

STUDY OF THE  
UNICEF NORTHERN CAUCASUS  
EMERGENCY PROGRAMME  
Nov 1999 to Dec 2002

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## **Executive summary**

The UN's stated objectives in the Northern Caucasus have from the outset included protection of the right not to be forcibly returned from Ingushetia to Chechnya, and more broadly the right to safety, in both cases in the context of international instruments and Russian legislation. The UN agencies, including UNICEF, have succeeded in providing a safe haven in Ingushetia by meeting basic needs and providing essential services, and the UN's engagement of the authorities through the provision of this assistance has helped to restrain the authorities from forcibly returning IDPs (although not always prevented it as the closure of Aki Yurt attests).

It is widely acknowledged however that the UN has not really been able to restrain the authorities in relation to the protection of civilians trapped in the conflict in Chechnya itself. In successive CAPs the UN agencies have accepted joint responsibility for this, but it has not been translated into effective action. This is partly because the UN agencies on the ground have different views of their responsibilities (driven in large part by fear of upsetting the Russian authorities and being asked to leave) and partly because even if unity of purpose could be achieved, the UN does not have the backing of influential countries to take a strong stand on Chechnya.

Notwithstanding the difficulties, it is recommended in this report that UNICEF 'stands on its mandate' in relation to the protection of children and women in Ingushetia and Chechnya, putting its positive image and credibility to maximum use, even if this involves some risk. The Country Office should start by defining the rights of children and women that need to be protected in the context of the Northern Caucasus and then determine (a) how sector based interventions in Chechnya (i.e. education, health, etc) could incorporate protection for children (particularly male adolescents) and women caught in the conflict and (b) which protection needs can't reasonably be expected to be met through sectoral programming and how they could otherwise be addressed. The latter is likely to require a stand-alone protection component, ideally involving several agencies working together.

It is recognised that Chechnya remains in security phase 5, with some areas completely off-limits, and that access by the UN is still limited to sporadic visits to Grozny conducted under extremely strict security. These are very considerable constraints, but not reasons for leaving to one side the main issue - the safety of civilians including children and women.

Protection has been highlighted because it remains the greatest challenge. UNICEF's performance in the education, health, mine/UXO, and water and sanitation sectors is discussed in the following paragraphs, followed by comments on management, monitoring and reporting, and the application of UNICEF standards and experience.

UNICEF is quite properly credited with having undertaken excellent work in the education sector in the Northern Caucasus, in which it is the lead agency. The work has been relevant and necessary, clearly within UNICEF's mandate to lead efforts to ensure children's access to basic education and, in the circumstances of displacement, preserve educational attainment. Moreover, basic education, recreation and sport do serve a protection function in so far as schools are normally safe environments, while recreation and sport are therapeutic and constitute an alternative to illegal, dangerous activities. This has worked well in Ingushetia, where school enrolment is now 85% for primary age children and 60% for secondary age children (even if it took longer to achieve than had been anticipated). In Chechnya, as a result of funding and security

constraints, UNICEF and its partners have only been able to provide limited assistance to education, principally the rehabilitation of a small number of damaged schools.

UNICEF's action in raising awareness about the dangers of mines/UXO and directly assisting victims has been important and the establishment of the IMSMA database has been an excellent initiative. Without detracting from the effort involved in mine awareness, it would be reasonable to question its effectiveness in changing behaviours in the absence of data to demonstrate results. Assistance to mine/UXO victims has been comprehensive and considerable with 260 victims fitted with prosthetics and orthotics and some degree of physical and psychosocial rehabilitation. UNICEF, however, should recognise that it has come to a crossroads. It can't support the Vladikavkaz prosthetic workshop in North Ossetia indefinitely. UNICEF needs to urgently develop a strategy for phasing out assistance to this workshop and help develop prosthetic, orthotic, rehabilitative and/or psychosocial capacity within Chechnya.

A large number of people in Ingushetia and Chechnya were assisted by UNICEF's provision of medical supplies and equipment, if only in a small way for some bulk items. It is impossible to say how many, because UNICEF has not had control over their final distribution. However, even if targets were not met and impact data is not available, preventative and curative aid provided through the MoH network and partners must have played a role in preventing the outbreaks of epidemic diseases that were initially feared and in decreasing morbidity related to communicable diseases and mother and child health.

The Representative's overall assessment is that although UNICEF's assistance in this sector has been useful, UNICEF has found itself playing a rather limited traditional supply-oriented role. This is not to say that UNICEF has not been focused. The assistance in rehabilitating the cold-chain and EPI is a case in point – very valuable, even if mainly involving supply.

UNICEF has managed to assume a key role in the provision of water and sanitation in Grozny, thanks to the partnership with the Polish Humanitarian Organisation. Very tangible results have been achieved: the considerable quantities of water provided remain indispensable and the attention to garbage collection and incineration of medical waste is smart. The main challenge now is sanitation, particularly the disposal of faecal waste. In Ingushetia, in contrast, UNICEF settled down into providing what could be described as well focused but limited assistance. UNICEF deserves credit for identifying a niche supply role (bladders, chloramide, etc), although it is evident that UNICEF stepped back from a potentially bigger role (although probably wisely under the circumstances).

The Consolidated Appeals for the Northern Caucasus have been relatively successful and UNICEF in particular has been very effective in raising funds (\$14.08 million from November 1999 to end 2002, representing 96% of the total requested). There have been, however, difficulties in the flow of contributions, most notably in 2002, where 60% of requested funds were not received until after September. The donors interviewed for the study were very positive about UNICEF – good profile as an agency, clear priorities and a good program with education a very strong component. This success does not come easily and the EP Coordinator spends the majority of his time liaising with donors and managing allocations.

Although the EP is well managed, there is no document that translates the CAP into a proper plan of work with targets, dates, indicators, etc. More rigour is required in the implementation of the EP and this calls for the development of rolling plans. In addition, transition plans are needed for each sector to support the shift in focus to Chechnya.

A weakness in the EP is the lack of application of UNICEF standards and experience. It was initially believed that IDPs would not remain long in Ingushetia, resulting in limited investments in staffing and training. Nevertheless, UNICEF has reached the point three years later where the EP, in terms of programming and staff, is insufficiently infused with UNICEF standards and experience. Putting it a different way, it is evident from talking to implementing partners about UNICEF's activities and from speaking to UNICEF staff that UNICEF is not adding value *as UNICEF* (as distinct from any other funding agency). Changing this will require familiarising staff and implementing partners with UNICEF standards and experience, training staff in their application, and reflecting them in performance indicators as well as in agreements with implementing partners.

Monitoring and reporting also needs to be strengthened substantially. There are two problems. Firstly, just as proper workplans have not been developed, performance in meeting targets and objectives is not tracked or reported systematically. Secondly, everything that is reported is at least partially intended for donor consumption (for example, through Annual Reports and SitReps). As a result, progress and performance are not assessed with sufficient frankness or rigour. UNICEF needs to make a commitment to intensify regular monitoring and reporting and apply more rigorous and systematic standards to test the effectiveness and efficiency of the EP. An internal reporting system, parallel with the existing external reporting, would enable managers to make decisions that can continually test progress and enhance performance.

## **1 Introduction**

### **1.1 Objectives of the study**

The objective of the study is to 'produce a document encompassing the description of the beginning, development, operational increase and implementation of the UNICEF Emergency Programme (EP) for the Northern Caucasus, including the full set of experience and lessons learned acquired between the end of 1999 and the end of 2002 and general comments on funding and resource mobilisation.' The terms of reference also provide that the study should 'include indicative advice/guidelines for future developments of the Programme' and that the study 'should be used as a baseline document for a comprehensive evaluation of the same programme in two to three years from now'.

The full terms of reference are attached (see **Annex A**).

### **1.2 Study method**

The study was undertaken in February 2003 by an external consultant, Bernard Broughton. A questionnaire was developed by the consultant and emailed to UNICEF managers and staff in advance of the study (see **Annex B**). The Emergency Programme Coordinator subsequently met with field staff and developed a preliminary list of lessons learned. The consultant reviewed key documents, including CAP documents and UNICEF Donor Updates, SitReps and Annual Reports. During a two-week visit, interviews were conducted in Moscow and in the Northern Caucasus (Vladikavkaz and Nazran) with UNICEF managers and staff, UN agencies, several partner NGOs and two donors. Visits were made to the Vladikavkaz Prosthetic Workshop in North-Ossetia and the Sputnik IDP camp in Ingushetia.

The itinerary incorporating the people interviewed is attached (see **Annex C**).

The study relies on the documents studied and the people interviewed. It was not possible in the time available to systematically cross check statements and reports on progress and reports. There was a high level of involvement of UNICEF managers and staff, arguably detracting from the independence of the study, but a necessity. Their contributions were invaluable. There was very limited consultation of beneficiaries and community leaders and no attempt was made to involve children and women in the conduct of the study.

The study report is structured according to sectors with the addition of sections on management, monitoring and coordination. Issues, opportunities, lessons learned and recommendations are included at the end of each section.

### **1.3 Context**

The Republic of Chechnya has undergone devastating instability and insecurity. There were major hostilities in 1994-96, which were re-ignited in September 1999. On this occasion more than 300,000 people (over 30% of the population of the republic) were displaced internally or to neighbouring republics. The capital, Grozny, suffered very heavy displacement and damage.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Grozny is said to have had 450,000 inhabitants in the '80s, down to 213,000 in 1997, and down to 90,000 in 2002.

The neighbouring republic of Ingushetia has hosted the largest number of IDPs by far and provided *relative* stability in terms of security and the government structure, which is not to say that the infrastructure was fully able to cope or that conditions were satisfactory for the IDPs. Some stayed with 'host families', some in IDP camps, some in 'spontaneous settlements'. In April 2001 the government stopped registering new arrivals, hampering access to the government's humanitarian assistance. Since June 2001, a growing number of IDPs have faced eviction from spontaneous settlements and host families.

In early 2000, several weeks into the crisis, there was a high of 200,000 IDPs in Ingushetia. Nearly three years later, at the end of 2002, the figure stood at 102,000<sup>2</sup>. This should not be taken to indicate a resolution of the conflict. IDPs returning to Chechnya are said to have been motivated by the bad living conditions in the camps, difficulties affording rents for those outside the camps, and pressure from the authorities. At the same time there have continued to be some flows out of Chechnya. The continued displacement is mainly a result of ongoing security operations. Other factors include damaged or destroyed housing and public infrastructure, the disruption to essential services, and the collapsed economy. Indeed the situation in Chechnya remained very difficult for both IDPs and non-IDPs at the end of 2002, with extreme insecurity and a high level of poverty. Resource transfers from the federal to the regional level to restore socio-economic life have been lower than planned. There has been no demining and there are approximately 500,000 landmines and UXO in Chechnya.

Displacement within Chechnya appears to have remained roughly constant. In October 2002 there were still 140,000 displaced people within Chechnya.<sup>3</sup>

The humanitarian operation in the Northern Caucasus is usually described as an emergency operation, which it is, but within Ingushetia at least it has largely settled down over three years into a care and maintenance operation.

#### **1.4 Humanitarian response**

A UN assessment team (which UNICEF participated in) visited Ingushetia and Dagestan from 3-8 November 1999. A UN Inter-Agency Flash Appeal for the 3 months 1 December 1999 to 29 February 2000 was issued on 23 November. There was a second inter-agency assessment mission in the first week of February 2000 and a CAP for the period 1 December 1999 to 30 June 2000 was issued in March. CAPs have been annual ever since.

The focus of UN action was then and still is on Ingushetia and the primary needs of IDPs for food, shelter, health and water and sanitation. Efforts have been made to shift the focus to Chechnya and the 2003 CAP sets a target of 60% of programming in Chechnya, but the security situation will make this difficult to achieve. The UN recognises that the size and scope of the humanitarian response in Chechnya is inadequate and that humanitarian needs remain largely unmet.

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<sup>2</sup> Danish Refugee Council (DRC) data

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

### **1.5 Establishing UNICEF staff and offices**

In October 1999 UNICEF opened an office in a UNHCR rented building in Stavropol, Stavropolsky Krai, 4-5 hours by road from Nazran, Ingushetia and deployed an international staff member on mission as the first Field Coordinator, Mr Rafik Kamarli who arrived in November 2000 from Kirgistan. Andrei Demidovich, coming from Kazakhstan, replaced him and served between March and June 2000. Both commuted between Moscow and Stavropol. A Programme Assistant, Ms Tatiana Degtyareva, was taken on in Stavropol in January 2000, who managed the office.

In January 2000 UNICEF opened an office in Vladikavkaz, North-Ossetia and recruited a Supplies/Logistics Assistant (Mr Georgi Meltauri). In February 2000 a third office was opened in Nazran, Ingushetia and a Project Assistant (Mr Artur Gagiev) was recruited. The move to the area of operations, Ingushetia, thus took three months - relatively slow. The office in Stavropol was closed in November 2000, at which time Ms Degtyareva's contract ended.

The first EP Coordinator, Mr Tony Raby, was recruited in January 2000 and he handed over to Mr Enrico Leonardi, the current EP Coordinator, in November 2000. Between October 1999 and April 2000, Mr. Fritz Lherisson served as Representative a.i. The Representative, Ms Rosemary McCreery arrived in Moscow in April 2000. The second Field Coordinator, Mr Rudi Luchmann, started in August 2000 and remained until September 2002, although he returned briefly for a handover in December to the current Field Coordinator, Ms Oyun Dendevnorov. The Field Coordinator has been based in Vladikavkaz throughout and commutes two to three days a week to the Nazran office.

### **1.6 UNICEF's initial contribution**

UNICEF's initial (emergency) assistance reportedly included the delivery to Ingushetia (mainly trucked from Stavropol 'piggy-backing' on UNHCR's operation) of 'school-in-a-box kits' and educational items (including pads, pencils, erasers, sharpeners, boards, chalk, etc.), children's winter jackets, collapsible water containers and tanks, and water purification tablets. Beneficiary numbers are not clear from the records. These were items bought in 1999 and presumably supplied by the end of the year. This represented a reasonably quick initial response. Between January and April 2000, emergency supply stepped up and included emergency health and MCH kits, oral rehydration salts, collapsible water containers and tanks, water purification tablets, and two mobile water purification units.

*Table 1: UNICEF procurement for Northern Caucasus, late 1999- April 2000<sup>4</sup>*

<b>Programme</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Procurement Items</b>	<b>USD</b>
Education	45,369 children aged 7 - 17	Pencils, erasers, pencil sharpener, boards, chalk, clays, pads, "School-in-a-box" kits, other education, winter jackets (size 4-14)	95 296

<sup>4</sup> Data provided by UNICEF, Moscow

Health & Nutrition	125,273 women (18+) and children (0-17)	Refrigerators, "Mother and Child Health" kits (MCH-A), emergency supply kits, vaccine carrier, cold box, ice pack, syringes, safety boxes, 7 tons of ORS (Oral Rehydration Salts), medical drugs	279 871
Water & Sanitation	160,284 IDPs and residents	Collapsible water containers (10, 17, 25, 50, 60 litres) and tanks (1,5, 5 and 10 cbm), water purification tablets, latrine kits (latrines and tents), 2 mobile water purification units	241 931

More systematic supply to assist IDPs in schools in Ingushetia commenced in May 2000 through the Ingush MoE and an NGO partner and included tents, textbooks, stationary and other non-food items. At the same time discussions took place that led to cooperation agreements for the establishment and management of alternative schools for IDP children.

Supplies were initially sourced offshore with few exceptions, but during 2000 there was more and more emphasis on local procurement with good results in terms of relative cost.

The four components of UNICEF's EP then took shape including education, mine action, health & nutrition and water & sanitation. UNICEF became the lead agency for education and mine action. The UNICEF EP gradually expanded through 2000 with the involvement of NGOs partners including PINF, ARD, PHO, IRC, CPCD, the Salvation Army and HWA.

UNICEF's response in each of the four sectors is discussed fully in following chapters.

### **1.7 Turning points**

The following turning points in the EP are taken from responses to the study questionnaire by the Representative, Emergency Programme Coordinator and former Field Coordinator:

- Opening of the UNICEF field offices in Vladikavkaz and Nazran in the beginning of 2000.
- Recognition in mid-2000 that engagement in the NC was likely to be long-term, leading to the decision to recruit an additional international staff member (Field Coordinator, July 2000) and to staff the Nazran office with a strong team (late 2000 onwards). At the same time it was decided to recruit actively for the Emergency Coordinator post rather than continuing to rely on temporary solutions.
- Decision by all agencies in late 2000 to go for a one-year (rather than 2 x 6-month) CAP which also facilitated planning for everyone and improved coordination among agencies. From then onwards (and particularly after the arrival of the new HC/DO in March 2001), the Humanitarian Coordination Group and Security Management Team became established and made routine, with beneficial effects on coordination.

- Progressive realisation among the agencies participating in the CAP on the need for clear ‘lead agency’ roles, resulting in UNICEF’s heading the Education and Mine Action sectors, and a reduction in duplication /gaps.
- Finalisation of the staff structure and main shaping of the programme between the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001.
- Increased UN access to Chechnya in Autumn 2001.
- Theatre raid by Chechen rebels in Moscow in October 2002: Increased pressure on the UN and its agencies. Increased military activities in Chechnya.
- Closure of the Aki Yurt Camp in December 2002: First tangible sign of dedication of the Federal and local Government to implement the “22-point plan” envisaging the return of all IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya.
- OSCE mission to Chechnya closed, March 2003: Sign of further increased pressure on the international community: the closure of the OSCE mission to Chechnya marks a significant setback in the struggle to protect human rights.

See further, Timeline of Key Events (**Annex D**)

### **1.8 Key constraints**

UNICEF’s participation in the response to the North Caucasus emergency has been limited by several significant constraints, the most important of which are described below:

#### *Security*

The biggest constraint has been and will presumably remain security, with negative consequences for access and the working environment for staff. It has been virtually impossible to access Chechnya, particularly since mid-2000, which has had a Phase 5 designation under the UNSECOORD system throughout the operation, making it extraordinarily difficult to assess needs and priorities or monitor progress. Field trips to Chechnya can be arranged through UNSECOORD New York but they are limited to day trips to Grozny in armoured vehicles with military escorts and no freedom of movement and thus no opportunity to do any independent work.

As a result, the UN has provided assistance to Chechnya through implementing partners. But INGOs face similar security problems and hindrances from the administration. Passes to access Chechnya are difficult to obtain and last a maximum of two months and although the UN was able to secure authorisation for the use of HF radio equipment in the NC, the NGOs are still not able to. Operations have often been disrupted when work has been suspended following each kidnapping of humanitarian staff.

It has been far easier to work in Ingushetia and assist IDPs there, although it has a Phase 4 designation and all international UN staff have had to live and move with armed escorts 24 hours a day. The specific security threat is kidnapping and abduction, whether for gain or politically-motivated. The more cautious approach adopted by the UN in recent years has reduced the extent of this phenomenon. From April 1995 to July 1999 fifty-two Russian and expatriate aid workers were kidnapped and an additional ten lost their lives. From October 1999 to the end of 2002 five were abducted and two killed.

*Relations with federal government*

UNICEF operates in a very tense political environment in Russia. UN programmes in the Northern Caucasus are not fully supported by the federal government and its position on many issues is ambiguous. There is little tolerance for anything perceived as criticism. (See further discussion of relations with authorities in Coordination chapter).

*Uncertain position of international community*

The position of the international community on humanitarian action in Chechnya has been uncertain if not weak and this has not helped the UN actors in the field. As everybody points out, Russia is not just any country and the dynamics are very much influenced by the interests of the west in drawing Russia into partnerships of various kinds, political, economic and commercial. The position of the international community has become even more fragmented since September 11, 2001 and the onset of the “war on terrorism”.

## **2 Humanitarian protection**

### **2.1 Protection needs**

It is well known that Federal forces are committing human rights abuses in Chechnya. The Council of Europe's Human Rights Commissioner Alvaro Gil-Robles recently referred to the 'atmosphere of impunity' reigning among Federal forces there and noted that cases of people disappearing during security sweeps has become more frequent since the deadly theatre raid by Chechen rebels in Moscow in October 2002.<sup>5</sup>

But there is limited space for any agency or organization to raise these issues with the Russian Federation. Agencies, organisations and individuals are all aware of the risk of being asked to leave. The over-riding problem is that the international community is not willing to criticize the Russian Federation over Chechnya, leaving the humanitarians with inadequate backing and vulnerable.

This problem is not going to go away. There has been considerable pressure from the federal government (and since the last election in Ingushetia the republican authorities) for IDPs to return to Chechnya. Two camps have been closed: Znamenskoye in Chechnya in July 2002 and Aki Yurt in Ingushetia on 1 December 2002. Some IDPs are now being deregistered from camps in Ingushetia<sup>6</sup> and it is anticipated that there will be renewed pressure for resettlement following the March 23 constitutional referendum. One humanitarian organisation referred to their fears of a 'spring of discontent'.

### **2.2 Overview of response**

The UN's formal objectives have from the outset included protection of the right not to be forcefully returned to Chechnya, and to a lesser extent on the right to safety, in both cases in the context of international instruments and Russian legislation. This is reflected in successive CAPs. The 2002 and 2003 CAPs also mention the *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (1998), although they do not have the force of an international agreement and the Russian Federation does not accept them.

UNHCR is the lead agency in relation to IDP protection and has protection officers in the field. But no single operational UN agency is responsible for the protection of civilians caught in the armed conflict. UN agencies working in the Northern Caucasus accept they have a joint responsibility for safety (reflected in the CAP) but this has not really been translated into effective action, in part because the UN agencies concerned are not united behind taking action. The head of one important UN agency actually said that the UN has no mandate to draw attention to abuses that the Russian Federation might be committing in prosecuting of the war in Chechnya, and that the safety of civilians is ICRC's responsibility, not the UN's.

This *disunity* hinders the UN's negotiations with the Russian Federation. Unity cannot be imposed – the Humanitarian Coordinator does not have this authority and

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<sup>5</sup> Moscow Times, February 17, 2003

<sup>6</sup> For example, during a visit to Sputnik IDP camp undertaken for this study it was learned that a woman was afraid to visit her sick brother in hospital lest she be deregistered during her absence (by the Chechen Refugee Committee). Several families had apparently been deregistered when absent. UNHCR is presumably aware of this practice.

individual agencies are free in the end to take their own line. There are even different views within agencies (including within UNICEF).

On the positive side UN agencies have done an enormous amount to protect the right to a safe haven in Ingushetia by meeting basic needs and providing essential services. Humanitarian engagement in Ingushetia, through education, health and other programmes, has helped to restrain the authorities from forcibly returning IDPs. UNICEF's support for alternative schools when enrolment of IDP children in public schools was contested is an example of this. Such actions have helped to establish the position of the IDPs in Ingushetia.

Nevertheless it needs to be remembered that the paramount reason why IDPs are in Ingushetia is the lack of security in Chechnya. The majority would presumably seek to remain there with or without assistance. This is the central problem but it is one that the UN seems unable to address satisfactorily. It also needs to be borne in mind that the international community is providing assistance that the Russian Federation is quite capable of providing and that a key justification for taking on these responsibilities is that it enables UN agencies, including UNICEF, to pursue protection.

### **2.3 Protection of children and women**

UNICEF initially joined with UNHCR in appealing for funds for the protection of IDPs,<sup>7</sup> however it was subsequently decided that UNHCR alone would appeal for protection funds while UNICEF undertook to:

‘... address complementary activities focusing on child protection issues in conjunction with the UNHCR programme and as part of UNICEF's assistance in the field of emergency education, psychosocial support, and mine awareness’.<sup>8</sup>

It is not clear precisely what this intended, but it seems to point to restraint on UNICEF's part in terms of taking on difficult child protection issues. When UNICEF was planning its programme for the second half of 2000 it was recognised that while there had been some achievements in sectoral components like education, health, etc. ‘little has been done in the protection sector where activities were in any event very broadly defined’.<sup>9</sup> Meaning presumably that no protection activities had really been defined outside sectoral programming. It seems that the rights of children and women were not properly defined at the outset (when planning the programme) and that this has never been rectified. It is probably also the case that there has been a lack of clarity about what protection means, in particular what protection needs can't be met through sectoral programming. These are the more acute protection needs arising directly from the conflict in Chechnya.

It is true that some forms of sectoral assistance can be modified to provide some protection in these circumstances, the most obvious example being the ‘child friendly spaces’ supported in Grozny. It is also true that UNICEF has advocated for children in the political arena and that in general UNICEF has been very principled, and seen to be so. It is also true that some CRC materials have been distributed. Nevertheless, it is

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<sup>7</sup> CAP 1 December – 30 June 2000 presented in March 2000

<sup>8</sup> CAP 1 December 1999- 31 December 2000 presented in July 2000

<sup>9</sup> North Caucasus: programme directions for UNICEF in the next Consolidated Appeal period (July – December 2000) (internal document).

plain that UNICEF has done relatively little to protect children and women from the conflict.

#### **2.4 Non-refoulement**

It is UNHCR's responsibility to apply the concept of non-refoulement (non forcible return) to IDPs in the Northern Caucasus. Other UN agencies and the donors generally believe UNHCR has not adequately discharged this responsibility. There is also frustration that UNHCR is not sharing information. UNHCR has also been criticised for serious gaps in its staffing in certain periods (including protection staff).

UNHCR's view (at least that of the Senior Protection Officer) is that there is confusion about UNHCR's mandate amongst the international community, resulting in unrealistic expectations: Protection of IDPs rests with the Russian Federation; UNHCR's role is to monitor the principles of safe haven and voluntary return; UNHCR can't intervene just because the government closes a camp to relocate citizens within the borders of a republic; UNHCR has to take at face value what the authorities say they are doing (i.e. merely relocating IDPs).

Indeed the view was expressed that OCHA should take on advocacy on protection matters on behalf of the international system. There is a lot of rationalising and passing the buck in this, nevertheless it is true that the UN has collective responsibilities, it is not just UNHCR. If there are weaknesses they are ultimately weaknesses in the UN system.

The closure of Aki Yurt was apparently a watershed for the UN agencies operating in the Northern Caucasus, marking a less cautious approach. On the one hand the UN's advocacy on the issue probably came together too late and did not prevent the closure of the camp. Although it was considered, no public statement was issued in New York. On the other hand, the UN agencies did come together like never before to advocate strongly that Aki Yurt not be closed and that the principle of voluntary return be respected. OCHA argues that the intervention has at least postponed the closure of other camps. The view of the Humanitarian Coordinator is that the UN has to continue to try to engage the Russian Federation to gain acceptance of protection issues.

#### **2.5 Issues, opportunities, lessons and recommendations**

##### Issues and opportunities

A number of field staff expressed the view that the EP could have had a stronger focus on rights and protection, some suggesting that the EP should have had the protection of children as its overriding objective, others that more attention could have been given to protection by having it as a separate component in the EP. The prevailing view has evidently been that the EP does not require a separate protection component because the whole programme is about protection. Many rights can be addressed by 'mainstreaming' protection through sectoral programmes, but the fundamental right to safety is plainly not adequately treated in this way in the context of Chechnya. Nor are the full range of CRC and CEDAW rights. Resisting this view involves taking too narrow a view of UNICEF's protection mandate.

But if UNICEF designed a stand-alone protection component, what would it include? Advocacy on behalf of male adolescents in Chechnya who are subjected to violence would be a good place to start. This could be tackled head on, or more circumspectly – whatever is most effective. A decision would have to be taken whether to pursue the

matter through advocacy or casework or both. Another important issue appears to be the difficulty women in Chechnya often face in getting to maternity units to deliver safely.

Would advocacy and/or casework of this type get UNICEF into trouble with the authorities? Possibly, however as was pointed out by one of UNICEF's main donors, UNICEF has earned a lot of credit with the Russian Federation with its 'friendly' Russia wide programme. Moreover, UNICEF has a uniquely positive international standing. With this standing and goodwill UNICEF can afford to push harder.

There are less confrontational issues as well that deserve to be taken up, including the granting of birth certificates to IDPs born in Ingushetia. Apparently newborns have not been registered for two years - parents are told to go to Chechnya to do it, despite legal provisions that should safeguard a citizen's right to be registered where he/she is born. The matter is covered directly by Article 7 of the CRC. There is potential to work with UNHCR on such issues given that UNHCR has the legal capacity. Indeed UNICEF could work with UNHCR to extend advocacy and casework to ensure that adolescents over 14 in Chechnya (non-IDPs) are granted national identity papers (a national passport) in accordance with the law. This would provide some modicum of protection given that one ground on which adolescents can be arrested is the lack of identity papers.

UNICEF also needs to do more to disseminate knowledge of the CRC. In this regard the director of one of UNICEF's education sector partners made the point that although UNICEF previously provided them with CRC booklets, these are not very useful on their own. Teachers need to be trained how to interpret or contextualise the rights. The point was also made that it is important to ensure that teachers present the rights in a way that does not bring the wrath of the authorities and parents down on them. Materials, tailored to the context of the Northern Caucasus, would need to be developed to assist the trainers. The Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) apparently held some training for teachers in Chechnya in human rights – their experience could prove useful.

CEDAW is mentioned occasionally in connection with UNICEF in the CAP, but it does not seem to have been adequately translated into programming (other than in a very general sense as support for MCH, etc). More needs to be done to identify activities that directly address women's protection issues.

#### Lessons

- The protection of civilians in armed conflict is very unlikely to be adequately addressed when the host government is intimidating and the international community provides inadequate support. This can manifest itself in a narrow interpretation of UN mandates, effectively leaving the protection of civilians in armed conflicts to ICRC.
- It might be theoretically possible for UNICEF to address CRC and CEDAW human rights through sectoral programmes (i.e. mainstreaming rights) without the need for a separate protection component. But it is evident that in practice opting not to develop a stand-alone protection component risks failing to adequately address fundamental protection issues, most notably relating to the safety of children and women.

- Materials on CRC (and CEDAW) need to be supported by training for those who are supposed to present them (e.g. teachers). The materials alone are unlikely to be effective and it is unwise to expect others to present them in the absence of training to enable them to interpret and contextualise children's (and women's) human rights and to do so safely without bringing the wrath of the authorities, community, parents or husbands down on them.

#### Recommendations

- UNICEF should 'stand on its mandate' in relation to the protection of children and women and put its positive image and credibility to maximum use, even if this entails some risk. As a first step the Country Office should define the rights of children and women that need to be protected in the context of the Northern Caucasus and determine (a) how sector based interventions in Chechnya (i.e. education, health, etc) could incorporate protection for children and women caught in the conflict (particularly male adolescents) and (b) which protection needs can't reasonably be expected to be met through sectoral programming and how they could otherwise be addressed. The latter is likely to require a stand-alone protection component.
- UNICEF should train trainers who can train teachers in Ingushetia and Chechnya in the presentation of the CRC to children. This should not be limited to schools in which there are IDP children.
- UNICEF should raise the issue of infants for which parents have not been able to obtain formal certification of their birth in Ingushetia with other humanitarian agencies/organisations including UNHCR, DRC and Memorial with a view to determining whether or not to collect more data on this problem and how best to take the matter to the relevant authorities.
- UNICEF field staff should inform the Field Coordinator about any matter they become aware of concerning pressure on IDPs to return, including the deregistration of IDP families residing in camps, so that the information can formally be passed on to UNHCR.
- Field staff should be made familiar with protection issues and UNICEF's policies, approaches and experience, to equip them to find opportunities to reflect the protection dimension in programming.
- UNICEF should continue to facilitate the establishment of more 'child friendly spaces' in Chechnya, if possible expanding this valuable aspect of the EP beyond Grozny.

### **3 Education**

#### **3.1 Education needs**

Even before the influx of IDPs into Ingushetia, not all children of school age could be accommodated into the existing Ingush education infrastructure. There were acute shortages of space, furniture, textbooks and recreational materials. The main challenge was to assist the school infrastructure to cope with the numbers, and to establish additional facilities in IDP camps and in or near spontaneous settlements.

In Chechnya, many school buildings were damaged or destroyed in the fighting and some are situated in the proximity of known mine fields. As a result many children are attending classes in alternative premises (such as rented private houses and tents). The lack of textbooks, school supplies and school furniture is even more acute than in Ingushetia. In many schools lack of heating poses a problem for winter.

In both Ingushetia and Chechnya, most pre-school facilities were either occupied by IDPs or no longer operating. Adolescents were at risk of involvement in illegal, dangerous pursuits and needed to be diverted into safe, constructive activities.

#### **3.2 Overview of response**

UNICEF has been the lead agency for education from the outset, maintaining links with other UN agencies concerned with education (UNHCR, WFP and, to a limited extent, UNESCO), liaising with the Ministers of Education of Ingushetia and Chechnya, and working with several implementing partners including People In Need Foundation (PINF), Hilfswerk Austria, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Center for Peacemaking and Community Development (CPCD), Agency for Rehabilitation and Development (ARD), and CARE International (specifically for psychosocial support to traumatised children). Regular coordination meetings are held in UNICEF's offices in Vladikavkaz or Nazran.

UNICEF's strategy in Ingushetia was to help provide a continuing programme of formal and non-formal educational and recreational activities for IDP children, assisting the Ingush MoE to cope with the influx by providing textbooks, furniture, etc and assisting NGOs to establish and maintain additional facilities principally by providing school-in-a-box/school-in-a bag kits.

The strategy in Chechnya was somewhat different and included rehabilitating and re-equipping schools to restore enrolment capacity and the quality of education. In both Ingushetia and Chechnya UNICEF attempted to provide a safe environment for pre-school age children by restoring and strengthening pre-schools and kindergartens.

By way of overview, the following supplies were reportedly procured and distributed in Ingushetia and Chechnya in the framework of the education sector in 2000-2002: 74 school-tents, 47,000 text-books, 700,000 pieces of stationery, 700 school-in-the-box kits, 10,500 items of recreational materials, 9,000 pieces of pedagogical materials, 15,000 pieces of sport materials, 11,000 Christmas gifts, 12,500 winter jackets, 12,000 winter boots, 2,700 items of school furniture, 9,000 kitchen utensils for summer camps.

### **3.3 Schools in Ingushetia**

#### 2000

UNICEF's initial response, reflected in the Flash Appeal 1 December 1999 to 29 February 2000, was to provide basic school supplies to the Ingush MoE to help it absorb IDP children.<sup>10</sup> The MoE estimated in early February 2000 that there were 61,000 school-age children among the registered IDPs and that almost half of them (some 29,000) were receiving some form of formal or non-formal educational assistance. UNICEF responded with 'school-in-a-box' kits<sup>11</sup> catering for 30,000 IDP children, distributed through the MoE from January 2000. UNICEF had also intended to provide a much smaller number of kits to the MoE in Dagestan, but the logistics of doing so were extremely difficult, the numbers small and the ICRC had plans to provide some assistance.

The Ingush MoE stated its intention to extend coverage to an additional 7,000 children through regular and tented schools in camps and some spontaneous settlements<sup>12</sup> and UNICEF accordingly revised its beneficiary target upwards to 36,000 school children, reflected in the CAP 1 December 1999 to 30 June 2000. In addition to school supplies, UNICEF began providing school furniture and teaching aids to the MoE.

To provide access to education to more IDP children, UNICEF also decided to support international NGOs to create tent schools in IDP camps and spontaneous settlements and, in a limited number of sites, to undertake minor repairs and improvements to existing structures that could be utilised. UNICEF then provided educational and recreational supplies to these schools. This involved support for 23 tented schools and 2 wooden schools for 5,046 children.

In mid-2000 the Ingush MoE started checking the number of school-age IDP children and the number enrolled and as a result substantially revised its estimates downwards from 61,000 to 50,000 for school-age IDPs, and from 29,000 to 15,170 for the number enrolled in an MoE formal or temporary school.<sup>13</sup> The MoE also announced that even while operating multiple shifts it would only be possible to find places for a maximum 16,700 IDP students when schools resumed in September (leaving 33,300 or 67% un-enrolled). The tent schools established by NGOs added to schooling capacity, but only by a few thousand initially. Thus when the CAP was revised in July 2000, UNICEF reduced its target beneficiary figure from 36,000 to 20,000 school children in Ingushetia. The difference, 16,000, was allocated to Chechnya (the allocation of 1,000 for Dagestan still remained).

In September 2000, UNICEF assisted the Ingush MoE and INGOs intending to work in the education sector (ARD, CPCD, IRC, HWA, PINF, Salvation Army the

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<sup>10</sup> What supplies/materials were actually provided from the Flash Appeal in the first 3 months?

<sup>11</sup> In each kit there are materials for 40 children and one teacher for six months.

<sup>12</sup> 11 tented schools for 3,577 children in all camps and some spontaneous settlements. Besides, MoE arranged in 17 regular schools of Ingushetia 76 classes for 1,140 IDP students.

<sup>13</sup> Enrolled in 96 state primary and secondary schools as well as 12 tent schools located in IDP camps. The tent schools mentioned were established by the MoE but when funds stopped after a few months NGOs took them over.

predecessor of Druzhba) to establish a database and organise a survey of IDP-focused activities in Ingush primary and secondary-level schools and temporary facilities.

In late 2000 (when the 2001 CAP was being prepared) it was reported that of the approx. 50,000 school age IDP children in Ingushetia, 32,000 were of primary school age (7-12 years) and 18,000 were of secondary school age (12-16 years). Of the primary school age IDP children, it was believed that less than 12,000 were enrolled (only 37%). The enrolment of secondary school age IDP children was thought to be even lower. Roughly half the IDP children enrolled in primary school were in MoE-run schools and MoE supported tent schools, and roughly half were in UNICEF supported NGO-operated tent-schools (by late 2000 set up in 32 locations and catering for 6,000 children). So despite the progress that had been made, approximately 20,000 primary school age children (63%) were still not enrolled.

The lack of physical infrastructure was the main constraint to be overcome. Lack of teachers was also a constraint, but teachers were found for the tent-operated schools from amongst the IDP community.

During 2000, UNICEF collaborated with UNHCR in the WatSan sector and some assistance was directed at schools, including plastic pit latrines provided at the end of 2000 that were not found to be very suitable.

At the end of 2000 UNICEF convinced the Ingush MoE to provide registration of IDP children attending school.

## 2001

For 2001 UNICEF set as its objective the school enrolment of *all* the IDP children in Ingushetia. This meant making a strong effort to establish more tented schools and/or construct wooden schools and/or rehabilitate schools presently closed down due to their poor state. This task was made easier by a substantial drop through 2001 in the estimated number of school age IDP children in Ingushetia – down from 50,000 to 32,000. By late 2001 (when the next CAP was being prepared) there were reported to be 23,000 children enrolled in MoE or NGO-run schools (72% overall including 85% primary school age enrolment and 60% secondary school age enrolment). This was a great result.

About 10,000 of the 23,000 were enrolled in MoE schools, whose enrolment capacity UNICEF has helped to increase through the provision of furniture, equipment and materials. The other 13,000 were enrolled in NGO-run alternative schools located in tents and wooden buildings (a doubling of capacity in one year), most of which were financed or partially supported by UNICEF. That left about 9,000 school age children not enrolled (about 28%).

## 2002

As in 2001, UNICEF continued to provide textbooks, stationery and school furniture to the MoE and NGO partners through 2002 to ensure schooling capacity for IDP children. Some difficulties were encountered in meeting commitments due to funding delays.<sup>14</sup> UNICEF also continued to help maintain the network of NGO-run tented and wooden schools, which by 2002 had been established in 56 locations near tented

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<sup>14</sup> E.g. see SitRep 42, May 2002

camps and spontaneous settlements. The number grew slightly to 59 locations by the end of 2002.

The 2002 CAP puts UNICEF's beneficiary target for IDP school-children in Ingushetia at 55,000, which seems odd given that the estimate at the end of 2001 was only 32,000. The EP Coordinator has pointed out that this figure was based on all children from 3 to 17 years of age (i.e. including pre-school age children). This may explain the basis for the figure but it still leaves it as an inflated or overambitious target.

The number of IDPs in Ingushetia declined further in 2002. By late 2002 it was estimated that there were 27,000 IDP children of school age, down from 32,000 in 2001. Of this number approximately 19,000 were enrolled, including 9,000 in regular schools and 10,000 in NGO-run schools. That left about 8,000 not enrolled (about 30%, a similar figure to 2001). The bulk of these were adolescents.

It was thought that this did not necessarily represent a lack of schooling capacity, rather that a large proportion of children had 'dropped out' of the school system for various reasons. It was learned that some children dropped out because they had been adversely affected by repeated displacements, missing many school years and having fallen behind. Some had physical or mental problems and their parents were thought to be embarrassed to send them to school. For others, generation of income was more important than education. The concern was that non-enrolled children, and others too in after school hours, generally had little to do, and were thus vulnerable to becoming involved in illegal and dangerous activities.

UNICEF's objective for 2002 included a special focus on 'drop-out' children, in order to guarantee access to basic education in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Special parallel classes were to have been developed for them. This did not eventuate on any scale although PINF arranged additional classes in the evenings and others like CPCD and IRC organised 'side-activities' (financed by UNICEF in the framework of the main PCAs for education).

UNICEF did however provide considerable support for recreational centres, sport projects, information and counselling centres, dance groups and other social and cultural activities in Ingushetia to reduce the risk of adolescents getting involved in dangerous or illegal activities (discussed in more detail below).

### **3.4 Schools in Chechnya**

#### 2000

The initial reports from local and federal authorities in 2000 were that 320 of 410 schools in Chechnya were still operating, albeit at minimum capacity. However, initial surveys in three districts by humanitarian agencies suggested that very few schools were functioning and that attendance was minimal. A clearer picture had emerged by the time the 2001 CAP was being drafted in late 2000. It was reported that 287 schools out of a total of 400 were at least partly operational, although it was anticipated that as many as half would have to close down during the winter months. The estimate of school age children in the republic was put at 120,000 (apparently an under-estimate given later estimates of 200,000 and more).

## 2001

UNICEF intended to shift the focus of its assistance in the education sector to Chechnya in 2001, focusing on the rehabilitation of school buildings. A beneficiary target of 140,000 IDP and resident children was set. NGO partners carried out surveys to independently assess the status of the school infrastructure from October 2000 to October 2001. This confirmed early on that up to one-third of school buildings in certain areas were totally destroyed, and that many were severely damaged and without basic equipment.

UNICEF developed a rehabilitation programme in collaboration with the Chechen MoE and its partner NGOs. The strategy was to focus on the basic rehabilitation of schools in which with limited efforts, the enrolment capacity and the teaching environment could be improved. During the remainder of 2001 three schools were rehabilitated by UNICEF's partner ARD, two were started by PINF and one was started by Chechen Refugee Council. The three completed (in Grozniensky) catered for 1,400. School furniture, materials and textbooks were also provided to most of these schools.<sup>15</sup>

## 2002

For 2002, UNICEF met its target of rehabilitating 15 schools, catering for 6,000 children. This was an achievement under the difficult circumstances prevailing in Chechnya. Nevertheless very many schools remained partly destroyed or unusable, obviously with higher percentages in the towns and villages most affected by the conflict.<sup>16</sup> Classroom capacity in the schools that were operating remained insufficient in relation to the high number of pupils.<sup>17</sup> Unsatisfactory alternative premises like rented houses, sheds and tents were often used. In some cases local communities mobilised to provide basic rehabilitation to their school(s), particularly in the countryside.

UNICEF's general beneficiary target for school children in Chechnya in 2002 was 50,000. UNICEF estimates that 20,000 to 30,000 benefited from the distribution of school materials, textbooks, sport equipment, stationery, shoes and jackets.

### **3.5 Pre-schools and kindergartens**

Many, possibly most, children aged 3 to 6 would normally be attending a kindergarten or other pre-school facility, thus giving their parents time for income generating activities (and in insecure times providing a reassuring and safe environment). However, with the influx of IDPs into Ingushetia, 15 of 32 state kindergarten facilities in Ingushetia were fully or partially occupied by IDPs taking shelter, thus decreasing the number of pre-school places for both resident and IDP children.

UNICEF supported the rehabilitation of 3 of these kindergartens by the NGO Humanitarian Cargo Carriers in 2001 and another two in 2002 as IDPs vacated them (nine remained occupied by IDPs at the end of 2002). In addition UNHCR funded

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<sup>15</sup> Reportedly 61,159 textbooks and 1,640 pieces of school furniture to all schools rehabilitated plus others

<sup>16</sup> UNICEF – Republic of Chechnya School Assessment, Part 1 and 2, 2001-2002

<sup>17</sup> UNESCO – Assessment Report – Education in the Chechen Republic: Conditions, Problems, Perspectives of Restoration and Development, 2002.

Hilfswerk to construct 8 kindergartens in camps in Ingushetia (which it is hoped can one day be transported and reconstructed in Chechnya) and UNICEF funded Caritas to construct 3 close to IDP camps. Despite these achievements these facilities can only offer places for approx. 2,000 children, or 15% of the estimated 13,000 pre-school age IDP children in Ingushetia.

In Grozny, no pre-school or kindergarten facilities seemed to be operating after hostilities resumed in late 1999. UNICEF took the opportunity to restore some to help provide a relatively safe and reassuring environment for young children. When the CAP was revised in July 2000, UNICEF included plans for establishing 'child friendly spaces', i.e. safe areas in which informal education, recreation, psychosocial support, food and basic services could be provided to pre-school and primary school age vulnerable children. This was an adaptation of UNICEF's experience with 'child friendly spaces' in the refugee camps in Albania. Although older children were initially included, participation soon began to be limited to 3-6 years of age.

Caritas Internationals started the first 'child friendly space' in Grozny at the beginning of 2001. UNICEF then assisted Caritas to start 4 more in June 2001, and then added the original one to the collaboration. Of these five, Caritas handed two over to the Chechen MoE in spring 2002. Caritas subsequently went on to establish another four (making seven it was operating at the end of 2002). Each kindergarten caters for approx. 50 children, so the total capacity created (including the 2 handed over to the MoE) was for approx. 450 pre-school children. This provided critical support for these children, but it was recognised that the needs remained huge.

### **3.6 Recreation and sport**

When the CAP was revised in July 2000, UNICEF included plans to support local ministries in Ingushetia (MoE, and Labour and Social Development) and INGOs to organise summer camps for IDP children to provide positive recreational activities and an environment of safety during the time schools remained closed (end May to September). Summer camps were organised for about 5,000 IDP children in 2000-2001 (the target had initially been 10,000) and UNICEF also provided some support for MoE financed summer camps (camping gear, bed clothes, cooking utensils, etc). UNICEF did not continue to organise summer camps in 2002 due to delays in contributions from donors, although this was to some extent substituted by ongoing support for recreation and sport in the IDP camps (discussed below).

UNICEF's support for recreation and sport in Ingushetia consisted of providing equipment and materials for wrestling, boxing, judo and dancing activities set up in tents in the IDP camps. There is a strong cultural dimension, wrestling being a popular sport, and with national dances performed. One dance group toured the Czech Republic recently!

By the end of 2002, UNICEF, in collaboration with its partners, had developed and maintained sports and recreational facilities in IDP camps in Ingushetia catering for more than 3,000 IDP children and adolescents. They were very much appreciated by children and adolescents, as well as by the IDP population in general. The intent has been to productively occupy adolescent IDPs, reduce stress and depression, and decrease their vulnerability to becoming involved in dangerous or illegal activities. Although it is evident that these activities are valuable, no qualitative indicators were set and UNICEF has not tested the results.

Less could be achieved in Chechnya. UNICEF and its partners provided some sport and recreational activities in the schools rehabilitated<sup>18</sup>, but the needs remain largely unmet.

### **3.7 Vocational training**

Some small-scale vocational training projects for improving prospects of employment were started in Ingushetia in 2002. Some NGOs developed vocational training in the framework of their educational programme supported by UNICEF. CPCD and IRC have been the most active in this sector, each involving a few hundred youths and adolescents in English, computer, cooking and tailoring classes. UNHCR supported vocational training for a period. Overall it seems less has been done than was hoped.

### **3.8 Psychosocial support**

For 2001 UNICEF set itself the task of supporting initiatives in schools and amongst the IDP community that aim at reducing stress and psychological trauma. The result was a focus on funding the training of teachers and health workers from Ingushetia and Chechnya in psychosocial support – basically improving their skills to identify and deal with traumatized children. CARE implemented this activity.

### **3.9 Conclusions and impact**

#### *Schools in Ingushetia and Chechnya*

UNICEF's assistance to schools has been relevant and necessary. The Convention on the Rights of the Child mandates that UNICEF lead efforts to ensure children's access to basic education and in this case preserve their educational attainment despite their displacement. Moreover, basic education, recreation and sport serve a protection function in so far as schools are normally safe environments and recreational and sports activities help keep children out of trouble. Education, recreation and sport are also normalising activities that help many children overcome the impact of violence and displacement.

It took longer to reach targets than UNICEF anticipated. In Ingushetia it seems to have taken three years to get close to realising the objective of providing all IDP children with access to education (allowing for an arguably irreducible drop-out rate). Nevertheless, the impact of UNICEF's assistance to the education sector in Ingushetia has in the end been outstanding, reflected in the enrolment in MoE and NGO-run schools of 85% of primary school age IDP children and 60% of secondary school age IDP children. UNICEF did not do this alone of course, but played a key role in its achievement. It is also to UNICEF's credit that the Ingush MoE agreed to officially recognise the enrolment of IDP children and issue final exam certificates, thereby facilitating their re-entry into other school systems.

An OCHA representative made the point that UNICEF made a contribution that nobody else initially considered critical, yet education is 'as critical as water'. Other positives include the fact that many children have missed years of school and the NGO-run schools offered them a way back in; the integration of IDP and local children where possible; the employment of IDP teachers; and the continuity with NGO partners over the years.

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<sup>18</sup> There are reportedly up to 1,000 beneficiaries in schools in Grozny

The results in Chechnya are not nearly as satisfactory and efforts have only been partially successful and limited in scale, as UNICEF is well aware. UNICEF's approach has been to rehabilitate and supply schools to increase enrolment capacity and improve the quality of education. But UNICEF and its partners had by the end of 2002 only been able to rehabilitate a fraction of the more lightly damaged schools, leave alone the large number severely damaged or destroyed. There is a long way to go, needs clearly outweigh resources available, and security/access problems are likely to continue to be an obstacle.

*Pre-schools, kindergartens, 'child-friendly-spaces'*

The restoration and strengthening of kindergartens and pre-school facilities as 'child friendly spaces' has helped to restore a sense of normalcy and security for children and their mothers. It represents an important and innovative approach to protection. The impact on the children and mothers concerned, particularly in Grozny, has been considerable. Without wishing to detract from this however, the number of children assisted still represents a relatively small percentage of needs.

*Recreation and sport*

Similarly, summer camps and recreational/sports facilities in camps provide a constructive, normalising environment. Activities like wrestling and dance for IDP children may seem peripheral, but they are extremely important and not difficult to support.

### **3.10 Innovation**

UNICEF's approach to education in Ingushetia was innovative in so far as support was provided simultaneously to construct and operate camp-based schools and to prop up mainstream schools with large IDP populations. The strategy also integrated the efforts of international and national NGOs under the umbrella of the Ingush Ministry of Education.

The concept of 'child friendly spaces', although used before by UNICEF in another operations, is innovative and valuable particularly in the protection context.

### **3.11 Sustainability**

As UNICEF's Representative has pointed out, the inputs into education (and health) in Ingushetia were crisis responses and not intended to be sustainable – the point was to relieve the pressure on an overburdened social sector so that IDPs could be catered for, and to minimise the effects of the inflow of IDPs on Ingush school-children. This was largely successful.

Sustainability is not just about maintaining infrastructure or an investment. This is a common misconception. Most fundamentally it concerns the sustainability of the *benefit* of the assistance. The benefits to IDP children of ongoing access to school will be sustained. The same could probably be said for the benefits to pre-school aged children and other activities that have helped to sustain children through these difficult years.

Having said that, sustained benefits can also attach to an investment in infrastructure and the benefits in terms of access to education of rehabilitating schools in Chechnya will be maintained, provided there isn't another round of damage and destruction.

### **3.12 Issues, opportunities, lessons and recommendations**

#### Issues and opportunities

- Getting more children in school in Chechnya is a key challenge for UNICEF and requires the participation of the federal and republican authorities given the reconstruction/rehabilitation costs involved. It also probably requires channelling more assistance through the MoE, assuming NGOs don't have the funds and capacity to operate on the scale required, although this raises monitoring / accountability issues.
- When asked if UNICEF 'adds value' in terms of advice, standards, approaches, etc. one of UNICEF's implementing agencies in this sector said: 'No, UNICEF is really just a funding agency'. (The same response was given by another partner in the context of mine action.) UNICEF should be adding value *as UNICEF* in terms of standards and approaches. A large part of the problem is that UNICEF's field staff, although excellent, are not sufficiently familiar with UNICEF policies and approaches, including Child Centred Teaching and Learning. Exposure to these concepts would give them a new perspective. This is not to suggest that UNICEF should set out to reform the Russian education system, but that knowledge of UNICEF's policies and standards would create opportunities for UNICEF to exert more influence.
- It is surprising that there are no women's classes in the IDP camps. Surely this represents an opportunity for UNICEF. The training and/or activities would have to be useful for the women concerned, which would be the first challenge, but it could provide a means of informing women about their CEDAW rights, mine/UXO risks, and nutrition and feeding practices.
- Some staff believe that UNICEF should do more to raise HIV/AIDS and drug addiction issues in the schools it supports.

#### Lessons

- The experience in the NC underlines the 'niche' role that UNICEF can play in assisting IDP children continue their education.
- The estimates for the number of school age IDP children in Ingushetia ranged from 30,000 to 65,000 at different times, making it difficult for UNICEF and others to plan. In future operations that include support for the education of IDPs, a greater investment in determining beneficiary numbers (school age children) would be warranted from the outset.
- Special methods of teaching and a contracted curriculum can be developed for IDPs, taking account of frequent migration, the needs of those lagging behind the curriculum, and the need for special attention to post traumatic stress.
- When trying to provide access to schooling for IDP children it has to be anticipated that a substantial proportion may not enrol or attend regular classes for a variety of reasons and that special programs will need to be developed to cater for their educational needs.
- The restoration and strengthening of kindergartens and pre-school facilities as 'child friendly spaces' can help restore a sense of normalcy and security for children and their mothers and it represents an important and innovative approach

to protection. 'Child friendly spaces' is an apposite label for them and attractive to donors.

- The provision of equipment and materials for sport and recreation in IDP camps should be considered where the IDPs were displaced by conflict and are still living in a volatile environment because these activities offer a constructive and fulfilling outlet particularly for traumatized children and adolescents who may also be at risk of becoming involved in illegal and dangerous activities.

#### Recommendations

- Field staff in the education sector should be made familiar with UNICEF's policies, approaches and experience, including Child Centred Teaching and Learning, and encouraged to find opportunities to reflect these policies and approaches in programming.
- UNICEF should revamp its strategy for assisting the school 'drop-outs' in Ingushetia (30% of school age IDP children in Ingushetia).
- Given the likely pressure to close IDP camps in the coming spring, UNICEF needs to determine how the education (and thus some measure of protection) of IDP children will be maintained should they have to relocate/return.
- UNICEF should review its strategy for restoring enrolment capacity in Chechnya, with particular reference to ways and means of collaborating more closely with the federal and republican authorities in the reconstruction effort.
- Given the important protection and psychosocial functions that can be played by pre-schools and kindergartens, UNICEF should document its experience, and the experience of its partners, for reference in other operations.

## **4 Mine awareness and victim assistance**

### **4.1 Humanitarian needs and planning assumptions**

It was recognised from the outset that there was a severe problem with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) in Chechnya. The latest estimates (2003 CAP) are that 500,000 landmines were laid inside Chechnya and that between 9,500 and 10,500 people have already been injured by mines and UXO, including about 4,000 women and children. Both sides are probably still laying new mines and humanitarian demining is not on the agenda for the authorities. Humanitarian agencies are limited to mine awareness and victim assistance.

UNICEF's involvement in mine awareness and assistance to mine victims is mandated by the UN policy on Mine Action and Effective Coordination (September 1997), which states that working in collaboration with UNMAS, UNICEF:

*“ ... is the focal point on mine awareness education. In this capacity, it will provide appropriate guidance for all mine awareness programmes, liaising closely with concerned partners ... (Further), UNICEF, in collaboration with WHO, ICRC, and other partners where appropriate, will ensure comprehensive rehabilitation of landmine victims, which includes psychosocial counselling, physical rehabilitation (including the provision of prosthetics and orthotics), and education for those with disabilities.”*

This ‘focal point’ role does not extend to demining, but as mentioned this has so far been blocked.

### **4.2 Overview of response**

UNICEF is the lead agency in this sector, working with UNCHR, WHO, local authorities and NGOs, including Danish De-mining Group (DDG), Vesta, Minga, Voice of the Mountains (VoM), Let's Save the Generation (LSG) and New Education (NE). The ICRC is also very involved and generally attends coordination meetings.

UNICEF's response includes three elements: mine awareness education, victim assistance and data gathering/analysis. The mine awareness campaign has in practice focused on IDP school children in Ingushetia and school children generally in Chechnya, although it was initially intended to reach a far broader audience (including adults) through mass media. Assistance to victims of mines and UXO is comprehensive and includes the fitting of prosthetics and orthotics (and refitting as required for growth/repair), physical rehabilitation, counselling/psychosocial care and in some cases vocational training. This is achieved principally by funding a prosthetic workshop and rehabilitation centre in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia. Data gathering and analysis on mine/UXO incidents and victims is managed via the UN Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which UNICEF has helped VoM establish in its office in Ingushetia.

Mine action was initially included in the CAP as an activity under the joint UNHCR-UNICEF protection component, but when it was revised in July 2000 mine action was included as a stand-alone component, with UNICEF and UNHCR as joint appealing

agencies and UNICEF as the focal point. In the 2001 CAP, WHO joined UNICEF and UNHCR as appealing agencies.<sup>19</sup>

UNICEF launched a Mine Action Strategy in March 2003 (after the field visit conducted for this study).

### **4.3 Mine and UXO awareness/risk reduction education**

#### 2000

For 2000, UNICEF planned to undertake a general mine and UXO awareness public information campaign for all IDPs in Ingushetia (target of 200,000), as well as for IDPs and affected residents in Chechnya (target of 500,000). There was to have been a 'special emphasis' on 50,000 potential returnees living in camps and spontaneous settlements and with host families in Ingushetia, and on 25,000 accessible persons in Chechnya affected by the hostilities. The main budget line in the appeal was for mine awareness materials.

In August 2000, UNICEF, UNHCR, Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Voice of the Mountains (VoM) initiated a mine and UXO awareness campaign which included the dissemination of 15,000 posters and 20,000 leaflets among vulnerable IDP communities in Ingushetia (mainly through the camps) and in Chechnya (mainly through food distribution points and schools). The 2000 campaign was supported by training of trainers (ToT) in mine awareness. UNICEF, UNHCR and VoM held a workshop for this purpose in Vladikavkaz from 20-27 November for teachers, psychologists and youth leaders from Chechnya (total 30 trained as planned).

#### 2001

In 2001, the UNICEF/UNHCR/DDG/VoM awareness campaign reportedly covered about 32,000 IDP children in Ingushetia and about 20,000 children in Chechnya through:

- The production and distribution to IDP camp schools of posters, leaflets, notebooks, pencils, crayons and t-shirts.
- The sensitisation of children through mine awareness lessons, interactive drama, puppet shows and games developed by ICRC.

As for the puppet shows, a total of 6,000 IDP children attended the activity funded by UNICEF in 2000-2001. At the same time, ICRC undertook puppet theatre in Chechnya.

In addition UNICEF funded the Danish De-mining Group (DDG) to train 400 teachers (one from each functioning school in Chechnya) in general mine awareness methods. UNICEF subsequently developed core course materials for inclusion in the school curricula in Chechnya, with inputs from the ICRC, DDG, local NGOs and the Chechen MoE. The same teachers trained by DDG became the target for ToT organised by VoM through the MoE.

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<sup>19</sup> In 2001, UNHCR had an agreement with Handicap International for the development of a database of the disabled persons and their needs in terms of rehabilitation, and delivery of technical assistive devices (14 hospitals in the region were supported with equipment, materials or walking aids). Also UNHCR supported the initial MA project of VoM. At the end of 2001 UNHCR started the implementation of a phase out strategy by handing the programme over to UNICEF and the MA team consisting of international and local NGOs, which ended in September 2002.

## 2002

In 2002, 8,500 IDP children from different raions of Chechnya residing in Ingushetia attended the MRE drama performances invented by UNICEF and staged by the Russian Academic Theatre in Vladikavkaz.

The plan for Ingushetia in 2002 was to expand the awareness campaign to reach more IDP children residing in the private sector and in spontaneous settlements. Together with the NGO "Let's Save the Generation" (LSG), UNICEF continued to focus on the IDP children living in host families and was transporting them to the MRE drama presentations. To this end, UNICEF funded an MRE pilot project "Mother and a Child" implemented by LSG for 1,000 IDP children and women residing in the private sector and spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia.

For Chechnya, in 2002 UNICEF and UNHCR were able to institute mine awareness education within the Chechen school curricula in 2002 utilising the course materials developed in 2001 and the teachers trained in 2001 by DDG. To support this, all functioning schools of Chechnya were provided with MRE booklets (192,000). VoM managed to cover a total of 23,200 school children residing in Ingushetia and Chechnya. This activity will continue in 2003, with a target of 200,000 schoolchildren to be taught the core course in mine awareness, reinforced by ongoing mine awareness interactive presentations by VoM instructors at schools.

DDG and VoM planned to train an additional 600 Chechen teachers in 2002 to use the materials, and also to target other especially vulnerable groups such as farmers, forest workers and returnees, and educate parents and religious leaders to disseminate mine awareness messages throughout Chechnya. It is not clear if these activities were implemented.

Almost 30,000 MRE items (notebooks and pens) were disseminated in IDP camps, schools and hospitals in Ingushetia and Chechnya.

UNICEF also planned to continue the mine awareness drama shows and develop additional awareness materials including posters, leaflets, comic books, television and radio spots to sustain interest in the campaign.

### **4.4 Assistance to mine/UXO victims**

#### 2001

In April 2001, UNICEF commenced its support for the Vladikavkaz Prosthetic Workshop in North Ossetia, the main facility in the Northern Caucasus providing prostheses and orthoses for injuries related to hostilities.<sup>20</sup> Through 2001, UNICEF provided 5 essential pieces of equipment, reporting enabling the workshop to double its production capacity. By the end of 2001, UNICEF and WHO had assisted the workshop to provide about 550 prostheses to mine victims.<sup>21</sup> UNICEF assisted children and women while WHO supported males over 18. Vladikavkaz is some hours from Chechnya by road and UNICEF funded the transportation of the mine/UXO

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<sup>20</sup> WHO had first provided UN support for the workshop in 1997.

<sup>21</sup> Of which UNICEF funded 86, having joined the programme in June 2001.

victims to the workshop and back.<sup>22</sup> Overnight stays had initially been planned but in practice they are day-trips (a funding issue apparently).

Physical rehabilitation is provided in the Rehabilitation Centre for People with Spinal Cord Malfunctions (a state institution)<sup>23</sup> UNICEF is planning to take children to a more child focused Vladikavkaz institution in future – the Physical Rehabilitation Centre for Disabled Children, a state institution.

UNICEF assisted in the creation of a psychosocial counselling centre within the Vladikavkaz workshop for mine/UXO victims (essentially a room, furniture, audiovisual equipment and a counsellor). Psychosocial assistance to mine/UXO victims was an area WHO had pursued for several years and there was some unease on the part of WHO when UNICEF expressed its intent in becoming involved in supporting this activity through the Vladikavkaz workshop. WHO then agreed because UNICEF was clearly in a better position to raise the funds.

UNICEF also developed a training module for dealing with the psychosocial trauma suffered by mine victims and their families (based on a mental health assessment of IDP children in Ingushetia). Through three workshops, 70 psychologists, medical doctors, social workers, monitors and teachers working in Ingushetia and Chechnya were trained in community-based counselling techniques. As a result some preliminary individual counselling sessions were provided to child mine victims in 2001.

UNICEF also supported a small-scale vocational training course in Ingushetia in 2001, in cooperation with UNHCR, (through the local NGO Vesta), and the regional ministries (including Labour and Social Development). Vocational training in was provided for 90 adolescent IDP mine/UXO victims and 30 women heads of households residing in the IDP camps in Ingushetia in 2001 (the target had been 150). The training was conducted at the Sleptovskaya Technical College and included computing and English for mine/UXO affected adolescents, and computing and accountancy for women-heads of households.

## 2002

In 2002, UNICEF continued to support the workshop in Vladikavkaz and 159 mine victims were fitted with 575 devices with UNICEF funding. This included 176 initial prostheses (including prostheses for double amputees), 54 refits, 32 orthopaedic

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<sup>22</sup> Initially it was planned to utilise the UNICEF purchased bus for bringing children from inside Chechnya to Vladikavkaz and back. Later, for security reasons, it was decided to make the trips only from the Chechen-Ingush boarder. For overnight stays of child mine victims UNICEF used the tent rehabilitation centre run by LSG (two tents provided by UNHCR) in Bella IDP camp in Ingushetia.

<sup>23</sup> This Centre, first supported by UNHCR (provision of a set of equipment for physical exercising), was providing diagnostics (ultrasound, blood testing – equipment provided by UNICEF), physical exercising, physiotherapy, massage and psychosocial counselling (the same psychologist as in the prosthetic workshop) to groups of 10-15 mine/UXO affected children. The beneficiaries were mostly those who already got fitted with artificial limbs at the prosthetic workshop. Regular visits to the centre enabled the psychologist to continue the psychosocial interventions started in the prosthetic workshop. In the beginning of 2003 UNICEF decided to suspend the programme, which was pretty successful, due to continuous reconstruction works in the centre being constantly delayed by the Government and affecting the process of healing. For continuation of the programme for the time of suspension UNICEF identified the specialised Rehabilitation Centre for Children situated in Vladikavkaz. The well-equipped centre is ready to provide a full package of physical rehabilitation to Chechen child mine victims under 15 within a 20 days course (children will be staying in the centre).

footwear, 292 corsets, and 21 tutors. It is unclear what targets UNICEF set, due to the wording used, making it impossible to determine if the targets were reached.<sup>24</sup> On one reading the result is well below target; on another it is not. Another 1,300 victims were provided with assistive devices (wheel chairs, crutches and corsets) bringing the cumulative total to 2,000.

Incidentally, WHO is (apparently) extricating itself from assistance to the Vladikavkaz workshop – according to the Field Coordinator, WHO has only 15 more prosthetic devices to allocate for victims coming to the Vladikavkaz workshop (as at 7 February, 2003).

In 2002, psychosocial support was reportedly provided to 400 mine victims and war-affected children and more than 100 caregivers. This counselling was provided in Vladikavkaz at the Prosthetic Workshop, in the Rehabilitation Centre, at the Medical-Pedagogical-Psychosocial Centre<sup>25</sup> and in IDP camps.

UNICEF's plan for mine/UXO victim vocational training for in 2002 was to extend the training provided in Ingushetia to Chechnya with the assistance of VoM. The plan was to establish training courses in technical colleges in the Grozinski district in Chechnya. About 100 children and youths were to receive advanced skills training courses in computers, accountancy, economics and English language. 61 adolescent mine/UXO victims were included in vocational training (computing and English) and sports training. In the beginning of 2002 a football team was established with UNICEF's assistance comprising 11 child and adolescent one leg/arm amputee players, which turned out to be a great success.

#### **4.5 Information gathering and data analysis**

VoM, with UNHCR support, established the first database of mine/UXO victims in 2000. Later in the year UNICEF decided to assist VoM to further develop this database to prioritise programme activities and develop strategies. In 2001, staff from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) visited the Northern Caucasus to set up the Information Management System for Mine Action database (IMSMA). (GICHD staff later returned to adjust it.) UNICEF then provided training for 30 NGO staff in the collection of data on mine incidents and sent personnel from VoM for advanced computer training at GICHD (the staff from GICHD came down to Nazran to train VoM) to enable them to use the IMSMA software. Thereafter VoM acted as the focal point for gathering mine incident data from a number of sources including WHO, ICRC, and MSF Holland, as well as with Vesta monitors operating within IDP camps. Additional information on the types and locations of mines and UXO was supposed to be provided by EMERCOM but was not. The IMSMA system is set up in VoM's office in Nazran. By late 2001, information on over 600 mine and UXO-related casualties had been collected from Chechnya.

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<sup>24</sup> The target is given as 'measure and fit 15 a week' without specifying if this is individuals or devices including refits.

<sup>25</sup> This facility is supported through CARE and NE. The programme deals with IDP children (with special focus on mine/UXO survivors) with psychosocial distress and associated trauma caused by war and mine related injuries. About 70% of all children are difficult cases. About 150 children were covered by the programme instead of the 120 planned, according to UNICEF.

During 2002, 850 new entries were added to the IMSMA database, making a cumulative total of 1,400 entries (old and new casualties). This is reckoned to be a bit more than 30% of all mine/UXO victims in Chechnya.

IMSMA is designed to reveal the location of mined areas, the types of activities pursued during the time of the incident, the levels of knowledge about risk-taking behaviour, the types of injuries sustained and the provision of services in response to the accident. It is seen as a good investment for the time when demining becomes possible.

The database currently includes progress reports on mine/UXO victims assisted and acts as a referral system for the Vladikavkaz prosthetic workshop to follow up their physical and psychosocial therapy and rehabilitation (including setting dates for visits). The first statistics have now been analysed and it is hoped that they will help to set the basis for more effective coordination and future planning of the programme, including guiding the campaign in targeting specific communities and age groups inside Chechnya.

#### **4.6 Conclusions and impact**

In OCHA's view, UNICEF's mine action work has been much weaker than the work done in education (the other sector in which UNICEF leads). This seems to be a fair overall assessment. It would also be fair to question the impact of UNICEF's inputs into mine/UXO risk awareness and behaviour over the last three years, and although the assistance to victims has been comprehensive, relatively limited numbers have been involved at considerable cost. The support for the workshop in Vladikavkaz, however necessary initially, is in need of a phase out strategy as UNICEF grapples with meeting needs more effectively and efficiently within Chechnya. To this end perhaps UNICEF has been meeting with others involved in victim assistance.

The short-term limitation is that during January-February 2003 the Grozny workshop produced only six prostheses and only below knee. This will be the only type of prosthesis produced until the end of 2003. UNICEF's view is that there should therefore be a division of labour between the Grozny and Vladikavkaz workshops at least in the short-term, with below knee prostheses production going to Grozny and the rest (above knee, arm, hand, corsets, recliners, bandages, tutors, etc.) going to Vladikavkaz. This is reasonable but does not obviate the need for a clear phase out strategy for UNICEF's support for the Vladikavkaz workshop.

#### Mine awareness

The mine awareness targets were very high in 2000 and 2001. In 2000 the target was 700,000 (including 200,000 in Ingushetia and 500,000 in Chechnya). The figure of 700,000 women and children was repeated in the CAP for 2001. Reports do not include estimates about how many were reached but the campaign could not have reached anything like the targets set – it was not initiated until August 2000 and radio and TV was not utilised to reach a mass audience as planned.

The mine awareness beneficiary target for 2002 dropped dramatically to 232,000 and was limited to school children: 200,000 in Chechnya and 32,000 in Ingushetia. One can conclude that UNICEF decided after two years not to attempt to reach IDP adults or the resident population in Ingushetia or Chechnya. UNICEF's response is that this was done to avoid overlap, implying that other agencies had these groups covered.

These targets (focused on school children) had already been incorporated in the targets and plans for 2000. It evidently took until the end of 2002 to reach them (assuming all school children in Chechnya have already completed the course). Perhaps this was because it took so long to develop the mine awareness materials for the curricula and train the teachers. Unfortunately the matter is not discussed in reports. In the 2003 CAP it is stated that the focus of the mine awareness programme has shifted from Ingushetia to Chechnya. This is indeed finally the case.

The work done on children's shows, including puppets and mime, is well regarded by other agencies. The only negative mentioned was that the shows are not in Chechen.

The overall objective or goal of the mine awareness campaign has been to reduce deaths and injuries (initially with a broad target group, subsequently with a narrower focus on school children). No attempt has been made at any point to directly quantify impact in terms of reduced deaths and injuries, and perhaps this is impossible and one can only resort to establishing whether or not the approach to mine awareness represents best practice (this could be considered as a benchmark in future).

VoM and UNHCR carried out surveys in November 2000 and again in June 2001, providing an indication of effectiveness. The first survey was confined to IDPs in Ingushetia and it was found at that time that IDPs had a poor understanding of the risk of mines and UXO. The second survey was broader and included the resident population in Chechnya.<sup>26</sup> The results for Ingushetia were encouraging given the earlier findings, but not for Chechnya where it was found that only 26% of respondents had been covered by MRE presentations and 74% still did not have the opportunity to obtain any technical knowledge about how to avoid risks while living in the mine contaminated territories.

#### Victim assistance

The objective of the victim assistance sub-component was to assist in the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of children and young people who are victims of mine and UXO incidents and to promote their socio-economic reintegration within society. In practice women (appropriately) were also assisted by UNICEF.

UNICEF has so far assisted 270 mine/UXO victims with prosthetics and orthotics, plus some degree of physical and psychosocial rehabilitation. This is an outstanding achievement. Without wishing to detract from this, UNICEF has fallen well below the targets it has set. It is also evident that physical and psychosocial assistance has been problematic because it is generally conducted under extreme time constraints during day-trips to Vladikavkaz.

#### Data gathering and analysis

The objective of the data gathering sub-component was (for 2002) to gather information from all relevant partners in order to maintain the IMSMA database on mine incidents, use it as a referral system and fine-tune and monitor the effectiveness of programme activities. UNICEF's establishment of the IMSMA database was an excellent initiative and several NGOs are engaged in contributing information to it, including the local NGO Let's Save the Generation, which has apparently contributed 40% of the entries. (The ICRC has not yet provided data but it is under discussion.)

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<sup>26</sup> *Survey on Mine Awareness Among Local Population of Chechnya and IDPs in Ingushetia*, Voice of the Mountains, June 2002.

The effective use of the information is yet to be proven and it will be interesting to see how UNICEF can draw on it to shape programming.

#### **4.7 Innovation**

The inclusion of mine awareness lessons in the school curricula in Chechnya was innovative and could be used elsewhere (provided it is adequately tailored for context and culture).

The sports training for mine/UXO affected children, run by VoM, is said to be the first pilot project of its kind supported by UNICEF. The idea of establishing a football team arose out of an international football tournament for the disabled in Vladikavkaz.

The use of drama for mine awareness creation is regarded by staff as innovative.

#### **4.8 Sustainability**

WHO and UNICEF have created a lasting capacity in the Vladikavkaz prosthetic workshop, one that the federal and republican authorities should be able to maintain. It will be of lasting benefit even if the focus for assistance to Chechens shifts to Grozny.

UNICEF and others have nurtured a number of local NGOs including VoM and LSG, which should be able to play on increasingly important humanitarian role in Chechnya.

The mine risk education that has been conducted, including the training of teachers, should be of lasting benefit. The integration of mine awareness into the Chechen curricula is likely to be sustained.

#### **4.9 Issues, lessons and recommendations**

##### Issues arising

- It is clear from successive CAPs that UNICEF intended to use radio and television in its awareness campaigns (in collaboration with EMERCOM, the Ministry of Education, and the Chechen and Ingush authorities) but this never seems to have come to fruition. Reports don't indicate why. Other agencies used the mass media (cartoons were shown on TV in 2000 and 2001 but they were not funded by UNICEF). ICRC has broadcast some material and plans to air TV spots in Chechnya starting 20 March 2003 (directed at adults, not children).
- A number of issues concerning UNICEF's awareness campaign arose in discussions with NGOs and the ICRC, which UNICEF needs to consider. Firstly, the point was made that posters and leaflets on their own are not likely to be effective in raising the awareness and changing the behaviour of children. There needs to be a link to an activity the children have been involved in, or to a message they have already received, so that the posters and leaflets serve to reinforce the message. For example, the ICRC uses well-known characters from their puppet theatre in their posters, which children respond to positively.

Secondly, the point was made that the mine risk awareness materials distributed through the schools on their own are not likely to be effective if the teachers are not trained in the use of the materials and dissemination of the message. It seems the training of teachers may have lagged behind the distribution of materials.

Finally, it was interesting to learn that ICRC pursues a child-to-child mine risk awareness approach, while this does not seem to be driving UNICEF's campaign. ICRC's child-to-child approach includes their child-to-child puppet theatre, 'Rainbow' magazine for children, and the use of sports and youth clubs. According to the CAP, child-to-child methods were to have been initiated by UNICEF in 2001, but for some reason they were not.

- In the opinion of a UN colleague, the posters and leaflets developed and distributed by UNICEF in 2001 were not very effective because they were not adequately tailored to the Chechen context or culture. The materials were apparently brought from Bosnia and translated into Russian. However, UNICEF's view is that the materials were adequately field-tested and that in any event the posters were republished with more appropriate characters in 2002.
- According to the director of the Vladikavkaz Prosthetic and Orthopaedic Centre supported by UNICEF and WHO, the federal authorities will not grant him a budget to assist victims coming from Chechnya – he only has funds for assisting those within North Ossetia. Thus UNICEF and WHO pay the costs (WHO for males over 18). The lack of federal or republican assistance to victims from Chechnya is unsatisfactory – they are citizens of the Russian Federation. UNICEF should consider advocating that the Russian Federation assumes at least a proportion of the cost. (UNICEF has recently been able to obtain a 10% decrease in the unit price for Chechen mine victims approved by the Ministry in Moscow.)
- All children and women enrolled in the programme (presumably meaning all those assisted) receive psychosocial counselling. It is appropriate that UNICEF would undertake to do this, but has any assessment been made of the efficiency and effectiveness of the way it is provided, given that counselling generally takes place in the context of day-trips from Chechnya? It makes sense to provide some counselling in Vladikavkaz if the mine/UXO victims are attending the workshop to have prostheses fitted, refitted or repaired. Nevertheless in CARE's view, it would be more effective in psychosocial terms to invest in community and family based counselling inside Chechnya. There will of course be even more reason to do as prosthetic/orthotic services shift to Grozny. UNICEF is considering bringing victims to Vladikavkaz for longer periods under a new arrangement, but would this be cost-effective and what proportion of Chechen mine/UXO victims would in practice be able to avail themselves of this?
- Physical rehabilitation appears to raise similar issues. It is noted in the field team's 2002 review that 'the term of physical rehabilitation has been too short'. Transporting children to Ingushetia for drama/puppet theatre performances could also be questioned. The NGO LSG believes that all IDPs in Ingushetia will have been covered in 2-3 months and that they can do mine/UXO risk education in Chechnya. According to LSG there are lots of qualified specialists in Chechnya, including traumatologists, and they believe the puppet show theatre in Chechnya could be repaired. LSG are disappointed that UNICEF 'promised' to support them with a newly established rehabilitation centre in Grozny but in the end said it was not possible. Unfortunately (they say) they were fairly sure of UNICEF funding and did not approach anyone else. UNICEF's response is that it had been agreed between UNICEF and WHO in 2002 that WHO would support the centre until the end of March 2003, but failed to raise sufficient funds for 2003. UNICEF consequently resumed discussions with LSG but could not commit because

funding was uncertain. UNICEF did provide equipment to the centre for physical exercising.

- Staff and NGOs made various comments about problems related to transporting mine/UXO victims to Vladikavkaz. The border crossing point from Chechnya is threatening to many and some parents don't bring their children / some adult victims don't come as a result. This imposes a filter and raises access and equity issues about the current UNICEF approach. It is also unclear how exactly UNICEF's partner, Minga, selects mine/UXO victims for assistance. It is sometimes said that mine/UXO victims welcome the opportunity to get out of Chechnya if only for a day, but this is hard to marry with the fear most people seem to have of the journey and the border checkpoint in particular. From a logistical point of view UNICEF has also faced considerable difficulties with transportation and arranging escorts.
- In 2003, UNICEF plans to increase the capacity of the Vladikavkaz workshop and there seems to be little expectation that the provision of prosthetic and orthotic services can be transferred to Grozny, even though the ICRC is currently involved in the training of prosthetists to restart activities at the workshop.<sup>27</sup> This raises the question: Does UNICEF intend to continue focusing its assistance on the Vladikavkaz workshop for another year, or another three years? The horizon will depend in part on funding, but there is a more fundamental strategic planning issue at stake.

It is estimated by UNICEF that there are still 354 victims in Chechnya to be assisted (189 above knee amputees and 165 below knee). Moreover, all the children assisted need a new prosthetic and orthotic every six months and adults every twelve months. So an enormous amount remains to be done. It would be churlish to suggest that UNICEF cease its assistance, nevertheless UNICEF needs to carefully consider the future scale and duration of its assistance in the context of outstanding and continuing needs, and the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of continuing to tie the programme to the workshop in Vladikavkaz. UNICEF is now in danger of over-investing in the Vladikavkaz workshop.

- UNICEF is clearly very cautious about working through partners in Chechnya, lest they be asked to take unacceptable risks on UNICEF's behalf. Nevertheless many other agencies have now found ways of operating in Chechnya and it does raise the question: How long can UNICEF effectively lead mine action (and education) when many others are more operational in Chechnya?
- When it does become possible to proceed with demining in Chechnya, it may be appropriate for a demining agency/organization to take the lead in the mine action sector.

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<sup>27</sup> It states in the 2001 CAP that WHO envisaged re-establishing prosthetic care in Chechnya to facilitate access to this service for victims there. This is again mentioned in 2002 and Handicap International is mentioned as a partner (training on prosthetic manufacturing and supply of basic equipment). But for some reason WHO did not become involved and apparently is not in a position to. HI is currently assisting the Nalchik workshop. ICRC has already provided the essential equipment to the Grozny Workshop (some equipment is still arriving), covered the training for the specialists, and contributed to reconstruction.

- It became clear in discussion with ICRC that both ICRC and UNICEF need to invest more in improving coordination in the mine action sector.

#### Lessons

- UNICEF's NC experience in initially attempting to reach a mass audience with mine risk education, not accomplishing this and after a number of years narrowing the focus to school children suggests that in future operations UNICEF should consider commencing with a focus on educating school children about the risks of mines/UXOs and only once this is in hand expand the campaign if warranted and feasible.
- Physical and psychosocial rehabilitation for mine/UXO victims cannot be effectively or efficiently undertaken on the basis of day visits to a centre or institution and future comprehensive victim assistance programmes should find a way to avoid this kind of arrangement.

#### Recommendations

- UNICEF has gained experience of child-to-child approaches to landmine/UXO awareness in other regions and this experience should be brought to bear in the Northern Caucasus.
- UNICEF should review the effectiveness of providing mine/UXO victims from Chechnya with physical rehabilitation and psychosocial counselling on day-trips to Vladikavkaz, and the cost-effectiveness and equity of bringing victims to Vladikavkaz for longer periods as an alternative. In doing so UNICEF should consider if physical rehabilitation and psychosocial counselling would not be more effective, efficient and accessible if provided within Chechnya in institutions and/or at the community and family levels (as appropriate and where feasible).
- UNICEF should seek information from ICRC on the likely capacity of the Grozny prosthetic/orthopaedic workshop in coming years. UNICEF should then draft a phase out strategy for its assistance to the Vladikavkaz Prosthetic and Orthopaedic Centre and in doing so consider if UNICEF should seek to assist victims in a similar way in Chechnya and if so how and when this might be achieved.
- If UNICEF decides to continue providing prosthetic, orthotic, physical rehabilitation and/or psychosocial assistance in the Northern Caucasus in coming years, the standard of assistance to be provided needs to be reviewed (including the cost of the device and the range of assistance). This is both a cost-effectiveness and a sustainability issue.
- UNICEF needs to invest in improving coordination with ICRC in the mine action sector. Practically this includes giving ICRC the one week's notice of coordination meetings that they require for internal purposes.
- As for other sectors, work with field staff and implementing partners to improve the quality of reporting and its efficacy as a management tool, and draft a phase out strategy for assistance in Ingushetia and an expansion strategy for assistance in Chechnya.

## **5 Health and nutrition**

### **5.1 Health and nutrition needs**

At the onset of the crisis, WHO and UNICEF reported that the health and nutrition conditions of both the resident and displaced population in Ingushetia and Dagestan were deteriorating and that the most critical problems were:

- High maternal and pre-natal mortality.
- Risk of epidemics (including cholera, diarrhoea, measles, diphtheria and polio) due to poor vaccination coverage, overcrowding and shortage of safe drinking water in IDP settlements.
- Increase of incidence of acute respiratory infection and skin diseases (pediculosis, scabies) resulting from a combination of primitive housing conditions, food problems and high proportion of vulnerable groups within IDPs (children, women and elderly).
- The overload of the already exhausted health care system in Ingushetia and Dagestan. The health care system of Ingushetia, structured to care for a population of 320,000, was for several months burdened with up to 200,000 additional persons.
- High incidence of TB due to pre-existing conditions, incomplete treatment, a shortage of essential anti-TB drugs and lack of expertise in modern approaches to TB control.
- Severe psychological stress, caused by military actions and the necessity to abandon homes, increasing vulnerability to many forms of disease.<sup>28</sup>

Less was known at the outset about the situation in Chechnya, but needs and risks were believed to be even more acute. Even with relatively little information it was evident that the emergency situation must have caused a total or near total depletion of resources amongst the health facilities that still existed and that there would be acute needs for drugs, medical supplies, and equipment. In mid-2000 WHO and UNICEF, on the basis of more information, expressed alarm about public health problems, and made particular reference to TB, anaemia in women and children, and mental disorders.

### **5.2 Overview of response**

WHO assumed the lead agency role (appeal focal point and sectoral coordinator) and undertook the strengthening of the disease surveillance system and the TB control service. UNICEF became involved in the provision of essential drugs and medical equipment, principally directed at MCH, and otherwise concentrated on rehabilitating the cold-chain and improving the immunisation of children. These and ancillary forms of assistance are discussed in detail below. UNICEF support was provided through federal and republic Ministries of Health, and in some cases directly to hospitals and other health facilities, and in part through NGOs (but not as implementing partners as in other sectors).

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<sup>28</sup> From analysis of need in Flash appeal 1 December 1999 to 29 February 2000 and CAP 1 December 1999 to 30 June 2000

WHO was more involved with the training of local health personnel and capacity building.

In mid-2000 an internal UNICEF report noted that health was its most problematic area of intervention, in part because of the 'complicating factor' of WHO and UNFPA involvement, with WHO as lead agency. UNICEF's response was to limit its role in the sector.<sup>29</sup>

The ICRC, which had been present for several years, was very involved in health. Together with the Russian Red Cross (RRC), the ICRC went on to supply nine hospitals in Chechnya, one in Ingushetia and one in Dagestan with surgical items and equipment, and to support a RRC project of mobile clinics in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan.

### **5.3 Essential drugs and medical equipment**

#### 2000-2001

In its initial response in early 2000 in Ingushetia, UNICEF provided essential drug kits, antibiotics to treat acute respiratory infections, and oral rehydration salts for diarrhoea, as well as micronutrients for children and their mothers. Through 2000-2001, UNICEF supported health posts and maternity centres with selected basic drugs, equipment and materials, both in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Infant starter kits were provided to mothers with newly born babies through maternity hospitals. The need for particular inputs was typically identified by programme partners, with requests sometimes coming via WHO, sometimes from the SES.

UNICEF had included plans in the 2000 CAP to work with local authorities and IOM to organise a community-based health education campaign for residents of spontaneous settlements and nearby communities with a focus on healthy lifestyles (including STI awareness), disease prevention, and the improvement of hygienic conditions in the camps. This was not undertaken, although the supply of drugs, medical consumables and hygienic items through NGOs contributed to these ends.

UNICEF had also planned to support the training of local health personnel but this was not undertaken either. However, UNICEF did provide emergency kits, MCH kits, ARI/CDD kits and minor and major surgical kits.

In April 2001 UNICEF undertook the refurbishing of the operation theatre in hospital #9 in Grozny.

#### 2002

Through 2002, UNICEF continued to play a supply role directed at MCH through the primary health care facilities in camps and settlements in Ingushetia, and in Chechnya. Supplies included infant starter kits provided through maternity hospitals in Chechnya, and MCH kits and emergency health kits to NGO run health centres in Chechnya and Ingushetia.

In 2002 UNICEF became unable to provide PHC drugs due to the insistence of UNICEF Copenhagen that they must not be procured within the Russian Federation and the extreme difficulties encountered in trying to import drugs into the Russian

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<sup>29</sup> North Caucasus: programme directions for UNICEF in the next Consolidated Appeal period (July – December 2000). (Internal document)

Federation because of customs and licensing requirements. WHO took over the provision of a more limited range of (21) MCH drugs.

## **5.4 EPI**

### 2000-2001

In the 1999 flash appeal it was proposed that immunisation services for more than 60,000 displaced and resident children would be supported by providing cold-chain equipment, syringes and other vaccination-related supplies. UNICEF provided cold-chain equipment and immunisation supplies to health facilities in Ingushetia and Dagestan and it was subsequently reported in the CAP that UNICEF had thereby supported the immunisation of some 22,000 displaced children (less than had been planned but a substantial achievement under the circumstances).

Through 2000 and 2001, UNICEF assisted the federal and Ingush MoH and NGOs to rehabilitate the cold-chain and EPI system in Ingushetia and to immunise children and women amongst the IDP and resident population. Support included the provision of cold chain equipment and other non-renewable material requirements, renewable immunization supplies, the provision of vaccination cards and awareness-raising letters to mothers, as well as support for outreach mobile immunisation teams. EPI coverage surveys were carried out among IDP populations in Ingushetia (in tandem with the nutrition survey) and coverage rates were found to be high (approx. 95%) although there was a discrepancy between residents and IDPs with the latter having lower coverage rates (below 90%). It was noted in the coverage survey report however that vaccination cards had not yet been provided and they had relied on information from mothers, which it was presumed would have resulted in higher than actual coverage data. WHO's main contribution was the provision of training for EPI managers and staff in health facilities.

In Chechnya, as well as rehabilitating the main cold-chain situated in hospital #9 in Grozny, UNICEF conducted an assessment of the cold-chain system in secondary immunisation centres. Thus far the rehabilitation of the cold-chain and EPI in Chechnya was only partial, but the results of the assessment were used to develop a rehabilitation plan in collaboration with the Chechen MoH.

### 2002

In 2002 UNICEF continued to provide material support for the EPI system in both Ingushetia and Chechnya, in collaboration with the two MoHs and several NGOs. However, UNICEF was not directly involved with vaccination campaigns. In Chechnya UNICEF commenced an assessment of the third level cold chain system of all vaccination centres in the town and villages of Chechnya to assess material requirements.

Material support to EPI in 2002 included:<sup>30</sup>

- Support of the EPI system in Ingushetia and Chechnya through distribution of 440,000 disposable syringes and 50,000 needles, 200 vaccine carriers and 1,600 safety boxes
- Supply of 19 refrigerators to the Ingush Central Vaccine Storage and other village health care centres

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<sup>30</sup> UNICEF North Caucasus EP Annual Report, 2001

- Equipment of all vaccination centres in the 12 district hospitals (second level) in Chechnya through delivery of 12 freezers and 21 refrigerators

UNICEF's assistance has increased coverage considerably in both republics. In Chechnya the MoH has recently reported coverage figures as high as 90% for most vaccination types, although there has to be some doubt about this figure in less accessible areas.

### **5.5 Nutrition**

In the 1999 flash appeal UNICEF proposed making available to children, in addition to the food aid provided by WFP, a limited quantity of high-energy biscuits and a locally produced food equivalent of UNIMIX. UNICEF did not proceed with this assistance, although iron/folate supplements and retinol were provided to pregnant women. The nutritional status of children and women in Ingushetia and Chechnya remained a concern through 2000. A WFP household food security survey confirmed nutritional problems.

In response, WHO set about organising a nutrition study to examine causes, including suspected anaemia, but lacked funding. UNICEF agreed to pay for it and the survey was finally undertaken in Ingushetia in mid-2001.<sup>31</sup> Blood and anthropometric samples were collected amongst the IDP and the resident population, and detailed interviews on nutrition habits were carried out. The results showed a chronic problem of anaemia, affecting both the IDP and resident populations. Anaemia was found to be present in more than half the mothers with a slightly higher prevalence in IDPs (54%) than in residents (51%). There were also some discrepancies in the growth rate of IDP and resident children. Low height for age was observed in 9% of the entire sample of children (6-59 mths), with a higher proportion in IDPs (14%) than in residents (8%). Iodine deficiency was also observed.

It was concluded that the main underlying problems were the short duration of breastfeeding and the counterproductive weaning practices (including feeding babies with water, juices and tea from the first months of life).

UNICEF included plans in the 2000 CAP to promote breastfeeding and proper feeding practices by training local health personnel, but it did not eventuate. This was later reconceived as the Mother Empowerment Programme (discussed below).

### **5.6 Mother empowerment programme**

In 2002, UNICEF included the development of a Mother Empowerment Programme (MEP) in the CAP, to be implemented in Ingushetia in collaboration with the MoH, WHO and NGO partners to be identified (with hopes of later expanding into Chechnya). The MEP is to include awareness of EPI, CDD, acute respiratory diseases, and exclusive breastfeeding practices. It is also intended to tackle the problem of childhood anaemia by formulating specific nutrition activities in collaboration with other UN agencies. The overall objective is to develop increased awareness and more proactive participation of mothers in all aspects related to children's health, nutrition and immunization status. This intervention could not be proceeded with in 2002 due to the unavailability of a suitable consultant to design the programme (one was identified in 2003 and design work has commenced).

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<sup>31</sup> *The Health and Nutritional Status of Children Under Five and their Mothers in the Republic of Ingushetia*, National Research Institute for Food and Nutrition-Italy, September 2001

## **5.7 Conclusions and impact**

It is not possible to say how many people in Ingushetia and Chechnya were reached by UNICEF's assistance. The targets grew from CAP to CAP and for 2002 included 500,000, more than half in Chechnya. Large numbers were no doubt assisted by the provision of medical supplies, if only in a small way, but it is unlikely that beneficiary targets were reached – certainly not in Chechnya. It is not just a matter of extrapolating numbers from what was supplied, particularly to health authorities. UNICEF had no control over final distribution and it would be unrealistic to assume that the supplies reached all corners of the health system in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Under the circumstances it would have been better if UNICEF had done more to appraise itself of the efficiency with which supplies were utilised by conducting spot checks of peripheral health sites (in Chechnya obviously through others).

But even if the targets were not necessarily met, preventive and curative aid provided in routine and emergency health care facilities by the MoH network and external assistance seems to have played an important role in preventing the outbreaks of epidemic diseases that were initially feared. It is also accepted that these efforts decreased morbidity related to communicable diseases and mother and child health, although it has to be said that no statistics to quantify this have been included in any reports.

When the CAP was revised in July 2000, it was reported that many aspects of the emergency health care response in Ingushetia remained problematic and health care for IDPs insufficient. With respect to Chechnya it was reported that 'indicators remain very high' and health infrastructure remains in a critical state. By late 2001, after two years of assistance, WHO and UNICEF reported that the humanitarian community together with the local health authorities had managed to 'stabilise the health/disease situation', and at least in Ingushetia make significant improvements in maternal and child morbidity and mortality.<sup>32</sup> It was reported that the Ingush health care system had been coping fairly well with the medical demand in primary care settings, although it was also noted that the comparatively stable situation could worsen at any time. To some extent contradicting this generally positive assessment, it was noted that mother and child health remained 'critical'. For Chechnya it was reported that emergency conditions prevailed and that the conditions in the TACs were particularly bad (overcrowding, very poor hygiene).

In late 2002, WHO commissioned a review<sup>33</sup> which reported that health services in Ingushetia were still not equipped to serve the additional IDP caseload and that in Chechnya the destruction of infrastructure, persistent conflict and scarcity of humanitarian actors able to work under extremely insecure conditions suggest that the health needs of the approximately 800,000 population far exceed the available resources. A sobering assessment three years out.

The Representative's assessment is that although UNICEF's assistance in the health sector health has been useful, UNICEF has found itself playing a rather limited traditional/supply-oriented role. Similarly, in the view of one member of the field team, the weakness of UNICEF's role is that it has been more gap filling than

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<sup>32</sup> See analysis of health sector needs in the CAP for 2002

<sup>33</sup> *Review of WHO Humanitarian Programs in North Caucasus (Russian Federation)*, 24 October – 12 November 2002, Dr Claude de Ville de Goyet and Mr Mark Phelan

systematic. This is perhaps always a risk in an emergency context when trying to be responsive and flexible. It would have been more satisfactory if UNICEF had been able to develop a more coherent MCH intervention integrated into government systems. But easier said than done and a more comprehensive intervention, however well focused, would have required more funds.

This is not intended to detract from UNICEF's contribution or to say that the programme completely lacked focus. The assistance in rehabilitating the cold-chain and EPI is a case in point – very focused and valuable, even if mainly involving supply.

### **5.8 Sustainability**

Most of UNICEF's inputs in this sector have been emergency or care and maintenance responses, and not intended to be sustainable. But some inputs will be of more lasting benefit, most notably the assistance provided to the MoH in Ingushetia and Chechnya to rehabilitate/refurbish the EPI/cold-chain system. Sustained benefits may also be achieved in future with the planned focus on the rehabilitation of maternity and paediatric departments in targeted hospitals in Chechnya.

### **5.9 Issues, lessons and recommendations**

#### Issues arising

- The MEP is arguably not the highest priority given that (a) it is to be focused on Ingushetia when the focus is supposed to be shifting to Chechnya, (b) it rests on behavioural change which is a difficult area, and (c) there are arguably more pressing health concerns where UNICEF can make a more immediate impact. Perhaps UNICEF would do better to concentrate on the rehabilitation of maternity and paediatric services in Chechnya, for which funds might be as easy if not easier to raise.
- Field staff expressed reservations about the inclusion of a mental health rehabilitation initiative in the EP because there is already a lot for the field officer concerned to deal with in the combined health/nutrition and water/sanitation sectors. UNICEF runs the risk of dealing with mental health only superficially. Moreover, UNICEF already addressed psychosocial issues in the mine action and education sectors.

#### Lessons

- It is unrealistic to assume that medical supplies provided to health authorities will be effectively and efficiently dispersed through the health system. Monitoring is indispensable even under emergency conditions to ensure that assessed needs are being met. After all it is a rights issue. The minimum should perhaps be spot checks of peripheral health sites.
- In an emergency setting there is always a risk when trying to be responsive and flexible of ending up in with a limited traditional/supply-oriented, gap-filling role. The assistance will be useful but it will tend to lack coherence and focus and will provide less opportunities for UNICEF to add value. This requires that UNICEF come up with a strategy from the outset for quickly establishing a coherent, systematic focus on mother and child health, as far as possible involving government authorities to ensure longer-term benefits.

- MCH is a very broad and complicated area for field staff to deal with and more care needs to be taken to provide expert guidance and training for field staff if they do not have a solid grounding in this field and WHO/UNICEF standards and experience. This seems to be more critical than in other sectors like education.

Recommendations

- UNICEF now needs to achieve greater coherence and focus to its assistance in health and nutrition and bring to bear UNICEF standards and experience to do so.
- UNICEF should reconsider proceeding with the MEP and mental health rehabilitation sub-components, by determining which interventions are likely to have the greatest short to medium term impact on the right to health of women and children in greatest need. This might lead to the confirmation of both or either intervention, but if either or both are to proceed they need to be put on this footing.

## **6 Water and Sanitation**

### **6.1 WatSan needs**

The public water distribution system in Ingushetia (and Dagestan) was in very poor shape even before the arrival of the IDPs in late 1999 and was not meeting needs. Underground water capacity was under-utilised and distribution pipes leaked large quantities. The influx of IDPs into Ingushetia increased the number of people in need of water by more than 60%.

Extremely poor sanitation conditions developed due to overcrowding, and inadequate sewage, storm-water drainage, toilets, and bathing and laundry facilities. Lice and scabies became widespread among IDPs due to the lack of the shower facilities and insufficient hygienic supplies. IDPs were forced to dig simple pit latrines and cut holes for sanitation. Major outbreaks of water-borne diseases and hygiene-related infections were feared.

A UNHCR-WHO spot survey in Ingushetia found that water and sanitation were the most urgent needs identified by IDP families after food.

In Grozny, NGOs reported that all water treatment and distribution stations had been damaged and that the public water supply system (Vodokanal-Chechnya) was only able to provide parts of the city with treated water. The quality of trucked water and water from other sources was extremely poor. A significant factor was the environmental effects of massive oil spills. Many hospitals and health facilities were relying on trucked water and suffered from poor sanitation facilities. Sewage and garbage collection systems were also largely destroyed. Sewerage pipes were blocked. There were piles of decomposing garbage on the streets. At hospitals normal solid waste was mixed with contaminated material including blades and needles. In sum, the lack of clean water and adequate hygienic and sanitation services represented a serious threat to public health in Grozny.

The situation outside Grozny was not as alarming in terms of damage, nevertheless IDPs in camps faced the same problems as the IDPs in Ingushetia - limited amounts of clean water and poor sanitation facilities.

### **6.2 Overview of response**

UNHCR took the lead role, joined by UNICEF and UNDP as appealing agencies. The ICRC, various NGOs and local water and sanitation authorities were also active.

Assistance was initially focused on Ingushetia. The target population to mid-2000 included approximately three-quarters of the combined permanent and IDP populations in Ingushetia (185,000 IDPs and 320,000 residents). A small allocation was made for contingency stocks for Chechnya in case IDPs began to return (which remained the expectation through 2000).

In Ingushetia, UNICEF initially supported UNHCR to organise a water distribution system and then focused on the distribution of hygienic, cleaning and disinfectant materials. UNICEF did not get underway in Grozny until late 2000 but through a partnership established with the Polish Humanitarian Organisation was able to develop a key role, which is still maintained. UNICEF has funded PHO to treat and distribute potable water, to collect garbage and sewerage, and incinerate medical waste.

### **6.3 Support for WatSan in Ingushetia**

#### 2000

In the initial emergency response period covered by the flash appeal from 1 December 1999 to 31 January 2000, the focus was on providing water to IDP camps and spontaneous settlements to prevent outbreaks of water-borne diseases and sanitation related infections. A government tanker service was operating but it only served the four largest tent camps and the quantities were insufficient and the water quality poor. UNHCR took charge of boosting water trucking while UNICEF provided collapsible water containers (bladders), jerry cans, and a water purification unit. This equipment was provided through UNHCR to its implementing partners, including International Rescue Committee (IRC). Little progress was made initially to establish adequate sanitation.

In the subsequent months in 2000, UNHCR commenced the rehabilitation of the central water distribution system, including the three main water treatment and distribution stations, and piping within the distribution network. This was well worth doing because almost 70% of the 261 IDP locations in Ingushetia were situated in the vicinity of the public water distribution system and improving the extraction rate and the distribution of this water reduced the need for trucking. UNHCR hoped to triple the capacity of the public system. Progress was slower than hoped and not enough water could be provided to IDPs through the summer of 2000. Work on improving the public system continued through 2001. Trucking is still maintained to those sites not reachable by the network.

UNHCR, UNICEF and its INGO partners also began to solve sanitation problems, focusing on the construction of latrines, disposal of sewage (emptying of latrines and septic tanks) and collection of garbage. Water points were established or repaired, sewage and garbage trucks were provided, garbage collection sites organised, wooden latrines constructed, drainage to evacuate surface water improved and shower units installed and winterised. Latrine construction was slower than planned but by the end of 2001 more than 400 latrine kits and 100 latrine tents had been installed /constructed.

UNICEF's supporting role through 2000 settled down into the regular provision of hygienic items (like medicated soap); the provision of more water bladders and jerry cans; and the provision of water test equipment and kits, latrine construction kits, chlorine powder and purification tablets. UNICEF had planned to produce educational materials on hygiene and utilisation of safe water and to work with local authorities and NGOs to train volunteer sanitation workers in the camps, and social and health-care workers on general sanitation and personal hygiene. These plans were not fulfilled.

#### 2001-2002

Through 2001-2002 UNHCR continued to face challenges in providing sufficient water and adequate sanitation. Gaps remained, particularly in sanitation. Many of the pit latrines installed at IDP camps and settlements did not comply with minimum standards and were suitable only for short-term use and required upgrading. By 2002 UNHCR was looking for an exit and it was suggested that UNICEF take over. UNICEF declined on the grounds that it did not have sufficient capacity to become the lead agency in a third sector. IRC has now taken the lead (reflected in the 2003 CAP).

In 2001-2002, UNICEF's main watsan assistance to camps and spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia was the supply of environmental and personal hygiene products. These included tons of pesticide for vector control (chloramide disinfecting powder), hundreds of thousands of bars of soap and hundreds of litres of anti-parasite treatment. During this period UNICEF also provided an additional 84 water bladders of 1.5, 5 and 10 cubic metres.

#### **6.4 Support for WatSan in Chechnya**

##### 2000

By mid-2000 UNICEF was seeking an INGO partner working in Chechnya through which to provide watsan assistance at least in Grozny. The Polish Humanitarian Organisation (PHO) was identified and in late 2000 UNICEF assisted PHO to start a water treatment and water trucking project by providing two water purification units which PHO set up nearby the water pumping station N°2 in Grozny which had been repaired by ICRC and which ICRC was helping to operate. UNICEF also provided about 68 water bladders (capacities of 1.5, 5 and 10 cubic metres), which were set up in schools, health centres and private sector sites, and a large number of jerry cans. PHO obtained six trucks from UNHCR and other equipment (including pumps, hoses, spares, etc) from ICRC, and rented another seven trucks under the framework of the agreement with UNICEF. UNICEF organised training for local technicians (Chechen Vodokanal) and IRC staff in the use of water bladders and water purification units. This knowledge was later shared with PHO. By the end of 2000 PHO was reportedly distributing 200 cubic metres of clean water per day.

##### 2001

In 2001, UNICEF began providing hygienic and water purification supplies and equipment to Chechnya as it did in Ingushetia. By the end of the year PHO distributed 19,250 jerry cans of 10 litres and 41 water bladders (1.5, 5 and 10 cbm).

During the year PHO increased the number of distribution sites to 105 covering about 40,000 of the estimated 100,000 people in Grozny, with hospitals and schools the priority. UNICEF assisted in this with the provision of two more water purification units that were installed at an ambulance station. PHO began constructing latrines in the summer of 2001 with UNICEF support under the PCA. At the end of 2001, UNICEF assisted PHO to establish a garbage collection system, also focusing on hospitals and schools. UNICEF provided money for salaries, garbage bins, running costs of UNHCR donated garbage and sewerage trucks, latrine construction costs, and special clothing and equipment.

##### 2002

The reported results for 2002 were impressive and included:

- Production and distribution of potable water in 157 water-distribution points (equipped with 136 UNICEF-donated bladders, including 27 bladders donated in 2002) in Grozny with average daily capacity of 528m<sup>3</sup>; the total amount of beneficiaries was 40,000 of the estimated 120,000 population of the city. The system included distribution of 18,537 jerry cans and 4,536 buckets to residents of Grozny.
- Sewage and garbage collection system created focusing on schools and hospitals in Grozny, with average monthly capacity ≈380m<sup>3</sup>. System includes:

construction of 40 double pit-latrines in 14 locations (hospitals and schools); installation of 120 garbage containers in 25 hospitals and 50 schools; and construction and maintenance of 10 incinerators in the major hospitals of the city.

- Distribution of chloramide disinfecting powder, soap and anti-parasitic treatment to health and medical facilities in Chechnya and through government partners such as Sanitary Epidemiological Stations.

As an implementing partner PHO is very capable, although there was a period when PHO had a very poor manager and there was a large loss of UNICEF donated equipment when a warehouse burned down (including 20 bladders and 13,000 jerry cans). Although PHO is now said to be performing very well, it would be prudent to check the controls PHO has in place to ensure that adequate monitoring is being undertaken (including the question of people's access to water points). PHO's control of the quality of water appears impressive.

Table 2: WatSan equipment provided by UNICEF

	Chechnya			Ingushetia		
	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002
<b>Water bladders, cbm</b>						
1,5	20	21	10	69		
5	10	10	12		18	
10	38	10	5	2		
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Jerry cans, cbm</b>			<i>Grozny</i>			
0.01	35,690	19,250	7,400			
0.025			11,137			
water buckets, 0.017			4,536			
<b>Total</b>	<b>35,690</b>	<b>19,250</b>	<b>23,073</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

## 6.5 Conclusions and impact

The key indicators for the provision of water were at least 15 litres of water per person per day, with low risk of faecal or other contamination, and at least one water point per 250 people. Reports do not refer to these standards and they were presumably not used for monitoring, which is unfortunate. Instead, inputs and gross quantities tend to be reported e.g. number of bladder tanks provided in Ingushetia or cubic metres of water distributed per day by PHO in Grozny. There are some references to gaps and problems but they tend to serve to remind donors of outstanding needs, not to rigorously measure progress against plans. Moreover, there is no attention to access/equity issues in reports. When asked about this PHO's representative stated that they had encountered situations where some people were denied access to a water point, but this does not appear in UNICEF's reports (and to be fair might not have appeared in PHO's report to UNICEF).

It has been reported that the various water and sanitation activities undertaken were effective because there was no outbreak of disease (i.e. epidemic) in either republic,

and that UNICEF contributed to this success. This is fair enough and relates to a key objective. The collaboration with PHO in Grozny delivered very tangible results in this regard: the considerable quantities of water provided remain indispensable and the attention to garbage collection and the incineration of medical waste is smart. The project is deservedly highly regarded and it has enabled UNICEF to be a key player in water and sanitation in Grozny. There is however a lot to do in sanitation, particularly the disposal of faecal waste.

Even though it is clear that an enormous amount was achieved in Grozny, the lack of reporting against indicators or standards, the lack of reference to problems encountered and the overall lack of analysis makes it difficult to gauge the extent to which needs have been met from year to year and difficult to dig deeper into the effectiveness and efficiency of the program. This is the downside of 'good news' reporting.

In Ingushetia UNICEF settled down into providing what could be described as both focused and limited assistance. UNICEF deserves credit for identifying a niche supply role (e.g. bladders and chloramide). But it is also evident that UNICEF stepped back from a potentially bigger role, presumably because it wanted to keep its distance and not rely too heavily on UNHCR or slide into taking over from UNHCR, which ran into difficulties in implementing its program.

## **6.6 Sustainability**

The production and distribution of potable water in Grozny has been undertaken on an emergency basis to sustain the population – although some repairs have been undertaken in the course of producing water, the water and sanitation system remains in a poor state in Grozny and the humanitarian community does not have the resources to fix it and in any event it is the responsibility of the federal and republican authorities. The incinerators installed in hospitals were an emergency measure but this investment should be maintained.

More systematic repair work has been undertaken to the Ingush water system, which will be of lasting benefit.

## **6.7 Issues, lessons and recommendations**

### Issues arising

PHO is not the solution to all watsan problems in Grozny, let alone Chechnya, and to substantially expand watsan assistance in the republic requires working more closely with the federal and republic authorities. But a joint plan of action will only work if the government commits substantial resources and in this regard the UN system needs to put more pressure on the Russian Federation to transfer adequate funds to pay for repairs of water and sanitation systems, particularly in Grozny.

### Lessons

- UNICEF is able to make a valuable but controlled contribution to water and sanitation in emergency and care & maintenance programmes by concentrating on well focused, clearly identified 'niche' areas of supply (such as the provision of water bladders and vector control agents).
- The key role played by PHO underlines the fact that when operating remotely, as in Chechnya, UNICEF is only as good as its implementing partners. In these circumstances UNICEF would be justified in investing more in developing the

capacity of effective partners to safeguard UNICEF's operational capacity and to ensure the accountability of the UNICEF emergency programme.

Recommendations

- Continue to provide focused 'niche' assistance in Ingushetia, including basic personal hygiene and vector control (anti-parasites, disinfectants, soap).
- Continue to support PHO in Chechnya, with a greater focus on equitable access to water and the disposal of faecal waste from public facilities including schools.
- Check PHO's monitoring system to ensure it is credible, including PHO's attention to equitable access to water.
- As for other sectors, work with field staff and implementing partners to improve the quality of reporting and its efficacy as a management tool, and draft a phase out strategy for assistance in Ingushetia and an expansion strategy for assistance in Chechnya.
- Play a role in encouraging federal and republican authorities to take the lead by developing and committing adequate funds to a reconstruction plan for water and sanitation services in Chechnya.

## **7 Management**

### **7.1 Funding and donor relations**

The Consolidated Appeals for the Northern Caucasus have been relatively successful and UNICEF in particular has been very effective in raising funds (\$14.08 million from November 1999 to the end of 2002 – over 96% of the total requested), although the EP Coordinator thinks there may be a decrease in funding this year. UNICEF's principal donors have been USA/PBRM, Germany, the German UNICEF National Committee, UK, Sweden (SIDA), ECHO, the Netherlands, Norway, and Canada (CIDA).

The charts in **Annex E** depict CAP requests, contributions, expenditure and the roll-over of funds from commencement to end 2002. For the period November 1999 to the end of 2000, \$4.43 million was requested and contributions were actually slightly more than this (103%) of which 64% was spent during the period and 36% rolled-over to the following year. For 2001, \$5.05 million was requested and contributions reached 87% by the end of the year. With the funds rolled-over from 2000 this came to \$6.12 million. Of this, 63% was spent and 37% was rolled-over. For 2002, \$5.12 million was requested and contributions reached over 99% by the end of the year. With the funds rolled over from 2001 this came to \$7.22 million. Of this 62% was spent and 38% was rolled over to 2003 (\$2.77 million).

Even though it is clear from this data that the EP has had more than enough funds each year, at least in 2002 there was a very poor flow of contributions (60% of the requested funds were not received until after September) making management of the EP very difficult through the summer and slowing/postponing implementation of activities and projects.

The percentage of funds rolled over each year has been in the range 36% to 38% of total funds available (contributions plus the amount rolled over from the previous year). One of the underlying reasons for the successive rollovers was the late receipt of funds limiting the amount spent by 31 December each year.

The donors interviewed for the study were very positive about UNICEF. As far as they are concerned, UNICEF has a good profile as an agency, clear priorities, and a good program with education regarded as a very strong component. Both the Representative and the EP coordinator are considered very helpful and responsive, and thus they are clearly managing donor relations very well. No complaints were made about UNICEF's management of funds or reporting to donors.

This success does not come easily and the Emergency Programme Coordinator spends the majority of his time liaising with donors and managing allocations. Obviously the programme needs the funds and managing allocations is evidently a complex task, but it does appear to detract from other functions (discussed further below).

The donor updates do not compare completed activities with targets or outcomes with what was planned. The donors may appreciate a more systematic approach. The donor updates are inclined to be repetitive and could perhaps be provided less frequently if there is nothing new of substance to report.

### **7.2 Approach to planning**

The Consolidated Appeal Process document (the CAP) has been the framework for UNICEF's planning. Annual action plans were introduced in 2002, but they basically

summarised the CAP and they are not really workplans for implementing what is in the CAP (for example there is no scheduling in the action plans). Successive EP Coordinators have taken the view that this is not a problem and indeed that implementation has to be left somewhat open given the fluid and unpredictable context, the programme's dependence on identifying suitable NGO partners, and frequent delays in the receipt of contributions through the year.

Flexibility is important, but workplanning does not preclude it. Workplans can be treated as rolling plans that are updated periodically (say quarter to quarter) to take account of the flow of funds, changing priorities, etc. The benefit of more detailed planning for implementation would include *inter alia* more transparency in the prioritisation of activities, and more rigour in tracking progress and performance.

Some members of the UNICEF team believe a more detailed planning tool is required than the CAP. Both the Area Operations Officer and the Field Coordinator expressed this view. This is a friendly difference of opinion, but one nonetheless requiring a resolution. As it happens, the Field Coordinator and field staff have gone ahead and prepared a workplan. The document is basically sound and there seems no reason why its use should not be supported.<sup>34</sup>

Field staff understand however that the flow of funds from donors, and the EP Coordinator's prioritisation of activities/projects, tend to override what may be scheduled at the field level. Some disquiet was expressed about this and it was suggested that there should be more consultation about prioritisation.

The Area Operations Officer has started introducing performance indicators and other controls. This is necessary in principle and should also be supported, but some caution is required. Planning matrices as used in Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) and Results Based Planning (RBM) are not as easy to develop as may be thought. Frankly, it can be a very frustrating exercise for everybody concerned and there is a risk of generating a lot of work for staff without clear returns. In any case, it is important to agree on a standard at the outset, preferably one that comes with guidelines and training materials. In this respect it is worth noting that UNICEF HQ has just developed a modified IMEP tool for use in emergency programmes.

The Field Coordinator has also taken the initiative of instituting monthly general programme meetings. This should also be supported. It would be preferable if both sectoral managers and the monitors continue to attend.

The EP has been relatively similar in its composition for three years now and has long since settled down into care and maintenance functions. Should we have seen a *transition* of some kind by now? The transition that has been on everybody's minds has been a shift into Chechnya where the needs are far graver. In these circumstances the best approach would be to develop transition plans for each sector, incorporating both a phase out strategy for the provision of assistance in Ingushetia (dependent of course on events on the ground and the capacity of other agencies and the authorities) and a transfer strategy to shift resources to Chechnya (after all there is a target to reach in 2003 of concentrating 60% of the programme in Chechnya, compared with approximately 35% in 2001 and 50% in 2002).

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<sup>34</sup> The workplan's limitation is the structure that it is based on which reflects implementation agreements with partner NGOs rather than sector outputs. The numeric indicators would be better expressed as proportions and there should also be some qualitative indicators and references to timing.

It is noted that UNICEF tends to use unrealistically high beneficiary estimates in CAPs and then uncritically report that large numbers were reached. This is not helpful.

The Emergency Programme has never participated in the UNICEF programme cycle and has been kept completely separate from the regular programme. The Representative points out that there are two principal reasons for this separation: a) the objectives and structure of the regular programme are entirely different from those of the EP, and there is little or no potential for integration or cross-fertilisation and b) there is a perceived need to protect the regular programme from the tensions with the government which arise from time to time over the EP. However, regular programme staff review some financial and administrative aspects of the EP programme through mechanisms such as the Contract Review Committee.

### **7.3 Staffing and management**

The Representative stated that if they had realised in 2000 that they would be involved in the Northern Caucasus for such a long period, recruitment and training of staff would have been organised differently. In 2000 the UN agencies were optimistic that IDPs would return to Chechnya and coupled with the fact that the Northern Caucasus was a new region for UNICEF there seemed no reason to build up capacity. As a result the programme was understaffed through 2000 and despite additions probably remained understaffed through 2001. This has finally been rectified and there is now an adequate complement of staff. The current team includes four staff in Moscow, eight in Vladikavkaz and seven in Nazran.

Details of when UNICEF recruited staff and commenced activities in each sector are included in **Annex D, Timeline of Key Events**.

Management of the program is very sound and UNICEF has developed a very valuable resource in its administration, supply and field staff over the last three years. They clearly undertake their work with intelligence and commitment and can be relied on to get the job done. A sister agency remarked that 'UNICEF has built the capacity of national staff so well and so comprehensively that they could continue without the expats and no other UN agency can boast that.' Managers past and present deserve credit for this.

The fact that field staff are relatively self-reliant and quite willing to work with minimal oversight is positive, although it would be wise to check if field staff would perhaps benefit from more guidance. It may also be useful for the EP Coordinator to engage more with field staff to get a better feel for strengths, weaknesses, constraints and opportunities, although it is recognised that the EP Coordinator has some fairly consuming donor relations and funds management responsibilities.

The new Field Coordinator wants to become more engaged in implementation, which is a good thing at this juncture, but to achieve it she will need solid support (and perhaps some guidance) from the EP Coordinator and Representative.

The Representative noted that they have the full confidence and support of the Regional Director and EMOPS senior colleagues in Geneva and New York, which has meant that they have 'had the ideal combination of flexibility when we needed it and energetic support when we needed that: hard to beat!'

#### **7.4 Application of UNICEF standards and experience**

There was little attention in the first two years to the orientation of staff to UNICEF's standards and experience. To compound this, the Northern Caucasus programme has tended to operate in a vacuum and has not benefited from cross-fertilization with other emergency offices. As a result the programme has not been infused with UNICEF's standards and experience and UNICEF is consequently not adding value *as UNICEF* (as distinct from any another funding agency). UNICEF relies too heavily on its implementing partners to design and deliver, without setting standards and offering the benefit of its experience to ensure UNICEF's mandated responsibilities to children and women are discharged.

It is understood that in the last 12 months there has been recognition of the need to invest more in national staff and to ensure they recognise that they are working for UNICEF.

There are a number of references in the CAP and UNICEF documents to 'the gender issue', in effect as a cross cutting issue in sectoral activities, but there is no evidence that this has been translated into real action.

#### **7.5 Supply and field administration**

When UNICEF opened an office in Stavropol in October 1999, there was no system for keeping track of supplies sent for distribution in Ingushetia for some months. Indeed there were no UNICEF staff members either in Vladikavkaz or in Nazran in the beginning. As a result, UNICEF had inadequate control over the supplies and their distribution. Dispatch and receipt were poorly recorded and some supplies went to the wrong destination or recipient (e.g. 130 tents ended up in the possession of the Federal forces in Chechnya and EMERCOM was only ever able to get 40 returned).

This lack of control over supplies changed with the opening of the office in Vladikavkaz in January 2000 and in Nazran in February 2000, and the recruitment of a logistics/supply assistant based in Vladikavkaz. A Supplies Officer was also recruited for Moscow and the system of procurement and supply substantially improved. Good relationships were established with local EMERCOM (Ministry of Emergencies of North Ossetia-Alania), which has provided transportation for the delivery of supplies and assisted with customs clearances by being official consignee for imported goods.

Nevertheless, timely local purchase of supplies was still described as weak in a SitRep at the end of 2000<sup>35</sup> and although there were vast improvements in 2001 there were still problems. For example, the education partner NGO ARD/Denal reported that in 2001 and 2002 textbooks were not available at the start of the academic year (in 2002 they were six weeks late). More recently, winter shoes intended for distribution at the commencement of winter last year finally arrived in February 2003 for distribution in March. Delays in the receipt of donor contributions, and a legal dispute with the supplier were factors in this case.

In a round table meeting for this study field staff complained that supplies are sometimes not well matched with the requests from beneficiaries and implementing partners (e.g. the bus), and that there have been problems with the quality of supplies (e.g. detergent, syringes).

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<sup>35</sup> No 14, December 2000

The supply of drugs has been particularly problematic, but for reasons beyond the control of the EP. In 2000, 3,480 water purification tablets arrived from Copenhagen but they were seized and destroyed by Customs on the grounds that such items were not allowed to enter the Russian Federation. It was learned that medicines were even more sensitive. A decision was made to procure drugs locally (at much lower cost, and with less transportation to worry about). But the Supply Division in Copenhagen objected, stipulating that drugs could not be procured in Russia due to an international standards issue (GMP). As a result UNICEF could not meet its commitments to NGOs. WHO stepped in and procured drugs locally, apparently keeping its HQ out of the loop.

For some years UNICEF relied on UNHCR to make payments at the field level and financial reporting was dealt with in Moscow. This changed in July 2001 with the recruitment of an Operations Officer and Operations Assistant, based in Vladikavkaz. ProMS was installed in Vladikavkaz in April 2002 and could be used when a bank account was finally available in July 2002, increasing the smoothness of the operation in terms of payments and reimbursement of implementing partners.

Operations field staff drew attention to the fact that when they are checking the financial reports of implementing partners it is sometimes unclear which costs UNICEF should pay for because they work with summary UNICEF budgets. One example they gave was transportation, which is just one line item without any details about what transportation is included/excluded. The staff requested some involvement in the negotiation of the budget and copies of the original, detailed implementing partner budgets to guide them in checking NGO financial reports.

UNICEF staff are split between offices in Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia and Nazran in Ingushetia. Vladikavkaz is regarded as the main office although there are equal if not more field staff now based in Nazran. The Field Coordinator lives in Vladikavkaz and travels to Nazran twice a week.

In terms of security, North Ossetia is rated phase 3, Ingushetia phase 4, and Chechnya phase 5. So Vladikavkaz is marginally safer than Nazran, but according to the deputy UNSECOORD coordinator the optimum arrangement would nevertheless be common premises for all UN agencies in Nazran. (Attempts to identify common premises in Nazran in 2002 were unsuccessful, and UN agencies are accommodated in a series of cottages on a small housing estate.) He said it would be more cost effective for UNSECOORD (and would improve coordination between UN agencies). He said the main reason for UNHCR and UNICEF having offices in Vladikavkaz is 'personal rather than operational'. He agreed that although there have been no incidents or accidents affecting the twice-daily convoys between Vladikavkaz and Nazran, it is a risk to be weighed. Accommodation is in short supply in Nazran, as it is in Vladikavkaz, but it is not an insurmountable problem given time.

Travel into Chechnya is by armoured vehicles – it is really a war zone with lots of checkpoints and plenty of risks. It is not possible for expatriates to travel outside Grozny (at least UNSECOORD has only organised one such trip so far). OCHA's Head of Office in Moscow argued that the UN needs a liaison office in Grozny to act as a focal point for the principal agencies (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA plus UNSECOORD). The argument is that it would enable agencies to liaise more fully with the authorities and keep in closer touch with partners, and it would facilitate visits into and around Chechnya. But UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP have consistently rejected this. UNICEF is unwilling to have people in Grozny that it could not be sure

of getting out in a crisis. Moreover, it is believed a UN presence would be exploited by the federal authorities in arguing that it is safe for IDPs to return. The Humanitarian Coordinator is in favour of an office but notes that the minimum security operational standards can't presently be met. UNSECOORD corroborated this and said it is not even possible to do an assessment at present so an office is unlikely to be approved in the near future. Which leaves UNICEF and others in the position of having to continue to operate in Chechnya by remote control (see Monitoring and Reporting).

## **7.6 Implementing partners**

UNICEF has agreements with a large number of international and local NGOs (see **Annex F**, *List of Implementing Partners*).

When it comes to results on the ground, UNICEF is only as effective as its implementing partners (or counterparts). The quality of implementing partners varies but UNICEF has established partnerships with some very effective international and local NGOs. For example, UNICEF has been able to rely on the Polish Humanitarian Organisation (PHO) to address water and sanitation needs in Grozny. UNICEF has learned in the process that Eastern European NGOs can have certain advantages: they are young organizations with strong commitment, motivation and eagerness to learn/improve; they have historical links with Russia; many staff speak Russian; and they are more cost-effective than Western NGOs.

UNICEF has also contributed to the development of local NGOs. Staff from Let's Save the Generation said involvement in UNICEF's mine action component helped them to organise. The continuity of UNICEF assistance to several local NGOs has helped.

ARD/Denal's director said she they are satisfied with the collaboration with UNICEF and thankful that UNICEF came through on teacher salaries when the MoE stopped paying them. Nevertheless there was some criticism for international and local NGO partners. Caritas complained that they proposed a project in October 2002 for which they await approval and which they are implementing without a signed agreement using leftover funds. They also pointed out that they are still waiting for approval on the purchase of a Niva after five months. They feel UNICEF is slow and bureaucratic and don't think the new master agreement (master PCA) makes approvals any faster. HWA also referred to delays in project approval, particularly in 2002 (when UNICEF experienced delays in the receipt of donor contributions). HWA had to postpone some activities last year. They also said they submitted a project in January this year but were told to wait until March. It is not clear why this would be because funds are now available.

Minga think that the UN should rely more on local NGOs, rather than international INGOs like PINF. Minga claim to have greater access to Chechnya, including the mountainous areas, and feel frustrated that WFP has chosen to sign agreements with Islamic Relief and Danish Refugee Council but not themselves.

Some UNICEF staff believe that UNICEF should provide more professional training for local NGO partners (in administration, operations and finance).

As has been mentioned, UNICEF is signing master PCAs with long-term NGO partners (the normal PCA will still be used in other cases). This is a very sensible initiative, although clearly some partners will need to be convinced that it will speed

up approvals (assuming this is one of the things it is supposed to do). The master PCAs (also) seek to introduce more rigour to NGO partner planning and monitoring. This is positive and necessary, however the first master PCAs at least are rather confusing in the way they attempt to incorporate results based management concepts, both in terms of structure and use of key concepts.

It is also noted that the master PCAs don't refer to UNICEF policies or principles. As mentioned above, UNICEF will be less likely to meet it's mandated responsibilities unless implementing partners are required to adhere to specific principles.

## **7.7 Lessons and recommendations**

### Lessons

- For field staff an important lesson is that planning needs to be more rigorous from the beginning of an emergency and field staff should be closely involved. Field staff also say they have learned that the involvement of donors directly in field activities from the beginning through field visits gives good fundraising returns.
- A significant lesson from the Representative's perspective is that despite the conventional wisdom, it is possible to have an emergency programme which is entirely separate from the regular programme, although this requires a high level of attention and flexibility on the part of the staff involved.
- Donor relations and the management of contribution are demanding tasks and if assumed by an Emergency Programme Coordinator there is a risk of crowding out programme management and support tasks.
- To realise its mandate, UNICEF has to do more than fund the right activities. UNICEF has to also apply its *standards and experience* through its field staff and implementing partners. They can't begin to do this if they are unaware of them and untrained in their application.
- UNICEF needs to establish operations and administrative capacity and standards, including staffing and systems for keeping track of humanitarian supplies provided for distribution, from the very outset of any operation, whatever the anticipated duration. Clear ToR should be provided for staff and training in the use of UNICEF systems (where required) should be provided without delay.
- As a general rule, local procurement is to be preferred in the Russian Federation. Customs clearance difficulties are likely to be greater than the difficulties of dealing with the local market.
- UNICEF is far less likely to realise its mandated responsibilities in relation to children and women if UNICEF does not expect partner NGOs to contribute to the realisation of this mandate by adherence to principles specified by UNICEF and if the benefit of UNICEF's experience is not provided to implementing partners.
- There are advantages working with Eastern European NGOs in the Northern Caucasus: they tend to be young organizations with strong commitment, motivation and eagerness to learn/improve; they have historical links with Russia; many staff speak Russian; and they are more cost-effective than Western NGOs.

- Consistent, long-term partnership is important in assisting local NGOs to develop.

#### Recommendations

- More rigour is required in the implementation of the EP and the development of workplans, performance indicators, annual reviews, etc should be supported by the Representative and EP Coordinator. However, rather than do this in an ad hoc way it would be prudent to examine the modified IMEP recently developed by UNICEF HQ and determine if this would be a suitable standard for the NC EP.
- Although the final responsibility has to remain with the EP Coordinator, the Field Coordinator should be more involved in the prioritisation of activities/projects. This could be achieved in the context of developing implementation workplans (or rolling plans).
- *Transition* plans should be developed by mid-year for each sector, incorporating a phase out strategy for the provision of assistance in Ingushetia and a transfer strategy to shift the focus to Chechnya.
- UNICEF should set more realistic beneficiary targets and be more precise in reporting achievements. This precision should include some estimation of effectiveness and efficiency.
- There should be strong support from the Representative for greater engagement on planning and implementation issues between Field Officers, the Field Coordinator, and the EP Coordinator.
- Field staff are a future resource for the Northern Caucasus whether or not they continue to work for UNICEF. To strengthen their capacity to contribute to reconstruction when the time comes UNICEF could invest in their project cycle skills (assessment, design, implementation and evaluation) so that they are better able to contribute to the preparation and implementation of multilateral and bilateral projects.
- The Representative and EP Coordinator should consider how UNICEF can add value and exert influence on its counterparts, implementing partners and beneficiaries *as UNICEF* (i.e. not just as a funding agency). This will certainly require, amongst other things, familiarizing staff and implementing partners with UNICEF standards and experience, training staff in their application, and reflecting them in performance indicators and agreements with implementing partners.
- The Representative and EP Coordinator should also consider how to give practical application to CEDAW in its programming, given that there is a gap here at present.
- Operations field staff should have access to original, detailed NGO budgets (in addition to UNICEF's summaries) to assist them check implementing partner financial reports.
- The UNICEF Field Coordinator should be transferred to Nazran, making it the principal office. One of the two Nissan Patrols should be transferred at the same time.

- PCAs should refer to UNICEF's mandate based principles (including general principles and sector specific principles) and partner NGOs should be required to adhere to them and demonstrate this in their monitoring and reporting. This should be reinforced by the participation of partner NGOs in orientation workshops.
- UNICEF should consider providing more professional training for local NGO partners in administration, operations and finance, monitoring and reporting.
- A clear and consistent planning and monitoring model, preferably reflecting the results based approach used in IMEP, needs to be agreed and used as the foundation for introducing more rigour to NGO partner planning and monitoring.

## **8 Monitoring and reporting**

### **8.1 Critical gaps**

Just as it has not been UNICEF's practice to develop workplans for implementing what is in the CAP for the Northern Caucasus, performance in meeting CAP targets and objectives is not tracked systematically (i.e. monitored), and reports are consequently not systematic either. There is a system of reporting, but it constitutes 'good news' reporting. The annual reports read like promotional material even though they are said to be principally for internal use (reporting to the regional level and HQ). Perhaps this is because the annual reports are also important public documents, perhaps it is just the way reporting has evolved within UNICEF. Whatever the reason, UNICEF's style of reporting does not serve well as a management tool because it does not systematically compare achievements with objectives and targets, record critical lessons, or provide guidance moving forward. The EP Coordinator and Representative can't rely on these reports to improve programme performance, and presumably rely more on informal information.

The SitReps are useful in so far as they provide short-term updates on plans and achievements and give some flavour to what UNICEF is doing, but like the annual reports they do not systematically track progress. Raw data is offered (for example 400 infant starter kits, or 15 wheelchairs, or 6,200 textbooks supplied) with no hint as to what this really means in terms of performance. Is it what was planned? Was it supplied on time? Are there any issues about quality? Perhaps this is not the role of the SitRep given that it is posted on the web. But there is no alternative in-house reporting system to guide managers (other than what happens informally by email and in person). Everything that is reported is at least partially intended for donor consumption.

The lack of critical, methodical reporting for use by managers represents a very significant gap in UNICEF's systems. Basically it means that UNICEF is not systematically testing its performance. Everything may *seem* to be OK because the activities are credible, implementation is proceeding and the donors are continuing to fund the programme. But this verges on complacency - UNICEF responsibilities to children and women require more effort and rigour than this.

This is not to say that UNICEF should not distribute promotional material. It is to say that there is a gap in terms of critical, analytical reporting, particularly at the results level (i.e. progress in achieving objectives). It may be objected that this is the realm of evaluation - not so, monitoring is not limited to the gathering of information about inputs and activities. What would be the point of putting off consideration of results to the end of a programme, or even to the end of the year in an emergency setting? Humanitarian agencies have a responsibility to regularly test the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of their assistance. An agency can't rectify shortcomings in the provision of humanitarian assistance if its managers are not fully informed. The problem is not just that UNICEF's internal reporting systems are lacking. Critical, results based information is not flowing through from implementing partners either, because UNICEF does not require it of them.

Neither the EP Coordinator nor the Representative can do their job adequately on the basis of current reporting.

Some UNICEF managers and staff clearly believe monitoring is weak, while others do not see the need to introduce new monitoring and reporting requirements. It is interesting that there should be such a divergence of views. Rather than just call for more monitoring, those who recognise the need for more rigour need to convince the sceptics by specifying the type of additional information that is required and by demonstrating how it will improve decision-making and accountability. It should not be too difficult to make this case. But it needs to be borne in mind that collecting and analysing information takes time, energy and money; and introducing new requirements is challenging for staff. There needs to be a consensus that it is worth it. Managers and staff alike will find ways to work around systems that are imposed.

One staff member made the point that the financial people are in a good position in relation to monitoring systems, but the planning and monitoring people are not. As far as she can see, mounds and mounds of paper are produced about the EP but it is not very useful because it is not adequately structured. In her opinion UNICEF needs to correct this by adopting a LogFrame approach. Perhaps, but there are considerable risks because many organizations have taken this course and found that many managers and staff find it hard to get the matrices, indicators, etc right and end up rejecting the approach. Yes a results based structure of some kind is required. But it is better to adopt a minimalist approach in terms of complexity, starting with the basics of ensuring that reports coming from the field compare achievements with plans, highlight constraints and opportunities and recommend changes that should be made.

It is also essential to institute periodic review processes to stop and reflect on progress and where to go next, ideally on a biannual basis coinciding with CAP formulation and six months out. Indeed it is normal practice to review the CAP midway. The new Field Coordinator involved field staff in a review of 2002 activities. This is an excellent initiative and should be fully supported and developed. One of the objectives of these reviews should be to more deeply involve field staff in planning and review processes.

## **8.2 Field level monitoring**

There is general agreement within UNICEF and amongst other agencies that field level monitoring was weak in the earlier stages of the EP and that it took over a year, possibly longer, to develop controls (e.g. over the drugs provided). This represents a weakness in the EP, but one that UNICEF has addressed by employing more local staff tasked with monitoring. There are now three – one for education, one for mine action and one covering both health/nutrition and water/sanitation.

Within Ingushetia the field monitors now appear to have reasonably good controls in place for monitoring the distribution of UNICEF assistance by implementing partners and Ingush authorities. The shelves of ring binders containing the reports of the field monitors attest to this. Nevertheless the emphasis is on witnessing the delivery of inputs to the partner/authority (not the final beneficiary) to check that it matches the allocation. Most reports on file are of this type. Less attention is paid to post-distribution monitoring or checking actual usage (depending on the nature of the supply). It is true that implementing partners have monitoring responsibilities at this level, but that does not remove the need for checks, particularly if the NGO concerned does not report problems (there are always problems of one kind or another). This is not to say that field monitors do not get down to this level of monitoring at all. Examples were given demonstrating that they do and that they approach the task with good sense. But this form of monitoring is limited and there is considerable reliance

on the implementing partner and insufficient checking of the use of supplies by the authorities.

The new Field Coordinator made the point that the reports filling the ring binders on the shelves are necessary as a first line of control, but it is left as raw data and never analysed. In other words information is not being presented to her that provides a feel for progress in each sector. She also needs allocations and distributions to be compared with targets (quantity, quality and timeliness). There is no reason why field monitors could not generate this information. The Field Coordinator also needs information that reports strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints in each sector. This is the responsibility of the coordinator for each sector.

The perspective of the field staff may be that this is not really necessary. From their point of view, if they encounter problems in implementation they solve them. This is a positive attitude, but they should not under-estimate the ability of those up the line to provide advice.

Sometimes monitoring is not enough and a study or survey is required to assess progress and/or effectiveness. A number of useful studies have been conducted. For example, in the area of mine/UXO victim assistance 50 beneficiaries were assessed. It was found that they lacked knowledge about care of the device and action is being taken to address this by Handicap International. This represents intelligent problem solving.

Although training has been provided for UNICEF monitors, more is needed to improve skills and more will definitely be needed if more rigorous reporting is required. Predominantly, this should be on-the-job training and mentoring, not just more workshops.

### **8.3 Monitoring in Chechnya**

Chechnya presents very unusual challenges because UNICEF staff can only make extremely circumscribed occasional visits to Grozny and in reality cannot conduct meaningful monitoring in Chechnya. As a result there is a question mark hanging over supplies to Chechnya, particularly items given to the MoE and MoH. For example, 6,200 textbooks were given to the Chechen Ministry of Education in 2001. How well would they have been distributed throughout schools in Chechnya? Earlier, school-in-a-bag kits were provided and some of these were seen on the market. In any case the MoH probably doesn't have the staff to control distribution properly. Similarly, it was reported that all functioning schools of Chechnya were provided with Mine Risk Education (MRE) booklets (192,000). It is unlikely that this distribution was or could have been effected as perfectly as the report suggests.

UNICEF can rely more on partner NGOs. They are doing more manageable jobs and requirements can be placed on them. They have to present reports after all. But they are being asked to monitor themselves, which represents a risk. UNHCR and WFP get around this by contracting another NGO, Vesta, to independently monitor the provision of assistance. Some believe strongly that this is unethical in so far as it involves having others do monitoring tasks in Chechnya that are considered too dangerous for staff. Nevertheless, this approach is worth considering, particularly where assistance is being channelled through organizations that are not already well known to UNICEF, or through the MoH and MoE.

WHO adopts a different approach and pays a senior person in the medical statistics department of the MOH in Grozny to conduct monitoring (and generally look out for WHO's interests). UNICEF could consider this. UNICEF has on occasion asked a doctor in Grozny working mainly for MSF-H to assist in the delivery of some drugs, consumables and kits and to monitor their distribution and use.

What UNICEF can readily do is invest more in testing the monitoring systems, and the veracity of self-assessment, of implementing partners. Where there are deficiencies in their M&E systems, their staff could be brought to Ingushetia for training. UNICEF field staff should participate in this training so that they learn together with partner staff and relationships are formed.

#### **8.4 Lessons and recommendations**

##### Lesson

- A preoccupation with raising funds and maintaining donor support impacts on reporting, which when shared with donors tends to become 'good news reporting'. This information is not very useful for managers and unless a parallel internal reporting system is put in place there is a strong risk of becoming complacent. As long as the positives are highlighted, the programme will look good. It may indeed be essentially sound, but improvements will only come from critical analysis.

##### Recommendations

- UNICEF needs to be more willing, and to invest more, in testing the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of its interventions. This will require the introduction of internal reporting formats (monthly or quarterly depending on the nature of the operation) for management purposes, and the reform of Annual Reports if only in the interests of transparency and accountability. The monthly or quarterly reports should clearly measure progress against workplans in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness. That is, results based, time bound reporting. Managers should encourage staff to regard their reports as problem-solving, opportunity seeking tools. The ideal to be promoted should be critical analysis and clear recommendations for action.
- UNICEF should require implementing partners to provide critical, results based reporting of their performance.
- The UNICEF EP should adopt a biannual review process, aligned with the annual CAP formulation and at the mid point in their implementation.
- Field monitors should maintain simple matrices that track progress by comparing planned supply and other activities with actuals, and regularly report progress to the sector coordinator together with a narrative account of the reasons for any shortfalls and possible solutions. The sectoral coordinators should in turn prepare regular (monthly) reports for the Field Coordinator on progress made against planning targets, issues and opportunities arising and recommendations for action.
- On each visit to an IDP camp or spontaneous settlement, UNICEF's field monitors should visit at least two randomly selected tents/houses to meet families and informally try to determine if needs within UNICEF's responsibility are being met.

- Given the great limitations on monitoring, UNICEF needs to be more transparent and critical of assistance provided to Chechnya. It should not implied that all supplies sent to Chechnya have been perfectly distributed/utilised. If there are known limitations, risks or doubts these should be noted, at least internally.
- UNICEF should explore the option of contracting an organization to monitor assistance provided within Chechnya, and the option of contracting key people in the MoE, MoH, etc to look out for UNICEF's interests.
- UNICEF should invest more in strengthening the monitoring and reporting systems of implementing partners. One means of doing this should be to bring implementing partner staff to Ingushetia for training.

## **9 Coordination**

### **9.1 Inter-agency coordination**

Since about mid-2000, the coordination between humanitarian actors appears to have been good (different opinions were expressed about how good). The UNICEF Representative believes coordination has been satisfactory overall, despite the occasional hiccup and the influence of the disposition of the changing cast of individuals involved, with regular coordination meetings producing more or less harmonious responses to policy, security and operational issues. In the Representative's opinion the more coherent stance taken to try to head off the closure of Aki Yurt IDP camp in Ingushetia was a sign of the maturing of inter-agency coordination.

The Humanitarian Coordination Group (HCG) appears to have worked quite well during the last two years, although as mentioned above there have clearly been times when individual agencies acted in what they perceived to be their own interests. The UNDP Representative/Humanitarian Coordinator noted that he would have liked a team that was more 'intellectually homogenous'.

UNICEF has encountered difficulties working with UNHCR at an operational level. UNHCR has seen itself as the senior partner, but not necessarily delivered on its responsibilities (notably protection and watsan). This was compounded for much of the EP by UNICEF's reliance on UNHCR for office space and admin/financial support.

OCHA's Head of Office suggested that the membership of the HCG should in effect be a 'local IASC' i.e. with NGO and ICRC representation. Heads of agencies apparently don't think it is necessary although the Humanitarian Coordinator is open to it.

By all accounts OCHA has performed very well, playing a vital role in leading the CAP process and setting-up of sectoral coordination meetings with clear agency leadership. The contribution of the Head of Office was widely referred to. The appointment of a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) in February 2002, based in Nazran, was welcomed by humanitarian actors in the NC and has improved field-level coordination.

### **9.2 Sectoral coordination**

The CAP provides an excellent basis for coordination although it does not achieve full integration or remove all overlap between agencies. UNICEF has been acting as the coordinating agency for Education and Mine Action. Other humanitarian actors and the relevant local authorities have appreciated UNICEF's contribution.

Coordination in the education sector is regarded by OCHA as very good and indeed better than others. It is assisted by the fact UNICEF does not have a UN competitor. Coordination in the mine action sector is also regarded as good, although there have been some tensions between UNICEF and WHO over responsibilities.<sup>36</sup> It is recognised within UNICEF that there are some weaknesses to be ironed out in relation to the coordination of mine/UXO assistance and data collection. To this end it has

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<sup>36</sup> See for example SitRep 14.

been decided to create a separate assistance database to be used by all agencies as a referral system and to hold separate monthly IMSMA coordination meetings.

Coordination is much more than hosting meetings and avoiding overlap between the players and it seems UNICEF could probably do more to facilitate joint strategic planning in education and mine action (beyond what is undertaken annually for the CAP). This should involve NGOs and ICRC. UNICEF does face the difficulty that it is not present in Chechnya whereas a number of the organizations attending coordination meetings are. UNICEF could reach a point in the mine action sector at least where it is seen to be trying to lead from behind. In such circumstances it may be prudent to suggest that another agency or organization takes the lead (perhaps whichever ultimately takes the lead in demining).

Coordination in the health and nutrition sector is said to be OK, although there has also been some tensions in this sector between UNICEF and WHO. Coordination in the water and sanitation sector is said to have been good between UNICEF, ICRC and PHO in Chechnya and in the initial stages between UNHCR and UNICEF in Ingushetia. It was noted that coordination with the ICRC, sometimes difficult, has been very productive both in Moscow and in the field.

### **9.3 Relations with beneficiaries, local communities and authorities**

According to the Representative, all programmes have relied heavily on the involvement of IDPs themselves, and/or Chechen professionals, helping to build capacity for future development within Chechnya. Reports do not contain any information on the matter and it could not be pursued during this study.

The UN has had problematic relations at times with the Russian Federation, most notably over camp closures and voluntary return (discussed in the chapter on protection). The federal government pays lip service to the idea of the international presence in the Caucasus and at the same time resents it, and reacts negatively to anything that can be perceived as criticism. There has also at times been poor communication between federal and republic authorities creating contradictory situations.

However, in the implementation of its programme UNICEF has been able to establish good working relations with federal and republican education and health authorities, and with EMERCOM.

In the view of one member of the field team, it needs to be borne in mind that UN and local systems of management often mismatch and a greater effort needs to be made to bridge this gap.

### **9.4 Issues, lessons and recommendations**

#### Issues arising

- When the current UNDP Representative/Humanitarian Coordinator leaves there will be an immediate issue concerning which agency takes on the (presumably interim) role of Humanitarian Coordinator.

#### Lessons

- A field staff member said that they had learned that IDP beneficiaries and members of the host community should be involved in the development of programmes/projects to ensure they had a clear understanding of what UNICEF

can do and cannot do to avoid possible tensions between IDP beneficiaries and the host community.

- A number of field staff gave as a lesson learned that establishing a constructive and clear relationship with relevant local authorities from the outset was very beneficial in terms of implementation and sustainability.
- There is general agreement that in the Russian Federation it is more important than in many other countries for UN agencies, other humanitarian actors and donors to develop strong linkages and maintain a common front on key humanitarian issues.

#### Recommendations

- UNICEF should meet with other agencies in the education and mine action sectors and recommend that a process be determined for undertaking a longer-term joint strategic planning exercise. UNICEF should undertake to facilitate this process.
- If UNICEF continues to be unable to operate directly in Chechnya and it appears to others involved in the mine action sector that UNICEF is trying to 'lead from behind', UNICEF should consider suggesting that another agency or organization take the lead.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**  
**STUDY ON THE UNICEF EMERGENCY PROGRAMME**  
**IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS**

**Objectives**

Produce a document encompassing the description of the beginning, development, operational increase and implementation of the UNICEF Emergency Programme (EP) for the Northern Caucasus, including the full set of experience and lessons learned acquired between the end of 1999 and the end of 2002 and general comments on funding and resource mobilisation.

The study should include indicative advice/guidelines for future developments of the Programme and should be used as a baseline document for a comprehensive evaluation of the same programme in two to three years from now.

**Activities**

Gather information (including relevant experiences, lessons learned, mistakes, trends, etc) from:

- All the UNICEF staff members who have been, even marginally, involved with the development and management of the EP from its beginning in autumn 1999. Direct interviews will take place in Moscow, Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia) and Nazran (Ingushetia), where the UNICEF offices dealing with the EP are located. As much as possible, phone interviews will be arranged with relevant staff members who moved to new duty stations.
- Key staff members of other UN Agencies (UNHCR, WFP, OCHA, WHO, UNDP), about the collaboration, coordination, development of joint initiatives, with UNICEF both at Moscow level, especially in the framework of the Humanitarian Coordination Group and Security Management Team, and at field level.
- Main current and previous implementing partners of UNICEF, about the collaboration, coordination, supervision and development of joint initiatives at field level.

Condense the amount of information gathered in a final report setting out the main accomplishments, successes, mistakes, lessons learned, positive and negative trends. The three years covered by the study could be divided into stages.

Draw conclusions for the continuation and possible improvement of the performances of the EP in the coming years.

## QUESTIONNAIRE FOR UNICEF MANAGERS AND STAFF

*Context:* What in your opinion have been the two or three most significant turning points for UNICEF impacting on the implementation of the Emergency Program?

*Relevance:* Have there been any notable gaps in UNICEF's EP at any stage, or any weaknesses in the strategy underpinning it?

*Results:* Which of the EP objectives have been most fully achieved over the last three years and for which have the results been the least satisfactory?

*Viability:* Do you think UNICEF's inputs into education, health, water & sanitation and mine action been viable/sustainable?

*Innovation:* Have any significant innovative approaches been attempted and if they have, with what success?

*Opportunities:* Are there any emerging opportunities that UNICEF is intending to or could conceivably seize?

*Constraints:* What are the most significant internal and external constraints and how effectively have they been dealt with?

*Management:* How well have UNICEF's planning and management systems functioned?

*Coordination:* What have been the strengths and weaknesses of coordination with other humanitarian actors?

*Lessons identified:* Overall, what do you think are the three most significant lessons to come out of the last three years for UNICEF and how could they be applied?

*Other issues:* Are there any burning issues not covered above that the review should address?

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### Itinerary and people met, February 2003

<b>Day/Location</b>	<b>Activity</b>
Sunday 2 <sup>nd</sup> Moscow	Preliminary meeting with Mr Enrico Leonardi (UNICEF Emergency Programme Coordinator). Meeting with Mr Rudi Luchmann (former UNICEF Field Coordinator for North Caucasus)
Monday 3 <sup>rd</sup> Moscow	<p>Attended presentation by Enrico Leonardi for UNICEF Regular Programme on activities in NC</p> <p>Joint meeting with Ms Rosemary McCreery (UNICEF Representative), Enrico Leonardi and Ms Oyunsaihan Dendevnorov (UNICEF Field Coordinator for NC)</p> <p>Meetings with UNICEF staff including Mr Ivan Donoso (Area Operations Officer), Ms Olga Basurmanova (Emergency Programme Assistant), Mr Cetin Hangul (Supply Officer), Ms Anna Engalycheva (Supply Assistant), and Irina Sharashkina (Senior Operations Assistant)</p>
Tuesday 4 <sup>th</sup> Moscow	Meet other agencies and organisations in Moscow including: Mr Koryun Alaverdyan (WFP Emergency Coordinator), Mr Toby Lanzer (OCHA Head of Office), Mr Frederick Lyons (UNDP Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator, UN Resident Coordinator), Dr Mark Tsechkovski (WHO Emergency Health Coordinator for NC); Dr Ute Enderlein (WHO Public Health Officer for NC), Mr Francois Wuarin (ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation)
Wednesday 5 <sup>th</sup> Vladikavkaz	<p>Fly to Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia) with Oyun Dendevnorov, UNICEF Field Coordinator</p> <p>After security briefing with UNSECOORD met with Georgi Meltauri (UNICEF, Supply/Logistics Assistant)</p> <p>Meeting with Mr Gang Lee, UNHCR Protection Officer</p>
Thursday 6 <sup>th</sup> Nazran	<p>Mini-workshop with UNICEF staff</p> <p>Individual interviews with UNICEF staff including Fatima Yandieva (Assistant Project Officer - Health &amp; Nutrition and Water &amp; Sanitation), Murad Shishkhanov (Assistant Project Officer - Education), Artur Gagiev (Field Monitor, Education), Satsita Eskieva (Field Monitor, Health Nutrition and WatSan), Eliza Murtazaeva (Field Monitor, Mine Action), Rustam Bagaev (Warehouse Assistant), Zareama Khussieva (Operations Assistant)</p>
Friday 7 <sup>th</sup> Nazran, Sputnik IDP camp and Vladikavkaz	<p>Visited Sputnik IDP camp. Met with Liuba Artchakova, ARD/Denal Program Director), Isabella Bankhaeva (principal of school) and others.</p> <p>Visited and interviewed randomly selected IDP households.</p> <p>Visited the sports and recreational centers and spoke with staff.</p>

	<p>Visited Vladikavkaz Prosthetic &amp; Orthopaedic Centre (Federal Government Enterprise) with Aida Ailarova (UNICEF Assistant Project Officer - Mine Action) and Eliza Murtasaeva (UNICEF Field Monitor, Mine Action).</p> <p>Met with Mr Esiev Vladislav (Director) and other camp staff.</p> <p>Debriefing with UNICEF staff involved in field visit to Sputnik IDP who had also visited and interviewed IDP households</p>
Saturday 8 <sup>th</sup> Nazran & Vladikavkaz	<p>Meeting with Dr Jorge Martinez (WHO, Field Coordinator of Humanitarian Health Assistance to the Northern Caucasus)</p> <p>Meeting with Marina Dzaurova (UNICEF Assistant Operations Officer) and Zareama Khussieva (UNICEF Operations Assistant)</p> <p>Meeting with UNICEF partner Save the Generation (Zarema and Roza) together with Ms Eliza Murtazaeva (UNICEF Mine Action Field Monitor)</p> <p>Lunch with Oyun</p> <p>Meeting with Bruno (UNSECOORD Deputy)</p> <p>Meeting with Elaine Duthoit (OCHA, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator)</p>
Monday 10 <sup>th</sup> Nazran & Vladikavkaz	<p>Louisa Khazhgirieva (ICRC Assistant Mine Action Program Coordinator), Adlan (Voice of the Mountains), Petr Kostohryz (People in Need Foundation, Senior Program Officer), Aslanbek Misktaev (Minga Program Manager), Jan Field (CARE International Project Manager)</p>
Tuesday 11 <sup>th</sup> Nazran & Vladikavkaz	<p>Aleksander Siwinski (Polish Humanitarian Organisation), Tomas Starczewski (Caritas Internationalis Representative), Agata Zamlynska (HWA), Li Gang (UNHCR Northern Caucasus Senior Protection Officer)</p>
Wednesday 12 <sup>th</sup> Ex Nazran	<p>Final discussions with UNICEF staff</p> <p>Fly back to Moscow</p>
Thursday 13 <sup>th</sup> Moscow	<p>Philippe Royan (ECHO Head of Office), Tatiana Meytis (ECHO Programme Officer)</p> <p>Esselien Van Eerten (Royal Netherlands Embassy, Political Section)</p> <p>Debriefing with Rosemary McCreery (UNICEF Representative, Russian Federation and Belarus) and Enrico Leonardi (UNICEF Emergency Programme Coordinator)</p> <p>Mr Jozsef Gyorke (UNHCR Regional Representative for Russian Federation), Mr Dennis Blair (UNHCR Deputy Regional Representative)</p> <p>Telephone interview, Mr Philip O'Brien (UNICEF Regional Representative in Geneva)</p>
Friday 14 <sup>th</sup> Moscow	<p>Michel Hofman (Medecins Sans Frontieres Holland Head of Mission)</p>

## TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

Date/period	External event/humanitarian context	Humanitarian response	UNICEF action
<b>1999</b>			
September	Conflict erupted anew in Chechnya		
20 October		Russian Government and UN signed a Memorandum on Consultations to establish a framework for cooperation	Departure of Gianni Murzi, UNICEF Rep, replaced by Fritz Lherisson (Rep <i>ad interim</i> ) 11 tented schools created by MoE Ingushetia with 3500 children enrolled
Oct-Nov		“Bart” & “Sputnik” IDP camps created	1 <sup>st</sup> UNICEF presence in Stavropol in UNHCR office
3 to 8 November		UN sent an assessment team to Ingushetia and Dagestan in which UNICEF participated	
23 November		UN Inter-Agency Flash Appeal for 3 month covering the period 1 December 1999 to 29 February 2000	
Nov-Dec	Parliamentary elections		Rafik Kamarli, Emergency Officer, arrival; based in Moscow/Stavropol UNICEF provision of emergency supplies till Jan 2000
<b>2000</b>			
January			Ivan Donoso, Area Operations Officer for the Regular Programme, arrival Tony Raby, Emergency Programme Coordinator, arrival Hiring of Georgi Meltauri, Logistics and Supply Assistant , Vladikavkaz

Date/period	External event/humanitarian context	Humanitarian response	UNICEF action
			Hiring of Tatiana Degtyareva, Emergency Programme Assistant, Stavropol Opening of the Vladikavkaz office
first week of February		Inter-agency mission	
February			Opening of Nazran office. Hiring of Artur Gagiev, Education Assistant
March	Presidential election; Putin new President	Launch of CAP covering the period 1 December 1999 – 30 June 2000	Departure Rafik Kamarli, arrival Andrei Demidovich, Fiedl Coordinator, Vladikavkaz
April	Russia suspended from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)		Departure Fritz Lherisson and arrival of Rosemary McCreery, Area Representative for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus
May		Humanitarian Coordinator function established: UNHCR Rep appointed as HC/DO. Establishment of Security Management Team (SMT)	First partnership with the NGO ARD (tented schools). Overall monitoring of IDP spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia. Started collaboration with MoE Ing. and NGOs through providing tents, textbooks, stationery and other non-food items
17 to 23 May		Inter-agency mission (including UNICEF) visited Ingushetia and Chechnya to review programmes, re-assess needs, and plan future action	
June			Departure Andrei Demidovich, return of Rafik Kamarli, Vladikavkaz
July		Launch CAP covering the period	Departure Rafik Kamarli, arrival Rudi Luchmann, new Field Coordinator;

Date/period	External event/humanitarian context	Humanitarian response	UNICEF action
		1 December 1999 – 31 December 2000. UNSECOORD presence established on the field, arrival Ravi Solanki	Vladikavkaz. Education Sector Coordination meetings started
August		Signature of the UN – RF Government MoU for the intervention in the Northern Caucasus	Tehnaz Dastoor arrival, mine action survey. UNICEF, together with UNHCR, initiated a programme of action with NGO partners to promote mine and UXO awareness
September			Start collaboration with Polish Humanitarian Organisation for watsan programme in Grozny and Project for ‘Child Friendly Space’ Hiring of Zareama Khussieva, Assistant Operations, and Satsita Eskieva, Assistant Health & Nutrition/ WatSan
November		“Alina” & “Bella” IDP camps created Launch of the CAP covering the period 1 January 2001 – 31 December 2001	Departure of Tony Raby and arrival of Enrico Leonardi. Closure of UNICEF Stavropol presence and end contract of Tatiana Degtyareva First Mine Awareness ToT. Security training. Project with PINF for creation of new schools for IDP children in Ing.
December			Hiring of Tamara Isaeva., Education Officer No funding for all tented schools for IDP children in Ingushetia by MoE Ing; UNICEF gets more and more involved and start negotiations with possible implementing partners

<b>Date/period</b>	<b>External event/humanitarian context</b>	<b>Humanitarian response</b>	<b>UNICEF action</b>
<b>2001</b>			
January	Kenny Gluck (MSF-H) kidnapping; consequent suspension of UN activities in Chechnya; MSF activities stop in the region. Russia re-admitted to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).		Beginning of first sport/recreational projects in the IDP camps. Project with CPCD for creation of schools for IDP children in Ing. Project with IRC for 5 schools and psychosocial support to IDP children in Ing.
February	Kenny Gluck released		Project with HWA for 8 wooden schools for 2700 IDP children in Nazranovsky, Karabulaksky, Malgobeksky and Sunzhensky regions of Ing. Project with CARE for psychosocial training for education in North Caucasus
March		“Satsita” IDP camp created. Starting of the tent-schools network for IDP children HC/DO functions passed to the new RC, Frederick Lyons	Beginning of the partnership with Voice of the Mountains (Mine Awareness). Starting of the Education survey in Chechnya ARD, IRC, PINF, Salvation Army took over 11 school from MoE Ing in addition to other schools
April	Government stopped registering new arrivals thereby hampering their access to temporary shelter and humanitarian assistance provided by the authorities. So far nobody who has been displaced since 1999 has obtained legal status in accordance with the law on forced migrants	Inter-agency security assessment mission to the NC	Hiring of Fatima Yandieva H&N+WatSan Officer, and Aida Ailarova, Mine Action Assistant later Officer
May		Mid-year review for the CAP	


Date/period	External event/humanitarian context	Humanitarian response	UNICEF action
June	A growing number of IDPs faced eviction from spontaneous settlements and host families		<p>UNICEF Republic of Chechnya School Assessment, done in collaboration with ARD, CPCD, DRC, PHO, PINF, and OSCE.</p> <p>Project with ARD to arrange summer recreation at the seaside for 150 IDP school children, construction of 2 wooden schools in Chechnya and to cover 50% of teachers' salaries</p> <p>Summer camp program for IDP children. 1<sup>st</sup> "Child-friendly space" project in Grozny (Caritas).</p> <p>Kindergartens rehabilitation in Ingushetia (Humanitarian Cargo Carriers)</p>
July			<p>Hiring of Marina Dzaurova, Assistant Operations Officer, Ella Muraydants, Operations Assistant and Rustam Bagayev, Warehouse Manager.</p> <p>Nutritional survey in Ingushetia.</p> <p>Beginning of collaboration with Prosthetic workshop</p> <p>Project with DRC 'Summer camp for IDP children in Alina'</p>
September			First wooden schools for IDP children construction
October	Small but steady flow of people from Chechnya to Ingushetia throughout year reached 8,000 by October		Visit of Carol Bellamy (UNICEF ExDir)
November		Launch of CAP for the period 1 January 2002 – 31 December 2002	1 <sup>st</sup> schools rehabilitation project in Chechnya (People In Need Foundation);


<b>Date/period</b>	<b>External event/humanitarian context</b>	<b>Humanitarian response</b>	<b>UNICEF action</b>
			School rehabilitation project with CRDPC in Chechnya 1 <sup>st</sup> Mine Awareness survey in Ingushetia; 1 <sup>st</sup> recreational activities in Grozny (PINF)
December			Cold-chain survey in Chechnya Project with PINF to support school network for IDP children in Ing.
<b>2002</b>			
January			Project with CARITAS for Children Center in Ingushetia Project with IRC for schooling, sports and vocational training for IDP children and adolescents
February		Arrival of Eliane Duthoit, UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator in the NC	Hiring of Eliza Murtazaeva, Mine Action Assistant
March	Mr Zyzikov's election as President of Ingushetia (replacing Mr Aushev)		
May	Issuing of the Russian Govt Action plan for IDP's repatriation (the 20 points plan)	UN security mission to the NC Mid-year review of the CAP	
June		Visit of Olara Otunnu SRSG for Children in Armed Conflict	MoE Ing is provided with recreational materials, bed sets and kitchen ware for summer camps for 50% of IDP children
July	Kidnapping of Nina Davidovich; consequent suspension of UN operations for 6 weeks Closure of the IDP camps in Znamenskoe-Chechnya		Mine Awareness survey in Chechnya ProMS (global UNICEF Admin network programme) installation in the field + opening of field offices bank account


<b>Date/period</b>	<b>External event/humanitarian context</b>	<b>Humanitarian response</b>	<b>UNICEF action</b>
	Floods in the region		
August	Kidnapping of Arian Erkel (MSF-Ch) in Dagestan; continuation of the suspension.		Programme retreat in Tsei (North Ossetia), preparation for the CAP
September			MA program integration in the school curriculum in Chechnya
October	Hostage crisis in Moscow		Departure of Rudi Luchmann Adoption of yearly cooperation agreement with main implementing partners
November		Launch of CAP for the period 1 January 2003 – 31 December 2003	Hiring of Murad Shishkhanov, new Education Officer
December	Closure of IDP camp in Aki-Yurt (Ingushetia). Explosion in the Government building in Grozny		Arrival of Oyun Dendevnorov , new Field Coordinator
<b>2003</b>			
January	Release of Nina Davidovich		Preparations for Mother Empowerment Programme in Ingushetia

## CAP REQUESTS, CONTRIBUTIONS, EXPENDITURE AND ROLL-OVERS

	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>
<b>Budget Requested through CAP, US\$</b>	<b>4 425 500</b>	<b>5 054 000</b>	<b>5 120 000</b>
<b><u>Donor Organisations</u></b>			
European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO)	524 650	990 358	1 806 220
Sweden - SIDA Sweden		523 550	469 050
CIDA/IHA International Humanitarian	136 054		
United Department of State (DOS)		100 000	
USA/BPRM US Bureau of Population, Refugees	1 238 000	500 000	670 450
Qatar Charitable Society	250 000		
<b><u>National Committees for UNICEF</u></b>			
German Committee for UNICEF	250 348	429 990	226 788
Danish Committee for UNICEF	31 181		
Luxembourg Committee for UNICEF			23 276
Slovenia National Committee	81 445		
United Kingdom Committee for UNICEF	15 015		
<b><u>Donor Countries</u></b>			
Germany Permanent Mission of Germany			196 850
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	951 587	670 000	1 169 230
Estonia	19 295		
Luxemburg	35 359		
Netherlands	615 708	896 350	371 129
Norway	110 500	111 860	
Canada	289 311	196 078	142 858
Czech Republic	3 285		
Liechtenstein	17 964		
Lithuania			12 710
<b>Total contributed, US\$</b>	<b>4 569 701</b>	<b>4 418 186</b>	<b>5 088 561</b>
<b>Carried-over from previous year, US\$</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1 696 988</b>	<b>2 130 270</b>
<b>TOTAL funds available, US\$</b>	<b>4 569 701</b>	<b>6 115 174</b>	<b>7 218 831</b>







## LIST OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

2000-2002

#	EDUCATION	HEALTH/NUTRITION/ WATSAN	MINE ACTION
1	<b>CPCD</b> <i>Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development</i>	<b>PHO</b> <i>Polish Humanitarian Organization</i>	<b>DDG</b> <i>Danish Demining Group</i>
2	<b>PINF</b> <i>People in Need Foundation, Czech Republic</i>	<b>Ministry of Health</b> <i>Chechnya</i> <i>(no PCAs)</i>	<b>VoM</b> <i>“Voice of Mountains”, Russia</i>
3	<b>Caritas Internationals</b> <i>Czech Republic</i>	<b>Ministry of Health</b> <i>Ingushetia</i> <i>(no PCAs)</i>	<b>“Minga”</b> <i>Saidullaev’s Charity Foundation, Russia</i>
4	<b>IRC</b> <i>International Rescue Committee, USA</i>	<b>Ministry of Emergencies</b> <i>Ingushetia</i> <i>(no PCAs)</i>	<b>Let’s Safe the Generation</b> <i>Russia</i>
5	<b>ARD / “Denal”</b> <i>Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, Russia</i>	<b>Sanitary Epidemiological Center -Chechnya</b> <i>(no PCAs)</i>	<b>CARE International</b> <i>Austria</i>
6	<b>HCC</b> <i>Humanitarian Cargo Career, Germany</i>	<b>Sanitary Epidemiological Centre</b> <i>Ingushetia</i> <i>(no PCAs)</i>	<b>Prosthetic Workshop</b> <i>North Ossetia, Russia</i>
7	<b>DRC</b> <i>Danish Refugee Council</i>		<b>Physical Rehabilitation Centre</b> <i>North Ossetia, Russia</i>
8	<b>Hilfswerk</b> <i>Austria</i>		<b>Russian Academic Theatre</b> <i>North Ossetia, Russia</i>
9	<b>CRDPC</b> <i>Chechen Refugee and Displaced People Council, Russia</i>		<b>NGO “Vesta”</b> <i>Russia</i>
10	<b>NGO “Druzhba”</b> <i>Russia</i>		
11	<b>Mercy Corps</b> <i>USA</i>		
12	<b>NGO “Vesta”</b> <i>Russia</i>		

## LIST OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

2003

#	EDUCATION	HEALTH/NUTRITION/WATSAN	MINE ACTION
1	<b>CPCD</b> <i>Center for Peacemaking and Community Development</i>	<b>PHO</b> <i>Polish Humanitarian Organization (MPCA)</i>	<b>DDG</b> <i>Danish Demining Group (till June)</i>
2	<b>PINF</b> <i>People in Need Foundation, Czech Republic</i>	<b>“Help”</b> <i>Germany (SSA)</i>	<b>VoM</b> <i>“Voice of Mountains”, Russia</i>
3	<b>Caritas</b> <i>Internationalis, Czech Republic</i>	<b>Ministry of Health</b> <i>Chechnya (no PCAs)</i>	<b>“Minga”</b> <i>Saidullaev’s Charity Foundation, Russia (starting in June)</i>
4	<b>IRC</b> <i>International Rescue Committee, USA</i>	<b>Ministry of Health</b> <i>Ingushetia (no PCAs)</i>	<b>Let’s Safe the Generation</b> <i>Russia</i>
5	<b>ARD / “Denal”</b> <i>Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, Russia</i>	<b>Ministry of Emergencies</b> <i>Ingushetia (no PCAs)</i>	<b>CARE International</b> <i>Canada</i>
6	<b>Hilfswerk</b> <i>Austria</i>	<b>Sanitary Epidemiological Centre</b> <i>Chechnya (no PCAs)</i>	<b>Prosthetic Workshop</b> <i>North Ossetia, Russia</i>
7	<b>CRDPC</b> <i>Chechen Refugee and Displaced People Council, Russia</i>	<b>Sanitary Epidemiological Centre</b> <i>Ingushetia (no PCAs)</i>	<b>State Chechen Drama Theatre</b> <i>(starting in July)</i>
8	<b>“Druzhba”</b> <i>Russia</i>		<b>Russian Academic Theatre</b> <i>North Ossetia, Russia (till March’2003)</i>
9	<b>Ministry of Education</b> <i>Chechnya (no PCA)</i>		
10	<b>Ministry of Education</b> <i>Ingushetia (no PCA)</i>		