findings and participatory analysis of implications and possible response;
- E-mail exchange with the Reference Group at key stages to validate findings and conclusions;
- Possibility for regional and/or country office case studies with field visits (e.g., 4-5 days per RO) with each case entailing further documentary review as well as key informant interviews.
ANNEX 2: Evaluation Timeline

Contracts issued 1 June
Initial briefing meetings and interviews in New York 1–5 June
Briefing meetings and interviews in Geneva 29 June – 1 July
Revised TOR (incorporating comments from DFID) issued 22 June
Inception report submitted 23 June
Participation in global cluster workshop 27–30 July
Inception report agreed 29 July
Internal and external questionnaire drafts submitted 13 July
Internal and external questionnaire agreed 5 August
Internal and external questionnaire distributed 8 August
Internal and external questionnaire end date 1 September
Sudan field trip 17–25 July
Central African Republic field trip 29 July – 6 August
Colombia field trip 9–15 August
Bangladesh field trip 9–15 August
Ethiopia field trip 16–24 August
Submission date for draft report 18 September
Validation meeting in New York 22–23 September
Comments on draft report received 6 October
Further comments on draft report received 9 October
Further interviews with UNICEF staff w/c 19 October
Pre-final draft submitted to UNICEF 26 October
ANNEX 3: List of persons interviewed

External

**UN agencies:**

1. Bishop Parajuli, UN Resident Representative/Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP, Myanmar
2. Erin Kenney, Global Lead Focal Point, WHO, Geneva
3. Jamie McGoldrick, Head, Humanitarian Reform Support Unit, OCHA, Geneva
4. Mark Cutts, Senior Adviser, Humanitarian Reform Support Unit, OCHA, Geneva
5. Ruven Menikdiwela, Deputy Director, Division of Protection Services, UNHCR, Geneva
7. Tullio Santini, Senior Adviser, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, New York

**NGOs, donors and Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC)**:

8. Andy Bastable, WASH, Oxfam
9. Chris McIvor, Advocacy and Programme Development Director, Save the Children, Mozambique
11. Emmanuel Tronc, Policy and Advocacy Coordinator, Médecines Sans Frontières
12. Heather Macleod, Associate Director, Global Rapid Response Technical Team, World Vision
13. Natalie Hogg, Head of Strategy, Education Cluster, Save the Children, UK
14. Sarah Petrie, NGO Co-Sector Health Lead, South Sudan
16. Susan Nicolai, Cluster Deputy Coordinator, Save the Children, Geneva
17. Toby Gould, Head of Training, RedR
18. William Carter, Officer, Watsan and Hygiene Promotion, IFRC, Geneva

**DFID**

19. Colum Wilson, Humanitarian Advisor OPT (formerly West Africa)
20. Dave Beer, Humanitarian Specialist, Sudan
21. Jack Jones, Humanitarian Programmes Manager
22. John Adlam; Team Director; Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department Operations Team
23. John Hayward; Head of Office; Regional Support Office; Central, Eastern and Southern Africa; ECHO
24. John Webster, Team Leader, Humanitarian Institutions and Policy Team
25. Rachel Kessler; Humanitarian Advisor; Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department
26. Rick Taylor; Deputy Programme Manager; Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department
27. Sean Hughes, Humanitarian Advisor, Sudan

**UNICEF**

Regional and Country Offices:

28. Adriana Zarrelli, Regional Emergency Adviser, APSSC
29. Angela Raven-Roberts, Regional Emergency Adviser, CEE/CIS
30. Asim Rehman, Preparedness and Risk Reduction, CEE/CIS
31. Chris Cormency, Regional WASH Adviser, WCARO
32. Gary Ovington, Senior Emergency Specialist, Education, APSSC
33. Gianluca Buono, Regional Emergency Adviser, TACRO
34. Isabel Crowley, Senior Adviser, PARMO
35. Juan Carlos Espinola Ayala, Deputy Representative, Eritrea
36. Laura Bill, Emergency Specialist, APSSC
37. Lilia Pakkala, Representative, Mozambique
38. Malak Zaalouk, Education Adviser, MENA  
39. Marcoluigi Corsi, Deputy Representative, Indonesia  
40. Michael Butcher, Regional Emergency HR, WCARO  
41. Rajendra Shakya, Emergency Specialist, Nepal  
42. Richard Luft, Project Officer, WES, Nepal  
43. Robert McCarthy, Regional Emergency Adviser, ESARO  
44. Sabine Himbert, Emergency Child Protection Specialist, WCARO  
45. Selassie Atidaka, Emergency Officer, WCARO  
46. Shahnaz Kianian-Firouzgar, Deputy Director, CEE/CIS  
47. Tanya Chapuisat, Regional Emergency Adviser, WCARO  
48. Thomas Davin, Regional Emergency Adviser, MENA  
49. Yasmin Haque, Representative, Indonesia

New York/Geneva:

50. Andres Pettersson, Former Head of DHR Emergency Unit  
51. Antony Spalton, Disaster Risk Reduction Specialist  
52. Arnaud Conchon, Emergency Specialist, Early Child Development  
53. Bo Viktor Nylund, Senior Child Protection Adviser, Programme Division /Child Protection  
54. Brendan Doyle, Chief, HIV/AIDS Targeted Intervention, Programme Division  
55. Carmen Maya-Rex, Human Resources Manager, Recruitment and Staffing Section  
56. Christine Knudsen, Chief, Inter-Agency Humanitarian Partnership Section  
57. Dan Rohrman, Deputy Director, Programme Division  
58. David Bassioni, Principal Officer, Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS)  
59. Dermot Carty, Deputy Director, EMOPS  
60. Elaine McDonald, Former DHR Emergency Specialist  
61. Finbar O’Brien, Director, Evaluation Office  
62. Flora Sibanda-Mulde, Senior Adviser, Nutrition Specialist  
63. Frederick Spielberg, Preparedness and Early Warning Specialist  
64. Hilde Johnson, Deputy Executive Director  
65. Jean McCluskey, WES Emergencies Adviser, Programme Division /WASH  
66. Joshi Dushyant, Chief, Recruitment and Staffing Section, Division of Human Resources  
67. Kate Alley, Manager, Knowledge Management, EMOPS  
68. Krishna Belbase, Senior Evaluation Officer, Evaluation Office  
69. Louise Maule, Programme Specialist, Humanitarian and Transition Interface Support  
70. Louis-Georges Arsenaut, Director, EMOPS  
71. Lucia Elmi, Chief, Humanitarian Field Support Section  
72. Mads Oyen, Humanitarian Affairs Specialist, EMOPS  
73. Michel Le Pechoux, Chief, Early Warning and Preparedness, EMOPS  
74. Naomi Ichikawa, Project Manager, Capacity Building Project  
75. Paul Sherlock, Senior Adviser, Emergencies, IASC WASH Cluster Coordinator  
76. Pilar Aguilar, Senior Adviser, Capacity Building, Education in Emergencies  
77. Prabhu Prabhakaran, Donor Relations Manager, PARMO, Resource Mobilization Office  
78. Quoc Dang Nguyen, Project Officer – Emergency  
79. Raana Syed, Learning Officer – Emergency, Division of Human Resources, Organizational Learning and Development Section  
80. Roger Wright, Senior Adviser, Programme Division /Education  
81. Runar Holen, Manager, Emergency Telecoms  
82. Suzanne Lee, Consultant, Evaluation Office  
83. Tasleem Hemani-Tuan, Project Manager, Humanitarian Response Capacity Building
Bangladesh

**UNICEF:**

- Anwar Hossain, Programme Specialist, Dhaka
- Carel De Rooy, Country Representative, Dhaka
- Hans Spruitj, Head, WES, Dhaka
- Iyarlumum J. Uhaa, Deputy Representative, Dhaka
- Josephine Iziku Ippe, Nutrition Manager, Dhaka
- Lalit Patra, WES Specialist, Dhaka
- M. B. Jalloh, Chief Finance Officer, Dhaka
- Nakoum Diakite, Chief of Operations, Dhaka
- Sanja Saranovic, Child Protection Specialist, Dhaka
- Tim Forster, Global WASH Rapid Response Team, Dhaka
- Zulfikur Ali Khan, Emergency Specialist, Dhaka

**Government officials:**

- A. H. M. Abdullah, Director, Training and Planning, Disaster Management Bureau
- Md. Kamaluddin Ahmed, Superintending Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department (DPHE), Khulna
- Md. Nadir Hossain, Superintending Engineer, DPHE, Khulna
- Md. S. Islam, Superintending Engineer, DPHE, Dhaka.
- S. M. Ihtishamul Haq, Superintending Engineer, DPHE Groundwater Circle, Dhaka
- Sudhir Kumar Ghosk, Executive Engineer, R&D Division, DPHE, Dhaka

**Other UN agencies and NGOs:**

- Faruque Ahmed, Programme Coordinator, Rupantar, Khulna
- Golam Morshed, Public Health Promoter, Oxfam, Dhaka
- Md. Zakir Hossain, Asst. Programme Engineer, NGO Forum, Dhaka
- Prodip M. Rozario, Director, Banchte Shekha, Jessore
- Sanjib Kr Mondal, Programme Officer, Caritas, Khulna
- Suraiya Khatun Putur, Field Coordinator, Concern Worldwide, Khulna

Ethiopia

**UNICEF:**

- Ahmed Yusuf, Administrative Assistant, Jijiga
- Aisloing Falconer, Emergencies Education Officer
- Ali Regah, Emergency WASH Officer, Jijiga
- Bukhari Sheikh, Health Officer, Jijiga
- Douglas Webb, Chief of Section, Adolescent Development, Protection and HIV/AIDS
- Helene Ruud, Child Protection Officer
- Kefyalew Ayam, Education Project Officer
- Mohammed Khalifa, WASH Emergency Officer, Kebredahar
- Mohammed Sheik Aden, Emergency Specialist
- Paul Deverill, Chief Water and Environment Specialist
- Rory Nefdt, Health Specialist, Malaria and Emergency Health
- Saed Hassen, Education Project Officer, Jijiga
- Setotaw Yimam, Education Specialist
- Solomon Tekle, WASH Project Officer, Jijiga
- Tom White, Emergency Specialist, Emergency Coordination and Support Unit
Government officials:

122. A. S. Ahmed, Humanitarian Adviser, President’s Office, Jijiga
123. Abebe Ayenew Bekele, Head, R&D Coordination Department, Ethiopia Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI)
124. Abdul Razaak Hussain, Deputy Head of Water Bureau, Jijiga
125. Abdullahi Mohammed, Deputy Head of Regional Education Bureau
126. Abubakar, Team Leader, Barre Mobile Health Team, Regional Health Bureau (RHB)
127. Ato Getachew, Team Leader, Fundraising and Resource Mobilization, Disaster Risk Management Social Security Sector (DRMFSS), Addis Ababa
128. Guled Ahmed, Head
129. Issack Manyama, Team Leader, Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU)
130. Jamal Kalif Abdi, ENCU Coordinator, ENCU, Jijiga
131. Dr. Yusuf Mohammed, Deputy Head of Regional Health Bureau, Jijiga
132. Dr. Milliyon Wendabeku, Expert on Public Health Emergency Management, EHNRI

Other UN agencies, donors and NGOs:

133. Abby Maxman, Country Director, CARE Ethiopia
134. Ahmed Alrahman, Early Warning Manager, Save the Children UK, Jijiga
135. Dr. Ahmed, Medical Supervisor, Ogaden Welfare and Development Association (OWDA)
136. Amy Martin, Deputy Head of Office, OCHA
137. Andrea Ambroso, Country Representative, Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI)
138. Anteneh Gebremichael, Nutrition Technical Manager, Save the Children US
139. Basher Mohammed, Nutrition and Food Security Programme Officer, Jijiga
140. Bekele Negash, Associate Programme Officer, UNHCR, Jijiga
141. Cate Turton, Humanitarian Adviser, DFID, Addis Ababa
142. Dinkneh Asfaw, Emergency Programme Manager, GOAL
143. Farah Bello, OCHA, Jijiga
144. Fasil Demeka, Mercy Corps
145. Francois File, Head of Mission, Médicines Sans Frontières Spain
146. Garth Van’t Hul, Programme Director, CARE Ethiopia
147. Ifran Ahmed, Regional Health Coordinator, UNFPA
148. Joe Macapili, Field Security Coordination Officer, United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), Jijiga
149. Joy Singhan, Programme Manager, Mercy Corps, Jijiga.
150. Kimberley Smith, Director of Policy and Programmes, Save the Children UK
151. Kristin Helz, Oxfam GB, Jijiga.
152. Marc Nosback, Deputy Country Director, Save the Children-US
153. Meseret Belachew, Quality Assurance Coordinator, Save the Children US.
154. Mohamed Hassen, Project Manager, Oxfam GB,
155. Mohammed Yusuf, Programme Assistant, WFP, Jijiga
156. Mohammad Mohammed Yusuf, Operations Manager, Somali Region, Save the Children UK
157. Mukhtar Sheikh Omar, Board Director, OWDA
158. Nicky Berry, Head of Education, Save the Children UK
159. Omar Abdulahi, Executive Director, OWDA
160. Salah Aden, Programme Manager, Mercy Corps, Jijiga
161. William Scaltriti, Project Manager, COOPI

Colombia

UNICEF:

162. Antonella Sicolamiero, Deputy Representative
163. Alexandra Sandoval, Corporate Advocacy PLM
164. Ana Maria Cancelado, Fundraising Officer
165. Ana Maria Rubiano, General Services
166. Ana Villamil, Intern - Human Resources
167. Bertha Lopez, General Services
168. Bertha Lucia Motoya, Programme Assistant – Education
169. Blanca Lopez, General Services
170. Carolina Ramires, IT Official
171. Clara de D'Maria, Human Resources Assistant
172. Eduardo Gallardo, Child Protection Specialist
173. Francisco Burbano, Basic Services Officer
174. Isabel C Montealegre, Administrative Assistant of Humanitarian Action
175. Jeneth Guzman, Finance Assistant
176. Liliana Forero, Protection and Sexual Exploitation Consultant
177. Lucia Cortes, Administrative Assistant, Basic Social Policies
178. Luis Gabriel Mojica, Marketing Specialist
179. Maria Del Pilar Rodriguez, Child Protection Officer
180. Manuel Pinzon, Officer, PLM
181. Maria Matilde Herrera, Human Resources Officer
182. Marisol Quintero, Communication Officer
183. Melba Cuellar, Finance and Accounting Senior Assistant
184. Miguel Gonzalez, Telecommunication Assistant
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273. Said Karmaoui, National Director, Danish Refugee Council Silis Munyembaraga, Head of Office, Kaga-Bandoro
274. Simon Ashmore, Head of Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
275. Sitta Kai-Kai, Country Director, WFP and acting Humanitarian Coordinator
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