UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO)

Emergency Preparedness and Response Evaluations 2003-2008

SUMMARY REVIEW

September 2008

Enrico Leonardi, Consultant
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>AMP</td>
<td>Annual Management Plan</td>
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<td>APA</td>
<td>Administrative Place of Assignment</td>
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<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>New York Head Quarters</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for the African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>PM(&amp;)E</td>
<td>Planning, Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
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<td>Programme Policy and Planning</td>
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<td>Programme Management System</td>
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<td>Special Operations Living</td>
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<td>Sudan (People) Liberation Army / Movement</td>
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<td>Special Service Agreement</td>
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<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Review Purpose
Between 2003 and 2008, the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO) has conducted evaluations of a number of emergency responses, both natural and man-made, in the region. Building on this comprehensive body of work, the UNICEF Regional Office (RO) has now led this “Summary Review” of lessons learned and recommendations to inform future humanitarian preparedness and response actions at Regional Office, Country Office (CO) and Headquarters (HQ) level.

Objective
The specific objective of the Review has been to “systematically capture conclusions, lessons and recommendations from recent evaluations and reviews of UNICEF humanitarian response in the Middle East and North Africa Region, highlighting common issues and distinguishing different levels at which issues need to be addressed (CO, RO, HQ), and presenting all of this in a structured, easily digestible format that can be used as a basis for prioritization and planning exercises that follow, including possible adjustment/adaptation of CO and RO level EPR planning processes and accountabilities.”

Methodology
Methodology has included a preliminary desk review of all the evaluation reports between 2003 and 2008 and extrapolation of all the main outcomes and recommendations. Main points have then been clarified, synthesized and contextualized to the current humanitarian environment. Out of approximately 400 recommendations proposed by the seven evaluations reviewed, 113 revised ones have been “distilled”. A discussion of the initial draft of the Review and of the 113 proposed Revised Recommendations has also taken place with relevant colleagues in MENARO and EMOPS, to fine-tune the latter, identify those which should be acted upon, and make them as practical as possible and useful for COs, RO and HQ. Other recommendations have been included in Annex as guidelines/best practices to be used as reference document by UNICEF offices. Additional literature, such as global evaluations of DFID-UNICEF collaboration, and outcome documents from relevant workshops, has also contributed to the revised recommendations in this Review.

Conclusions
The global rollout of the UN Humanitarian Reform has greatly influenced the humanitarian operating environment. It has created momentum to undertake major shifts in the way the United Nations and its partners prepare for and work in humanitarian emergencies. Especially in medium to large-size crises, the Cluster Approach is proving

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1 From the Summary Review’s ToRs.
2 The UN Humanitarian Reform website defines the Cluster Approach as “a way of addressing gaps and strengthening the effectiveness of humanitarian response through building partnerships. Moreover the cluster approach ensures predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies, by clarifying the division of labour among organisations, and better defining their roles and responsibilities within the different sectors of the response. It is about making the international
to be an extremely useful tool for coordination. Increasingly, Resident Coordinators are becoming aware of their responsibilities with regards to emergency preparedness and response, and the selection process for Humanitarian Coordinators is resulting in a greater pool of quality candidates. Donors are also supporting the Reform process, including through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), or through the Consolidated and Flash Appeal Processes.

The Reform and resulting UNICEF in-house efforts are starting to become visible in MENARO and, as noted in the evaluations, recent emergency responses have been of an increasingly higher standard. Several recommendations of the evaluations covered by this Review have been acted upon, with leadership provided by the RO, demonstrating that the MENA region provides numerous challenges but also opportunities for heightened emergency preparedness and response efforts.

Recommendations of this Review are clustered by cross-cutting themes and areas (Preparedness – including Leadership, Responsibilities and Accountabilities, and other areas –; Coordination; Partnerships; Planning, Monitoring and Assessments; External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations), operational sectors (Security; IT/Telecommunications; Logistics and Supply; Human Resources; Administration and Finance), and by programmatic sectors (Health; Nutrition; Water & Sanitation; Education; Child Protection).

The evaluations reviewed show several common patterns, and some areas in need of special attention have been identified by more than one evaluation. The most relevant and crucial recommendations, including for the MENA Regional Office and Country Offices, are included in the areas listed below. Although some developments already took place in these areas, some positive trends have been started, and some best practices have been identified, there is still abundant room for improvement.

- **Preparedness** – Preparedness is one of the main factors influencing the success of a Country Office in its immediate response to a new crisis. It needs to be consistently embedded in the Country Programme cycle in all sectors, with strong oversight from CO management and RO to ensure that preparedness activities are adequately represented in any CPD and AWP. Preparedness processes should be fully inclusive. Staff ownership of the preparedness processes and dedicated resources – financial and human – are also critical to the success of any humanitarian response effort.

- **Leadership** – Senior managers in the COs have the responsibility to lead preparedness process and emergency responses; this includes ensuring clarity, strategic vision, credibility and team cohesiveness and spirit, as well as advocating for children’s concerns in interagency coordination and external relations. The Regional Office has the responsibility to underscore the importance of UNICEF emergency preparedness and help guide/decide upon response scope and scale. The RO must ensure sound coordination between COs in the event of cross-border crises. All these are

*humanitarian community more structured, accountable and professional, so that it can be a better partner for host governments, local authorities and local civil society.* Additional information on the Reform and its components is available on the same website ([www.humanitarianreform.org](http://www.humanitarianreform.org)).
deliverables which COs and RO should be rated against in terms of performance evaluation.

- **Responsibilities and Accountabilities** – The oversight role of the Regional Office for the preparedness processes at country level needs to be clarified, as well as the formal triggering of a Regional Office response, especially in countries reluctant to acknowledge, or unable to identify a humanitarian crisis.

- **Coordination** – Interagency (IA) coordination has greatly improved in the framework of the UN Humanitarian Reform. In many cases though, especially in non-emergency-prone countries, IA coordination for emergency preparedness and response is still a challenge. UNICEF can play an important role by advocating with other actors for sound and inclusive preparedness processes and for leveraging partnerships.

- **Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** – These are still weak areas of UNICEF work in many countries. UNICEF Country Offices must dedicate more resources to strengthen the link between its monitoring work in the regular programmes and the preparedness and response processes. Baseline indicators should be expanded and include CCC-specific indicators. Emergency Rapid Assessment forms should be developed and agreed interagency during preparedness phases. Monitoring should be also qualitative and focusing on impact.

- **Communication and Advocacy** – The political complexities of the MENA region, as well as the increasingly vibrant and vocal regional media, necessitate for UNICEF to develop, refine and systematize its communications and advocacy strategies related to child rights and the broader UNICEF mandate. UNICEF as a voice for children in the region is critical to preserving humanitarian space and neutrality in complex operating environments such as Iraq.

- **Human Resources** – Staff mobilization plans are one of the key components of any reliable preparedness plan, and their development, update and dissemination is integral successful humanitarian responses. UNICEF main strength is in its staff, national and international. If the organization really aims at achieving excellence in emergencies, it should ensure that its staff’s wellbeing and rights are safeguarded and supported in the most difficult circumstances.

Evaluations like those covered by this Review, due to the discrepancies in format, scope and profile of the responsible consultants, underline the importance for UNICEF to establish rigorous approach and standards in evaluating its work in humanitarian crises. Nonetheless, these evaluations highlight the importance of reflection, careful follow up and ownership of lessons learned, in order to strengthen UNICEF’s leadership role in emergency preparedness and response. By ensuring the review, discussion, implementation and application of these Actionable Recommendations (below) and Guidelines & Best Practices (Annex V), UNICEF offices and senior managers would underscore the relevance and usefulness of the new approach to corporate information management, as well as the importance of the learning culture at the core of its mandate for children and women. The role of EMOPS would be especially relevant in the institutionalization of some of these Recommendations into policies or guidelines.
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<th>HEADQUARTERS Recommendations/Action Points</th>
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<td>(HQ) In the ongoing review of the CCCs, and in a future review or development of its operationization tools and guidelines, HQ (EMOPS leading, all Divisions) should look into incorporating the following: a) clear links with and UNICEF role in mitigation, prevention and disaster risk reduction (DRR); b) clear links with the EPRP processes and a chapter on preparedness; c) reference to the interagency context, the UN Humanitarian Reform and the cluster leadership responsibilities; d) simple benchmarks and monitoring indicators; e) vulnerability considerations in both assessment and response phases. (RR4)³</td>
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<td>(HQ) EMOPS, PD should review and eventually adapt the CCCs context in the event of slow-onset humanitarian crises, with a particular focus on triggers for action, both in terms of vulnerability indicators and triggers related to accountability for action. (RR5)</td>
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<td>(HQ) From the Lebanon lessons learned exercises, and other exercises in similar contexts, EMOPS, PD should develop lessons learned-based guidelines on humanitarian interventions in Middle Income Countries (MIC) and countries with small or minimal UNICEF presence. These guidelines should be included in any new CCCs operationisation tool/manual. (RR6)</td>
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<td>(HQ) EMOPS, PD, DPP should develop guidelines on how to relate a new emergency programme to the regular country programme, and how to phase down and integrate residual, longer lasting post-crisis interventions into regular programmes. (RR7)</td>
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<td>(HQ) EMOPS, PD should provide clear guidelines on UNICEF engagement in reconstruction interventions during rehabilitation phases, building on experiences in Indonesia (Tsunami) and elsewhere. Additionally, EMOPS, PD should develop a system to take fast strategic decisions – involving relevant RO and CO/s – related to special situations and opportunities for UNICEF to get involved (if and how) in major reconstruction endeavours. (RR8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(HQ) EMOPS, DPP, PD should develop and disseminate guidelines, lessons learned and training modules for Human Rights Based Approach to Programming in emergencies. (RR17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(RO, HQ) ROs and HQ should carefully monitor the integration of EPRP processes in the regular programmes and provide feedback and oversight to COs on the consistency and quality of the</td>
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³ Between parenthesis, the number of Revised Recommendation each Actionable Recommendation refers to.
integration, through the standard planning, monitoring and reporting systems (Annual Reports, CPAP, Proms, etc.) and also through direct support and guidance. (RR18)

**HQ** PD, DPP should increase, through capacity development initiatives, RO and CO capacities to identify, roll out and use vulnerability analysis tools, in order to strengthen the pool of knowledge and skills available during the assessment and initial planning phases of any new humanitarian crisis. (RR19)

**HQ** PD should advocate to include vulnerabilities and capacities analysis (VCA) in the main joint UN programming processes carried out a country level (CCA/UNDAF) with a special focus on areas and populations at risk of humanitarian crises. (RR20)

**HQ** EMOPS should develop and establish Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in order for systems to effectively transform “early warnings” into “actions”, clarifying the chain of accountabilities in this necessary transition. (RR22)

**HQ** EMOPS, in coordination with ROs should finalize discussions on benchmarks for preparedness, and formalize their application. (RR24)

**HQ** Through the ongoing Competency Framework review process, DHR, through the SSR, should ensure that Representatives appointed to emergency-prone countries have adequate exposure to and understanding of EPR policies, processes and accountabilities. (RR25)

**HQ** OED should finalize and lead the implementation of the outcomes and decisions of the Accountability Review, ensuring their comprehensive dissemination. (RR26)

**HQ, RO** EMOPS, PD and RO should increase their capacity to assist COs in taking gender analyses into consideration in all planning processes, including EPRP, through the development of training and guidelines and their dissemination. (RR33)

**HQ, RO** Building on various experiences (Larnaca and Amman structures for Iraq crisis, Tsunami team in NYHQ, Myanmar support team in Bangkok, etc.) EMOPS and ROs should formalize and disseminate guidelines on the appointment of senior support staff, and establishment of support structures and teams at their respective levels, in the event of large-scale emergencies. (RR36)

**HQ** EMOPS, PD and ROs should revise and clarify the role and responsibilities of ROs (REA, RTAs) in the roll-out and dissemination of cluster training and documents, and in the application of the approach – including identification of suitable staff – in the event of a new crisis. (RR40)

**HQ** Following years of work in humanitarian crises in countries with “difficult” Governments, both
<table>
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<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>MENA (Sudan, Iraq, Iran) and in other regions (Myanmar, DPRK, Zimbabwe, DRC, Russia, etc.)</td>
<td>EMOPS should undertake a lessons learned and best experiences collection and analysis exercise to develop some guidelines for dissemination in ROs and COs. (RR43)</td>
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<td>(RO, HQ) DOC and MENARO (in close coordination with the oPt CO) should establish ways and strategies to be able to be more vocal when advocating for the protection of civilians, especially women and children, as well as for neutrality, impartiality, human rights and humanitarian space, in the political complexities of the Middle East. (RR57)</td>
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<td>(RO, HQ) DOC and MENARO should intensify advocacy and communication campaigns on UNICEF corporate mandate, aimed at the increasingly influential Arabic media, focusing also on positive aspects and success stories and in some cases counterbalancing anti-UN sentiment. Key NatComs should be part of this process, to intensify visibility and understanding. (RR58)</td>
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<td>(HQ) EMOPS, SD should disseminate to all COs the latest guidelines for accepting donations in-kind (DIK) during emergencies. In case of doubts of local applicability, the COs should seek advice with both RO and HQ while highlighting local context, capacities and dynamics. (RR76)</td>
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<td>(HQ) EMOPS, DHR, PD should develop policies and guidelines for effective surge capacity in COs with minimum structures, for MICs, and when there is an international staff ceiling, considering the size of the response, positions needing to be filled and local capacity. (RR82)</td>
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<td>(HQ) EMOPS, OED, DHR should develop guidelines on how to deploy staff to – and set up operations in – countries where there is no UNICEF presence (building on Kuwait experience). (RR85)</td>
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<td>(HQ) EMOPS, DFAM, DPP, ICT should ensure that the new system replacing ProMS will maintain flexibility for administrative planning and follow up in emergencies and tools for multi-country emergency response plans. (RR89)</td>
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<td>(HQ, RO) Global CP focal point (sub-cluster) should expand the dissemination of the Child Protection in Emergency training and guidelines, covering also the links between CP and other programmes (e.g. education). Regional CP Adviser should fine-tune the training for the specific protection-related challenges MENA COs might face in the implementation of the CP commitments. (RR104)</td>
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<td>REGIONAL OFFICE</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendations/Action Points</strong></td>
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<td><strong>(RO, HQ)</strong> ROs and HQ should carefully monitor the integration of EPRP processes in the regular programmes and provide feedback and oversight to COs on the consistency and quality of the integration, through the standard planning, monitoring and reporting systems (Annual Reports, CPAP, Proms, etc.) and also through direct support and guidance. (RR18)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(RO)</strong> Following the finalization and the outcomes of the Accountability Review, EMOPS should liaise with ROs and COs in the fine-tuning and application of the EPRP-related accountability decisions, and in the framework of the Review to advocate for a final decision on the establishment of regional trigger system, including a discussion of the limits of RO oversight on this issue. (RR26)</td>
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<td><strong>(RO)</strong> The REA should identify, in collaboration with EMOPS, some performance targets for the RO’s response in support to humanitarian crises, and monitor them in the event of a new emergency. (RR29)</td>
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<td><strong>(RO)</strong> In case of expected cross-border crises, the respective Regional Director (or Directors, in case of two regions affected) should take the lead in encouraging, facilitating and supporting preparedness and contingency planning initiatives, ensuring effective strategic coordination between UNICEF COs and with other organisations and actors, as well as advocacy with media and donors. This role, directly supported by the REA/s and RTAs should continue at the onset of the crisis. (RR30)</td>
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<td><strong>(RO)</strong> The REA with the M&amp;E Officer should keep supporting the training of key programme and PM&amp;E staff on assessments, monitoring indicators in emergency, key terminology, as well as the use of GPS and PDAs in all COs, as much as possible in an interagency context. (RR55)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(CO)</td>
<td>Senior managers should ensure that all CCC programmatic sectors are covered by EPRP processes and activities, regardless of whether UNICEF has a programme in those sectors at “normal” times. (RR9)</td>
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<td>(CO)</td>
<td>Senior managers should ensure that sufficient resources are allocated for EPRP processes and that EPRP status and operationalization, in the most suitable and sensible way for the local context, is reviewed at regular intervals by the CMT. (RR10)</td>
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<td>(CO)</td>
<td>Senior managers should ensure that UNICEF CO EPR plans are consistent with and feed into any interagency preparedness and contingency planning process in the country. (RR13)</td>
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<td>(CO)</td>
<td>Senior managers should advocate for the undertaking of interagency preparedness and contingency planning initiatives, including training, rehearsals and simulations, and cluster-specific regular meetings. (RR15)</td>
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<td>(CO)</td>
<td>Representatives, including in countries with a small UNICEF presence and MICs, should ensure sound and consistent utilization of the EW/EA system, eventually cross-checking the assessment at country level with the REA and OPSCEN, against the EW analysis on the country from external sources (Oxford Analytica, International Crisis Group, ODI, etc.). (RR21)</td>
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<td>(CO)</td>
<td>Representatives should define clear roles for key staff members in the “non-emergency” team, and as a minimum, identify and appoint an Emergency Focal Person, responsible for leading EPR processes, as well as routing relations with the REA. In emergency prone countries, a full Emergency Task Force, comprising at least one emergency focal person from all main working areas and sectors of the CO, should be established, with a clear definition of ToRs. (RR23)</td>
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<td>(CO)</td>
<td>Senior managers, with the support of the RO (REA) should ensure, through the EPRP processes and events, a clear understanding of the Cluster Approach among its staff. Sectors with cluster leadership responsibility should include the approach in their respective EPR processes, even when the CO does not have an existing program in the given sector. (RR37)</td>
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**Sector chiefs** should engage key counterparts in cluster discussions, meetings and training in order to increase their capacity for preparedness and response, identify gaps in the event of a response, and jointly plan ways to fill them. COs should advocate with UNCTs and local IASC to adopt the same approach in the framework of interagency preparedness and contingency planning. (RR42)

**During preparedness phases**, COs should develop UNICEF-specific cross-sector rapid assessment forms and ensure all key staff are familiar with them. COs should also advocate with UNCTs and local IASCs for the development of jointly agreed cross-sector rapid assessments forms, and methodologies for data gathering. Similarly, cluster leaders should ensure during preparedness phases the development of cluster-specific assessments tools and forms, as well as monitoring indicators, jointly agreed by all cluster members. (RR48)

**COs in the MENA region** should include in their EPRP processes a communication strategy which takes into consideration the political sensitivities of both the national and regional context. This communications strategies should take into account the framework of humanitarian principles and human rights, but should also include plans for specific communication arrangements and structures (e.g. Amman News Desk) to be set up in the event of a crisis. The strategies should be developed in close coordination with MENARO and HQ for sound consistency and all staff, especially senior managers and spokespeople, should be informed about it. (RR59)

**COs, especially in emergency-prone countries**, and with support from RO, should carry out logistics capacity assessment (LCA) and warehousing surveys, as well as local market surveys. Outcomes from these surveys, together with arrangements for stockpiling if necessary, should feed into and be an integral part of the CO’s preparedness plans. Additionally, COs should evaluate the establishment of stand-by agreements – with blanket CRC endorsement for up to one year – with supply providers for items which have been proven essential in the local humanitarian context. (RR69)

**Clear and comprehensive supply plans** should be developed by each programmatic section, to be consolidated by Supply/Logistics staff, included in the EPRP, and shared with RO and SD. In the event of an emergency, this supply list could be revised and fine-tuned, updated when necessary, and used for planning and monitoring purposes. (RR70)

**COs should ensure that nutrition is fully integrated in preparedness processes**, even if not part of the regular programme. In coordination with the RO, COs should plan to fill up human and financial resources gaps in the event of a crisis where malnutrition could be a risk. COs should look at existing
non-UNICEF nutritional capacities in the country (Government and other organizations), and interact with them to ensure that preliminary arrangements are in place for a sudden crisis. (RR96)

(CO) COs should ensure that WASH is fully integrated in preparedness processes, even if not part of the regular programme. In coordination with the RO, COs should plan to fill up human and financial resources gaps in the event of a crisis where WASH is expected to be part of the humanitarian response. COs should look at existing non-UNICEF WASH capacities in the country (Government and other organizations), and interact with them to ensure that preliminary arrangements are in place for a sudden crisis. (RR97)

(CO) Child Protection Chiefs, with support from the Global CP focal point (sub-cluster), should start integrating more consistently SGBV in their preparedness and response planning, including robust advocacy strategies. (RR106)
1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1 - The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region Context

The UNICEF Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region spans from Morocco, in the west, until Iran in the east, and includes all North African countries facing the Mediterranean Sea, Sudan and Djibouti, as well as all the majority of the countries in the Middle East. It is quite arid and prone to dramatic droughts and subsequent food-crisis, as well as sudden and violent floods. Earthquakes, like the ones in Bam, Iran, in December 2003, and in Algeria in February 2004, occasionally hit parts of the region. A major quake hitting Teheran, the large capital of Iran, is unfortunately a scenario that cannot be ruled out.

Politically, the region is extremely complex. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict impacts most of the dynamics in other Middle East countries, and UNICEF positioning, as part of the broader UN, vis-à-vis local Governments and the wider general public is a much more delicate challenge than in other regions. Iran is the only non-Arabic speaking country in the region, and the only one predominantly Shia. It plays an increasingly relevant political role in the region, which is influencing politics and dynamics in other countries.

Sudan represents the extension of the region in sub-Saharan Africa, and deserves special attention. The conflict between the Northern Government and the SPLA-controlled south, which for decades has torn apart the south of the country, is over and a peace-agreement has been signed. The South will undergo a secession referendum in 2011 for self-determination. The current peace is quite shaky and could be interrupted by the escalation of the frequent tensions over oil-rich border areas or by other unresolved issues between the two parties. Since 2003, the Darfur crisis, stemming from fighting between central Government and different local rebel groups for issues of equitable development and rights, added another dramatic layer to the complexities of the country and the suffering of its populations.

The ongoing occupation in Iraq, started in 2003, is still causing the displacement, as IDPs or refugees, of hundred of thousand of people. Most basic services are still below their pre-war standards, and children malnutrition rates have dramatically increased. This crisis still represents a huge political challenge for UNICEF and the UN – easily associated with the occupying forces –, to protect humanitarian space and human rights, and adhere to neutrality and impartiality principles. On the other hand, the extraordinary global attention to this crisis, allowed for unlimited financial support for preparedness. By setting up comprehensive plans in Iraq and all neighboring countries, UNICEF gained important experience for its EPRP processes and for high-level interagency coordination of contingency planning.

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4 The complete list of MENARO Country Offices includes: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Oman, Yemen. The Gulf Area Office in Ryad, Saudi Arabia, covers also Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A UNICEF presence in Libya is being evaluated.
Security is another factor that has dramatically changed the way the international community works in humanitarian crises in the MENA region. Two among the worst attacks to the United Nations in the last decade took place in Iraq (Baghdad, August 2003) and Algeria (Algiers, December 2007).

Yet, in parallel with its high level of vulnerability, political instability, security challenges, and recurring number of humanitarian crises, the MENA region offers rich opportunities for UNICEF to achieve its mandate. The emergence of a more energetic and vocal Arabic media increasingly allows for advocacy and communications initiatives. While some countries in the region (Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan) are still struggling with poor development indicators, others are already, or are becoming, Middle Income Countries (MICs), which offers opportunities for networking with stronger local NGOs and groups, and eventually for fund-raising, to be paired with the increasingly important resources UNICEF is already receiving from the oil-rich Gulf States. In recent years, the Amman-based UNICEF MENA Regional Office began taking advantage of these opportunities, and will clearly gain by developing these further, both with civil society partners, or private sector outlets.

At the same time, the MENA RO also took significant steps to boost its capacity to respond to the many crises of the region, against the limited capacity of many fairly small UNICEF country teams. It strengthened its preparedness and response capacities by establishing a professional Emergency Team, composed by an Emergency Adviser, two Emergency Officers, a dedicated WASH Emergency Officer, and an Administrative Assistant, aiming at supporting and supervising all EPR processes and activities in the region. In addition, a Security Officer and a Security Assistant are also part of the Emergency Team.

1.2 - Purpose of the Review and Objectives
During the last seven years, the UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO) responded to several humanitarian crises, extremely variable in their complexity and magnitude, and ranging from the relatively small scale earthquakes in Algeria and Morocco, to the preparation for and consequences of the Iraq conflict, and the tragedy of Darfur. All these humanitarian responses have been followed, sometime with delay, by one or more evaluations, namely:


In addition to these, a preliminary workshop entitled “UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response in the Iraq Crisis” was held in Istanbul on 2-3 October 2003. The outcome report from this workshop - “Results of the Iraq Sub-Regional Lessons Learned Workshop” - includes a comprehensive list of recommendations, some of which are still valid.

The quality of these evaluations ranges, and has been influenced by different factors, including various evaluators’ knowledge and understanding of UNICEF and the broader humanitarian environment. To ensure a more systematic learning from this regional body of work, MENARO decided to undertake a comprehensive Summary Review of these evaluations, and extrapolate a set of recommendations, which would be useful for and applicable by the Country Offices in the MENA region, in the Regional Office and in HQ.

As per the TOR of the exercise, the objective of the Review is to:
“systematically capture conclusions, lessons and recommendations from recent evaluations and reviews of UNICEF humanitarian response in the Middle East and North Africa Region, highlighting common issues and distinguishing different levels at which issues need to be addressed (CO, RO, HQ), and presenting all of this in a structured, easily digestible format that can be used as a basis for prioritization and planning exercises that follow, including possible adjustment/adaptation of CO and RO level EPR planning processes and accountabilities.”

1.3 – Review Process and Methodology
Many changes and developments took place in the last few years, both inside UNICEF and the wider humanitarian world, following the rollout of the UN Humanitarian Reform and its components (enhanced partnerships, stronger role of Humanitarian Coordinators, increased humanitarian funding, Cluster Approach), as well as in light of several UNICEF internal reviews.

Long term collaborations with constructively critical donors such as DFID and ECHO, have allowed UNICEF to refine its position in the framework of the UN Humanitarian Reform and to greatly strengthen its capacities to prepare for and respond to humanitarian crises at all levels of the organization (HQ, ROs and COs). Some external evaluations of

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5 This evaluation was an initiative of the interagency Flood Task Force carried out at the end of the floods 2007, with interventions still ongoing and other planned.
the UNICEF-DFID collaboration, or part of it, have been used as references for, and to
textualize this review exercise.\(^8\)

In light of these developments, UNICEF MENARO decided to delegate the responsibility
for this Review to a consultant with a fair and “hands-on” knowledge of UNICEF and its
preparedness and response work in humanitarian crises, rather than to an evaluator.\(^9\) It is
hence important to underline that this work is not an evaluation of evaluations, or a so-
called meta-evaluation, but an analysis of a set of reports, sometime outdated, carried out
in the framework of the current humanitarian context.

Methodology for this Summary Review included a preliminary desk revision of the
evaluation reports and additional documentation (a complete list in Annex II). This was
followed by the extraction from these evaluations of key outcomes and recommendations,
and their merging, re- phrasing and tweaking to make them more relevant to the current
humanitarian context and utilisable by UNICEF offices.\(^10\) Out of approximately 400
issues and recommendations proposed by the reviewed evaluations, 118 “Revised
Recommendations” have been “distilled”\(^11\). A preliminary draft of the Review has been
consequently discussed with key staff in the MENARO and in EMOPS, for their inputs
and review. The main findings and the list of Revised Recommendations have been
refined to identify Actionable Recommendations (presented in the Executive Summary)
and Guidelines & Best Practices (presented in Annex V), and to make them more useful
and applicable by COs, the Regional Office, and Headquarters.

It is worth noting that during discussions with UNICEF staff in MENA RO and EMOPS,
several additional recommendations for improving specific EPRP areas (programmatic,
operational, and cross-cutting) where identified. It was decided though to focus only on
recommendations stemming directly from the reviewed evaluations, in order to respect
the ToRs for the consultancy and the limited timeframe. For this reason, some of the


\(^9\) The consultant selected has been until recently a UNICEF staff members, with approximately ten years of work in emergencies, at all levels of the organization: in Country Offices (Rwanda, Zaire/DRC, Russia/Chechnya, Myanmar), Regional Office (as Regional Emergency Adviser for the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office), and in HQ (Office of the Executive Director, and EMOPS).

\(^10\) Some of the evaluations reviewed have been carried out before the implementation of the UN Humanitarian Reform started to bear its fruits. Some of the outcomes, lessons learned and recommendations proposed (see Annex IV) are outdated, partially or fully implemented, often repeated in more than one evaluation, and few have limited or no relevance in the current context. Additionally, the way issues, lessons learned and recommendations have been proposed varies among the evaluations, and, at times, these are overlapping or merged. In general, all evaluations have been focusing their outcomes more on recommendations than on lessons learned.

\(^11\) The complete list of approximately 400 Outcomes, Lessons Learned and Recommendations coming from the reviewed evaluations is included, with the same thematic structure utilized for this Summary Review, in Annex IV, at the end of this documents.
outcomes and recommendations proposed by this Review are limited in scope, especially the programmatic ones.

2 - REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1 - Recommendations for the Broader United Nations Interagency Processes
During the last few years, the UN Humanitarian Reform has been the main drive for change in the humanitarian world. Largely endorsed and supported by donors, the Reform and its components (enhanced partnerships, stronger role of Humanitarian Coordinators, increased humanitarian funding, cluster approach) created a completely new framework and higher standards for interagency emergency preparedness and response. In the body of the MENA evaluations reviewed, there are some pertinent issues and consequent recommendations directed to the wider UN and the role it plays in both preparedness and response to humanitarian crises.

Revised Recommendations
1) The UN (UNDOCO, ex-UNDGO; OCHA) should continue to review and improve the role and leadership of HC/RCs in large, complex and chronic crises. The UN (UNDOCO; OCHA) should undertake a broad interagency evaluation of key UN humanitarian responses of different types, to identify weaknesses in the HC/RC system, its selection and appointment processes and propose improvements.
2) In militarized emergency contexts, the UN should develop advocacy and other strategies to define its position to defend its neutrality and humanitarian space and for the protection of human rights of civilian populations. The UN should develop guidelines on how to work alongside significant military presence and develop clearer policies regarding its relationships with occupying forces. In this, the UN should strive to adhere to the principle and approach of HRBAP.
3) In long, protracted complex emergencies like Iraq and Darfur, with recurrent spikes of humanitarian crises, the UN should ensure continuous leadership for sound, comprehensive, inclusive and cluster-based interagency preparedness and contingency planning – as much as possible in close coordination and collaboration with the Government and the local administrations –, including zone- or area-specific plans and an increasing focus on vulnerabilities of affected populations.

2.2 - Guidance from Headquarters and Review of the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) in Emergencies
Major steps have been taken at HQ level in the last years to improve the wider UNICEF corporate preparedness and response systems, as well as its tools. Following through on the UN Humanitarian Reform and its internal reviews, UNICEF HQ has already fulfilled several of the recommendations proposed by the MENA evaluations. There are still valid indications though, that HQ, led mainly by EMOPS and PD, still has an important role to play in ameliorate guidance and support to ROs and COs especially in certain areas. It is expected that the current review of the CCCs will allow tackling and clarifying several of the issues hereby listed.
Revised Recommendations

4) **(HQ)** In the ongoing review of the CCCs, and possibly in a future review or development of its operationalization tools and guidelines, HQ (EMOPS leading, all Divisions) should look into incorporating the following:
   - clear links with and UNICEF role in mitigation, prevention and disaster risk reduction (DRR);
   - clear links with the EPRP processes and a chapter on preparedness;
   - reference to the interagency context, the UN Humanitarian Reform and the cluster leadership responsibilities;
   - simple benchmarks and monitoring indicators;
   - vulnerability considerations in both assessment and response phases.

5) **(HQ)** EMOPS, PD should review and eventually adapt the CCCs context in the event of slow-onset humanitarian crises, with a particular focus on triggers for action, both in terms of vulnerability indicators and triggers related to accountability for action.

6) **(HQ)** EMOPS, PD should develop lessons learned-based guidelines on humanitarian interventions in Middle Income Countries (MIC) and countries with small or minimal UNICEF presence. It should eventually include these guidelines in any new CCCs operationalisation tool/manual.

7) **(HQ)** EMOPS, PD, DPP should develop guidelines on how to relate a new emergency programme to the regular country programme, and how to phase down and integrate residual, longer lasting post-crisis interventions into regular programmes.

8) **(HQ)** EMOPS, PD should provide clear guidelines on UNICEF engagement in reconstruction interventions during rehabilitation phases, building on experiences in Indonesia (Tsunami) and elsewhere. Additionally, EMOPS, PD should develop a system to take fast strategic decisions – involving relevant RO and CO/s – related to special situations and opportunities for UNICEF to get involved (if and how) in major reconstruction endeavours.

2.3 - Preparedness

Preparedness can be defined as “all actions taken upstream of an emergency in order to mitigate, reduce or better withstand the impact of the future disasters”. It encompasses all areas of UNICEF work, both programmatic and operational. The following key issues, lessons learned and recommendations, stemming from the MENA evaluations, are divided in thematic areas, and cover aspects of preparedness that are either general or cross-cutting throughout many or all UNICEF working sectors. Preparedness issues and recommendations specific for certain working areas are included in the next chapters.

2.3.1 - Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) Processes

The Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning processes and activities represent the core of UNICEF work for emergencies, before the emergency strikes. The EPRP is a dynamic and continuous process, culminating in the development or the updating of the EPR planning matrix. It should be considered a standard component of the UNICEF programme planning cycle, and as such should receive due attention and resources, in terms of time, staffing and funds.
The developments brought by the UN Humanitarian Reform call for a much more coherent interagency approach for EPR, and often UNICEF has been spearheading the process at country level, bringing other agencies and organizations around the table or advocating for it. The evaluations carried out in the MENA region underlined a broad range of areas where room for improvement of the EPRP processes is still present. The very different contexts faced by UNICEF and other actors in places like Iraq, Darfur, Bam and Lebanon stress the need for the EPRP process to be comprehensive, bold, inclusive, ambitious, soundly understood, and flexible.

Revised Recommendations

9) **(CO)** Senior CO managers, with the support of the REA and the RTAs, should ensure that all staff is involved in the EPRP process, and that each sector (programme and operations) is responsible for developing and updating its specific component, and for sharing it with key counterparts in the Government, with other organizations and agencies and in the cluster groups. All CCC programmatic areas should be covered, regardless of whether UNICEF has a programme in those sectors at “normal” times.

10) **(CO)** The EPRP should be an ongoing process in each CO, and sufficient resources should be allocated to it. The EPRP matrix is only the reference document defining the preparedness action plan and indicating the first steps in a crisis. Its format – shaped around the CCCs – is flexible, and senior managers should ensure it is utilized in the most suitable and sensible way for the local context.

11) **(CO)** In small offices, UNICEF should carefully examine human resources and sector gaps and define strategy to fill them up in case of emergency. This can be done through a HR mobilization plan shared with RO and DHR, and for wider sector areas, by establishing stand-by partnerships with possible available implementing partners.

12) **(CO)** Wherever they exist, COs should ensure that Zonal Offices and Field Offices are involved in the country level EPRP processes and activities. Specific EPR plans should be developed – eventually at ZO or FO level – for emergency prone areas, provinces or districts, looking at specificities and constraints of these areas and vulnerabilities of populations.

13) **(CO)** In countries with frequent or ongoing crises, the EPRP should be – more than elsewhere – a live document, which must be updated frequently, in light of new developments, new assessment and survey results, better information and updated figures. This document should be consistent with and eventually feed into any interagency preparedness and contingency planning process in the country.

14) **(CO)** As much as possible, COs should involve UN agencies, other organizations and whenever suitable Government counterparts in key steps of the EPRP processes and initiatives, including training, rehearsals and simulations.

15) **(CO)** UNICEF, especially at CO level, should keep advocating, facilitating and encouraging interagency preparedness and contingency planning initiatives, including training, rehearsals and simulations, and cluster-specific regular meetings. The IASC-endorsed “Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance” should be used as reference document for these interagency exercises. COs should also advocate for the participation of key beneficiary representatives and groups in major steps of the wider preparedness and contingency planning processes.
16) **(HQ)** EMOPS should keep posting all EPRP formats, guidelines, good samples, and other relevant documents on the EW/EA intranet website.

17) **(HQ)** EMOPS, DPP, PD should develop and disseminate guidelines, lessons learned and training modules for Human Rights Based Approach to Programming in emergencies. These should be utilized and applied at CO level and during collaborations between REA and COs.

### 2.3.2 - Mainstreaming of EPRP in UNICEF Programme Planning Processes

EPRP has been for quite some time formally included in the guidelines for the preparation of the Annual Work-plans of the ROs and COs. Some of the MENA offices have reached a very high degree of integration of all aspects of preparedness into planning documents, including earmarking budgets, staff recruitment, and interagency initiatives and events. Less emergency-prone COs are however seldom adequately prepared, and fail to integrate EPRP into regular programmes and planning processes (Sitan, CPD, MTR, UNDAF). While this is more a problem of accountability and leadership (discussed later in this document), several recommendations indicate that there is a need for consistent mainstreaming of these aspects in all MENA COs.

It is not uncommon that during the first phases of a humanitarian crisis some population groups, often among the most vulnerable, like widows, women-headed and adolescent-headed households, orphans, elderly, people with disabilities, etc. slip through the assistance net only because of poor planning and monitoring systems. Much can be done to mitigate this type of neglect of vulnerable categories, especially through the increasingly consistent joint UN programming cycle and quality of the CCA/UNDAF processes.

**Revised Recommendations**

18) **(CO, RO, HQ)** Building on successful examples of good integration of EPRP components into UNICEF programme planning processes, all COs should undertake the same approach. ROs and HQ should monitor this integration processes carefully and provide feedback and oversight on the consistency and quality of the integration, through the standard planning, monitoring and reporting systems (Annual Reports, CPAP, Proms, etc.) and also through direct support and guidance.

19) **(HQ)** PD, DPP should increase, through capacity development initiatives, RO and CO capacities to identify, roll out and use vulnerability analysis tools, in order to strengthen the pool of knowledge and skills available during the assessment and initial planning phases of any new humanitarian crisis.

20) **(HQ)** PD should advocate to include vulnerabilities and capacities analysis (VCA) in the main joint UN programming processes carried out a country level (CCA/UNDAF) with a special focus on areas and populations at risk of humanitarian crises.

### 2.3.3 - Early Warning Systems

Since 2001 UNICEF has co-led, together with WFP, the IASC sub-working group on Early Warning, establishing a process by which quarterly global early warning updates are submitted to the IASC Principals for their consideration and follow up. In 2005 EMOPS developed a UNICEF intranet-based Early Warning / Early Action (EW/EA)
system. While the usefulness of the system is by now recognized at all levels in the organization, as well as amongst IASC partners, its real potential, especially for the quality and usefulness of the links/indicators between “warning” and “action” component, is directly linked to the leadership provided by senior managers in the office and their role in using and feeding the system for preparedness planning.

Revised Recommendations

21) **(CO)** Representatives, including in countries with a small UNICEF presence and MICs, should ensure sound and consistent utilization of the EW/EA system, eventually cross-checking the assessment at country level with the REA and OPSCEN, against the EW analysis on the country from external sources (Oxford Analytica, International Crisis Group, ODI, etc.).

22) **(HQ)** EMOPS should develop and establish Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in order for systems to effectively transform “warnings” into “actions”, clarifying the chain of accountabilities in this necessary transition.

2.3.4 - Leadership

While UNICEF work in emergency is a responsibility of each single staff member, it is quite clear that leadership is one of the main factors which can “make or break” UNICEF’s response to a humanitarian crisis. During the preparedness phase of the Iraqi crisis, for example, the leadership of the MENA Regional Director at the time was widely recognized as an essential asset for success. Some of the evaluations reviewed, on the other hand, showed strong perceptions that poor leadership during preparedness phases and/or the emergency response has been one of the causes of mistakes and partial failures.

Leadership for preparedness is essential to motivate a team, to help all understand the importance of contingency planning, as well as for ownership of the final EPRP plan. Leadership for response is the key to define vision and strategies, to maintain team cohesion, to advocate with other organizations and Governments for better coordination, and with donors and media to strengthen UNICEF’s credibility and mobilize resources.

Revised Recommendations

23) **(CO)** Representatives should define clear roles for key staff members in the “non-emergency” team, and as a minimum, identify and appoint an Emergency Focal Person, responsible for leading EPR processes, as well as routing relations with the REA. In emergency prone countries, a full Emergency Task Force, comprising at least one emergency focal person from all main working areas and sectors of the CO, should be established, with a clear definition of ToRs.

24) **(RO, HQ)** EMOPS, in coordination with ROs, should finalize discussions on benchmarks for preparedness, and formalize their application.

25) **(HQ)** Through the ongoing Competency Framework review process, DHR, through the SSR, should ensure that Representatives appointed to emergency-prone countries have adequate exposure to and understanding of EPR policies, processes and accountabilities.
2.3.5 - Roles, Responsibilities and Accountabilities

In recent humanitarian emergencies, there has been an increasingly smooth collaboration between affected COs, RO and different divisions of HQ. The Iraq crisis and its broad political and geographical dimensions, constituted for UNICEF a unique challenge which required a new type of corporate response, including the set up of special task forces and support teams. These operated from different locations (Larnaca, Amman, New York), to assist COs in the preparedness phase, the continuation of the programme during the conflict, and the consequent humanitarian response. These teams played a role also in handling the complex political environment and external communications issues.

Nonetheless, the MENA region evaluations reviewed underline some flaws, and pointed at delays and mistakes that in presence of better-defined accountabilities for the different levels of the organization could be avoided or mitigated. One of the main areas where there is lack of clarity is in the EPR processes, and related decisions on operations scale and scope at country level and the supervisory role that ROs should theoretically play.

Another area where more clarity is needed is the suitability and necessity to define and establish a regional trigger system - analogous to the global trigger - to formalize the activation and role of the RO in medium to large-size crisis, not big enough to demand the activation of the global trigger. Some ad-hoc solutions have been experimented in several regions, and the establishment of such a trigger has been recommended by the UNICEF-DFID Darfur Evaluation (2005).

Under the leadership of one of the Deputy Executive Directors, an accountability review process started in 2007\(^\text{12}\); it will include also a review of EPRP-related accountabilities. It is hoped that the exercise would cover the above areas needing clarity, that it will produce clear outcomes, and that these will be implemented consistently, with sufficient resources.

Revised Recommendations

26) **(HQ)** OED should finalize and lead the implementation of the outcomes and decisions of the Accountability Review, ensuring their comprehensive dissemination. Following the above, EMOPS should liaise with ROs and COs in the fine-tuning and application of the EPRP-related accountability decisions, and in the framework of the Accountability Review to advocate for a final decision on the establishment of regional trigger system, including a discussion of the limits of RO oversight on this issue.

27) **(CO, RO, HQ)** At the beginning of a new large-size crisis – including cross-border (see below) –, HQ, RO and affected CO/s should immediately define and put in place structures, arrangements and procedures for defining main strategies, managing information, ensuring sound coordination, handling specific emergency related issues, establishing clear responsibilities at all levels, and have this information widely disseminated. These procedures, structures and arrangements should be monitored and evaluated together with the rest of the emergency programme.

\(^{12}\) Thomas/Kate, can you please provide details on the Accountability Review led by Omar: official title; objectives; timeframe; etc.
2.3.6 - Regional EPRP
The increasingly important role the RO has been playing in large-size and cross-border humanitarian crises in the MENA region, coupled with the increasingly professional regional emergency team and the emergency-support role the Regional Technical Advisers (RTA) are supposed to play, underline the need to ensure EPRP processes are followed also at regional level. The focus of these periodical EPRP exercises should be on refining specific roles and responsibilities of the RO staff in case of a new crisis, defining special arrangements for specific scenarios, differentiating between emergency specialists and technical advisers respective roles and responsibilities, and producing a preparedness action plan to strengthen the RO capacities for the response, as well as for improved interagency coordination, media contacts, supply networks, and surge capacity rosters.

Revised Recommendations
28) (RO) The REA should organize and facilitate yearly EPRP exercises focusing on a scenario where one or more COs in the region are affected by a medium- to large-size humanitarian crisis. The objective of the exercise would be to refine roles and responsibilities of the RO staff in the event of a humanitarian emergency and strengthen capacities and arrangements at the onset of the crisis. The preparedness action plan stemming from this EPRP exercise should be implemented and the implementation monitored in a defined period of time.

29) (RO) The REA should identify, in collaboration with EMOPS, some performance targets for the RO’s response in support to humanitarian crises, and monitor them in the event of a new emergency.13

2.3.7 - Cross-Border Crises
Some of the largest cross-border humanitarian crises took place in MENA region during the last few years, including the conflict in Iraq (with the largest ever cross-border contingency plan ever, and the outflow of refugees in Syria and Jordan), the Darfur emergency with its refugee spill-out in neighboring Chad, and the conflict in Lebanon, which saw a sudden exodus of refugees into Syria. The evaluation of these crises allowed for several important lessons learned and recommendations, inevitably linked to those underlined in other parts of this document, namely those on leadership, on the role and accountabilities of the RO, and on the overall quality of EPRP processes.

Revised Recommendations
30) (RO) In case of expected cross-border crises, the respective Regional Director (or Directors, in case of two regions affected) should take the lead in encouraging, facilitating and supporting preparedness and contingency planning initiatives, ensuring effective strategic coordination between UNICEF COs and with other organisations and actors, as well as advocacy with media and donors. This role, directly supported by the REA/s and RTAs should continue at the onset of the crisis.

31) (CO) Representatives of COs potentially affected by cross-border humanitarian crises, should enhance coordination and contacts between offices and between

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13 Some work has been done in this area, by EMOPS and the REAs.
sectors, in order to define common strategies, agree on scenarios and numbers, work on consistent plans, optimize use of resources and the preposition of stocks, and reinforce specific programmatic responses.

2.3.8 - Gender
The crisis in Darfur has highlighted the critical need for focused, scaled up approaches to gender-based violence and other forms of gender discrimination in emergencies. The specific problems faced by women and girls – and in some case by men and boys – in humanitarian crises, underline the importance of using a “gender lens” when planning for emergency preparedness and response. While a lot of initiatives have taken place, both inside UNICEF and in the wider interagency context, to ensure that gender is consistently applied as a planning approach, and that specific gender issues are taken into consideration in EPRP, in most cases it seems that most of the results remain on paper. Even after the welcomed appointment of gender officers and advisers in large offices and humanitarian crises, there is still a huge need to expand capacities and skills among staff and for a leadership drive to turn a gender approach into discipline.

Evaluations of humanitarian responses in MENA and other regions confirm that taking gender consistently into consideration from the preparedness phases, and even more importantly during the first planning steps at the beginning of an emergency, greatly mitigates the risk of having vulnerable categories of beneficiaries slipping through the mesh of the assistance net, and of unnecessarily put girls and women in danger. The “IASC Guidelines for Gender-based Violence in Humanitarian Settings” (2005) and the “IASC Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action” (2006) offer excellent tools to support these processes; their dissemination and utilization should be encouraged at all levels of the organization.

Revised Recommendations
32) (CO) Representative, Deputy Representative should ensure that a “gender lens” is applied and gender considerations are included in every EPRP process and exercise at CO level, starting from the vulnerabilities and capacities analysis, and including the initial rapid assessments. CO should also advocate for this “gender lens” approach in the context of interagency preparedness and contingency planning.
33) (HQ, RO) EMOPS, PD and RO should increase their capacity to assist COs in taking gender analyses into consideration in all planning processes, including EPRP, through the development of training and guidelines and their dissemination.
34) (CO) COs with chronic or complex humanitarian crises, as well as COs in emergency-prone countries, should identify sufficient resources to support the long-term position of one or more gender planning and/or advisory staff. The RO should support these initiatives.

2.4 - Coordination
During the period taken into consideration by this Review the interagency Cluster Approach did not exist yet; it was established only in 2005, and progressively rolled out from 2006. Nonetheless, the MENA evaluations reviewed clearly differentiate already between UNICEF internal coordination in humanitarian responses, and the broader
interagency context. According to the proposed recommendations, both areas deserve consistent improvement.

2.4.1 - UNICEF Internal Coordination
Experiences and lessons learned from many emergencies (Indonesia Tsunami, 2004; Pakistan Earthquake, 2006; Myanmar, 2008) as well as recommendations from the MENA evaluations, led to major leaps in UNICEF internal coordination, at all levels, in the management of humanitarian response. Most results in this area have been attained at CO level though, where, in some successful cases – especially emergency-prone countries or countries in protracted crisis –, internal coordination arrangements in emergency are part of the EPR plans, and all staff have clear in mind their respective roles and responsibilities. Increasingly this is happening also at RO and HQ level, where selected staff and teams are appointed for back up support to major humanitarian crises. While many of the recommendations analyzed in this document have already been taken into consideration, some of them are still valid and should be either reinforced or acted upon.

Revised Recommendations
35) (CO) All COs should incorporate in their EPR plans and exercises internal coordination arrangements in the event of an emergency, have them clearly understood by all staff, and share this information with RO and HQ (EMOPS) for immediate back-up and support purposes. All ZOs and FOs should be consistently involved in this process and their staff be part of the plans.
36) (RO, HQ) Building on various experiences (Larnaca and Amman structures for Iraq crisis, Tsunami team in NYHQ, Myanmar support team in Bangkok, etc.) EMOPS and ROs should formalize and disseminate guidelines on the appointment of senior support staff, and establishment of support structures and teams at their respective levels, in the event of large-scale emergencies.

2.4.2 - Cluster Coordination
Undoubtedly, one of the most important components and accomplishments of the UN Humanitarian Reform has been the reshaping of the sector coordination structures applied in many forms and structures in emergencies around the world into the standardized, high-level performance, Cluster Approach. Many of the evaluations reviewed include recommendations that anticipate this approach, calling it in different ways.

After activation in about a dozen medium- to large-scale emergencies (more recently during the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar), the Cluster Approach appears to be bringing concrete results in terms of improved standards for coordination. All agencies and organizations have an increasing understanding of the concept and start seeing its benefits. Similarly, some Governments see the approach as useful to harmonize their EPR structures in similar ways. Importantly, the majority of the donors fully support the approach and are ready to finance the associated costs, including dedicated staff salaries.

Revised Recommendations
37) (CO) COs, with the support of the RO (REA) should ensure, through the EPRP processes and events, a clear understanding of the Cluster Approach among its staff. Sectors with
cluster leadership responsibility should include the approach in their respective EPR processes, even when the CO does not have an existing program in the given sector.  

38) (CO) COs and sector chiefs should advocate for including discussions on EPR and the Cluster Approach in UNCT, local IASC, and sector-specific meetings, eventually aiming at joint initiatives (training, workshops, simulations) and a joint preparedness and contingency plans.  

39) (HQ) Global Clusters under UNICEF responsibility should keep developing and disseminating, also through dedicated websites, cluster-specific guidelines, lessons learned, technical documents and other relevant documents.  

40) (HQ) EMOPS, PD and ROs should revise and clarify the role and responsibilities of ROs (REA, RTAs) in the roll-out and dissemination of cluster training and documents, and in the application of the approach – including identification of suitable staff – in the event of a new crisis.  

2.5 - Partnerships  
By defining it as the main platform on which the UN Humanitarian Reform has been built, the UN has been striving to expand the way it works in partnership – with Governments, international and local NGOs, local groups and constituencies, donors, and especially beneficiaries – with the aim of improving its performance in emergency preparedness and response. With its presence in most countries before, during and after an emergency, UNICEF has the enviable advantage of being able to build long-term partnerships, especially with Governmental counterparts, local NGOs and groups, and international NGOs. These long-term collaborations were not always automatically utilized or expanded in the event of an emergency, and as the evaluations reviewed reveal, there are many areas where UNICEF, especially at country level, could improve its performance and establish partnerships in emergency that could last well beyond the end of one.  

In that regards, some UNICEF COs gained invaluable experience and defined sound methodologies for developing stand-by agreements with implementing partners, to be suddenly activated in the event of a new crisis (Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Rapid Response Mechanism). In other countries, with limited access to certain areas for either political or security reasons, UNICEF developed different types of collaboration with the local Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies, present everywhere with their chapters, to gather information, assess situations and distribute aid supplies.  

Revised Recommendations  
41) (CO) COs should strive to create and expand existing partnerships with governmental counterparts, sharing with them key EPRP-related documents (CCCs, EFH, EPR

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14 “Launched in late 2004, the RRM is designed to provide critical multi-sectoral assistance to victims of complex emergencies, natural disasters and epidemics in the DRC. To date, the RRM has assisted more than 2 million victims of rapid-onset emergencies, the majority of them internally displaced persons. Managed jointly by UNICEF and OCHA, and implemented together with three international NGOs – Solidarités, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) – the RRM is recognised by humanitarian actors, donors and external evaluators as the most effective multi-organisation, multi-sector, emergency response mechanism in the country.” From: “Ensuring the predictability of emergency response: the DRC Rapid Response Mechanism” by Silvia Danailov and Steven Michel, UNICEF/DRC. Humanitarian Practice Network (HPG, ODI) http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2908
plans or parts of it, emergency programme work-plans, cluster-related documents, etc.) aiming to improve trust and understanding.

42) (CO) Sector chiefs should engage key counterparts in cluster discussions, meetings and training in order to increase their capacity for preparedness and response, identify gaps in the event of a response, and jointly plan ways to fill them. COs should advocate with UNCTs and local IASC to adopt the same approach in the framework of interagency preparedness and contingency planning.

43) (HQ) Following years of work in humanitarian crises in countries with “difficult” Governments, both in MENA (Sudan, Iraq, Iran) and in other regions (Myanmar, DPRK, Zimbabwe, DRC, Russia, etc.), EMOPS should undertake a lessons learned and best experiences collection and analysis exercise to develop some guidelines for dissemination in ROs and COs.

44) (CO) COs, especially in emergency-prone countries and for clusters falling under UNICEF responsibility, should investigate the possibility of developing stand-by agreements with locally based implementing partners, administratively fully cleared, which can be activated in the event of a new crisis.

45) (CO) In countries where UNICEF has limited access to areas where there likely are beneficiaries in need, COs should investigate the possibility to work with the local Red Cross and Red Crescent Society – eventually asking facilitation from the IFRC – to improve information gathering, and eventually set up aid distribution systems.

46) (CO, RO, HQ) Some donors (DFID, CIDA, SIDA, USAID, AUSAID, etc.) have their own technical units and humanitarian departments with extensive experience, and access to key supplies and surge capacity for emergency. Interaction with them can go well beyond fund-raising, and some can – and in some cases have – become critically constructive partners before, during and after large humanitarian crises. HQ (PARMO, EMOPS) in coordination with affected RO and COs, should expand these “beyond fund-raising” collaborations with specific donors, aiming at increasing trust, and ultimately improve the preparedness and response work.

2.6 - Assessments, Monitoring and Planning

Globally, dozens of evaluations, including those carried out in the MENA region and hereby considered, have identified assessments, performance monitoring and planning among the weakest areas of most UNICEF humanitarian responses. Notwithstanding years of training and guidelines, when a new emergency strikes, these are quickly forgotten, and the priority becomes delivering aid. To address this reality a number of easily accessible tools are increasingly now available. The challenge is to put them into place, and to emphasize the internal role of planning and monitoring in emergency response.

In addition, the cluster approach globally has further enhanced the importance of assessments and monitoring in emergency, across all sectors. In large-size crises, it is generally recommended to appoint an Information Management Officer to assist the Cluster Coordinator also for assessment and monitoring issues.

The MENA evaluations endorsed this view and pointed out a number of areas for strengthened assessment, monitoring and planning in this region’s early response.
Revised Recommendations

47) (CO) COs, in the framework of the regular programme cycle, should expand baseline “data gathering”, particularly focusing on “high risk” populations, with collection of agreed indicators (CCC-linked, plus other suitable ones) which will be monitored in the event of an humanitarian crisis and a consequent response. These baseline benchmarking data can be obtained from historical records, from reliable secondary sources, and through new specifically targeted assessments. During preparedness phases, COs should develop UNICEF-specific cross-sector rapid assessment forms and ensure all key staff are familiar with them. COs should also advocate with UNCTs and local IASCs for the development of jointly agreed cross-sector rapid assessments forms, and methodologies for data gathering. Similarly, cluster leaders should ensure during preparedness phases the development of cluster-specific assessments tools and forms, as well as monitoring indicators, jointly agreed by all cluster members.

48) (CO) Cluster leaders, with the support of information management officers, should produce common cluster-specific web-based tools/formats for monitoring and evaluation, feeding in OCHA-managed HIC-type general interagency web-tools.

49) (CO) In all stages of work on EPR-related assessments, and monitoring and evaluation in emergency, COs should ensure sufficient human and financial resources. These should include the appointment of information management officer in support of each cluster under UNICEF responsibility being activated, as well as funds for sound field monitoring and planned future evaluations or RTEs. These costs should be included in any Flash Appeal or CAP developed in-country. (Note that EPF funds can be utilized for assessments, also.)

50) (CO) Monitoring and reporting – linked to CCCs and other indicators agreed during the preparedness phases – should start at the beginning of the response, and should focus not only on direct beneficiaries (IDPs, refugees) but also on host communities.

51) (CO) COs should ensure that response work-plans are developed at the beginning of the emergency, and eventually revised/refined at later stages bringing in recovery elements as early as possible. These plans should be as comprehensive as possible, include gender and vulnerability analyses, and include a small scale IMEP. Additionally, work-plan outputs should be not only quantitative, but also qualitative and focusing on impact; and special focus should be put on data analysis and not only data collection, during the monitoring processes.

52) (CO) COs should include a simple, realistic and clear M&E component in any PCA established with implementing partners in the framework of EPR processes. This should be linked to any relevant cluster/sector level indicators and including agreement on simple standards for joint field monitoring.

53) (CO) The MENA evaluations as well as other recent experiences (Myanmar, 2008) confirmed the great usefulness of utilizing GPS for M&E in emergencies, especially in countries with limited geo-referencing capacities and in contexts where beneficiaries are displaced to remote, poorly accessible areas (Darfur, Iraq, Iran).

15 Refer also to “Initial Rapid Assessment (IRA): Guidance Note for Country Level” (UNICEF, 2006), especially chapter 2.3 “Collection of secondary data prior to field work” and Annex 2 “Pre-crisis secondary data and information checklist”.

26
These could be replaced by even more versatile PDAs, incorporating specific rapid assessment tools. COs should ensure acquisition and training for utilization of sufficient GPS (or PDAs) for any expected emergency.

55) (RO) The REA with the M&E Officer should keep supporting the training of key programme and PM&E staff on assessments, monitoring indicators in emergency, key terminology, as well as the use of GPS and PDAs in all COs, as much as possible in an interagency context.

56) (CO, RO, HQ) COs and ROs should plan for evaluations of all medium- to large-scale emergency responses. In turn, HQ (EO-Audit, EMOPS) and ROs should ensure the evaluation recommendations’ vigorous follow-up.

2.7 - External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations

Communication is an essential and powerful tool in emergency preparedness and response. Good communications strategies during preparedness and response help to: i) explain to external actors (donors, media, public), but also to other parts of the organization, what the organization does, why it does it and with what results and impact for women and children; ii) to advocate for the protection of children and women in politically complex environments. The MENA region, many countries of which are directly or indirectly affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is, according to most of the evaluations reviewed, an extremely complex environment for UNICEF to exercise this task. While constraints are fully acknowledged, the MENA evaluations provide a long set of recommendations to improve UNICEF performance and results in this area. It is worth stressing further though, the importance of defining a common “corporate” strategy for communication and advocacy in emergency in this region, where HQ and MENA RO should take the lead and provide continuous and solid guidance to the COs.

Revised Recommendations

57) (RO, HQ) DOC and MENARO (in close coordination with the oPt CO) should establish ways and strategies to be able to be more vocal when advocating for the protection of civilians, especially women and children, as well as for neutrality, impartiality, human rights and humanitarian space, in the political complexities of the Middle East.

58) (RO, HQ) DOC and MENARO should intensify advocacy and communication campaigns on UNICEF corporate mandate, aimed at the increasingly influential Arabic media, focusing also on positive aspects and success stories and in some cases counterbalancing anti-UN sentiment. Key NatComs should be part of this process, to intensify visibility and understanding.

59) (CO) COs in the MENA region should include in their EPRP processes a communication strategy which takes into consideration the political sensitivities of both the national and regional context. This communications strategies should take into account the framework of humanitarian principles and human rights, but should also include plans for specific communication arrangements and structures (e.g. Amman News Desk) to be set up in the event of a crisis. The strategies should be

developed in close coordination with MENARO and HQ for sound consistency and all staff, especially senior managers and spokespersons, should be informed about it.

60) **(CO, RO)** COs and RO should establish stronger links, interaction and dealings with Arab civil society, think tanks, and research institutes, as well as local media networks, to increase mutual understanding.

61) **(CO)** Building on regular country programme collaborations, MENA COs should try to increase trust with Government counterparts to discuss and anticipate advocacy issues related to protection of women and children, in the event of political crises. Through sound emergency response, COs should aim at building Government trust during humanitarian crises, increasing chances for advocacy on protection of women and children.

62) **(CO, RO, HQ)** In light of the great complexities of the region, HQ, MENARO and COs should ensure that sufficient resources are made available for communications and advocacy in emergency, at all levels of the organization.

### 2.8 - Security

Some of the humanitarian responses implemented in the MENA region (Iraq, Darfur, Lebanon) are among the most challenging in terms of safety and security of its staff and assets, and UNICEF, like the other UN agencies, has been striving to keep on its programmes running in these extremely dangerous environments. Unfortunately, in some cases the full extent of the challenge has been appreciated only after dramatic events, like the Baghdad bombing (August 2003). Lessons gathered from the evaluation of these crises provided several sound recommendations and suggestions regarding security for both UNICEF and the wider UN, many of which have by now been implemented or partially put into place in the countries where they are stemming from. Some of these recommendations are still very useful though, for other countries in this troubled region.

**Revised Recommendations**

63) **(CO)** Representatives should ensure that national staff are fully integrated in preparedness and response discussions related to safety and security, especially to clarify arrangements and suitable solutions for their protection and for the continuation of the programmes, in the event of an evacuation of international staff.

64) **(CO, RO, HQ)** Funds should me made immediately available – by COs, RO and/or HQ – for newly identified security and safety needs, including human resources and assets.

65) **(CO, RO, HQ)** Security arrangements and structures should be fully integrated and coordinated at all levels (COs, RO, HQ), with a clear sharing of responsibilities and accountabilities, in order to ensure the broadest possible implementation of the programmes, while ensuring safety of staff and assets. For this reason it is essential that security officers and staff are fully integrated in all the emergency preparedness and response plans. Vice-versa, all staff (both programme and operations) should be fully informed and abreast of safety and security issues in the duty station and in the country, and their perspectives should be represented in the SMT.

66) **(CO, RO, HQ)** COs should manage civil-military relationships as much as possible in the framework of the IASC local approach and guidelines; at the same time, it should establish constructive dialogue with military entities for specific issues and
collaborations related to women and children. HQ and MENA RO should gather lessons learned and success stories, and eventually develop guidelines for the complexities of the civil-military relationships in the region.

2.9 - IT/Telecommunications
In the framework of the cluster approach, and in the wider ITC cluster under the responsibility of WFP, UNICEF has a defined corporate leadership role for data communications (Datacoms). During the last few years, UNICEF has been able to greatly strengthen its capacities in this area, establishing partnerships with implementing partners at global level (Telecom Sans Frontieres), and stockpiling essential equipment in key locations. These arrangements are known at HQ and regional level, as well as in emergency-prone COs. It is essential that dissemination of information and training on the activations of these arrangements reach all COs.

Revised Recommendations
67) (CO) ICT Officers should ensure that ICT considerations, staffing and equipment needs, deployment and installation arrangements, as well as costs are included both in EPR documents and plans, and in the Flash Appeal or CAP. The specific role UNICEF plays in the ITC cluster provide a stronger framework and rationale for the request of these resources.

68) (CO, RO) Given the increasing availability and quality of telecommunication equipment, COs and RO ICT Officers should provide training in their utilization to key staff who might be deployed to respond to a humanitarian crisis.

2.10 - Logistics and Supply
In most humanitarian crises supplies characterize the bulk of UNICEF initial response, and their cost normally represents up to 80% of the total budget. Over the last years, UNICEF capacity to deliver supplies to beneficiaries has dramatically increased; a special emergency unit has been created in Supply Division, in Copenhagen. Supply Hubs have been established in Dubai and Panama. Emergency supply lists with delivery time of 48/72 hours have been developed. Regional networks for procurement have been started and expanded, and collaboration between COs has been greatly enhanced. Still, at the beginning of any new emergency, supply and logistics often constitute bottlenecks. The MENA evaluations identify several areas where, with limited efforts and resources, things could be greatly improved. These recommendations – in some cases already partially implemented – coupled with the much stronger interagency logistics environment created by the establishment of the WFP-led Logistics cluster and the increasingly professional deployment of the UNJLC, if fully enacted could dramatically improve UNICEF’s response at field level.

Revised Recommendations
69) (CO) COs, especially in emergency-prone countries, and with support from RO, should carry out logistics capacity assessment (LCA) and warehousing surveys, as well as local market surveys. Outcomes from these surveys, together with arrangements for stockpiling if necessary, should feed into and be an integral part of

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17 Refer also to upcoming “Supply and Logistics Lessons Learned” document (EMOPS).
the CO’s preparedness plans. Additionally, COs should evaluate the establishment of stand-by agreements – with blanket CRC endorsement for up to one year – with supply providers for items which have been proven essential in the local humanitarian context.

70) (CO) Representatives should ensure stronger interactions between supply and logistics staff, and programme staff from the preparedness phases, to optimize management and delivery of humanitarian aid. Clear and comprehensive supply plans should be developed by each programmatic section, to be consolidated by Supply/Logistics staff, included in the EPRP, and shared with RO and SD. In the event of an emergency, this supply list could be revised and fine-tuned, updated when necessary, and used for planning and monitoring purposes.

71) (CO) COs should evaluate security and political consideration for transport, warehousing and branding of trucks/supplies during preparedness and response phases, especially in complex emergencies.

72) (CO, RO, HQ) In the event of large crises, dedicated logistics and supply staff should be identified or appointed at both RO level and in SD Copenhagen. COs should ensure adequate logistics and supply capacity is proportional to the size and complexity of the response. Plans for strengthening supply and logistics human resources should be part of the broader HR mobilization plan included in the EPRP matrix. RO (REA and Regional Supply Officer, if the post exists) should ensure that planning at CO is sound.

73) (RO) ROs in coordination with SD should enhance regional supply networks, looking at suitable markets, regional agreements, and improve exchanges and loans between COs in the event of new crises.

74) (CO, RO) In the event of large crises, COs and RO should integrate UNICEF logistics capacities with those of UNJLC and/or WFP-led Logistic cluster, whenever these are activated and put into place. The establishment of custom-bonded warehouses should be taken into consideration in these contexts.

75) (HQ) SD, with support of the ROs, should enhance dissemination and utilization of UniTrack with specific training at CO level. SD should also developed a warehouse management training – possibly based on WFP package, or directly linking to it – for roll-out at regional and country level.

76) (HQ) EMOPS, SD should disseminate to all COs the latest guidelines for accepting donations in-kind (DIK) during emergencies. In case of doubts of local applicability, the COs should seek advice with both RO and HQ while highlighting local context, capacities and dynamics.

2.11 - Fundraising
UNICEF is able to mobilize extraordinary financial resources at the beginning of an emergency. Unfortunately, raising funds for preparedness is much more difficult, even in countries with seasonal disasters. Some far-sighted COs in these countries fully include EPRP in the planning processes and allocate some budget for preparedness at the beginning of each year. The Iraq crisis has been one of the few emergencies that consistently managed to attract attention and funds during protracted preparedness phases. This happened in a very unique context and for obvious political reasons. Some of the recommendations from the evaluations of the Iraq and Darfur crises, although
specific, as well as lessons from other regions (Rapid Response Mechanism, Eastern DRC\textsuperscript{18}), offer some suggestions for how UNICEF could try to improve its performance in fund-raising for preparedness.

**Revised Recommendations**

77) (CO) Representatives, especially in emergency-prone countries, should enhance their relationship with key donors and engage them in EPRP-related discussions. Demonstrating sound preparedness plans, and especially how this preparedness allows for improved response, would likely induce donors support. This approach should be backed by quality donor reporting, as well as by frequent, engaging field visits and briefings to appraise the impact of funds utilization.

78) (CO, RO, HQ) In the context of large-scale emergencies, COs and RO should limit the number of external visits (donors, NatComs, media) to FOs and ZOs to avoid overburdening staff. Additional staff should eventually be deployed from RO or HQ for these visits.

### 2.12 - Human Resources

Human Resources in emergencies has received significant attention during recent years in UNICEF, resulting in dedicated organizational resources to ensure “the right people, in the right place, at the right time”. These resources include the establishment of an increasingly successful Emergency HR Unit in HQ. Surge capacity for qualified staff is, together with supplies and funding, an essential ingredient for successful humanitarian response. The MENA evaluations emphasize the importance of human resources, stating that the success of deployment in emergency is the sum of flexible systems, realistic mobilization plans developed by COs well before an emergency strikes, and the right attitude and attention of senior managers.

**Revised Recommendations**

79) (CO, RO, HQ) UNICEF at all levels should keep striving to strengthen its HR surge capacity systems in emergency through:

- (CO, RO) Training of UNICEF staff on EPRP, as well as on specific programme and operations in emergencies;
- (HQ) A wide range of stand-by agreements with critical partners and organizations;
- (CO) Empowering national staff, through training activities, inter-country exchanges and simulation exercises, to run an emergency programme, especially in the event of an evacuation of international staff;
- (RO, HQ) Further strengthening of surge capacity rosters at HQ and RO level, consistent monitoring of their utilization, and possible establishment of targets. While the main responsibility to manage, update and make them available lays with HR at all levels, responsibilities for feeding them with suitable candidates and appraise them after each deployment should be better clarified and formalized.
- (HQ) Appoint an emergency focal point and emergency-dedicated technical staff in all Division at HQ level;

\textsuperscript{18} Ref: footnote 14, page 24
Ensure that the ongoing Accountabilities Review will clarify role and responsibilities of RTAs and other RO staff in preparedness activities and in emergency response. The review should also clarify the role and power of the RD in obliging reluctant Representatives to release key staff for emergency surge, linking this process to the establishment of a regional trigger.

80) (CO) A realistic human resources mobilization plan in the event of an emergency should be part of each EPRP, and should make sure to encapsulate HR gaps on often forgotten areas such as supply and logistics, administration and finance, HR, ICT, PM&E, and report writing. The HR Officer should ensure the fine-tuning and update of this plan at the beginning of a crisis and according to evolving circumstances. As early as possible, the plan should start looking at the short-, medium- and long-term staffing structures, and define strategies to fulfill the needs with a combination of: a) in-country staff rearrangements; b) UNICEF staff on mission (also from NatComs, especially useful for Communications Officers and Sitrep/report writers); c) UNICEF staff on loan from other offices; d) deployment of stand-by partners staff; e) consultancies (SSA); and f) official posts (TFT, FT, UNV). The plan should become the main reference for HR surge in the event of a new crisis, and all its updates should be shared with the HR and REA in the RO, as well as with the Emergency Unit in DHR NY, even before the emergency strikes.

81) (CO) COs should ensure that the human resources mobilization plan includes clear provisions for the identification and appointment of the coordinators for the clusters under UNICEF responsibility – clearly separating this role from programme coordination roles –, as well as for their respective information management officers.

82) (RO, HQ) EMOPS, DHR, PD should develop policies and guidelines for effective surge capacity in COs with minimum structures, for MICs, and when there is an international staff ceiling, considering the size of the response, positions needing to be filled and local capacity. The RO (REA, Regional HR Officer) should work closely with these COs on realistic preparedness plans.

83) (CO) Operations Officer, HR Officer should ensure that financial arrangements, entitlements and compensations of both national and international staff and their dependents in case of an emergency and especially of an evacuation, are clarified and made available during preparedness phases. The arrangements should include provision to national staff of survival/support equipment (water, medical kits, etc.) or salary advances to purchase these.

84) (CO, RO) HR Officer, Deputy Representative should ensure that new staff employed for an emergency receive comprehensive briefings on the country, on the emergency context, on cultural and religious issues (especially important for the MENA region), on security and coordination systems in place, and on existing programmatic arrangements. Staff new to UNICEF should be provided with short training (eventually web-based, to be undertaken while waiting for deployment) on UNICEF’s Programme Policies and Procedures, with special emphasis on Emergency, Rights Based programming, and administrative management. The RO (Regional HR Officer, REA) should assist the COs in these processes, and identify ways to monitor these arrangements.
85) **(HQ)** EMOPS, OED, DHR should develop guidelines on how to deploy staff to – and set up operations in – countries where there is no UNICEF presence (building on Kuwait experience).

86) **(CO, RO, HQ)** Staff wellbeing and psychosocial support for both national and international staff and dependants should be taken into serious consideration at all levels of the organization in the event of an emergency and especially in case of an evacuation. Costs for this type of support should be included in the CO EPRP, or in more in-depth contingency plans.

87) **(CO)** Representatives and Deputy Representatives, with the support of Operations and HR officers, should ensure sound leadership for HR issues in preparedness and response phases, when the risk of underestimating HR needs are acute, when staff will be under pressure and working long hours, and when dynamics in the office are strained. This can be done by demonstrating clear, consistent direction and strategy, by sharing information and responsibilities, by clarifying roles and reporting lines, by allocating task according to specific skills, by keeping an eye on work-load and other stress factors, by underlining the need for private time and setting good examples, and with team-building and encouragement.

2.13 - Administration and Finance

Administration and finance have struggled to keep pace with UNICEF advances in emergency preparedness and response, but several recent initiatives, notably the issuing of the “Financial and Administrative Management for Emergencies – A Guide for UNICEF Staff”, have become indispensable tools in each CO and RO. These offer practical advice on how to facilitate transactions and contracts, open new field offices, and create petty cash accounts, without breaking the rules. The MENA evaluations are limited in their scope and largely outdated; yet still offer some good advice.

*Revised Recommendations*

88) **(CO, RO, HQ)** HQ, ROs and COs should ensure comprehensive dissemination, understanding of and familiarization of all staff with the “Financial Administration Management for Emergency” guidelines. Operation Officers should bring to the attention of all staff any special arrangement established or amended in light of the guidelines, and any change in the table of authority in the event of an emergency, with the arrival of new staff.

89) **(HQ)** EMOPS, DFAM, DPP, ICT should ensure that the new system replacing ProMS will maintain flexibility for administrative planning and follow up in emergencies and tools for multi-country emergency response plans.

2.14 - UNICEF Programmes

UNICEF HQ is currently leading a comprehensive review of the CCCs, involving all main divisions and sections in NYHQ as well as colleagues from ROs and selected COs. Specific in-depth discussions are taking place inside each programmatic section of the organization, looking at the existing commitments and, building on years of field experience and testing, aiming are refining and fine-tuning them. The revised version of the CCCs is expected by early 2009. The Cluster Approach, with specific leadership and coordination responsibilities for UNICEF in the Water and Sanitation, Nutrition,
Education and Child Protection sectors, added a new perspective and framework to the way UNICEF and other organizations work in emergency. In this framework, over the last three years, UNICEF has undergone major improvements and strengthening in the sectors under its Cluster responsibility, and many of the recommendations proposed by the MENA evaluations have been already fulfilled. In light of this rapidly evolving scenario, and also because several of the recommendations in the MENA evaluations focus on country-specific issues, the few programmatic Revised Recommendations proposed in this document are limited in scope.

2.14.1 - Health
Better coordination with WHO has been one of the main recommendations from the MENA evaluations, well before WHO took the leadership of the Health Cluster. The cluster structure offers new opportunities for an improved harmonization of WHO and UNICEF work in emergency, in coordination with local Ministries of Health and other actors.

Revised Recommendations
90) (HQ) Health Section should continue working closely with WHO (leader for Health Cluster) and other cluster members on the clarification of responsibilities in emergency, collaboration with local Ministry of Health (MoH), development of kits, and optimization in the use of resources.
91) (CO) Deputy Representatives, Chiefs of Health should continue working closely with the local WHO office, the MoH and with other organisations active in the health sector, to optimize preparedness and response arrangements, as well as to look at health economics in the country and how these are affected in the event of a crisis.
92) (CO) COs managing emergency programmes in conflict affected countries, should keep advocating for “days or weeks of peace/tranquility”, and utilize the EPI and nutrition surveillance campaigns as ways to access areas otherwise inaccessible or under the control of non-state entities.

2.14.2 - Nutrition
Since it took the leadership for the newly established Nutrition Cluster, UNICEF has been working to strengthen its capacities in this sector. There are still many COs though, in MICs and developing countries, also in the MENA region, where UNICEF does not have a nutrition programme. Defining a strategy to manage nutritional problems in these countries should be a priority for MENA RO and HQ. Additionally, the MENA region is affected by frequent and harsh droughts, with the potential to induce slow-onset nutritional crises. It is hoped that improved monitoring and triggering systems for this type of crises, currently under discussion in the framework of the CCCs review, will soon be established.

Revised Recommendations
93) (CO, RO, HQ) In light of its role of Nutrition Cluster leader, UNICEF should keep reinforcing its nutrition sections at all levels (HQ, ROs, COs), especially in regions and countries where malnutrition is recognized as a chronic risk and vulnerability.
94) **(HQ)** Global Nutrition Cluster should keep clarifying arising issues in emergencies and assist COs and ROs with simple, well-targeted guidelines and best practices.

95) **(RO)** The REA, and the RTA for Nutrition should participate in the process to establish monitoring and triggering mechanisms for slow-onset crises, and eventually identify COs which could field-test any newly developed tool.

96) **(CO)** COs should ensure that nutrition is fully integrated in preparedness processes, even if not part of the regular programme. In coordination with the RO, COs should plan to fill up human and financial resources gaps in the event of a crisis where malnutrition could be a risk. COs should look at existing non-UNICEF nutritional capacities in the country (Government and other organizations), and interact with them to ensure that preliminary arrangements are in place for a sudden crisis.

2.14.3 - Water and Sanitation

When UNICEF took the responsibility for the WASH Cluster leadership, its WASH programmes had been downsized in several countries and regions. The process was reversed, and the Global WASH Cluster is now quite effective and efficient in its support to ROs and COs. As for nutrition though, many Country Offices, including in the MENA region, do not have WASH programmes or staff. The role the Global Cluster can play in these contexts (prompt staff identification, technical advice, direct support, fundraising) cannot be overstated. All the recommendations for WASH come from the evaluations of the Darfur and Bam crises. These are context specific, but provide valid suggestions for the MENA RO and COs, facing many challenges in this sector.

**Revised Recommendations**

97) **(CO, RO, HQ)** UNICEF at all levels (HQ, RO, CO), and under the guidance of the Global WASH Cluster, should ensure to have sufficient capacities for WASH preparedness and response, also in COs and ROs where there is no WASH programme or staff. WASH capacities suitable for the specific characteristics of a region or country (drilling in droughts; purification in floods; sanitation in large displacements; etc.) should be ensured.

98) **(HQ)** UNICEF Global WASH Cluster should keep working closely with Supply Division for the selection, development, update and optimisation of key WASH supplies and products, as well as for other supply-related issues.

99) **(RO, HQ)** UNICEF Global WASH Cluster and RO should ensure guidance in all situations where COs might have to engage in new, challenging post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstructions initiatives. Key communications and advocacy actions might be necessary to influence behavioural changes.

2.14.4 - Education

Donors and the wider international community are increasingly recognizing that education is an essential component of each humanitarian response. It allows children to find, even in a few hours of schooling under a tree or a tarpaulin, some normalcy, and their parents to focus on other priorities. Funding from the CERF system allocated for education in emergencies confirms this recognition. Unfortunately, often UNICEF staff still has to convince senior managers from other organizations about the importance of education in the first phases of a new crisis. UNICEF has been appointed, together with
Save the Children UK (SCF), to co-lead the Global Education Cluster. This role is creating a lot of opportunities for stronger advocacy, development and refinement of approaches and supplies, more consistent responses, and better interactions with other clusters. The adoption of the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) guidelines\(^{19}\) as main source of advice and standards for education in emergency has been useful, and their dissemination and application must be further expanded.

**Revised Recommendations**

100) (CO, RO, HQ) UNICEF should keep advocating at all levels (HQ, RO, CO), with donors and the international humanitarian community, that education is an essential component of humanitarian response, and that re-activation of any type of learning environment is the best way to a fast return to normalcy for children.

101) (HQ) Global Education Cluster should keep liaising with SD to ensure that education-specific supplies are of right quality, up-to-date and eventually shaped according to country-specific needs.

102) (HQ) Global Education Cluster should gather and disseminate best practices, lessons learned and guidelines — in line with the INEE guidelines, whose utilization at country level should be expanded — on education in emergency issues, like back-to-school campaigns, child friendly schools (CFS), adaptation and translation of kits, as well as teachers’ salaries and broader capacity building initiatives.

103) (CO) Education has been recognized as an excellent channel to address other issues, like hygiene, psychosocial support, mine awareness, MCH, etc. COs should ensure that during preparedness and response phases, comprehensive interactions and discussions take place among all programmatic sections, to identify synergies and optimize resources. COs should also ensure that a participatory approach is utilized in preparedness and response phases, involving as much as possible local communities and beneficiary groups.

2.14.5 - Child Protection

A Global Protection Cluster has been established under the leadership of UNHCR, and UNICEF has a special role, sometime described as focal point agency, for Child Protection issues in emergency. While UNICEF role for CP is well recognized, the broader arrangements for Protection are still being delineated. UNHCR specific mandate for refugees, and its limited (in context, scope and time) role in other types of disasters, leaves some gap areas in the leadership this organisation can provide. This requires an expanded role for UNICEF and occasionally for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the other main actor in the Protection Cluster. Although greater clarity is urgently needed for these arrangements, the establishment of the Global CP focus area (or sub-cluster) and improved collaborations with specialized INGOs, allowed for increasingly better responses in recent humanitarian crises (Myanmar). UNICEF still needs more qualified and skilled staff at all levels (HQ, RO, CO) to cover all areas of CP response in emergency. The CP focus area should also continue developing, refining and disseminating guidelines and best practices for each technical area covered by CP in emergencies.

\(^{19}\) “INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early reconstruction” INEE (2005) http://www.exacteditions.com/exact/browse/436/494/2635/2/1
Revised Recommendations

104) **(HQ, RO)** Global CP focal point (sub-cluster) should expand the dissemination of the Child Protection in Emergency training and guidelines, covering also the links between CP and other programmes (e.g. education). Regional CP Adviser should fine-tune the training for the specific protection-related challenges MENA COs might face in the implementation of the CP commitments.

105) **(HQ)** Global CP focal point (sub-cluster), in collaboration with DHR and CP colleagues in HQ and ROs, should develop and update rosters with external and internal candidates with experience covering different components of UNICEF CP in emergency responses (psychosocial support, tracing and reunification, SGBV, DDR).

106) **(CO)** Child Protection Chiefs, with support from the Global CP focal point (sub-cluster), should start integrating more consistently SGBV in their preparedness and response planning, including robust advocacy strategies.

107) **(HQ)** Global CP focal point (sub-cluster) should ensure that psychosocial support is better represented in the ongoing revision of the CCCs, and that lessons learned and best practices are gathered and disseminated, together with guidelines.

108) **(HQ)** Global CP focal point (sub-cluster) should work together with SD and CP RTAs to develop, adapt and update global and region-specific supplies and tools for child protection in emergency. COs should be encouraged to translate and adapt these tools and supplies into local relevant languages well before an emergency strikes.

109) **(CO)** COs should keep striving to ensure that special attention is paid, during both preparedness and response phases, to vulnerable groups, often slipping through the net of the humanitarian response. These include orphans, adolescents, children with disabilities, single women- and adolescent-headed households, widows.

110) **(CO)** At the beginning of a new crisis, CP officers should negotiate as soon as possible with governmental counterparts the integration of newly started activities and services into formal, sustainable structures (e.g. children and women police desks).

111) **(CO)** COs should advocate with – and eventually support – key counterparts and organizations for the integration of adolescent and youth projects in the preparedness and response phases of any new emergency.

112) **(CO)** COs should use the CP humanitarian response and its components as a channel to scale-up enhanced social services and social protection with the Government.

113) **(CO, RO, HQ)** As for other sectors (Education, WASH), EMOPS, PD should define clear guidelines and parameters for UNICEF engagement in reconstruction programmes and other large-scale rehabilitations of basic services. COs should ensure that before engaging in any endeavor of this type, a thorough consultation takes place with RO and HQ’s relevant divisions/sections to reach an agreed conclusion and define a consistent position throughout the organisation. Pressure from donors should not influence this process.

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20 The recently adopted Security Council Resolution 1820 (19 June, 2008) calling for an end to sexual violence in conflict is a powerful advocacy tool in complex emergencies.
3 – CONCLUSIONS

Over the last years, UNICEF has been actively engaged into strengthening its emergency preparedness and response capacities, both in-house and in the framework of the UN Humanitarian Reform. The way UNICEF defined predictability of its interventions with the development of the Core Commitment for Children in emergency, became a vantage starting point for the new responsibilities offered by the Cluster Approach. The humanitarian response evaluations carried out in the MENA region between 2002 and 2008 show clear indications of the gradual improvement of UNICEF work in humanitarian crises; they offer a broad range of recommendations, at times overlapping, and often underscoring areas where, although some years have already passed, there is still room for improvement.

The “distillation” of sharper and better-contextualized Revised Recommendations allowed for focusing on some of these areas, and to propose a set of Actionable Recommendations (in the Executive Summary) especially relevant for the MENA Regional Office and its Country Offices, and the specific challenges they face. Actionable Recommendations are also offered to Headquarters. It is hoped that these Actionable Recommendations will be taken into consideration at different levels (CMTs, RMT, and EMOPS), and that responsible staff or offices will be appointed for their implementation and monitoring.

In addition, the remaining Revised Recommendations have been clustered into targeted groups of Guidelines & Best Practices. These are offered for consideration in Annex V of this Summary Review. It is hoped that these Guidelines & Best Practices will be broadly disseminated in the MENA RO and in the MENA COs, as well as in key Divisions in HQ. While not mandatory, these should offer many good suggestions and “tips” for staff dealing with the many facets of UNICEF work in emergency preparedness and response.
UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO)

Emergency Preparedness and Response Evaluations 2003-2008

SUMMARY REVIEW

ANNEXES

September 2008

Enrico Leonardi, Consultant
Consultancy Terms of Reference

Synthesis of recent evaluations/reviews of humanitarian response in the Middle East and North Africa Region

BACKGROUND OF THE ASSIGNMENT
In the last few years, UNICEF has supported humanitarian response to a number of emergencies in the Middle East and North Africa region. In late 2003 and early 2004, UNICEF undertook internal evaluation of UNICEF emergency Preparedness & early response in Iraq. In March 2005 a Joint UNICEF-DFIF evaluation of UNICEF preparedness and early response to the Darfur emergency was also conducted. November 2005 UNICEF evaluated its response to the earthquakes in Algeria, Iran and Morocco. February 2007 Bam emergency was evaluated. August 2007 lessons learned exercise was conducted for the UNICEF response for the 2006 war in Lebanon. And in October 2007 another lessons learned exercise was carried out for the South Sudan flood response.

The wealth of evaluative documentation on humanitarian response in MENA is significant. However, the practical application of such findings to UNICEF’s organizational approach is less well documented. Globally in UNICEF the Interdivisional Standing Committee on Children in Emergencies has undertaken a recent review of recommendations from recent evaluations/synthesis and this is feeding into headquarters planning. The UNICEF Regional Office has undertaken to ensure a more systematic learning from this regional body of work as the basis for improving emergency preparedness and response. This requires distilling conclusions from the many evaluations/reviews, identifying common issues and differences across the various emergency responses, prioritizing issues and examining/refining actionable recommendations. UNICEF is seeking external support on the first steps – distilling and analyzing the material from the existing evaluations/reviews.

OBJECTIVE AND TRAGETS
The purpose of the review is to feed into a process of digesting and analyzing lessons from experience in UNICEF preparedness and response so that these can be useful prioritized and actions taken to strengthen UNICEF humanitarian response capacity within the region and also globally.

The objective of the review will be to systematically capture conclusions, lessons and recommendations from recent evaluations and reviews of UNICEF humanitarian response in the Middle East and North Africa Region, highlighting common issues and distinguishing different levels at which issue need to be addressed CO-RO-HQ, and presenting all of this in a structured easily digestible format that can be used as a basis for prioritization and planning exercises that follow including possible adjustment/adaptation of CO and RO level EPR planning processes and accountabilities.
--- ANNEX II ---

List of Evaluations Reviewed and Other Documents

Evaluations
- “UNICEF’s Response to the Lebanon Crisis, July to September 2006. Lessons Learned” Sheila Reed, Consultant (November 2007).
- “Lessons Learned – Northern Sudan Floods” Sudan Interagency Flood Task Force (February 2008).

Other Documents
- “Supply and Logistics Lessons Learned” EMOPS (XXXX?).
➢ “IASC Guidelines for Gender-Based Violence in Humanitarian Settings” IASC (2005) -
➢ “IASC Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action” IASC (2006) -
➢ Security Council Resolution 1820 (19 June, 2008) on the End of Sexual Violence in Conflict -
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation of UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response in Iraq was commissioned by the Iraq Country Office, the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO) and the Evaluation Office and managed by a team with one representative from each office. The evaluation was undertaken with the aim of briefly documenting UNICEF’s experience, assessing the relevance of its preparedness and response, and recording lessons with which to strengthen organisational preparedness and response systems. The evaluation was carried out by an external evaluation consultant, assisted by a research consultant, between September 2003 and January 2004.

PURPOSE

UNICEF decided that it was important to assess its preparedness effort and early response for Iraq with particular attention to preparedness. The Iraq crisis developed at a time when UNICEF’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning process was becoming more widely used in the organisation, and preparedness in the sub-region received utmost attention. This presented an opportunity to examine the relevance and effectiveness of EPRP. The aim of the evaluation was to provide a critical reference for subsequent evaluations of subsequent stages of the UNICEF response in Iraq.

OBJECTIVES

As stated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), the overall objectives of the evaluation were:

I To briefly but systematically document UNICEF’s experience in emergency preparedness planning, actual preparedness and early response, situating this in the context as it evolved.

I To assess the overall relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of UNICEF preparedness efforts and early response.

I To assess the degree to which preparedness and early response in Iraq was specific to that context and correspondingly what enduring lessons and concerns can be carried forward to strengthen organisational preparedness and response systems.

SCOPE

The evaluation exercise was limited in scope to UNICEF performance in preparedness planning and early response. The TOR recognised that, because of time and security constraints, the assessment of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness would be limited.
The evaluation was required to cover all key support functions of UNICEF preparedness and response across UNICEF’s decentralised structure, and to address a wide ranging set of questions under the headings of Coordination, Preparedness efforts, Actual Preparedness, Early Response and Putting Iraq experience into perspective. The evaluation covered from September 2001 when the sub-regional effort was initiated to June 23 2003, the launching of the second UN Inter-Agency Appeal for Iraq drawn up in collaboration with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The evaluation was framed as an internal exercise because a future planned inter-agency evaluation will look more widely at the performance of United Nations agencies. This exercise will form an input to a wider evaluation.

METHODOLOGY
The evaluation was based on more than eighty interviews, an extensive review of UNICEF documentation, a two-day ‘lessons-learned’ workshop in Istanbul attended by key staff from relevant Regional and Country Offices and from Headquarters, and feedback sessions in Amman and New York. In addition to the limitations in scope mentioned above, the methodology was limited by insecurity which meant that no field trip inside Iraq could be included.

CONTEXT
UNICEF’s emergency preparedness experience for Iraq was unique, not only for the long lead time the context allowed but also for the scale of attention given by the organisation. The Iraq emergency was highly unusual in several respects. Iraq had (and has) a very high political profile; the war was anticipated but with uncertain timing and unpredictable outcomes; governments both in the region and beyond were reluctant to be seen to be preparing for the humanitarian consequences of a conflict the UN was trying to head off; and the lead time was unusually long, giving UNICEF almost 18 months to prepare.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING
From October 2001, MENARO initiated a sub-regional Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) process including Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and GAO. A sub-regional contingency plan was produced and refined over almost one year, with individual country contingency plans being updated in the process. Of the scenarios considered, a large scale attack or invasion by foreign countries on Baghdad and oil fields in the North and Southeast was considered most likely. The attack began starting on March 20 2003 but the outcomes of the war were different from those anticipated in UNICEF and UN contingency plans. Mass displacement and ethnic conflict did not happen, while the security situation in Iraq after the war was far more difficult than expected, restricting the scope and geographical coverage of UNICEF’s assistance to children and women.

UNICEF’s sub-regional and country contingency planning was effective. Several factors made this possible, including: Leadership of the EPRP process by MENARO; the preparation of detailed “To Do” action lists for each Country Office (CO); the inclusion of all aspects of operations from the outset; UNICEF’s corporate commitment to strengthen its emergency response capability, backed by DFID funding; the presence in the sub-region of a cadre of
staff with emergency experience; and, not least, the availability of EPF and CERF funding for preparedness.

Each CO achieved its planned level of standing readiness before the war. The planning processes were productive but also drawn out and onerous, especially when combined with the effort required to support inter-agency planning.

The scale of UNICEF’s emergency preparedness and early response was substantial. UNICEF actions within Iraq since the war, supported by cross-border operations from surrounding countries, have provided direct assistance to at least two million Iraqi children across a number of sectors.

In Iraq, UNICEF took action ahead of the war to mitigate its possible effects. Before the war, UNICEF supported the Iraq government in pre-positioning thousands of tonnes of nutritional supplies (therapeutic milk and High Protein Biscuits) at community level. UNICEF intensified its support for the national breast-feeding promotion campaign, supported the health authorities’ polio, measles and DTP campaigns for under U5s, and contracted mobile maintenance teams to repair water and sanitation facilities both before and during the war. UNICEF’s strategy of placing preparedness stocks at community level in Iraq, and in warehouses both inside and outside Iraq’s borders gave it the flexibility to cope with a range of possible outcomes of the war. It also spread UNICEF’s risk with regard to possible losses. The Iraq country office took the precaution of sending its better vehicles to neighbouring countries to reduce the risk of their being lost or damaged.

**RESPONSE**

Soon after the start of the war UNICEF started tankering drinking water to Basra and surrounding areas from Kuwait. This was later extended to Baghdad. At its peak, UNICEF was supplying 4.5 million litres of water per day, enough for some 300,000 people. At the same time, UNICEF committed $23 million for six months for spares, chemicals, equipment, and repairs to critical water and sewage systems, while making a one-off salary payment to 15,000 Baghdad Water Authority staff as an incentive to continue working.

UNICEF supported the restoration of the cold chain system for vaccines, rehabilitated hospital generators, supplied fuel and imported and distributed health supplies. In addition to the 3,600 tonnes of HPB purchased before the war, a further 22,000 tonnes were supplied during and immediately after the war.

UNICEF launched a Back to School campaign, building on the pressure being exerted by Iraqi families on the authorities to get schools reopened. UNICEF printed 15 million exam booklets to enable 4.5 million children (90% of those eligible) to take end of year exams. Damaged school buildings were rehabilitated and School-in-a-Box kits delivered throughout the country.

In Northern Iraq, UNICEF assisted 80% of children in institutions to return to their families before the war. In Baghdad, some of the children left in orphanages were abducted during the war and UNICEF provided material support and vehicles to help find them. UNICEF’s post
war Child Protection programme was slow to get off the ground, beyond meeting the basic needs of children in institutions.

UNICEF was one of few agencies to continue working in Iraq throughout the war. This was made possible by careful preparation and training before the evacuation of international personnel, and by the commitment and professionalism of national staff in Iraq, which have been recognised by UNICEF’s Executive Director.

The major supply routes for cross-border operations were Turkey, Kuwait and Jordan. The Kuwait supply route proved contentious because it gave the appearance of working in collaboration with the Coalition forces invading Iraq from the south. Logistics and supply seem to have been effective, strengthened by Supply Division support to MENARO.

**FUNDING**

UNICEF made use of EPF funding on an unprecedented scale for emergency preparedness and took a calculated risk in borrowing $5 million of CERF funds. A grant of $2 million was made from UNICEF Regular Resources for emergency preparedness. By the start of the war, preparedness funding came to over $9 million without donor funds and totalled some $15m with. The bulk of this funding was used for preparedness stocks. UNICEF used an additional $5m to pre-position supplies in northern Iraq, drawing on OFFP funds rather than EPF/CERF. Fundraising against the March Flash Appeal for $166 million was initially slow but picked up to 60% funded by the end of June. UNICEF’s financial commitment to preparedness and the period to the end of June 2003 amounted to some $80 million. The primary goal of this assistance was to ensure the protection of children and support the basic rights of Iraqi children to have access to water and sanitation, health and nutrition, and education.

**HUMAN RESOURCES**

Sub-regional preparedness was dependent on the redeployment of the large staff team from Iraq to the smaller UNICEF CO’s in surrounding countries. If a major IDP and refugee emergency had occurred as a result of the war, UNICEF might not have had enough human resources available to meet its commitments. The availability of a sizeable team for redeployment from Iraq, and the long lead time for this emergency, masked UNICEF’s lack of regional and global surge capacity. UNICEF will need to strengthen its systems if it is to meet its revised Core Corporate Commitments in Emergencies.

**MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS**

UNICEF achieved a significant level of media coverage, not least through the News Desk in Amman, a new innovation for this crisis. This probably boosted its fundraising efforts. However, attempts to impact on the Arab media were seen as less successful and the Regional Office acknowledges that an improved strategy is required.

There was a general sense amongst staff that UNICEF could have done more to speak out in defence of the rights of women and children in Iraq. At the same time, the constraints on what UNICEF could and could not say within an agreed UN communications strategy were not well understood within the organisation, especially in the field but also at HQ.
POLICY

The Core Corporate Commitments were influential in the design of both sub-regional and country-level contingency planning. By contrast, UNICEF’s human rights based planning approach to programming (HBRAP) does not seem to have been. UNICEF acknowledges that it needs to articulate more clearly how HBRAP applies in EPRP and emergency response.

Guidance on civil military relations needs strengthening as the Iraq experience has highlighted a lack of clarity at some points. The UN needs, but does not have, guidance on working under military occupation. More broadly, the challenge of needing security cover from military forces for the conduct of humanitarian operations has called into question the humanitarian principle of neutrality and the idea of ‘humanitarian space’. UNICEF needs to work with UN and other partners to explore how these can be strengthened.

All aspects of operations featured prominently in planning and in detailed preparations by COs. There was a substantial investment in telecommunications equipment. All offices in the region upgraded their systems and met MOSS standards for telecoms. UNICEF was successful in securing telecoms licences for the whole UN system for Jordan and Syria, while VSAT installations were completed in Iraq in record time.

SECURITY

There were no deaths or serious injuries to UNICEF staff during the study period but security remained a constant concern before, during and after the war. No solutions were on offer in case of biological or chemical attack. UNICEF offices in Baghdad were looted and valuable equipment lost. Across Iraq, the value of UNICEF equipment and supplies lost to looting and other forms of damage is not known but probably runs to millions of dollars. National staff were involved in security discussions but UNICEF HQ now considers that security planning for national staff operating during the war was not adequate.

PROCEDURES

There are a number of shortcomings in financial and other procedures which complicate and slow down UNICEF’s progress in emergency response, authorisation and contract procedures. UNICEF’s systems and control mechanisms have been devised for steady state development programming, aspects of which are not appropriate to emergency situations. This issue has been understood for some time but there is currently no plan of action for addressing such procedural problems.

COORDINATION

UNICEF combined well at country, regional and HQ levels to make both preparedness and response phases successful. As the political profile of Iraq developed, the centre of gravity of UN decision making moved away from the region, first to Geneva and then to New York. UNICEF put considerable human resources into the New York based Iraq Support Unit from March 2003 on.

UNICEF made a substantial contribution to inter-agency planning and coordination at country, regional, Geneva and HQ levels. In Iraq and the surrounding countries, UNICEF took on the coordination of at least one sector per country, usually two or three. UNICEF
also provided the inter-agency sub-regional coordination for four sectors, water and sanitation, education, nutrition and child protection. Three out of four coordinators were seconded in from other organisations, an arrangement that generally worked well. In New York, UNICEF was an active member of the Steering Group for Iraq, bringing operational issues to the table and focusing discussions on the humanitarian implications of the decisions under consideration.

**SUMMARY OF MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. *Developing Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning.* A number of steps are proposed for the further development of EPRP, including; the inclusion of UN and NGO partners into the preparedness planning process; the development of regional and global EPRP processes; the clearer formulation of human rights based approaches to programming in EPRP; greater results orientation; speeding up the process of making EPRP planning formats available on the UNICEF Intranet; and clarifying regional management of regional and sub-regional emergency preparedness and response.

2. *Improving Emergency Human Resource Capacity.* UNICEF requires better developed registers of internal and external expertise for emergency response and proactive management to ensure that the registers are populated and kept up to date, with targets set by EMOPS. As part of this exercise, UNICEF should increase the number of individual secondments and agreements with seconding agencies. UNICEF will need to dedicate resources to achieving revised targets.

3. *Key NGO Partners.* It is proposed that sector specialists in UNICEF HQ covering education and nutrition take time to investigate possible key NGO partners and negotiate MOUs with them.

4. *HBRAP in Emergencies.* UNICEF is already aware of the need to improve the understanding of HBRAP in emergencies. A consultation process is already underway. UNICEF’s initiatives to issue new instructions, guidance and tools on HBRAP in emergencies are endorsed.

5. *Streamlining ProMS.* One or more staff members with emergency programme experience should join the ProMS Reference Group. These staff must be able to give attention to detail, be ready to take part in iterative discussions over a period of months, and be available to test prototypes. DFAM are open to such involvement.

6. *The Wider UN.* The following areas are proposed for debate and evaluation within the wider UN family: *Coordination.* In this evaluation, the performance of Resident Coordinators and OCHA was reported to be patchy. Can the UN Secretariat take action to address long-standing weaknesses in coordination? *Neutrality and Humanitarian Space.* UNICEF needs to continue to be an active participant in UN and IASC debates, defending humanitarian principles and finding ways for their integrity to be restored. *Working under Occupation.* The UN needs to develop guidance on working under military occupation. *Human rights based approaches.* UNICEF should initiate a debate with other agencies on how best to apply HBRAP in emergencies. *CAP.* Consideration should be given to funding inter-agency planning and coordination from the Consolidated Appeal Process.
SUMMARY OF OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

I Regional Communications. UNICEF needs a new communications strategy for addressing the media in Arab countries, taking into account the significance of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

I Donations-in-Kind. UNICEF should explore how to increase its fundraising for emergencies through donations–in-kind by tapping into the experience those agencies which have developed this area of fundraising.

I National Staff Security. National staff should be more fully involved in security discussions.

I Accountability for Security. UNICEF needs to strengthen RO supervision and CO management accountability for security.

I Sector Coordination. Where UNICEF intends to provide inter-agency sector coordination, it should not assume that the coordinator can provide UNICEF programme management capacity as well.

I Warehousing. Custom-bonded warehouses should be used for shipments all or part of which are expected to be sent on to another country.

I Tracking System. The evaluation endorses UNICEF’s plan to develop a corporate commodity tracking by mid 2004.

I Local Market Surveys. The concept of local market surveys should be extended to other potential emergencies as part of future EPRP.
JOINT UNICEF-DFID EVALUATION OF UNICEF PREPAREDNESS AND EARLY RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR EMERGENCY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The objectives of this joint UNICEF/DFID evaluation were to:
- Examine the relevance and timeliness of preparedness planning, early intervention and the 90-Day plan, as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of management and operational support;
- Extract lessons to help UNICEF enhance its preparedness and its ability to respond in a meaningful and effective way to emergencies.

Over a month-long period, the Evaluation Team visited Sudan, including Khartoum and the three Darfur states, UNICEF Regional Office (RO) in Amman, UNICEF New York headquarters (NYHQ), and conducted telephone interviews with additional key UNICEF and DFID staff and external stakeholders. A desk study, including a review of financial and supply records, was carried out before and during the mission. Two feedback workshops took place during the evaluation: one in Khartoum (3-4/11/04) and one in Geneva (19/11/04). The findings and recommendations of this evaluation will be integrated into a wider learning process within UNICEF and their application will strengthen DFID/UNICEF working relations.

2. DARFUR: THE CRISIS NOBODY WANTED
Although in early 2003, initial signals indicated that a crisis was developing in Darfur, the international community was distracted by other international events, including the Naivasha Peace process in Sudan and the Kassala Floods. As the crisis gradually escalated in Darfur and the number of IDPs and refugees continued to rise throughout 2003 and early 2004, affected populations began to assemble in camps. In mid 2004, OCHA estimated that approximately 2 million people had been affected by the crisis, including IDPs, refugees in Chad and resident populations across a vast area. The challenges facing the international community were, and continue to be, overwhelming.

3. THE UNICEF RESPONSE
Prior to the crisis, UNICEF was involved in Darfur through its regular programmes. The UNICEF response to the Darfur emergency comprised four phases.

Early phase: from March/April 2003 to beginning October 2003
UNICEF was among the very few agencies present in Darfur, and responded early with small-scale interventions. Government restrictions, limited resources and insufficient implementing partners have impacted UNICEF’s capacity to respond.

Intermediate phase: from November 2003 to April 2004
Security conditions worsened and access to a widely dispersed population was severely restricted. At this point, only limited emergency funding was available for Darfur. The
UNICEF Country Office (CO) provided some relief where access and resources permitted. Awareness started to grow at NYHQ and Regional Office (RO) of the developing emergency situation.

Development of a fully-fledged response: May to September 2004
UNICEF activated the corporate trigger on 20 May 2004, declaring Darfur an organisation-wide emergency. UNICEF’s response had expanded significantly by June/July 2004.

Stabilisation phase: October 2004 to present day
Now that operations are relatively well resourced, both in human and financial terms, UNICEF has begun to consolidate its activities. The recent nomination of a UNICEF Special Representative for Darfur, with authority in both Sudan and Chad, has also had a positive impact on the Darfur operation. The challenge facing humanitarian agencies now is to maintain momentum, reinforce coordination activities, improve the quality of the response and lay down a long-term strategic plan.

4. FINDINGS
UNICEF was one of the few agencies present in Darfur during the early stages of the crisis. The early warning signals raised by UNICEF field staff triggered a small-scale response in 2003. Over 2003 and during the first part of 2004, the early UNICEF response, along with that of other UN agencies, NGOs and institutional donors, was by and large inadequate. This was due to a combination of factors, some internal (both institutional and country-specific) and some external. Following the activation of the corporate trigger, all emergency UNICEF systems prioritised support to the Darfur response.

Response per sector
In all sectors, the timeframe presented in the Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies (CCC) was irrelevant, as it sets the planning process for a rapid-onset emergency whereas the situation in Darfur is best described as a slow onset, protracted crisis. Yet in the long run, most CCC sectoral targets were met.

Child Protection. UNICEF child protection interventions focused on three components: analysis and monitoring of the situation, creation of a protective environment for children and provision of assistance for the establishment of Children’s Spaces. Collaboration between protection and education sectors was very positive. UNICEF should be commended for having been the first UN agency to address SGBV in the emergency and for assuming the lead role in this difficult and sensitive sector. Problems were encountered in the reporting and treatment of GBV cases.

Education. Education is one of the ‘success stories’ of the Darfur operations. Over 240,000 children were taken care of in schools erected with support from UNICEF. The sector benefited from strong in-house expertise and from the recently published “Guidelines for education in emergency” (May 2004). Climatic conditions caused damage to temporary...
classroom materials, prompting a widespread need for repairs.

Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES). Water and Sanitation was a critical sector in the response. UNICEF’s WES Section was not adequately prepared and had only a limited number of partners. Inappropriate technical choices in the early stages of the emergency significantly reduced the impact of UNICEF’s response. The NYHQ WES section has been weakened over the years and it is no longer able to play a significant supportive role for field operations. WES teams stepped up interventions during implementation of the 90-Day Plan. At the end of the 90-Day plan, UNICEF and partners were providing drinkable water to 832,000 people and had constructed 28,000 latrines. These achievements, in conjunction with a large-scale hygiene campaign, contributed significantly to reducing the risk of epidemics. At the time of the evaluation, the status of services, i.e. number of functioning latrines/hand pumps, etc. was not known. Quality problems and maintenance issues indicated that a sustained effort in this sector is still required.

Health and Nutrition. The vaccination campaign implemented in Darfur and Eastern Chad was relatively successful, with 2,023,000 children vaccinated. However, the window of opportunity created by this vaccination campaign was not utilised for other programmes due to security restrictions. UNICEF was one of the main suppliers of drugs and medical equipment to over 100 health facilities run by NGOs and the Ministry of Health (MoH).

UNICEF supported a wide range of programmes for the management of malnutrition through various means, including the provision of specialised products and support to micro-nutrient deficiency. The significant decrease in malnutrition rates can be attributed to a combination of factors, including the distribution of WFP food aid, high resilience levels amongst IDPs, WES interventions, improved control of most diseases and UNICEF/NGO nutrition interventions.

Management of the Emergency Programme
UNICEF staff has approached the response with dedication and commitment but their ability to respond was hampered by ineffective preparedness measures. The period from November 2003 until June 2004 was particularly difficult and frustrating. The Naivasha Peace process, constraints imposed by the Government of Sudan (GoS), insecurity and UN security regulations and lack of funds hindered UNICEF’s and other agencies’ capacity to deploy staff in the field and to access affected populations. Additionally, UNICEF operations were severely constrained by the lack of implementing partners in Darfur. Whilst UNICEF’s efforts have visibly been gathering momentum, monitoring, reporting and overall sector-based analysis could have been improved. As a result of this situation, questions were raised regarding UNICEF’s capacity to report adequately.

Despite the existing chain of responsibility, UNICEF Regional Office (RO), NYHQ Emergency Operations (EMOPS) and Programme Funding Office (PFO) were unable to play a strong advisory role and counsel the CO when necessary. Furthermore, offers of strategic advisory support were often not taken up by the CO.

Field offices struggled to obtain necessary operational equipment. Some offices have only recently become fully operationally equipped.
Resource mobilisation
Financial resources were slow in arriving, despite the early mobilisation of the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) and, subsequently, the Central Emergency Reserve Fund (CERF). Prior to the declaration of an organisation-wide emergency, identification and strategic deployment of human resources was sluggish and insufficient personnel has proved to be one of the most significant constraints in the UNICEF response in Darfur. However, throughout June-August 2004 staffing levels greatly increased and this has already had a positive impact on UNICEF’s coordination role, monitoring capacities and overall credibility amongst partners.

Coordination
UNICEF participated fully in United Nations Country Team (UNCT) meetings and assessments throughout the crisis. However, relations between UNICEF and other agencies (Office of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) and OCHA) became strained. UNICEF undertook the responsibility of coordinating several sectors - child protection, education, water and sanitation, as well as certain aspects of health and nutrition - yet did not have sufficient technical expertise to ensure effective coordination until July-September 2004. As the number of NGOs deployed in the region rose, so did UNICEF’s coordination role become increasingly crucial.

Cross-border issues
Chad and Sudan Country Offices did not develop a joint operational strategy until the nomination of the UNICEF Special Representative for Darfur. Reintegrating the Darfur programme into the country programme remains a challenge for the future.

Communication and Advocacy
At end 2003 and in February 2004, UNICEF issued strong statements with regards to the growing violence affecting children and women in Darfur. Later, the CO adopted a communications policy with a fundraising and visibility perspective, as opposed to advocacy. Opportunities to disseminate UNICEF advocacy and programme activities via Arabic-speaking media were not pursued, despite the strategic importance of circulating UNICEF messages in the region and the impact this could have had on both advocacy and fundraising.

DFID-UNICEF relations
Criticisms voiced by DFID at HQ and country level were coupled with targeted support (financial, HR, in-kind) to assist UNICEF in improving its response. The procurement process suffered significant delays as a result of inappropriate technical choices and incorrect specifications issued by the CO. Both partners should examine the added-value of DFID procuring on UNICEF’s behalf.

5. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusive judgments on the UNICEF response to the Darfur crisis, with a special focus on the 90-Day Plan, have been summarised according to the OECD/DAC evaluative criteria.
Relevance. The sectors of intervention (child protection, education, WES, health and nutrition) were extremely relevant to the Darfur crisis, while the operational strategies and timeframe were in many instances less so. In 2003 and early 2004, Sudan was confronted with a series of emergencies which placed the CO under extreme pressure. This hampered CO’s ability to appreciate the nature or magnitude of the crisis, which in turn weighed heavily on the shift from a development approach to a fully-fledged emergency response.

Effectiveness. The very early response in 2003 with initial provision of supplies from the contingency stockpile was effective, even though limited. Activities carried out over the period from November 2003 to May 2004 were far less so. Until the corporate trigger was activated, UNICEF recruitment processes could not support the emergency response. UNICEF was heavily reliant on external surge capacity, a risk for an institution with both operational and normative roles. Additionally, certain technical choices significantly limited programme effectiveness.

Efficiency. In the absence of operational partners, the use of private contractors (in June 2004) in drilling and latrine construction to meet increased targets proved cost-effective, although quality issues later became apparent. The June 2004 participatory field workshops significantly raised the implementation rate. Standby arrangements with certain institutional donors (for example, DFID) and NGOs are very efficient mechanisms, although there is a risk that UNICEF’s corporate image may suffer. Attempting to mainstream emergency relief into development programmes at the expense of the emergency response capacity should be avoided.

Impact. After months of difficulties, the activities of UNICEF and its partners finally started to have an impact in most sectors of intervention during the 2004 rainy season. Achievements include better access to water, improved nutritional status, higher enrolment rate in schools, etc. However, relatively weak monitoring systems, limited UNICEF’s capacity to measure progress and assess impact. Continuing violence against women and children seems to indicate that the initial UNICEF advocacy has, like many other similar efforts, been largely ignored.

Coordination and coherence. UNICEF’s initial performance in coordination does point to a global weakness in UNICEF emergency coordination capacity (see Appendix 7). The lack of leadership on protection issues in the UN system made the articulation of child protection activities with the rest of the protection sector more complicated. Internal coordination between the different stakeholders within the UNICEF structure has not always been optimal. Chad and Sudan coordination is still at its early stage. The recent nomination of a UNICEF Special Representative for Darfur and Eastern Chad and the establishment of a dedicated team should ease the burden on the CO.

Sustainability
Whether sustainability is prioritised in Darfur operations is likely to depend on how situation evolves. There are three likely scenarios: firstly, the situation continues to deteriorate with increasing demand for emergency relief; secondly, the status quo is maintained and interventions will, broadly speaking, focus on care and maintenance; or thirdly, the situation
stabilises creating ad-hoc requirements for rehabilitation. Expansion of the programmes to as yet inaccessible areas, support to non-IDP affected populations and quality control represent key challenges. The relatively high level of assistance provided to IDPs will make it more difficult for them to return to their villages, underlining the importance of routinely providing support to host communities. Certain issues, such as the importance of a response with a longer-term outlook, of ensuring a degree of sustainability and of taking the fate of the resident populations into account, did not receive sufficient attention during the early phases of the operation. Planning an exit strategy, programme stabilisation and a post-emergency strategy are nevertheless recommended good practice.

In conclusion
The difficulties experienced by UNICEF in its management of the Darfur crisis have raised some questions about the agency’s capacity to deliver and coordinate emergency operations. The quality of the relationship between DFID and UNICEF has suffered to a certain extent, despite clear improvement in UNICEF’s performance from June 2004 onwards. However, this evaluation exercise proves that both parties are committed to restoring confidence levels.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNICEF

Recommendations to enhance UNICEF Emergency Response Capacity

1. CCCs should be revised, especially the timeframe, which is not adapted to slow onset crises and protracted conflicts
2. UNICEF should continue to improve its early warning and preparedness system by strengthening OPSCEN and EMOPS Geneva, creating an ERT, boosting its surge capacity and developing standard operational procedures.
3. UNICEF should strengthen RO and EMOPS roles in their guidance role to CO.
4. The creation of a dedicated emergency team at CO level should be compulsory procedure in times of emergency.
5. UNICEF should continue to develop and promote strong advocacy tools regarding children in war and SGBV.
6. WES NYHQ emergency staffing capacity should be increased urgently. WES NYHQ should ensure the WES Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan of Action 2004-2005 targets are financed and met.
7. The question of whether UNICEF should become operational in circumstances where there is a lack of partners should be explored further.

Operational recommendations for the management of Emergency Programme

8. Greater attention should be paid to systems aimed at monitoring the crisis situation and how operations are running, as they provide essential information for programme management.
9. The importance of sector and inter-agency coordination should be acknowledged with an appropriate level of resource allocation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CURRENT DARFUR OPERATION

General recommendations

10. CO should further explore means of gathering information on inaccessible areas. CO should continue to ensure that all major planning
exercises include Zonal Offices as well as partners.

11. Focus on quality should be supported by an overall improvement of monitoring and reporting systems.


Cross-border issues

13. The CO should continue to regularly update contingency planning on a cross-border basis. Significant energy has still to be invested in the Chad/Sudan coordination.

14. CO should ensure that joint planning meetings between technical sectors are held regularly for information exchange and identification of cross-sector synergies.

SECTOR-BASED RECOMMENDATIONS

Child protection

15. Child Protection should be integrated into the overall protection coordination system.

16. CO and Protection Section should ensure that protection concerns are integrated into preparedness planning and assessments.

17. Emergency coordinator and Protection Section should ensure that protection is integrated into existing sector intervention plans.

18. CO and Protection Section should engage in dialogue with AU troops on child protection, SGBV and HIV/AIDS, in order to reduce the risk of improper behaviour (as per evaluations in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, etc.)

Education

19. ZO and Education Section should define a set of criteria for the location of temporary classrooms in order to relieve or avoid raising tensions between IDP and host communities.

20. CO and Education Section should be more involved in seeking a practical solution to the teachers’ salary issue.

Water and sanitation

21. Schools should be provided with adequate health and WES support.

22. The CO WES and Supply Sections should monitor the quality of hand pump supplies.

23. CO WES should examine requirements for maintenance and repair of existing water and sanitation systems, including, where relevant, the social organisation that would be responsible for undertaking these activities.

Health

24. Information on the options for the design of a regularly updated primary health kit should be disseminated to NGOs and other partners.

25. Health Section should a) develop a strategy for monitoring health economics in order to reduce the risk of system abuse, for example, IDPs having to pay for drugs and medical care, and b) strengthen its capacity to advise the government and the affected population when the situation has become sufficiently stable to return to a cost-recovery system in healthcare.

Nutrition

26. UNICEF’s position in the nutrition sector has to be strengthened at all levels, including HQ and RO.

27. HQ should press for systematic UNICEF involvement in inter-agency missions related to nutrition. A senior in-house nutritionist should be assigned to these missions in order to retain a leading role.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNICEF/DFID PARTNERSHIP

28. Diversified and coordinated mechanisms to ensure a good dialogue with DFID should be established, with the PFO retaining its prominent role.
Evaluation of UNICEF responses to recent earthquakes in Algeria, Iran, Morocco

1.1- Background

UNICEF is committed to responding to the critical needs of children and women in emergency situations. Operations are undertaken every year in the application of this corporate commitment where and when a sudden emergency situation occurs.

The Amman Regional Office of UNICEF (MENA Region), which supports emergency preparedness and response planning in most countries of the Region, has organised an independent evaluation of UNICEF responses following 3 earthquakes that occurred in Algeria (Boumerdes 21/5/03), Iran (Bam 26/12/03) and Morocco (Al Hoceima 24/2/04).

The objectives of this evaluation are to document and assess 3 experiences of UNICEF in preparedness planning, actual preparedness & early response (first 3-6 months) to earthquake emergencies, to find lessons and propose recommendations for improving the effectiveness of future UNICEF emergency responses.

The terms of reference referred to a "rapid evaluation" with 50 workings days, more than half dedicated to visits in Amman and in the 3 field countries, over a 3 month calendar schedule. This plan was not feasible. From a methodological point of view, this work is an evaluation synthesis: 3 separate evaluations had to be done and then a synthesis made. Furthermore, the work in Iran had to be delayed for several months. In addition, building credible assessments meant reconstituting the chronology of facts, systematically comparing all opinions and, in doing so, carefully reviewing thousands of pages of documents. The evaluator took the initiative to add a lot more work (around 110 days in total for the evaluation) and, regrettably, to extend the schedule (10 months). The consultant regrets slowing down the pace of the UNICEF staff learning process, but it was the price for more credible conclusions and hopefully more useful recommendations.

1.2- Facts and Findings for Each emergency situation

In the 3 cases studied, the earthquakes and their consequences were very different. Emergency responses had to be adapted to specific situations and relied partly on varying opportunities. For this reason it is necessary, before any generalization, to present briefly the conclusions of this evaluation for each case.

In Algeria, the earthquake that occurred on the 21st May 2003 in Boumerdes was very devastating in a densely populated zone near the capital city of the country, with many wounded but relatively few fatalities (200,000 people affected, 2,300 dead and 11,500
injured). Authorities reacted very quickly and efficiently in coordinating international aid. Being only a small part of a huge international support effort, the initial response of UNICEF, adequate to the demands, came very quickly, and was much appreciated by the Government. Beyond the initial response, the rehabilitation operations undertaken by UNICEF were not very ambitious and their implementation suffered from low efficiency. The flash appeal was very modest, and few resources were mobilized (USD 0.5 million). However, the Government had a strong rehabilitation and reconstruction strategy for which considerable resources were mobilized, so that vulnerable groups of children and women were not abandoned.

**In Iran,** on the 26th December 2003, an earthquake struck the old city of Bam, 1,000 km from Tehran, and took a huge toll on the population (30,000 deaths, 30,000 persons injured, 75,000 people left homeless and, in total, 200,000 people affected). The capacity of local Government was largely destroyed which posed difficult problems for the implementation of emergency operations. Iran opened its borders and humanitarian aid from more than 40 countries, rushed to Bam in a massive effort to help rescue survivors, to rehabilitate basic conditions of life and reconstruct the city and the damaged surrounding villages.

UNICEF initially quickly delivered tons of emergency supplies to Bam and, as part of a large UN/Red Cross Flash appeal launched in January 2004, requested USD 14.34 million to address children and women relief, recovery and immediate rehabilitation requirements for the next 90 days. Donors were very generous, and UNICEF received a total of 200% of the amount requested.

From the end of January 2004, with not enough synergy with the others parts of UNICEF, the Tehran CO became progressively entangled in organization, recruitment, management and logistical issues. Except in Child Protection and Psychosocial care, where experienced UNICEF professionals launched effective operations, outputs were modest, efficiency average and effectiveness low. 7 months after the earthquake, UNICEF had spent, for the benefit of the Bam's children and women, no more than 30% of the funds requested from donors. UNICEF-Iran did not completely fulfil the CCCs and the evaluator's opinion is that a larger part of the needs of the children and women in Bam should have been addressed by UNICEF (notably in education, nutrition and sanitation).

**In Morocco,** the Al Hoceima earthquake occurred on the 24th of February 2004, in a mountainous region far from the capital city. 8 localities were severely damaged but the extent of the damage was less than in the two other cases (636 deaths, 928 injured, 15,000 homeless, 30,000 affected people). The central government was not well prepared for this emergency situation and it reacted slowly, but local government capacities were not very damaged and re-mobilized rapidly.

MENARO immediately sent an emergency specialist. The Rabat UNICEF CO, after a short hesitation, took the UN System leadership for a needs assessment mission in Al Hoceima. Some days later, UNICEF launched a Flash Appeal (3/3/04) requesting USD 1,512,000, mostly for education. This appeal only succeeded in raising 52% of the requested amount (USD 795,386). All the funds received have been used for the early response.
Based on the good relationship developed with the Ministry of Education, UNICEF rapidly defined a response strategy aimed at the resumption of schooling, as a starting point for the region to return to normal life. This strategy catalysed the efforts of Government and other donors. At the same time, UNICEF also supported the health sector and Psychosocial care. In general, this early response seems relevant with only one weak point: there was insufficient follow up and advocacy related to children from remote affected villages. The response was implemented following schedules compatible with the urgency of the situation. However, the implementation system was in some way weakened by loose planning and the lack of an appropriate follow up and monitoring system on the ground in Al Hoceima. Effectiveness was very satisfactory. Important outcomes resulted from the early response showing that UNICEF had invested in useful operations and created dynamics which contributed to the quick rehabilitation of a large part of life in the affected zone (the school).

1.3- General conclusions

UNICEF appears really committed to help children and women in emergency situations. CCCs are an integral part of the corporate culture and are present in the mind of each staff member. UNICEF was present and highly visible on the ground of the three emergencies assessed, advocating in favour of vulnerable groups of children and women. The role of UNICEF was acknowledged and its voice listened to.

The capacity of UNICEF to mobilize donors is strong but the donor's subsequent response seems difficult to manage: per head of affected persons, UNICEF was given four times more in Al Hoceima than in Boumerdes and 35 times more in Bam than in Boumerdes.

The initial response of UNICEF, in the days following the earthquake, was remarkable in the 3 cases assessed. All the parts of UNICEF, having complementary roles, acted in a well coordinated way to bring to the emergency site a lot of first necessity supplies. Beyond the initial response, UNICEF performed well, effectively helping children and women, in Boumerdes and Al Hoceima, where the size of the emergencies operations undertaken were much smaller than the size of the regular programme. In Bam, where the funds requested in the Flash appeal were 6 times the size of the Country Programme, the Iran CO could not cope with the situation and effectiveness was less than satisfactory except in Child Protection and Psychosocial care.

This general view of effectiveness gives an impression of insufficient reliability. In the biggest emergency situation, UNICEF did not demonstrate enough strength and experience to successfully provide all the necessary assistance to children and women.

1.4- Recommendations

A number of improvements should be introduced to improve the effectiveness of UNICEF's early response to sudden emergencies like earthquakes.
1. **CCCs should be modified** to include preparedness activities and actual preparedness, to clarify time phasing and linked programme responses by sector and also to add Psychosocial care. CCCs should be more specific on procedures. Emergency procedures should apply during the 6-7 months of the early response. When UNICEF is engaged in an early response the budget of which exceeds half of the regular programme, a specific autonomous UNICEF team should be in charge of implementing the response under RO responsibility.

2. **Preparedness activities** should follow a result oriented action plan approach with more training, and regular benchmarking with other organisations.

3. An annual review of the COs' **actual preparedness** should be done by RO in emergency prone countries.

4. The rapid **assessment** concept should be clarified including the need to focus on more specific data all along the early response implementation process.

5. **Staffing and organisational** issues such as appeared in Bam after the initial phase should be solved radically with the setting up of a specific autonomous team under the responsibility of RO when resources allocated to the early response are over half of the budget of the regular country programme.

6. A summary of the **rosters** managed by HQ and RO should be printed out every 6 months, then reviewed and discussed between HQ, RO and COs.

7. **Action planning**, linked to the early response process, should be promoted as well as **monitoring and evaluation**

8. The **corporate control** on early responses content should be reinforced with formal collective reviews

9. **RO** should maintain its alert role, but improve the organisation of the emergency specialist section (one emergency specialist has to be on call at any time) and take a bigger role in monitoring and evaluation in emergencies operations.

10. **CO** should not bear the whole burden of big emergencies (i.e. those involving funds equivalent to more than half of the regular programme budget). In such cases, after participating actively in the initial relief phase, the CO should come back to the regular programme, collaborating and coordinating with a special autonomous team that should be on site for the management of the early response beyond the initial response, under the responsibility of RO and for a 6-7 months period.

11. **HQ** should assess for its efficiency the recruitment of emergency staff from seconding agencies, review global agreements with seconding agencies to ensure better performances and send information on assessments and agreements to the country offices. Other global agreements could be sought with Universities or training centres specialized in emergency management.

Executive Summary

Introduction
This review documents UNICEF’s emergency preparedness planning and response experience in Iraq for the period 2004-6. The review was prompted by the recognition of UNICEF Iraq that since a major external evaluation was conducted in 2004, ‘UNICEF’s Emergency Preparedness and Early Response Programming for the period September 2001 till June 2003’, subsequent emergency experience in Iraq was not systematically reviewed. Like the 2004 evaluation, this review aims to draw out lessons learned and present recommendations to help strengthen Iraq’s emergency response planning for 2007 and beyond.

Given the limitation of being unable to visit UNICEF’s operational environment in Iraq a combination of methods was employed to arrive at a comprehensive review: a short desk review of materials made available by UNICEF, a review of relevant UN documents on Iraq and the UN’s collaborative approach towards the country, interviews with key staff members of different UN organisations, Iraqi government officials, representatives of international, regional and local organisations, interviews with former and current UNICEF staff members. This was complemented by interviews with UNICEF’s actors on the ground notably the monitors and engineers contracted by UNICEF and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society being one of UNICEF’s main partners in the delivery of its emergency response.

Initial findings were discussed during a workshop organised towards the end of the assessment by bringing together UNICEF’s programme and operations staff. Based on the discussions the recommendations were consolidated.

This review limits itself to the specific emergency interventions undertaken during the mentioned period, and not the full scope of the UNICEF Iraq programme. ‘Emergency’ interventions were those specific actions – be it in health, water & sanitation, education or child protection – to respond to humanitarian situations in localized hot spots involving insurgency/counter-insurgency, acute shortage of water in selected locations, and natural disasters such as flooding.

Situation in Iraq and Humanitarian Assistance
Over the last twenty years the people of Iraq have suffered the impact and consequences of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the imposition of UN sanctions in 1990, the Gulf War of 1991, the coalition-led invasion in 2003 and its aftermath.

Even as the paradigm of the international approach to Iraq quickly shifted to reconstruction in 2004, humanitarian crises persisted in Iraq in 2004-6. During 2004 and 2005 emergencies were mostly related to counter-insurgency military operations, such as those that took place in Fallujah, Najaf, Telafar, Anbar and Baghdad. These events were localized and relatively
short-lived, yet further worsened the humanitarian situation already marked by pervasive violence and insecurity. The mid-February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askaria Shrine in Samara'a sparked a wave of sectarian violence and widespread displacement across the country, adding to the existing humanitarian crises resulting from frequent military operations.

**UNICEF Iraq’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans**

UNICEF’s Emergency Preparedness and Response planning process is captured by an Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Plan which provides for a contingency plan that sketch scenarios defining UNICEF’s assistance to women and children in emergencies. Both the 2005 and 2006 EPR Plans (there was no 2004 EPR Plan as UNICEF’s emergency work was carried out as a continuation of its 2003 emergency intervention) were based on a scenario that up to half a million persons would be displaced by emergencies. The reality has been that a far smaller number of Iraqis became internally displaced and for those who did displacement was of a relative short duration. The experience of all major displacements in 2004-2005 such as Fallujah, Al Qaem, Telafar showed that movements have been of a temporary nature. However during 2006 the number of Internally Displaced People became more substantial and their displacements of longer-lasting nature (apart from this large number of internally displaced people a very substantial number of Iraqi’s had left for other countries in the region).

The EPR Plans have concentrated on IDPs only, whether in terms of direct support to them or support for the hosting communities. Internal displacement has been regarded the main indicator of the emergency faced by the Iraqi people shading other potential emergencies such as the food insecure or the large number of Iraqi widows who have lost their husbands as a result of war.

The question must be raised to what extend the 2005 and 2006 EPR Plans were, or could be, treated as operational tools. Feedback from former and current staff members suggests that the 2005 and 2006 Plans have had limited value as a practical operational tool with the impact of the emergency mitigated by UNICEF’s Regular Programme rather than its EPR Programme.

**Key Recommendations**

- For UNICEF to review the EPR Plan template in order to tailor it into a practical operational tool which suits the Iraqi context (which necessitates flexibility in respect of the volatile and dynamic situation in the country).
- Allow more time and space for the EPR Plan to be developed and incorporate more extensively the experiences and perceptions of the various stakeholders inside Iraq such as the government counter parts (particularly at a more decentralised level), UNICEF’s monitors and engineers and the Iraq Red Crescent Society being UNICEF’s main implementing partner its emergency interventions inside Iraq since 2006.
- For UNICEF together with the United Nations Country Team to promote a wider consultation of categories of people at risk in Iraq beyond the narrow definition of IDPs which so far has been the main focus of UNICEF’s emergency preparedness and response.
• For UNICEF to develop a comprehensive and integrated emergency preparedness and response strategy which interlinks its various programme areas (health and nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, education and child protection) and which elaborates on its programmatic modality and operational mode based on local context and partner choice.

• Develop, further to the strategy documents, a concrete plan of action to follow through with the broad commitments of the 2007 EPR Plan and the strategy. By doing so the organisation can match its commitment expressed in its new Country Programme Action Plan 2007-10 for a rapid and effective emergency response against a deteriorated security situation in parts of Iraq.
1. Introduction
The earthquake that struck the city and district of Bam on December 26, 2003 claimed over 26,000 lives, left 10,000 injured, 75,000 homeless and caused estimated overall losses of US$1.5 billion. The response to the disaster was led by the Iranian government which has a well-developed disaster response system. Highly unusually, the government invited in international agencies and created ‘open skies’ for the flow of relief aircraft. This resulted in a massive influx of international agencies and relief material. However, the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) played a central role in the relief response, drawing on its own very substantial resources.

UNICEF immediately responded to the disaster in a generally timely and appropriate way, although, in fact, its contribution which was mainly channelled through the IRCS was small compared to the overall response and the IRCS’s own resources. UNICEF subsequently developed recovery programmes with government counterpart departments in the areas of education, water and sanitation, psychosocial support, health and nutrition and child friendly cities. UNICEF’s National Committees and other donors and responded strongly, eventually raising over US$27 million.

UNICEF, working with its government partners, has made an important and lasting contribution to recovery in Bam and to the lives of children and their families. This contribution is widely recognised by citizens and government officials. The evaluation also notes ways in which UNICEF could improve its performance in the future.

It is commendable that UNICEF has stayed in Bam and has had the resources to follow through on its programmes, at the same time incorporating the city and district into its longer-term country programme. The team found that recovery and reconstruction in Bam was by no means finished towards the end of 2006. Many houses remained to be constructed and social issues of drug addiction and depression remain.

It is too early to be sure about the degree of sustainability and longer-term impact of the programmes supported by UNICEF and there are likely to be mixed results. UNICEF has commendably encouraged innovation in its programme support to the government. In some areas, such as family reunification and psychosocial approaches this is very likely to have produced lasting developments in government practice and policy. The prospects for introducing innovation in post-disaster programmes are probably highly context
specific and in some areas such as the introduction of computer labs and libraries, the results may be less successful.

2. Education
All 131 schools in Bam and the surrounding region were destroyed or very severely damaged. The earthquake took the lives of an estimated one-third of the city’s teachers. UNICEF very quickly provided supplies and tents so that temporary classrooms could be established. The opening of temporary schools and the gathering the surviving children together in friendlier spaces than streets was probably a major contributor to the post-earthquake normalisation process. The back-to-school campaign supported by UNICEF achieved excellent coverage.

In its rehabilitation projects, UNICEF supported and promoted the child friendly school concept, school hygiene promotion and capacity building, professional development, and emergency preparedness for Ministry of Education teachers and staff. This work has been relevant and much appreciated by students, school teachers, principals and Ministry staff. There are questions about the sustainability of some of the projects supported by UNICEF, including the computer laboratories.

3. Psychosocial Support Project
The Bam earthquake had a devastating effect on survivors in Bam, especially on children, given the huge loss of life amongst friends, parents and teachers. It was estimated that 60% of the children suffered from strong post-traumatic reactions and corresponding behavioural problems.

The UNICEF’s support for psychosocial responses in both the emergency and rehabilitation phases was highly relevant and important and the coverage of the psychosocial projects was very high. However, the work may not have responded fully to the psychosocial problems of Bam’s youth.

The Neshat Centres, established later in the programme, were specifically expected to provide culturally-appropriate psychosocial services to children and the community. The centres need stronger ties with the community to be useful and responsive to the needs of potential clients.

The psychosocial approaches supported in Bam could be adopted as the model for disaster-related interventions at national level and have an impact on national policy and practice. At the time of the evaluation, a national emergency preparedness plan has been developed based on the achievements of psychosocial project in Bam.

4. Water and Environmental Sanitation
In the initial relief period, UNICEF provision included water storage bladders, water purification tablets and other items. UNICEF’s main rehabilitation contribution has been to provide over 560km of earthquake-resistant pipes for the renewal of the Bam water system. This was a substantial infrastructure contribution to the overall rehabilitation of
Bam and will be a significant achievement. UNICEF’s role was to supply materials and monitor progress. It is probable that the Iranian government would have funded this scheme although many of the officials interviewed felt that UNICEF’s contribution was very important in helping to avoid delays.

UNICEF could have made more of an input into social aspects of the project and network design. When the scheme goes live UNICEF should monitor accessibility by the poorest and most vulnerable households, particularly looking at issues relating to charges for connections and water metering.

UNICEF was not successful with its latrine-building programme, largely due to the model it chose for implementation and the time delays in starting the project.

5. Family Reunification
Approximately 4,000 children lost one or both parents as a result of the earthquake. Although traditional practice in Iran is to place children without parents in residential care, official policy has moved toward family based care where possible. UNICEF supported a family reunification programme with the Social Welfare Office of the government which was relevant, appropriate and effective and resulted in the majority of children without primary care givers living in extended family-based care. Only 120 children were reported to be living in residential care. This was probably one of UNICEF’s greatest achievement in its work in Bam.

In addition to the direct impact of this programme on children, the project experience has also influenced the way that the State Welfare Organisation views childcare in the aftermath of disasters as shown by its response to the Zarand earthquake in 2005.

The family reunification programme demonstrated UNICEF using its position as an inter-governmental organisation, combining practical experience and solid policy work to maximum effect.

6. Child Friendly Spaces
One of UNICEF’s first responses to the disaster was the provision of tents where children could enjoy supervised play. This happened within a week of the earthquake and was widely regarded as one of the most visible and successful of the early UNICEF interventions. Subsequently the progression of these tented care centres into kindergartens (ECCCs) was also relevant and appropriate. Coverage was also good. This intervention will certainly have had a positive impact on the lives of children affected by the earthquake and is one of UNICEF’s interventions most appreciated by the people of Bam.

The recreational and cultural centres (RCCs) were an important attempt at providing services for adolescents, a group traditionally neglected in the aftermath of disasters. However, the relevance and appropriateness of the RCCs is less clear, as is their future sustainability.
A long term aim of the UNICEF country programme is to increase pre-school education to 25% nationally. This target has already been achieved in Bam and Baravat and shows evidence of an attitudinal change almost certainly produced by the post-disaster ECCC project.

7. Health and Nutrition
The health and nutrition programme was patchy in both design and implementation. The provision of essential drugs, although not monitored, was a sensible emergency measure. The replacement of the cold chain equipment in Bam and districts was useful if not essential. Of the nutrition programmes, the flour fortification will probably have the greatest impact. Human resource constraints have been the biggest issue affecting this sector of UNICEF’s response.

Some aspects of the current nutrition programme are interesting and could provide a link to the longer-term programming. The nutrition care centres provide a base on which UNICEF could design some interesting future programmes, especially in poor areas such as Rigan.

8. Child Friendly City Programme
At an early stage after the Bam earthquake, UNICEF saw that there was an opportunity to promote the CFC concept, given the high level of urban destruction. At the time of the evaluation, ten of the twenty school playgrounds were nearly completed. These facilities are a considerable improvement on the standard designs and as such welcomed by the teachers interviewed. The playground designs were weakened by lack of consultation with staff and children about details and by lack of disabled access.

The Olia complex, comprising an early child care centre, primary school and teachers’ resource centre, is intended to be a model for future child friendly designs and will probably be completed by May 2007. Construction work on a community centre started in October 2006 and detailed planning work on the child friendly zone has yet to be completed. It was therefore too early to evaluate the outcomes of these projects.

The UNICEF Country Office strategy for Bam avoided involvement in large scale construction projects. At some point this policy changed, possibly prompted by the arrival of a large contribution from the Italian National Committee earmarked for school construction. It has not been possible to find any clear paper trail of how and when the strategy was changed.

UNICEF has limited expertise in construction and in the CFC concept and the project has been hindered by inadequate supervision of the project. The organisation therefore needs to decide whether it gears up its expertise and and resources to be able carry out projects of this kind.

9. Cross Cutting Issues
In traditional manner, UNICEF focused on women and children and to some extent on girl children in its programme responses. However, gender analysis was largely absent
from programme documentation and UNICEF’s response to the disaster lacks a well defined gender policy approach.

UNICEF worked with some of the most vulnerable children, including those who had lost parents or care givers and women-headed households (with latrines). However, the evaluation team did not find evidence of a written vulnerability analysis. This may explain why, for example, the needs of disabled children appear to have been neglected.

In a 2004 strategy document for the Bam programme, UNICEF placed a rights-based approach at the heart of the recovery programme. An extremely positive achievement is that UNICEF succeeded in reminding policy makers and government of the importance of children’s rights in the response. However, in this context, more could have been done to encourage government departments to provide more information to and facilitate participation by beneficiaries.

UNICEF has taken a planned and managed approach to integrating the Bam projects into the Iran country programme. This appears to have worked well so far when there is a direct alignment of sectors as with education. To some extent the structural arrangements for the programmes are of less importance than ensuring that all the ‘residual’ parts of the Bam programme are adequately supported and supervised and the full advocacy and scaling-up opportunities are capitalised on.

As has been noted earlier, UNICEF’s pre-existing relationships with government partners in its country programme provided a crucially important asset in carrying out the Bam programme work. The evaluation team found that generally there was positive collaboration between UNICEF and its government counterparts, although this varied consirably. The Bam programme has generally strengthened and broadened relationships with government counterparts.

UNICEF appears to have fulfilled its coordination commitments in its allocated sectors and forged a strong relationship with the Reconstruction Task Force in Bam.

10. Operations and Programme Management
The sudden expansion of UNICEF’s programme in Iran created immense demands on management, administrative structures and capacities. It took a long time to get key posts filled in the programme both on the programme and operations side. The lack of experienced technical staff is particularly important for a developed country such as Iran where UNICEF’s comparative advantage is in technical expertise as much as in funding.

The supply component of the Iran programme expanded nearly ten fold in 2004 and most operations were constrained by delivery delays with some stretching to over six months. There were also, at times, administrative delays in making payments to partners.

Both UNICEF and government counterparts faced the challenge of making their respective administrative and financial systems work together and there was frustration at times with each other’s bureaucracies. This was probably exacerbated on the UNICEF
side by the fact some of the staff were new to UNICEF and they themselves were discovering how the systems worked.

In terms of planning, there was a lack of a single overarching document or plan of action that described the rationale for UNICEF’s programming decisions, analysis, the assessment of need etc. Programme quality could have been improved by more focus on assessment, analysis and planning to determine who is in need and how UNICEF can help. Monitoring activity tended to focus on outputs and on the liquidation of cash assistance to government, rather than looking at issues of programme quality, what beneficiaries think and whether any groups have been missed.

11. General Lessons

1. In order for UNICEF to respond effectively to major, sudden onset disasters it is crucial that experienced staff are fielded quickly to back up country office staff. It is unacceptable that there are long waits for staff in key areas such as education. It is also crucial that key operational personnel in human resources, finance and supplies are in place equally quickly.

2. If UNICEF is to be involved in major construction projects, it must develop the policies and in-house expertise to handle such work.

3. In terms of quality programming, UNICEF should ensure that there is an adequate focus on the needs of poorer and vulnerable groups, including children with disabilities and that there is also a focus on community consultation and participation. The challenge in post-disaster planning of this kind is to be able to plan and implement rapidly while working very much in a developmental context.

4. In a middle income country such as Iran, inputs that have the highest impact are technical, rather than financial. UNICEF’s advocacy for children is important, as is it experience from other disasters, especially in the area of social policy and practice. However, robust and relevant responses give UNICEF credibility which provides a valuable base to have influence on children’s issues in post-disaster situations.

5. Although UNICEF has stayed the longest of any international humanitarian agency in Bam, by the end of 2006 there was still a great deal of work left to be done before the city is fully recovered. UNICEF should consider a five year time frame for major rehabilitation programmes, particularly those involving physical construction.

6. The CFC project has shown that there must be a clear and transparent decision-making process within UNICEF whenever major capital expenditure commitments are made and when decisions are being made that, apparently, change the programme policy in place.
7. UNICEF Iran’s partnership work with its government counterparts has been an important and generally positive feature of the Bam response. In post-disaster situations where large amounts of funding are being dispersed rapidly, experience in Bam has shown the importance of time being spent to ensure that both parties understand each other’s administrative and financial requirements.

8. The Bam disaster has underlined the importance of preparedness and disaster risk reduction work and UNICEF Iran should continue to build these elements into its country programmes.

12.1 General Recommendations

Country Specific Recommendations

1. UNICEF should ensure that there is adequate follow-up to the Bam programmes to maximise sustainability and advocacy potential. Recommendations in the programme areas can be found in the relevant sections of the report (Country Office. Immediate).

2. Because of Iran’s disaster prone nature and the emergency prone nature of the region, it is strongly recommended that UNICEF should retain an emergency preparedness and response capacity. Building on the Bam experience, each programme sector should regularly update a preparedness and response plan. This work should be done in conjunction with the UNICEF Regional Office. This work should be incorporated into Annual Work Plans and consideration should be given to an addendum to the CPAP (Country / Regional Office. Action plan for implementing this recommendation by mid 2007).

3. A senior UNICEF staff member should have clearly assigned management responsibility for overseeing and developing the disaster response and disaster preparedness part of UNICEF work in Iran. Consideration should also be given to an emergency post within the country programme. (If that person was also available to neighbouring countries, some cost sharing arrangements for the post could be considered) (Country/Regional Office. June 2007).

4. UNICEF continues to develop its emergency preparedness frameworks, such as the EPRP. It should ensure that preparedness plans are practical, up-to-date and ‘live’ documents, not just box-ticking exercises (Country/Regional/HQ. Ongoing).

5. For first phase relief responses, UNICEF should develop a limited list of child-friendly items that supplement the basic relief materials provided by the IRCS to be available in-country and regionally (Country Office with Regional Office / Supplies Department. Finalise by June 2007).

6. On the policy and advocacy side, UNICEF should continue to work with government counterparts and disaster management structures, the IRCS and other agencies such as
UNDP to develop policy, guidelines, good practice in favour of children in emergencies. UNICEF should determine whether it can support the Ministry of Education, the IRCS in areas such as school safety and earthquake preparedness and awareness (Country Office. Ongoing and review progress at end of 2007).

7. UNICEF Iran should draw up a management response to this evaluation stating which recommendations have been accepted, the reason for the rejection of any and a work plan for the implementation of the accepted recommendations (Country Office. Immediate).

Global Recommendations

1. UNICEF should develop and implement assessment, programme planning, implementation and monitoring methods that focus on situation and vulnerability analysis, beneficiary consultation and programme quality. Elements of this work can very usefully be shared with government counterparts (NYHQ/Regional/Country Office. Demonstrable progress by end 2007).

2. UNICEF needs clear policies about whether or not to embark on post-disaster infrastructure projects. There is a strong argument for UNICEF to be involved in school reconstruction, so that it can introduce and promote child friendly concepts. UNICEF will therefore need better global expertise in large scale infrastructure and reconstruction projects. This should go beyond the MoU with UNOPs and should include partnerships with multi-laterals such as the World Bank who have this expertise. UNICEF can develop expertise in social aspects of infrastructure projects as well as understanding better how to manage such projects. This will necessitate the development of in-house capacity (NYHQ. Clear policy and implementation plan by mid 2007).

3. UNICEF should give consideration to including vulnerability considerations within the CCCs, so that there is a clear instruction that vulnerable groups be sought out and supported (NYHQ. Mid 2007).
UNICEF’S RESPONSE TO THE LEBANON CRISIS  
July to September 2006  
LESSONS LEARNED

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1.1 Background
Lebanon’s history has been marked by periods of violent conflict. On July 12, 2006, conflict broke out in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel resulting in deaths of 1,191 Lebanese civilians, approximately one third of them children, and 44 Israeli civilians. More than a quarter of the Lebanese population was displaced. The crisis caught national and international communities by surprise. The UN Security Council was criticized for being slow in its deliberations and UN agencies faced an image crisis. UNICEF deployed emergency staff as early as July 14 to the Lebanon Country Office (LCO) and the Syria Country Office (SCO) responded to assist refugees in Syria. Fighting ended on August 14, and the Government of Lebanon (GoL) implemented an early recovery plan in September 2006.

Important aspects that distinguish the Lebanon crisis from other global crises include the following:
1. Lebanon’s Middle Income Country (MIC) status denotes the presence of strengths and resources of all kinds including a well functioning government and a large network of civil society actors.
2. Extremely high political sensitivities related to the relationships between Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians complicated the UN role.
3. On-going bombing led to declaration of Phase IV security in Lebanon restricting access to the south for UN staff for more than 40 days.
4. Because of Lebanon’s MIC status, most UN offices were minimally structured prior to the crisis and staffed with policy advisors rather than emergency personnel.

1.1.2 The Purpose of the Lessons Learned Exercise and Methodology
Analysis of the response in Lebanon was essential to strengthen intervention in other MICs as well as in similar crisis situations. The overall objectives of the exercise are to:
1. Provide critical recommendations to improve UNICEF’s response capacity in Lebanon and other countries in the region, as well as from a Regional Office and Headquarters perspective.
2. Provide feedback on global policies and guidelines to UNICEF’s work in emergencies.

An external consultant conducted more than 60 interviews and used documents from several lessons learned exercises and various standards and guidelines, particularly the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) and the Emergency Field Handbook (EHF), to write the synthesis.
Cross Sectoral Areas

Lack of recent interagency preparedness processes and plans in Lebanon and Syria resulted in weak connectedness limiting the potential impact in all aspects of the response. Stronger staff preparedness was required in both the LCO and SCO. HQ, RO and CO leadership for preparedness needs to be guaranteed to strengthen interagency and CCC guidelines, staff skills, partnerships, plans, and mitigation. Delays in joint assessment due to time needed to agree upon assessment forms and procedures caused prioritization and targeting problems. Available in-country human and material resources were largely overlooked as assets to the response. Having assessment arrangements in place with partners and earlier use of a broader range of information sources would have significantly speeded UNICEF’s data collection.

Joint planning was inefficient because of inadequate pre-planning and assessment, need for implementation partners, and weak interagency information sharing. Resources for M&E were not sufficiently allocated. UNICEF implemented assorted monitoring activities but COs needed a cohesive M&E plan developed with partners in order to gain greater insights on assistance issues, particularly those relevant to a MIC.

Tighter pre-crisis security arrangements by the GoL and UN organizations might have facilitated evacuation of UN personnel and mitigated an attack on the UN House. The Phase IV security declaration in Lebanon resulted in struggles to comply with MOSS and severely restricted UN staff movement. The security requirements were not eased after the cease fire which affected access to returning IDPs and refugees and contributed to a poor UN image. UNICEF security staff need to work much more closely with program staff and bring reservations to the attention of the Security Management Team to achieve better balance in security management and humanitarian objectives.

Inconsistent UN leadership was the cause of weak coherence among security and humanitarian policies. Lack of clarity for implementing the cluster approach resulted in confusion both in policy and implementation. Coordination gaps were noted among clusters, sub-clusters and donors. Strong cluster leadership and government participation resulted in more effective clusters. UNICEF’s leadership of the WASH cluster demonstrated the efficacy of providing separate dedicated staff for cluster leadership. CO staff require training on cluster participation and management.

A great deal of media attention focused on the Lebanon crisis and could have been used more effectively to state UNICEF’s position on children’s rights in conflict situations and explain UNICEF’s advocacy and technical services. UNICEF’s visibility was impeded by the public’s negative view of the UN, lack of access to south Lebanon, and poor preparedness for communications needs in both Lebanon and Syria. The LCO largely met media demands and the RO communications team provided crucial guidance through its news desk. Improvements are needed for hiring freelance journalists, designating spokespersons and repetition of advocacy messages.

The CO and RO ICT staff provided timely IT connectivity support in Beirut and Tyre. UNICEF’s leadership for the Datacomms sub-cluster required more preparations by HQ and COs and a dedicated coordinator. Delays in providing Datacomms services were due to lack of complete and tested standby kits for the first two phases and the needs for funding not included in the first Flash Appeal.
Since there were few pre-arranged partnerships, the COs acute need for partners who could work in areas off limits to UN staff and implement distributions was addressed by jump-starting partnerships, resulting in only partial benefits from these relationships. Lack of clarity on government and UN roles delayed partnerships. The COs partnered with the Lebanese Red Cross and Syrian Arab Red Crescent but their capacities did not always match UNICEF’s program needs. UNICEF lost opportunities to work with the IDPs, Lebanese NGOs and other civil society groups. UNICEF’s rules can be burdensome to partners and result in late delivery of goods and services.

**Procurement** was a challenge because of late assessment, time consuming bidding processes and controversies over purchasing in Syria. **Logistics** was facilitated by control of supply activities from Lebanon, RO and Iraq operation support, and the UN hub in Cyprus. System mapping and procedures for customs clearance could have been put into place ahead of time. A tailored approach is needed for contingency stock and during the emergency based on CO requests as soon as possible. Logistics staff should be deployed immediately to support small offices. The logistics cluster did not efficiently integrate government and UN systems but deploying UNICEF staff to the cluster was effective. For supplies, it is important to balance cost and origin with acceptability to the affected people.

The Flash Appeal process and UNICEF’s own appeal failed to fully assess and plan to use national capacity. **Fundraising** for Syria is a challenge which requires more UN support. The LCO received criticism for circumventing the UN appeal system. HQ support helped the LCO secure additional funds from the EPF. Acceptance of in-kind donations should be driven by CO needs and management capacities.

UNICEF staff were extremely dedicated and hard working. **Staffing to meet emergency requirements** was constricted by the UN-imposed security ceiling and complexities in hiring national staff. UNICEF needs a policy that will address hiring and deployment for COs that are minimal in structure. RO and HQ support for recruitment was crucial. More skilled staff were needed for operations, logistics, media relations, education and cluster leadership. Deployment was extremely fast in the first weeks but efficiency was reduced by rapid turnover. **Stress** could be minimized and effectiveness improved by strong leadership for team building, clarifying responsibilities, prioritizing work and development of emergency management skills.

**Sectoral Areas**

The **WESH** program effectively supplied badly needed drinking water to IDPs and later to the south. No comprehensive UNICEF or joint agency WESH assessment was undertaken and too many water tanks and bladders were distributed. National technical staff was needed right away to interpret the complexities of Lebanon’s water supply system, two were hired after a month. Agreements for UNICEF support of WESH inputs need to be formalized; MOUs should be made with municipalities on use of emergency water storage equipment. The WASH cluster was effective but did not include all relevant local actors such as Hezbollah.

In view of the large numbers of civilian casualties, multi-agency **advocacy** efforts were seriously weak. The UNHCR-led **protection** cluster had no agreed definition of protection in Lebanon and organizations did not satisfactorily assist marginal people and
vulnerable groups. The united response to the UXO threat was timely and appropriate. It is important to strengthen the UNICEF led child protection sub-cluster. A critical input of the LCO was to issue guidance notes on psychosocial support.

In Lebanon, the WHO-led health cluster coordinated early but a formal health assessment was delayed. The vaccination campaign was problematic because of lack of standardization of vaccination guidelines and weak emergency response capacity in the MoPH. The SCO appropriately complimented the MoH’s strong response. Nutrition was not a priority problem so Vitamin A supplementation, provided in Lebanon and Syria, and supplemental biscuits may not have been needed. Women in a MIC may not exclusively breastfeed and may practice safe infant feeding but large donations of milk products signaled need for guidance which was not provided until September.

Despite the use of schools for IDP shelters, education was not present in the Flash Appeals and no UNICEF advisors were deployed in the first weeks. The RO pushed to implement education CCCs in Lebanon through coaching national staff; a "shadow" cluster on education was chaired by UNICEF. The high profile Back to School project required establishing relations with the MoE and met with issues regarding quality of supplies but was largely successful. The campaign could have been run using cash transfers, a more appropriate approach for Lebanon, and involved Hezbollah and more national NGOs. The INEE guidelines could be used to complement the CCCs.

**Key Lessons and Recommendations**

1. **UN leadership requires strengthening in all aspects of crisis management but particularly for advocacy, preparedness, assessment, planning and monitoring, coordination, and security as UN decisions in these areas influence the efficacy of all UN organizations. UN capacity should be developed along with government partners’ capacity for emergency preparedness and response. UNICEF should participate in:**
   
   a. Strengthening UN advocacy.
   b. Promoting adherence to the IASC standards for contingency planning.
   c. Gaining pre-crisis agreement on joint assessment forms and procedures that use all information sources and assess national resources.
   d. Ensuring resources for M&E and making joint M&E plans.
   e. Strengthening the cluster approach
   f. Preparing for UNICEF cluster leadership and participation
   g. Striking a balance between security and humanitarian objectives.

2. **Advocacy must be emphasized as a priority service in conflict situations, particularly when civilians are suffering the effects of violence. Advocacy cannot be thought of as esoteric while goods are considered to be priority humanitarian assistance – this does not make sense to the public or to those affected and can result in anti-UN sentiment.**
   
   a. Strengthen UNICEF’s leadership for human rights monitoring and advocacy.
   b. Toughen and expedite UNICEF’s messages to the media to focus on upholding human rights and preventive activities as well as goods delivered.
3. UNICEF needs to ensure that preparedness planning is systematized among HQ, the RO and the COs and includes government and other partners since the consequences for not having synchronized plans in place and regularly updated are very serious.
   a. Guarantee leadership for preparedness at RO and COs and augment staff for this purpose if necessary.
   b. Conduct regular early warning analyses to determine levels of risk particularly where there are small offices with minimal structures.
   c. Implement scenario planning and contingency planning with RO, COs and government, local and regional partners.
   d. Ensure that an M&E plan is in place which can be modified for an emergency.
   e. Put programmatic and administrative arrangements in place or in readiness mode.
   f. Make available formal and informal opportunities for training, rehearsals and information exchange for staff and partners in MICs.
   g. Enhance response capability including mapping logistics networks and positioning tailored contingency stock.
   h. Augment Human Resources and deployment readiness.

4. Recognizing and strengthening local capacity are precepts of emergency assistance. Overlooking local capacity should not continue to be a criticism. UNICEF should build its own capacity for working in the MIC and local culture by persistently reaching out and helping to coordinate and strengthen people and organizations that can enhance protection for children.
   a. Maintain a range of partnerships and relationships among local NGOs, the private sector, CBOs, and non-state actors.
   b. Strengthen emergency preparedness and response capacity development exercises along with government partners.

5. UNICEF needs a policy for effecting surge capacity in COs with minimum structures, for MICs, and when there is an international staff ceiling, considering the size of the response and positions needing to be filled.
   a. Take decisive action to reduce international deployment needs by:
      • building response capacity of government and local partners.
      • increasing potential for surge of national staff by streamlining hiring and orientation procedures.
   b. Ensure recruited people have required skills, clear TORs, and adequate briefings.

6. Strong emergency management leadership is essential to reduce staff members’ stress and enhance their job performances, particularly where the office is not normally involved in an emergency situation. Leaders should clarify the emergency office structure and roles and responsibilities, build the team, and help staff prioritize their work and strengthen their skills.

7. The CCCs and the EFH need to provide more detailed guidance, useful in a variety of scenarios including the MICs, and be more mitigation and prevention oriented.
a. The CCCs should be expanded to demonstrate commitment to preparedness and the EFH should devote a chapter to preparedness.

b. Fine tuning is needed to guide staff on timing and formats for rapid assessment, and health, nutrition and education and protection inputs for the MICs.

c. Specify activities to be conducted for capacity development of government and other partners

d. Describe UNICEF’s role within the milieu of other organizations contributions
LESSONS LEARNED
Northern Sudan Floods Response 2007

I. Executive Summary

In 2007 flooding in Sudan began in early July, at least one month earlier than normal. An estimated 500,000 people (100,000 households) were directly affected and more than 100 deaths reported. The UN & Partners responded immediately to the needs of those affected by the floods. This meant using internal funds and borrowing materiel, particularly from the Darfur Pipeline, that have since been replenished.

The response provided clean drinking water to over 4.5 million people. Through the use of local media and an outreach campaign has influenced more than 1 million people who were educated on the importance of hygiene; Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD) was controlled and an outbreak was prevented; 65,000 flood affected families received Non-Food Items (NFIs) from the Common Pipeline; 6,225 units of veterinary drugs and 189,000 doses vaccines were distributed in the East; and over 70,000 people received food.

From the outset the UN & Partners and the IFRC/SRCS collaborated closely with government at central and state level. This partnership included routine coordination, the development of joint assessment templates and harmonized reporting structures, all leading to efficient knowledge sharing and a more effective response.

A variety of fora were created in order to facilitate coordination at all levels. The Northern Sudan Floods Task Force (FTF), chaired by the RCO, was established in Khartoum. Members included several UN agencies, local and international NGOs and donors. Government representatives participated in select meetings.

At state level coordination was led by the RCO in Kassala, Red Sea, Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, Khartoum Camps. In El Obeid, White Nile, Sennar, Gezira, Northern Kordofan, River Nile, Northern, Unity, Upper Nile, Northern and Western Darfur where the RCO has no presence, NGOs, OHCA and Government acted as lead coordinators.

The response at a technical level was divided into sectors led by key agencies:
- Food security and livelihoods (FAO)
- Health and nutrition (WHO)
- Non-food items and emergency shelter (UNJLC)
- Water and sanitation (UNICEF)
- Education (UNICEF)
- Basic Infrastructure (UNOPS)

Funding was sought through established mechanisms such as CHF, CERF and via a Flash Appeal issued in late August 2007. Although a substantial funding gap remains, the use of different funding sources has allowed UN & Partners to control outbreaks, distribute NFIs and medicines, ensure clean water and sanitation facilities, and even began school
reconstruction.  
A public information strategy ensured international attention to the floods emergency in Sudan and supported the appeals for funding.

Despite the fact that good coordination, information sharing and close collaboration with government allowed an efficient and strategic response, there is still room for improvement.

This paper aims to outline what worked and where the UN & Partners need to improve in order to better respond to floods in the future. Some of the areas for improvement/action include:

1. Preparedness, including updated contingency planning.
2. Information management, analysis, refining of assessment/reporting templates and established agreement with UN & Partners and with government and modeling for estimates.
3. Risk reduction programming, including UNDP pilot in Southern Kordofan and East, as well as UN-Habitat programming in building codes.
4. Capacity building for flood response at both state and central levels, including at the sector level and for coordination as a whole. This will also provide a vehicle for greater engagement with ministries and other government actors.

In order to maintain the mechanisms established during the flood response, the key recommendation of this paper is that attention should now focus on moving forward the areas specified above through a recommendations and actions matrix (Annex A). FTF Matrix for Risk Reduction, Preparedness and Capacity Building and through project proposals related to the recommendations. Items 3 and 4 will be a particular focus in addressing some underlying factors that ensure enhanced coping mechanisms in future floods.
Recommendations for the Broader United Nations Interagency Processes

- The designated Humanitarian Coordinator should be a representative of an agency having good operational capacity in-country. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

- *Coordination*. Both good and bad examples of inter-agency coordination were identified in this evaluation. In some countries, the performance of both Resident Coordinators and OCHA was well received. In others, lack of skill or interest was reported on the part of UNDP Resident Coordinators, while lack of funding, late arrival and unclear mandate undermined OCHA’s performance. These failings are not new. A wider inter-agency evaluation could make use of the Iraq experience to further explore continuing weaknesses in UN coordination and propose further improvements, including a clarification of how the lead agency for any country and emergency is chosen and how the agency lead role fits with the Resident Representative role and the task of OCHA. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- *Neutrality and Humanitarian Space*. Recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have undermined the concepts of the neutrality of humanitarian agencies and ‘humanitarian space’, whereby humanitarian assistance can be provided in a safe, impartial environment. UNICEF needs to continue to be an active participant in UN and IASC debates, defending humanitarian principles and finding ways for their integrity to be restored. UNICEF participation in ICRC’s recent initiative to clarify ‘what humanitarian space is and how to preserve it’ is encouraged. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- *Working under Occupation*. The UN needs to develop guidance on working under military occupation. This will need to cover, amongst other topics, how to maintain neutrality, and how to manage security considerations. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- *Human rights based approaches*. It was reported that some agencies are not finding it easy to apply human rights based approaches to emergencies. While clarifying its own guidance, UNICEF should initiate a debate with other agencies on how they apply HRBAP in emergencies. If human rights based approaches are abandoned by some agencies, or given only lip service by others, UNICEF will face an uphill battle when working closely with UN or other partners in emergency situations. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- *Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)*. There is an argument for funding within the CAP to support both interagency coordination and the establishment of robust telecommunications networks. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- With the recognition in the 2006 JPAP of the urgency of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, for the UN to draw up concrete plans of action to enhance the capacity of its emergency preparedness and response in Iraq. (*Iraq, 2007*)
• In the absence of reliable data from the field to enhance the existing vulnerability analysis (as an integral part of the 2006 JPAP), or develop new datasets to ensure that earmarked funds for emergency preparedness and response inform a needs driven intervention (rather than a source driven one). (Iraq, 2007)

• UN leadership requires strengthening in all aspects of crisis management but particularly for advocacy, preparedness, assessment, planning and monitoring, coordination, and security as UN decisions in these areas influence the efficacy of all UN organizations. UN capacity should be developed along with government partners’ capacity for emergency preparedness and response. (Lebanon, 2007)

• Advocacy must be emphasized as a priority service in conflict situations, particularly when civilians are suffering the effects of violence. Advocacy cannot be thought of as esoteric while goods are considered to be priority humanitarian assistance – this does not make sense to the public and to those affected and can result in anti-UN sentiment. (Lebanon, 2007)

• Strengthen UN advocacy. (Lebanon, 2007)
  □ (HQ) Support the HC recommendations to the ERC to review the functioning of the protection cluster and advocacy mechanisms
  □ (HQ) Integrate protection into all clusters, assigning clear tasks for monitoring human rights and sending advocacy messages.

• Support preparation of framework document on preparedness, capacity building and risk reduction. Individual projects and activities developed by relevant sector leaders (e.g. capacity, risk reduction). Funding will then be sought. (Sudan Floods, 2008)

• EP&R to support RCSO in coordinating 2008 flood response, particularly in states where RCSO is absent. (Sudan Floods, 2008)

• Establish points of contacts with Government. (Sudan Floods, 2008)

• Ensure clear understanding of terms and procedures for funding (i.e. CERF, CHF). (Sudan Floods, 2008)

• Support the development of contingency and response plans to assist in defining roles and responsibilities of different actors (HAC). (Sudan Floods, 2008)

• Training of WS sector partners on EP&R and support state EP&R plans. (Sudan Floods, 2008)

Guidance from Headquarters and Review of the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) in Emergencies

• The relevance of CCCs in slow-onset and protracted crises should be reappraised. EMOPS should review the CCCs and develop a CCCs Implementation Handbook (as per recommendation of Heffnick Study on Rapid Deployment of Suitable Human Resources for Emergencies, July 2004). (Darfur, 2005)

• UNICEF HQ should examine its role and capacity to fulfill its obligations under the CCCs in emergencies where implementing partners are limited. (Darfur, 2005)

• CCCs should be modified to include preparedness activities and actual preparedness, to clarify time phasing and linked programme responses by sector and also to add Psychosocial care. CCCs should be more specific on procedures. Emergency procedures should apply during the 6-7 months of the early response. When UNICEF is engaged in an early response the budget of which exceeds half of the regular
programme, a specific autonomous UNICEF team should be in charge of implementing the response under RO responsibility. (*Earthquakes, 2005*)

- For UNICEF HQ and MENARO to realise that Iraq presents an exceptional case for UNICEF to meet its Core Commitments for Children in emergencies which demands an unique approach requiring special efforts. (*Iraq, 2007*)

- For UNICEF not only to be much clearer regarding the distinction between its EPR Programme and its Regular Programme but to seek ways to integrate the EPR Programme more firmly but distinctively in its Regular Programming process. (*Iraq, 2007*)

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- In order to have a more comprehensive and inclusive 2007 emergency preparedness and response plan and action, UNICEF is advised to define in more accurate terms what ‘emergency’ constitutes in today’s Iraqi context, and how the EPRP process and its emergency response relate to its Regular Programme. (*Iraq, 2007*)

- UNICEF should provide guidelines to country offices on how to handle the winding up of emergency programmes and the integration of continuing or residual elements into country programmes (UNICEF HQ). (*Iran, 2007*)

- If UNICEF is to be involved in major construction projects, it must develop the policies and in-house expertise to handle such work. (*Iran, 2007*)

- The CFC project has shown that there must be a clear and transparent decision-making process within UNICEF whenever major capital expenditure commitments are made and when decisions are being made that, apparently, change the programme policy in place. (*Iran, 2007*)

- Although UNICEF has stayed the longest of any international humanitarian agency in Bam, by the end of 2006 there was still a great deal of work left to be done before the city is fully recovered. Whilst it is timely to reduce staffing levels in Bam, UNICEF should consider a minimum five year time frame for major rehabilitation programmes, particularly those involving substantial financial commitments and physical construction. (*Iran, 2007*)

- UNICEF needs clear policies about whether or not to embark on post-disaster infrastructure projects. There is a strong argument for UNICEF to be involved in school reconstruction, so that it can introduce and promote child friendly concepts. UNICEF will therefore needs better global expertise in large scale infrastructure and reconstruction projects. This should go beyond the MoU with UNOPS and should include partnerships with multi-laterals such as the World Bank who have this expertise. UNICEF can develop expertise in social aspects of infrastructure projects as well as understanding better how to manage such projects. This will necessitate the development of in-house capacity. (*Iran, 2007*)

- UNICEF should give consideration to including vulnerability considerations within the CCCs, so that there is a clear instruction that vulnerable groups be sought out and supported. (*Iran, 2007*)

- The CCCs and the EFH need to provide more detailed guidance, useful in a variety of scenarios including the MICs, and be more mitigation and prevention oriented. (*Lebanon, 2007*)
The CCCs and EFH need to provide more detailed guidance, useful in a variety of scenarios including the MICs and be mitigation and prevention oriented. (Lebanon, 2007)

- Expand the CCCs to include preparedness measures to be put in place ahead of emergencies (some “Beyond initial response” guidelines are actions that should be taken ahead of emergencies).
- The EFH should devote a chapter to preparedness
- Tie the guidelines more closely to guidance for the EPRP
- Include cluster responsibilities for all services and technical sectors
- Include suggested indicators in the CCCs
- Specify activities to be conducted for capacity development of government and other partners
- Describe UNICEF’s role within the milieu of other organizations contributions and make reference to identification and use of national/local capacities

Preparedness

Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) Processes

- Preparedness planning and preparedness activities must fully involve and prepare national staff for takeover of responsibilities where international staff evacuation becomes a likely scenario. (Iraq WS, 2003)
- In preparedness planning as well as in emergency response, one must take into consideration the constraints and limitation of small offices, where staff must be ‘jack of all trades’ and adapt planning/resources and support accordingly. (Iraq WS, 2003)
- It is crucial that partners (government, UN agencies and NGOs) be fully involved in both the production and revision of UNICEF COs contingency planning. Where capacity gaps have been identified, corrective action should be fully integrated into the CO regular programme. (Iraq WS, 2003)
- At interagency level, in doing risk analysis, we need to move as quickly as possible from risk analysis and scenario development to developing the feasible and doable response by key operational agencies, including UNICEF (doable in the time and reasonable estimate of $ available). Then more focused reassessment of risks and scenarios must continue. The process must acknowledge the limited precision of risk/threat analysis, and not spend excessive time over it. (Iraq WS, 2003)
- While UNICEF has to continue to be involved in and assist interagency preparedness planning process, UNICEF COs’ primary duty is to ensure their own preparedness. The COs have to carefully balance efforts and time spent accordingly. (Iraq WS, 2003)
- When doing contingency planning, COs need to identify future gaps in implementation/delivery capacity, and take pro-active steps to establish contact, and if required draw partnership agreements, with NGOs that would be in a position to fill the said gaps. Given sufficient likelihood of an emergency to occur and adequate lead time to do so, the search for reliable partners should not necessarily stop at the existing actors in country, but look towards INGOs with proven technical expertise and reliability. (Iraq WS, 2003)
- Under the CCCs, UNICEF is committed to ensuring that an appropriate emergency response is made to emergencies, but not necessarily to delivering the response itself, which is sometimes beyond UNICEF’s capacity in any case. It is therefore important to bring the principal UN and NGO partners in that country into the preparedness
planning process, so that their knowledge and capacities can be taken into account and they can be included in detailed planning. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- Speed up the process of making the EPRP guidelines available on the UNICEF Intranet, with on-line forms and guidance materials available for completing the planning documents. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- UNICEF is already aware of the need to improve the understanding of HRBAP in emergencies. A consultation process including policy advisers and staff with current or recent emergency field experience is already underway. UNICEF’s initiatives to issue new instructions, guidance and tools on HRBAP in emergencies are endorsed. Any new guidance must be rooted in practical programme considerations, with examples. As part of the same initiative, UNICEF should clarify rights-based versus needs-based approaches to emergencies. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- Include HRBAP and humanitarian principles more clearly into EPRP guidelines, once their application to emergencies has been more clearly articulated. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- The CO, with RO support, should undertake a participatory EPRP process. If deemed necessary, EMOPS Geneva EPRP Unit should support this activity. (*Darfur, 2005*)

- CO should continue to ensure that all major planning exercises include Zonal Offices as well as partners. (*Darfur, 2005*)

- CO should ensure that Zonal Offices are integrated into the decision-making process with the CO in Khartoum. (*Darfur, 2005*)

- COs should update their assessment of the capacity of current partners on the ground. If necessary, CO, together with RO and EMOPS, should examine alternative implementation modalities if capacity remains lacking (see also Partnerships). (*Darfur, 2005*)

- CO should be instructed to designate a separate emergency officer/task force with clear division of responsibility early in the crisis. If CO is reluctant to implement, RO/EMOPS should investigate the CO’s capacity and structural organization. (*Darfur, 2005*)

- EMOPS should undertake dissemination of the recently revised emergency funding mechanisms (CERF and EPF). (*Darfur, 2005*)

- Preparedness activities should follow a result oriented action plan approach with more training, and regular benchmarking with other organisations. (*Earthquakes, 2005*)

- With the UN’s 2006 JPAP underlining the importance of basic social service delivery via area based approaches as well as the need for emergency preparedness and response, for the new UN contingency plan to call for the UN Country Team to develop an area based context analysis for specific regions in Iraq presenting high humanitarian needs while presenting specific challenges to deliver it. (*Iraq, 2007*)

- For UNICEF to develop by itself, or pro-actively contribute to the efforts of other UN agencies (such as the UNHCR initiative in cluster F), a decentralised contingency plan based on the basis of socio, political and economic developments in particular areas of Iraq, notably the hot spots. (*Iraq, 2007*)

- For UNICEF to consider revisiting the EPRP template to tailor it into an operational tool suiting the Iraqi context (which necessitates flexibility in respect of the volatile and dynamic situation in the country). (*Iraq, 2007*)
• Allow more time and space for the EPR Plan to be developed in the office and exploit UNICEF’s annual review and planning meeting in Amman to incorporate more intensively the experiences and perceptions of the various stakeholders inside Iraq such as the government counterpart, monitors and engineers, and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. (Iraq, 2007)

• In the light of the inappropriateness of the planning figures used in the EPR Plans, the scenario should be updated in line with the UN’s new contingency plan. (Iraq, 2007)

• For UNICEF, together with the UNCT, to promote a wider consultation of categories at risk in Iraq beyond the IDPs which so far has been the main focus of UNICEF’s emergency preparedness and response. (Iraq, 2007)

• For UNICEF and other UN agencies to define and characterise a number of geographic areas in Iraq characterised by high humanitarian needs but constrained humanitarian access (must include specific key planning assumptions). (Iraq, 2007)

• With displacement related to ethno-religious tensions or military operations on the rise UNICEF should try, in co-operation with IOM and UNHCR, to map out existing needy IDP case loads and draw up scenarios indicating the potential for further or new displacements. (Iraq, 2007)

• For UNICEF to realise that even if the situation in Iraq improves it has to deal with an imminent emergency situation as facilities have been destroyed, services eroded and with many ‘hidden’ groups placed at risk. (Iraq, 2007)

• For each of the sections to have their EPR Plans firmly rooted in a clear strategy (the strategy notes are an important step to this effort) linked with the updated UN Contingency planning scenarios. (Iraq, 2007)

• Review the recent contingency planning within the UNCT for a response to the Iraq emergency with a focus on those displaced within and across Iraq’s borders (Iraq, 2007)

• UNICEF is advised to develop a more comprehensive and inclusive emergency preparedness and response programme instead of the rather ad hoc add-on nature of the current EPRP process. What are UNICEF’s different levels of response and modalities to meet the needs of Iraqi children and women caught up in emergencies? What is it that UNICEF wants to do in order of priority? (Iraq, 2007)

• With most of those interviewed as part of this review voicing a concern and frustration that more could and should have been done, there is a need for making more resources available to develop and implement a more comprehensive EPR programme. (Iraq, 2007)

• The nature and scale of the unfolding emergency in Iraq demands a qualified full time Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer’s position to give more focused attention to emergency preparedness and response. (Iraq, 2007)

• To advocate UN-wide, and with the authors of the International Compact, for the need for practical modalities within the framework of the ICI to mitigate the impact of the emergency, e.g. by the creation of an emergency or disaster department within the Iraqi government. (Iraq, 2007)

• Advocate with the director of the Iraq Support Centre in Amman as well as with the director of UNICEF’s Regional Office to be serious on preparedness planning to be able to address the consequences of a widening crisis in Iraq. (Iraq, 2007)
UNICEF continues to develop its emergency preparedness frameworks, such as the EPRP. It should ensure that preparedness plans are practical, up-to-date and ‘live’ documents, not just box-ticking exercises. (Iran, 2007)

Because of Iran’s disaster prone nature and the emergency prone nature of the region, it is strongly recommended that UNICEF should retain an emergency preparedness and response capacity. Building on the Bam experience, each programme sector should regularly update a preparedness and response plan. This work should be done in conjunction with the UNICEF Regional Office. This work should be incorporated into Annual Work Plans and consideration should be given to an addendum to the CPAP. (Iran, 2007)

A senior UNICEF staff member should have clearly assigned management responsibility for overseeing and developing the disaster response and disaster preparedness part of UNICEF work in Iran. Consideration should also be given to an emergency post within the country programme. (If that person was also available to neighbouring countries, some cost sharing arrangements for the post could be considered) (Iran / regional). (Iran, 2007)

Implement scenario planning and contingency planning with RO, COs and government, local and regional partners. (Lebanon, 2007)

- (RO, CO) Develop the EPRP based on a technical assessment including the mapping of key actors to be mobilized such as NGOs active in thematic areas and suppliers (with local production capacity), and including delivery channels, warehousing, etc.
- (RO, CO) Develop more highly detailed contingency plans based on current scenarios.
- (RO, CO) Include all CCC technical sectors in planning regardless of whether the CO is undertaking work in those sectors in normal times (e.g. WESH)
- (RO, CO) Revisit the EPRP and contingency plan on a regularly scheduled basis which increases in frequency as indicators signal a potential emergency.
- (CO) Participate together with government and partners in emergency preparedness planning creating an understanding of organizational mandates, capacities, and procedures.

Make available formal and informal opportunities for training, rehearsals and information exchange for staff and partners in MICs. (Lebanon, 2007)

- (RO, CO) Practice the plans regularly in the form of simulation exercises which give staff confidence in their roles and lessons from these simulations incorporated into the plan. All staff should be included to build organizational capacity for emergency response.

Augment mitigation and emergency preparedness and response capacity development exercises along with government partners. (Lebanon, 2007)

- (CO) Conduct a capacity development needs assessment with government partners to identify needs for dialog and capacity development and preferences for types of joint activities
- (CO) Share examples of programs in other MICs with government actors

Update contingency planning in flood affected states. (Sudan Floods, 2008)

Preparedness planning at state level, including formalizing emergency response coordination structures, with UN, partners and Government. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Establishment of regular sector meetings. (*Sudan Floods, 2008*)
• Meeting/update on national flood preparedness (may 2008) to review progress and identify gaps. (*Sudan Floods, 2008*)

**Mainstreaming of EPRP in UNICEF Programme Planning Processes**

- RO should ensure and continue to support the integration of emergency preparedness in all programme processes, including CP/CCA/UNDAF”. This should include ensuring current PPM, doing provisions on Annual Management Plan (AMP), and continuing to build preparedness and institutionalization in all offices through:
  - EPRP and training
  - RO support units
  - Integration in programming processes tools. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)
- During CCA/UNDAF process, particular attention should be paid to population vulnerability, agencies implementation/delivery capacity and management systems in the event of an emergency. This should include discussion of scenario, decision on sectoral lead agencies, and planning of staff training as required. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)
- At the Country Programme Planning stage, and in line with EPRPs, the CO should clearly identify and design response mechanisms by which the regular program will, if need be, quickly adapt, refocus and prioritize activities to respond to an emergency. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)
- In order to have a more comprehensive and inclusive 2007 emergency preparedness and response plan and action, UNICEF is advised to define in more accurate terms what ‘emergency’ constitutes in today’s Iraqi context, and how the EPRP process and its emergency response relate to its Regular Programme. (*Iraq, 2007*)
- The Bam disaster has underlined the importance of preparedness and disaster risk reduction work and UNICEF Iran should continue to build these elements into its country programmes. (*Iran, 2007*)
- Vulnerability analysis should be a key element of programming, so that the needs of vulnerable, disadvantaged or neglected groups can be identified and taken into account. (*Iran, 2007*)
- Practical training and support on vulnerability analysis in programming should be provided to staff (UNICEF Iran and RO). (*Iran, 2007*)
- UNICEF needs to ensure that preparedness planning is systematized among HQ, the RO and the COs along with government and other partners since the consequences for not having synchronized plans in place and regularly updated are very serious. (*Lebanon, 2007*)

**Early Warning Systems**

- Update the guidelines to distinguish more clearly between early warning, scenario planning, contingency planning, preparedness actions and mitigation actions. (*Iraq, 2004*)
- OPSCEN role/capacity as an early warning mechanism should be assessed by EMOPS and if necessary strengthened. (*Darfur, 2005*)
- Conduct regular early warning analyses to determine levels of risk particularly where there are small offices with minimal structures. (*Lebanon, 2007*)
  - (RO, CO) Irregardless of a MIC status, conduct an early warning analysis for all countries based on a scientific approach using accepted analytical tools.
 Periodically update the answers to questions in the EFH rough assessment guide, as part of the early warning, preparedness and contingency planning process.

Leadership

- For UNICEF to demonstrate a level of seriousness in its Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning to match its commitment expressed in the CPAP 2007-10 for a rapid and effective emergency response against a deteriorated security situation in parts of Iraq. *(Iraq, 2007)*
- Guarantee leadership for preparedness at RO and COs. *(Lebanon, 2007)*

An appropriate leader and co-leader should be selected in each CO to lead planning exercises and to coordinate with the RO and within the multi-agency planning forums.

- Augment staff if necessary to support all aspects of preparedness.

Roles, Responsibilities and Accountabilities

- Roles and responsibilities in emergency response at CO, RO and HQ level must be clarified. The Office of the Executive Director should continue to stress the responsibility of RO and NY HQ in assessing CO capacity and if necessary take robust measures to ensure response is sufficient. *(Darfur, 2005)*
- EMOPS should examine the potential of a RO trigger, as part of a staged approach to supporting country-level response. *(Darfur, 2005)*
- An annual review of the COs' actual preparedness should be done by RO in emergency prone countries. *(Earthquakes, 2005)*
- The corporate control on early responses content should be reinforced with formal collective reviews. *(Earthquakes, 2005)*
- RO should maintain its alert role, but improve the organisation of the emergency specialist section (one emergency specialist has to be on call at any time) and take a bigger role in monitoring and evaluation in emergencies operations. *(Earthquakes, 2005)*
- CO should not bear the whole burden of big emergencies (i.e. those involving funds equivalent to more than half of the regular programme budget). In such cases, after participating actively in the initial relief phase, the CO should come back to the regular programme, collaborating and coordinating with a special autonomous team that should be on site for the management of the early response beyond the initial response, under the responsibility of RO and for a 6-7 months period. *(Earthquakes, 2005)*
- With a focus on the size and scale of the unfolding emergency in Iraq seek the support of UNICEF’s regional office in Amman (emergency section) and UNICEF’s head office in New York. *(Iraq, 2007)*
- Undertake a joined UN review of the situation in the sub-region in relation to the emergency in Iraq (seek agreement to this aim within the UN Country Team) by looking at the situation in countries that have received a substantial number of Iraqis, notably Syria and Jordan. *(Iraq, 2007)*
In the light of the current situation in Iraq UNICEF’s Iraq Support Centre in Amman should appoint a full-time Emergency Co-ordinator to give more prominence and weight to the EPRP process. (Iraq, 2007)

In the face of the unfolding Iraqi crisis for UNICEF’s Iraq Support Centre in Amman to be ready for its consequences? What is happening on the ground now should feed into its programming. (Iraq, 2007)

UNICEF must develop its humanitarian perspective on Iraq and develop an integrated vision covering its main programme sectors for refugees, IDPs and the ‘hidden’ affected. (Iraq, 2007)

Regional and Global EPRP

Regional and sub-regional EPRP exercises should set out the arrangement for regional management of emergency preparedness and response, where the geographical scope of a crisis requires it. (Iraq, 2004)

Regional EPRP. It is proposed that an EPRP exercise is conducted at regional level. This will be similar to a country based planning exercise - looking at regional context, assessing risks and scenarios at regional level. The difference would then be in determining what capacity the regional office needs in order to support one or more COs in responding to certain scenarios. (Iraq, 2004)

Global EPRP. In order for UNICEF to develop its global preparedness and emergency response capabilities, and to develop a corporate strategic plan for meeting the CCCs, it is proposed that a Global EPRP exercise is undertaken. As well as country and regional level EPRP, the organization requires mechanisms for emergency response to which all parts of the organization contribute. A global EPRP exercise would not consider the consequences of any one emergency but consider the likely types of emergencies, where they might occur and how UNICEF can respond. A global EPRP exercise should also lead to the development of a set of performance targets for emergency response, for example for recruitment, supply of equipment, and response times for administrative approvals required to achieve the CCCs. (Iraq, 2004)

Cross-Border Crises

As a standard practice, preparedness coordination systems should be put in place from the preparedness phase on, particularly for multi country emergencies. These should have been agreed upon by the respective UNCTs involved, and should include:

- Establishing a core team across CO-RO-HQ/Copenhagen/EMOPS/Geneva with responsibilities for ensuring and operationalising preparedness;
- ensuring continuity in this group;
- ensuring good information sharing systems;
- holding regular meetings. (Iraq WS, 2003)

For emergencies with regional or sub-regional scope, Regional Directors should play a stronger role in ensuring the appropriate staff capacity is in place in each CO. (Iraq, 2004)

In future cross-border crises, relevant COs and ROs should ensure inter-country communication, technical coordination and information sharing from the inception of
the operation through regular contacts between both top management and technical focal points. (Darfur, 2005)

- CO should continue to regularly update contingency planning on a cross-border basis, paying particular attention to the need for a coherent cross-border approach. (Darfur, 2005)

- CO should ensure that joint planning meetings between technical sectors (Health and Water and Sanitation, Education and Child Protection, etc) are held regularly for information exchange and identification of cross-border synergies. (Darfur, 2005)

- Sudan and Chad COs should promote cross-border initiatives in all fields, especially in Health, Education, WES and Protection. (Darfur, 2005)

- Advocate for UNICEF’s regional office in Amman to call for or support an UN regional assessment to see if there is a current need for a regional emergency preparedness and response programme (addressing the needs of vulnerable Iraqis displaced across its national borders). (Iraq, 2007)

**Gender**

- CO should ensure that women, who represent roughly 65% of the total population in camps, see their needs clearly integrated in all activities. Monitoring should be gender oriented. (Darfur, 2005)

- Gender considerations should move beyond programmes for women and girl children and analyse how programmes will differentially impact according to gender and be designed accordingly, consideration being given to the needs of boys as well as girls. (Iran, 2007)

- Practical training and support on gender analysis in programming should be provided to staff (UNICEF Iran and RO). (Iran, 2007)

**Coordination**

**UNICEF Internal Coordination**

- Incorporate/integrate emergency concerns (including coordinating roles and capacities) in regular office structures. Roles for management and coordination of potential emergencies should be delineated in advance and well understood by all CO staff. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- Streamline emergency management to allow senior management (at HQ/RO/CO level) to focus on strategic goals to reduce stress-levels and enhance efficiencies. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- A crisis management team should be determined in advance at the country level. The team’s tasks should be clearly defined and decision making mechanisms clarified as early as possible. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- At both Regional and HQ levels, one focal point/coordinator should be designated from the preparedness phase onward. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- Appoint crisis manager and allow the senior management to focus on corporate goals. Background: This is particularly meant for NYHQ and RO level. The idea, supposedly, is to reduce overlapping roles, confusion, and waste of efforts, while freeing the more senior staff from too-heavy involvement. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- At the onset of an emergency, all decision making and information sharing processes and mechanisms (be they CO internal or between CO/RO/HQ) should be reviewed, streamlined, clarified and disseminated to all in order to improve time management and reduce mis-communication, stress and fatigue. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• In a major emergency response that depends on a sub-office, the managerial, logistical and decision-making centre of gravity should be shifted as far as possible to the sub-office in order to ensure timely and effective programme implementation. *(Iran, 2007)*

**Cluster Coordination**

• Clearly assign leadership role at the country level (and beyond) to one of the ‘front line’ agencies (preferably from WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF since these agencies have demonstrated best capacity) and ensure an effective accountability structure/mechanism. Such leadership should as much as possible be based on UNCT agreements. *(Iraq WS, 2003)*

• Establish/practice effective emergency coordination systems at country level as part of the UNCT regular mechanisms. This could, for example, go through ‘disaster management’, being one of the thematic groups handled by the UNCT. *(Iraq WS, 2003)*

• Agency-specific lead roles in an emergency should be defined from the preparedness stage. It is also recommended that HQ works out a draft list of objective criteria that could help and ease the objectivity of decision in identifying lead/coordinating agencies. Once agreed upon at IASC level, the list could be annexed to the RC/HC TORs. *(Iraq WS, 2003)*

• **Sector Coordination.** Where UNICEF intends to provide inter-agency sector coordination, it must ensure that its own sector programmes have adequate programme management capacity. It should not assume that the coordinator can provide UNICEF programme management capacity as well, especially where the coordination role is demanding, for example where there are multiple agencies to coordinate. *(Iraq, 2004)*

• UNICEF is advised to develop a strategy document that starts from a humanitarian cluster approach in order to pay respect to area based emergency preparedness and response interventions. *(Iraq, 2007)*

• Prepare for UNICEF cluster leadership and participation *(Lebanon, 2007)*

  □ (HQ) Recruit cluster leaders on the basis of skills required, whether internal or a consultant
  □ (HQ, RO, CO) If staff are not available in the CO, deploy a dedicated cluster leader as a matter of priority and ensure administrative support for cluster duties
  □ (HQ) Define lines of reporting for the cluster leader internally and externally
  □ (CO and Cluster Leaders) Promote inter-cluster/program collaboration through regular discussions within the CO on cluster strategies.
  □ (HQ, RO, CO) Develop or support joint pre-emergency training programs on the cluster approach and ensure that all staff are prepared for cluster participation.
  □ (HQ, RO, CO) Strengthen influence for interagency logistics arrangements through the cluster and in coordination with the government.
  □ (HQ) Clarify EMOPS-ERT roles and responsibilities in the ETC and coordinate with ITD on deployment of the Data Communication Coordinator as separate from the UNICEF MOSS and ICT support, if they are required

• Promote adherence to the IASC standards for contingency planning. *(Lebanon, 2007)*
(CO) Schedule regular meetings among the UNCT, the Movement, government and authorities, and other partners to share agency preparedness plans and collate them into a multi-agency plan. (2001 IASC Guidelines)

- Strengthen the cluster approach and promote inter-cluster collaboration. (*Lebanon, 2007*)
- (HQ, WASH, IT, Protection, Education) Define roles and responsibilities of cluster and sub-cluster leaders
- (CO, Cluster Leaders) Promote action by the cluster through efficient meeting management and follow-up
- (CO, Cluster Leaders) Circulate information including organizational databases, needs analysis, government directives and cluster strategy
- (CO, Cluster Leaders) Include all stakeholders in the cluster though adequate publicity, support to promote government staff leadership and attendance, communications in relevant languages and through contact with those who cannot attend meetings.
- (HQ, CO) Ensure that the Flash Appeal is based on adequate consultation with government and national NGOs
- (HQ, CO) Ensure inclusion of ETC Datacomms in the Flash Appeals process; integrate security needs into the Flash Appeal
- (HQ, CO) Work with OCHA and donors to ensure that supporting programs in countries such as Syria are funded and included in the flash appeals.
- (HQ) Develop guidelines for the allocation of UNICEF funds through the cluster
- (HQ, CO) Encourage donors to allocate funding as per the cluster strategy

**Partnerships**

- In situations in which humanitarian principles are put at risk, independence and flexibility can be protected by implementing directly or via NGO contractors, rather than government or occupying powers. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)
- UNICEF Education and Nutrition sector do not have key NGO partners, though there are suitable candidates for both sectors: CARE, WVI, Save the Children etc. It is recommended that the relevant sector specialists in UNICEF HQ take time to investigate possible key partners and negotiate MOUs with them. (*Iraq, 2004*)
- Mid-level EMOPS-DFID London contacts must be further nurtured during the crisis response and utilized to discuss operational concerns. Diversified and coordinated mechanisms to ensure a good dialogue with DFID should be established, with the PFO retaining its prominent role. (*Darfur, 2005*)
- (*UNICEF should*) elaborate on modes of operation as well as rules of engagement with its partners: the central government and line ministries, regional and local governments, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society, its own monitors and engineers, and other partners on the ground such as local organisations and civil society. (*Iraq, 2007*)
- UNICEF Iran’s partnership work with its government counterparts has been an important and generally positive feature of the Bam response. In post-disaster situations where large amounts of funding are being dispersed rapidly, experience in Bam has shown the importance of time being spent to ensure that both parties understand each other’s administrative and financial requirements. (*Iran, 2007*)
Recognizing and strengthening local capacity are precepts of emergency assistance. Overlooking local capacity should not continue to be a criticism. UNICEF should build its own capacity for working in the MIC and local culture by persistently reaching out and helping to coordinate and strengthen people and organizations that can enhance protection for children. (Lebanon, 2007)

- Put programmatic and administrative arrangements for partnerships in place or in readiness mode. (Lebanon, 2007)
  - (CO) Put administrative arrangements in place such as partnership agreements, MOUs, cash transfer, bidding and contracting rules. Rules for all implementation agreements should be reviewed by staff before and throughout the emergency; consider a briefing sheet – this is how we do things to avoid any issues of accountability

- Use of National/Local capacity: Maintain a range of partnerships and relationships among local NGOs, the private sector, CBOs, and non-state actors. (Lebanon, 2007)
  - (RO, CO IT) Use local facilities and expertise, and within communities and IDP and refugee populations
  - Disseminate the CCCs to partners so they understand the parameters of UNICEF’s humanitarian response commitments.

- Conduct technical workshops with key government departments to review sector performance and establish areas for further strengthening. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
- Increase links with Government that will allow for more transparent information regarding bilateral funding and planned appeals. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
- Identify gaps with government counterparts, including coordination at state and central level. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
- Support technical capacity for internal government discussion on coordination mechanisms as requested. (Sudan Floods, 2008)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning**

- Current preparedness planning format and process focuses mainly on immediate/first response. Greater attention should be paid to medium term assistance in programme planning, in the light of the change of political, military and social environment, as well as foreseen new stakeholders’ plans and strategies. This is particularly true in the type of emergencies where UNICEF and UN partners work alongside other significant actors on which we (UNICEF/UN) have little sway. Functions like RO Planning Officers should be involved to assist in that instance. (Iraq WS, 2003)
- Modify guidance and EPRP planning formats to include more elements from logframe-type planning, in particular to allow for further definition of the intended outcomes from emergency responses and means of verification, ie how these outcomes are to be assessed. (Iraq, 2004)
- Evaluation Office NYHQ should compile findings and action points on emergency related reviews undertaken over the past twelve months. EMOPS should compile a list of all emergency tools (and updated status of development). Both documents should be disseminated to HQ and RO emergency focal points and countries experiencing, and prone to, emergencies. (Darfur, 2005)
- CO should ensure that baseline assessments are carried out urgently to feed into future planning. CO planning process should then be undertaken for each sector and
operational unit. This should integrate lessons learned and findings from Zonal Offices. (Darfur, 2005)

- CO should ensure that a clear monitoring and reporting mechanism is defined at a very early stage in the project cycle in order for these activities to be integrated into the programme planning process. The quantity and nature of information gathered should be adapted to the management and coordination requirements of different sectors. (Darfur, 2005)

- Outputs should not be exclusively defined in terms of quantitative performance but should include qualitative impact indicators. Monitoring should be conducted with short-term, mid-term and long-term goals in mind. (Darfur, 2005)

- Monitoring efforts should not exclusively focus on the situation in the IDP camps but also consider the impact on host and resident communities. (Darfur, 2005)

- CO should invest further resources in exploring means of gathering information on inaccessible areas. (Darfur, 2005)

- CO should ensure that monitoring takes place in the most appropriate and cost-efficient way. Additional specialized staff should be hired and assigned to M&E unit as Darfur focal points in order to provide technical support to the different programme sections. (Darfur, 2005)

- Greater emphasis should be placed on data analysis, as opposed to data collection. A data specialist should be recruited and assigned to the PME unit to verify and analyze all quantitative data prior to final edition of UNICEF documentation. (Darfur, 2005)

- A multidisciplinary evaluation might be worth considering for mid-2005 (Darfur, 2005)

- The rapid assessment concept should be clarified including the need to focus on more specific data all along the early response implementation process. (Earthquakes, 2005)

- Action planning, linked to the early response process, should be promoted as well as monitoring and evaluation. (Earthquakes, 2005)

- For UNICEF to take serious and follow up upon major evaluations, such as the one on UNICEF’s Emergency Preparedness and Early Response in Iraq (2001-3), which would have probably resulted in a more comprehensive EPRP process for the period 2004-6. (Iraq, 2007)

- Work on a comprehensive strategy document that includes all programme areas. The strategy should elaborate UNICEF’s emergency and response programme and the modalities to deliver humanitarian assistance respecting local context and partner choice. This should necessarily incorporate relevant experience from the field. Develop, further to the strategy document, concrete plan of action to follow-through with the broad commitments of the EPRP and the strategy. (Iraq, 2007)

- For UNICEF’s programmatic sections to elaborate on the effectiveness and appropriateness of their emergency response in terms of meeting the CCCs with the aim to define a set of emergency response modalities suiting particular geographic areas in Iraq. (Iraq, 2007)

- UNICEF Iran should draw up a management response to this evaluation stating which recommendations have been accepted, the reason for the rejection of any and a work plan for the implementation of the accepted recommendations. (Iran, 2007)
• The quality of the assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation cycle should be improved with an increased focus on impact on beneficiaries. (Iran, 2007)
• Immediate post-emergency planning guidelines for the rehabilitation period need to be improved, including aspects of assessment, gender and vulnerability analysis (UNICEF). (Iran, 2007)
• Systems need to be developed and implemented so that the focus broadens from checking on deliveries and outputs to looking at programme outcomes and quality issues (UNICEF). (Iran, 2007)
• UNICEF should develop and implement assessment, programme planning, implementation and monitoring methods that focus on situation and vulnerability analysis, beneficiary consultation and programme quality. Elements of this work can very usefully be shared with government counterparts. (Iran, 2007)
• Support the surveys and research activities for collection of relevant data on the areas prone to disasters. (Iran, 2007)
• Gain pre-crisis agreement on joint assessment forms and procedures that use a wide range of information sources and assess national resources. (Lebanon, 2007)
  □ (HQ) Fine tune guidance for an interagency initial rapid assessment focusing on 1) agreement on joint assessment instruments, 2) defining the start of the emergency; and 3) methods for collecting data in situations of limited access.
  □ (CO) Develop a strategy to obtain as much information as possible from secondary sources and historical data as well as through interviews of national organizations, IDPs, refugees and hosts.
  □ (CO) Make arrangements among partners to conduct the assessment or to provide secondary information using agreed upon formats.
  □ (Cluster Leaders) Undertake the who-what-where analysis for the cluster and use it to promote an updated needs analysis
• Ensure resources for M&E and making joint M&E plans. (Lebanon, 2007)
  □ (HQ, RO, CO) Ensure inclusion of M&E in the Flash Appeals and UNICEF appeals
  □ (HQ, RO, CO) Engage in joint or separate-but-publicized Real Time Evaluations, joint monitoring and Lessons Learned exercises to support learning for all organizations
• Ensure that an M&E plan is in place which can be modified for an emergency. (Lebanon, 2007)
  □ (RO, CO) Prepare to activate a standardized trackable monitoring system with simple forms that collect both qualitative and quantitative data.
  □ (CO) Include an M&E plan in partnership agreements with implementation activities (e.g. gathering feedback from affected people and partners closest to them using standardized methods) and addressing potential issues in coverage and community distribution
  □ (HQ, RO, CO) Involve M&E staff and expertise at the onset of the emergency response
  □ Determine when the RA should be completed relative to the start of the emergency. (Modify the CCCs and EFH to provide more guidance on timing and actions.)
• Creation of state specific wikis, blogs and bulletin boards. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Establish early contact with all entities involved in mapping and modeling and prepare workplan for 2008. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Further develop standard assessment forms and ensure dissemination at central and state level. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Conduct central and state level workshops on data collection and assessment forms. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Further develop common definitions (affected population/households, partially affected, number of people per household, etc.). (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Establish and agree on common methods of data sharing and aggregation via sector leads. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Agreement on data sharing and information, particularly on urban mapping of elevation at Khartoum via OCHA/IMU and UNMIS. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Encourage GPS use for establishing assessment areas, including ensuring continued availability of GPS systems. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Organization of workshop on capacity building for development of rain/floods statistics and information collection by government. (Sudan Floods, 2008)
• Training or workshop on coordination, needs assessments and analysis. (Sudan Floods, 2008)

External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations

• In light of the Iraq/OPT experience, refine and incorporate UNICEF communication strategy as part of EPRP ($; staff). Background: UNICEF needs to redefine/reinforce its communication strategy with regard to the MENA region, as the one being used is perceived as having had limited success, and sometimes negative impact on the perception of UNICEF vis-à-vis neutrality and impartiality. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• UNICEF to initiate a multi-level communication/advocacy campaign involving local media networks, CSOs and community leaders to help public and government at large to understand UNICEF’s humanitarian role. This advocacy campaign is needed immediately. It has to be ongoing, long term oriented, and follow the MENA geo-political evolution and its impact on the perception of the UN by its population. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• Refine organisation’s policy and strategies for addressing children’s issues related to conflict situations, especially with regard to occupation and UN/non-UN sanctioned wars. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• Ensure that the principles of neutrality, impartiality and transparency are retained in all aspects of UNICEF operations, including operational ones such as logistics, security and others. See Supplies/Logistics for more detailed recommendations. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• The UNICEF communication and advocacy strategy should take into account the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the Arab world, and as such attach a paramount importance to UNICEF image as an impartial and transparent actor. The group perceived that UNICEF’s image in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a strong factor in the overall negative/neutral image UNICEF has in the Arab world. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• Ensure all countries in the region are kept abreast of situation, as well as on UNICEF response and position on sensitive issues, so that UNICEF presents a united front/picture towards the situation of children and women in the Arab world. Offices that have communications officers, especially those in emergency countries should maintain a one- to two-page overview of what UNICEF is doing and what is needed for the children and women of the country. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• Build credibility with government and partners in a variety of areas during normal CP implementation, and in particular during tense periods (social, economic, political) so that when advocacy on sensitive issues is needed, this will be more effective to discuss and negotiate. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• Communication strategies must be a pre-requisite and part of the emergency preparedness and response planning exercise. As such, a clear communication strategy should be developed by COs as related to the envisaged scenario as an integrated part of the preparedness work. This strategy should take into account issues of advocacy, humanitarian principles, and human rights issues that may arise. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• Sufficient funding should be allocated to communication sections in advance, including for human resources, once a crisis is identified as very likely to occur. This will allow the production of an adapted communication strategy, along with a build-up of UNICEF visibility and credibility in terms of advocacy for children. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• At the onset of a crisis, the CO/RO should establish asap a mechanism for rapid communication response, staffed by Communications staff with UNICEF experience. It is believed that the sub-regional news desk mechanism developed for the Iraq crisis adequately fulfilled this task and should be replicated in future crises. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• Maintain and strengthen UN media coordination mechanism from the preparedness phase onwards, including throughout the crisis. The profile and message of the UN in general has to be united, neutral, and clear from all viewpoints. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• In countries where UN/UNICEF position might be blurred by geo-political considerations, it is crucial to develop and implement a strong communication strategy that ensures UNICEF visibility on the basis of the humanitarian principles (neutrality, impartiality…) whose primary concern is the situation of children and women’s access to rights. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• Elaborate strategy to develop understanding amongst staff of politics/society etc in the region e.g. orientation for Reps and senior managers, and more importantly UNICEF spokespersons, both in region and HQ. Likewise, staff at CO level (in particular in MENA) should be well briefed and understand clearly both UNICEF position and its communication strategy. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• Establish stronger links and a more systematic approach and strategy to increase understanding, interaction and dealings with Arab society and media networks. This could be done through increased participation and involvement in open dialogue with Arab civil society, think tanks, and research institutes, as well as more systematic use and dealings with Arab media networks. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• Raise profile of positive aspects and variety of region to wide audience (e.g., placing stories in media). (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

• Strengthen the MENA COs relationship with National Committees (*Iraq WS, 2003*). This should include:
  - strengthening COs/GRO collaboration, encouraging timely visits by National Committees to emergency countries to increase visibility/understanding of the situation of children and women in that particular country, while improving fundraising possibilities in the Natcom country;
  - when possible, sending international staff to their respective countries to talk to their National Committees.

• For both advocacy and fundraising purposes, from the preparedness phase onward, develop strong communication strategy while designing timely, effective communication to different audiences (vulnerable population and beneficiaries, host countries, donors,
Natcoms). The importance is in tailoring the focus of the communication to different audiences while keeping the major messages at the forefront. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

- In future crises, it is recommended that at HQ level, action be taken to defend the “humanitarian imperative” principle against political pressures and power struggles, delivering to the public, the Security Council and other agencies strong messages on the lines of “humanitarian imperative” as early as possible. The UN establishment has too long remained silent or been hesitant in taking a position to prepare for a crisis such as Iraq, while the imperative provided all the back-up required to state a position and take action, if only to “prepare for a potential crisis”. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)

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- The Iraq experience has shown that UNICEF staff did not understand why UNICEF was constrained in the types of public messages it could put out in defense of the rights of children in Iraq. It is recommended that further guidance or briefing material is prepared to inform staff members of what messages UNICEF can communicate and in what ways. Areas covered should include: The constraints of being part of the UN; why anti-war messages are inappropriate; why UNICEF must avoid conjecture and hyperbole; and, more positively, how UNICEF seeks to advocate through its public communication. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- *Regional Communications*. UNICEF needs a new communications strategy for addressing the media in Arab countries, taking into account the significance of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. (*Iraq, 2004*)

- NY HQ Division of Communications should ensure that guidelines and lessons learned in communication during emergencies are packaged and disseminated to CO Communications Units. UNICEF NY HQ should discuss the possibility of using Advocacy in Emergency Toolkit as a pilot in Sudan with CO. (*Darfur, 2005*)

- UNICEF NY HQ should examine the possibility of allocating ad-hoc in-house funds for emergency communications to ensure early support to communications functions. CO should integrate a communication strategy when developing future EPRP and contingency plans. (*Darfur, 2005*)

- To acknowledge that the situation on the ground in Iraq constitutes an emergency for hundreds of thousands of Iraqi families. (*Iraq, 2007*)

- There must be a systemic challenge within the UN that Iraq now constitutes an emergency country. (*Iraq, 2007*)

- ‘Flash’ an appropriate advocacy and communication strategy for UNICEF New York to be fully aware of the reality that UNICEF’s Support Centre for Iraq is, or should be, dealing with. (*Iraq, 2007*)

- For UNICEF to advocate on behalf of the Iraqi women and children in emergencies by providing a perspective on their situation in Iraq today. It must communicate on the needs and the situation of children and present it as a demand for the UN to inform its emergency preparedness and response. (*Iraq, 2007*)
In a middle income country such as Iran, inputs that have the highest impact are technical, rather than financial. UNICEF’s advocacy for children is important, as is it experience from other disasters, especially in the area of social policy and practice. However, robust and relevant responses give UNICEF credibility which provides a valuable base to have influence on children’s issues in post-disaster situations. *(Iran, 2007)*

UNICEF should ensure that there is adequate follow-up to the Bam programmes to maximise sustainability and advocacy potential. Recommendations in the programme areas can be found in the relevant sections of the report. *(Iran)* *(Iran, 2007)*

On the policy and advocacy side, UNICEF should continue to work with government counterparts and disaster management structures, the IRCS and other agencies such as UNDP to develop policy, guidelines, good practice in favour of children in emergencies. UNICEF should determine whether it can support the Ministry of Education, the IRCS in areas such as school safety and earthquake preparedness and awareness. *(Iran, 2007)*

**Strengthen UNICEF’s leadership for human rights monitoring and advocacy.** *(Lebanon, 2007)*

- *(CO)* Gather data and continuously monitor the human rights situation of women and children and other vulnerable groups pre-emergency, planning to augment efforts during emergencies, and transform information into effective advocacy activities. Work closely with partners and communities.

- **Toughen and expedite UNICEF’s messages to the media to focus on upholding human rights and preventive activities as well as goods delivered.** *(Lebanon, 2007)*

- *(HQ, RO, CO)* Increase consultative networks between HQ, RO and CO
- *(HQ, RO, CO)* Establish media partnerships with other UN agencies and local media
- *(CO)* Ensure presence of strong CO spokespersons and alternates and communications’ access to the Representative
- *(HQ, RO, CO)* Strengthen procedures to hire freelancers and protect their capacity to free roam; strengthen outsourcing networks; increase local language capacity
- *(HQ, RO, CO)* Train staff to undertake emergency communication roles
- *(HQ, RO, CO)* Provide explanations of child protection processes to the media and donors
- *(HQ, RO, CO)* Review status of communication protocols; streamline procedures for transmission of footage and clearance
- *(CO)* Maintain preparedness tools (media materials, fact sheets) and communications strategies
- *(RO, CO)* Use lessons from countries that have established efficient communications response systems, which include LTAs for photographers, human interest story writers, translators in addition to the Regional LTAs for translation, graphic design and video production (e.g. Iran Bam response and oPt Gaza withdrawal)
- *(CO)* Develop the CO website featuring up-to-date information and human interest stories with follow-up

**Security**
More comprehensive consultation is needed with national staff in preparedness planning, with a focus on ensuring necessary safety and security for national staff and assets prior to as well as following evacuation of international staff. (Iraq WS, 2003) This includes:

- national staff should be involved fully in EPRP production and discussion, including security-sensitive issues;
- contrary to current practice, national staff should be part and parcel of security plans. This should not stop at the evacuation of internationals but should take into account procedures, systems and back-up for national staff to safely undertake and manage programming in the absence of internationals;
- national staff must be fully prepared/trained to manage programme operations securely and efficiently (people and assets).

Where security needs are identified during planning phases, management at all levels must ensure that necessary funding and expertise is identified and made available a.s.a.p within the context of security policy and the accountability framework. (Iraq WS, 2003)

Security and humanitarian planning groups at different levels must ensure full interaction. Note: security mandate is about ensuring the humanitarian operation, not just protecting staff and assets. (Iraq WS, 2003) The interaction could be strengthened:

- at HQ level — Security section should be involved in action on Advocacy Priority Recommendation #3, which relates to the ways UNICEF addresses issues of children and women in UN sanctioned/not sanctioned conflicts, and ways operations on the ground are perceived, with direct security implications for UNICEF staff and assets.
- Through training — Security officers should partake in both EPR and humanitarian principles training in order to better understand UNICEF programming principles and procedures, and to be able to provide useful comments as per realism of the procedures and principles in question in acute emergencies.
- at CO level — Too often, security officers are perceived as “add-on/outiders” by the receiving office; as they often report only to the head of office, they create the perception of having classified information. At CO level, it is recommended that Security Officers participate in Programme Meetings to offer input at planning level on security risks and implications of programming.

In security management, the accountability framework and agency policy must be strengthened through RO monitoring and oversight and sanctions for poor performance.

Existing guidelines on civil-military interaction need to be strengthened in meaning and implementation AND disseminated systematically. As other IASC agencies could limit the scope of strengthening of such guidelines, it is proposed that, parallel to the IASC process, UNICEF produces and disseminates strong and clear internal guidelines on this. (Iraq WS, 2003)

**National Staff Security.** National staff should be more fully involved in security discussions. (Iraq, 2004)

**Accountability for Security.** UNICEF should consider what additional support Representatives need to fulfil their role as security managers and to strengthen RO supervision and CO management accountability for security. (Iraq, 2004)

For UNICEF to consider employment of more than one Field Security Advisor to monitor and advise on developments in each of its three main areas of operation. (Iraq, 2007)

For UNICEF to consider a closer partnership with UNAMI to make use of its security infrastructure (offices, armed cars, detailed site information and the like). (Iraq, 2007)
• For UNICEF to maintain and adhere to clear safety and security guidelines for its staff, monitors and engineers in order for them to take ‘calculated’ risks. (Iraq, 2007)
• For UNICEF to keep in mind the security aspect regarding the development of its modalities to deliver emergency assistance to Iraqi women and children. (Iraq, 2007)
• Balance security and humanitarian objectives. (Lebanon, 2007)
  □ (HQ, CO) Advocate with the IASC at the highest level to ensure that security phases are realistic and continuously re-assessed including re-assessment of the staff ceilings.
  □ (CO) Promote greater communication between operations, program and security staff. Ensure that the opinions of the operations and program managers are sought for inclusion in SMT decision-making processes and include security needs within program plans.
  □ (HQ, RO, CO) Develop or use inter-agency training programs to enhance staff knowledge on how to manage emergency response in different security scenarios and provide regular refresher training.

IT/Telecommunications
• When ordering telecom material (handsets, Codan), CO/RO should make sure their staff is trained for their use as soon as possible following delivery. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• ICT Funding. UNICEF was only able to meet install adequate ICT equipment for the sub-region because of EPF and CERF funding. Other crises may not have the same scale of funding available but will still need adequate equipment to meet MOSS and operational requirements. Alternative funding mechanisms should be explored as part of EPRP exercises. (Iraq, 2004)
• (RO) Train CO staff on ICT support in emergencies with new satellite kits, remote access software and troubleshooting tips. (Lebanon, 2007)
• (HQ, RO IT) Strengthen planning for control of IT dispatches (Phase I and Phase II IT kits should be ready, complete and tested and located in regional hubs and vulnerable countries; People deployed early should carry the Phase II IT kit and be skilled in Phase II implementation; Consider using Copenhagen for procurement and storage of IT equipment; Equipment should be inspected prior to shipment so errors can be corrected immediately) (Lebanon, 2007)

Logistics and Supply
• COs should be more open and prompt more logistics facility-sharing discussions at sectoral levels. This should lower warehouse and logistic base costs. By the same token, the role and mandate of UNJLC with regards to supply movements or logistic operation should be clarified. Lack of transparency has caused the agency to assume many different roles in various countries, seemingly without consistency. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• For foreseen or big crises SD should identify early on a team to be 100% dedicated to crisis. This team shall be involved early in the planning. At RO level, a dedicated IP should be involved with a focus on logistics. If the RO lacks appropriate resources to fill such a position, it is recommended that temporary support be sent from SD. (Iraq WS, 2003)
• Design a corporate and global tracking system to set up (IT and staff training) at the beginning of the preparedness planning process. This system should be designed and
tested by SD with inputs from COs with an ultimate goal to be used by all countries. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- In preparation for possible emergency cross border operations, include in regular programme process a logistics analysis survey, export procedures and facilities custom bonded warehousing at interagency level, and warehousing/logistics capacities at provincial/sub-national level. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- When in conflict/post conflict situations, careful consideration must be given to branding of trucks or items for convoy security. Similar concerns of security and upholding of principles must guide our relationships and decisions with regard to interaction with military personnel/assets in humanitarian convoys. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- All COs staff should have received systematic training on basic ProMS utilization. Back up systems in each office should include sufficient staff fully ProMS-trained. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- The principle of neutrality, impartiality, and transparency must be retained in all operational aspects. This includes logistics: choice of entry point for humanitarian assistance (e.g., decision to use Kuwait might not be politically wise); security; cost/time; past experience; storage capacity/warehousing; local procurement. These technical decisions have, at the end of the day, important political consequences. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- Supply and Logistics staff should be fully involved in programme planning. This will improve both quality and specs check of the required supplies, and allow smoother delivery/distribution schedules at the implementation phase. Inversely, “Programme staff and management need to be better trained/aware of supply/logs procedures and constraints in an emergency”. One of the means for that, the PPP workshop, is often cut for lack of time. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- The number and availability of logistic officers need to be expanded at global level. The organisation is still too limited in its HR options in terms of qualified logistic staff. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- Pre-positioning prior to an emergency should be replicated. In doing so, the closer the supplies are from the community level, the lower the risk of damage/destruction. Similarly, the level of losses sustained with regards to the Iraq pre-positioning should be reviewed and assessed more comprehensively. However, it is believed that risks of supply losses are amply offset by the potential advantage to vulnerable populations having access to life-saving supplies even after UNICEF/UN evacuation of the country. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- For potential refugee crises, the tool of customs-bonded warehouses should be replicated. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- In order to limit the amount of looting/destruction to UNICEF equipment, it is recommended that the CO at risk loan as much of its sensitive/costly material to surrounding COs as possible. This material can then be utilized for refugee operations or returned to the CO if possible. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- In future crises, EPF funds should be released sooner, in order to allow for the procurement/transport lead time of the required assets/supplies prior to the onset of the crisis. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- It would be worthwhile to try and integrate in all PCAs a clause that obtains a commitment of the government to give UNICEF certain privileges for goods going in and out of the country during an emergency. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- Donations-in-Kind. UNICEF should explore how to increase its fund-raising for emergencies through donations—in-kind in emergency by tapping the experience those agencies already successful in this area. (Iraq, 2004)
• **Warehousing.** Custom-bonded warehouses should be used for shipments all or part of which are expected to be sent on to another country. (*Iraq, 2004*)

• **Tracking System.** The evaluation endorses UNICEF’s plan to develop a corporate commodity tracking by mid 2004. This system should include the capability to track items beyond the warehouse to final distribution. (*Iraq, 2004*)

• **Local Market Surveys.** The concept of local market surveys should be extended to other potential emergencies as part of future EPRP. (*Iraq, 2004*)

• SD should ensure that a dedicated person in Copenhagen is assigned to support the Sudan operation (with appropriate funding from the emergency operation’s budget). (*Darfur, 2005*)

• CO should share detailed supply plans for all programme sectors with SD as early as possible to allow time for sourcing and procurement of supplies, thus ensuring effective, efficient and timely response. (*Darfur, 2005*)

• If the decision is taken that UNICEF will manage warehouses in an emergency, it is important to produce an in-house Logistics and Supply guide (or to adopt one produced by a sister agency) and to provide training on warehouse management. (*Darfur, 2005*)

• CO should envisage and plan for different scenarios to overcome any break in supply chain links. Recruiting experienced logistics staff to manage emergency supplies in and out of the warehouses, distribution and monitoring with beneficiaries, should resolve many of the difficulties encountered. (*Darfur, 2005*)

• CO/SD should continue to update its information on produce availability through regular market survey in Sudan as part of contingency and preparedness planning for the Emergency Preparedness. (*Darfur, 2005*)

• DFID should ensure there is a clear added value in DFID procurement of in-kind support, especially with regard to the time factor. If UNICEF requests cash support, DFID should not insist on providing in-kind support. (*Darfur, 2005*)

• The rapid supply of materials required for post-emergency programmes is essential. Delivery schedules should not revert to development programme timescales. (*Iran, 2007*)

• UNICEF has to overcome the supplies gap that develops after the initial relief phase of an emergency programme by improving systems throughout the organisation and ensuring adequate staffing in this area (UNICEF). (*Iran, 2007*)

• Enhance response capability including mapping logistics networks and positioning tailored contingency stock. (*Lebanon, 2007*)

  □ (RO, CO) Work toward a faster pull effect by 1) pre-planning with partners and communities and identifying appropriate supplies for families who are likely to be mobile and not in intrinsic need; 2) maintaining culturally and quality-wise acceptable contingency stocks and/or agreements with local suppliers; 3) Implementing expeditious joint assessments and supply requests to avoid duplication among organizations and late delivery which reduces relevance

  □ (RO, CO) Include in preparedness planning: 1) Establish transport, clearing and forwarding contracts and alternates; 2) steps for synchronizing logistics with procurement; 3) Interagency logistics systems mapping and agreement on procedures.

  □ (HQ, RO) Plan for storage of donations in kind if they cannot be used by the CO
Define the deployment roster to: 1) Deploy a Logistics Officer immediately for COs with minimal structure; 2) Deploy a logistics assistant trained in UniTrack inventory and supplies tracking tool (from Day 1 and staying 4-6 weeks). Ensure security slots for these positions.

**Fundraising**
- Donor visits should be organised as early on as possible, and should be backed up quickly by “donor-specific” info briefing kits. *(Iraq WS, 2003)*
- A strategy should be designed for CO Communications Unit with specific targets for advocacy and fund-raising. This should be harmonized with the strategies of RO and HQ to ensure coherence in the messages. This strategy should also include processes and mechanisms for monitoring its effectiveness. *(Darfur, 2005)*
- The number of external missions that are sent to Zonal Offices through CO should be kept to the minimum required. Additional staff should be deployed and assigned to this specific purpose. *(Darfur, 2005)*
- For UNICEF to develop a proper fundraising strategy and campaign (based on a comprehensive EPRP strategy document) to inform its potential donors about the need for emergency preparedness and enhanced response capacity inside Iraq. UNICEF should exploit the window of opportunity that exists now that the international community acknowledges that Iraq constitutes not only a political emergency but, increasingly, also an humanitarian one. *(Iraq, 2007)*
- Some argue that with increasing international recognition of a deterioration of the situation in Iraq the ITF should be pushed to the realities of that country. The ITF’s fast track modality may be utilised to request funding for UNICEF’s regular programme with a focus on emergency response. *(Iraq, 2007)*
- For UNICEF to keep a close eye on its donor accountability. What is its base of verification to ‘guarantee’ that money donated for EPR is spent on emergency response and not on funding terrorist activities inside Iraq? *(Iraq, 2007)*
- Build up an understanding of more localised contexts and the need for emergency preparedness and response capacity so as to win over potential donors to pledge fund for UNICEF to respond timely and adequately to people in concrete settings (e.g. in Baghdad). *(Iraq, 2007)*

**Human Resources**
- Strengthen global, RO, CO system and stand-by arrangements for key technical areas (CP, MRE, Comms, WES and operations). This involves identifying and training potential stand-by agency staff, as well as existing UNICEF staff, on UNICEF procedures and programming in an emergency, using both training and missions to emergency-prone COs. *(Iraq WS, 2003)*
- Prepare/empower national staff to fully handle all office activities during emergency situation which covers: capacity building and training, and simulation of work activities in emergencies. This preparation is to be integrated in CO regular programme plans. *(Iraq WS, 2003)*
- Establish surge capacity system at RO. *(Iraq WS, 2003)*
- It is recommended that all HQ technical sections maintain a network of emergency-knowledgeable technical staff who have indicated interest in working in an emergency at short notice. *(Iraq WS, 2003)*
All HQs Divisions to establish one emergency focal point, as DHR did for the Iraq emergency. (Iraq WS, 2003)

Staff on mission or evacuated should be given opportunities to familiarize themselves before the onset of the crisis with receiving office staff, structure and systems. This should improve both collaboration and coordination between the visiting and resident staff while helping to integrate the incoming staff in their new working environment. (Iraq WS, 2003)

Upon incidence of a crisis involving evacuation of s/ms to alternative locations, DHR (CO and HQ) to immediately review situation of emergency entitlements of all staff, international and national with a view to ensuring these do not act as disincentives and/or negative factors on staff moral and work. In the Iraq case, APA worked as a disincentive for Iraq staff in Amman, as staff working long and stressful hours received neither SOLA nor DSA, while colleagues who were sent home received full DSA/evacuation allowance. (Iraq WS, 2003)

In potential multi-country crisis, the (sub)regional contingency plan should include measures and arrangements considering countries in regions where there is no UNICEF CO. This lesson was particularly learned from the need for and set-up of an operational office in Kuwait in a very short time. (Iraq WS, 2003)

Mechanisms need to be established to support practical and psychological needs of all staff, including evacuated and rotated staff. (Iraq WS, 2003)

Human resources work is required with neighbouring countries to ensure basic benefits for spouses/families of staff taking R&R in these countries. Some families had no visas and couldn’t accompany staff to Amman. (Iraq WS, 2003)

Provide national staff with basic survival/support equipment and supplies prior to the emergency (e.g., water purification, medical kits etc). (Iraq WS, 2003)

During EPRP scenario planning, or effective preparedness phase to a certain emergency, COs/sections should identify detailed anticipated staffing needs to address the situation, and start identifying potential qualified incumbents for the said gaps. (Iraq WS, 2003)

If physically possible (time allowing), s/ms about to enter an acute emergency phase or already involved in an emergency should be provided with a minimum amount of time to go through an EPR training, or at least receive sufficient orientation briefing upon arrival at duty station. (Iraq WS, 2003)

For large emergencies, during preparedness, ensure timely deployment of a qualified person to deal with timely submission of quality donor proposals and reports, and related functions at country level. (Iraq WS, 2003)

Surge Capacity. UNICEF requires better managed registers of internal and external expertise for emergency response. (Iraq, 2004) The following are proposed:

- From a Global EPRP exercise, UNICEF to determine the numbers, types and locations of personnel to support countries and regions, taking into account any regional preparedness capacity already developed.
- Proactive management at HQ and regional levels to ensure that the registers are populated and kept up to date
- DHR and EMOPS to agree how targets for surge capacity are to be met. (Given that this represents a departure from the way surge capacity has been provided up to now, senior management backing will be required for such an initiative to be successful).

Secondments. As part of its upgrading of its emergency response capacity, UNICEF has the potential to increase the number of individual secondments and agreements with seconding agencies. UNICEF already has standby agreements with NRC, DRC,
It is reported that these arrangements are in the process of being enhanced. UNICEF should dedicate resources to exploiting the potential of such agreements and set clear targets for numbers and types of external stand-by personnel. *(Iraq, 2004)*

- **Psychological support.** It is recommended that psychological support to staff involved with Iraq is reviewed by contacting individual members of staff for non-attributable feedback on the quality of the services received, on whether counselling was available and, if so, why offers of counselling offered were or were not taken up. *(Iraq, 2004)*

- DHR and EMOPS should review progress in relation to the recommendations provided in the Heffnick Study. Clear policy for HR in emergencies should be documented and disseminated to RO and COs. *(Darfur, 2005)*

- EMOPS should establish standard mechanisms for surge support whereby the first support sent is a team to back up senior management functions. *(Darfur, 2005)*

- Strong investment in roster development and maintenance, together with diversification of stand-by arrangements should be implemented. *(Darfur, 2005)*

- CO should ensure that operation support staff are deploying prior to, or simultaneously with, programming staff in order to ensure minimum working conditions (computers, printers, etc.) and living conditions, in compliance with MOSs requirements (proper communication means, evacuation plans in place). HQ DHR and CO should ensure that the mechanisms and means for proper staff care are in place. *(Darfur, 2005)*

- UNICEF HQ, ROs and COs should analyze their own capacity and subsequently ensure that it can call on the appropriate technical capacity if required. The emergency HR structures at all levels (NY HQ, RO and CO) should be reinforced at an early stage in case of large-scale emergencies. If necessary, this should be undertaken prior to declaring an organization-wide emergency. *(Darfur, 2005)*

- CO should ensure that all opportunities are explored to reinforce the position of UNICEF in coordination. A clear strategy should be developed that is supported with manpower and information management software and hardware and that is coherent with other types of coordination systems (including OCHA and HIC). DHR should develop a roster of people with both technical knowledge, and facilitation and negotiation skills. *(Darfur, 2005)*

- CO should recruit a separate HR officer to support the ongoing operation. Development of a twelve month staffing strategy, which is currently being undertaken, is essential and should be regularly updated. Deployment of replacement staff should be organized in order to ensure a proper hand-over process. *(Darfur, 2005)*

- All newly recruited staff should receive a three-day training on UNICEF’s Programme Policies and Procedures, with special emphasis on Emergency, Rights Based programming, administrative management and in-country orientation. *(Darfur, 2005)*

- CO should produce a list of the essential documents that should be made available as standard briefing kit to any new staff, visitors or consultants. Consultants’ time should be maximized for the key tasks of the exercise for which they are contracted,
and not the compilation of basic background information. In order to achieve this, there is an urgent need to upgrade the filing system. (Darfur, 2005)

- The DFID-UNICEF surge capacity arrangement should be continued. If a revision of the MOU is required, this should be undertaken immediately to avoid any delays in rapid deployment. (Darfur, 2005)

- Staffing and organisational issues such as appeared in Bam after the initial phase should be solved radically with the setting up of a specific autonomous team under the responsibility of RO when resources allocated to the early response are over half of the budget of the regular country programme. (Earthquakes, 2005)

- A summary of the rosters managed by HQ and RO should be printed out every 6 months, then reviewed and discussed between HQ, RO and COs. (Earthquakes, 2005)

- HQ should assess for its efficiency the recruitment of emergency staff from seconding agencies, review global agreements with seconding agencies to ensure better performances and send information on assessments and agreements to the country offices. Other global agreements could be sought with Universities or training centres specialized in emergency management. (Earthquakes, 2005)

- Explore ways to increase its emergency human resource capacity including the exploitation of existing expertise available in the Iraq Support Centre and the regional UNICEF office, both of which are situated in Amman, in emergency preparedness and response. (Iraq, 2007)

- The timely appointment of well-qualified and experienced technical staff is particularly important for a developed country such as Iran where UNICEF’s comparative advantage is in technical expertise as much as in funding. (Iran, 2007)

- It is crucial that UNICEF’s emergency responses are underpinned by the rapid deployment of senior, experienced staff both in key programme areas and equally importantly in the areas of human resources, operations and supplies (UNICEF). (Iran, 2007)

- In order that UNICEF can respond effectively to major, sudden onset disasters it is crucial that experienced staff are fielded quickly to back up country office staff. It is unacceptable that there are long waits for staff in key areas such as education. It is also crucial that key operational personnel in human resources, finance and supplies are in place equally quickly. (Iran, 2007)

- If there is an influx of new staff for an emergency, priority must be given to ensuring that they are well-briefed and trained in UNICEF systems. Time must be spent with counterparts early on explaining about UNICEF and its priorities and its financial and administrative systems. (Iran, 2007)

- UNICEF needs a policy for effecting surge capacity in COs with minimum structures, for MICs, and when there is an international staff ceiling, considering the size of the response, positions needing to be filled and local capacity. (Lebanon, 2007)

- Strong emergency management leadership is essential to reduce staff members’ stress and enhance their job performances, particularly where the office is not normally involved in an emergency situation. Leaders should clarify the emergency office structure and roles and responsibilities, build the team, and help staff prioritize their work and strengthen their skills. (Lebanon, 2007)

- Augment HR and deployment readiness (Lebanon, 2007)
□ (HQ, RO, CO) A preparedness analysis of HR needs is essential in the CO EPRP and Regional contingency plans. The surge has to cover tasks that if uncovered or left to overburdened staff are likely to cause bottlenecks in the response; these include assistance for logistics, procurement, and operations.

□ (HQ) To assist the CO with the HR needs analysis at the point of the emergency, a surge capacity matrix should be made available to the CO and the process for selection of needed personnel by the CO facilitated by the RO and HQ.

□ (HQ, RO, CO) Key staff posts as per the CCCs should be assured such as for external relations/media, WESH, and education.

□ (HQ, RO, CO) Feedback on HR performance (through perhaps a rapid HR assessment) should be regularized to identify areas requiring support where staff are not able to cope with demands.

□ (CO) Additional short-term support should be brought in quickly as needed, even when the CO is unsure of the medium-term office structure.

- Create a new model or policy for emergency deployment to COs with minimum structures, in MICs and where security ceilings are imposed. (*Lebanon, 2007*)
- (HQ, RO, CO) Take decisive action to reduce international deployment needs by building response capacity of government and local partners.
- (HQ, CO) Increase the potential for surge of national staff (and UNVs) by streamlining hiring and orientation procedures. Ensure local knowledge for all technical sectors.

- Ensure recruited people have required skills, clear TORs, and adequate briefings. (*Lebanon, 2007*)
- (CO) Clarify the emergency office structure, line of command, roles, responsibilities and lines of communication.
- (CO) All staff whether deployed or CO staff need a detailed TOR tied to the response plan; Generic ToRs for emergency staff on mission should be made available in intranet.

□ (HQ, RO, CO) Ensure that recruited people for deployment have the following qualifications.
  ➢ Be familiar with the affected countries, the region and the EPRPs and contingency plans, or a rapid orientation program developed for them.
  ➢ Be familiar with UNICEF’s financial and administrative procedures and be willing to be held accountable for correctly documenting projects and programs they establish and manage during their deployment.
  ➢ Have proven emergency experience which has been evaluated and their strengths identified which will contribute to the CO team.
  ➢ Be capable and willing to contribute to capacity development for CO staff and a plan made for doing so.
  ➢ Have appropriate language skills preferably the affected country languages and certainly the operational language which was English in Lebanon, to communicate with other members of the team.

□ (RO, CO) Contributions of the deployed people should be regularly evaluated by the emergency focal point, the DHR and the regional HR advisor.
(HQ, RO, CO) Remove barriers to slow release from post by prioritizing response needs regionally and globally and striking arrangements with COs to facilitate the deployments.

(HQ, RO, CO) The length of deployment must be appropriate to allow orientation to places and people, time to see actions through or make needed contributions and/or build capacity in the CO.

(CO) Ensure adequate briefings by the CO and partners

(HQ, RO, CO) Ensure that the composite team offers the needed expertise in the CCC technical sectors as well as local knowledge and enough “hands on” people, who have been recently involved in emergency program development from scratch.

- Enact good management practices immediately to increase efficiency and reduce staff stress. (*Lebanon, 2007*)
- (CO) Assess staff capacity to take on additional or unfamiliar tasks and build capacity if needed, preferably prior to an emergency.
- (HQ, RO, CO) Create a human resources monitoring function to provide advice to leadership as to how to best manage resources in order to effectively achieve goals and objectives. This monitoring has to be based on a HR plan integrated with an operations plan which covers all needed tasks and helps to orchestrate staff and tasks in order to support expansion and contraction of various functions in the office.
- (CO) Guided by leaders, all staff should work on integration of CO staff and visitors.
- (CO) Guided by leaders, staff should prioritize daily work and monitor progress toward planned goals.
- (CO) Time off for staff during the emergency should be mandatory
- (CO) Allow staff to return to reasonable working hours as soon as possible

**Administration and Finance**

- TD to adapt a financial tracking system in ProMS to deal with multi-country emergency response. (*Iraq WS, 2003*)
- UNICEF’s management of finances in the Iraq crisis indicates that the system needs to be both simpler and more flexible for use in emergency situations, where which change rapidly, and quick decisions are needed. In order for ProMS procedures to become more streamlined one or more staff members from EMOPS with practical emergency management experience should join the ProMS Reference Group. This staff must be able to give attention to detail, be ready to take part in iterative discussions over a period of months, and be available to test prototypes. In addition, EMOPS should attend the OGM. Currently there is an open invitation for programme staff to join these consultations and the opportunity should be grasped. EMOPS should consult COs working in emergencies about how ProMS needs to be modified. (*Iraq, 2004*)
- Put programmatic and administrative arrangements for partnerships in place or in readiness mode. (*Lebanon, 2007*)
- (CO) Put administrative arrangements in place such as partnership agreements, MOUs, cash transfer, bidding and contracting rules. Rules for all implementation
agreements should be reviewed by staff before and throughout the emergency; consider a briefing sheet – this is how we do things to avoid any issues of accountability

☐ (CO) A CO which has external UNICEF staff support should consider modifying the table of authority to allow the external staff to carry out basic ProMS functions.

UNICEF Programmes

Health

- Coordination with WHO on establishing coherency between MCH, primary health care, prevention, etc. should be further nurtured and developed. (Darfur, 2005)
- Information on the options for the design of a regularly updated primary health kit should be disseminated to NGOs and other partners. (Darfur, 2005)
- Health sector should a) develop a strategy for monitoring health economics in order to reduce the risk of system abuse, for example, IDPs having to pay for drugs and medical care, and b) strengthen its capacity to advise the government and the affected population when the situation has become sufficiently stable to return to a cost-recovery system in healthcare. (Darfur, 2005)
- UNICEF should continue to use EPI, polio and measles vaccination campaigns as well as nutrition surveillance, as a means of gaining access to, and eventually developing its activities in SLA/SLM and JEM areas. This strategy should be coherent with activities implemented in Government-controlled areas. (Darfur, 2005)
- In view of the difficult security situation, agencies should take advantage of opportunities to access areas and populations (multi-sector activities). (Darfur, 2005)
- Specialist staff should be employed early in projects with significant budgets.
- Basic delivery of health care items is appreciated by government and populations and is useful. In countries such as Iran that have a well developed health system however, an organisation like UNICEF has a greater role in sharing knowledge than in service delivery. (Iran, 2007)
- Previous reliable working relationship in routine situations, as between UNICEF and MoH, will maximise achievements during the crisis response. (Iran, 2007)

Nutrition

- UNICEF’s position in the nutrition sector has to be strengthened at all levels, including HQ and RO. (This appears to be currently underway at NY level). (Darfur, 2005)
- HQ should press for systematic UNICEF involvement in inter-agency missions related to nutrition. A senior in-house nutritionist should be assigned to these missions in order to retain a leading role. (Darfur, 2005)
- UNICEF should continue to promote good practice information, especially in relation to the new area of community-based therapeutic feeding. (Darfur, 2005)
- UNICEF’s culture of risk taking and pilot project innovation is well suited to a country like Iran where government can replicate projects where it sees value (for instance with the flour fortification project). It is all the more important in such project therefore, to ensure technical design and management is good so that projects are replicated with the requisite supervisory regime. (Iran, 2007)
• UNICEF, or the Ministry of Health, or both should undertake a second nutritional survey to determine the impact of programmes to date before the end of the first quarter 2007. (Iran, 2007)
• UNICEF should undertake a household economy type survey in Rigan to understand the underlying causes of malnutrition and what some of the potential solutions might be. This type of work can be used to help formulate policy on how best to support settling nomadic communities. Ideally this too would be undertaken in 2007. (Iran, 2007)
• Determine threshold of need for the BP5s; Review guidelines on breastfeeding and breast-milk substitutes. (Lebanon, 2007)
• Determine whether the Vitamin A supplement should be given in countries with good nutrition indicators. (Lebanon, 2007)

Water and Sanitation
• WES NYHQ emergency staffing capacity should urgently be strengthened. (Darfur, 2005)
• The CO should ensure that the recommendation of NYHQ WES Senior Officer to set up a WES database (including types of equipment, spare parts, maintenance requirements, etc.) be implemented. (Darfur, 2005)
• The CO should identify alternatives to the heavy drilling rigs of the NWC/WES and diversify its range of technical options. (Darfur, 2005)
• The CO WES and Supply Sector should monitor the quality of hand-pump supplies. (Darfur, 2005)
• CO WES should examine requirements for maintenance and repair of existing water and sanitation systems, including (where relevant) the social organization required to undertake these activities. (Darfur, 2005)
• Enhanced sanitation monitoring should be carried out to verify whether the response continues to meet needs. CO must urgently engage with partners in planning for alternative options to the existing latrine system in IDP camps in the process of urbanization. (Darfur, 2005)
• Big urban water system building is possible in countries where government has this knowledge. UNICEF’s added value could be sharing knowledge and the introduction of some of the social aspects of water consumption and management. (Iran, 2007)
• If UNICEF chooses to target vulnerable families with assistance such as latrine and shower blocks, then the best model of implementation is to help with construction as well as finance. NGOs are often more flexible partners in this kind of work. (Iran, 2007)
• Attitude change is easiest to achieve when there is a clear and compelling reason. Trying to change sanitary practices in Bam post-earthquake did not work because there was not obvious benefit for people. (Iran, 2007)
• Ensure that households and villages at the periphery of the network receive supply as a priority. UNICEF staff should carry out a short inventory before the close of the project of villages that have significant numbers of households without supply and the reasons for this. The solutions should then be costed with the UWWC or RWWC and an agreed schedule of works put in place. UNICEF should consider part funding these works to expedite their progress. (Iran, 2007)
- Develop a strategy for the switch over to the new network, including a clear communication plan. *(Iran, 2007)*
- Consider most vulnerable households for extra support in switch over. *(Iran, 2007)*
- UNICEF’s water section in New York should visit Iran before the end of this project and ensure that lessons are learnt as UNICEF rebuilds its in-house capacity in WES. *(Iran, 2007)*
- A regional WES post should be considered. *(Iran, 2007)*

**Education**
- UNICEF should continue to advocate (to donors but also to international humanitarian community) that education should be treated as a priority in emergency. *(Darfur, 2005)*
- SD should ensure that quality control of recreational kits supplied by Copenhagen be carried out prior to arrival in country. Greater care should be taken in classroom design so that they can withstand the specific climatic conditions in the region. *(Darfur, 2005)*
- ZO and Education Section should define a set of criteria for the selection of the location of temporary classrooms, in order to relieve or avoid raising tensions between IDPs and host communities. *(Darfur, 2005)*
- CO and Education Section should be more involved in seeking a practical solution to the teachers’ salary issue. *(Darfur, 2005)*
- The Emergency Coordinator and the Education Section should ensure that other sectors are providing adequate support for schools (construction and maintenance of latrines and water-points). *(Darfur, 2005)*
- Opening schools was an important and effective way to start “normalising” process in post disaster/recovery situation. *(Iran, 2007)*
- Wherever principals and teachers had warmly received the concept of CFS, the project was implemented with more success, and they have made use of the teaching materials and equipment more effectively. *(Iran, 2007)*
- Schools with more children from better-off families and parents that value education greatly have responded to CFS concept more visibly. *(Iran, 2007)*
- The construction of latrines with involving children and teachers in supervising their regular cleanliness ensures the improvement of health situation of schools. *(Iran, 2007)*
- Negotiate with MoE to find practical solution for the proper use of all TRCs (even if it leads to relocation of them). *(Iran, 2007)*
- Arrange for visits of some MoE officials, principals, teachers and students from Bam as well as other cities to the schools that have met the standards of CFS. *(Iran, 2007)*
- Conduct studies on specific barriers for grasping and applying the idea of CFS. *(Iran, 2007)*
- Initiate advocacy on CFSs through press and media and bring into foreground the achievements of the project with the intention of introducing a working model for education system in Iran. *(Iran, 2007)*
- Review the articles of previous LoUs with MoE (in participation with the MoE staff) to increase ownership of the programmes in future collaboration. *(Iran, 2007)*
(CO) Run the Back to School program with cash transfers when feasible in MICs. (Lebanon, 2007)

Describe and integrate INEE guidelines. (Lebanon, 2007)

Child Protection

- Development of clear global guidelines on child protection issues and priorities in emergency situations would benefit from involvement of COs that have the experience, so as to make the guidance realistic and practical. (Iraq WS, 2003)

- Since UNICEF recognized the multi-sector nature of the needs of the affected population and what protection issues were a high concern, a Child Protection plan should be drawn up with specific activities focusing on general management and on a sector-by-sector basis. (Darfur, 2005)

- UNICEF still needs to develop appropriate tools and guidelines to enable staff to deal appropriately with protection issues. Protection issues should be further integrated into the different sectors (components) of the programme rather than being treated separately. (Darfur, 2005)

- UNICEF in general should further invest in the prevention of SEA and SGBV. Causes of threats need to be identified and documented urgently. Protection issues related to humanitarian assistance should be identified and addressed at a very early stage in the programme. The link between monitoring, reporting and advocacy should be strengthened. (Darfur, 2005)

- CO and Protection Section should ensure that protection concerns are integrated in the preparedness planning. CO and Protection Sections should facilitate the assessment of the specific protection needs of men, women, boys and girls at the early stage of the emergency. (Darfur, 2005)

- Emergency Coordinator and Protection Section should ensure that protection is integrated into existing sector intervention plans. (Darfur, 2005)

- CO and Protection should engage in dialogue with the AU troops on child protection, SGBV and HIV/AIDS in order to reduce the risk of improper behavior. (Darfur, 2005)

- UNICEF should systematically incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention in SGBV activities and provide relevant information, as stated in the CCCs. (Darfur, 2005)

- As part of an integrated approach to SGBV and reproductive health, culturally acceptable HIV/AIDS prevention messages should be more widely disseminated, including to OAU troops. (Darfur, 2005)

- Research and study on the social, economic, and cultural issues of the disaster-hit areas prior to the crisis can help with a better understanding of social behaviour of people. Consequently, this helps with more sensible programming with respect to psychosocial interventions. (Iran, 2007)

- As the transition to recovery period started, the role given to community should be strengthened. The community should have changed from the “recipients” of aid to “agents” of development. Though the documents say that children and the community have an important role in designing and programming, they are not consistently involved in the post-emergency work. The involvement of beneficiaries in programming and monitoring can help social integrity and counteract tendencies to community breakdown. (Iran, 2007)
A balanced proportion of local, provincial, and national coordination is helpful for sustainability. Agreements at local levels can ensure faster project progress, but agreements at national level should also be considered, particularly to increase the possibilities of replication and to avoid policy and financial blockages. (Iran, 2007)

Agree with the government partners more certain ways for integration of the services into the current infrastructure. (Iran, 2007)

Organise seminars/annual conferences (and every possible joint gathering) that can remind the officials, researchers, social workers, and etc. of the comparative advantage of this approach in disaster and post disaster situations and perhaps support the launch of bi-lingual website on psychosocial interventions to keep the trained people (including UNICEF staff) in contact with each other, or at least support the publication of a quarterly journal in this regard (with the collaboration of relevant departments of MoH, SWO and MoE so that the achievements are not lost and are kept within the ministries). (Iran, 2007)

Translate documents related to psychosocial intervention into Farsi and disseminate them among the MoH and SWO technical staffs at provincial level. (Iran, 2007)

Continue to produce and disseminate documents that promote best practice of psychosocial interventions. (Iran, 2007)

Provide opportunities, such as training workshops on using participatory tools in psychosocial projects, for the government staff and related NGO members at provincial and local levels with the aim of expanding community based activities and improving the quality of M&E systems from a community participation perspective. (Iran, 2007)

Involve agencies (governmental or NGO) that can work on underlying livelihood issues for adolescents to complement the activities that are done for children. (Iran, 2007)

The combination of practical (financial) and technical support using proven approaches made this (Family Tracing and Reunification) project a success. This type of approach works well in a country like Iran that has a relatively sophisticated social welfare bureaucracy with both the technocratic capacity and the policy alignment to implement such ideas comprehensively. (Iran, 2007)

The practical, “on the job” training worked well in bringing in new social workers rapidly. (Iran, 2007)

The individual kits given to children were well thought out and worked well. This experience should be captured and replicated. (Iran, 2007)

The lack of support for disabled children meant that they stayed a relatively neglected group, despite being probably the most seriously affected by the earthquake (losing parents and suffering a permanent disability in some cases). Increased care payments might have made it easier for family to take in these children; UNICEF needs to give both practical and policy consideration to this group of children in future. (Iran, 2007)

The Iranian government and the SWO must ensure that payments due to families for the caring of children are maintained. Some have not been paid for a year and this risks compromising the success of the programme. (Iran, 2007)
UNICEF and SWO should actively consider the situation of disabled children and investigate whether a different support payment regime is needed to ensure their care within families. (Iran, 2007)

UNICEF should work with the SWO and the Iranian legislature to demonstrate the success of family based care in Bam. Visits for parliamentarians to Bam would keep this issue on the agenda and would help in practically addressing some of the legislative changes that may be needed. (Iran, 2007)

UNICEF should work with the SWO to ensure that the principal and practice of family based care is understood and supported in the wider organisation. This will involve workshops, production of simple materials on how the system works in the Iranian context and perhaps exchange visits between provinces. The leadership of SWO in Kerman province is a valuable resource in advocating this approach. (Iran, 2007)

The training course used in Bam should be further developed and used a model for new social workers. Recruits without the requisite courses in their degree could receive “on the job” training and qualify for an SWO certification that allows them to practice at a certain level. This could form the basis for future professional social work qualifications. (Iran, 2007)

UNICEF needs to have more rapidly deployable expertise in family reunification globally, regionally and nationally. Serious consideration should be given to having standby capacity either within the country or the region as part of a contribution to global preparedness. (Iran, 2007)

Involving managers, staff and parents in the design of programmes is proven to make them more responsive and more appropriate. In particular UNICEF should have consulted on its supply list (initially) and the way in which supplies were to be distributed. (Iran, 2007)

The provision of services to adolescents is important but challenging, especially where there is no obvious partner. UNICEF needs to develop guidance on best practice in this area. (Iran, 2007)

Develop regional recreation kits that can be stored in regional hubs. Ideally this should be undertaken by each UNICEF regional office in collaboration with the Copenhagen supply section and EMOPs. MENARO could pilot this approach, with the design for each recreation kit developed with the involvement of country offices. The design stage should take no longer than six months with an initial stock purchased as and when funds allow. (Iran, 2007)

UNICEF has limited expertise in construction and in the CFC concept. The latter is not a priority in UNICEF’s Medium Term Strategic Plan. UNICEF should not consider entering into projects of this kind in the future without the assurance of adequate know-how and experienced staffing. (Iran, 2007)

In situations such as the Bam disaster, where funding is available, UNICEF needs to make an early decision about moving into school reconstruction. If UNICEF had decided to fund some of the immediate school rebuilding programme in Bam, it might have been possible to introduce child friendly principles earlier and on a wider scale. (Iran, 2007)
• The larger construction elements of this project seem to have come about partly as a result of the timing and scale of earmarked funding from a National Committee. *(Iran, 2007)*

• Advocating the CFC concept requires a multi-disciplinary approach involving planners, administrators, architects, engineers, sociologists and a range of government departments. This makes it a labour intensive activity that has to be led consistently by a senior UNICEF staff member or consultant. *(Iran, 2007)*

• UNICEF should decide by mid-2007 whether to gear up its expertise and resources in post-disaster school construction and in the CFC approach. *(Iran, 2007)*

• UNICEF should further develop dialogue and procedures with funders including National Committees to ensure that tied funding does not lead to inappropriate programming. *(Iran, 2007)*

• By March 2007, UNICEF should follow up with the Bam Department of Education about sports and play equipment needs for the schools that have UNICEF funded playgrounds. *(Iran, 2007)*

• UNICEF should immediately appoint an international consultant to oversee and follow the progress of this project both in terms of the Bam programmes as well as wider advocacy of the CFC idea. *(Iran, 2007)*

• The CFC programme in Bam will only be fully justified if it has spin-offs and replication more widely on school and city design in Iran. This means that the UNICEF Iran office should programme for the continuation of the programme at least until the end of 2007. *(Iran, 2007)*

• The project should be evaluated towards the end of 2007. *(Iran, 2007)*

• In terms of quality programming, UNICEF should ensure that there is an adequate focus on the needs of poorer and vulnerable groups, including children with disabilities and that there is also a focus on community consultation and participation. The challenge in post-disaster planning of this kind is to be able to plan and implement rapidly while working very much in a developmental context. *(Iran, 2007)*

• For first phase relief responses, UNICEF should develop a limited list of child-friendly items that supplement the basic relief materials provided by the IRCS to be available in-country and regionally. *(Iran, 2007)*

• *(HQ, CO)* Enhance capacities of UNICEF staff and partners to provide psychosocial support in emergencies based on issues prevalent in the country. *(Lebanon, 2007)*

• *(CO)* Conduct a mapping exercise of all potential contributors to child protection as part of preparedness planning and establish relationships with these actors. *(Lebanon, 2007)*

• Describe steps needed to provide psychosocial support in the first six to eight weeks. *(Lebanon, 2007)*
## ANNEX V

### GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES

#### For the Country Offices

| EPRP Processes | Senior CO managers, with the support of the REA and the RTAs, should ensure that all staff is involved in the EPRP process, and that each sector (programme and operations) is responsible for developing and updating its specific component, and for sharing it with key counterparts in the Government, with other organizations and agencies and in the cluster groups. All CCC programmatic areas should be covered, regardless of whether UNICEF has a programme in those sectors at “normal” times. (RR9)
| EPRP Processes | The EPRP should be an ongoing process in each CO, and sufficient resources should be allocated to it. The EPRP matrix is only the reference document defining the preparedness action plan and indicating the first steps in a crisis. Its format – shaped around the CCCs – is flexible, and senior managers should ensure it is utilized in the most suitable and sensible way for the local context. RR(10)
| EPRP Processes | In small offices, UNICEF should carefully examine human resources and sector gaps and define strategy to fill them up in case of emergency. This can be done through a HR mobilization plan shared with RO and DHR, and for wider sector areas, by establishing stand-by partnerships with possible available implementing partners. (RR11)
| EPRP Processes | Wherever they exist, COs should ensure that Zonal Offices and Field Offices are involved in the country level EPRP processes and activities. Specific EPR plans should be developed – eventually at ZO or FO level – for emergency prone areas, provinces or districts, looking at specificities and constraints of these areas and vulnerabilities of populations. (RR12)
| EPRP Processes | In countries with frequent or ongoing crises, the EPRP should be – more than elsewhere – a live document, which must be updated frequently, in light of new developments, new assessment and survey results, better information and updated figures. This document should be consistent with and eventually feed into any interagency preparedness and contingency planning process in the country. (RR13)
| EPRP Processes | As much as possible, COs should involve UN agencies, other organizations and whenever suitable Government counterparts in key steps of the EPRP processes and initiatives, including training, rehearsals and simulations. (RR14)
| EPRP Processes | UNICEF, especially at CO level, should keep advocating, facilitating and encouraging interagency preparedness and contingency planning initiatives, including training, rehearsals and simulations, and cluster-specific regular meetings. The IASC-endorsed “Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance” should be used as reference document for these interagency exercises. COs should also advocate for the participation of key beneficiary representatives and groups in major steps of the wider preparedness and contingency planning processes. (RR15)

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21 Between parentheses, the number of Revised Recommendation in main Summary Review document each Guideline/Best Practice refers to.
Mainstreaming of EPRP in Programme Planning Processes - Building on successful examples of good integration of EPRP components into UNICEF programme planning processes, all COs should undertake the same approach. (RR18)

Roles, Responsibilities and Accountabilities - At the beginning of a new large-size crisis – including cross-border (see below) –, HQ, RO and affected CO/s should immediately define and put in place structures, arrangements and procedures for defining main strategies, managing information, ensuring sound coordination, handling specific emergency related issues, establishing clear responsibilities at all levels, and have this information widely disseminated. These procedures, structures and arrangements should be monitored and evaluated together with the rest of the emergency programme. (RR27)

Cross-Border Crises - Representatives of COs potentially affected by cross-border humanitarian crises, should enhance coordination and contacts between offices and between sectors, in order to define common strategies, agree on scenarios and numbers, work on consistent plans, optimize use of resources and the preposition of stocks, and reinforce specific programmatic responses. (RR31)

Gender - Representative, Deputy Representative should ensure that a “gender lens” is applied and gender considerations are included in every EPRP process and exercise at CO level, starting from the vulnerabilities and capacities analysis, and including the initial rapid assessments. CO should also advocate for this “gender lens” approach in the context of interagency preparedness and contingency planning. (RR32)

Gender - COs with chronic or complex humanitarian crises, as well as COs in emergency-prone countries, should identify sufficient resources to support the long-term position of one or more gender planning and/or advisory staff. The RO should support these initiatives. (RR34)

Internal Coordination - All COs should incorporate in their EPR plans and exercises internal coordination arrangements in the event of an emergency, have them clearly understood by all staff, and share this information with RO and HQ (EMOPS) for immediate back-up and support purposes. All ZOs and FOs should be consistently involved in this process and their staff be part of the plans. (RR35)

Cluster Coordination - COs and sector chiefs should advocate for including discussions on EPR and the Cluster Approach in UNCT, local IASC, and sector-specific meetings, eventually aiming at joint initiatives (training, workshops, simulations) and a joint preparedness and contingency plans. (RR38)

Partnerships - COs should strive to create and expand existing partnerships with governmental counterparts, sharing with them key EPRP-related documents (CCCs, EFH, EPR plans or parts of it, emergency programme work-plans, cluster-related documents, etc.) aiming to improve trust and understanding. (RR41)

Partnerships - COs, especially in emergency-prone countries and for clusters falling under UNICEF responsibility, should investigate the possibility of developing stand-by agreements with locally based implementing partners, administratively fully cleared, which can be activated in the event of a new crisis. (RR44)

Partnerships - In countries where UNICEF has limited access to areas where there likely are beneficiaries in need, COs should investigate the possibility to work with the local Red Cross and Red Crescent Society – eventually asking facilitation from the IFRC – to improve information gathering, and eventually set up aid distribution systems. (RR45)

Partnerships - Some donors (DFID, CIDA, SIDA, USAID, AUSAID, etc.) have their
own technical units and humanitarian departments with extensive experience, and access to key supplies and surge capacity for emergency. Interaction with them can go well beyond fund-raising, and some can – and in some cases have – become critically constructive partners before, during and after large humanitarian crises. HQ (PARMO, EMOPS) in coordination with affected RO and COs, should expand these “beyond fund-raising” collaborations with specific donors, aiming at increasing trust, and ultimately improve the preparedness and response work. (RR46)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - COs, in the framework of the regular programme cycle, should expand baseline “data gathering”, particularly focusing on “high risk” populations, with collection of agreed indicators (CCC-linked, plus other suitable ones) which will be monitored in the event of an humanitarian crisis and a consequent response. These baseline benchmarking data can be obtained from historical records, from reliable secondary sources, and through new specifically targeted assessments. (RR47)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - Cluster leaders, with the support of information management officers, should produce common cluster-specific web-based tools/formats for monitoring and evaluation, feeding in OCHA-managed HIC-type general interagency web-tools. (RR49)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - In all stages of work on EPR-related assessments, and monitoring and evaluation in emergency, COs should ensure sufficient human and financial resources. These should include the appointment of information management officer in support of each cluster under UNICEF responsibility being activated, as well as funds for sound field monitoring and planned future evaluations or RTEs. These costs should be included in any Flash Appeal or CAP developed in-country. (Note that EPF funds can be utilized for assessments, also.) (RR50)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - Monitoring and reporting – linked to CCCs and other indicators agreed during the preparedness phases – should start at the beginning of the response, and should focus not only on direct beneficiaries (IDPs, refugees) but also on host communities. (RR51)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - COs should ensure that response work-plans are developed at the beginning of the emergency, and eventually revised/refined at later stages bringing in recovery elements as early as possible. These plans should be as comprehensive as possible, include gender and vulnerability analyses, and include a small scale IMEP. Additionally, work-plan outputs should be not only quantitative, but also qualitative and focusing on impact; and special focus should be put on data analysis and not only data collection, during the monitoring processes. (RR52)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - COs should include a simple, realistic and clear M&E component in any PCA established with implementing partners in the framework of EPR processes. This should be linked to any relevant cluster/sector level indicators and including agreement on simple standards for joint field monitoring. (RR53)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - The MENA evaluations as well as other recent experiences (Myanmar, 2008) confirmed the great usefulness of utilizing GPS for M&E in emergencies, especially in countries with limited geo-referencing capacities and in contexts where beneficiaries are displaced to remote, poorly accessible areas (Darfur, Iraq, Iran). These could be replaced by even more versatile PDAs, incorporating specific
rapid assessment tools. COs should ensure acquisition and training for utilization of sufficient GPS (or PDAs) for any expected emergency. (RR54)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - COs and ROs should plan for evaluations of all medium- to large-scale emergency responses. In turn, HQ (EO-Audit, EMOPS) and ROs should ensure the evaluation recommendations’ vigorous follow-up. (RR56)

**External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations** - COs and RO should establish stronger links, interaction and dealings with Arab civil society, think tanks, and research institutes, as well as local media networks, to increase mutual understanding. (RR60)

**External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations** - Building on regular country programme collaborations, MENA COs should try to increase trust with Government counterparts to discuss and anticipate advocacy issues related to protection of women and children, in the event of political crises. Through sound emergency response, COs should aim at building Government trust during humanitarian crises, increasing chances for advocacy on protection of women and children. (RR61)

**External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations** - In light of the great complexities of the region, HQ, MENARO and COs should ensure that sufficient resources are made available for communications and advocacy in emergency, at all levels of the organization. (RR62)

**Security** - Representatives should ensure that national staff are fully integrated in preparedness and response discussions related to safety and security, especially to clarify arrangements and suitable solutions for their protection and for the continuation of the programmes, in the event of an evacuation of international staff. (RR63)

**Security** - Funds should be made immediately available – by COs, RO and/or HQ – for newly identified security and safety needs, including human resources and assets. (RR64)

**Security** - Security arrangements and structures should be fully integrated and coordinated at all levels (COs, RO, HQ), with a clear sharing of responsibilities and accountabilities, in order to ensure the broadest possible implementation of the programmes, while ensuring safety of staff and assets. For this reason it is essential that security officers and staff are fully integrated in all the emergency preparedness and response plans. Vice-versa, all staff (both programme and operations) should be fully informed and abreast of safety and security issues in the duty station and in the country, and their perspectives should be represented in the SMT. (RR65)

**Security** - COs should manage civil-military relationships as much as possible in the framework of the IASC local approach and guidelines; at the same time, it should establish constructive dialogue with military entities for specific issues and collaborations related to women and children. HQ and MENA RO should gather lessons learned and success stories, and eventually develop guidelines for the complexities of the civil-military relationships in the region. (RR66)

**IT/Telecommunications** - ICT Officers should ensure that ICT considerations, staffing and equipment needs, deployment and installation arrangements, as well as costs are included both in EPR documents and plans, and in the Flash Appeal or CAP. The specific role UNICEF plays in the ITC cluster provide a stronger framework and rationale for the request of these resources. (RR67)

**IT/Telecommunications** - Given the increasing availability and quality of telecommunication equipment, COs and RO ICT Officers should provide training in their
utilization to key staff who might be deployed to respond to a humanitarian crisis. (RR68)

### Logistics and Supply
Representatives should ensure stronger interactions between supply and logistics staff, and programme staff from the preparedness phases, to optimize management and delivery of humanitarian aid. Clear and comprehensive supply plans should be developed by each programmatic section, to be consolidated by Supply/Logistics staff, included in the EPRP, and shared with RO and SD. In the event of an emergency, this supply list could be revised and fine-tuned, updated when necessary, and used for planning and monitoring purposes. (RR70)

### Logistics and Supply
- COs should evaluate security and political consideration for transport, warehousing and branding of trucks/supplies during preparedness and response phases, especially in complex emergencies. (RR71)
- In the event of large crises, dedicated logistics and supply staff should be identified or appointed at both RO level and in SD Copenhagen. COs should ensure adequate logistics and supply capacity is proportional to the size and complexity of the response. Plans for strengthening supply and logistics human resources should be part of the broader HR mobilization plan included in the EPRP matrix. RO (REA and Regional Supply Officer, if the post exists) should ensure that planning at CO is sound. (RR72)

### Logistics and Supply
- In the event of large crises, COs and RO should integrate UNICEF logistics capacities with those of UNJLC and/or WFP-led Logistic cluster, whenever these are activated and put into place. The establishment of custom-bonded warehouses should be taken into consideration in these contexts. (RR74)

### Fundraising
- Representatives, especially in emergency-prone countries, should enhance their relationship with key donors and engage them in EPRP-related discussions. Demonstrating sound preparedness plans, and especially how this preparedness allows for improved response, would likely induce donors support. This approach should be backed by quality donor reporting, as well as by frequent, engaging field visits and briefings to appraise the impact of funds utilization. (RR77)

### Fundraising
- In the context of large-scale emergencies, COs and RO should limit the number of external visits (donors, NatComs, media) to FOs and ZOs to avoid overburdening staff. Additional staff should eventually be deployed from RO or HQ for these visits. (RR78)

### Human Resources
- UNICEF at all levels should keep striving to strengthen its HR surge capacity systems in emergency through: a) (CO, RO) Training of UNICEF staff on EPRP, as well as on specific programme and operations in emergencies; b) (CO) Empowering national staff, through training activities, inter-country exchanges and simulation exercises, to run an emergency programme, especially in the event of an evacuation of international staff. (RR79)

### Human Resources
- A realistic human resources mobilization plan in the event of an emergency should be part of each EPRP, and should make sure to encapsulate HR gaps on often forgotten areas such as supply and logistics, administration and finance, HR, ICT, PM&E, and report writing. The HR Officer should ensure the fine-tuning and update of this plan at the beginning of a crisis and according to evolving circumstances. As early as possible, the plan should start looking at the short-, medium- and long-term staffing structures, and define strategies to fulfill the needs with a combination of: a) in-
country staff rearrangements; b) UNICEF staff on mission (also from NatComs, especially useful for Communications Officers and Sitrep/report writers); c) UNICEF staff on loan from other offices; d) deployment of stand-by partners staff; e) consultancies (SSA); and f) official posts (TFT, FT, UNV). The plan should become the main reference for HR surge in the event of a new crisis, and all its updates should be shared with the HR and REA in the RO, as well as with the Emergency Unit in DHR NY, even before the emergency strikes. (RR80)

**Human Resources** - COs should ensure that the human resources mobilization plan includes clear provisions for the identification and appointment of the coordinators for the clusters under UNICEF responsibility – clearly separating this role from programme coordination roles –, as well as for their respective information management officers. (RR81)

**Human Resources** - Operations Officer, HR Officer should ensure that financial arrangements, entitlements and compensations of both national and international staff and their dependents in case of an emergency and especially of an evacuation, are clarified and made available during preparedness phases. The arrangements should include provision to national staff of survival/support equipment (water, medical kits, etc.) or salary advances to purchase these. (RR83)

**Human Resources** - HR Officer, Deputy Representative should ensure that new staff employed for an emergency receive comprehensive briefings on the country, on the emergency context, on cultural and religious issues (especially important for the MENA region), on security and coordination systems in place, and on existing programmatic arrangements. Staff new to UNICEF should be provided with short training (eventually web-based, to be undertaken while waiting for deployment) on UNICEF’s Programme Policies and Procedures, with special emphasis on Emergency, Rights Based programming, and administrative management. The RO (Regional HR Officer, REA) should assist the COs in these processes, and identify ways to monitor these arrangements. (RR84)

**Human Resources** - Staff wellbeing and psychosocial support for both national and international staff and dependants should be taken into serious consideration at all levels of the organization in the event of an emergency and especially in case of an evacuation. Costs for this type of support should be included in the CO EPRP, or in more in-depth contingency plans. (RR86)

**Human Resources** - Representatives and Deputy Representatives, with the support of Operations and HR officers, should ensure sound leadership for HR issues in preparedness and response phases, when the risk of underestimating HR needs are acute, when staff will be under pressure and working long hours, and when dynamics in the office are strained. This can be done by demonstrating clear, consistent direction and strategy, by sharing information and responsibilities, by clarifying roles and reporting lines, by allocating task according to specific skills, by keeping an eye on work-load and other stress factors, by underlining the need for private time and setting good examples, and with team-building and encouragement. (RR87)

**Administration and Finance** - HQ, ROs and COs should ensure comprehensive dissemination, understanding of and familiarization of all staff with the “Financial Administration Management for Emergency” guidelines. Operation Officers should bring to the attention of all staff any special arrangement established or amended in light of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guidelines, and any change in the table of authority in the event of an emergency, with the arrival of new staff. (RR88)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong> - Deputy Representatives, Chiefs of Health should continue working closely with the local WHO office, the MoH and with other organisations active in the health sector, to optimize preparedness and response arrangements, as well as to look at health economics in the country and how these are affected in the event of a crisis. (RR91)</td>
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<td><strong>Health</strong> - COs managing emergency programmes in conflict affected countries, should keep advocating for “days or weeks of peace/tranquility”, and utilize the EPI and nutrition surveillance campaigns as ways to access areas otherwise inaccessible or under the control of non-state entities. (RR92)</td>
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<td><strong>Nutrition</strong> - In light of its role of Nutrition Cluster leader, UNICEF should keep reinforcing its nutrition sections at all levels (HQ, ROs, COs), especially in regions and countries where malnutrition is recognized as a chronic risk and vulnerability. (RR93)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong> - UNICEF should keep advocating at all levels (HQ, RO, CO), with donors and the international humanitarian community, that education is an essential component of humanitarian response, and that re-activation of any type of learning environment is the best way to a fast return to normalcy for children. (RR100)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong> - Education has been recognized as an excellent channel to address other issues, like hygiene, psychosocial support, mine awareness, MCH, etc. COs should ensure that during preparedness and response phases, comprehensive interactions and discussions take place among all programmatic sections, to identify synergies and optimize resources. COs should also ensure that a participatory approach is utilized in preparedness and response phases, involving as much as possible local communities and beneficiary groups. (RR103)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Child Protection</strong> - COs should keep striving to ensure that special attention is paid, during both preparedness and response phases, to vulnerable groups, often slipping through the net of the humanitarian response. These include orphans, adolescents, children with disabilities, single women- and adolescent-headed households, widows. (RR109)</td>
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<td><strong>Child Protection</strong> - At the beginning of a new crisis, CP officers should negotiate as soon as possible with governmental counterparts the integration of newly started activities and services into formal, sustainable structures (e.g. children and women police desks). (RR110)</td>
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<td><strong>Child Protection</strong> - COs should advocate with – and eventually support – key counterparts and organizations for the integration of adolescent and youth projects in the preparedness and response phases of any new emergency. (RR111)</td>
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<td><strong>Child Protection</strong> - COs should use the CP humanitarian response and its components as a channel to scale-up enhanced social services and social protection with the Government. (RR112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child Protection</strong> - As for other sectors (Education, WASH), EMOPS, PD should define clear guidelines and parameters for UNICEF engagement in reconstruction programmes and other large-scale rehabilitations of basic services. COs should ensure that before engaging in any endeavor of this type, a thorough consultation takes place with RO and HQ’s relevant divisions/sections to reach an agreed conclusion and define a consistent position throughout the organisation. Pressure from donors should not influence this process. (RR113)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### For the Regional Office

**Roles, Responsibilities and Accountabilities**  - At the beginning of a new large-size crisis – including cross-border (see below) –, HQ, RO and affected CO/s should immediately define and put in place structures, arrangements and procedures for defining main strategies, managing information, ensuring sound coordination, handling specific emergency related issues, establishing clear responsibilities at all levels, and have this information widely disseminated. These procedures, structures and arrangements should be monitored and evaluated together with the rest of the emergency programme. (RR27)

**Regional EPRP**  - The REA should organize and facilitate yearly EPRP exercises focusing on a scenario where one or more COs in the region are affected by a medium- to large-size humanitarian crisis. The objective of the exercise would be to refine roles and responsibilities of the RO staff in the event of a humanitarian emergency and strengthen capacities and arrangements at the onset of the crisis. The preparedness action plan stemming from this EPRP exercise should be implemented and the implementation monitored in a defined period of time. (RR28)

**Partnerships**  - Some donors (DFID, CIDA, SIDA, USAID, AUSAID, etc.) have their own technical units and humanitarian departments with extensive experience, and access to key supplies and surge capacity for emergency. Interaction with them can go well beyond fund-raising, and some can – and in some cases have – become critically constructive partners before, during and after large humanitarian crises. HQ (PARMO, EMOPS) in coordination with affected RO and COs, should expand these “beyond fund-raising” collaborations with specific donors, aiming at increasing trust, and ultimately improve the preparedness and response work. (RR46)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning**  - COs and ROs should plan for evaluations of all medium- to large-scale emergency responses. In turn, HQ (EO-Audit, EMOPS) and ROs should ensure the evaluation recommendations’ vigorous follow-up. (RR56)

**External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations**  - COs and RO should establish stronger links, interaction and dealings with Arab civil society, think tanks, and research institutes, as well as local media networks, to increase mutual understanding. (RR60)

**External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations**  - In light of the great complexities of the region, HQ, MENARO and COs should ensure that sufficient resources are made available for communications and advocacy in emergency, at all levels of the organization. (RR62)

**Security**  - Funds should immediately available – by COs, RO and/or HQ – for newly identified security and safety needs, including human resources and assets. (RR64)

**Security**  - Security arrangements and structures should be fully integrated and coordinated at all levels (COs, RO, HQ), with a clear sharing of responsibilities and accountabilities, in order to ensure the broadest possible implementation of the programmes, while ensuring safety of staff and assets. For this reason it is essential that security officers and staff are fully integrated in all the emergency preparedness and response plans. Vice-versa, all staff (both programme and operations) should be fully informed and abreast of safety and security issues in the duty station and in the country, and their perspectives should be represented in the SMT. (RR65)

**Security**  - COs should manage civil-military relationships as much as possible in the...
framework of the IASC local approach and guidelines; at the same time, it should establish constructive dialogue with military entities for specific issues and collaborations related to women and children. HQ and MENA RO should gather lessons learned and success stories, and eventually develop guidelines for the complexities of the civil-military relationships in the region. (RR66)

**IT/Telecommunications** - Given the increasing availability and quality of telecommunication equipment, COs and RO ICT Officers should provide training in their utilization to key staff who might be deployed to respond to a humanitarian crisis. (RR68)

**Logistics and Supply** - In the event of large crises, dedicated logistics and supply staff should be identified or appointed at both RO level and in SD Copenhagen. COs should ensure adequate logistics and supply capacity is proportional to the size and complexity of the response. Plans for strengthening supply and logistics human resources should be part of the broader HR mobilization plan included in the EPRP matrix. RO (REA and Regional Supply Officer, if the post exists) should ensure that planning at CO is sound. (RR72)

**Logistics and Supply** - ROs in coordination with SD should enhance regional supply networks, looking at suitable markets, regional agreements, and improve exchanges and loans between COs in the event of new crises. (RR73)

**Logistics and Supply** - In the event of large crises, COs and RO should integrate UNICEF logistics capacities with those of UNJLC and/or WFP-led Logistic cluster, whenever these are activated and put into place. The establishment of custom-bonded warehouses should be taken into consideration in these contexts. (RR74)

**Fundraising** - In the context of large-scale emergencies, COs and RO should limit the number of external visits (donors, NatComs, media) to FOs and ZOs to avoid overburdening staff. Additional staff should eventually be deployed from RO or HQ for these visits. (RR78)

**Human Resources** - UNICEF at all levels should keep striving to strengthen its HR surge capacity systems in emergency through: a) **(CO, RO)** Training of UNICEF staff on EPRP, as well as on specific programme and operations in emergencies; b) **(RO, HQ)** Further strengthening of surge capacity rosters at HQ and RO level, consistent monitoring of their utilization, and possible establishment of targets. While the main responsibility to manage, update and make them available lays with HR at all levels, responsibilities for feeding them with suitable candidates and appraise them after each deployment should be better clarified and formalized. (RR79)

**Human Resources** - HR Officer, Deputy Representative should ensure that new staff employed for an emergency receive comprehensive briefings on the country, on the emergency context, on cultural and religious issues (especially important for the MENA region), on security and coordination systems in place, and on existing programmatic arrangements. Staff new to UNICEF should be provided with short training (eventually web-based, to be undertaken while waiting for deployment) on UNICEF’s Programme Policies and Procedures, with special emphasis on Emergency. Rights Based programming, and administrative management. The RO (Regional HR Officer, REA) should assist the COs in these processes, and identify ways to monitor these arrangements. (RR84)

**Human Resources** - Staff wellbeing and psychosocial support for both national and
international staff and dependants should be taken into serious consideration at all levels of the organization in the event of an emergency and especially in case of an evacuation. Costs for this type of support should be included in the CO EPRP, or in more in-depth contingency plans. (RR86)

**Administration and Finance** - HQ, ROs and COs should ensure comprehensive dissemination, understanding of and familiarization of all staff with the “Financial Administration Management for Emergency” guidelines. Operation Officers should bring to the attention of all staff any special arrangement established or amended in light of the guidelines, and any change in the table of authority in the event of an emergency, with the arrival of new staff. (RR88)

**Nutrition** - In light of its role of Nutrition Cluster leader, UNICEF should keep reinforcing its nutrition sections at all levels (HQ, ROs, COs), especially in regions and countries where malnutrition is recognized as a chronic risk and vulnerability. (RR93)

**Nutrition** - The REA, and the RTA for Nutrition should participate in the process to establish monitoring and triggering mechanisms for slow-onset crises, and eventually identify COs which could field-test any newly developed tool. (RR95)

**WASH** - UNICEF Global WASH Cluster and RO should ensure guidance in all situations where COs might have to engage in new, challenging post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstructions initiatives. Key communications and advocacy actions might be necessary to influence behavioural changes. (RR99)

**Education** - UNICEF should keep advocating at all levels (HQ, RO, CO), with donors and the international humanitarian community, that education is an essential component of humanitarian response, and that re-activation of any type of learning environment is the best way to a fast return to normalcy for children. (RR100)

**Child Protection** - As for other sectors (Education, WASH), EMOPS, PD should define clear guidelines and parameters for UNICEF engagement in reconstruction programmes and other large-scale rehabilitations of basic services. COs should ensure that before engaging in any endeavor of this type, a thorough consultation takes place with RO and HQ’s relevant divisions/sections to reach an agreed conclusion and define a consistent position throughout the organisation. Pressure from donors should not influence this process. (RR113)
### For Headquarters

**EPRP Processes** - EMOPS should keep posting all EPRP formats, guidelines, good samples, and other relevant documents on the EW/EA intranet website. (RR16)

**Roles, Responsibilities and Accountabilities** - At the beginning of a new large-size crisis – including cross-border (see below) –, HQ, RO and affected CO/s should immediately define and put in place structures, arrangements and procedures for defining main strategies, managing information, ensuring sound coordination, handling specific emergency related issues, establishing clear responsibilities at all levels, and have this information widely disseminated. These procedures, structures and arrangements should be monitored and evaluated together with the rest of the emergency programme. (RR27)

**Cluster Coordination** - Global Clusters under UNICEF responsibility should keep developing and disseminating, also through dedicated websites, cluster-specific guidelines, lessons learned, technical documents and other relevant documents. (RR39)

**Partnerships** - Some donors (DFID, CIDA, SIDA, USAID, AUSAID, etc.) have their own technical units and humanitarian departments with extensive experience, and access to key supplies and surge capacity for emergency. Interaction with them can go well beyond fund-raising, and some can – and in some cases have – become critically constructive partners before, during and after large humanitarian crises. HQ (PARMO, EMOPS) in coordination with affected RO and COs, should expand these “beyond fund-raising” collaborations with specific donors, aiming at increasing trust, and ultimately improve the preparedness and response work. (RR46)

**Assessments, Monitoring and Planning** - COs and ROs should plan for evaluations of all medium- to large-scale emergency responses. In turn, HQ (EO-Audit, EMOPS) and ROs should ensure the evaluation recommendations’ vigorous follow-up. (RR56)

**External Communications, Advocacy and Media Relations** - In light of the great complexities of the region, HQ, MENARO and COs should ensure that sufficient resources are made available for communications and advocacy in emergency, at all levels of the organization. (RR62)

**Security** - Funds should made immediately available – by COs, RO and/or HQ – for newly identified security and safety needs, including human resources and assets. (RR64)

**Security** - Security arrangements and structures should be fully integrated and coordinated at all levels (COs, RO, HQ), with a clear sharing of responsibilities and accountabilities, in order to ensure the broadest possible implementation of the programmes, while ensuring safety of staff and assets. For this reason it is essential that security officers and staff are fully integrated in all the emergency preparedness and response plans. Vice-versa, all staff (both programme and operations) should be fully informed and abreast of safety and security issues in the duty station and in the country, and their perspectives should be represented in the SMT. (RR65)

**Security** - COs should manage civil-military relationships as much as possible in the framework of the IASC local approach and guidelines; at the same time, it should establish constructive dialogue with military entities for specific issues and collaborations related to women and children. HQ and MENA RO should gather lessons learned and success stories, and eventually develop guidelines for the complexities of the civil-military relationships in the region. (RR66)

**Logistics and Supply** - In the event of large crises, dedicated logistics and supply staff should be identified or appointed at both RO level and in SD Copenhagen. COs should
ensure adequate logistics and supply capacity is proportional to the size and complexity of the response. Plans for strengthening supply and logistics human resources should be part of the broader HR mobilization plan included in the EPRP matrix. RO (REA and Regional Supply Officer, if the post exists) should ensure that planning at CO is sound. (RR72)

**Logistics and Supply** - SD, with support of the ROs, should enhance dissemination and utilization of UniTrack with specific training at CO level. SD should also developed a warehouse management training – possibly based on WFP package, or directly linking to it – for roll-out at regional and country level. (RR75)

**Fundraising** - In the context of large-scale emergencies, COs and RO should limit the number of external visits (donors, NatComs, media) to FOs and ZOs to avoid overburdening staff. Additional staff should eventually be deployed from RO or HQ for these visits. (RR78)

**Human Resources** - UNICEF at all levels should keep striving to strengthen its HR surge capacity systems in emergency through: a) **(HQ)** A wide range of stand-by agreements with critical partners and organizations; b) **(RO, HQ)** Further strengthening of surge capacity rosters at HQ and RO level, consistent monitoring of their utilization, and possible establishment of targets. While the main responsibility to manage, update and make them available lays with HR at all levels, responsibilities for feeding them with suitable candidates and appraise them after each deployment should be better clarified and formalized; c) **(HQ)** Appoint an emergency focal point and emergency-dedicated technical staff in all Division at HQ level; d) **(HQ)** Ensure that the ongoing Accountabilities Review will clarify role and responsibilities of RTAs and other RO staff in preparedness activities and in emergency response. The review should also clarify the role and power of the RD in obliging reluctant Representatives to release key staff for emergency surge, linking this process to the establishment of a regional trigger. (RR79)

**Human Resources** - Staff wellbeing and psychosocial support for both national and international staff and dependants should be taken into serious consideration at all levels of the organization in the event of an emergency and especially in case of an evacuation. Costs for this type of support should be included in the CO EPRP, or in more in-depth contingency plans. (RR86)

**Administration and Finance** - HQ, ROs and COs should ensure comprehensive dissemination, understanding of and familiarization of all staff with the “Financial Administration Management for Emergency” guidelines. Operation Officers should bring to the attention of all staff any special arrangement established or amended in light of the guidelines, and any change in the table of authority in the event of an emergency, with the arrival of new staff. (RR88)

**Health** - Health Section should continue working closely with WHO (leader for Health Cluster) and other cluster members on the clarification of responsibilities in emergency, collaboration with local Ministry of Health (MoH), development of kits, and optimization in the use of resources. (RR90)

**Nutrition** - In light of its role of Nutrition Cluster leader, UNICEF should keep reinforcing its nutrition sections at all levels (HQ, ROs, COs), especially in regions and countries where malnutrition is recognized as a chronic risk and vulnerability. (RR93)

**Nutrition** - Global Nutrition Cluster should keep clarifying arising issues in emergencies and assist COs and ROs with simple, well-targeted guidelines and best practices. (RR94)
### WASH - UNICEF Global WASH Cluster

- Should keep working closely with Supply Division for the selection, development, update and optimisation of key WASH supplies and products, as well as for other supply-related issues. (RR98)

### WASH - UNICEF Global WASH Cluster and RO

- Should ensure guidance in all situations where COs might have to engage in new, challenging post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstructions initiatives. Key communications and advocacy actions might be necessary to influence behavioural changes. (RR99)

### Education - UNICEF

- Should keep advocating at all levels (HQ, RO, CO), with donors and the international humanitarian community, that education is an essential component of humanitarian response, and that re-activation of any type of learning environment is the best way to a fast return to normalcy for children. (RR100)

### Education - Global Education Cluster

- Should gather and disseminate best practices, lessons learned and guidelines – in line with the INEE guidelines, whose utilization at country level should be expanded – on education in emergency issues, like back-to-school campaigns, child friendly schools (CFS), adaptation and translation of kits, as well as teachers’ salaries and broader capacity building initiatives. (RR102)

### Child Protection - Global CP focal point (sub-cluster)

- Should develop and update rosters with external and internal candidates with experience covering different components of UNICEF CP in emergency responses (psychosocial support, tracing and reunification, SGBV, DDR). (RR105)

- Should ensure that psychosocial support is better represented in the ongoing revision of the CCCs, and that lessons learned and best practices are gathered and disseminated, together with guidelines. (RR107)

- Should work together with SD and CP RTAs to develop, adapt and update global and region-specific supplies and tools for child protection in emergency. COs should be encouraged to translate and adapt these tools and supplies into local relevant languages well before an emergency strikes. (RR108)

### Child Protection - As for other sectors (Education, WASH), EMOPS, PD

- Should define clear guidelines and parameters for UNICEF engagement in reconstruction programmes and other large-scale rehabilitations of basic services. COs should ensure that before engaging in any endeavor of this type, a thorough consultation takes place with RO and HQ’s relevant divisions/sections to reach an agreed conclusion and define a consistent position throughout the organisation. Pressure from donors should not influence this process. (RR113)