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Evaluation of UNICEF’s support to Education Personnel in the Syria Crisis Response in Turkey (September 2014 – May 2019)

Final Report

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<td>Accountability to Affected Populations</td>
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I Evaluation Report
Executive Summary

Purpose and context

UNICEF Turkey Country Office (TCO) commissioned this evaluation in March 2019, which has focused upon three important components of the TCO education sector response to the Syrian crisis: the Syrian Volunteer Education Personnel (SVEP) incentives programme, the professional development of both SVEP and Turkish teachers, and the development and integration of the YOBIS system.

A team of four evaluators (two international, one Turkish, and one Syrian resident in Turkey) conducted the evaluation between March and May 2019. The evaluation included a four-week mission in country incorporating site visits to Turkish Public Schools, Public and Temporary Education Centres, and Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) (Refugee Camps) at locations in Istanbul, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, and Mersin. Interviews with UNICEF staff, partners, government officials and donors were undertaken alongside key informant interviews with Head Teachers, and focus group discussions with Syrian and Turkish teachers, Syrian parents, and Syrian and Turkish Children during the site visits. Consultations were also held with staff from the ECAR and MENA Regional Offices.

Because of the Syrian conflict, ongoing for more than eight years since initial civil protests in March 2011, Turkey is now hosting the largest number of refugees in the world with about 3.6 million Syrians as well as approximately 366,000 asylum-seekers and refugees from other nationalities, predominantly Iraqis and Afghans. Of these, 1.7 million – or 45% – are children. The government has prioritised a policy of integration, specifically within the education sector, and refugees retain their right to remain in Turkey under their temporary protection status.

The political environment in Turkey in recent years has also been somewhat turbulent as an attempted coup in July 2016 led to the declaration of a state of emergency, and increased pressure on government institutions. Changes in the national constitution in 2017, led to the creation of a presidential republic in June 2018. This has led to governmental restructuring and numerous changes at a ministerial level, together with an increase in the centralisation of decision making. One outcome of this process was the substantial constriction of the space within which humanitarian and civil society organisations can operate.

The Turkish Government, however, is the largest provider of humanitarian aid in country supported by UN agencies and international donors currently utilising the UN “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan” (3RP), the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RRMRP), and the “No lost generation” strategy.

Educational opportunities for refugee children in Turkey have increased significantly since the beginning of the crisis. The enrolment of refugee children in schools has grown from 230,000 students at the end of the 2014/2015 school year to almost 650,000 students as at the start of 2018/19 school year.

The evaluation will serve the dual purposes of accountability and learning, to assess and report on the quality and results of the activities to date, and to draw lessons and derive good practices and pointers for learning. This will provide evidence-based findings to assist in decision-making around future programme implementation regarding the strengthening of the national education system and ensuring quality and inclusive education for all girls and boys in Turkey.
As per the TOR the evaluation objectives were to:

- Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence and sustainability of UNICEF’s contribution to strengthening the education personnel as part of the response to the refugee crisis in the education sector;
- Identify and document potential innovations and lessons learnt in relation to the implementation modalities of the three concerned programme components, considering the country context and UNICEF’s comparative advantage;
- Provide recommendations to inform the programming around the three programme components for the coming years, in particular to guide the programming for the years 2019 and 2020, the last two years of the Turkey-UNICEF Country Programme 2016-2020.

A mixed methodological approach has been adopted in this evaluation, whereby the ET has undertaken a mix of semi structured interviews, focus groups discussions with various stakeholder groups, and secondary research of available documentation.

The evaluation adopted the Equity-Focused Approach, as developed and utilised by UNICEF and its partners which seeks to:

- Involve stakeholders, from as many relevant backgrounds as feasible to generate suggestions about future developments as well as acting as Key Informants;
- Explore how beneficiaries and stakeholders have made inputs into the design and implementation of the programme components to date;
- Include as many types of situations and stakeholders as possible in seeking responses to the evaluation questions.

The Evaluation Team attempted to utilise two approaches, which are key to an Equity-focused evaluation:

- The Utilization Approach, to identify the users of the evaluations and involve them in the design of the evaluation, and then in the sense-making of findings;
- Outcome Harvesting, to capture stories from the beneficiaries about what is key to the improvement of their learning environment;

Underpinning these two is the HRBA in education.

Findings

Relevance

Overall, as the crisis has evolved into a protracted crisis, UNICEF’s response in these three components has remained relevant and has adapted to the changing context. They have also remained relevant to the 3RPs and to the CPD.

The development of the Education Personnel Management Strategy (EPMS), under which umbrella the SVEP incentives programme and training for SVEPs were developed, was a key contribution enabling systems to respond to the crisis as it evolved. The EPMS included the Code of Conduct (later the Letter of Commitment), conditions of work, recruitment and selection procedures, and capacity building for SVEPs.

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1 Segone, M. & Bamberger, M., 2011. How to design and manage EQUITY-FOCUSED EVALUATIONS. New York: UNICEF.
3 Programme beneficiaries are Syrian children (and increasingly, Turkish children), teachers (Turkish and SVEPs), data management and information system administrators, and other education personnel.
It responded to the need for robust recruitment and selection procedures, the registration of students, and standardised conditions of service for SVEPs.

With respect to the SVEP incentives programme, consistent feedback has been received that this has been very relevant for the education of children in that it has been crucial in getting Syrian children back to school. Additionally, not only did the initiative provide remuneration to SVEPs in need of income to support their families, but also gave dignity, and the opportunity to the SVEPs to contribute to the support of their own people, a view echoed by the SVEPs themselves. Furthermore, SVEPs enabled Syrian children to feel more comfortable in school, a view supported by some school principals and students. From an HRBA perspective point of view, the stabilisation of the SVEP cadre has enabled the Syrian children to be taught in their own language, and given them support during their transition into the Turkish Education system.

Similarly, focusing on strengthening teachers’ capacities has also been seen as wholly relevant given the pivotal role teachers play in the education of the child. The professional development of education personnel is seen as providing access and quality education to Syrian children, originally in TECs and latterly in the Turkish Education System. However, interviews with SVEPs have indicated that the training was more relevant to some than others, depending on their previous qualifications and experience. The initial selection was done by MoNE considering the emergency needs of Syrian children under temporary protection. This was an emergency situation and the documentation of the SVEPs’ qualifications was not available at that time; thus, MoNE and UNICEF worked hand in hand to meet the needs of SVEPs and students by offering multiple layers of training to SVEPs and Turkish teachers who were working with Syrian students. The new roles undertaken by SVEPs will produce new training needs.

YOBIS has enabled the visibility of Syrian students. It has contributed to the right of Syrian students not to be excluded and provided a record of their progress through school. They now have documentation, which will accompany them to other levels and into the Turkish education system. A positive outcome not expected at the outset is that the system provides the demographic and attendance data needed to pay incentives to SVEPs, as well as attendance data of children in TECs eligible for the CCTE support.

**Effectiveness**

The activities have achieved positive progress against the baseline value of all indicators, especially in terms of the number of additional Syrians enrolled in school. Furthermore they have attained their targets for all indicators, with the exception of the number of female educational personnel trained.

The introduction of a system of incentive payments for all SVEPs served to regularise a system for payments which until then had been inconsistent whereby only some SVEPs were paid, in differing amounts, by NGO projects then operational. There was widespread agreement, especially from school principals, that the SVEP incentives served to stabilize the cadre of SVEPs. All FGDs with SVEPs identified the incentive as one reason why the SVEPs would stay in the position. It was also reported that the attendance of SVEPs at work increased after the introduction of the incentive scheme, as they had to fulfill an attendance requirement. In 2017, MoNE (as advocated by UNICEF) agreed to align the level of the incentive to the minimum wage. Satisfaction with the payment system from field respondents is high. SVEPs reported that the system is easy to use, each SVEP having a card against which they can withdraw their incentive.

Evaluating the Professional Development of teachers is difficult because there is little or no data on how teacher performance improved in the TECs or schools as a result of the training. The Turkish system of
Education has a supervision system for Turkish teachers but it doesn’t cover SVEPs. In addition, when questioned, neither provincial MoNEs nor school Directors/principals themselves reported on the performance of the SVEPs in the classroom, with three exceptions. Additionally, there is no way of knowing what role the training has played in improving learning outcomes. The impact of the training on student learning outcomes can only be directly observed using longitudinal observations of student learning in the classroom. This has not been done neither during the training period nor during the period of this evaluation, but satisfaction with training has been evaluated using alternative methodologies.

YOBIS has achieved its objectives. Around 600,000 children have been registered in YOBIS. This means that, in the absence of YOBIS, the same number of Syrian (and other foreign children) would have been invisible, perhaps attending education programmes but without documentation as to whether they progressed. The data contains breakdown by age, level, and gender-all crucial for appropriate planning of education opportunities. From a rights-based perspective, this is a significant achievement.

Operationally UNICEF has faced a considerable number of bottlenecks and barriers. The three components have been able to address some of these as, without the SVEPs, the education for Syrian children would have been less effective, lacking teachers able to teach children in their mother tongue, and support them culturally and psychologically, and without the training component the quality of education provided would have been considerably lower.

**Efficiency**

Recent years have seen a more equitable split in staff levels between the UNICEF Gaziantep Field Office and the Country office in Ankara. Furthermore, the evaluation concludes that staff have been utilised to good effect in the development and especially the monitoring of the three components under evaluation. This is in addition to success in terms of leveraging policy developments, particularly the EPMS, the early recognition of TECs by the Government, the shift to the inclusion of Syrian children in the Turkish system and now discussions on the future of SVEPs. UNICEF monitoring data has contributed to the evidence base for these discussions.

In addition, the country office has been able to procure sufficient funds for implementation of two of these components: YOBIS and the SVEP incentives programme. This is in itself a creditable achievement when, overall the funding received for education in the 3RP has only been around 51% of the total requested. However, UNICEF could have supported more teaching and learning materials, and follow-up and study of teacher performance. It is unclear to the evaluation team whether more funds could have been utilised, since UNICEF had little control over this activity. If training is to be effective in the classroom, however, teachers and students require appropriate teaching and learning materials. The lack of adequate materials renders the training itself inefficient, as well as less effective, and is a demotivating factor for the teachers.

**Sustainability**

With the closure of Temporary Education Centres (TECs), the role of SVEPs as teachers of Syrian children in the classroom ceases and Turkish teachers assume that role for all children, including Syrians. Most SVEPs are not qualified under the Turkish system to be classroom or subject teachers. The government, with assistance from UNICEF, has therefore defined new roles for SVEPs within the Turkish Education System i.e. the Turkish Public Schools, Public Education Centres (PECs), and Research and Assessment Centres (RAMs). Under this plan, SVEPs have been categorized based on their qualifications and matched with new roles.

This was an important step as some provinces are resistant to the presence of SVEPs and regard them as temporary. This could be linked to the attitude towards hosting Syrians in general, the fact that there is
only one more year of guaranteed funding for their incentives, or political pressure to discontinue employing SVEPs when there are 400,000 unemployed Turkish teachers. In some cases, schools are unwilling or unable to utilise SVEPs effectively, especially where there are too many at the same school. The evaluation team also found instances of inappropriate utilisation of SVEPs in this transition period i.e. their engagement in non-educational roles. Such utilisation was probably not on a grand scale. However, there were sufficient incidences of this to warrant further investigation. MoNE supports the continuation of SVEPs, and would like to retain them.

UNICEF transferred YOBIS to the MoNE in September 2016. The system was deliberately designed to be able to communicate with the Turkish education system’s E-okul software, so students have easily transferred to the official system once they have their registration. Thus, UNICEF built in a sustainable strategy from the start. It should be noted, however, that the sustainability of these components are largely beyond UNICEF’s control. The Government retains control of all decision making functions and UNICEF’s role is that of a technical advisor.

**Coherence**

The three components under evaluation were developed in accordance with International Humanitarian obligations, the Core Commitments for Children (UNICEF, April 2010) and the INEE Minimum standards. They were also aligned with the 3RP, the UNICEF Turkey CPD, UNICEF Strategic Plans, and UN Development Co-operation Strategies released during the evaluation period. The initiatives were in alignment with Turkish Government education priorities. Also, the activities are contributing towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4: “inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.”

UNICEF and UNHCR have been jointly co-leading the Education Sector Group, however, in 2019 UNICEF received a request from UNHCR to take the sole lead at national level enabling them to use their convening power to bring NGOs/CSOs, UN agencies, and government institutions together. UNICEF also chairs the Southeast Turkey Education Working Group in Gaziantep.

One current concern is the coordination between UNICEF supported programmes and the EU supported PIKTES programme, both of which are supporting the integration of Syrian children into the Turkish Education system. This is specifically in training Turkish Teachers. At national level, UNICEF TCO has made efforts to share information with PIKTES. However, difficulties with sharing of information between UNICEF and PIKTES remain.

**Gender**

The three components have made efforts to address gender. YOBIS incorporated gender disaggregation into its software, and set the standard for all education data. As of May 2019, there were 12,507 SVEPs (5,859 males, and 6,648 females) in post and receiving incentives. As there were more female SVEPs than males, 53% as compared with almost 47%, this also put money into the hands of more women. Training of SVEPs has shown a similar pattern. The second round of SVEP training covered 10,201 female or 54.8%, and 8,415 male or 45.2%. To improve gender awareness, in 2018, MoNE (with UNICEF support) trained a total of 575 teachers and school administrators (218 women and 357 men) in gender equality. A gender equality package was implemented in an initial 162 secondary schools in all 81 provinces.

There is little deep analysis available of gender differences and the needs of Syrian students. What does exist is largely a description of barriers to access, such as safety and distance from school, early marriage, and the desire for separate classes for girls. It is widely noted that girls, in fact all Syrian children, are not
participating strongly in secondary education, reflecting the Turkish situation, but at a more chronic level. Boys often have to work rather than attend school, and girls are vulnerable to early and forced marriage as a way of alleviating the burden on a family. This situation will persist as coping strategies for the family. From 2017, UNICEF has put an emphasis on girls’ education in secondary school through communication activities with parents emphasising the importance of continued education, and to ensure that teachers understand and practice gender sensitivity in the classroom and school.

Overall, it was difficult to ascertain whether UNICEF has addressed the different needs of girls and boys.

**Conclusions**

The evaluation concludes that the three components under consideration were a very relevant response from UNICEF to support the Government of Turkey in managing education for Syrians under temporary protection. Many gains have been made in a difficult policy environment and changing context. All of these three components are inter-related and each would be weaker without the other.

Had YOBIS not been developed, 650,000 Syrian children who are now known to have enrolled in formal education may have remained invisible, and their engagement in any form of education difficult to track. This was particularly important once the influx began to settle in communities rather than TACs. YOBIS is a good example of an innovation addressing the need for data in education in an emergency and protracted crisis. It also a good example of a system strengthening initiative in education in emergencies supported by donors through UNICEF.

The system provides the Turkish government, which took ownership in 2016, with the means to register all newcomers in education, including in the future. Turkey is a country with a history of accepting newcomers, and is a transitional country for migrants. Therefore, this is likely to be a crucial system in future for meeting the needs of children in education and helping them to realise their rights.

UNICEF’s support to the government in recruitment, regulation and motivation of SVEPs was vital. However, neither the SVEP cadre nor their incentives are sustainable in the long term. The opening made by the government for some Syrian UTPs to be employed is helpful, but necessitates them going through the government’s recruitment process, including exams, qualifications and work permits, and few of the SVEPs are qualified to teach in classrooms, even those qualified in Syria, as there is no equivalence between the two systems. There are a substantial number of Turkish teachers unemployed and a cadre of Turkish contract teachers employed by PIKTES, whose future is also uncertain in the long term.

In this respect, UNICEF has adopted the best course of action and worked with the government to outline new roles for SVEPs in the Turkish education system, in TPSs as well as PECs and other institutions for the short to medium term. If effectively implemented, there would be a great benefit for SVEPs to accompany children transferring to the Turkish Education System.

UNICEF’s support for the establishment of the SVEP working group has provided the mechanism with which to articulate the future of SVEPs in the Turkish Education system. Beyond this, opportunities for SVEPs in other related programmes such as the Out-of-School children study, and outside education, on other income support programmes, may be available.

It has been a vital course of action to provide appropriate education opportunities to Syrian children through: firstly addressing teacher training needs as a priority; and secondly then to support and progress from the provision of emergency response training in 2013 to support MoNE in the design and
implementation of a series of training courses, compatible with the requirements of the Turkish teacher training system.

A lack of baselines on performance in the classroom[^4], limited follow-up, and no system for performance assessment of SVEPs in their classrooms, prevents a more confident claim to the effectiveness of the training sessions, and the Evaluation team noted the desire from SVEPs for more practical and flexible modes of training. Other elements which would have supported the training were reported to be less present and could have been budgeted for: - a professional support and supervision system for SVEPs in their classrooms, long term follow-up and data-gathering of performance and an enhanced supply of sufficient interactive teaching and learning materials for both SVEPs and Turkish teachers.

The evaluation found a potential lack of coherence between UNICEF supported activity and PIKTES. This is specifically in training Turkish Teachers. There is a need to define more clearly the roles of both initiatives.

While it is difficult in some respects to evaluate the performance of UNICEF in an operating environment where they are not in control, The Evaluation team concludes that UNICEF used its mandate and resources well. UNICEF has provided high quality technical assistance through its own staff and consultants to support and advise the GoT, which plays the leading role in all initiatives. UNICEF has supported the government with key inputs for both emergency operations and systems development, while quietly advocating on behalf of children for greater coverage, inclusion, and quality in education programmes. UNICEF’s relationships with the Government at senior management level and the respect accorded the agency by government and other partners have considerably facilitated progress. The value placed on the relationship with UNICEF by MoNE was obvious during the evaluation exercise.

It was noted that GoT has borne the majority of the costs of the response and its governance, and its officials and institutions have come under some strain. This is even more severe now, with the integration of Syrian students into the Turkish education system. One of the factors contributing to the early response and enabling UNICEF’s support to the education of Syrians UTP, was, and remains, the continuing commitment of the government to educating Syrians, and, now, to provide equitable service provision and full integration. The government has also been strong in its leadership in the response and has well developed institutions in its system to channel the assistance UNICEF and other agencies have offered.

UNICEF support in education for Syrian children UTP, has remained and continues to remain relevant and that as key pillars of any education system, the components under evaluation have a continuing role to contribute to the education system as a whole in future, as long as they develop along with the changing context. YOBIS is needed as a continuing system in which to register children arriving in Turkey in education programmes, and ensure their visibility in education, given Turkey’s geopolitical position.

**Gender issues**

It was difficult to ascertain whether UNICEF has addressed the different needs of girls and boys. However, there have been some other gains: because there were more (53%) female SVEPs than males, professional benefits accrued more than equally to women. These benefits may not be available elsewhere. Equally, financial incentives benefitted the same percentage of female SVEPs.

**Moving Forward**

[^4]: In the early years of the Syrian crisis everyone thought that it would be over within months or a year, so there was limited thinking around establishing and measuring baselines.
The education of Syrian children and the education system itself is in flux. Transition/integration is demotivating for some Syrian children who expressed concerns over the reduced teaching of their other subjects when so much time was given to learning Turkish. Children (Syrian and Turkish) and teachers involved in this process are experiencing some form of anxiety, an unfortunate phenomenon when Syrians are already affected by conflict and displacement. The evaluation team concluded that school leadership is key to the current needs and future wellbeing of the education system and all within it, and the school as an institution is key in the wider integration process and support to children under stress.

UNICEF’s presence since 1951 has made them a trusted partner for the government. It has used its convening power to raise funds, especially in the current crisis, provided leadership within the 3RPs, supported Turkey with high calibre technical assistance, and provided opportunities for sharing and displaying Turkey’s innovations and support to refugees. The new country programme will regard Syr ians as a vulnerable group within a more comprehensive strategy to support equity and quality more widely in education.

Emergency funding from donors may not be able to fund a longer term development programme. Turkey is a high-middle income country and, therefore, ineligible for development funds. It is also unlikely that the national budget could be made available to cover the costs of a durable solution for SVEPs in particular, either as volunteers or teachers, as a component of the education of Syrian children. Both UNICEF and the government are mindful that the income status of up to 13,000 Syrian adults and their families could deteriorate (and 53% of them are female).

A major conclusion of the evaluation is that factors relating to social cohesion need to be addressed. The issues of discrimination and bullying, which appear to be consistent with hardening of social attitudes more generally, could be addressed if the ethos of the school and classroom were addressed in a holistic way. The hardening of social attitudes towards Syrians is mirrored in the school, notwithstanding examples of benevolent action such as joint activities, which UNICEF also supports. The evaluation team suggests that where certain factors come together, they could have a tendency to ignite tensions. These factors appear to be: an oversupply of SVEPs in one institution; concentration of Syrian students in schools and classes, sometimes forming the majority; and limited capacity of Syrian students, parents and SVEPs to communicate well in the Turkish language. An outcome of this situation is the seemingly increasing instances of discrimination and bullying.

Several of these factors are outside the remit of the current exercise, but unless addressed may compromise the implementation and impact of UNICEF-supported interventions. This is particularly the concentration of large numbers of Syrian students in specific locations. At the same time, UNICEF interventions such as meaningful training in this area could help to mitigate the effects of social tensions. One first step is to ensure that SVEPs are deployed more equitably around the relevant provinces and that they are effectively engaged in the new roles.

**Selected Lessons Learned**

The following are some of the key lessons that could be learned by UNICEF globally from the situation so far.

- Supporting the education system itself to develop systems and mechanisms (YOBIS, incentives, certified training) has been key to ownership of initiatives and the sustainability of learning paths for refugee children, and can address scale across the nation or particular group of vulnerable children.
• Instruments such as the EPMS and structures such as the working Group on SVEPs, have provided useful formal mechanisms through which focussed discussion and advocacy can take place with MoNE.

• A good monitoring system has been found to be crucial to provide evidence for advocacy with government and accountability to donors. It has also provided necessary feedback for improvement of systems and services.

• Temporary or volunteer teachers are necessary in a crisis situation, and incentives contribute to their motivation and coping strategies, but cannot be sustained either financially or when refugee students are integrated into the national system. Alternatives to volunteer teaching for these volunteers need to be planned for in advance.

• The payment of SVEP incentives through a tripartite agreement between the private sector, a government ministry and UNICEF has demonstrated the efficacy of such a partnership.

• The establishment of a registration system for refugees in education has been crucial to fulfilling the right of refugee children to education. Further, the design of the system which is able to communicate to the national EMIS system has facilitated integration of refugee students into the national education system.

• In order to fulfil the broad aim of access to a quality education for refugees, a multi-sectoral approach has been needed particularly for out-of-school children and adolescents. In this case cash transfers, psychosocial counselling, outreach to parents and communities have all been employed as necessary parts of such an approach.

• Differences between the systems of education of host and newcomers influences behaviour in schools (one example is the use of corporal punishment in one system, which is forbidden in the other) and need to be understood by all personnel, not just the refugees learning about the host system. Ignoring the lived experiences of refugee teachers and children in their own systems can be a factor in poor social cohesion in schools.

• In a situation such as this where the host country language is different from the language of the new arrivals, language acquisition from an early age is crucial, as it has been reported in this evaluation and other studies that older children have difficulty learning a new language and this affects their integration into the education system and society and may be a cause of dropout. For parents it is key to their involvement with their child’s education and the school itself.

• Noting the implications of such a large influx of refugees on relations between host communities and newcomers, a strong and well-defined approach to social cohesion, including within schools, is needed, as the refugee crisis continues to strain basic education infrastructure and services, including within schools themselves. In any similar crisis, this needs to be anticipated and planned for.

• The evaluation team further suggests that there are lessons to be learned about the process of integrating a large number of foreign students into a national system: in particular, ensuring quality is maintained while ‘winding down’ of temporary education centres (TECs) is in process, and that students are supported through this transition; in addition, schools in the national system need to be ready, and its personnel prepared to accept students of a different culture (and
potentially traumatised). There are documented experiences from other countries\textsuperscript{5}, but as yet no global standards for the length of the integration process and each situation will be unique.

**Recommendations:**

Recommendations are for the final two years of the current CPD and thereafter, and are developed from the findings and conclusions of this study, the literature reviewed and the experience of the evaluators. They are prioritised from high to low priority.

**High priority**

1. Work with government to strengthen a comprehensive approach and plan for the education of Syrian children under temporary protection, and others, according to international norms and standards
2. Work with government to highlight factors that could assist the integration of Syrian children into the Turkish education system
3. Work with MoNE and other Government departments where relevant, to sustain remuneration for SVEPs
4. Work with government to highlight the need and plan for distribution of SVEPs across geographic locations as well as various institutions
5. Work urgently to implement the decisions of the EPMS working group on the role of SVEPs
6. Assist MoNE to develop further training for Turkish teachers to manage multicultural classes. (HIGH PRIORITY)

**Medium to high priority**

7. Assist MoNE to design and implement training for SVEPs in their new roles.

**Medium priority**

8. Work with MoNE to adopt a whole school approach for developing quality education, professional development within it, and strengthening social cohesion, for the next CPD
9. Work with MoNE to develop a more holistic approach to capacity development for education personnel
10. Maintain support to YOBIS for training and system development

**Medium to low priority**

11. Work with MoNE to profile the innovations from the three components globally within UNICEF and externally, consistent with guidelines on UNICEF’s role in Middle Income Countries
12. Contribute the experience of Turkey in addressing the large influx of newcomers and their integration into the Turkish education System to consultations on International Norms and Standards.

# 1 Background

In November 2018, the UNICEF Turkey Country Office (TCO) initiated the process to undertake an evaluation of UNICEF’s support to Education Personnel in the Syria Crisis Response. TCO awarded the contract in March 2019 in time for the inception mission in the first week of April 2019, with fieldwork undertaken during May 2019.

## 1.1 Object of the evaluation

UNICEF in Turkey provides an array of programmes designed to meet the needs of the most vulnerable children. This includes child protection, psycho social support, the capacity building of government services across a number of ministries and services, programmes to support Turkish and refugee youth and adolescents, gender and child rights focused interventions, and a multi-faceted education programme that includes early childhood support activities and cash transfers that enable the poorest children to attend school.

This evaluation, however, has focused upon three components of the UNICEF TCO education sector response to the Syrian crisis that mostly fall under the Education Personnel Management Strategy (EPMS): the Syrian Volunteer Education Personnel (SVEP) incentives programme and the professional development of SVEPs, and additionally the development and integration of the YOBIS system. The evaluation also encompasses the professional development of Turkish teachers supported by UNICEF. The total expenditure for the three programme components represented approximately 30% of the total expenditure for the Turkey-UNICEF Country Programme in 2017, which was USD151 million in 2017, USD181 million in 2018. The evaluation covered the period from September 2014 to May 2019. A brief summary of the three components follows.

### 1.1.1 SVEP incentives programme:

The SVEP incentives programme was established in 2014 with the primary objectives of providing quality education in a safe environment to Syrian children living in TACs and host communities. It also aimed at improving the quality of the education by increasing the motivation and strengthening the capacity of the Syrian Volunteer Education Personnel (SVEPs) working in Temporary Education Centres (TECs).

In November 2014, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE), the General Directorate of Post and Telegraphic Organisation (PTT), and UNICEF established a tripartite protocol. According to it, MoNE is responsible for overall management of the initiative, PTT for the transfer of incentives to the SVEPs, and UNICEF for technical assistance and financial backing generated through a variety of donors, utilising the UNICEF funding pipeline utility. At that initial stage of the initiative, there were only 2,500 SVEPs.

The number of SVEPs has increased over the last five years as the intake of Syrian students into the Turkish education system has risen significantly (please see context section below). As of March 2019 there were 12,564 SVEPs supported through this initiative, working in 23 provinces in Turkey. The highest concentrations of SVEPs match that of the refugees: most SVEPs are in the South East of the country, as

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6 UNICEF TURKEY, 2018 c. Turkey Results and Resources Matrix 2018 dd.05.02.2018. s.l.:s.n.

7 As described in: THE PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION,UNICEF AND PTT ON THE REMUNERATION OF THE SYRIAN TEACHERS CONTRIBUTING VOLUNTARILY TO EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT FOR THE SYRIAN CITIZENS 2018
well as in Istanbul, predominantly in urban areas where families have gone in search of work. The cost of their incentives is almost USD 3.4M per month.\(^8\)

The role of SVEPs changed considerably in October 2018 as many TECs closed and large numbers of Syrian students integrated into the Turkish education system. An edict issued by MoNE on October 16th 2018 outlined their new educational and administrative support and outreach/community liaison and counselling roles.\(^9\)

1.1.2 Professional development of teachers:
The aim of this component is to improve the pedagogical knowledge and skills of educational personnel and therefore improve the quality of education provided. In particular, MoNE, with UNICEF, has developed training strategies, modules, and packages aimed at ensuring the provision of quality inclusive education for every child.

UNICEF implemented the programme for the most part in Partnership with the Teacher Training and Development General Directorate, and the Lifelong Learning General Directorate of MoNE. It has provided three phases of training for SVEPs during 2016 (19,776 teachers), 2016/2017 (18,616 teachers) and 2017 (13,537 teachers), as well as training for Turkish Teachers (37,023 in 2016, 70,915 in 2017, and 154,451 teachers and administrators in 2018). A list of content of the training courses is found in Annex 14.

1.1.3 YOBIS
UNICEF developed this information management system in close co-ordination with MoNE, during 2014, with the objective of managing the demographic and educational data of refugee students enrolled in TECs, and as such providing a system that tracks a Syrian student’s education, providing graduation certificates, and proof of academic enrolment, attendance and achievements. UNICEF successfully handed over YOBIS to MoNE in 2016 for further development.

Due to the transfer of most students into the Turkish Education System and therefore onto their E-okul system, with which YOBIS is compatible, YOBIS in the Turkish Education System is now predominantly used for tracking attendance of the SVEPs, generating a monthly report that triggers the release of monthly incentive payments, while also registering any new arrivals in education.

These three elements together have provided the backbone of UNICEF’s education response to the Syria crisis since 2014, integrating with other UNICEF programmes such as their Child Protection and CCTE programmes as elaborated in the 2016-2020 Country Programme Document.

1.2 Context

According UNDP’s Humanitarian Development Report, Turkey, with a total population of 80.7 million, has an improving HDI index in 2018 of 0.791 ranking it in 64\(^{th}\) place of the 189 countries assessed. Adult literacy stands at 96.8%, with a mean of 8 years of expected schooling (7.1 for females, and 8.8 for males). Life

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\(^8\) 12,564 salaries at 1,603 Turkish Lire per month being 20.1M TL, which at May’s UN exchange rate of 1 USD = 5.9464 TL is the equivalent of USD 3,386,939.

expectancy for men is 75 years, and for women is 81 years.\textsuperscript{10} The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranked Turkey as the 18\textsuperscript{th} largest economy worldwide in 2019.

The World Bank classifies Turkey as an upper middle-income country and estimated Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product in 2017 as USD 851.5 Billion, with a growth rate of 7.4%. Growth in 2018, however, has fallen 2.7 percent and over the past year Turkey has experienced significant market turbulence which by the end of 2018 had generated an effective exchange rate decline of 25 percent\textsuperscript{11}. Consumer inflation was above 20 per cent.\textsuperscript{12} Having an upper middle income status furthermore restricts some donors from supporting development activities in Turkey\textsuperscript{13}.

The political environment in recent years has also been somewhat turbulent as an attempted coup in July 2016 created social unrest, the declaration of a state of emergency, and increased pressure on government institutions. Changes in the national constitution in 2017, led to the creation of a presidential republic in June 2018. This has led to governmental restructuring and numerous changes at a ministerial level, together with an increase in the centralisation of decision making. One outcome of this process was the substantial constriction of the space within which humanitarian and civil society organisations can operate.

As a result of the Syrian conflict, ongoing for more than eight years since initial civil protests in March 2011, Turkey is now hosting the largest number of refugees in the world with about 3.6 million Syrians as well as approximately 366,000 asylum-seekers and refugees from other nationalities, predominantly Iraqis and Afghans. Of these, 1.7 million – or 45% – are children. The cost of the supporting Syrian refugees and ongoing high unemployment (13% as at May 2019)\textsuperscript{14}, remain permanently in the public domain maintaining pressure on the government who have to avoid being seen as too generous a host, while its own citizens are struggling. Significantly, the influx has also seriously affected local employment markets, reducing daily labour rates as the supply of cheaper labour has emerged. Despite this, the government has maintained a policy of integration as a priority, specifically within the education sector, and the refugees retain their right to remain under their temporary protection status.

The Turkish Government is the largest provider of humanitarian aid in country supported by UN agencies and international donors currently utilising the UN “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan” (3RP), the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RRMRP), and the “No lost generation” strategy. The government provides extensive public services, especially in health and education. Nevertheless, some groups of children continue to experience difficulties and face risks such as child labour, child marriage, violence and discrimination. Adolescent girls and boys are in many cases out of school seeking employment due to economic necessity.

Over time, the possibility that the refugees would return home in the short term has become unrealistic. The humanitarian situation in Idlib however, remains precarious, and the possibility of another influx of refugees remains a possibility. Figure 1 illustrates the net influx of refugees over recent years.

\textsuperscript{10} Turkish Statistical Institute, September 2018.

\textsuperscript{11} The Turkish Lira has devalued from 2.3 TL /USD 1 in Jan 2015 to 5.6TL/USD 1 as of July 2019

\textsuperscript{12} The World Bank in Turkey, August 2019, \url{https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview#3}

\textsuperscript{13} This can lead to lower levels of operational capacity, and as such a lack of emergency response capacity.

\textsuperscript{14} The number of unemployed people aged 15 years old and over increased to 4 million 157 thousand people in the May 2019 marking an increase of 1 million 21 thousand people during the last year. As for the unemployment rate, it was measured as 12.8 percent, marking a 3.1-point increase, Turkish Statistical Institute, May 2019.
Education opportunities for refugee children in Turkey have increased significantly since the beginning of the crisis. The enrolment of refugee children in schools has grown from 230,000 students at the end of the 2014/2015 school year to almost 650,000 students as at the start of 2019 (please see Figure 2, and Table 1 below). As can be seen, there has been a clear trend in terms of children moving from Temporary Education Centres (TECs) into the Turkish Education System (83% in 2014 to 15% in 2019).

These statistics, however, also indicate that 38% of school-aged children are not enrolled in schools (Table 1). Evidently, enrolment decreases with age as boys grow into young men and seek employment to support their families, and young women leave school to work at home or to get married. These events have a similar statistical impact on both sexes as can be seen in Figure 3.
1.3 Intervention Logic

The initiatives’ rationale, and their place in the broader portfolio of UNICEF support can be seen in Annex 5, where the relevant education theories of change (ToC), highlight the necessary conditions that need to be in place for UNICEF to achieve the overall Education objective of “All refugee girls and boys receive quality certified education”.\textsuperscript{15}

The key elements of these TOCs include conditions such as there being enough places in the Turkish education system to accommodate refugee children, which are outside of the scope of this evaluation and not affected by these activities undertaken. However, such conditions as “Quality of teaching up to standards” and “Positive school environment”, sufficient salaries, and “Systematic student assessment” fall within the components under evaluation.

Beyond this the TOCs identify other necessities such as refugee families supporting and enabling their children’s participation in school together with the need for sufficient learning materials are targeted within other UNICEF activities.

Bottlenecks, such as a lack in consistently good quality teaching practices, a lack of information on refugee children’s learning achievements, budgetary shortcomings, and the economic and cultural aspects that lead to children leaving school early, have been identified. The three components evaluated are intended, as much as possible, to address such issues.

UNICEF AND UNHCR have jointly supported the education sector, with UNICEF taking the largest share. Other UN agencies involved have been IOM, and before 2016, and to a lesser degree afterwards, several NGOs were supporting local initiatives.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} UNICEF COUNTRY OFFICE IN TURKEY, 2017 October. THEORY OF CHANGE IN EDUCATION, s.l.: s.n.
\textsuperscript{16} As an illustration of their relative activities, in the 2018-19 3RP, the shares of requested budget were: UNICEF $188,460,000; UNHCR $70,885,400; IOM $8,500,000; other partners $ 25,374,990.UNHCR has focused largely on Tertiary Education and Turkish Language Teaching; IOM on school transport.
1.4 Key Stakeholders and users of the evaluation findings.

The UNICEF Turkey Country Office (TCO) will be the main user of this report, utilising the findings, conclusions, and recommendations generated by the evaluation to support the 2019 TCO Strategic Planning process that will produce the next TCO Country Strategy (2020-2025). Specifically, the Education Section of the TCO, who presented an overview of their activities during the inception mission, and have been interviewed by the evaluation team, will be the most interested in terms of if, and in what form, the components assessed here will be implemented in the future. Other TCO Sections whose activities are linked to the three components evaluated will also be interested in the findings as there are a number of linkages between the components and other UNICEF activities undertaken.

TCO has also contracted the consultancy firm to undertake the evaluation, facilitated the evaluation itself, organising meetings with the ministries, UN agencies and other key stakeholders, as well as consolidating comments that have fed into the report writing process. The TCO will also organise the final evaluation debriefing to government partners and other invited external agencies. UNICEF personnel accompanied the team to introduce them to government counterparts, in both Ankara and the South East.

MoNE, governmental partners PTT, and internal departments such as the Teacher Training and Development General Directorate, and the Life Long Learning General Directorate, may also utilise the evaluation findings as they plan how to best utilise the SVEPs during this transition phase and in the future. How the report will affect UNICEF future Country Strategy thinking will also be of importance to them as this will be the basis for future co-operation between these two main stakeholders. Such departments, both at a National and provincial level, have been interviewed within the evaluation process. MoNE has facilitated the overall evaluation process, agreeing the TOR, and ensuring provincial offices were informed of field visits and interview requests. Provincial MoNE officers also facilitated the visits to the schools within their respective districts, and accompanied the team to introduce them.

Managers and staff at the UNICEF Regional Offices for Europe and Central Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, as well as at UNICEF Headquarters and others in UNICEF for whom the Syria refugee crisis response holds relevant lessons, will use lessons learnt and good practices identified here that may prove relevant for their future education programmes.

Other Government of Turkey departments beyond MoNE, past and future donors, other UN agencies, and development partners, especially those involved in the education sector, might also be interested in the main findings of the evaluation in this respect.

Finally, the school principals who work with and manage the SVEPs on a day-to-day basis, and, clearly the SVEPs themselves, may be interested to read what the report has to say about SVEP functionality and their suggested future contribution to the overall Syrian student integration process into the Turkish Education System.
2 Evaluation purpose, objectives, and scope.

2.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The evaluation process utilised has been forward-looking (formative) with, as per the terms of reference (ToR), an emphasis on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and coherence of UNICEF activities to date. Furthermore, the evaluation will serve dual purposes of learning and accountability:

- Accountability – Assess and report on the quality and results of the activities to date.
- Learning – to draw lessons, and to derive good practices and pointers for learning in order to provide evidence-based findings to assist in decision-making around future programme implementation regarding the strengthening of the national education system and ensuring quality and inclusive education for all girls and boys in Turkey.

2.2 Objectives of the evaluation

As per the TOR the evaluation objectives are to:

- Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence and sustainability of UNICEF’s contribution to strengthening the education personnel as part of the response to the refugee crisis in the education sector;
- Identify and document potential innovations and lessons learnt in relation to the implementation modalities of the three concerned programme components, considering the country context and UNICEF’s comparative advantage;
- Provide recommendations to inform the programming around the three programme components for the coming years, in particular to guide the programming for the years 2019 and 2020, and the last two years of the Turkey-UNICEF Country Programme 2016-2020.

The evaluation questions for each of the three programme components are listed below. We have maintained the evaluation questions as formulated in the TOR, with only one small amendment. We have added “and inclusive” to the end of the second relevance question.

Relevance

- Is UNICEF’s role in and contribution to strengthening the education personnel relevant for the response to the crisis given the country-context? How did UNICEF’s role and contribution evolve over time and adapt to changes in the country-context?
- To what extent is UNICEF’s role in and contribution to strengthening the education personnel relevant for the achievement of the objectives of the 3RP and the Turkey-UNICEF Country Programme 2016-2020? To what extent is it gender sensitive?
- To what extent are the three programme components described above relevant for the needs of refugee girls and boys in Turkey?

Effectiveness

- To what extent has UNICEF’s support to strengthening the education personnel achieved (or contributed to achieve) the expected outcome and output level results to date?
- To what extent has UNICEF’s support to strengthening the education personnel contributed to progress towards/achieve unexpected results, especially at the policy level?
• To what extent has the UNICEF contribution to strengthening the education personnel played a role in reducing bottlenecks and barriers that leave refugee girls and boys behind in terms of accessing quality and inclusive education in Turkey?
• What are the main factors that have promoted or hindered the effectiveness of UNICEF’s contribution to strengthening the education personnel?

**Efficiency**
• How efficiently did UNICEF use its resources (funds, people/time, expertise, reputational assets, leveraging capacity) in its contribution to strengthening the education personnel?

**Sustainability**
• To what extent has MoNE and other concerned government agencies demonstrated ownership over the teacher incentives programme, the teacher training programmes (for both Syrian volunteer teachers and Turkish teachers) and YOBIS?
• What are the opportunities for and risks to the sustainability of the teacher incentives programme, the teacher training programmes (for Syrian volunteer teachers and Turkish teachers) and YOBIS?

**Coherence**
• To what extent is UNICEF’s contribution to strengthening the education personnel coherent with the Turkey-UNICEF 2016-2020 Country Programme, the 3RP as well as with the UNICEF Strategic Plan 2013-2017 and CCCs?”

### 2.3 Scope of the evaluation

The scope of the evaluation covered the three main thematic areas mentioned above, for the period from September 2014 until May 2019 when the fieldwork was undertaken.

The evaluation has assessed UNICEF’s support to MoNE for strengthening education personnel as part of the response to the refugee crisis in the education sector in Turkey. This includes the components mentioned in section one. Specific evaluation objectives are mentioned above.

Beyond this, the evaluation has also looked at the continuum between the emergency response interventions and the current resilience building approach, utilising the 2015 evaluation as a baseline wherever relevant. It has also integrated gender, equity, and human rights aspects into the evaluation analysis.

Furthermore, it has acknowledged the fact that the three components touch onto other UNICEF country office activities, such as Child Protection and CCTE activities. Although the latter are beyond the scope of the evaluation, linkages with such activities are considered as key overall factors that contribute to the **relevance and coherence** of the three key components under consideration.

Geographically, all TCO activities in Turkey within the three components are within the scope of the evaluation. Site visits were arranged as outlined in the TOR evaluation design. However, the ET only undertake such visits in Istanbul, and the South East of the country near to the Syrian border where the majority of the refugees are living (Gaziantep, Mersin and Sanliurfa). The ET also conducted Key Informant Interviews in Ankara.
The evaluation has focused on Syrian refugees and has not specifically analysed the effects of UNICEF intervention on others, for example on Afghan or Iraqi school age refugees in Turkey.
3 Evaluation Methodology

3.1 Evaluation criteria and approach

3.1.1 Evaluation criteria

As requested, the evaluation utilised the DAC criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, and Coherence. UNICEF did not require the team to address Impact.

The point of departure for this evaluation is the completion of the evaluation carried out in 2015, which addressed the humanitarian crisis. This evaluation is reviewing the time up to 2019, when the population is more stable and systemic issues have become more relevant. The evaluation has not used other criteria common in Humanitarian Evaluations, apart from references to coverage.

The evaluation adopted the Equity-Focused Approach, as developed and utilised by UNICEF and its partners which seeks to:

- Involve stakeholders, from as many relevant backgrounds as feasible to generate suggestions about future developments as well as acting as Key Informants
- Explore how beneficiaries and stakeholders have made inputs into the design and implementation of the programme components to date
- Include as many types of situations and stakeholders as possible in seeking responses to the evaluation questions.

The Evaluation Team attempted to utilise two approaches, which are key to an Equity-focused evaluation:

- The Utilization Approach, to identify the users of the evaluations and involve them in the design of the evaluation, and then in the sense-making of findings
- Outcome Harvesting, to capture stories from the beneficiaries about what is key to the improvement of their learning environment (as specified in the outcomes). While data collected could inform that, the evaluation team only has the scope in this report to select a few issues raised by children.

The evaluation team has complemented this approach with an exploration of ideas on what could have happened without UNICEF, with a review of quantitative data supplied by MoNE and UNICEF, on indicators of success, and which suggests the contribution of UNICEF at the output level.

Both the Utilization Approach and Outcome Harvesting encouraged the process of reflection, exchange, teamwork and questioning. This began with two participatory exercises with the Education team at TCO during the inception visit. Such opportunities did not present themselves readily later in the process, given the intensity of the fieldwork, and the fact that the team left Turkey after the fieldwork phase from the South-East rather than returning to Ankara. The return visit of the team to Ankara in July 2019, served mainly to validate the findings with both the UNICEF education team and to the TCO as a whole. The

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19 Programme beneficiaries are Syrian children (and increasingly, Turkish children), teachers (Turkish and SVEPs), data management and information system administrators, and other education personnel.
The evaluation team felt that this fell short of their expectations but there is a plan to return to Ankara for final discussions with UNICEF and MoNE, which the ET will suggest focuses on the feasibility of the recommendations. The team acknowledged that further discussion will be held within UNICEF during their Strategic Moments of Reflection and discussions on the new CPD.

The evaluation team validated their findings through triangulation of data sources with KIs and FGDs in the field and with secondary research documentation, as well as information in UNICEF Monitoring reports. No survey was carried out as the team agreed with UNICEF that no data additional to the existing and ongoing UNICEF Monitoring surveys would be obtained.

As far as possible, the evaluation used a Gender and Equity approach, and a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) when analysing the UNICEF supported activities and outputs. The UNEG Guidelines on Integrating Gender and Human Rights in Evaluations was used but the proposed use of the IASC Gender marker was abandoned after due consideration, due to its lack of development and appropriateness for this type of situation. The guideline utilised for HRBA is one developed by UNICEF and UNESCO, specifically for education\(^\text{20}\). Giving children a voice was part of the approach in this evaluation.

The evaluation team conducted variance analysis where appropriate in relation to targets and results\(^\text{21}\) as a simple analysis of the difference between the expected and actual value of an indicator, expressed in percentage terms, enabling a comparison of performance across different quantitative indicators.

### 3.1.2 Ethical considerations

The inception report included ethical considerations to be employed by the team. These went through a review process as required by UNICEF’s Ethical Procedures. In summary, the main ethical principles and actions employed by the Evaluation team were:

- **Informed consent**: consent forms signed by parents were received by the team for every child who participated in a FGD, except in one case where the teacher (acting as a responsible adult) signed the forms.
- **Voluntary participation**: this was explained to participants and respondents\(^\text{22}\)
- **Do no harm**
- **Anonymity and confidentiality**: the schools were coded so that their names do not appear on the report forms. Nor do names of Key informant appear on interview forms. A full explanation of each of the above can be seen in the evaluation Inception report.

### 3.1.3 Sampling

The evaluation team agreed with UNICEF in the inception phase that the sample would not be a representative one, and that the design would be one to triangulate information from multiple sources. Therefore no attempt has been made to generalise findings to the whole population (of SVEPs etc.) The data, instead, raises issues and highlights examples of what lies beneath the statistics in national or provincial representative sample surveys.

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\(^{20}\) UNICEF UNESCO September 2007. It outlines 3 domains (p.28): 1. The right of access to education 2. The right to quality education 3. The right to respect in the learning environment

\(^{21}\) This is a simple analysis of the difference between the expected and actual value of an indicator, expressed in percentage terms for allowing comparison of performance across different quantitative indicators.

\(^{22}\) People at times did indeed leave Focus Group discussions, largely parents, who might have had to accompany their children home or see to other tasks.
The choice of provinces was negotiated between the Evaluation Team and UNICEF. UNICEF has grouped the 27 provinces with Syrian population of over 10,000 according to the number of out-of-school children, the percentage of out-of-school children who are Syrians, the percentage of Syrians living in the host community, the number of students per class, and the GDP.

Istanbul falls into Group 2: high Syrian school-age population (12% of TR); low percentage of Syrians in the province (4%); relatively low percentage of out-of-school children (35.3%); high number of students in class and better economic condition and was selected due to its size and importance within Turkey.

Mersin falls into Group 3: relatively low Syrian school-age population (17% of TR, avg. 5.7%); relatively high % of Syrians in province (10.9%); high percentage of out-of-school children (51.6%); high number of students per class and economic challenges. Mersin was selected out of this group because this province was the first one to start the transition of Syrian volunteer teachers from TECs to the Turkish Education System PSs and they had already completed the integration process of the Syrian children.

Sanliurfa falls into Group 1: high Syrian school-age population (43% of TR, avg. 14%); high % of Syrians in province (avg.23.2%); high percentage of out-of-school children (47.9%); high number of students per class and economic challenges. Sanliurfa was selected from this group because of the presence of many Arabic speakers in the province.

Schools were selected so as to give a mix of primary/secondary, PECs (1), TECs (8-including 2 in TACs) and Turkish Public Schools (11), of which 5 were religious schools, and where a reasonable number of SVEPs were working. Logistically, the team needed to be able to reach two sites within one day (this was sometimes in addition to an office of PDoNE for example).

16 KIIs were conducted with UNICEF staff in Ankara and Gaziantep, (2 were Regional Offices and 3 with staff in Gaziantep, as the hub of the Southeast operations), 3 UN partner organisations, MoNE at central and provincial levels (4), 3 donors which have or are funding the programme components, PTT, plus 20 School Directors/Principals of TECs, PECs, TPSs, TACS, and TAC managers. Some KIIs, especially with some donors or international agencies were conducted remotely as were the KIIs with the two UNICEF Regional Offices.

The evaluation team conducted 21 teacher Focus Group Discussions in Istanbul and the South East, (18 with SVEPs and 3 with Turkish teachers), 13 with parents, 13 with Syrian and Turkish students, again at TECs, PECs, TPSs, and in the TACs. Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 provide a breakdown of the numbers interviewed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVEPs by gender and institution</th>
<th>TEC</th>
<th>TPSs</th>
<th>PEC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 UNICEF has a categorisation for the 27 provinces where the Syrian population is higher than 10,000. 96.6% of Syrians live in these 27 provinces, where the number of school age Syrians is 1,017,351 which is 97.1% of total Syrian school aged children.

24 TAC schools were originally TECs, but during the transition process of integrating all children into the Turkish Education System, one TAC visited by the team, Nizip II, is gradually changing over to follow the Turkish Education System curriculum and will soon be staffed by regular Turkish teachers.
### Table 3 The number of Syrian parents, male and female, by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersin</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4 The number of Syrian children interviewed, male and female, by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersin</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5 The number of teachers, male and female, by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.1.4 Limitations and mitigation measures

Lack of documentation in the early phase of the crisis. While various strategy papers existed (often done by consultants), as was referred to in the 2015 Evaluation, there were no early Theories of Change for the components. However, subsequently in 2016-2017, the TCO rectified this and developed TOCs addressing all the appropriate strategies, which the Evaluation Team has utilised.

There is a limited supply of official data apart from administrative enrolment data from MoNE. Although this has improved after 2016 when UNICEF handed over YOBIS to MoNE, education data on Syrians UTP is also sparse. The Evaluation Team utilised Humanitarian reports (SITREPs etc.) and MoNE’s draft Statistical Report on the Education of Syrian Children in Turkey, 2017-2018.

Data relating to educational needs of Syrian children is also difficult to find, especially any differences between girls and boys. To understand the bottlenecks and barriers and other aspects of the situation, the Evaluation Team utilised UNICEF’s Situational Analyses for 2014, 2017, and 2019 and Theories of Change, as well as other reports.

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26 Apart from the data used for CCTE payments to which UNICEF has access, and monthly attendance of SVEPs, to pay the Incentives.
The selection of both SVEPs and Turkish teachers for the FGDs was undertaken either by MoNE (Turkish teachers at the Provincial level), or school Directors and Principals or their delegated representative, as were the children. The evaluation team had wished to avoid bias and ensure an equal number of males and females in each group, and communicated this to the school in advance of their visits. During the inception phase it was explained to the team by UNICEF that all FGDs would be held as mixed groups. The local experts who facilitated the FDGs did not feel that having mixed groups of males and females had an influence on the discussion.

In three SVEP FGs, (out of 18) a person of influence stayed for the discussion: in two cases a teacher (with children), and in one case a MoNE official\(^\text{27}\). The team always briefed the Principal/Director on all aspects of the exercise and explained that they were welcome, but that they preferred the group members to be free to discuss.

In a few limited cases, SVEPs were also in parents’ FGDs, playing dual roles. This was of course entirely normal, but unanticipated, and the Evaluation Team should have asked for this to be avoided. However, it came late in the process when all communications with schools had been carried out.

The evaluation used proxy measures, such as qualitative statements on changes in performing tasks, as well as UNICEF monitoring reports carried out at the site of training, and in follow-up surveys, as no observation was carried out.

Due to delays in selecting and contracting the Evaluation Team, the field exercise was carried out at the end of the school year (with the risk that children would either be doing exams or have left), and during Ramadan. The latter was not ideal as most of the respondents were fasting, and the team wished not to place extra burdens on them at this time (perhaps most significantly for parents coming to a school).

### 3.2 Evaluation Matrix, Instruments and Process

The Evaluation Team elaborated a general evaluation matrix and then adapted the evaluation questions further to the thematic components in four detailed matrixes in order to be able to articulate sub-questions for each component and develop appropriate field instruments. They based the semi-structured interview schedules for KIIs and the Focus Group Discussion Formats on a thorough examination of the evaluation questions together with a review of the programmatic theories of change, taking into account the information received during the inception mission, documentation, as reviewed and agreed by UNICEF in Ankara. The evaluation matrix is in annex 2 of this report.

The evaluation team could not pilot the evaluation instruments due to concerns regarding testing the tools without necessary MoNE permission, so the team utilised the first field site (Istanbul) to review the instruments and make any necessary adjustments. The instruments are found in annexes 7, 8, and 9.

Two local consultants facilitated the FGDs: one a Syrian (male), recruited as the Target group Specialist and the other, a Turkish female, engaged as the Context Specialist, both of whom had already very relevant experience in related fields. The evaluation team hired a Syrian female note-taker for the Arabic FGDs and a Turkish note-taker (female) for the Turkish sessions. It also employed two interpreters, one (female) in Istanbul, and the other (male) in the Southeast. They also had relevant experience of the field.

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\(^{27}\) This meant that students were not free to speak, and it was obvious when the teacher left the group and the students became less restrained. It was however, positive for safeguarding. The facilitator and note-taker recorded when this happened in their notes.
to contextualise the interpretation. With the Team Leader (male) and Education Specialist (female), the team achieved a gender balance.

KIIIs took place in Turkish, through an interpreter, or directly in English (donor and UN agencies). Where both the team leader and Education specialist were present, one led the discussion with the other took responsibility for the recording of the interview. On occasions, only one of these professionals was available for an interview.

Focus group discussions with Syrian children and parents were in Arabic. Those with Turkish teachers and personnel in the administration in Turkish. Initially focus group discussions with SVEPs were in Arabic but as the workload increased for the Arabic-speaking members of the team, SVEPs were largely facilitated by the Turkish-speaking team, as it was ascertained that the SVEPs spoke sufficient Turkish. The Evaluation Team was sensitive to the possibility of illiteracy in the parents’ group, but that did not arise.

The note-takers wrote up each focus group discussion, then notes from all groups in each category was summarised in English for each province. Statements in the report refer to number of Focus groups rather than number of participants.

The Evaluation team built in three formal sessions to review methodology and field experience:

- a briefing and training at the beginning of the fieldwork
- a review and revision of the instruments at the end of the first field phase-in Istanbul
- a whole day at the end of fieldwork for a structured discussion on preliminary findings.
- Another is planned to present the findings to UNICEF, GoT and other stakeholders such as UN partners.

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28 This actually took too much of their time and it might have been prudent to hire a note-taker (but would also have been an extra cost).
29 This is done by group, as it was impossible to note accurately in each group, how many members agreed with a particular point of view.
4 Evaluation Findings

4.1 Relevance

The three components are relevant to UNICEF’s own Country Programme Document Outcome 1, and outputs 1A and 1B, which refer to increasing the capacity of the education system to provide quality inclusive education for refugees through formal education opportunities.

The relevance of the components to the Regional Response Plans (RRPs) Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans (3RPs), UN Development Cooperation Strategy (UNDCS), and UNICEF Country Programme Document (CPD) will be addressed, initially as a package, and then by component. Other normative documents under the coherence criteria, such as UNICEF’s Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) and the Guidelines for Education in Emergencies from the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) are considered largely in the coherence section. Coverage (one of the humanitarian principles of response, relevant in the initial phase covered by this evaluation) is mentioned where appropriate.

The context surrounding and leading up to the development of the components is crucial to their understanding. The timeline of the context and response is presented in annex 11, and conceptualised in Box 1.

| Phase II Recognising Medium Term Needs 2016-17: The influx slows down but many children are not in education programmes especially girls at upper levels; a Back to School initiative is launched and attention given to quality. |
| Phase III Transition and Durable Solutions 2017-2019: Integration of children into the Turkish education system begins with TACs and TECs closing in stages. A proposal to identify out-of-school children is developed. |
| Phase IV Long-term Strategy and Resilience Building 2019: Further integration of Syrian students into the Turkish Education system and SVEPs redeployed. Emergence of new and deepening of existing bottlenecks and barriers |

Box 1 Concepts for the timeline

Phase I Emergency Response 2011-2014/15

In 2015, large numbers of Syrians were crossing the border in waves (Figure 1). Children had lost years of education both from the disruption within Syria itself and then the move to Turkey30. Thus the Government of Turkey, supported by UNICEF and others, needed to adopt at least a three-pronged approach: meeting the immediate needs of the refugees in education, ensuring their mid and longer-term future, and building the capacity of systems to address the needs.

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30 A UNICEF survey in 2017 suggested that the number of years out-of-school age children were not in school was an average of 4 years. (UNICEF 2018a)
UNICEF support to MoNE was relevant in that it addressed evident needs following from the Circular of September 2014, which opened up access to education either in the Turkish Education System or in TECs for Syrians Under temporary Protection (UTP), and allowed agencies to work in host communities.

UNICEF operated according to the operational space permitted, initially within the TACs, utilising the Adapted Syrian curriculum in Arabic. This was consistent with the aspirations of Syrians to return home and of the government’s expectation that they would do so in the short term. At the very beginning of the refugee response, ‘schools’ that Syrian community established were not regulated by MoNE, then MoNE decided to establish TECs under their regulation with a hybrid curriculum taught in Arabic. This accelerated the recruitment of emergency teachers from among the Syrian population in Turkey, by MoNE and UNICEF and encouraged the government to expand the number of TECs. This provided the most important focus for a formal education for Syrian children UTP and increased the number of Syrian students in schools. The operational space affected UNICEF’s ability to address the issue of coverage of education services for more Syrians UTP as many children were outside the TACs. The beginning of 2015 saw the further development of the partnership between UNICEF and GoT to address the out-of-camp issues and services. The Evaluation of 2015 criticised UNICEF for not moving more quickly on this, when access had apparently been granted towards the end of 2014.

With the release of the 3RP of 2015-2016, a resilience-based response was called for, along with assistance to national and sub-national systems and “capacity development of key actors and systems for implementation”.

Within this context, the three components under evaluation were developed in accordance with International Humanitarian obligations, the Core Commitments for Children and the INEE Minimum standard. Permission was difficult to obtain for needs assessments as recorded in the Evaluation in 2015, although a small number of NGOs began to do this in specific geographical areas.

The development of the Education Personnel Management Strategy (EPMS) was a key contribution to systems to respond to the crisis, both immediately and for the future (thereby addressing resilience). The EPMS included the Code of Conduct (later the Letter of Commitment), conditions of work, recruitment and selection procedures, and capacity-building for SVEPs. It responded to the need for robust recruitment and selection procedures, registration of students, and standardised conditions of service for SVEPs. Using the EPMS as a mechanism, UNICEF has continued to work with MoNE to respond to new needs and further develop the strategy.

At the time, UNICEF’s support to the GoT in TACs and in TECs was highly contested by UNHCR, which was unhappy that UNICEF apparently was setting up a parallel system of education. UNHCR’s greater experience with refugee populations suggested that such populations would remain in a host country for at least 17 years, now revised to an average of over 20 years, and that advocacy and support to GoT should

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26 These were initially tents or containers within TACs (later often permanent structures) and then double shifting in existing Turkish schools, where a TEC would typically take the afternoon shift.
27 In 2014, 220,000 Syrians UTP were in designated centres (TACs) while an estimated 800,000 were outside these, living in host communities.
29 UNITED NATIONS IN TURKEY 2015 REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN 2015-16 TURKEY p.4
30 UNICEF, APRIL 2010. CORE COMMITMENTS FOR CHILDREN IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION, NEW YORK, USA: UNICEF.
focus on the long-term future of Syrian children in Turkey, and the inclusion of Syrians UTP in the Turkish education system.

How UNICEF could have employed a radically different strategy from that which they did in the short term, at that particular point in time, is difficult to imagine. The choice was constrained by the political context at the time, the urgency of getting often-traumatised children into education programmes in compliance with HRBA in education and CCCs, and the difficulties experienced by Syrian children trying to register in the Turkish Education system. However, with hindsight, some aspects of the support to TECs could have addressed some pertinent issues, most particularly advocating for the greater inclusion of Turkish language in the curriculum from an early stage. This would have enhanced the relevance of the response by addressing not just the possibility of children staying in Turkey in the longer term (which was not acknowledged by the GoT), but also the ability to survive in the present.

4.1.1 Phase II Recognising medium term needs-2016-17
The 3RP 2016 re-emphasised access for the 400,000 out of school children, sustained access to quality and safe education for all children through formal, non-formal, and informal education programmes, and aimed to improve monitoring and evaluation. In all these aspects, UNICEF support remained relevant, including the development of more robust monitoring system for UNICEF’s own education support, which fed into the monitoring of the 3RPs and other plans such as the UNDCS and UNICEF’s CPD.

During this phase, MoNE provided training for SVEPs with UNICEF support to ensure quality improvement in teaching, as SVEPs had a variety of qualifications, concurrent with other needed inputs such as teaching and learning materials.

4.1.2 Phase III Transition and durable solutions 2017-2019
The 3RP of 2017-2018 called for appropriate alternative pathways in education, “strengthening sector-wide capacity to collect, analyse and utilise relevant data on education”. Therefore, the establishment of YOBIS in 2015 to register Syrian students and record appropriate data, Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALP), and Non Formal Education Programmes (NFE) programmes were relevant responses to the needs of Syrian students and this 3RP.

UNICEF’s response to the 3RP of 2018-2019 addressed one of the overall strategic objectives to scale up support to local authorities, with its work with municipalities, and prior support to Provincial Action Plans. UNICEF’s support to system strengthening is an important contribution to the Durable Solutions Strategy of this Plan.

Until 2017, UNICEF had largely kept pace with the evolving policy context for refugees in education, specifically the needs for standardisation of incentives, provision of non-financial benefits and the Letter of Commitment addressed through the EPMS, and the evolving need to train Turkish teachers for mixed classes as Syrian students were eligible to enrol in schools in the Turkish Education system. However, while enrolment in the Turkish education system had been permitted since 2014, the recent policy of integrating all children into the Turkish education system has created new challenges: for example, large, multilingual and multicultural classes, discussed under Bottlenecks and Barriers in the EFFECTIVENESS section; the SVEPs are to be somehow utilised in the Turkish Public Schools and other education

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40 Sanduvac September 2016.
41 MONC could not verify some claims to qualifications as some Syrians had fled their country without papers.
42 UNITED NATIONS IN TURKEY Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2017-2018 IN RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS TURKEY.UNHCR p.42.
institutions. In this perspective, UNICEF’s work with government on the new roles for SVEPs, and Inclusive Education training is also relevant. The process of integration will take probably two years at least to settle in practice. The Evaluation team observed anxiety on the part of children and SVEPs, low morale in TACs and TECs, and concern on the part of Turkish teachers. However, Students and SVEPs in TPSs where integration has taken place have noted that the second year of implementation has been easier than the first.

The increasing emphasis on resilience in the 3RPs (which included the change in name in 2016, and the two-year timelines of the 3RP), was emphasised in the 3RP of 2017-2018, with an additional objective for education to “support a resilient national education system to facilitate the provision of quality education to refugee and Turkish children and youth”\(^{43}\). Overall, UNICEF is reducing its service provision in the form of supplies (school materials and teaching materials) and increasing its support to alternative learning pathways and systems strengthening (such as learning assessment). All three components under evaluation contribute to resilience as they are both responding to an immediate need and assisting MoNE to develop systems for the longer term.

### 4.1.3 Phase IV Long term strategy and resilience building – 2019 and beyond

In 2019, the three components remain highly relevant to the current plans of the UN and UNICEF as they are addressing current needs. UNDCS 4.1 promotes sustainable services to people under Temporary protection, and UNICEF’s education programme remains relevant in particular to the outcome indicator “% of Syrian children benefitting from education”\(^{44}\). UNICEF is also addressing the other two indicators in the UNDCS: percentage of 5-year-olds in early learning programmes, and divergence in PISA scores between the lowest and highest performers through its work on Quality Education. Draft indicators for the next 3RP 2019-20 have been developed.\(^{45}\)

UNICEF’s new Country Programme is moving towards an inclusive model for all children, Turkish, Syrians and others alike, where refugees are a vulnerable group. It provides an opportunity to address new bottlenecks and barriers created by the integration process and other changes in context. At school level, the whole school approach suggested in the recommendation section should be relevant. Both the CPD and the recommendation are underpinned by the HRBA in education: the right of access to education; the right to quality education; and the right to respect in the learning environment.

### 4.1.4 Relevance by component

**Teachers' incentives**

UNICEF initially recruited SVEPs to staff the emergency response in education. MoNE regularised the situation under the EPMS, as a key element for providing formal education opportunities to Syrian children.\(^{46}\)

UNICEF mobilised funding and set up a system of paying incentives to SVEPs through a tripartite agreement between MoNE, UNICEF and PTT. This was a response to The 3 RP 2015-16, which noted the high turnover of Syrian Volunteer Education Personnel (SVEPs) SVEPs had been supported by other funds prior to this, notably training allowances and some SVEPs had been paid by NGOs, but there was no

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\(^{43}\) UNITED NATIONS IN TURKEY c Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2017-2018 IN RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS TURKEY.UNHCR p39.


\(^{45}\) https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=e+yIRjolNlWY2ZZDlNdcMTAzNC00YmVmlWFk2ZWyitMWE4Ngg3YjY5ZjUihlwidC6lmu1yZm3QTwLY2NjQ1ND E5NC4YTBjLY1DNkMfMfODBibZSlmMDQj9

\(^{46}\) UNICEF, 2019 a. SVEP INCENTIVES FACTS. s.l. s.n.
standardization of payment. The 3RP put emphasis on “greater teacher professionalism and increased retention of volunteer teachers through incentives.” In 2017, the payment levels were linked to the minimum wage and provided to all SVEPs, as had been suggested in the 3RP 2015-2016.

Three aspects of relevance were expressed in KII. Firstly, there was definitely a view that this has been relevant for the education of children. A donor suggested that the incentives programme was highly relevant, another that the engagement of SVEPs had been crucial to getting Syrian children in school, and a donor evaluation recorded the payment of incentives as relevant because the system “stabilises the Syrian teaching staff”. Amongst the UN agencies, one described the incentives programme as “one of the most important things to be done in 2014”.

For one of the donors, the funding provided to UNICEF for this component comes from a Cash for Work fund, under which income for Syrians is of “high relevance”. UN Agencies interviewed also felt that this system created a work opportunity for teachers, supporting their families. Another said the incentives were a good opportunity for job creation and a donor report mentioned that SVEPs “need to survive if not live. They could not work as volunteers indefinitely”.

Despite one UNICEF staff member expressing initial scepticism that “UNICEF doesn’t do incentives”, they acknowledged that the need became clear. Two UNICEF staff members mentioned that not only did the incentives provide remuneration, but also gave dignity and the opportunity for Syrians to contribute to their own people, a view that was echoed by SVEPs themselves. Furthermore, it was stated that employing SVEPs was a good strategy to make Syrian children more comfortable, a view supported by some school principals and students in the field.

From an HRBA perspective, stabilisation of the SVEP cadre is a very relevant strategy, and has enabled Syrian children to have teachers in their own language in TECs, something which could assist children during the process of integration into the Turkish Education System, potentially providing a needed link with language, culture, and psychosocial adaptation as the process of integration progresses.

How SVEPs retain their relevance within the integration process, and in what capacity, is the subject of highly divergent views amongst stakeholders interviewed, and will be discussed further in the Sustainability section.

**Capacity Building – SVEPs**

Focussing on teachers while strengthening mechanisms in the system itself is wholly appropriate given the pivotal role teachers play in the education of the child. All of this was relevant to contextual needs over time.

The professional development of education personnel is seen as providing access and quality education to Syrian children, originally in TECS and latterly increasingly in the Turkish Education System. Professional development spans officials at many levels in the system, but mostly targets teachers. The modality for this strengthening is training. Other mechanisms include the recruitment and selection procedures for

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47 UNITED NATIONS: IN TURKEY 2015, REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN 2015-16 TURKEY p.44
48 UNITED NATIONS IN TURKEY 2015 op. cit
50 EUROPEAN UNION, n.d., Monitoring Question report for the ROM of MADAD I: EU Trust Fund - Support to the No Lost Generation Initiative in Turkey p.2
SVEPs, and the Code of Conduct (now the Letter of Commitment), which have undergone revision as the response evolves.

In 2015-16, more emphasis was put on “greater teacher professionalism”\(^\text{51}\) and while emergency, provincial level training had happened in 2013, it was in 2016-17 that SVEPs completed more professional training, in line with the number of hours and topics in Turkish teacher training.

The component achieved wide coverage, and ensured that every SVEP received the training. Furthermore SVEPs are deployed in the 23 Provinces and municipalities where the concentration of the Syrian population is greatest, thus benefitting the most children.

SVEPs have changing roles in Turkish Public schools, in which they do not currently teach classes in subjects, though some are utilised to provide support and remedial tutoring in subject areas. Their previous training would be only partially relevant for their new roles and thus the relevance of their previous training in the current environment much diminished. The new roles undertaken by SVEPs will produce new training needs.

**Capacity building – Turkish teachers**

As policy has shifted to include Syrian students in the Turkish Education System, UNICEF worked with MoNE to support Turkish teachers who had high numbers of Syrian students in their classrooms. This is a very relevant shift in strategy but including all Turkish teachers may take time.

Given the pivotal role of the school administration and teachers, the decision to focus on teachers as a means to providing and enhancing quality of education for Syrian children, was a very relevant intervention.

**YOBIS**

The launching of YOBIS in early 2015 responded to the indicator in UNICEF’s CPD “Availability of data on vulnerable students from education management information systems (EMIS)”\(^\text{52}\). As one respondent mentioned, it contributed to the right of Syrian students not to be excluded.

Some stakeholders in the system at provincial and school level consider YOBIS to be less relevant now that students are registered in the Turkish Education System. However, YOBIS is still relevant for the Syrian child who is a newcomer or is not fully registered in E-okul. Students (regardless of their nationality) enrolled in the Turkish Education System should be registered in E-okul, as long as they have a MERNIS registration (as per Turkish Educational system, and National Education Law requirements) but those who do not, or cannot, have a UTP ID and can be registered in Turkish Public Schools through YOBIS as YOBIS generates an automatic school ID. YOBIS continues to maintain its relevance by providing the demographic and attendance data needed to pay incentives to SVEPs, and attendance data of children eligible for the CCTE support. The data in YOBIS is gender disaggregated.

**Gender**

It is not clear how UNICEF has identified the differentiated needs of girls and boys for planning in the three components. There is a gender analysis in the TOC for girls’ secondary education (UNICEF 2017g) which relates to issues of curriculum and textbooks. Studies that exist highlight the needs of boys and girls to access learning and quality of education. The evaluation team acknowledges the fact that access and quality are interrelated, but UNICEF needs to investigate further gender-related aspects of quality.

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\(^{51}\) UNITED NATIONS IN TURKEY 2015 REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN 2015-16 TURKEY p.44

education, (for example teacher behaviour towards girls and boys) if these components are to improve their relevance to this issue.

### 4.1.5 Conclusions

According to MoNE “UNICEF support was definitely in the right areas....UNICEF established for itself a very good role in Training and also in other departments”

The evaluation team concludes that all three components, as part of a broader education response, were highly relevant to the context and to the overall response articulated through the 3RPs, UNDCS and CPD, whose design of course they were involved in. The components also evolved with the changing context, and although the HRBA framework is not always well articulated in TOCS, UNICEF has incorporated HRBA throughout.

UNICEF has helped to develop each component with its support and advocacy, recognising the immediate needs, the medium-term nature of the issue and also focusing on system strengthening: the YOBIS system has evolved and from an HRBA perspective there are still new arrivals and children not formally registered, leading to the continuing need to address their short-term as well as the long-term issues. Re SVEP incentives, the level of payment has kept pace with the minimum wage, and has recognised the need to address non-financial remuneration. Moving from emergency, localised training of SVEPs to training more aligned to standards of the Turkish system has also responded to the need over time for improvements to quality education and to certifying SVEPs.

Though perhaps somewhat outside the scope of this evaluation, it is noted that not enough was done to include Turkish language teaching to Syrian students and parents from the start. This could have alleviated some of the current stresses of children integrating and of their parents, and is a lesson to be learned. It also emerged as a need in the findings related to the effectiveness of training, in the next section.
4.2 Effectiveness

Annex 15 contains an analysis of variance between achieved and target value. Table 6 presents summary information on the variance, which provides a compact indication of the extent to which the components, YOBIS, the SVEP incentives programme, and Professional Development have achieved their results. The first column, labelled variance against 2018 targets, show the extent to which UNICEF has over or under-achieved its 2015 target. A positive percentage variance means UNICEF has over-achieved against its target by that percentage. Contrariwise, a negative percentage means UNICEF under-achieved by that percentage. Values are all expressed as percentages of the target to allow a better comparison of performance across components. The third column, labelled variance against baseline, shows the extent to which UNICEF has improved against the baseline value. It shows that UNICEF might have improved substantially against baseline, even in cases where UNICEF underachieved against its targets (perhaps because the targets were over-ambitious).

The programme has achieved positive progress against the baseline value of all indicators, especially in terms of the number of additional Syrians enrolled in school. In 2018, it was, however, lagging behind its outcome target value for the % of total Syrian children in school by 11%. The programme has achieved its targets for all indicators, with the exception of the number of female educational personnel trained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Variance against 2018 target</th>
<th>Variance against baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong> - Percentage of Syrian children in Turkey accessing approved and monitored education services</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>+78.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1A 1</strong> - School-aged children and adolescents in affected areas back in school after interruption or newly enrolled since the emergency</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>+200.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1A 2</strong> - Number of SVEPs operating under the “Management strategy for education personnel” providing services to children under temporary protection (by MTR)</td>
<td>+0.0%</td>
<td>+49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1B 2 – combined</strong> - Number of educational personnel trained</td>
<td>+5.6%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1B 2 - Number of educational personnel trained - female</strong></td>
<td>-4.1%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1B 2 - Number of educational personnel trained - male</strong></td>
<td>+15.4%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is easier to evaluate the specific contribution of these three components to the outputs rather than the overall outcome. During the period under evaluation, UNICEF has supported MoNE with a package of interventions including school construction, educational materials, stationery and school bags, and outreach exercises, as well as the components under the EPMS and YOBIS, and the CCTE programme. This package has served to increase enrolment in the formal education system, and MoNE, with the support of UNICEF (and other partners) has increased enrolment as shown in Figure 2.

UNICEF has worked on both the supply-side and demand side of education. It continues to conduct Back to School Campaigns on an annual basis, and communicates to parents and schools through its monitoring visits. It has recently increased its support for capacity-building of Turkish teachers, investment in SVEPs’ capacity, assistance to students learning Turkish in PECs, and Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALP) for
those who have missed schooling. These have provided opportunities to those not ready for the formal system and all these interventions have contributed to the increase of Syrians in the formal school system and are synergistic.

Moving forward, effectiveness needs to be evaluated in relation to the changing context of Turkey and the Syrian students within it, the main change being that of integrating all students into the Turkish Education system, a process which has been ongoing but has recently accelerated. Aspects of the process communicated to the Evaluation team are mentioned below.

4.2.1 **Integration of Syrian children into the National Education System**

It is noted that being in the Turkish Education System has several advantages for Syrian children in the form of a better quality of education, better supplies and is a more durable solution to their education, which is then certified. Children mentioned the better discipline and structure which moving to the Turkish education system also brought.

However, during the field data gathering, the Evaluation team encountered a mood of uncertainty and anxiety on the part of many SVEPs, Turkish teachers, and Syrian children, due to the integration process itself. Children commented on a decrease in quality in TECs over the last two years, (due to the TECs closing down) which was demotivating.

7 FGDs with Syrian children (out of a total of 10) mentioned this aspect and its contributing factors:

- Grouping TECs as they closed (4), sometimes leading to larger classes;
- Management less organized and careless about attendance (4) and discipline and there was a feeling that TECs were only temporary and about to be closed;
- No homework, and teaching quality decreased due to change in teachers (1 TAC);
- Quality dropped in the last years because of changing SVEPs (2);
- Number of students is high and there is not enough stationery (2);
- Students grouped by age not level (1);
- Lack of teaching and learning materials (3);
- 2 FGDs mentioned that there were no textbooks and that pupils were required to buy other texts

The changing balance in the curriculum with Turkish lessons occupying 50% of the lesson time in TECs was causing concern amongst students who felt that the decreased time for their other subjects was impeding their ability to pass exams.

Parents also supported many of these perceptions (number of parents’ FGDs 3/13 total):

- Lack of seriousness in TECs, they are temporary and the main aim is for children to learn Turkish (2);
- Lack of monitoring and supervision (3);
- Students not asked to do homework (3);
- Grouping in classes by age not level (3);
- Teaching aids and tools not very available (1).

11 FGDs of SVEPs (out of 18) confirmed the lack of sufficient teaching materials or textbooks, when they were or are still teaching in TECs; in 1 that there were no textbooks at all. In the budget outlined for UNICEF in the 3RP (2017-2019),\textsuperscript{53} Output 2.2 3RP assumes that the average life of a textbook is 3 years.

\textsuperscript{53} UNICEF TURKEY COUNTRY OFFICE 3RP (2017-2019) UNICEF SUMMARY BUDGETS AND TARGETS
That is probably why it includes a budget for it in 2018, but not the two subsequent years. However, the reported absence of textbooks by children and SVEPs is of concern.

Due to the integration process, TECs were sometimes grouped together after certain grades shifted, which resulted in SVEPs and children being moved. UNICEF reported in 2017 that while 79.74% of SVEPs were still at the same TEC, 20.26% were not. Children in one FGD reported that the fact that their teachers were changing regularly (Turkish as well as SVEPs) made it difficult for students to cope with each teacher’s style. No claim of generalisation is being made but for children with new teachers this has been a reality from 2017 and from an HRBA point of view, their perspectives cannot be ignored. One school Principal, empathizing with the Syrian students, regretted that students have been twice displaced, once from Syria and again from TECs into the Turkish Education System, (but acknowledged that there had been no easy solution to this issue).

The integration of Syrian students into the Turkish education system has changed many things including the role of SVEPs as they move to TPSs or other educational institutions. SVEPs expressed their frustration at not being able to teach in the Turkish Public schools (11 FGDs) and with their relocation, often incurring extra expense as they moved out of TACs, which were closing, or were allocated schools further from their residences. This will be explored further in the SUSTAINABILITY section.

4.2.2 SVEP INCENTIVES

SVEPs have been an effective input to the education of Syrian children UTP according to many stakeholders interviewed, and according to one “we cannot ignore the good work SVEPs have done”.

The Basic Programme Planning Framework for the SVEP incentives programme explains the expected outcomes for this component: “UNICEF’s teacher incentives programme aims to retain qualified Syrian volunteer education personnel (SVEP), improve their capacity, morale and motivation in the classroom, and prevent them and their families from resorting to negative coping mechanisms (such as sending their own children into early marriage or the labour market) – thereby promoting a safe and protective learning environment for Syrian children in Turkey.”

This is an ambitious aim, and evaluating some of these objectives, such as the objective of preventing negative coping mechanisms, is beyond the scope of this exercise.

In terms of results against targets, the implementation of the SVEP incentives payment fully met its targets over time, covering all the operational SVEPs by December 2017. As of May 2019 there were 12,507 SVEPs (5,859 males, and 6,648 females) in post and receiving incentives.

It is estimated that this has impacted a total of 253,009 Syrian children.

There was widespread agreement, especially from school principals, that the SVEP incentives served to stabilise the cadre of SVEPs. All 18 FGDs with SVEPs identified the incentive as one reason why the SVEPs would stay in the job (though there were also other reasons). For example, according to SVEPs in one province “Almost all SVEPs preferred to stay here because it is the job that they like, the working hours are few and the payment is regular and easy to collect. Working in factories is difficult and very long, unlike teaching here.”

54 UNICEF, a n.d.-Basic Planning and Results Framework p.2
56 UNICEF 2019 a SVEP incentives facts
57 While the number of children in TECs is known, it can only be estimated for those in TPSs, as they are registered in E-okul
59 Summary of FGDs.
According to UNICEF during a KII, the attendance of SVEPs at work increased after the introduction of the incentive scheme, as there is an attendance requirement described in the Letter of Commitment. MoNE has the right to dismiss any SVEPs who do not abide by the Letter of Commitment.

The attendance requirement initially resulted in a few negative outcomes as was reported in one donor monitoring report in 2016: “teachers were only paid when they were working and so rarely took leave, working all summer (e.g. catch-up sessions, informal education, planning).” There was a gender dimension—Pregnant women were close to give birth in the schools, and came back for work the day after delivery to keep their wages and not to risk being definitively replaced by another teacher during their leave.60

UNICEF and MoNE responded quickly to this and developed “non-financial entitlements” such as leave, which would serve to offset the low level of incentive payment, and which now form part of the Letter of Commitment. SVEPs also requested that insurance be added to their package, but this was not met. UNICEF’s monitoring process investigated how far these entitlements61 were utilised. During the school visits in May 2018, 38.3% of the SVEPs (163 out of a sample of 474) mentioned that they had used their leave, and 61.7% (263 out of 474) that they had not. 83.27% of the SVEPs who had not cited the reason as “I did not need them, while 10 SVEPs stated that they were not allowed to take leave.62

During this evaluation, SVEPs in 5 TPS and 2 TECs reported that the conditions at their place of work were not conducive to claiming these benefits, so they were rarely used. As the above monitoring report acknowledges, this needs to be further investigated.

2 principals (1 TEC, 1 TPS) reported that SVEPs had other jobs as they needed to support their families, and they thought this was widespread. One school principal reported that it was difficult to schedule any meetings because SVEPs disappeared quickly to other work after school. Because of this, they felt that the incentives had not increased their motivation.

It is not surprising that the level of incentive is often uppermost in the minds of SVEPs. As one school principal put it, and as is recognised as one theory of motivation, on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, SVEPs were at the base, trying to satisfy basic needs of food and shelter.63 The amount of the incentive was raised as an issue in all FGDs with SVEPs.

In 2017, MoNE (through UNICEF advocacy) agreed to align the level of the incentive to the minimum wage. However, there is a delay between the rise in the minimum wage (January) and the rise in the incentives (usually July). UNICEF explained that this is due to the process whereby UNICEF needs to receive a request

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61 Paid leaves that the SVEP are entitled to are sick, maternity and emergency leaves. SVEP use leave based on their needs.
63 Other theories of motivation include: a differentiation between “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” motivation, (extrinsic being those such as payment and intrinsic being those such as love of children) and that the more intrinsic factors being present the greater the likelihood of them completing their duties because of a personal sense of satisfaction (Frederick Hersberg’s two factor theory); Ring and West who focused on emergency settings concluded that motivational factors were the following:-(1) Teacher recruitment, selection, and deployment; (2) The teaching environment; (3) Certification; (4) Professional development; (5) Incentives; (6) Management structures; and (7) Status and social recognition. All these theories are well described in Koomen, S, August 2017 cited in the bibliography.
from MoNE to increase the amount of the incentive. This delay creates anxiety and is clearly one of a number of processes and issues serving to demotivate SVEPs at the current time.\textsuperscript{64}

In addition to payment, there are also other motivating factors (and it is well recognised that high motivation is due to several factors, not one alone)\textsuperscript{65}. In terms of non-financial motivation, the picture is somewhat more complex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for SVEP motivation</th>
<th>NO of SVEP FGDs in which mentioned\textsuperscript{66}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular salary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability in work</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope to get a teaching job</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our students need us</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn a new language</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching jobs are not available elsewhere (and we want to teach)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like the job</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t just sit at home and do nothing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7** SVEPs reported the following reasons why they are motivated:

SVEPs reported that the only other options for teaching were in International Schools, for which teachers need a high level of English, and in private schools. (However, teaching jobs might be available for those SVEPs who have the correct qualifications). One SVEP reported that if they could find a higher salary in another teaching job they would go. Other job options were not liked e.g. “Working in factories is difficult and very long unlike teaching here.” Yet another group mentioned the short hours as motivation, though in another they thought they were too long.

Not being able to teach in the Turkish Education system in the same way as in TECs or being surplus to requirements in TECs with too many SVEPs is a considerable source of frustration to SVEPs. This was mentioned in SVEP FGDs in 6 TPS, one PEC and one TEC. Furthermore, in 2 TECs SVEPs mentioned that students do not respect them because they know that they will not be teaching next year. This decreasing respect was mentioned also in the TPSs, undermining their dignity and contribution to the development of Syrian students. One school principal mentioned that if their roles are well articulated and they are included in social activities, they feel happy and appreciated. Two others mentioned that SVEPs would be happy if they could teach, though some are enjoying their new roles.

\textsuperscript{64} During the report writing phase, the rise in the minimum wage level to 2,020 TL has been applied to the monthly incentive and SVEPs have started receiving their raised monthly incentives as of July 2019

\textsuperscript{65} A study comparing Host country teachers and Syrian refugee teachers in Lebanon discusses the very same issue (Koomen, S, August 2017)

\textsuperscript{66} Out of 21 SVEP Focus group Discussions. One group would have mentioned more than one item.
SVEPs raised other factors echoed by global research on teachers’ motivation, and which are described in the EPMS. One is the availability of tools to do their job (materials). Another is the support and interest of the wider system-supervision. The felt lack of these is described above.67

SVEPs also had ideas on what other things could motivate them, such as having loans to purchase computers and free advanced Turkish language lessons. Turkish teachers and one PDoNE suggested that SVEPs could earn points for extra responsibilities, such as organising clubs. This is a system often used for a salary increment but in this case, where SVEPs are not getting a salary it is not a realistic suggestion. According to the principal of 1 TPS, motivation comes from treating SVEPs well.

### 4.2.3 Operational Effectiveness

Satisfaction with the payment system from field respondents was high. They reported that the system is easy to use, each SVEP having a card against which they can withdraw their incentive.

There have been a few issues with implementation, such as non-receipt of incentives in a few cases in the early stages. However, these have been very quickly rectified. There is also an effective monitoring system, which uses SMS technology (Rapidpro Surveys) with follow-up school visits, which verify that SVEPs have received their incentives, confirms the continuation of individual SVEPs in their posts, and provides the data to sort out any issues arising.68 The evaluation team did not encounter any recent instances of non-payment.

This is consistent with UNICEF’s own Monitoring exercise which also found that all SVEPS in their samples were receiving their incentive payments.69 985 in October 2018 and 983 in November 2018, along with 596 in February 2019 confirmed receipt of incentives. The same exercise found no irregularities.

### 4.2.4 Capacity Building (Training)

MoNE, with UNICEF support, has achieved the targets for training of SVEPs and Turkish teachers set out in the 3 RP and CPD, which specified that “13,000 (all SVEPs currently working are trained).” 18,616 SVEPs were trained, of which 12,725 were prepared for certification through a pedagogical formation training.70

The monitoring report (Phase II) reported that “Overall, more than 70% of respondents (both male and female) report that they currently use the knowledge and skills learnt in previous training in their teaching”. Both UNICEF monitoring and the Evaluation exercises concurred that this was largely related to the length of experience of the teacher, the younger benefitting more (younger females in the case of the monitoring exercise) but also those with more than 10 years of experience.

In the Evaluation exercise there was a comment that this served as refresher training. There were also comments that some did not learn anything new and had learned these subjects in Syria in teacher training workshops.

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67 MONE 2014 EPMS
68 UNICEF November 2018
70 18,165 volunteer Syrian teachers certified, while also 19,776 SVEPs and their trainers received a pedagogical formation training covering: classroom management (e.g. positive discipline); student learning, evaluation and assessment, and counselling and education psychology (including PSS). 18,165 of these teachers were certified after passing the written exam. (p. 18). According to the UNICEF’s Annual Report of 2017 13,537 of the above number received a third and final phase of training, and 94% passed the written exam and received certificates.”
training. This may be because some trainings were offered to align the qualification of SVEPs with Turkish teacher qualifications.

Both UNICEF’S monitoring and the Evaluation exercise have relied on self-reporting. It also needs to be mentioned that the evaluation exercise was conducted two years after the completion of all the SVEP training, so recall may be a problem.

Evaluating the Professional Development of teachers against the Outputs and Outcomes of UNICEF CPD is difficult because there is little or no data on how teacher performance improved in the TECs or schools as a result of the training. The Turkish system of education has a supervision system, which does not cover SVEPs. The impact of the training on student learning outcomes can only be directly observed using longitudinal observations of student learning in the classroom. This has not been done neither during the training period nor during the period of this evaluation, but satisfaction with training has been evaluated using alternative methodologies. In light of a lack of an assessment system for Syrian students UTP (though UNICEF is now supporting this development) and no baseline on performance in the classroom or school, it would also be difficult to assess whether the training was responsible for any changes in teacher performance or learning outcomes (attribution). It is understood that this is outside the control of UNICEF.

When questioned, neither provincial MoNEs nor school Directors/principals themselves observed or reported on the performance of teachers in the classroom in relation to the SVEP training. There were exceptions to this, from 1 PDoNE and 2 school principals, both of whom routinely visited their classrooms and noted improvements.

As mentioned in the Evaluation Methodology section, the FGD included a question on the modules most helpful after the training, and a follow-up question on what “I might observe if I came into your classroom”.

FGDs reported that the most useful modules to practice in the classroom (number of focus groups) were special education (8), teaching methodologies and classroom management (7), Turkish education system (7), and psychosocial guidance (7). SVEPs were very positive about these.

However, SVEPs in 10 of the 18 (55%) Focus groups mentioned that there was no change in their practices or the modules were not useful. The majority (6) were in TPSs, which perhaps relates to their non-teaching roles. These results can only be indicative, but it was noted that Turkish teachers felt that SVEPs needed more education on the Turkish school system and what was expected of them particularly in relation to discipline, and not using corporal punishment.

A recent study illustrates the difficulty Syrian teachers had inside Syria teaching in the classroom without support. As SVEPs come from the same system and share the teaching culture, this would underline the need for supervision and support. A wide-scale analysis of teacher practice in Northern Syria carried out by Integrity Global found that in order to implement new practices, teachers needed extra support to “translate willingness into action”. It quoted examples of participatory methodologies and good practices related to socio-emotional well-being, and stated that only 38 per cent of teachers often or always witnessed their colleagues using participatory methodologies, and only 56 per cent of school administrators screened children for special needs.”

The current evaluation exercise has asked questions on various aspects of the trainings received. The results are shown in Figure 3, which includes both Turkish and SVEPs.

71 Integrity Global 2019
The results from this evaluation are not statistically significant. However, they largely concur with the monitoring findings, which reported concern on the quality of the trainers, the need for incorporation of more practical and activity-based modules, as well as instructional interaction, the learning environment and assessment. This concurs with the feedback obtained by the Evaluation team that:

- more practical methods need to be used and
- trainers were sometimes not qualified.

“Overall, the monitoring findings demonstrate that the programme is perceived to be useful and effective by the majority of the participants.” 72 Any divergence from this found by the Evaluation team is probably because of the current uncertainty and change of role.

The evaluation team found some evidence that feedback from SVEPs was acted upon. In two SVEP focus groups, the participants mentioned that the third training had included practical exercises, which they felt were very useful, indicating that feedback from the previous trainings were taken into account for subsequent trainings. UNICEF also reports that feedback on the length of the day resulted in a reduction of daily hours to the extent that one extra day was added.

In terms of further professional development needs, both the monitoring report and the Evaluation exercise concurred. In the latter, the extra needs included Turkish language for teachers and IT. The monitoring report provided more detail: “the most frequently cited professional development need was training on protection issues, such as child psychology, special education, psychosocial support, counselling, and social cohesion (18% of respondents). Other needs identified included Turkish language skills for the SVEPs (16.5%), general information technology (IT) skills (13.9%), subject-specific training courses, and level-specific training courses (7.2%). 4.6% of respondents also emphasized they needed more training on teaching methods as well as practical rather than theoretical training and felt that more activity-based training was critical for effectiveness.”73 It recommended that the third round “should focus on child protection issues, Turkish language skills, IT courses, teaching methods and specialized subject

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73 Ibid., p.14
and grade level courses. Particularly, revised modules for Special Education and Counselling should be integrated into the third round.”

Despite the feedback, neither IT nor Turkish language featured in the subsequent, third, training. Clearly, IT was an important issue and was mentioned across the range of stakeholders interviewed in the Evaluation exercise. PDoNE, school principals and parents expressed the desire that Syrian children should have equal access to the benefits of technology as Turkish children. While not under UNICEF’s control, MoNE was the ultimate decision maker in terms of what topics and modules were included in all phases of the teacher training, it should be noted that these are key life skills. Both of these potentially provide access to knowledge and opportunities. Lack of them in the Turkish society can constitute a source of inequity.

In one TAC it was noted that a volunteer from the Syrian community was teaching IT at the TEC. He had tried several times unsuccessfully to apply for the incentive scheme, so was continuing as a true volunteer. This is an excellent example of Syrians themselves addressing one of their own perceived needs.

**Turkish Teacher Training**

In 2014, UNICEF highlighted the limitations of the Turkish Teacher training system. In particular, “Teachers’ training does not equip them to work in difficult environments – for example, in rural schools where children of different age groups study together, or in schools with large numbers of children from disadvantaged backgrounds, including children who do not have Turkish as their first language, or in classes practicing inclusive education for children with disabilities”.

Consequently, it was felt that Turkish teachers were ill-equipped to manage their classes and schools with a large numbers of Syrian students.

In 2017, 107,938 Turkish teachers trained in inclusive education, “to enhance their capacity to support refugee children in Turkish public schools by promoting social cohesion and supporting the children’s academic and psychosocial needs.” By December 2018, 154,451 teachers and school administrators (70,121 women and 84,330 men) in all 81 provinces had received this training.

Additionally, the module in Inclusive Education has become one of the 145 modules offered under the Turkish Teacher “In-service education system” (however these are voluntarily taken up), in line with the indicator in the UNICEF Turkey Results And Resources Matrix 2018: “By 2020, Pre- and in-service teacher training programmes incorporate components on inclusive education that are in line with international good practices”. This is a significant achievement.

According to the monitoring report, roughly 50% of respondents to the survey felt that the training was useful. Those in provinces where the number of Syrian children in the Turkish Education System was low, felt that the training might be useful in future. Feedback gained during the evaluation team’s field exercise cannot be quantified or generalized, and it was unclear whether they were referring to the Inclusive education training supported by UNICEF or PIKTES. In view of this, only their suggestions, which were very

24 Ibid p.17
75 (REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION Directorate General for Teacher Training and Development Program of the 3rd Training of the Syrian Teachers Who Work/Will Work at the Temporary Education Centres--İNGİLİZCE_VERSİYON_EK-2_Eğitim İçeri@).
77 This began later than planned because of the security situation, UNICEF 2017 Country Office Annual Report.
80 UNICEF TURKEY, 2018 c. *Turkey Results and Resources Matrix 2018 dd.05.02.2018* s.l.:s.n.
constructive, will be reported. These are not necessarily related to their training, but could form the basis for exchanges at training sessions. Suggestions included:

- sessions where Syrian and Turkish children and teachers get to know each other to reduce prejudice; understanding the differences between the Syrian and Turkish education systems; more materials for the students learning Turkish;
- Turkish lessons for parents so that they can interact more with the school and vice versa.

Through the UNICEF monitoring exercise Turkish teachers expressed the needs of teaching classes which have increasingly included children from various origins, especially Syrian UTPs. These were expressed as follows: need to improve their skills in the children’s mother tongue; that children need a certain competency in Turkish language before joining the class; that communication channels with parents need improvement; and that the psychological well-being of students was important. This has been substantiated this during the evaluation. Turkish teachers mentioned the need to learn techniques to manage large classes, teach students whose mother tongue is not Turkish, and deal with psychosocial issues, including disruptive behaviour. Similar to the feedback on SVEP training, teachers expressed the need for more materials, in this case including, but not necessarily limited to, language teaching and learning.

**YOBIS**

YOBIS has achieved its objectives. Around 600,000 children have been registered in YOBIS allowing them to be registered in schools in 2019 (TECs and TPSs). The data contains breakdown by age, level, and gender—all crucial for appropriate planning of education opportunities. From a rights-based perspective, this is a significant achievement. Children UTPs also progressed through various forms of education, emerging with their reports for the next phase. The system was deliberately designed to be able to communicate with E-okul, so students have easily transferred to the official system once they have their registration. YOBIS also still exists to meet the need of new children entering Turkey and those yet without registration.

In addition, the system holds data on SVEP characteristics and attendance, and has enabled the incentives to be paid in a very timely manner. Records of student attendance have enabled CCTE payments.

### 4.2.5 Operational effectiveness

The development of YOBIS began in September 2014. YOBIS became operational in early 2015 along with the Education Personnel Management Strategy of MoNE, supported by UNICEF.

By September 2015, 70% of student data had already been entered in the system. All features were used for the 2015-2016 school year, and initial training was conducted for MoNE Provincial IT focal points in

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81 The current evaluation exercise collected information on the differences between the Turkish and Syrian education systems, expressed by SVEPs. It is not known whether this formed part of needs analysis for either training, but it did signal the need to take into account the background of SVEPs when planning training for both groups, and to incorporate sessions where the two groups actually share these differences, for the benefit of mutual understanding.

82 In 1 TPS teachers reported that they were given a list of 300 Syrian students to register in one day.

83 UNICEF n.d Turkish Teacher Training Phase II-Monitoring report.

In 2015, 63% of MoNE Coordinators reported that, when the school year is open, they use YOBIS every day. Issues were reported during the early implementation of the system, such as power supply, slowness of the system, which UNICEF’s own monitoring visits during 2015 also highlighted: infrastructure (electricity, internet and hardware), user practices, and user roles. UNICEF designed the visits to identify bugs in the software as well as identify needs for the further development of YOBIS.

This feedback enabled problems to be fixed quickly. However, it was also reported by SVEPs (in a TAC) that the system was too slow at the end of the year when they were trying to complete reports.

MoNE conducted the training for users of YOBIS together with UNICEF in April 2018. The training reached a total of 400 MoNE TEC Coordinators and provincial level MoNE participants from 22 provinces. Further YOBIS training was carried out in November 2018, for officials from Provincial Directorate of National Education working in 58 provinces, completing training for all 81 Provinces in Turkey.

In April 2019, another YOBIS workshop was to be planned for Provincial MoNE staff to address new developments such as the new version of YOBIS and a new field on OOSC.

In the field, the evaluation team met users of the system who had not been trained, but the team often heard that even with no training, at least one official in each institution could use the system, and if there were problems, they either found the solution from a colleague in a neighbouring school, or could telephone MoNE directly. In every province there is apparently one designated YOBIS Provincial Coordinator in Lifelong Learning departments of PDoNEs as well as at central level, using email, telephone, and WhatsApp groups as channels of communication.

4.2.6 Gender

The three components have made efforts to address gender. YOBIS incorporated gender disaggregation into its software and set the standard for all education data. The SVEP incentives programmes retained the proportion of female SVEPs receiving incentives as 53% over the years. As of May 2019, there were 12,507 SVEPs (5,859 males, and 6,648 females) in post and receiving incentives. As there were more female SVEPs than males, 53% as compared with almost 47%, this also put money into the hands of more women.

Training of SVEPs has shown a similar pattern. The second round of SVEP training covered 10,201 female or 54.8%, and 8,415 male or 45.2%. The eventual number of female SVEPs being consistently around 53% of the total has ensured a more than equal distribution of professional benefits (in this case access to training) in favour of women.

The evaluation team did not have the resources to analyse the responses by gender of teachers and furthermore the sample was too small for the findings to be significant. However, UNICEF’s own monitoring exercises were able to do this, and explored any differences in response by gender and age. One observation is a welcome indication of analysis, which goes beyond numbers: the report noted less positive perceptions by male over female SVEPs of the trainers. Given the balance of female trainers, it was suggested that this might reflect social norms amongst the group. In response to greater gender awareness, in 2018, MoNE (with UNICEF support) trained a total of 575 teachers and school...

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85 UNICEF 2015 Foreign Student Education Information Management System” (YOBIS) Information Note (TUR YOBIS INFO NOTE for UN Agencies).
86 UNICEF 2015
87 UNICEF and SVEP Training Report phase II
administrators (218 women and 357 men) in gender equality. Aspects of this included gender-specific guidance materials for use in Grade 9. A gender equality package was implemented in an initial 162 secondary schools in all 81 provinces.

The first two trainings of Turkish teachers showed participation in favour of females, but by the end of 2018, the benefits were in favour of males with 84,330 males and 70,121 females.\(^{89}\)

There is little deep analysis of gender differences and needs of Syrian students available. What does exist is largely a description of barriers to access, such as safety and distance from school, early marriage, and the desire for separate classes for girls. One exception to this is the finding that girls and boys manifest trauma differently, girls withdrawing and boys becoming aggressive.\(^{90}\) While the training component for both SVEPS and Turkish teachers has included the management of psychosocial issues, it is not clear if the module focused on this aspect of differentiated need of boys and girls. The TOC on Secondary education for girls mentions the lack of gender awareness in education personnel.

It is widely noted that girls (as well as all Syrian children) are not participating strongly in secondary education, reflecting the Turkish situation also, but at a more chronic level. Boys often have to work rather than attend school at the upper levels, and girls are vulnerable to early and forced marriage as a way of alleviating the burden on a family. This situation will persist as coping strategies for the family. From 2016, UNICEF has put an emphasis on girls’ education in secondary school, through communication activities with parents to put importance on education, and to ensure that teachers understand and practice gender sensitivity in the classroom and school. A list of components to include is to be found in the Light Gender Analysis, section 8, and would be a useful component of a whole school approach suggested in the recommendations.

### 4.2.7 Contribution to policy and unexpected consequences

As these have been discussed in the narrative already, they will be mentioned here in brief points (some are also captured in Lessons Learned):

- The engagement of SVEPs as an emergency measure to fulfil the CCCs led to an expansion of the cadre to fulfil medium-term educational needs of Syrian children UTP
- The establishment and development of the EPMS has helped to provide administrative support to the deployment and engagement of SVEPs, and has become the main government instrument. The establishment of the SVEPs EPMS working group to take the issue forward in the context of integration was largely due to UNICEF’s monitoring process, which highlighted issues, leading to the formation of new proposals.
- The Payment of SVEP incentives constitutes one of the largest livelihood programmes in Turkey and was the first model of its kind, later used by other agencies.
- The Development of an information system for foreign students (YOBIS) has proved its use across interventions, such as CCTE, teacher incentive payments, and ALPs.
- The development of Inclusive Education training has become one of the in-service training modules offered by MoNE to its teachers.

\(^{89}\) The balance in favour of males is assumed to be the preponderance of males in administrative roles, as the swing is quite stark after the second training when administrators were included, but the team has no evidence for this.

\(^{90}\) Kılıç, G. & Özkor, D., 2019. Research Report on the Education of Syrian Children. Istanbul: Mavi Kalem. There are some recommendations for further research and analysis in the Light Gender Analysis 2016, these are beyond the scope of this exercise.
Leadership and coordination in the sector has helped to streamline interventions and maximize the use of funds.

UNICEF has contributed to the advocacy for integration of Syrian children UTP into the Turkish education system. UNHCR was doing this even in 2014, following the development and publication of its policy on durable solutions and its Education Strategy 2012-2016 (UNHCR 2012).

4.2.8 Bottlenecks and barriers

Articulation of bottlenecks and barriers appear in several places in UNICEF documentation. The bottlenecks are variously related to access, attendance, and learning more generally. The TOCs developed in 2016-17 defined those more closely than had been done in early strategy papers, but before the acceleration of the integration process.91

We present here the list of bottlenecks:

- Insufficient education provision
- Registration difficulties
- Not enough opportunities for non-formal and informal education or other social and educational activities (particularly affecting older children who are most likely not to be enrolled or attending)
- Exclusive use of Turkish as a language of instruction
- Lack of age-related education materials and methods in multi-age classes
- Poor quality of education
- The nature of examinations and problems experienced during the transition from one level of education to the next
- Discouragement, discrimination and harassment

We present here some barriers to accessing education:

- Poverty, resulting in child labour, or forced marriage92
- Linguistic and cultural issues
- Bullying
- The preference for single-sex classes for girls
- The reluctance of older children to sit in class with younger ones

YOBIS addressed gaps in the registration system. SVEPs and the Professional Development of teachers have attempted to address the issue of poor quality of education. The TOC in Quality of Education suggests that poor quality is prevalent in both the Turkish system (students having failed to perform well in either PISA or TIMMS) and in TECS. UNICEF noted that there are “Gaps in teacher quality and education personnel’s capacity to cater for different needs and to facilitate inclusion”.93 The TOC specifically mentions the limited number of school counsellors adequately specialized, and the limitations of the

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92 According to UNICEF, 98% of girls who are married or engaged do not attend school UNICEF TURKEY January 2019. The Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) estimates that 15 per cent of Syrian refugee children between the ages of 15-18 years were married in 2014, while a recent survey shows that more than half of the participants’ age at marriage was below the age of 18 years.35 NLG 2019 P.6.

teacher professional development system in content and delivery for inclusive education. UNICEF notes additional issues with quality, including in the TECs and describes them as.\textsuperscript{94}

- Lack of child-centredness
- Gender bias of teaching and educational materials
- The sufficiency of the curriculum and extra-curricular activities for allowing each child to develop to her or his full potential;
- The relevance and ideological content of education, including the adequacy of vocational and technical education and the growing role of religious schools, classes and organisations
- The child-friendliness of school environments including incidence of violence and inadequate participation mechanisms.

Several recent studies have re-evaluated the bottlenecks and barriers facing Syrian children in education. Each study has its own emphasis, either for access and attendance,\textsuperscript{95} or needs assessment for investigating the need for more psychosocial support)\textsuperscript{96}. In some cases, the data has yielded similar results, especially the need for Turkish language proficiency by students and SVEPs, and psychosocial support.

During the fieldwork, the Evaluation team noted that some factors were more obvious in some provinces in the schools they visited. This is not to be generalised, but for example, the issue of older children finding it harder to learn Turkish and integrate into the Turkish Education system, and bullying and discrimination was highlighted more in the Province which had completed integration quickly. It was also here reported that some Turkish parents were withdrawing their children from schools and sending them sometimes to private schools. In another location visited by the team, where the integration process was slower, where there were fewer Syrian students in each school and class, and also fewer SVEPs per school, there were less comments about discrimination either by children or SVEPs. In the province where there were many Arabic-speaking people, it was reported that children were not practicing Turkish language because outside school they only spoke Arabic. Rather than taking these statements as conclusive, because many factors interact, the issue deserves further study.

A list of the bottlenecks and barriers collected during the fieldwork is presented below:

- Insufficient number of schools\textsuperscript{97}
- Large classes\textsuperscript{98}
- Syrians concentrated in some schools –can result in uneven balance of students, and Turkish parents objecting to this\textsuperscript{99}
- Classes with children from multiple origins-language, culture, level and types of schooling in Syria, as well as transfer from TECs, which Turkish teachers find difficulty managing
- Age gap of as much as 2 years in a class, and classes with same ages but different levels, both because of lost schooling

\textsuperscript{95} Development Analytics-UNICEF October 31st 2018.
\textsuperscript{96} Kılıç & Özkor, 2019.
\textsuperscript{97} Insufficient number of schools: MONE proposes to build over 400 new schools.
\textsuperscript{98} Large classes, which have expanded from under 30 to nearly 40, and to 45 reported in one TPS.
\textsuperscript{99} 2 TPS reported a ratio of 50% Syrian and 50% Turkish students in their schools.
A curriculum that does not serve needs-excludes mother tongue teaching\textsuperscript{100}, employable skills

- Cadre of SVEPs underutilized because they cannot be employed-too many in one school
- Role of SVEPs- remedial support in subjects, assisting Turkish teachers, mostly are not allowed to take classes but are often performing non educational roles, or supervising floors (some sit idle much of the day), to be accessible to students
- Limited access for SVEPs to advanced Turkish language classes
- Speed of the integration process which has challenged the language skills of some children
- A teacher training system which does not at present meet the new needs of the situation
- Less than 100% registration of children
- Cost and ease of transportation as children have often moved to schools away from their homes
- Charges for activities at some schools\textsuperscript{101}
- Understanding of Turkish Language-differentiated by age\textsuperscript{102}
- Need to catch up on subject learning; Children have sacrificed learning subjects for learning Turkish
- Discriminatory environment between Syrian and Turkish children and teachers—bullying, discrimination\textsuperscript{103}
- New school environment\textsuperscript{104}
- Turkish children (and parents) are not used to having Syrians in their classes. In some classes Syrians outnumber Turkish children
- Low family income causing children to work
- Seasonal jobs and agriculture

The importance of good and kind school management in both types of school during this transition phase was a recurring theme amongst children, mentioned by students in 4 TECs and 1 TPS. This is also reflected in the study in Istanbul referred to above where one of the most important conclusions/findings is the importance of the school as an institution in the lives of these children, and the pivotal roles played by the school administration and teachers.\textsuperscript{105}

Interestingly, the list includes barriers, which are not new, but have not been addressed. At the forefront of these is the issue of discrimination and bullying. Instances of this were formally reported as early as 2015, through YOBIS monitoring,\textsuperscript{106} the UNHCR study,\textsuperscript{107} and apparently, informal reports were discussed in the Education Working Group.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{100} Of concern to parents who fear children will lose their identity
\textsuperscript{101} Reported in 2 FGDs in TPSs with SVEPs and 1 (different) TPS from parents, where 2 projects per month needed to be paid for. It was also reported in 1 TPS by parents that Syrian parents were paying for cleaning materials on request from the school.
\textsuperscript{102} Easier for younger children, more difficult for older children (parents’ FGDs)
\textsuperscript{103} 7 FGDs of SVEPs (in TPS), 2 FGDs of children, and 6 FGDs of parents all mentioned discrimination at school. Examples included: Turkish students waiting outside to harass Syrians; urinating on the floor inside TECs (second shift); putting rubbish on the floor; teachers ridiculing Syrian students, making them sit separately, and when they do well, using them to bait Turkish students; Syrian students ganging up on Turkish teachers. Furthermore SVEPs in one TPS complained that they were not allowed to sit in the staff room, while Turkish teachers had been unhappy that their room had been overrun and there were no chairs to sit on between lessons.
\textsuperscript{104} Children from previous schools in Turkey—TECs, children from TACs, SVEPs are now not all teaching Syrian children directly, so potential for children lose stability and in-class translation. TACs seem to have been particularly nurturing.
\textsuperscript{106} UNICEF YOBIS MONITORING REPORT November 19-20, 2015
\textsuperscript{107} UNHCR 2015, Age, Gender and Diversity Report 2015.
\textsuperscript{108} However, it should be noted, that where conditions are enabling, Syrian children do well academically as illustrated by the Syrian boy who outperformed all children nationally.
The enabling factors of the effectiveness of UNICEF components have been:

- The commitment of MoNE throughout the period to bring education opportunities to Syrian children UTP
- MoNE’s strategy to integrate Syrian students UTP into the Turkish Education System, realizing that there needed to be a long-term solution, as well as addressing the issue of TECs being often of poor quality
- Provincial and municipal education officials who are responsive to the need they see. Despite the centralisation of the education system, some planning is done at provincial level, for example Mardin piloted integration and Mersin determined its own timeline
- School principals and teachers who genuinely believe it is their moral duty to make Syrians comfortable and help them progress, and who encourage joint activities between Syrian and Turkish teachers and children
- The continuity and length of service of the Country representative and senior staff in UNICEF Country Office
- The longstanding reputation of UNICEF in country
- Senior UNICEF staff having the ears of government
- The excellent relationship of the education section with officials in MoNE over time
- During 2015-16 (including the time of the coup attempt) UNICEF had good access to TACs when other agencies did not
- The understanding and flexibility of donors and their trust in UNICEF.

Changes in the socio-economic and political landscape have been described in the Introduction in this report. Their impact on education has included the following constraints to effectiveness:

- Frequent changes of government officials at all levels in the education system. According to one UNICEF official, personnel in the government education sector changed every 6 months at one time. The evaluation team noted this in the field, including principals of TECs
- This also resulted in a shrinking of civil society space, and the restrictions imposed affected several partners with whom UNICEF could work
- Limitations on the opportunities for Syrians to obtain formal employment raises the importance of the incentives paid to SVEPs and the difficulty of phasing those out
- Hardening social attitudes towards Syrians, which have also affected education, expressed in attitudes (discrimination and bullying) between some Turkish and Syrian students and teachers
- It is difficult to keep a UNICEF team coherent with needs, e.g. the shift from supply to quality education (KII)
- Planning is usually done at national level, both in MoNE and UNICEF, when there is diversity in many provinces and districts
- Families moving from TACs may lead to children dropping out of school during the school year

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109 8 FGDs of parents, 2 FGDs SVEPs and 7 FGDs with children reported that in their view, social acceptance was related to the political orientation of the community.
A sample survey does not necessarily pick up the nuances of the implementation and impact of strategies and actions, and more in-depth qualitative analysis is needed for complementarity. While schools’ visits are conducted by UNICEF to explore in detail challenges in the field as a part of the monitoring strategy, FGDs with all actors in education, as well as observations need to be conducted periodically.

4.2.9 Conclusion

The evaluation team concludes that the education programme components have been implemented according to their objectives despite the changes in the socio-political and economic landscape and notes the huge improvement in data collection over the period under evaluation since the 2015 evaluation exercise when it was difficult to conduct needs assessment exercises (Darcy et al, 2015).

UNICEF has employed increasingly modified tools to collect data relevant to the effectiveness of its programmes, and used it to improve their effectiveness.

The integration of Syrian children into the Turkish education system has clearly exacerbated some existing barriers and blockages and highlighted some new ones.

Overall, UNICEF’s contribution can only be assessed through asking the question: what would have happened if UNICEF support had not been present?

In the absence of YOBIS, over 600,000 Syrian (and other foreign children) would have been invisible, even if they had been attending education programmes. There would have been sparse information of how many children, whether they progressed, and how many needed to be integrated into the Turkish Education System.

Without SVEPs, education for Syrian children would have been less effective, without teachers able to teach children in their mother tongue, and support them culturally and psychologically. There would have been fewer SVEPs without the legal framework and system for paying salaries, accompanied by an effective monitoring system for verifying continued presence of SVEPs. All of the factors have had large roles in making this work so that SVEPs can be paid and over 600,000 Syrian children could have a teacher. From an HRBA perspective, this support to one level of duty bearers in education produced a good outcome, facilitating teacher attendance

Designed to motivate SVEPs, incentives increased their attendance as minimum attendance is compulsory for receiving the incentive on a monthly basis. Whether SVEPs are truly motivated or just attending to receive their incentive is only possible to learn through qualitative data collection

With no formal system available to train SVEPs and limitations of the Turkish system to enable teachers to address classes with mixed needs, the training has contributed to building the capacity of both Syrian and Turkish teachers and improving the professional development system in inclusive education. Consecutive trainings have built on previous ones, been progressive and made adjustments in the light of participants’ feedback while still adhering to Turkish Teacher Training standards. Acquisition of Language, understanding culture communication skills are important for both teachers and children and need to be emphasised more in future training.

TECs have suffered from a weak incentive system, where good performance and extra responsibility cannot be remunerated, training which is not yet incorporated into the government system and prospects for permanent employment are limited. All these are outside the control of UNICEF, which has worked around them to equip teachers (both Syrian and Turkish) with skills for inclusive education, and has made a notable achievement in getting the IE training module into the Turkish system. Despite the fact that

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110 Other levels would be the Turkish government and agencies
TECs will soon be closed, some TECs remain. Even with their imminent closure, the team feels that there are lessons to be learned for providing a quality education (particularly in the eyes of the stakeholders), and that the perspective of children needs to be understood so that they may be appropriately supported.

Because of the process of integration, there is a need to re-evaluate the bottlenecks and barriers to the participation of school-age children, including their learning, in education for the new CPD, and to repeat this at MTR timing. Moving forward, UNICEF can maintain its relevance in the integrated system, through support to MoNE for whole school development which could address some of the new and deepened bottlenecks and barriers, explored further in the next section.
4.3 Efficiency

In this section, the evaluation team will evaluate the use of UNICEF’s resources in relation to the three components.

4.3.1 Human resources of the UNICEF country programme

It is not possible to ring-fence the human resources used in the three components only, particularly as responsibilities change from time to time within the education team, so some comments are applicable to the UNICEF response in education for Syrians as a whole.

UNICEF normally does not deliver large service programmes in Middle Income Countries, and usually its staffing levels correspond to that situation. Because of this, at the beginning of the evaluation timeline, the UNICEF Turkey Country Office did not have sufficient resources to meet the demands of the crisis. UNICEF reported in 2015 “The new Country Programme requires delicate merging of UNICEF’s typical engagement in MICs with one based on the CCCs in Humanitarian Action”. In 2015, there was no substantive chief of education, there had been a gap without a Country representative, and the overall emergency experience in the Country Programme was largely in the area of natural disasters, in particular earthquakes. The evaluation of 2015 reported that UNICEF was scaling up emergency sectoral staff, but not operational support staff. In addition, the staffing in the Gaziantep office was totally under-resourced for the response, including for education and for monitoring in general, given that the majority of Syrians UTP were concentrated in the South East of the country. The report concluded that “in general, UNICEF’s programme struggles had difficulty keeping pace with the scale and nature of the evolving needs, and UNICEF underestimated the related support requirements”.

A new Country Representative addressed the situation. Over the period under evaluation, the number of positions in the education section (both Ankara and Gaziantep) gradually increased, from 10 in 2014 (0 in Gaziantep) to 30 in 2019 (of which 6 are in Gaziantep). Please see Figure 5. The boost to technical staff in Gaziantep, along with an expanded education team in Ankara, enabled better monitoring and follow-up, for example verification of incentives payments, as well as maintaining relationships with MoNE, PDONE and municipalities. This report acknowledges that UNICEF placed importance to staffing the education response. The Education section reported that when monitoring and knowledge management staff took the load off the technical staff, they had more capacity to undertake their technical work with MoNE.

111 The UNICEF structure is very decentralized, with a country office in the frontline of any emergency.
113 This number also includes posts in ECE, programme assistants, and those on different contracts: FT, TA, SSA, UNVs and includes NETI.
Recruitment did not keep pace with post establishment. The team noted the number of vacant posts over the last four years, which is shown in annex 12. UNICEF staff reported continuing difficulties in recruitment. Firstly, it is difficult to match constantly changing needs with appropriate capacity; and secondly, the process of recruitment does not always match the need, both in terms of timeliness and the calibre of professionals required. While UNICEF globally has pre-selected candidates in a pool, matching those to posts for which experienced people are required of sufficient seniority is a challenge. This is especially true for the skill mix to work with a government with robust systems, which is leading the Syrian response. UNICEF Ankara spends time justifying to UNICEF HQ why particular candidates are not suitable, before being permitted to source candidates elsewhere. Thus, a process, which should save time, has the potential to lengthen the time for recruitment into a post.

Within the office, UNICEF TCO makes good use of the considerable expertise of the staff. Senior management is involved at a high level in government and in support of education for all children, including Syrians. However, there was some indication of a need for making understood some of the elements of an education response across the office, such as the crucial need for sufficient education materials and follow up of teaching performance to ensure the implementation and effectiveness of training in the classroom.

Cross-sectoral working groups within UNICEF contribute to wider elements of interventions being better understood and programmed. Additionally, elements of the response in education, which need to be synergistic in order to achieve the overall outcomes, are often managed through sections other than education, but with cross-sectoral teams. Examples of this are CCTE and psychosocial support.

UNICEF has also used its convening power to ensure coordination mechanisms; it has been co-leader of the national Education sector group (with UNHCR), and as of 2019 has been formally requested by UNHCR to become the sole lead of this group. UNICEF also plays the same role in the Southeast Turkey Education
Working Group in Gaziantep. The establishment and development of the EPMS and the current SVEP working group planning for the future of SVEPs can be attributed to the work of UNICEF staff.

From 2015, UNICEF increased its monitoring capacity in education with the appointment of extra staff, and this has been extremely useful for the EPMS and its components. Use is made of Mobile/SMS surveys, followed up by staff visits to verify information and troubleshoot problems. This ensures that UNICEF monitors carefully the large amounts of funds, and keeps staff in touch with the field. It has also made donor reporting more efficient.

Additionally, the monitoring system itself has become more efficient in the following ways:

- The M&E framework for the CPD links to that of the 3RP, as CPD indicators are included in the 3RP. Some of these are defined globally though they can differ in terminology between the various instruments and documents.
- The TCO has developed a standardised way of collecting data
- The use of mobile technology (KOBO and Rapidpro) has saved funds, time, and human resources in gathering information on a large scale
- Adding monitoring visits in order to establish the presence of SVEPs and, formerly, supplies. The monitoring visits validate self-reported data on receipt of incentives and utilisation of training. They also have the potential to validate the CCTE programme.
- The monitoring team is also able to contribute to other exercises, such as the Out-of-School study, and to support the development of YOBIS.

Access to MoNE data has improved, and UNICEF now has data from the monitoring exercises. This combines to provide evidence to inform programming, advocacy, and fundraising. There was a view also that the evidence gathered should inform programme discussions more regularly, and not be limited to external needs or only utilised when there was an imperative, such as for the payment of incentives. A more rigorous monitoring system has been a useful technical development for the office and for donors, who want their contributions tracked. UNICEF expertise in programming and monitoring is also utilised substantially in the development of interventions and indicators for the 3RP and the UNDCS.

4.3.2 The wider UNICEF system

The involvement of other parts of the UNICEF system is variable. There appears to have been a paucity of advice available from headquarters on financial modalities employed by the TCO for the Syrian Education response. If this is because there has been no prior experience, then globally UNICEF should learn from the experience of Turkey, and disseminate it for use elsewhere.

Respondents reported that UNICEF HQ has too few people to get involved, and has provided little support. Within the UNICEF structure, the Regional Office is the first line of support to country offices. Turkey actually falls within the region ECAR, based in Geneva and Istanbul. However, for the Syrian response it has participated in and coordinates with initiatives in the region in which the other four countries involved in the Syria response are situated, and where the No Lost Generation initiative is based. This region, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), has provided leadership on the annual reports on the No Lost Generation, organized regional meetings at which Turkey has been able to share its innovations and overall response. It is not possible to ascertain whether this has resulted in additional funding for

114 Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt.
115 During the London pledging conference in 2016, partners, donors and the international community made a commitment to ensure protection and learning pathways for children and youth affected by the Syria crisis. Since then, annual reports have
Turkey as respondents have reported that there is no satisfactory financial tracking system within the No Lost Generation Initiative. According to reports, a study will be mounted soon.¹¹⁶

4.3.3 Financial elements and Donors to the Programme Components

Donors to the Education Programme components were very complimentary about UNICEF’s expertise in relation to efficiency. Some quotations are presented in Box 2.

“We are very happy with UNICEF—the quality is high and the contract runs well”

“The high level of skilled experts working at UNICEF and at partner organisations enables an efficient management....UNICEF has a highly efficient monitoring and evaluation department. It has the ability to ensure a perfect follow up on the general programme”.

“UNICEF has the capacity to procure high quality technical assistance”

Box 2 Views of donors on UNICEF efficiency, from Key Informant Interviews

One donor mentioned that cooperation with UNICEF HQ is “sometimes very hard”. The same donor, funding the SVEP incentives programme, mentioned that last year the agreement with UNICEF HQ took about six months to finalise and to provide funds: usually it is much quicker. This is inefficient and a delay at any point in the system is detrimental to the coping strategies of the SVEPs in question. This is perhaps not appreciated by all sections in HQ involved with the process. UNICEF TCO recognizes this and has a speedy process of data review and funding approval at country level.

Funding a pipeline aligned to the 3RP has some issues for donors, while it provides flexibility for UNICEF. On the one hand, this “ensures coherence and sustainability for the action and its benefits”,¹¹⁷ as reporting is done against the indicators in the 3RPs. On the other hand, the funds are mixed, and the donor loses visibility, which makes it difficult to convince their home government of the particular impact of their funds. In addition, it is not so easy to determine how many pupils are impacted by the support now that Syrians are integrated into the Turkish Education System.¹¹⁸

MoNE also reported no problems with UNICEF in Turkey in terms of financial efficiency. However, there was a wish expressed by a PDoNE that UNICEF decentralize some of its funding to the Province, and from some school principals that UNICEF visit the schools more often. The first is not a decision UNICEF can take, as resource allocation is done centrally in Turkey.

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¹¹⁶ No Lost Generation, 2018 b. THE 2018 ED TECH SUMMIT POST EVENT REPORT, s.l.: NO LOST GENERATION.
¹¹⁷ EUROPEAN UNION TRUST FUND 31 August 2016 a DRAFT ROM REPORT MADAD I p.8.
¹¹⁸ UNICEF came up with a formula for one donor for this “given the limitation of accessing data on the number of children (Syrian and Turkish) enrolled in TPSs where SVEPs are working, the calculation used to come up with an estimated number of children is based the number of TPSs (581) and the average number of students enrolled in primary and lower secondary education schools nationwide - 250. As a result, approximately 215,000 children benefitted indirectly from the support provided........ to the teacher incentives programme” (UNICEF November 2018, Preventing a ‘Lost Generation’ in Turkey: Support to the Syrian volunteer teachers incentives programme: Final Report – Phase II. KfW Development Bank).
In addition, the country office has been able to procure sufficient funds for implementation of two of these components: YOBIS and the SVEP incentives programme. This is in itself a creditable achievement when, overall the funding requested for education in the 3RP has only been around 51% of the total.

### 4.3.4 SVEP Incentives Programme

It is a considerable achievement on the part of UNICEF to procure an Annual sum of around €40-44 million from donors in order to pay incentives for nearly 13,000 SVEPs. The SVEP incentives programme was found to be appealing to a donor as it provides the donor with a predictable amount needed for which there are no utilisation issues. One donor to this strategy remarked, “Efficiency in-country is high”.

UNICEF staff agreed that there were no blockages in the UNICEF system in the way UNICEF utilises its resources and systems to advantage. The system for signing off appears to be very efficient: “The system for Teacher incentives is very sophisticated. The UNICEF Representative signs off for the next release of funds, after reviewing the evidence. The incentives timeline for processes to be completed is short and important. YOBIS has enabled that, and SMS technology has reached out to SVEPs”

UNICEF utilises YOBIS to mark attendance, monitoring visits to check whether the incentives are being received and SVEPs are still working, and has used its leveraging capacity to appeal for funds from several donors over the period of the evaluation. However, there is an issue of sustainability as is discussed in a later section.

### 4.3.5 SVEPs

The annual cost of a SVEP reportedly is US$ 4,135 in 2017 and US$ 3,853 in 2018\(^1\). The unit cost of training is US $179 for Syrian Teacher Training (STT) phase 1 in 2016; and $178 for the trainings in STT phase 2, and $214 for the STT phase 3.\(^2\) These costs are not high for providing over 200,000 children with an education.\(^3\)

UNICEF has demonstrated its ability to provide children with a minimum standard of education at a reasonable cost, which is a significant achievement, given the reliance on donor funds and the scale of the crisis. However, the reality is that UNICEF had to follow MoNE’s lead on teaching and learning resources.

The whole issue of SVEP functionality in the past and the future is discussed in other sections (particularly Sustainability). Here, the efficiency of this strategy during the current transition phase of integrating Syrian students into the formal Turkish education system is addressed. Currently, as the TECs are closed and SVEPs are moved into the Turkish Education System, they are not always carrying out the roles for which they were intended, as under Turkish law only certified teachers can enter classrooms, they are not now allowed to teach in the classroom. The field data of the evaluation team shows that some are gainfully employed in clearly identified roles, but others are now either underemployed or performing non educational roles. Our data shows that often too many SVEPs were assigned to an individual TPS. This is currently not an efficient strategy. This is hopefully a temporary phenomenon during integration, but requires proactive advocacy with MoNE to change it. UNICEF has begun the advocacy process on roles

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\(^1\) The decrease in US$ probably due to the exchange rate as the TL loses value. Information provided by UNICEF.

\(^2\) Excluding training.

\(^3\) The increased cost may be due to the extra day added in response to feedback that there were too many working hours per day in previous trainings.

\(^4\) It is not certain whether this includes training materials for the trainees.

\(^5\) UNICEF does not have unit costs per child because (according to UNICEF) many activities are implemented to deliver education and it is difficult to calculate this number.
and employment of SVEPs with a working group put in place to address the issue. However, UNICEF needs to take advocacy action on more rational deployment swiftly, or else programme reputation and donor interest may suffer.

4.3.6 Capacity Building
This component is not quite so linear nor is it controlled by UNICEF. One donor report mentioned the delay in SVEPs training, which is exacerbated by the model of training used to train a small number of trainers (TOT) before rolling it out. Consequently, the utilisation rate of their contribution was slower, and only the funds remaining after other components had spent, would be available for this component. In terms of potential impact, it also means delays in improvements in the quality of the teaching for children. This, however, is outside the control of UNICEF, as MoNE controls it.

4.3.7 YOBIS
The development of YOBIS is a highly specialised activity, for which UNICEF was able to procure appropriate technical assistance (TA) for the design of the system. After the initial development and rollout, UNICEF pays comparatively small amounts for any further inputs, including training. The utilisation of funds for 2019 is so far $68,602.04. The system is national, has been taken over by MoNE, is a system benefiting students, SVEPs, and MoNE, and is valuable for the current crisis and for years to come. It is also compatible with MoNE’s own system E-okul. This system has enabled efficiencies in other processes, for example recording attendance to pay SVEPs. YOBIS also enables CCTE payments to be made to beneficiaries as it records the attendance data of students, which is shared with MoFLSS, UNICEF resources were clearly used to good effect in this component.

4.3.8 Conclusion
UNICEF has utilised its human resources in the country team to good effect in the development and monitoring of the three components, as well as leveraging policy developments, particularly the EPMS, the early recognition of TECs by the Government, the shift to the inclusion of Syrian children in the Turkish system and now discussions on the future of SVEPs.

It was not clear to the Evaluation team how much influence the Gaziantep office had initially on developing education strategy within UNICEF, but it is a valuable resource where education officers understand the reality at first hand and should be able to contribute to policy, strategy and tools.

UNICEF monitoring data has contributed to the evidence base for discussions with MoNE and other stakeholders. The Evaluation team feels that the monitoring system in education which is now in place is worthy of special mention, even if monitoring is by nature in-house, and therefore itself needs verification. While the team learned that since government is a beneficiary, it should not be monitoring itself, they also question whether government is sufficiently involved as a capacity-building measure.

The monitoring system has made a considerable contribution to the verification and development of the incentives and the training programmes. It is rigorous, and combines surveys of large samples with follow-up verification visits, which are necessary, as the surveys are self-reporting. It is innovative in the use of technology, and responsive to new needs. It also links well to problem-solving and programmatic development processes. Despite the expressed view that suitable institutions are limited in Turkey, there may be need for occasional Third Party monitoring also.

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124 EUROPEAN UNION TRUST FUND 30TH August 2016 b.
125 Information from the Turkey Country office.
Resources in the MENA regional office have provided an additional platform for displaying results and advocating for continued commitment from the international community, to which Turkey has considerably contributed, with UNICEF support.

4.4 Sustainability and the future

The evaluation team acknowledges the multifaceted nature of the concept of sustainability and sees the starting point of any discussion related to the following fundamental issues and actions:

- Sustaining the learning of all children, with attention to gender, age differences, CWD
- Sustaining progress in access to education opportunities
- For an individual child (HRBA) sustaining his/her path through learning opportunities.

These higher-level considerations are actually encapsulated in the outcome and output statements of the CPD 2016-20, and it is important that UNICEF retain this focus when developing the new CPD.

Stakeholders reported broader strategies to sustain and expand access. They include MoNE’s plan to construct over 400 more schools; assistance agreed between UNICEF and MoNE to identify all out-of-school children (including Syrians) through MoNE, Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS) and other relevant entities, and to develop multi-sectoral support for improving their access. In addition, UNICEF-supported ALP and informal learning programmes have begun to facilitate pathways for children through alternative learning opportunities.

In the next few years, perhaps for some students after the end of the 2019-20 school year, Syrian students will leave TECs where they are taught by Arabic-speaking teachers, and join the Turkish education system. There, Syrian students will learn in a foreign language in a mostly mixed-gender environment. Turkish teachers will teach classes with students from various origins, and initially in overcrowded conditions. One official at a PD reported class sizes of 50 before Syrians arrived and Turkish schools were double shifting. Although the GoT built some new schools, the influx of Syrian students resulted in overcrowding once more.

Overall, the achievements of the interventions assisted by UNICEF, as measured by the indicators in the CPD, have been sustained over the time of this evaluation. Enrolment of Syrian children in formal education has increased year on year; the number of SVEPs has remained stable; incentive payments have been consistently paid; training of SVEPs was completed according to target, and the process of developing the EPMS has continued according to changes in the environment.

Most of this has been achieved with donor funding, particularly the funding of the incentives payments, as shown in annex 16. As such, the sustainability of these changes is in question, but funding is not the only issue. Fundamental to the discussion is the future of SVEPs themselves.

4.4.1 The Future of SVEPs and the SVEP incentives programme

With the closure of TECs, the role of SVEPs as teachers of Syrian children in the classroom ceases and Turkish teachers assume that role for all children, including Syrians. Most SVEPs are not qualified under the Turkish system to be classroom or subject teachers. Around two-thirds of SVEPs claim to have a degree or diploma, but the Turkish and Syrian systems are not equivalent regarding teacher qualification.

The team heard in one of the locations they visited that SVEPs from closing TECs were allowed a choice of posting by PD. They had the option of joining Turkish Public Schools or other TECs, creating a very unbalanced distribution of SVEPs. One of the last remaining TECs in another location, where SVEPs still
had a teaching role, had 60 SVEPs, of which only 25 were teaching. The principal’s view was that he only needed 20-30. This imbalance also occurred when SVEPs chose the locations of their next positions in the Turkish Education System. The remaining 300 SVEPs in TECs in one province would not have the choice, according to the PDoNE. The consequences of this move and any attempt to relocate SVEPs on a geographically more balanced basis will of course result in increased transport costs for the SVEPs, unless the new location is affordable for them to relocate to. This may not always be the case. It should be noted that this is an interim situation.

The government, with assistance from UNICEF, has defined new roles for SVEPs within the Turkish formal public schools, Public Education Centres (PECs), and Research and Assessment Centres (RAMs). Because of UNICEF monitoring exercises and advocacy, MoNE set up an EPMS working Group in September 2018 to develop new roles for SVEPs as the TECs closed. MoNE and UNICEF staff joined the working group. Under this plan, SVEPs have been categorized based on their qualifications and matched with new roles (annex 15). ToRs for the working group were finalized in March 2018. During a workshop conducted between 3-5 September 2018 in Izmir, potential roles of SVEPs were identified and the Letter of Commitment (previous Code of Ethics) was revised. Both outputs were disseminated to 22 PDoNEs by official letter on 16 October 2018. Implementation started in 22 and now covers 23 provinces. A second workshop was conducted on 26 November 2018, in Antalya.

One PDoNE was clearly resistant to the presence of SVEPs and regards them as temporary. This could be linked to attitudes towards hosting Syrians in general or political pressure to discontinue SVEPs when there are 400,000 Turkish teachers not assigned by MoNE. The evaluation team encountered a variety of views on the need for SVEPs from different stakeholders, for example the negative views “Schoolchildren will not suffer if there are no SVEPs” or “there is no hope for SVEPs”. There were also positive views, mentioning the contribution that (a specified number of) SVEPs could make during the integration process. The incidence of both positive and negative views cannot be quantified. It appeared to the evaluation team that there are several factors contributing to this, mentioned below, and further discussed in the conclusions.

In some cases, schools and other nominated institutions are unwilling or unable to utilise SVEPs effectively (especially where too many exist). The UNICEF Autumn monitoring exercise reported that out of a sample of 2,016 in October 2018, and 2,208 in November 2018, 14.5% of SVEPs in TPSs had not started new roles. Reasons given for not being assigned to new roles were: 45 % of SVEPs have worked in these roles for a

127 “The SVEP MSWG will include members from MoNE Lifelong Learning (LLL) DG and UNICEF. The WG may also include participants from other DGs in MoNE and other institutions as relevant and needed (i.e. Ministry of Labor and Social Security, ISKUR, etc.). Those members should be recommended and selected by MoNE and UNICEF and should be officially invited to the SVEP MSWG by MoNE LLL DG. ”Ref: UNICEF Syrian Volunteer Education Personnel Management Strategy Working Group Terms of Reference P.4
128 The appropriate number varied. One school principal suggested 1 SVEP for every 100 Syrian students, another 1 for 20
long time; in 22% of cases, the school manager is not aware of the communication outlining new roles; and 33% SVEPs were reported to be either ineffective, or not motivated.129130

The most recent monitoring report covering Oct. Nov. 2018 & Mar. 2019 covered 8,371 total SVEPs, (4,058 males, 4,313 females) and outlined the roles they were playing (self-reported) as in Figure 6. 31.48% self-reported as teachers in TPSs, but it is not known what is understood by “teacher”, as SVEPs are not allowed to act as teachers in the classroom in a TPS. According to five Turkish Public School Principals interviewed by the Evaluation Team, SVEPs were carrying out support roles defined and agreed by MoNE of translation, liaison with families of students and bringing out-of-school children into school, translation, and school maintenance. Three reported that SVEPS are not allowed in the classroom. One of those said that it was a MoNE ruling, while another said that they can do so if they go in to help another teacher. Yet another principal said that neither the SVEPs’ qualifications nor their teaching behaviour allowed them in the classroom and that he would only employ them as cleaners.

As a corollary to this, one TPS principal reported that 4 out of 9 SVEPs were acting as teaching assistants (five were in non-educational roles), another one that SVEPs were providing extra subject teaching, and were very useful for religious education, for example teaching the Koran. Principals in three schools reported that SVEPs could be useful teaching sports or physics, English and Arabic and one (TAC) that he had excellent SVEPs teaching Maths and Physics.

While one TPS Principal reported that SVEPs in his school were doing nothing, another suggested that if SVEPs are not utilised, it is the responsibility of the Principal.

The evaluation team also found instances of utilisation of SVEPs (who had been trained for teaching roles) in non-education roles131.

In the UNICEF monitoring report the category of “other” is not broken down. It is advised that future surveys allow for the name of the specific role, or a category of “non-educational”. At the outset of this crisis, MoNE hired Syrians for non-educational roles, but after the introduction of the maintenance grant in February 2017 Turkish people were supposed to be hired with these funds. At the time of the April 2017 monitoring report, UNICEF, monitoring the receipt of SVEP incentives and their presence in schools, data required by MoNE to activate the payment of SVEP incentives, noted that 25 Syrians were filling such positions (UNICEF April 2017). Since that time, in 2019, the school maintenance grant, which had facilitated the employment of non-educational personnel by schools has been discontinued.132 This is possibly why some TPSs still utilise SVEPs for those roles, as they are already receiving incentives.

While the Evaluation data is not quantifiable or open to generalisations, there were sufficient mentions by SVEPs and other education personnel interviewed regarding the difficulty of carrying out a teaching role anywhere other than in TECs to warrant a further disaggregation of the category “teaching” in UNICEF’s data, particularly in TPS.

130 Most of the SVEP were assigned to TPSs by the beginning of the 2018 school year and role definitions were implemented in schools by mid-October. They have already been given roles which are more or less the same roles as those defined later during the EPMS working group meeting. This is why they define themselves as not assigned to “new roles” when in reality they may already implementing them.

131 In one school, the Principal reported that out of nine SVEPs at his school, five were working as teacher assistants (all male), and five were working in menial roles. 15 further SVEPs reported acting in similar roles in 2 TPSs in one province. In the same province, in 5 TPSs visited by the evaluation team 48 SVEPs reported acting as guards.
132 This was a grant given by UNICEF to MoNE for this purpose.
Current funding of incentives for SVEPs is from emergency budgets of donors, which might not extend indefinitely. Donors expressed the wish to see progress to more formal employment, but it is not clear whether they could fund this item if the strategy is framed as development or resilience. To engage the SVEPs in formal employment approximately doubles the cost per teacher vis-à-vis a volunteer incentive, and current budgets do not cover that increase.

### 4.4.2 Capacity Building

Under the current situation, there are new needs for SVEP orientation and training. The need for capacity development on inclusive education for Turkish teachers and other education personnel has been noted. MoNE has accepted Inclusive Education as a course in their In-Service Training programme. Apparently this module is widely available for any teacher on a voluntary basis.

In an effort to assist the future employability of SVEPs in the Turkish education system, the three SVEP certificated trainings, which occurred in 2016-17, were designed according to the Turkish requirements for number of hours, content, and assessment.

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134 Full financial support to the programme for the Oct 19-20 phase has now been guaranteed to UNICEF.
4.4.3 YOBIS
UNICEF transferred YOBIS to the MoNE in September 2016. Thus, UNICEF built a sustainability strategy in from the start. This facilitated the transfer of the system and the path of the student. It is also compatible with other information systems in the government’s social sector departments, facilitating the transfer of students (for example ALP) and data.

As a stand-alone system, YOBIS is still needed for newcomers to Turkey before they become registered, and provides MoNE with an instrument for humanitarian response and ensuring children realise their right to education. It has also been adapted to new, if originally unintended needs, such as the implementation of the CCTE programme, registering out-of-school children, and recording characteristics of SVEPs. As mentioned by PDNE in one province, it will also be needed in the future to support the PECs, as 8,790 students are still registered there.

Some stakeholders perceived that YOBIS would be no longer needed when the transition of students into the formal education system is complete. These stakeholders only saw a use for YOBIS to pay incentives for SVEPs. However, the view of MoNE, which administers it, was that “Even when closing all TECs, YOBIS will still be necessary, because there are still students of other nationalities without papers/ID.” Actually, there are clear opportunities for adding new data base functionality. Thus, YOBIS is continuing to serve new purposes, such as providing data on new roles and locations of SVEPs, tracking CCTE payments, and out-of-school children.

In terms of financial needs, MoNE has taken over all costs except training for which it requests UNICEF to continue funding. UNICEF makes available a small amount of funds and technical expertise for training and development of new fields. This enables UNICEF to continue their involvement with the system.

4.4.4 Risks, Opportunities and enabling factors for sustainability
Quality education is a key pillar in the Government’s Education 2023 plan so the policy framework exists to address it, in which teachers are key.

Turkey’s recent Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores were not as high as hoped. The integration of new students with diverse needs in the system, including those whose language is not the language of instruction, and those with difficulties of adaptation to the new environment, will provide an opportunity for the government to address quality across the system so that individual and aggregate scores will not be compromised. It is within this context as well as from an HRBA perspective that the future role of SVEPs in education could be considered.

Many stakeholders (described below) expressed the need for SVEPs to support the transition process of integrating Syrian students into the formal school system, including MoNE who would like to retain them, and 2 TPS principals who would like more SVEPs.

Syrian students in three focus group discussions in one province preferred that the counsellor in the schools, both TECs and TPSs, were Syrians, as this would make the counsellor understand what they are experiencing and going through. Several school principals and Turkish teachers saw a distinct role for SVEPs in teaching Arabic, reaching out to families and other roles as reported above.

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135 Including, attendance, qualifications, roles and location
136 GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION, n.d. TURKEY’S EDUCATION VISION 2023, s.l.: s.n.
137 PISA (OECD Programme for International Student Assessment) tests conducted in 2015 among 15 year-olds in 70 countries and economic zones, Turkish students ranked 54th in science literacy, 50th in reading skills and 49th in mathematics. They show large discrepancies between the performance of children in different regions and income groups, children in urban and rural areas, and children in different schools.
There are prospects for employing SVEPs on a more secure basis, under the regulation on work permits of foreigners under temporary protection. Reviews of the general implementation of the law permitting employment cite obstacles for Syrians obtaining work permits, for example a lack of incentive and the cost for the employer, as well as the residence requirement. There are also certain limitations on them such as location and limiting the number of Syrians in any one workplace to ten. SVEPs who qualify for teaching posts in the Turkish school system may not get posts. This could happen for reasons cited above—the existence of a large group of unemployed Turkish teachers, or other political considerations. With the downturn in the economy, and the lack of fiscal space, the government of Turkey is unlikely to fund incentives for SVEPs.

UNICEF’s TOC on quality education places emphasis on employment of SVEPs in the Turkish system as the main strategy for sustainability. The EPMS Working group has outlined the employment modalities, but has still to work out the details. These include two options: contracted teacher under a specific programme and paid teacher. However, the fiscal space for MoNE to expand its teaching force appears doubtful.

Through planned training and other capacity building strategies, there is an opportunity to share good examples in deploying and utilising SVEPs in new roles within schools. One such example came from a FGD with Syrian students, which described how helpful it is to have a SVEP working alongside a Turkish teacher in science lessons. Children keenly felt the need for this role.

Accurate data on SVEPs exists in YOBIS (qualifications, field of work, Turkish Language level/certificate etc.), and will enable UNICEF and MoNE to address the needs of SVEPs in their new roles, develop appropriate training, and formulate employment strategies.

The incentive payment system allows donors to predict spending. It simply requires approval of funding, and evidence now on the efficiency of the payment system.

Some bilateral donors who do not have a development funding envelope for Turkey might fund the program from budgets related to security issues. There is previous experience in UNICEF globally where a very large programme was funded in this way.

4.4.5 Risks and opportunities for children

Non-participation in education will put Syrian children at risk of having no future and no employment prospects. They may be subject to serious vulnerabilities such as sexual violence, as well as poverty. As participation in education (and poverty to some extent) is intergenerational, this situation could persist for the future families of young people. This is recognised by the GoT with its commitment to children in general and education in particular and the presence of safety nets, and desire for technical and Vocational education.

Risks and opportunities to SVEPs

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138 SVEP EMPLOYABILITY MODALITIES-PPT.
139 3RP (2017-2019) UNICEF SUMMARY BUDGETS AND TARGETS.
140 This was the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme funded by the Government of Netherlands 2012-16.
No remuneration could result in mental health as well as income issues for SVEPs. Additionally, SVEPs are being “demoted” in the eyes of some students, as they are no longer teaching classes.

There is the possibility that SVEPs could be targeted for inclusion in other income generation or skills based programmes offered by other agencies. Beyond that, should they meet the necessary requirement, the possibility of including SVEPs in national safety net programmes, such as that run by the Turkish Red Crescent, could be considered. However, due to the economic downturn, there are currently almost 4.5 million unemployed Turkish nationals, and such programmes are time limited (including probably the EU’s Facility for Integration in Turkey-FRIT). UNICEF needs to advocate at high levels with the Turkish Government and international stakeholders for a long-term strategy.

**Language as a Contribution to Resilience**

Support to language proficiency is crucial to the participation of Syrian children in education. As mentioned elsewhere in the report, older children are having difficulty learning Turkish, which impedes their participation in education. SVEPs are more valued if they speak Turkish well. In the evaluation exercise, parents mentioned the desire to learn Turkish.

Turkish teachers mentioned the need for more materials. In the budget outlined for UNICEF in the 3RP (2017-2019), Output 3.3: “Support to education system for the development of language teaching curricula and materials that will support education inclusion of Syrian refugees into the national system”. In this output, it is not clear whether training and materials focus on children or parents. It is hoped that some of the budgeted language support is allocated to programmes for parents, including gender-appropriate programmes that reach into the home in order to address the cultural and childcare needs of mothers, partly so that their confidence increases to take part in the life of the school.

The GEM Report 2019 points out that “Adult literacy can increase immigrants’ and refugees’ sense of welcome and belonging and their ability to communicate and meet day-to-day needs”. The case of the European Union echoes this, where “such involvement is shown to improve student outcomes”. Building capacities of communities is also one of the pillars of UNICEF’s resilience strategy, and all these factors are relevant to sustaining and improving the participation of Syrian children in the education system and improving learning outcomes. There are several interesting international examples-in Sweden, the UK, France and Germany for example.

### 4.4.6 Conclusion

UNICEF’s overall programme is contributing to the sustainability of access to education through a multi-pronged strategy, addressing needs through non-formal and informal education opportunities. YOBIS is sustainable as it is owned by MoNE, which requests only small amounts of funding from UNICEF for training, and this is useful for UNICEF’s continuing participation. The integration of Syrian students UTP into the formal Turkish school system is a durable solution but has implications for two of the components evaluated here: training and the continuation of SVEPs and their remuneration.

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141. According to the UN 18.4% of Syrians UTP are already living below the extreme poverty line (UNITED NATIONS IN TURKEY n.d. Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 201-2019 IN RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS TURKEY (3 RP)p.6
142. These include schemes supported by the Turkish Directorate General of international Labour, ILO, FAO, UNDP, and IOM, as well as vocational training offered by the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR) in order to facilitate integration into the labour market.
143. Kemal Kirisci & Gokce Uysal Kolasin, Thursday July 18, 2019. The authors also suggest that funding will run out in 2 years.
The Evaluation team concludes that in the short-medium term SVEPS can be useful supporting Syrian students in the integration process both for psychosocial support and for extra teaching in core subjects. Their role as teaching assistants could be maximised. They can also be well engaged in outreach work.

However, their remuneration is not secured after the current academic year 2019-2020. After this, employment opportunities in the education sector or training opportunities for other employment opportunities should be explored with MoNE to secure a swiftly transition, as the current numbers of SVEPs are not sustainable either professionally or financially.

In the event of reducing the overall number of SVEPs or should they be categorized for new roles and levels of pay, there will need to be vigilance over whether females lose out disproportionately.

This affects the future of capacity development/training which both needs to focus on the new education roles of SVEPs and heavily on inclusive education, particularly for Turkish Teachers and Administrators. Particular attention within this to social cohesion is needed. In view of the long-term presence of the large number of Syrians, as well as other newcomers, UNICEF would do well to support MoNE’s system of pre-and in-service training to incorporate these new needs.
4.5 Coherence

Documents and plans based in the country context (3RPs, CPD, and UNDCS) were discussed in the relevance section. This section addresses UNICEF’s coherence vis-à-vis the normative principles of the CCCs\(^{147}\); UNICEF strategic Plan 2013-2017, and 2018-2021; INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, (all of which are based on the HRBA for education) and MoNE’s standards for Turkish teacher training.\(^{148}\)

In addressing the needs of Syrian children UTP, UNICEF is contributing towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4: “Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”.

4.5.1 The Core Commitments for Children

Adherence to the CCCs was important in order to meet immediate needs in education. The relevance of UNICEF programming in education against the five Core Commitments at the start of the crisis was summarised in the previous evaluation.\(^{149}\)

Of the 5 CCCs, three commitments and one early recovery action are particularly relevant to these three components and the utilisation if UNICEF resources:

- Effective leadership is established for education cluster/inter-agency coordination (with co-lead agency), with links to other cluster/sector coordination mechanisms on critical intersectoral issues (Commitment 1).
- Access to quality education opportunities, (Commitment 2)
- Establish safe and secure environments (Commitment 3)
- Advocate for appropriate compensation for teachers and paraprofessionals, according to agreed-upon inter-agency guidelines.\(^{150}\)

Commitment 1

Inside Turkey, there was not an official education Cluster. In 2014, establishing coordination mechanisms initially was difficult. Since that time, the roles of the two main UN agencies in education have become clearer. In accordance with the 3 RRP, UNICEF and UNHCR used to jointly co-lead the Education Sector Group, (though in 2019 UNICEF has been requested by UNHCR to be the sole lead at national level). In 2016 UNICEF was supporting MoNE to coordinate with other stakeholders (AFAD, MoFSP, NGOs/CSOs, UN agencies, government institutions). UNICEF also chairs the Southeast Turkey Education Working Group in Gaziantep.

Within the Region,\(^{151}\) UNICEF Turkey has also played a coordination role when it led the consultations for the preparation of the education report for the London ‘Supporting Syria’ Conference under the No Lost Generation initiative in February 2016.

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\(^{147}\) (Core Commitment for Children 2010). “The CCCs – are UNICEF’s central policy to uphold the rights of children affected by humanitarian crisis….. Initially developed in 1998, and revised in 2010” [https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/index_68710.html](https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/index_68710.html) accessed over the time period of the evaluation.

\(^{148}\) Outlined in 2014 Turkish Teacher Management Strategy.

\(^{149}\) [UNICEF TCO Evaluation, 2015 section 2.2].

\(^{150}\) Advocate for appropriate compensation for teachers and paraprofessionals, according to agreed-upon inter-agency guidelines. UNICEF 2010 CORE COMMITMENTS FOR CHILDREN, Early recovery p.39

\(^{151}\) The region here refers to the 5 countries affected by the Syrian crisis, and included in the No Lost Generation Initiative. Structurally, within the UNICEF system, Turkey is part of the Central Europe region [ECAR], whose office is based partly in Geneva and partly in Istanbul.
One of the main concerns now is the coordination between UNICEF supported programmes and the EU support to Government of Turkey PIKTES, both of which programmes are supporting the integration of Syrian children UTP into the Turkish Education System especially the training of Turkish Teachers. At national level, UNICEF TCO had made efforts to share information with PIKTES. However, difficulties remain, the exact reason for which is not clear.

According to one Key informant, there is a coordination meeting between PIKTES and UNICEF every 2 months. UNICEF is invited to their steering committee meetings. They have a set of indicators and results for output and outcomes but they cannot share actual results. PIKTES also participates in the annual revisions of plans between UNICEF and MoNE. At provincial level, PDoNE oversees all education in each province, including UNICEF and PIKTES support.

**Commitment 2**

The creation of YOBIS and technical assistance provided to MoNE for the Education Personnel Management Strategy, covering emergency and continuous training of SVEPs, incentives, the Code of Conduct and training for Turkish teachers all formed part of a coherent package to support the government response to the influx of Syrian children. UNICEF and other international agencies do not implement directly, and have been unable to ensure the inclusion of preschool-age children, and other excluded children (especially CWDs), which is also part of commitment 2. Girls enrolled at the primary and lower secondary levels of education in almost equal numbers to boys. However, by upper secondary level, the enrolment rate for girls is not so high (Figure 2). This mirrors the trends of Turkish school-aged children, but at a lower level.

UNICEF has increasingly supported MoNE to reach excluded Syrian children, and those of other origins and abilities. Along with other agencies, UNICEF has advocated for changes in education policy. UNICEF continues to address Commitment 2 through the initiation of a new Out of School Study, which aims to document all children out of school, thereby also addressing the needs of the hosts-the Turkish population also (something for which the CCCs make little provision).

**Commitment 3**

The environment within TECs inside and out of TACs was partly able to establish safe and secure learning environments, with children taught in the mother tongue by Syrian volunteers, with an adapted Syrian curriculum. TECs and TAC TECs were able to address partly Commitment 3 at the time. Now, the transfer of children into the Turkish education system has temporarily created new bottlenecks and barriers to access to education for some children (discussed in the Effectiveness section). Most particularly, there has been an apparent increase in discrimination, and potentially diminishes the safe and secure environment. The frequency and intensity of such an issue is difficult to quantify and was present somewhat before integration.

### 4.5.2 UNICEF strategic plans

This evaluation spans two UNICEF strategic plans: 2013-17 and 2018-21.
UNICEF strategic plan 2013-17

In the 2013-2017 Strategic Plan, the UNICEF response to Syrians UTP in Education is coherent with

- Outcome 5: “Improved learning outcomes and equitable and inclusive education”
- “Number and percentage of children in humanitarian situations accessing formal or non-formal basic education (including pre-primary schools/early childhood learning spaces), whose indicator was at least 80% of targeted population”
- Output d: “Increased country capacity and delivery of services to ensure girls and boys access to safe and secure forms of education and critical information for their own well-being in humanitarian situations”.

The three components are coherent with UNICEF strategic Plan, indicator 1.7, interpreted in the UNICEF Turkey Country Office CPD 2016-20 as “% of Syrian children in Turkey accessing approved and monitored education services”.

UNICEF’s Strategic Plan 2018-21

The components are also coherent with UNICEF’s Strategic Plan 2018-21, and in goal 2: Every Child Learns, particularly access:

- “Where needed, UNICEF will help to fill critical gaps in service delivery to reach excluded populations.”
- “Service delivery will always be accompanied by explicit capacity development”. In other areas:
- Cross-cutting Humanitarian Action, particularly strengthening coherence and complementarity between humanitarian action and development programming, and also the resilience agenda “providing learning and support for children caught up in emergencies”.
- Attention to gender analysis; UNICEF Turkey has set a standard on the gender disaggregation of education statistics in YOBIS, and, together with Child Protection, implemented a Gender Awareness curriculum project until it was paused temporarily by MoNE due to adverse and sensationalised publicity. All UNICEF monitoring exercises pay attention to gender, as do analyses for programming, such as the updated Situation Analysis, and some recommendations from the Light Gender Analysis of 2016 have been implemented.
- programming at scale (training and incentives covering all SVEPs);
- developing and leveraging resources and partnerships for children (for example PTT and MoNE for incentives, contributing to and utilising the regional platform No Lost Generation)
- using the power of evidence to drive change for children (YOBIS and MONITORING)
- Worthy of mention is also the use of new technologies under the change strategy Fostering Innovation and Change for Children, through the innovative payment mechanism for incentives, and the monitoring tools and programmes used for end-line supply monitoring of education materials, and to mount surveys amongst SVEPs on timeliness of incentives and feedback on training and other issues.

4.5.3 INEE Minimum standards for education in emergencies

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155 UNICEF strategic plan 2013-17 p5,6
157 UNICEF STRATEGIC PLAN 2018-21p.22
UNICEF has conformed to these standards through the development of the EPMS, which includes teachers as well as other education personnel such as administrators and focuses on their recruitment and selection, conditions of work and support and supervision (Standards 1 through 3). For example, INEE Minimum Standard 2 states that:’ Teachers and other education personnel have clearly defined conditions of work and are appropriately compensated.” Until the establishment of an incentive scheme, UNICEF paid $400 in three instalments to SVEPs while training them for the TACs during 2013-14. Then, the EPMS spelled out the strategy for a system of incentive payment in 2014.

Through the development of the EPMS, after some early selection procedures were noted as non-transparent, UNICEF worked with MoNE to adhere to the principle in the INEE Minimum Standards which specify that ‘the identification, recruitment and selection of teachers and other education personnel should be non-discriminatory, participatory and transparent.”

In accordance with the CCCs and the INEE guidelines for Education in Emergencies, SVEPs and Turkish teachers were trained in issues of classroom management and psychosocial support.

**4.5.4 Turkish Teacher Standards**

In order to align with the Turkish system, the 2014 EPMS outlined three categories of SVEPs.

- **Category I**: Syrian vice principals or deputies who have extensive teaching backgrounds and qualifications serve in a support capacity to the MoNE coordinator as part of the management team for a 40-hour work week
- **Category II**: Syrian teachers who have completed some university and teach a minimum of 20 hours per week. Subject teachers should have a specialization in that subject; and
- **Category III**: Syrian teachers who have volunteered to teach but have no university degree or teaching experience and who teach less than 15 hours per week.

In addition, the three training courses for SVEPs in 2016-17 adhered to the number of hours and minimum content to ensure accreditation in the Turkish system.

**4.5.5 Conclusion**

The Evaluation Team concludes that UNICEF adhered to and utilised the appropriate international and national norms and standards. All these are based on HRBA in education. While the TOCs do not explicitly describe these principles, they are largely incorporated in substance, and UNICEF might have felt better able to work with MoNE if proposals are proposed in a more technical manner. However, the principles of “Child-friendly, safe and healthy environments” (which has been raised in a previous section in Barriers to education in relation to the issue of bullying and discrimination) and “The right to respect in the learning

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158 “INEE defines the term ‘teachers and other education personnel’ widely. It includes ‘classroom teachers and classroom assistants; early childhood or pre-school teachers; educators of people with disabilities; subject specialists and vocational trainers; facilitators in child-friendly spaces (CFSs); community volunteers, religious educators and life skills instructors; head teachers, principals, school supervisors and other education officials.’


161 MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION; AFAD; UNICEF August 2014 - MANAGEMENT STRATEGY for EDUCATION PERSONNEL PROVIDING SERVICES TO SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN TURKEY Draft v9 p 13)
environment which includes: respect for identity (as well as Respect for participation rights and Respect for integrity) form the basis of the recommendation to adopt a Whole School Approach as one approach to mitigate these issues and promote social cohesion and peace-building.

The Evaluation Team also concludes that, in agreement with the Synthesis of UNICEF Evaluations of Humanitarian Action 2010 to 2016, (UNICEF Evaluation Office June 2017) some of these international instruments (here the CCCs) do not make adequate provision for large-scale protracted refugee crisis such as the one in Turkey. Furthermore, the Evaluation team is sympathetic to the consultations underway to revise the DAC criteria for Evaluations, partly in the light of similar considerations, in particular in relation to sustainability.

\[162\] The evaluation of UNICEF’s response to the Syria regional crisis found that the CCCs lacked coherence with the crisis’ specific characteristics: a protracted crisis in a middle-income context with a strong protection component.\[162\] The conclusion of the 2015 evaluation study (of which two current Evaluation team members were a part) that the CCCs need revising remains the view of the current Evaluation team. The CCCs are not adapted to protracted crisis and are apparently under revision.\[162\]
5 Conclusions

The purpose of this section is to bring together more strategic conclusions, which can contribute to recommendations for ways forward.

The evaluation concludes that the three components under consideration were a very relevant response from UNICEF to support the Government of Turkey in managing education for Syrians under temporary protection. Many gains have been made in a difficult policy environment and changing context. All of these three components are inter-related and each would be weaker without the other.

The three components have been fit-for-purpose up to the present time with minor limitations, for example limited information of the effectiveness of training on quality education. Worthy of special mention are the innovative components: YOBIS; the system for paying incentives; and the UNICEF monitoring system. Alongside this, the EPMS itself and its components separately have provided crucial support.

While it is difficult in some respects to evaluate the performance of UNICEF in an operating environment where they are not in control, UNICEF has provided high quality technical assistance through its own staff and consultants to support and advise the GoT, which plays the leading role in all initiatives. UNICEF has supported the government with key inputs for both emergency operations and systems development, while quietly advocating on behalf of children for greater coverage, inclusion, and quality in education programmes. UNICEF’s relationships with the Government at senior management level and the respect accorded the agency by government and other partners has considerably facilitated progress. The value placed on the relationship with UNICEF by MoNE was obvious during the evaluation exercise.

The Evaluation team concludes that UNICEF used its mandate and resources well. Importantly, UNICEF worked with government to develop mechanisms and instruments for planning and governance (in addition to the existing formal mechanisms for the country programme of cooperation), specifically the EPMS. It has enabled all three components to be formally reviewed and developed as the need arises. UNICEF also assisted the Government to develop its existing systems, in the form of student registration for newcomers (YOBIS) and teacher training for both SVEPs and Turkish teachers. UNICEF was thus working at several levels both concurrently and sequentially - emergency response, systems development and resilience, enabling continuity of support to the government and education of Syrian children.

Without the above support, the Turkish government may have been left with a much larger problem of disengaged youth, out of school children, and the consequences this would fuel. As the largest agency in the education response, UNICEF’s contribution to the results of the Government of Turkey’s efforts to educate Syrian children has been useful and important.

It was noted that GoT has borne the majority of the costs of the response and its governance, and its officials and institutions have come under some strain. This is even more severe now, with the integration of Syrian students into the Turkish education system. One of the factors contributing to the early response and enabling UNICEF’s support to the education of Syrians UTP, was, and remains, the continuing commitment of the government to educating Syrians, and, now, to provide equitable service provision and full integration. The government has also been strong in its leadership in the response and has well developed institutions in its system to channel the assistance UNICEF and other agencies have offered.
It should also be noted that there are no quick fixes in this situation (if indeed, in education at all), and that if the right strategies are selected, continuous support is absolutely crucial to the outcomes for children. In this respect UNICEF support in education for Syrian children UTP, including the three components under evaluation, has remained and continues to remain relevant.

5.1.1 Gender issues
It was difficult to ascertain whether UNICEF has addressed the different needs of girls and boys. The area where girls’ needs are greatest, secondary education, is being addressed by a separate TOC, leading the team to conclude that UNICEF has been aware of the need to differentiate, but perhaps initially not able to bring it high on the agenda. Going forward, there are issues within the schools, some older Syrian girls preferring to be in separate classes. However, there have been some gains: because there were more (53%) female SVEPs than males, professional benefits accrued more than equally to women. These benefits may not be available elsewhere. Equally, financial incentives benefitted the same percentage of female SVEPs.

5.1.2 YOBIS
Had YOBIS not been developed, 650,000 Syrian children who are now known to have enrolled in formal education may have remained invisible, and their engagement in any form of education difficult to track. This was particularly important once the influx began to settle in communities rather than TACs.

The Evaluation team noted that the focus of YOBIS was on moving data up the system and providing students with reports. It was not clear how much the data was used in the improvement of quality in classrooms in the TECs. Despite this, the system fits well with its purpose, and is now proving its usefulness for other needs. The system provides the Turkish government, which took ownership in 2016, with the means to register all newcomers in education, including in the future. Turkey is a country with a history of accepting newcomers, and is a transitional country for migrants. Therefore, this is likely to be a crucial system in future for meeting the needs of children in education and helping them to realise their rights.

YOBIS is a good example of an innovation addressing the need for data in education in an emergency and protracted crisis. It also a good example of a system strengthening initiative in education in emergencies supported by donors through UNICEF, and ensuring a sustainable way of integrating data and information of refugee children into government systems utilized for planning, programming and decision making as well as being useful for advocacy.

5.1.3 SVEPs and INCENTIVES
As discussed above, without SVEPs the education of Syrian children would have been less satisfactory, as they provided the backbone of a system which encouraged children to attend school in their mother tongue and with a more familiar curriculum. UNICEF’s support to the government in the recruitment, regulation and motivation of SVEPs, through its technical assistance and advocacy, fundraising for the incentives, and monitoring system was vital in this process. The partnership between the Government of Turkey, PTT and UNICEF is very innovative and has provided a model for other sectors.

However, neither the SVEP cadre nor their incentives are sustainable in the long term. The opening made by the government for some Syrians UTPs to be employed is helpful, but few of the SVEPs are qualified to teach in classrooms under the government system, even those qualified in Syria, as there is no equivalence between the two systems. It is unclear how ready the government is, for political reasons, to qualify and employ Syrian teachers when there are a substantial number of Turkish teachers unemployed and a cadre of Turkish contract teachers employed by PIKTES, whose future is also uncertain in the long term.
In this respect, UNICEF has adopted the best course of action and worked with the government to outline new roles for SVEPs in the Turkish education system, in TPSs as well as PECs and other institutions for the short to medium term. If effectively implemented, there would be a great benefit for SVEPs to accompany children transferring to the Turkish Education System.

UNICEF’s support for the establishment of the SVEP working group has provided the mechanism with which to articulate the future of SVEPs in the Turkish Education system. Beyond this, searching for opportunities for SVEPs in other related programmes such as the Out-of-School children study, and outside education, on other income support programmes, should be pursued.

5.1.4 Professional development

The evaluation team concludes that without this component SVEPs may have been less equipped to carry out their roles, and Turkish teachers may have been less able to manage their increasingly diverse classrooms. It has been a vital course of action to provide appropriate education opportunities to Syrian children through: firstly addressing teacher training needs as a priority; and secondly then to support and progress from the provision of emergency response training in 2013 to support MoNE in the design and implementation of a series of training courses, compatible with the requirements of the Turkish teacher training system.

A lack of baselines on performance in the classroom\textsuperscript{163}, limited follow-up, and no system for performance assessment of SVEPs in their classrooms, prevents a more confident claim to the effectiveness of the training sessions, and the Evaluation team noted the desire from SVEPs for more practical and flexible modes of training. Notwithstanding the core teaching and learning materials supported by UNICEF, other elements which would have supported the training were reported to be less present—a professional support and supervision system for SVEPs in their classrooms and an enhanced supply of sufficient interactive teaching and learning materials for both SVEPs and Turkish teachers.

The evaluation found a potential lack of coherence between UNICEF supported activity and PIKTES. This is specifically in training Turkish Teachers. There is a need to define more clearly the roles of both initiatives.

5.1.5 Moving Forward

The education of Syrian children and the education system itself is in flux. Transition/integration is demotivating for some Syrian children who expressed concerns over the reduced teaching of their other subjects when so much time was given to learning Turkish. Children (Syrian and Turkish) and teachers involved in this process are experiencing some form of anxiety, an unfortunate phenomenon when Syrians are already affected by conflict and displacement. The evaluation team concluded that school leadership is key to the current needs and future wellbeing of the education system and all within it, and the school as an institution is key in the wider integration process and support to children under stress.

One lens which is badly needed moving forward for the three components under evaluation is how each of them separately and combined can reduce the observed anxiety, which is very common to large-scale change, but is rarely addressed with the participants in mind. UNICEF needs to consider how it can support MoNE to strengthen its psychosocial support to students particularly within the current two-year period.

\textsuperscript{163} In the early years of the Syrian crisis everyone thought that it would be over within months or a year, so there was limited thinking around establishing and measuring baselines.
On a positive note, UNICEF has the opportunity to support benefits to more than Syrian children and SVEPs. UNICEF’s presence since 1951 has made them a trusted partner for the government. It has used its convening power to raise funds, especially in the current crisis, provided leadership within the 3 RPs, supported Turkey with high calibre technical assistance, and provided opportunities for sharing and displaying Turkey’s innovations and support to refugees. The new country programme will regard Syrians as a vulnerable group within a more comprehensive strategy to support equity and quality in education. This is testimony to the desire of both Turkey and UNICEF to provide benefits in education equitably for all children, and is consistent with the MoNE’s plan and vision for Education 2023.

The Evaluation Team concludes that as key pillars of any education system, the components under evaluation have a continuing role to contribute to the education system as a whole in future, as long as they develop along with the changing context. YOBIS is needed as a continuing system in which to register children arriving in Turkey in education programmes, and ensure their visibility in education, given Turkey’s geopolitical position.

UNICEF can provide important support to MoNE to promote the continuation of SVEP support in the integration of Syrian children UTP into the education system, at least in the medium term. Beyond that, UNICEF advocacy and technical assistance to MoNE for Syrians to qualify as regular teachers or to be absorbed into the education system in other roles, is needed, along with the need to work with other partners for employment opportunities outside the education sector.

UNICEF support for training and orientation for new roles of SVEPs within the education system is needed. As crucial is the professional support needed for the new challenges faced by Turkish teachers.

If UNICEF and the government wish to adopt more development/resilience programming, then emergency funding from donors may not be able to cover it. Turkey is a high-middle income country and, therefore, ineligible for development funds. On the other hand, given economic pressures and a public high level statement emphasizing the need for international contributions to cover costs associated with hosting Syrians, it is unlikely that the national budget could be made available to cover the costs of a durable solution for SVEPs in particular, either as volunteers or teachers, as a component of the education of Syrian children. Despite donor funds being available for 2019-2020 for paying SVEP incentives, the future is very uncertain. Both UNICEF and the government are mindful that the income status of up to 13,000 Syrian adults and their families could deteriorate (and 53% of them are female).

The possibility that SVEPs could be targeted for inclusion in other income generation or skills-based programmes offered by other agencies is a further option for UNICEF to work on, and including SVEPs in national safety net programmes could also be considered.

A major conclusion of the evaluation is that factors relating to social cohesion need to be addressed. The issues of discrimination and bullying, which appear to be consistent with hardening of social attitudes more generally, could be addressed if the ethos of the school and classroom were addressed in a holistic way. The hardening of social attitudes towards Syrians is mirrored in the school, notwithstanding examples of benevolent action such as joint activities, which UNICEF also supports. The evaluation team suggests that where certain factors come together, they could have a tendency to ignite tensions. These factors appear to be: an oversupply of SVEPs in one institution; concentration of Syrian students in schools and classes, sometimes forming the majority; and limited capacity of Syrian students, parents and SVEPs to communicate well in the Turkish language. An outcome of this situation is the seemingly increasing instances of discrimination and bullying.
Several of these factors are outside the remit of the current exercise, but unless addressed may compromise the implementation and impact of UNICEF-supported interventions. This is particularly the concentration of large numbers of Syrian students in specific locations. At the same time, UNICEF interventions such as meaningful training in this area could help to mitigate the effects of social tensions.
6 Lessons Learned

The crisis in Turkey has a number of unique characteristics. Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, of whom half are children, giving rise to a massive school-age refugee population. Most of these do not share the language of the host country, or have a foreign language in common, and the Government of Turkey has provided strong leadership from the start of the crisis, including financing accommodation of the refugees in the early stages of the crisis. While documentation from other similar situations exists, it is not well developed as a body of knowledge. The Turkish government has had to learn over time how to manage its unique situation in education and UNICEF has needed to learn what kind of support to provide to an existing well developed education system and how to provide it. The following are some of the lessons that could be learned by UNICEF globally from the situation so far.

- Supporting the education system itself to develop systems and mechanisms (YOBIS, incentives, certified training) has been key to ownership of initiatives and the sustainability of learning paths for refugee children, and can address scale across the nation or particular group of vulnerable children.
- Instruments such as the EPMS and structures such as the working Group on SVEPs, have provided useful formal mechanisms through which focussed discussion and advocacy can take place with MoNE.
- A good monitoring system has been found to be crucial to provide evidence for advocacy with government and accountability to donors. It has also provided necessary feedback for improvement of systems and services.
- In the absence of needs analyses in the early stages of the crisis, international norms and standards became the focus of developing well targeted programmes in the short term, emphasising the importance of feeding in this experience to those norms and standards.
- Temporary or volunteer teachers are necessary in a crisis situation, and incentives contribute to their motivation and coping strategies, but cannot be sustained either financially or when refugee students are integrated into the national system. Alternatives to volunteer teaching for these volunteers need to be planned for in advance.
- The payment of SVEP incentives through a tripartite agreement between the private sector, a government ministry and UNICEF has demonstrated the efficacy of such a partnership.
- The need for streamlined processes within UNICEF was shown to be key in the timely payment of incentives to SVEPs and in recruitment of staff.
- After initial emergency training for volunteer teachers, meeting the standards and requirements of the host country system for training is important. Certification for volunteer teachers, to facilitate future employment, and for children to enable their progression through education is crucial.
- The establishment of a registration system for refugees in education has been crucial to fulfilling the right of refugee children to education. Further, the design of the system which is able to communicate to the national EMIS system has facilitated integration of refugee students into the national education system.
- In order to fulfil the broad aim of access to a quality education for refugees, a multi-sectoral approach has been needed particularly for out-of-school children and adolescents. In this case cash transfers, psychosocial counselling, outreach to parents and communities have all been employed as necessary parts of such an approach.
• Within the education environment it has been apparent that differences between the systems of education of host and newcomers influence behaviour in schools (one example is the use of corporal punishment in one system, which is forbidden in the other) and need to be understood by all personnel, not just the refugees learning about the host system. Ignoring the lived experiences of refugee teachers and children in their own systems can be a factor in poor social cohesion in schools.

• In a situation such as this where the host country language is different from the language of the new arrivals, language acquisition from an early age is crucial, as it has been reported in this evaluation and other studies that older children have difficulty learning a new language and this affects their integration into the education system and society and may be a cause of dropout. For parents it is key to their involvement with their child’s education and the school itself.

• The absence of key life skills education, such as IT and language learning, can leave refugee students, volunteer teachers and parents behind and unable to participate meaningfully in education and civic affairs, thereby increasing inequity.

• Noting the implications of such a large influx of refugees on relations between host communities and newcomers, a strong and well defined approach to social cohesion, including within schools, is needed, as the refugee crisis continues to strains basic education infrastructure and services, including within schools themselves. In any similar crisis, this needs to be anticipated and planned for.

• The evaluation team further suggests that there are lessons to be learned about the process of integrating a large number of foreign students into a national system: in particular, ensuring quality is maintained while ‘winding down” of temporary schools is in process, and that students are supported through this transition; in addition, schools in the national system need to be ready, and its personnel prepared to accept students of a different culture (and potentially traumatised). There are documented experiences from other countries, but as yet no global standards for the length of the integration process and each situation will be unique. Internationally, Turkey is being looked at for lessons to share. Early planning for this situation could well play a role in the promotion of social cohesion, and the type of support that UNICEF would be well placed to provide.

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7 Recommendations

The recommendations in this section have been derived from the findings and conclusions of the current evaluation, reviewed literature (which contains, case studies, conceptual frameworks, research and norms and standards, including the HRBA approach for education) included in the bibliography, and the substantial experience of the evaluators in similar contexts at all levels of an education system, in other sectors, and with various international agencies, including UNICEF.

As this is an evaluation of UNICEF support, the evaluation team proposes recommendations on UNICEF’s role in the future of Syrian children’s education, particularly the three components under evaluation, which it recommends to continue. It provides suggestions for the final two years of the current CPD as well as beyond (only one year now remains in the current CPD, but there is a need for some action for the second half of 2019).

As described in the Evaluation Approach, two consultative meetings on the findings were held with UNICEF staff, for validation of the findings and the discussion of recommendations. In addition KIIIs with stakeholders in agencies and governments and FGDs with school principals, teachers, children and parents sometimes produced suggestions (incorporated in this report) and recommendations, one of which came from PDoNE for UNICEF to decentralise funding, which UNICEF advised was not possible within the government framework of cooperation. Further meetings are planned during which the evaluators will present the findings to a wider group within and outside UNICEF and discuss the feasibility of recommendations made, as well as consider new ideas from the stakeholders.

7.1 Overall education strategy

Recommendation 1: Work with government to strengthen a comprehensive approach and plan for the education of Syrian children under temporary protection, and others, according to international norms and standards. (HIGH PRIORITY)

- Utilise the OECD Holistic model for the educational integration of refugee children in the new CPD to address the education of refugees within the Turkish Education System and use it for monitoring.
- Within the parameters of the new CPD, develop an integrated TOC for education utilising an HRBA framework along with the systems framework mentioned above. The use of these two and the PACT framework for capacity building would provide a theory-based structure to the TOC and could be used alongside the situation analyses and evaluations of practice and implementation to provide a robust approach to programming.

7.2 Integration

Recommendation 2: Work with government to highlight factors which could assist the integration of Syrian children into the Turkish education system. HIGH PRIORITY

165 Several of the recommendations are informed by the HRBA in education. Most specifically Rec 2 which focusses on the best interests of the child, and Rec 3, which utilize largely domains 2 and 3 of the framework - The Right to Quality Education and the Right to respect in the learning environment p.28.

• Propose a study on the integration of Syrian children into the Turkish education system, to understand the factors which can assist children’s integration. Take into account the pace of integration (a comparative study which includes Mersin, for example) and children’s perspectives.
• Ensure that the design of such a study includes investigating the factors that are contributing to social tensions, such as large numbers of Syrian children in any one school or class, concentrations of SVEPs, language capability of SVEPs and Syrian children.
• Support interactive and child-centred teaching and learning materials for Turkish language as a matter of urgency HIGH PRIORITY
• Under the auspices of the EPMS, develop a school-based support strategy for children moving into the education system. This could include, for example, a designated teacher and SVEP at each school for overseeing the process, small tutorial groups comprised of students from all backgrounds, structured processes of feedback from teachers, SVEPs and children, and the involvement of Turkish and Syrian parents. Provide guided opportunities in the curriculum for students of both cultures to share their backgrounds. Consider a system of peer buddying across cultures. This would be synergistic with the recommendation on a Whole School Approach below.

7.3 Whole-school approach

Recommendation 3: Work with MoNE to adopt a whole school approach for developing quality education, professional development within it, and strengthening social cohesion, for the next CPD. MEDIUM PRIORITY

• Utilise the need to improve PISA scores as an entry point for advocating a whole school approach to quality inclusive education
• Utilise findings from Focus Group discussions with children and teachers which present views of students on their education
• Build empathy of education personnel and students towards each other through meaningful participatory exercises and activities
• Build the ethos of the school to include respect for diversity, including gender issues, commitment to helping others, positive discipline, celebrating culture and achievements, in accordance with the principles of a rights-respecting school.
• Build the capacity of school principals to provide leadership not only academically, but in integration of students and education personnel, social cohesion, and peace-building activities, learning from examples in the field
• Support the introduction of team teaching, or a hybrid of that with teacher assistants (including SVEPs) to meet the needs of children in classes.
• Support strategies for-appropriate education in schools and classes according to age, gender and ability
• Work across schools so that personnel can see practical solutions in practice

• Develop systems based on good practice for the involvement of parents and community in the life of the school and assistance to their children, including Turkish language lessons for parents (look at UNDP model for home-based access to learning)
• Develop school-based feedback systems for staff, parents and students to provide continuous feedback and improvements in quality education in the school
• Strengthen systems of psychosocial support to students (and SVEPs) within the school.

7.4 SVEPS

Recommendation 4: Work with MoNE and other Government departments where relevant, to sustain remuneration for SVEPs. HIGH PRIORITY (because of the time this would take)

• In the short-term, close the gap between the raise in the minimum wage and the raise in level of incentive payment
• Advocate to donors the need to continue incentive payments during this transition period, assuming SVEPs can be properly installed in their new roles, at least for the extra year following the October 2019-20 phase, for which UNICEF already has funding committed.
• Continue to collaborate with MoNE to develop a modality for contracting Syrians as teachers and in other roles such as facilitators for Early Childhood Education and youth programming, and outreach workers to bring out-of-school children into the education system. Ensure that females do not lose out in any reduction or reassignment of SVEPs.
• Support MoNE to look into alternative methods for financing SVEPs who find themselves surplus to requirements following the above-mentioned redeployment.
• If the national budget does not enable the government to support SVEPs, or are unable to relocate, work with other agencies to procure a livelihood for SVEPs within national safety net systems or employment schemes developed for refugees.

Recommendation 5: Work with government to highlight the need and plan for distribution of SVEPs across geographic locations as well as various institutions.
HIGH PRIORITY

• Under the auspices of the EPMS, and the newly formed Working Group on SVEPs, map the geographic locations of SVEPs in detail at various institutions to highlight concentrations of SVEPs and gaps where they could play a role
• From monitoring data UNICEF could show where there are concentrations of SVEPs at particular institutions
• Support MoNE at all levels to develop and implement a plan for equitably distributing SVEPs geographically according to need, both in TPSs and other institutions
• Propose a pilot to redistribute SVEPs which, should provide information on both financial and social costs of redeployment and if successful, could be scaled up by a larger funder (for example, the EU)
• Consider an allowance as an incentive and to mitigate against increased cost for travel or relocation. Tap into donor budgets for security and social cohesion as well as education

Recommendation 6: Work urgently to implement the decisions of the EPMS working group on the role of SVEPs. HIGH PRIORITY
• Support MoNE to ensure that all school Principals have received and are implementing the proposals for the new roles of SVEPs, as outlined in the letter of 16th October 2018
• Use examples of utilization, which exist, to share ways of utilising SVEPs in the Turkish Education System
• Work with MoNE to identify a formal category of Teaching Assistant, which might be more accessible to SVEPs, and more affordable
• Support MoNE at all levels to develop and implement a monitoring system for feedback on the redeployment and utilisation of SVEPs in new roles both in TPSS and other institutions
• Collect evidence by increasing school visits to verify new roles and provide qualitative feedback (FGDs) from SVEPs, school principals and students twice in each year, to complement the representative sample at national level provided by the surveys. It is recommended that UNICEF further define “teaching” roles and “other” in their questions. UNICEF might need third party monitoring to expand coverage of qualitative feedback

7.5 Training and capacity development

Recommendation 7: Work with MoNE to develop a more holistic approach to capacity development for education personnel. MEDIUM PRIORITY

• Support workshops at various levels utilising the PACT model (explained in https://www.pactworld.org/sites/default/files/WhitePaper%20on%20Capacity%20Development_Pact.pdf) to provide an internationally robust framework, to outline who needs capacity development, and what modes of development can be made to support the continuous professional development of education personnel, and improve quality education in the school and system.

Recommendation 8: Assist MoNE to design and implement training for SVEPs in their new roles. MEDIUM-HIGH PRIORITY

• Ensure that training of SVEPs increases their future employability, through continued adherence to Turkish standards and certification.
• Ensure that any training course is practical, and trainers are credible (i.e. experienced in the classroom)
• Provide opportunities for SVEPs to articulate amongst themselves the differences and difficulties in the culture of schooling between the Syrian and Turkish education systems
• Develop new modalities of supporting and accessing training, including on-line access
• Strengthen the existing Turkish system or develop and implement a new professional support and supervision system for SVEPs, which is carried out in the classroom or institution, until SVEPs are contracted as teachers in the system.
• Ensure that sufficient teaching and learning materials for students and SVEPs are available for implementing their roles and are relevant to student needs, including being gender neutral and otherwise inclusive. Language learning materials need to be interactive.
• Support Turkish language teaching and proficiency for SVEPs
• Strengthen modules on psychosocial support to students and channels of support for SVEPs who need them.

**Recommendation 9: Assist MoNE to develop further training for Turkish teachers to manage multicultural classes.**  
**HIGH PRIORITY**

• Carry out a rigorous analysis of training needs of students and teachers in the transition phase of integration, and beyond.
• Ensure that training is practical and uses examples from good practice, including gender sensitivity and inclusiveness
• Provide opportunities for SVEPs and Turkish teachers to jointly learn about the differences in their school and wider cultures and systems
• Support face-to-face training with on-line material
• Assist the development of the supervision system to incorporate new needs and responses
• Ensure that sufficient teaching and learning materials for students and teachers are available for implementing their roles and are relevant to student needs, including being gender neutral and otherwise inclusive
• Strengthen modules on psychosocial support to students
• Ensure clarity, both programmatic and geographical between PIKTES initiatives and those of UNICEF, and pursue avenues for stronger co-ordination.

### 7.6 YOBIS

**Recommendation 10: Maintain support to YOBIS for training and system development. MEDIUM PRIORITY**

• UNICEF should still support training (as a useful way to remain engaged) to enable problem solving, and support the training of new users and for new fields. It should work with MoNE to develop an online training module, but maintain face-to-face training as it also provides a useful interface between the developers, implementers and users of the system
• UNICEF should assist MoNE to further develop and refine the system and utilize it for new needs, at the same time facilitating its continued use for new arrivals in Turkey.

### 7.7 Knowledge management

**Recommendation 11: Work with MoNE to profile the innovations from the three components globally within UNICEF and externally, consistent with guidelines on UNICEF’s role in Middle Income Countries. MEDIUM-LOW PRIORITY**

• Document each component including Lessons learned from which presentations and papers can be developed
• Identify platforms for promoting the innovations in addition to those already accessed, such as CIES and Oxford Conferences. Examples are the joint NORRAG/INEE initiative on data for Education in Emergencies\(^{169}\), the Journal on Education in Emergencies, the International Journal

of Education and Development, and the current review of tools for Education in Emergencies by INEE and UNHCR, as part of the Global Partners Project supported by Education Cannot Wait\textsuperscript{170}.

- Disseminate innovations and lessons learned within UNICEF globally, including any new financial and organisational modalities (for example the monitoring system)

**Recommendation 12: Contribute the experience of Turkey in addressing the large influx of newcomers and their integration into the Turkish education System to consultations on International Norms and Standards. MEDIUM-LOW PRIORITY**

- Provide lessons learned to the development of the CCCs underway within UNICEF\textsuperscript{171}
- Feed the experiences into the consultations on revision of the DAC domains for Evaluation\textsuperscript{172}, in particular on sustainability.
- With MoNE synthesise the experience of integrating Syrian students into the Turkish education system to provide lessons for the international community, including other countries, which could significantly affect children’s lives around the world.

\textsuperscript{170} https://inee.org/us/partners?utm_source=INEE+email+lists&utm_campaign=c9f5222523-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_04_03_11_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_710662b6ab-c9f5222523-25746001

\textsuperscript{171} https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/index_68710.html

\textsuperscript{172} http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/