DEVELOPMENTAL EVALUATION PEACEBUILDING EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY PROGRAMME


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PBEA DE REGIONAL PROFILES
At a time when conflict is affecting so many children around the globe, peacebuilding becomes a prerequisite for achieving human security and lasting development results. Recognizing this challenge, UNICEF has over the past several years developed and supported a programme to test and implement innovative education solutions to achieve peacebuilding results. This programme was the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA), implemented from 2012 to 2016 and supported by funding from the Government of the Netherlands.

The programme set out an ambitious vision of strengthening resilience, social cohesion and human security in 14 participating countries. Given such a novel strategy and challenging agenda, it was agreed by programme managers and stakeholders that evaluation activities should be undertaken to document programme processes, choices and decisions, and to provide valuable lessons for programming in complex settings. Hence, PBEA has benefited from three distinct evaluation activities: an evaluability assessment, conducted in 2013; a summative evaluation, completed in 2015 to document and assess outcomes; and, in 2016, developmental evaluation activities were concluded in Ethiopia and Myanmar. The Ethiopia developmental evaluation is the subject of this report.

“Developmental evaluation” is an approach that draws on evaluative methods and thinking and supports adaptive learning within complex initiatives. It combines, in real time, the rigour of monitoring and evaluation practice with the flexibility and creativity that is required in seeking solutions to complex development problems typically involving innovation, high levels of uncertainty, and social engagement. The present report brings together insights, lessons and reflections from the developmental evaluation activities in Ethiopia. It offers conclusions and recommendations on ways UNICEF Ethiopia can carry forward learning from the PBEA experience to strengthen programming practices.

The developmental evaluation activities were initiated to accompany PBEA implementation in the final 18 months of the programme. This evaluation benefited from the insights of children, women, and men living in Ethiopia’s four ‘Developing Regional States’. On behalf of the UNICEF Country Office in Ethiopia and the Evaluation Office, we would like to take this opportunity to offer a word of gratitude to people in these locations who have worked with the programme in undertaking activities aimed at strengthening social cohesion and resilience in their communities. We also acknowledge our partners in Government who have participated in this evaluative exercise and provided considerable insights on the local context. These partners include the Federal Ministry of Education, the Regional Education Bureaus of Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella and Somali and their respective Woreda Education Offices.
The developmental evaluation was led by Darragh Minogue, a consultant who was embedded with the Ethiopia team and managed by the Evaluation Office. Darragh showed considerable conceptual and practical skills in conducting the work, and we would like to recognize and applaud his expertise, energy, and dedication. We would also like to acknowledge the contribution and guidance of other UNICEF colleagues: Emmanuelle Abrioux, Dorothy Angura and Setotaw Yimam from the UNICEF Ethiopia Education team; Neven Knezevic, formerly the Peacebuilding Specialist based in the UNICEF Regional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa; Bosun Jang from the Education Section in UNICEF headquarters in New York; as well as Kathleen Letshabo and Pamela Wridt, Evaluation Specialists from the Evaluation Office who have been most closely involved in this work. Kathleen ably designed and managed not only this evaluation but the whole set of evaluation activities integrated into the PBEA programme, building up a detailed and insightful picture of this exceptional and broadly successful programme.

Finally, we wish to express special appreciation to the Government of the Netherlands, whose vision and commitment to building peaceful societies has not only helped support changes in the field of education and peacebuilding but has also, through this programme and others, helped to improve the lives of millions of children in so many parts of the world affected by conflict.

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UNICEF           UNICEF
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<thead>
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<th>ACRONYMS</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABE</td>
<td>Alternative Basic Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWP</td>
<td>Annual Work Plan</td>
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<td>BoFED</td>
<td>Bureau of Finance and Economic Development</td>
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<td>C4D</td>
<td>Communications for Development</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Context Analysis</td>
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<td>CtC</td>
<td>Child to Child</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>Developmental Evaluation</td>
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<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>DRS</td>
<td>Developing Regional States</td>
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<td>ECCE</td>
<td>Early Childhood Care and Education</td>
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<td>ECD</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development</td>
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<td>ECO</td>
<td>Ethiopian Country Office (UNICEF)</td>
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<td>EIE</td>
<td>Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
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<td>EPRP</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness Response Plans</td>
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<td>ESARO</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern African Regional Office (UNICEF)</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>Education Development Sector Plan</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographical Information System</td>
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<td>GoN</td>
<td>Government of Netherlands</td>
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<td>KAP</td>
<td>Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice</td>
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<td>L&amp;D</td>
<td>Learning and Development Programme</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoFED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Development</td>
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<td>MTR</td>
<td>Mid-Term Review</td>
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<td>OOSC</td>
<td>Out of School Children</td>
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<td>PBEA</td>
<td>Peacebuilding, Education, and Advocacy</td>
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<td>PIM</td>
<td>Programme Implementation Manual</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent Teacher Association</td>
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<td>RALS</td>
<td>Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results Based Management</td>
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<td>REB</td>
<td>Regional Educational Bureau</td>
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<td>SIP</td>
<td>School Improvement Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRGBV</td>
<td>School Related Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>WEO</td>
<td>Woreda Education Office</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) was a four-year (2012-2016) innovative programme funded by the Government of the Netherlands that aimed to strengthen policies and practices around education for peacebuilding in 14 countries. In Ethiopia, PBEA focused on strengthening resilience and social cohesion and improving equity in the country’s four marginalised Developing Regional States (DRS) – Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella and Somali. The US $4.7 million initiative was mainstreamed across UNICEF Ethiopia’s Country Programme (2012-2015) to build upon existing institutional strengths and give wider traction to the peacebuilding initiatives introduced.

The Evaluation Aims and Approach

Developmental Evaluation (DE) as an approach emerged recently in the evaluation literature in response to programmes and interventions that do not have a clear progression in terms of definition, objectives, and implementation strategies leading to a set of hypothesized outcomes. It was recommended by the UNICEF Evaluation Office for Ethiopia and Myanmar in response to the 2013 PBEA evaluability assessment which suggested that monitoring and evaluation systems were focused too heavily on outward accountability to donors and inadequate for capturing emerging learning within country offices.

The DE in Ethiopia focused on systematically capturing PBEA learning that could be infused into the programme to heighten its chances for success. It marked a move away from standardised monitoring approaches to a “learning oriented management approach” that stimulated learning about expected and unexpected results and allowed for real-time programmatic adjustment based on lessons learned (Van Ongevalle & Peel, 2014: 14).

The evaluation was conducted in two stages:

- **Stage 1**: a three-month period orientation to: i) develop a deeper understanding of the PBEA programme and its operating systems, ii) develop relationships within the UNICEF ECO team, and iii) create a learning framework to guide programmatic learning.

- **Stage 2**: a nine-month period of data collection to: i) map PBEA challenges and opportunities, according to the learning objectives, ii) provide opportunities to reflect on emergent learning and iii) feedback information to improve the programmatic achievement.

LEARNING OBJECTIVE 1: Cultural Dynamics Around Pastoral Education

UNICEF has supported the MoE’s Pastoralist Education Strategy since 2008 primarily through Alternative Basic Education initiatives. The PBEA programme scaled up interventions around the non-formal educational modality in Afar and Somali to address inequity among traditionally neglected pastoral communities. Activities largely included school construction, teacher training and the provision of teaching and learning materials. During the evaluation from Afar and Somali, key questions emerged that related to the inability of regions to sufficiently address the main conflict driver: inequity. The complex cultural dynamics and systems that surround pastoral communities significantly complicates the equitable provision of education and thereby the achievement of the PBEA. This issue was identified as a key area for learning. Therefore, two key DE evaluation questions were identified to improve and guide UNICEF programmatic learning:

1. What is the current status of pastoral education in Ethiopia?
2. How culturally and economically relevant is ABE to pastoralist livelihoods?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Key Findings
The findings presented below ‘mesh’ the DE’s ‘intuition with data’ collected (Gamble, 2008). Given the short timeframe of the DE, the recommendations provided were implemented in some cases while others provide an opportunity going forward for UNICEF ECO to adapt their strategic focus in continuing educational programmes for peace.

• UNICEF-sponsored trips facilitated the development of the 2008 Pastoralist Education Strategy. However, few modalities were actually implemented. Further, pastoralist ‘experience sharing’ trips as a primary intervention in the initial stage didn’t provide sufficient value in and of themselves to ensure a robust, implementable strategy.

• Implementation of 2008 pastoralist educational strategy was insufficient in creating equity across pastoralist areas. Although access has expanded, the type of education has failed to respond appropriately to pastoralists’ livelihood and culture, or to their need to retain flexibility in dealing with changing and possible adverse circumstances, and their other needs in a rapidly urbanising society.

• The lack of timetable and calendar flexibility of Alternative Basic Education Centres indicates that while the modality is culturally and economically relevant in its design, it is not in its application. Pastoral children must decide between their pastoral duties and education on a daily basis. Labour often wins due to the community’s need to maintain animal welfare.

At the UNICEF ECO level, successes and challenges were experienced through the mainstreaming approach taken with PBEA. The office decisively streamlined PBEA within the general education section portfolio. Rather than having a dedicated full time PBEA staff member, it was integrated as a subcomponent of the UNICEF Learning and Development programme (2012-2015). In addition, the programme channelled its interventions only through government partners with Direct Cash Transfers (DCTs) instead of working with NGOs. This management approach is unique to many PBEA programmes around the world. The UNICEF ECO therefore sought to document the lessons learned to improve their understanding around PBEA and help guide similar initiatives going forward. Four key DE evaluation questions were therefore identified to improve and guide UNICEF programmatic learning:

• What are the lessons learned from the mainstreaming approach taken with PBEA?
• How has UNICEF PBEA team addressed the sensitivities surrounding conflict in Ethiopia?
• Have UNICEF’s routine, integrated monitoring systems been sufficient for capturing PBEA results?
• How best can the ECO take forward the lessons learned of PBEA?

LEARNING OBJECTIVE 2 Mainstreaming and Management Lessons

Cultural Issues Around Pastoral Education

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Mainstreaming and Management Lessons Learned

- Strong upstream work conducted by the UNICEF ECO carved out a space to discuss PBEA in a sensitive environment.
- The UNICEF field staff struggled to manoeuvre within the existing structures of the REB and WEO to address conflict openly. Emphasis was largely placed on natural disasters (drought, flood, and environmental degradation) as opposed to man-made struggles. While this focus addressed factors that give rise to conflict, it didn’t facilitate direct engagement on conflict or more sensitive issues like ethnic tension.
- Stronger national level programme design and separate M&E structures required to sufficiently capture PBEA progress and maintain a collective programmatic vision.
- Using local universities and research institutes to conduct research increased the knowledge base on peacebuilding in Ethiopia.
- UNICEF proposal development presents the best opportunity to incorporate PBEA lessons learned and continue programmes for peace in Ethiopia.

Key Recommendations

Cultural Issues Around Pastoral Education

- Reflect internally on pastoralist education approaches in Ethiopia to adequately guide the development of the new 2016 Pastoralist Education Strategy. Instead of looking abroad for new modalities to trial, more added value would come from conducting in-depth analysis of the different modalities attempted in Ethiopia to understand factors that contributed to the success or failure of the differing approaches.
- Provide long-term technical support to the Ministry of Education to successfully guide the implementation of the 2016 Pastoralist Education Strategy and ensure that the Ministry actively learn from failure, avoid duplication of efforts and reduce ineffective spending around pastoral education.
- Explore and strengthen collaboration with pastoral development partners to ensure that education is part of the wider growth and transformation plan for pastoralists.
- Conduct a robust impact evaluation on Alternative Basic Education in pastoral areas to identify tangible recommendations for both the government and UNICEF to improve the provision of basic education to pastoralist regions.
- Maintain a dual focus on the aspirations of the pastoralist children: 1) to provide a route for those who wish to exit pastoralism, and 2) to provide education that is relevant, is of quality and enhances pastoralist livelihoods.
Building on its success of strengthening relationships at the Federal and Regional level, UNICEF ECO should explore ways to strengthen its focus on peacebuilding within the new Ministry of Education’s five-year Education Sector Development Plan. Focused should be placed on identifying explicit approaches which acknowledge how the intervention/result contributes to peacebuilding.

Invest more in cross sectoral UNICEF collaboration to tackle the multi-dimensional nature of conflict.

Build on existing advocacy efforts and adapt a direct or indirect focus towards engaging conflict based on the sensitivity of the context.

Instead of mainstreaming M&E systems across the programme, peacebuilding initiatives should have separate, systems to track progress towards theories of change and capture emergent learning.

Develop programme specific theories of change in close collaboration with field offices and gather more evidence at a local level to collectively validate the theories of change.

A full-time programme manager with experience in peacebuilding is recommended for lead PBEA like initiatives. This is particularly important in light of the key need for advocacy (at federal and regional levels) and for quality assurance to ensure explicit alignment of interventions within a theory of change.

Continue conducting research through local universities and research institutions.
This chapter provides the background and programme rationale, the evaluation purpose, objective, outputs, and scope of the 12-month Developmental Evaluation.
The Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) was a four-year (2012-2016) programme funded by the Government of the Netherlands (GoN). Fourteen countries in conflict-affected contexts were selected as the focus of the programme which included countries at risk of, or experiencing and recovering from conflict.

The strategic vision of the programme was to “strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-affected contexts,” with the strategic result of “strengthening policies and practices in education for peacebuilding.” The outcomes to be achieved included the following:

I. Increase inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analyses, and implementation;

II. Increase institutional capacities to supply conflict-sensitive education;

III. Increase capacity of children, parents, teachers and other duty-bearers to prevent, reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace;

IV. Increase access for children to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace; and

V. Contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge on policies and programming on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding.

1.1. Programme Description

In Ethiopia, PBEA was introduced towards the end of 2012 to support the Ministry of Education to strengthen resilience, social cohesion and improve equity in the four Developing Regional States (DRS): Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella and Somali. UNICEF Ethiopia pooled the US $4.7 million PBEA funds across its larger US $84 million Learning and Development Programme, thereby giving wider traction to the risk informed and conflict sensitive principles of PBEA. The Ministry of Education (MoE) was the sole implementer of PBEA over the four years with activities aligned to the Annual Work Plans of the MoE and the Regional Education Bureaus (REBs).
The geographical focus of the programme stemmed from the Government of Ethiopia’s constitutional obligation1 and subsequent provisions2 to assist the “least advantaged” DRS regions in Ethiopia through affirmative action. The four peripheral regions, distinguished from the other five “Developed Regional States”, are seen to have been neglected or exploited by previous governments, frequently disposed to man-made and natural disasters and particularly affected by their close proximity to the volatile situation with Ethiopia’s conflict prone border countries (Somalia in the east, Eritrea in the north-east, South Sudan and Sudan in the west). They lag significantly behind the rest of the country in almost all development indicators and are characterized by low government service delivery, weak regional governance systems and low capacities for planning and managing educational services which are seen as critical impediments to promoting equity and overcoming factors fuelling exclusion and grievance among marginalized communities.

In 2009, a UN Joint DRS Programme Mid-Term Review was launched to assess the lack of effective geographic and programmatic convergence of UN agencies around UNDAF results in the 9 regions of the country, and a UN Joint Programme was therefore launched to collectively address the regional inequities within Ethiopia by targeting the four DRS regions. The UN Joint DRS Programme, and hence the PBEA Programme, therefore selected a total of 22 lagging Woredas (districts) in order to accelerate development outcomes, increase equity and improve social indicators and stability.

The PBEA programme emerged from this setting and subsequently launched a context analysis to inform programme design and implementation. Conflict drivers in the DRS were identified and activities were launched to address the inequitable access to quality education in the DRS which was undermining social cohesion and resilience and contributing towards pressures for conflict (See Figure 2.)

### FIGURE 2 Conflict drivers

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<tr>
<td>• Political exclusion</td>
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<td>• Inter-regional territorial disputes</td>
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<td>• Inequitable economic development</td>
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<td>• Commercial agricultural development and encroachment</td>
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<th>Social Factors</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Tensions between native and settler groups</td>
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<td>• Mobilisation of ethnic and religious divisions</td>
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<td>• Gender-based violence and discrimination</td>
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<th>Environmental Factors</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Competition over scarce resources</td>
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<td>• Natural and man-made disasters</td>
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<tr>
<th>Security and Justice</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Refugee influx creating hostility</td>
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<td>• Border-related conflict</td>
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1 Government of Ethiopia 1991 Constitution, Article 89(4): “the Government shall provide special assistance to Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples least advantaged in economic and social development.”

2 2009 Federal Budget Grant Redistribution Formula aimed at rectifying vertical and horizontal imbalances in the DRS. The establishment of a Federal Board to Provide Affirmative Action for the DRS to initiate planning ideas, give coordinated and sustainable support with respect to plan preparation and implementation of less developed regions; give sustainable capacity building support to the less developed regions so that they can become self-reliant; and coordinate all federal development and good governance support provided to the less developed regions. The proclamation to provide the Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia provided a legal foundation to support special affirmative action for the DRS by the executive organs at federal level.
As a result, the PBEA in Ethiopia designed its programme around supporting the MoE and Regional Education Bureau’s (REBs) to address these conflict drivers by providing context responsive and equitable education services. These aims were articulated in contextualised outcomes and subsequent theories of change (see Figure 3. above)

During the four years of implementation, the programme addressed some key shortfalls identified within the context analysis, particularly the inequities in education undermining social cohesion and community resilience in the DRS regions. Key achievements include:

- **Mainstreaming peacebuilding as a principle in policy, curricula and planning structures.** Risk informed annual work plans (AWPs), Disaster Risk Reduction plans, and Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRP) were developed at regional and woreda (district) levels. The five-year Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP) - 2016/2020 - were developed at federal and regional levels to enshrine peacebuilding values into the existing government structures. Curriculum and learning materials were revised to eliminate cultural biases and expressions of hatred, and newly developed textbooks were translated into marginalised indigenous languages to reduce tensions and promote multi-ethnic participation. Within UNICEF, the new country programme document (2016-2020) integrated peacebuilding to take forward PBEA beyond 2016. These comprise significant milestones towards creating an enabling environment that can mitigate and respond to regional inequities and the impacts of stresses and shocks.
- **Strengthening institutional and individual capacities.** The capacity of UNICEF, federal, regional and woreda level planners were developed in context informed sector planning and management which enabled officials to promote equity, provide conflict sensitive education services, and develop risk-informed educational sector plans. More than 2,500 education personnel received training in guidance counseling, positive disciplining, effective planning and management, peacebuilding and school related gender based violence (SRGBV). This promoted education service delivery models to ‘act on’ factors creating vulnerability to stresses and shocks and address inequities that undermine social cohesion. In addition, the capacity of more than 15,000 individuals from school management committees, Parent Student Teacher Associations (PSTA), community members, parents and other care-givers was also strengthened through trainings on early stimulation, positive parenting practices and conflict-sensitive school management.

- **Improving inclusive and equitable access to education.** The programme increased children's access to education for marginalised communities through the construction of non-formal schools in neglected pastoral areas, the provision of teacher training and learning materials, the implementation of innovative education service delivery models for scale up and the initiation of go-to-school campaigns. Although in-school changes to facilitate peacebuilding in wider communities takes substantial time and proceeds through more indirect means (Bush and Saltarelli’s, 2000), extending access to education for marginalised communities affected by conflict and natural disasters brought safety and stability to children's lives. This equates to a peace dividend whilst also preventing the exacerbation of educational inequality.

- **Knowledge generation for peacebuilding.** In terms of research, the UNICEF Ethiopia Country Office (ECO) commissioned a large scale context analysis to inform PBEA and government programming and evaluated the contribution of PBEA on direct and indirect beneficiaries through a large scale Knowledge Attitudes and Practices Survey, as part of an innovative UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) M&E pilot assessment. In addition, the ECO completed two outcome case studies on the impact of Alternative Basic Education (ABE) in Pastoralist settings on peacebuilding and on school clubs building social cohesion and resilience; and hosted an Inter-Ministerial Pan African Symposium on Education, Resilience and Social Cohesion. This PBEA research prompted/motivated the Ministry of Education to embrace the importance of peacebuilding in education, which is demonstrated by the government's inclusion of peacebuilding as a significant issue within the MoE's new ESDP V.

### 1.2. Evaluation Features

**Background and Rationale**

The complexity of peacebuilding education is challenging for traditional evaluation methods. The outcome is influenced by a multitude of factors such as behaviour, attitudes, power, status, resource distribution, history of conflict, and externalities. Due to the interconnected nature of these factors, there was no linear cause-and-effect pathway towards the five outcomes listed earlier in this report. In recognition of this challenge, UNICEF's Evaluation Office sought to systematically assess the programme's readiness to be evaluated by examining the coherence and logic of the design and the capacity of the management and governance structures to implement, monitor and measure results. In 2013, a global evaluability assessment of PBEA was launched.

Considering the wide diversity of country contexts and the differential readiness and receptivity that PBEA programmes have towards comprehensive implementation, the assessment concluded that there was a need
to strengthen PBEA monitoring as the systems and indicators used were not yielding data for evaluating peacebuilding impact. While the majority of monitoring indicators at the activity and output levels were sufficient, programmes had yet to articulate clear evaluation indicators at the outcome or strategic vision/result levels (including individual behaviour change, policy implementation and social change). In addition, evaluations were deemed inadequate for capturing emergent learning within country offices; instead focusing too heavily on outward accountability, to capture the diversity of interventions, broad disparities in country profiles, and variations in navigating complexity.

A well-conceived and non-conventional end-of-programme evaluation effort was therefore required to capture the diversity of interventions, broad disparities in country profiles, and variations in navigating complexity, as well as balance accountability to funding authorities.

To this end, two major evaluative activities were proposed for the PBEA programme: 1) an exercise to assist in the systematic documentation of the lessons of PBEA over a period of 12-21 months; and 2) a summative outcome evaluation during the final year of the programme. This report concerns the former and is based on an emerging evaluation modality: ‘developmental evaluation’ (DE). The latter outcome evaluation was completed in November 2015.

**Description of approach**

Developmental evaluation (Patton, 2011) emerged recently in the evaluation literature in response to complex programmes and interventions that do not have a clear progression in terms of definition, objectives, and implementation strategies leading to a set of hypothesized outcomes. It is an evaluation approach that is well suited for programmes characterised as follows (Patton, 2008, 2011; Gamble, 2008):

- **Complex interventions**, categorised by uncertainty as to how to achieve the desired outcomes; non-linearity in terms of how the desired change takes place; and emergence of patterns where triggering conditions are difficult if not impossible to identify;

- **Socially complex themes**, requiring collaboration across a multitude of stakeholders that offer differing understandings of programme objectives and how to achieve them;

- **Innovative interventions**, that can be optimised through the use of real-time feedback for learning; and processing this feedback to modify and improve the programme to increase potential achievement of desired outcomes.

DE then assists evaluation processes that support programme and organisational development, including “asking evaluative questions, applying evaluation logic, and gathering real time data to inform ongoing decision makers and adaptations. The evaluator is often part of a development team whose members collaborate to conceptualise, design and test new approaches in a long-term, ongoing process of continuous development, adaption and experimentation, keenly sensitive to unintended results and side effects. The evaluator’s primary function in the team is to infuse team discussions with evaluative questions, thinking, and data, and to facilitate systematic, data-based reflection and decision making in the developmental process” (Patton, 2011, 1-2).

PBEA programmes fall into this category of complexity in which the most important relationships of cause and effect are fundamentally unknown, thereby challenging traditional summative and formative evaluation approaches. Indeed, while the PBEA funded countries share the same programme goals, they are quite distinct in terms of their country specific PBEA conceptualization. A DE framework therefore facilitated an in-depth

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description of the unique contextual characteristics, the conflict drivers and the social structure of each initiative and the dynamic stakeholder relationships that continuously shaped country-specific PBEA conceptualization and activities. It was an approach that supported evaluative thinking and adaptive learning in complex initiatives whilst also allowing for the flexibility and creativity required to evaluate such phenomena using methods that yield the credible evidence needed in monitoring and evaluation. Ultimately, there was no judgement provided on success or failure of a programme, instead, feedback is provided on what’s working, for whom, and under what conditions. (Patton, 2008, 2011; Gamble, 2008; Dozois et al., 2010).

**Purpose**

The purpose of evaluation was to systematically capture PBEA learning that could be infused into the programme to heighten its chances for success. Findings will be used to document learning around the contributions that UNICEF has made through PBEA and support the team to strengthen implementation going forward. The DE was part of UNICEF Ethiopia’s PBEA’s outcome 5, to support “the generation and use of evidence and knowledge in policies and programming related to equity in education, social cohesion and peacebuilding”.

The primary intended audience for this report is the UNICEF Ethiopia Education Section, and UNICEF Ethiopia Senior Management. Secondary audiences include UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO), the PBEA Programme Management Team and NYHQ staff.

**Objectives and Outputs**

The objective of the evaluation reflects the purpose of capturing emergent learning across PBEA: What new learning and/or improvements were effected to improve attainment of results and/or outcomes? The focus of the objective was narrowed through a learning framework developed within the UNICEF ECO team.

The main outputs of the evaluation were:

1. An inception report explaining the evaluation methodology and approach (completed by a Lead Evaluator to guide the Support Evaluators in the execution of DE);
2. Country-level monthly evaluation reports to provide quality assurance/review;
3. This final evaluation report, presenting the consolidated findings, conclusions and recommendations.

**Scope of Evaluation**

The DE was implemented in both Ethiopia and Myanmar. It was managed by a US based Lead Evaluator and implemented by two Support Evaluators embedded in each country office. The Lead Evaluator was responsible for conceptualising and guiding the technical execution of the evaluation in the two PBEA implementing countries. Each Support Evaluator, hired as external consultants, then worked from within their respective Country Offices to adapt the DE methodology to the country context and facilitate the execution of the evaluation as an integral part of the country programme team.

This report presents the findings of the DE conducted in Ethiopia. It will draw upon evidence from primary and secondary sources obtained from the UNICEF ECO gathered between May 2015 and June 2016. Considering the DE was initiated in Ethiopia during the final year of PBEA implementation, the recommendations introduced through the DE should be seen within this limited timeframe as their effect on the attainment of PBEA results may only be witnessed within the next UNICEF Country Programme (2016-2020).

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5 The DE in Myanmar took place over 21 months, while the DE in Ethiopia took place over 12 months.
This chapter outlines the methodology employed as part of the Developmental Evaluation in Ethiopia. It begins by presenting the overall premise of devising a DE methodology, outlines the design of the evaluation and then presents data collection approaches.
2.1. Overview

Unlike other evaluation strategies, the scope and dimensions of DE are not set in advance. There is no prescriptive methodology. The approach is determined by the needs and context of the programme and builds on methods borrowed from other disciplines such as organisational and community development, traditional evaluations and applied social sciences (Dezois et al. 2010). Techniques can include interviews, focus group discussions, surveys, questions via e-mail, interpretation and observation. While these methods are common to most evaluation processes; the difference in DE is that the evaluation accompanies the development process so that questioning and learning happen simultaneously with action (Gamble, 2008: 30).

2.2. Developing the Methodology

As DE is an adaptive and context-specific approach, the development of the methodology required significant early investigative work. With no step-by-step instructions, ‘A Practitioners Guide to Developmental Evaluation’ was followed which provided guidance on key entry points for the DE to develop a sense of the landscape of work and help in identifying key areas of focus (Dezois et. al. 2010: 27-31).

Following the practical guidance on these three entry points formed the major focus of the first 3 months of the DE.

2.3. Orientation

DE effectiveness is determined by how well an initiative itself is understood and the broader context it is trying to influence. Three months were therefore dedicated towards developing a deeper understanding of DE and the PBEA programme and the systems that potentially impact PBEA outcomes. In total, the orientation stage engaged 39 key informants through interviews, small group and focus group discussions. The DE orientation was conducted in two phases: 1) developing an ECO DE country profile; and 2) developing regional level profiles through field visits to implementing regions.

### TABLE 1 Key DE practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orientating yourself</td>
<td>A successful orientation can help build a deep understanding of PBEA specific problems/ opportunities, resources, stakeholders and the broader context;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building relationships</td>
<td>Building relationships between the evaluator and the regional focal points as the quality of these relationships determines the degree to which the evaluator can access information and influence change;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a learning framework</td>
<td>Developing learning objectives with key stakeholders can guide PBEA learning by mapping key challenges and opportunities, highlighting potential areas for learning, and identifying feedback mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2 Key informants engaged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Stakeholder Group</th>
<th># of Key Informants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>UNICEF HQ Staff</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lead Evaluator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>UNICEF RO Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>UNICEF Ethiopia HQ Staff</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF Ethiopia Field Staff</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DE Country Profile**

Within the first two months of the evaluation, specific DE questions identified by the Lead Evaluator in the DE inception report were explored to inform the DE process and provide a basis on which to develop a learning
framework. The research was predominantly conducted through document reviews, participation in and observation of workshops and informal interviews and discussions with the Addis Ababa UNICEF team, the UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa PBEA Regional Advisor, and key MoE Directorates.

1. How did the PBEA initiative emerge? What issues were considered in terms of site selection?

The PBEA programme emerged from the Government of Ethiopia’s focus on equity in their ESDP IV and their constitutional commitment to provide ‘special assistance to nations, nationalities and peoples least advantaged in economic and social development’. The 4 DRS regions of Ethiopia where PBEA is being implemented lag significantly behind the other 5 regions in the country and have been marginalized within previous governments. The MOE and the Regional Education Bureau’s saw PBEA as an opportunity to improve context responsive education service delivery within the 22 target DRS woredas and reduce the factors that have the potential to give rise to conflict. Promoting equity and equitable access to education and overcoming factors fuelling exclusion and grievances among marginalized and vulnerable communities were the key issues considered, especially among pastoralists in Afar and Somali and indigenous populations in Benishangul Gumuz and Gambella.

2. What was the initial primary focus of the Ethiopia PBEA initiative?

From 2012 until 2014, the conflict analysis was the major focus of the PBEA programme. Of significant concern was garnering support for the findings from the Ministry of Education, the DRS regions and target woredas. Due to the sensitive nature of discussing issues of conflict in Ethiopia, the conflict analysis didn’t commence until January 2013, and although it had only been planned as a five-month activity, the entire process lasted until August 2014 due to regional complications in endorsing the findings. The delays in endorsement meant that PBEA had to be funded during the initial stages on a fast track basis (USD$500,000) over government agreed activities, which was primarily school construction.

From the outset, the federal MoE was uncomfortable with the title ‘conflict analysis’ and preferred the use of the title ‘context analysis’ due to the negative connotations surrounding the word ‘conflict’ in Ethiopia. At a regional level, Afar and Somali delayed the finalization of the analysis by more than one year due to a dispute over the findings outlined in the report and the perceived political implications for their regions. Significant efforts were made during this initial stage to overcome these barriers by effectively communicating the purpose of the PBEA initiative, providing a platform for joint visioning and consensus building, explaining the role of education in peacebuilding and trying to shift attitudes away from the traditional view of peacebuilding within only the peace and security agenda to a broader understanding. In the end, endorsement was achieved by building significant trust, altering some of the language and limiting the document’s dissemination to only government partners.

3. What resources (human, and financial) did PBEA have to work with?

UNICEF has been operating in Ethiopia since 1952 and has a longstanding relationship with the government. It has a staff of more than 400 and operates in all 9 regions as well as at federal level with sector ministries. Intersectoral collaboration across UNICEF occurs in each woreda from at least two sectors (WASH, Health, Education, Child Protection and Nutrition) throughout the country.

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7 The full title of the context analysis was: Equity, Social Cohesion and Peacebuilding through the Education Sector: Context Analysis for the Developing Regional States of Ethiopia
In the Education Section, there are 23 staff, of which 14 are based in Addis Ababa while the remainder work as Field Education Officers in Area Programme Support Offices in 8 regions. There was no full time staff dedicated to PBEA programming in Ethiopia. The Education Section Chief led the initiative, while the Education Specialist responsible for Access and Equity in the Learning and Development Programme held full responsibility for the implementation and coordination of all PBEA activities. An Education Specialist for M&E then supported the monitoring and coordination of the PBEA Programme. In each of the DRS UNICEF field offices, an education officer supported the implementation of the programme along with other initiatives, with the exception of Somali that has two education officers. The programme was then implemented in full through government structures at a federal, regional and woreda level.

In terms of financial resources, the PBEA programme’s total funding is $4,691. The largest expenditure has been in Afar and Somali where more than 30% has been spent on infra-structural costs creating access to primary schooling for marginalised pastoral children.

4. What has the greatest potential for favourable PBEA impact?

The large emphasis placed on creating equitable access to education for pastoralist children should provide the greatest potential for impact based on financial investment. The upstream policy work at federal level in generating a deeper understanding around peacebuilding and education has also shown demonstrable impact through the MoE’s incorporation of peacebuilding within the next five year ESDP V plan.

5. What was tried within the programme in terms of strategies for achieving PBEA objectives (processes, activities, etc.)?

As mentioned previously, PBEA is not delivered as a stand-alone programme. Like all education programmes in the UNICEF Ethiopian country office, it is streamlined through existing four year UNICEF Country Programmes, and integrated specifically into the Education Section’s US $84 million Learning and Development programme framework (2012-2015). This integration has simplified processes within the Education Section and focused on one unified structure, e.g. “Output 4.1. Context sensitive, equitable access to quality education (formal and non-formal) enhanced for pastoralist and other disadvantaged children” is subsumed under the Access and Equity output area in the L&D framework: “Output 2. By 2015, regional capacity to provide equitable access to education to boys and girls at primary and lower secondary level are strengthened in 11 regions.”

This mainstreaming approach was seen as important in not overcomplicating work by establishing parallel systems. Since UNICEF work across multiple funding agencies, this streamlining approach was seen to simplify programme management which is important when there is only one representative from the education team in each the field offices (except for Somali where there are two).

Implementing in full through the Government of Ethiopia was another strategy employed. Due to the legal confines of programme implementation through NGOs in Ethiopia, UNICEF ECO partners directly with the government for all programme implementation. This differs from many other PBEA countries where NGO’s are contracted to implement certain activities. In Ethiopia, all activities are aligned with the Annual Work Plans (AWPs) of the Federal MoE, the REBs and the Woreda Education Offices (WEOs) to ensure UNICEF is reinforcing key priorities identified by the MoE. This ensures that UNICEF is working within the MoE’s ESDP

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8 For more information on the legal restrictions, see the 2009 Proclamation to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies (CSP). It is a comprehensive law governing the registration and regulation of NGOs which restricts NGOs that receive more than 10% of their financing from foreign sources from engaging in human rights and advocacy related activities.
and not establishing parallel systems of implementation, which gives greater traction for sustainable impact.

The government institutions have therefore led, prioritised and implemented PBEA activities with funds channelled directly through the federal and regional offices via the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BoFED). UNICEF then provides system-wide training and capacity building support at the institutional and individual level and monitors programmatic implementation so the partners are able to execute the programmes successfully and sustainably.

Key activities for achieving PBEA objectives have already been mentioned in Chapter 1.

6. Who were the key stakeholders in the PBEA initiative within Ethiopia?

The main stakeholders involved in the PBEA programme are UNICEF Ethiopia, UNICEF ESARO, the MoE, the Bureaus of Finance and Economic Development (BoFEDs), the DRSs Administrative Councils, the Disaster Risk Reduction and Food Security Sector (DRRFSS), Addis Ababa University, UN Joint DRS Programme Agencies, Education Cluster for Disaster Risk Reduction, the DRS REB’s, WEO’s, schools, communities and PTAs. At the federal level, the key directorates for PBEA are a) Special Support and Inclusive Education, b) Planning and Resource Mobilization, and c) Curriculum Development and Instruction.

Regional DE Thematic Profiles

In the third month of the DE, field trips were conducted to three of the four regions where PBEA was implemented. In total, 25 key informants from UNICEF Field Offices, REBs and WEOs were engaged to generate regional level DE profiles. A semi structured questionnaire was administered and included questions on identifying causal connections and emerging patterns, examining different perspectives on PBEA initiatives, and contextualising the field offices understanding of conflict drivers, challenges and solutions. Responses were then re-structured based on thematic areas covered in the questioning (See Appendix 1).

Information gathered from the DE profile questions and the DE thematic profiles were further analysed and prioritised to form the learning framework.

2.4. Relationship Building

Investing early during the first 3 months of the DE in establishing successful relationships was important for accessing information needed to form a well-developed understanding of the programme, including the decisions made, the delays, emerging threats and potential opportunities. It was also crucial to develop the capacity to influence given that the primary purpose of DE is supporting programmatic learning that enables feedback and reflection to optimise the PBEA programme. Unobtrusive observations on programme dynamics is built on trusted relationships, as is the ability to influence team members to modify and adapt the PBEA programme towards more favourable impact.

2.5. Development of Learning Framework

A learning framework documents the conditions for learning as part of the DE (Dezois et. Al. 2010). It charts out key challenges and opportunities by identifying what UNICEF Ethiopia should focus on going forward, as well was what they need to learn from the PBEA initiative. It’s a living document that often undergoes many alterations throughout a DE but ultimately gives structure and direction for learning and programme improvement.

In order to develop the framework, the information gathered during the orientation stage was reviewed for the top threats and opportunities.

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9 The fourth region wasn’t visited during the DE due to staff turnover of the education officer leading the PBEA initiative.
associated with PBEA going forward. It was further analysed thematically, with specific objectives selected for validation. Two learning objectives were then selected after deliberations with the PBEA focal point, the UNICEF ESARO PBEA Regional Advisor and the Lead DE Evaluator. A key factor in this selection process was to maintain a practical focus to ensure that the objectives selected were not seen to be overly ambitious, considering the short timeframe left in PBEA.

Over the remaining 9-month period of the DE, the evaluator assisted the PBEA team to enhance learning around the two identified learning objectives, provide opportunities for reflection and incorporate the feedback into UNICEF ECO programming.

2.6. Application of DE

The application of DE was practised in line with four broader functions identified by Dezois et. Al (2010) in ‘A Practitioners Guide to Developmental Evaluation’: 1) orienting the group 2) observing, 3) sense-making, and 4) intervening.

Key to the application of these four practices was providing sufficient time to reflect on how the information can be used in terms of feedback to enhance UNICEF programming. Therefore, the DE followed a phased interventional approach that facilitated strategic pauses along the way in order to reflect and incorporate feedback to improve UNICEF programme planning and implementation.

LEARNING OBJECTIVE 1 Cultural Dynamics Around Pastoral Education

Across the DE Regional Profiles developed, one of the conflict drivers highlighted was inequity in pastoral areas. This manifests itself within and across social services, infrastructure and human resource capacities. In the field of education, the 2008 Pastoralist Education Strategy was developed to expand access to equitable, quality and relevant education and bridge the huge gap of participation in education between pastoralist areas and other parts of the Country. Alternative Basic Education (ABE) was the modality championed by the MoE as part of the strategy to provide pastoral children with relevant access to basic education. With a flexible timetable, ABE’s is designed to provide contextualised non-formal schooling (grades 1-4) at a time that suit pastoral children and their livelihood activities.

UNICEF has supported the ABE initiative since 2008 and has scaled up its programming around this modality through PBEA in Afar and Somali to address marginalisation among traditionally neglected pastoral communities. Activities implemented predominantly included school construction, teacher training, and the provision of teaching/learning materials. Part of PBEA’s outcome 4, UNICEF sought to increase pastoral communities’ resilience to stresses and shocks thereby resulting in greater social cohesion and resilience.

However, key questions emerged from the DE regional profiles in Afar and Somali which relate particularly to the inability for regions to sufficiently address the main conflict driver: inequity (See Appendix 1 DE Regional Profiles for more details). The complex cultural dynamics and systems that surround pastoralist communities significantly complicates the equitable provision of education and thereby the achievement of the PBEA intended outcome. This issue was identified as a key area for learning. Therefore, two key DE evaluation questions were identified to improve and guide UNICEF programmatic learning:

- What is the current status of pastoral education in Ethiopia?
- How culturally and economically relevant is ABE to pastoralist livelihoods?
At the UNICEF ECO level, successes and challenges were experienced through the mainstreaming approach taken with PBEA. The office decisively streamlined PBEA within the general education section portfolio. Rather than having a dedicated full time PBEA staff member, it was integrated as a subcomponent of the UNICEF Learning and Development programme (2012-2015). In addition, the programme channelled its interventions only through government partners with Direct Cash Transfers (DCTs) instead of working with NGOs. This management approach is unique to many PBEA programmes around the world.

In taking this approach, many challenges were observed and many opportunities taken, especially considering the difficulties addressing the issue of conflict within Ethiopia. Key concerns emerging from the DE orientation related to the need to document the lessons learned from the mainstreaming approach for knowledge management purposes and identify how best UNICEF ECO can build on the PBEA approach taken and guide future peacebuilding programme efforts. Four key DE evaluation questions were therefore identified to improve and guide UNICEF programmatic learning:

- What are the lessons learned from the mainstreaming approach taken with PBEA?
- How has UNICEF PBEA team addressed the sensitivities surrounding conflict in Ethiopia?
- Has UNICEF’s routine, integrated monitoring systems been sufficient for capturing PBEA results?
- How best can the ECO take forward the lessons learned of PBEA?

2.7. Data Collection Process

The focus of the DE was primarily on capturing process-focused learning emerging from each of the learning objectives. From the outset, a data collection framework was established in conjunction with the Lead Evaluator. This was reported against on a monthly basis during the course of the 12 month DE. This included: 1) summarising key activities and notable events; 2) capturing emergent learning, reflecting and incorporating feedback across the learning objectives; and 3) identifying issues and challenges in programme implementation and the application of the DE. Findings were shared with the UNICEF ECO Education Section, the UNICEF ESARO PBEA Regional Advisor, the Lead Developmental Evaluator, and the UNICEF Evaluation Manager.

Data collection occurred in two stages.

Stage 1: Involved a three-month period of on-site data collection using these methods:
- Review of ECO programme documentation and external documentation;
- Review of existing literature on peacebuilding and developmental evaluation;
- Individual and group interviews with 7 ECO staff in Addis Ababa.
- Three field office visits (Afar, Benishangul Gumuz and Somali) to conduct individual interviews and focus group discussions with 6 UNICEF staff, 19 Government partners and 3 beneficiaries, and observe programme activities.

Stage 2: Involved a nine-month period of data collection to map PBEA challenges and opportunities, according to the learning objectives, and gather information to be infused
into UNICEF programmes. The methods used to collect data during this phase were as follows:

- Observations of programmatic activities and processes (documented in DE monthly reports);
- Facilitation and examination of secondary data relative to pastoral education;
- Individual interviews and participatory workshops with UNICEF ECO key informants on lessons learned and challenges experienced.

Primary data collection was gathered from 51 key informants throughout the DE process.

### 2.8. Limitations of Approach

The main limitations of the approach relate to the practical application of the DE during orientation and close out.

- **Staff turnover affected DE orientation.** Staff turnover during the initial stages of the evaluation affected the degree of DE readiness within the Ethiopia Country Office. The Chief of Education retired one month into the DE and her replacement wasn’t appointed until four months later. In addition, five months into the DE, the Education Specialist responsible for managing PBEA also retired. This position wasn’t replaced as the country office was undergoing a reshuffling of its organisational structure as part of the new country programme (2016-2020). While the UNICEF ECO was understaffed, it was embarking on a new four-year Country Programme. Obtaining buy-in across the education section, assessing the learning climate and developing mutual trust was challenging given that staff were overburdened during this period.

- **Premature end of contract for Lead Evaluator.** The Lead Evaluator was contracted from an academic university and tasked with the overall responsibility for the technical guidance of the DE and its quality. However, four months prior to the end of the PBEA programme, the Lead Evaluator moved positions to another university which had contractual implications for the DE. Unable to initiate another institutional contract within the limited timeframe of PBEA, this meant that a field visit from the Lead Evaluator wasn’t possible, and that the support evaluators were tasked with guiding the finalisation of the DE.

Despite these limitations, the evaluator believes the findings and conclusions of the evaluation are reliable, particularly the iterative participatory process used to gather data which was fed back into UNICEF programme strategies to improve peacebuilding through education.
This chapter provides the findings of the evaluation related to the first DE learning objective. It begins by presenting the rationale, key challenges and opportunities behind the learning objective and then presents the overall evaluation findings, reflections and recommendations.
3.1. Context

Within the framework of the 1994 Education and Training Policy (ETP), the Government of Ethiopia embarked on the first five-year Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP I) in 1997 which focused on increasing access to primary education from 3.7 million to 7 million. The target was surpassed with enrolment reaching 8.1 million by 2001. Despite the increased enrolment, significant inequities existed in access to education, particularly in pastoral communities.

Pastoralists constitute a large proportion of the Ethiopian population, with an estimated 12–15 million people (between 14%-18% of the population), and they inhabit 60% of the land area (PFE, 2006), predominantly in the regions of Afar, Oromia, SNNPR, and Somali. Due to long periods of neglect under previous governments, pastoralist communities have historically had limited access to education and other social services. Children and youth have been unable to regularly attend formal school because their communities migrate for varied periods of the year or because there were simply no schools located in their remote area.

In order to address these inequities and achieve universal primary education (UPE) by 2015, the Ministry of Education began exploring non-formal and alternative solutions by commissioning a study in 2000 entitled “Alternative Routes to Basic Education”. In addition, UNESCO and UNICEF (2002) commissioned a study on Nomadic Education in East Africa which recommended Alternative Basic Education (ABE) as a suitable approach to be expanded within Ethiopia.

Alternative Basic Education is a non-formal educational modality that offers the first cycle of primary (grades 1-4) in a flexible manner. Intended to attract some of the 4.8 million primary school aged children that were out of school in 2002, the programme was devised in two forms in Ethiopia: 1) for children at the right age; and 2) for overage students in a condensed three year programme (ages 11-14). According to the national guidelines (MoE, 2006), ABE was designed to provide:

- 8 months of education in the same place;
- learner oriented teaching;
- flexible and participatory scheduling of classes;
- low-cost construction;
- teaching in the local language,
- facilitator from the local community; and
- education to under-served pastoralist populations.

Following some initial piloting by NGOs in pastoral communities, ABE was formally introduced as a means of providing lower primary education in the ESDP II (2002/03 – 2004/05). Since this introduction, ABE has contributed, on average, 4-6 percent to the Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) for basic primary education each year.

Furthermore, pastoralists were given special attention in the third Education Sector Development Plan (2005/2006-2010/2011). The government streamlined pastoralist education as a priority for all sub-sectors of the educational system. A Pastoral Education Strategy was then developed in 2008 to guide the MoE to:

- Expand access to equitable, quality and relevant education in pastoralist areas with the active participation of the community.
- Bridge the huge gap of participation in education that prevails between pastoralist areas and other parts of the country.

Specific challenges and opportunities in pastoral communities were outlined and strategies identified to promote primary and secondary education for these marginalised communities.
UNICEF supported the development of the pastoralist education strategy and has since supported pastoralist education primarily through ABE. Since 2008, UNICEF has constructed more than 1,500 ABE centres creating educational opportunities for more than 270,000 children.

As part of the PBEA programme, UNICEF identified inequitable access to education as one of the major conflict drivers in the pastoral regions of Afar and Somali. PBEA therefore supported ABE programming to address and make gains in Outcome 4 (i.e. increase access to quality, relevant, context responsive education that contributes to social cohesion and peace). It was guided by the theory of change that by providing marginalised communities with access to flexible and safe learning spaces with culturally and economically relevant curriculum, excluded communities will be more resilient to shocks and stresses resulting in greater social cohesion and resilience.

Resilience as it affects children in school is defined as the “social and emotional knowledge, skills and attitudes [that] help students cope with adversity, and foster their resilience. Resilience is the ability to recover, perform and transform from situations of adversity. Applied to the education sector it relates to vulnerable individuals achieving learning outcomes and social and emotional well-being even in contexts of overwhelming difficulty” (World Bank, IRC, 2013).

Related activities of the PBEA programme included:

- Development of new permanent ABE construction design for Somali and Afar;
- Construction of 52 ABE centres in Afar and Somali to provide first time access to education for over 3,000 children from pastoralist and agro-pastoralist backgrounds¹⁰;
- Construction of supplementary classrooms in 14 ABECs to offer two extra grade levels;
- Renovation of classrooms in six ABECs to meet child friendly school standards;
- Provision of furniture and basic learning supplies to 291 ABE centres;
- Provision of more than 1,000 scholarships to pastoralist girls to continue education beyond grade 4;
- Teacher training on multi-grade for 160 teachers;
- Scale up of migration education cards in Somali to assist children to attend another ABE during migration periods;
- Support to the revision of the 2008 Pastoralist Education Strategy.

Since a number of related key challenges and opportunities emerged from the DE Regional Profiles and the majority of PBEA funds were allocated towards improving pastoral education, increasing UNICEF’s programmatic learning around the cultural issues and systems was selected as a learning objective. This will help UNICEF ECO better understand its own contributions and provide guidance on how UNICEF can best align its strategic focus on equity and pastoralist education beyond PBEA.

### 3.2. Key Challenges and Opportunities

**Weak implementation of 2008 Pastoralist Education Strategy and insufficient strategic reflection.** The original strategic plan from 2008 was developed by the Special Support and Inclusive Education (SSIE) Directorate, who holds responsibility over pastoralist education. The strategy development process included: 1) a needs assessment; 2) UNICEF supported

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¹⁰ Pastoralism as a livelihood is based mainly on livestock; they live and source most of their food source and income from domestic livestock production (Getachew, 2001; Dawit, 2000). Agro-pastoralists then engage in opportunistic crop farming integrated with livestock husbandry (Brule, 2002).
experience sharing trips for the SSIE Directorate to other pastoral countries, including Iran (2006), Kenya (2007), Nigeria (2008); 3) a workshop in the dominant pastoral areas; 4) a situation analysis and strategy and validating the findings with the regions. The final strategic plan contained a variety of potential interventions, including ABE, mobile schools; para-boarding schools; hostels; distance education; and education radio programmes. However, with the exception of ABE, the majority of the different practices weren’t implemented, and those that were trialled were deemed unsuccessful.

With little focus on adaption to the Ethiopian context and insufficient technical support to effectively pilot the different strategies, the various initiatives were largely seen as “failed” by the SSIE Directorate. Despite the fact that further “experience sharing” was conducted overseas with UNICEF support to Tanzania and Uganda in 2012, the Directorate believed they had exhausted all avenues and needed to conduct more South-South trips to gain more experience and find new initiatives to introduce to Ethiopia in a new Pastoralist Education Strategy.

These challenges are problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it highlights the lack of human resource and financial capacity within the SSIE to sufficiently oversee and support the implementation of a national level strategy at the regional level. Secondly, there is a lack of self-awareness and internal reflection on the reasons for the ‘failure’ of the strategy.

Lack of evidence on impact of pastoralist education modalities. Since the development of the 2008 Pastoralist Education Strategy, the MoE stated that there have been no baseline or impact evaluations on the quality of any of the different modalities presented in the strategy. Or if these studies have been done, the results have not been shared with the SSIE Directorate.

Of particular concern to UNICEF and PBEA is the lack of robust evidence on the impact of ABE. Indeed, access related information is readily available and great strides have been made in the expansion of basic primary across the country with net enrolment increasing from 82.1% in 2002 to 92.6% in 2014 (MoE, 2014). However, there is a need to assess the quality of interventions and determine their progress towards creating more equity in pastoral regions. Such an evaluation is timely considering the changing dynamics between rural and urban areas in Ethiopia and the Government of Ethiopia’s ambition to become a middle income country by 2025.

Implicit biases perpetuating livelihood marginalisation. Within the 2008 Pastoralist Education Strategy, there exist implicit cultural biases demonstrated against pastoral communities in the form of language such as ‘backward’ or ‘primitive’ when speaking of pastoral communities in Ethiopia. See below two example quotations from the 2008 strategy:

- “The down-trodden economic status of pastoralists that is mainly based on backward animal rearing practices severely limits their capacity to support the education system financially and materially” (MOE, 2008: 4);
- “Low level of awareness on the importance of education and reluctance to send girls to school on the part of pastoralists that stems from deep-rooted backward mind-set and harmful traditional practices” (MOE, 2008: 4).

As the Government of Ethiopia was the sole implementer of PBEA, these assumptions have the potential to shape the development and implementation of the programme. The bias towards pastoralist livelihoods was also seen to be emerging from a local level. A PBEA case study on Pastoralist Education in Somali identified an emergent theory of change for ABE from local partners and government counterparts: “By changing livelihoods through ABE (from pastoralist and agro-pastoralist to a range of sedentarist livelihoods), drivers of conflict related to livelihood will be reduced or eliminated altogether” (UNICEF, 2015: vii).
Since ABE supported through PBEA was intended to be culturally and economically relevant for pastoral and agro-pastoralist communities, this implicit bias risks damaging social cohesion and resilience among pastoralists, the very outcome PBEA was trying to achieve.

**Revision of 2008 Pastoralist Education Strategy.**
The key opportunity to align with this learning objective was the revision of the new pastoralist education strategy in 2015/2016. UNICEF agreed in the 2015/2016 Annual Work Plan (AWP) that it would support the SSIE Directorate to revise the strategy, 8 years after its original design. This provided an opportunity not only to revise each of the challenges faced during implementation and reflect on the changing environment in which pastoralists live, but also to establish a new process of strategic implementation. This provided the framework for incorporation of real-time feedback from the learning objective for programme improvement.

### 3.3. DE Research Questions

To ensure that the DE was intentional about where to focus its energy and attention, two evaluation questions were developed to guide learning about ‘cultural issues around pastoral education’.

1. **What is the current status of pastoral education in Ethiopia?** By looking at the progress and challenges encountered since the launch of the 2008 Pastoralist Education Strategy, it allows UNICEF to learn from the broader systems that Pastoralist Education operates in and understand how UNICEF can best align their strategic focus on equity and pastoralist education beyond PBEA.

2. **How culturally and economically relevant is ABE to pastoralist livelihoods?** This will help determine how sufficient PBEA’s contribution to ABE has been in addressing the major conflict driver of inequity. It will also assist in revising the policy direction of UNICEF going forward on ABE as a flexible and contextualised educational modality.

### 3.4. DE Activities

As part of the learning objective, the activities were completed between September 2015 and June of 2016. As an embedded member of the programme, the key functions of DE (observing, sense-making and intervening), were also practiced throughout the DE to create the space to challenge and question learning in a way that didn’t stifle creativity but moved the conversation forward.

#### TABLE 4 Key DE Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of pastoralist education partnership and conduct regular</td>
<td>A partnership was established between the MoE, UNICEF and British Council’s Quality Education Strategic Support Programme (QESSP) in October 2015 to take forward the revision of the 2008 Pastoral Education Strategy. Seven members of the three organisations were identified to form the Pastoralist Education Task Force, which provided technical guidance to the development of the strategy. A terms of reference (TOR) was developed to provide structure and guide this process, with costs shared between organisations across deliverables. More than 20 meetings were held since October 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoralist Education Task Force meetings</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Activity Description

**UNICEF ESARO Meeting with SSIE Directorate**  
**Date:** Jan, 2016  
Meeting held to: 1) discuss the revision of the 2008 Pastoral Education Strategy and 2) share pastoralist lessons learned from other Eastern and Southern African countries and 3) provide inputs based on the Ethiopia Context analysis, which showed how formal services have been undermining the resilience of pastoral communities in Ethiopia and contributing to vulnerability.

**Pastoralist strategy reflection workshop**  
**Date:** Jan, 2016  
A consultative workshop was conducted in Adama, Oromia to discuss the current status of the 2008 pastoral strategy with more than 30 educational partners (government, universities and NGOs) from the four pastoral regions of Afar, Oromia, SNNPR and Somali. The workshop gathered critical information to guide the strategic revision process, and as a result the learning objective, including what worked, what didn’t work and what is missing from the current strategy. The workshop was financed by UNICEF’s PBEA.

**Consultants hired to develop strategy with Pastoralist Education Task Force**  
**Date:** Mar, 2016  
Two PhD level consultants with experience in pastoralist education were hired to conduct a situational analysis and develop the new strategy with the MoE. The consultant fees were financed by British Council’s QESSP with some logistical arrangements covered by UNICEF.

**Situational analysis conducted**  
**Date:** May-Apr, 2016  
A situational analysis was conducted by the consultants and the MoE in Afar, Oromia, SNNPR and Somali. In total, 231 key informants were engaged and questioned on the state of pastoralist education in Ethiopia through focus group discussions or semi-structured interviews. This included participants from the government (Region, Zone and Woreda), development partners, religious institutions, Teacher Training Colleges, Universities, ABEs, Boarding schools, Hostels, Primary schools, Parent Teacher Associations, students and communities. Classroom observations also took place in 5 primary schools, 3 boarding schools, 2 hostels and 12 ABE’s across 8 districts.

**Situational Analysis dissemination workshops**  
**Date:** Apr, 2016  
A dissemination workshop was held on April 5 for the MOE, UNICEF and British Council. Another dissemination workshop was held on April 9 during UNICEF annual retreat to ensure findings would inform the new Annual Work Plan (starting July, 2016).

**TOR developed for ABE impact evaluation**  
**Date:** Apr, 2016  
A terms of reference (TOR) was developed to initiate a wide scale impact evaluation in order to determine the broad effectiveness of the modality based on its original purpose, and guide UNICEF support towards this modality in the new country programme.

**Draft strategy developed**  
**Date:** Jun, 2016  
The 2016 Pastoralist Education Strategy was developed and shared in draft format for comments and AWP consideration.

**AWPs revision**  
**Date:** Jun, 2016  
Draft MoE AWPs were revised based on the pastoralist education strategy and the key activities required within the first year of implementation (as advised by the consultants).

### 3.5. Findings, Reflections and Recommendations

The findings presented below ‘mesh’ the DE’s ‘intuition with data’ collected (Gamble, 2008) from the DE field trips and the pastoralist strategy revision process. Given the short timeframe of the DE, the recommendations provided were implemented in some cases while others provide an opportunity going forward for UNICEF ECO to adapt their strategic focus in continuing equity related programmes that contribute towards resilience and social cohesion (outcome 4 of PBEA).
During the early stages of developing a plan of action for the revision of the Pastoralist Education Strategy, the MoE were intent on gaining UNICEF support for more South-South country learning exchanges. While these were useful for the MoE to identify best practices from other countries, there was no theory of change developed based on each of the new modalities. The strategy was therefore more like a ‘wish list’ than a practical document with sufficient strategic guidance. Eight years on, the MoE saw the different modalities as ‘failures’ and requested further ‘experience sharing’ trips to identify new modalities to pilot. However, considering the previous trips didn’t have the desired impact, and that many of the initiatives weren’t adequately trialled, financing further trips abroad were unlikely to bring about the intended outcome. Internal reflection on implementation was key towards learning from the 2008 strategy. More added value would come from conducting in-depth analysis of the different modalities attempted in Ethiopia to understand factors that contributed to success of failure of the differing approaches – including the lack of dedicated technical support inside ministries to help implement new initiatives.

Recommendation #1:
**Internal reflection on pastoralist education approach required to adequately guide the new strategy.**

Through multiple meetings and discussions, a compromise was reached with the MoE, that instead of supporting further South-South exchanges, consultants with international experience would be hired to conduct a situational analysis on the current state of pastoralist education and work with the MoE to develop the new strategy. A Terms of Reference (TOR) was then developed in October 2015, between the MoE, the British Council and UNICEF to guide the revision process. The TOR specifically highlights this shift away from external experience sharing towards internal reflection: “By identifying feasible strategies and analysing unsuccessful interventions, it allows the MoE to narrow its focus, find space for innovation and develop a more context specific strategic plan to accelerate the provision of quality basic education to pastoral communities across the country”\(^\text{11}\).\[11\]

While enrolment has increased across pastoralist regions particularly through the expansion of ABE’s and formal primary and secondary schools, the expansion is still below national averages and there exist serious concerns over the quality of education provided. “At the core of the current situation has been the failure of educational provision to respond appropriately to pastoralists’ livelihood and culture, or to their need to retain flexibility in dealing with changing and possible adverse circumstances, and their other needs in contemporary society”\(^\text{12}\).\[12\]

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\(^{11}\) MoE, 2015: 1, TOR to Revise the Pastoralist Education Strategy- MoE, British Council and UNICEF

\(^{12}\) MoE, 2016: 7, Pastoralist Education Strategy
The pastoralist situational analysis established that while access has expanded, the needs of pure pastoralist children were neither sufficiently visible nor met yet.

Overall, the full range of delivery modalities suggested in the 2008 strategy were deemed to have only been partially adopted. Across the four regions, it was apparent that:

1. **Education lacks relevance.** The formal school/ABE curriculum lacks relevance to pastoralist livelihoods, indigenous knowledge, context and development needs and is often delivered in an unfamiliar language of instruction;

2. **Teacher quality is poor.** Recruitment and training of teachers/facilitators is not delivering consistent, high quality, contextualised education for pastoralists. Unable to find qualified facilitators for rural ABE’s, teachers are recruited with below grade 10 requirements (between grade 5-10);

3. **Capacity is limited.** Capacity to implement policy strategies is hampered by low technical competence and shortage of staff. Staff transfers and turnover are also frequent and have many effects, including lack of institutional memory;

4. **Evidence is lacking.** Documentation is very weak and inconsistent. There is little to no evidence on what has been attempted, what has worked or failed, and why. This information deficit hampers implementation, strategic planning, and evidence-based policy making;

5. **Weak partnerships affect planning.** Policy and programme implementation has been ad hoc across partners and regions. There is a need for stronger partnerships, joint planning and co-ordination of resources and human power;

6. **Unclear long-term path for pastoralist development.** Education needs to play a clearer and better defined role within an integrated pastoralist development strategy” (Dyer and Eshahew, 2016).

Therefore, while the MoE has clearly made strides in reducing the gap in participation, and PBEA towards Outcome 4 by increasing equity in terms of creating first time access to education, this has been insufficient due to weak implementation and the poor quality of learning on offer. Many pastoralists know and feel that the education they are being provided is sub-par and lacking (schooling only up to grade 4). Evidence from the situational analysis suggests that parents are ‘suspicious’ of the quality and in some cases are even sending their children to stay with relatives in urban areas so they are afforded a full opportunity for quality education. As pastoralists begin to voice their demands for education, more funding is needed to invest in proven, cost-effective interventions that meet pastoral needs, as well as their aspirations.

**Recommendation #2:**

**Long-term technical oversight required to successfully guide the implementation of the 2016 Pastoralist Education Strategy.**

In moving forward with the new Pastoralist Education Strategy, it should start from the recognition that more significant and coordinated investment across sectors is needed to address the cycle of deprivation and inequality experienced within pastoral communities. Budget shortage was widely cited as the reason for implementation gaps during the situational analysis and considering these geographic areas already have weak transportation links, inadequate physical infrastructure and limited access to social services, it will be far costlier to extend educational services to these areas than around more urban dwellings. However, increasing financial investment towards social services without sufficiently addressing the capacity gaps within these areas would be an inappropriate use of resources.

Through discussions held between the consultants and the Pastoralist Education Task Force, it was clear that regions need strong long term guidance on how to address their context.
specific challenges. In 2008, the strategy was developed at federal level and then immediately disseminated to the regions. However, 8 years later, the majority of the educational officials interviewed during the situational analysis were unaware that a strategy existed or what role they should play in its implementation. To address this concern, an implementation manual was initially deemed appropriate by the Task Force to provide guidance on the different interventions required in the different regions. However, based on the SSIE Directorates previous experience with manuals and the decentralised regions (e.g. ABE Manual, Mobile School Manual), they are often developed at the federal level and then not sufficiently implemented at the regional level. Long term technical support was therefore deemed as a requirement to guide the effective implementation of the strategy.

Based on this feedback, UNICEF and British Council agreed in June to extend their support to the pastoralist revision beyond the development of the strategy. Within the new AWP to be signed in July, the international and national consultant who took part in the Pastoralist Education Strategy will be hired to provide ongoing technical guidance to the MoE in their implementation of the new strategy within the MoE’s ESDP V. Furthermore 4 consultants will be hired to contextualise the strategy to each of the four regions, increase regional ownership over the process and develop a three-year plan of action. In order to facilitate this longer term approach, AWPs were then shared with the consultants and adapted to ensure all activities necessary within the first year of the strategy’s implementation were incorporated.

By providing this longer term focus, it seeks to address the lack of institutional memory witnessed on tried and tested modalities. In many cases, there have been initiatives launched to address challenges of migration and flexibility such as mobile schools and camel libraries in Afar, South Omo and Somali, yet there has been no documentation on how the modality was piloted or more importantly, why it was deemed unsuccessful. Sufficient technical oversight guiding more coordinated use of resources will allow the MoE to actively learn from failure, avoid duplication of efforts and reduce inefficient and ineffective spending around pastoral education.

**Recommendation #3:**
*Explore and strengthen collaboration with pastoral development partners.*

In order to ensure that education is part of the wider growth and transformation plan for pastoralists there is a need to actively engage partners who work closely on pastoralist development. This can be accomplished by 1) distributing the new Pastoralist Education Strategy to line ministries and partners, 2) inviting partners to the various dissemination events involved in the revision of the pastoralist education strategy and 3) producing 6 months or 1-year briefing papers on the status of the status of implementation on the new strategy.

The scheduling of the ABE timetable with the community is not systemic in its operation. From field observations during the situational analysis, teachers conducted classes from 8am-12pm daily. Instead of being locally recruited, the facilitators live in the nearby urban area and don’t consult the community over the scheduling of classes. The ABE approach therefore
appears more like a low-cost version of first cycle primary. As a result of this lack of flexibility, children must decide between their pastoral duties and education on a daily basis. Labour often wins out because of the community need to maintain animal welfare. This causes dropouts and absenteeism.

The seasonal calendar further affects attendance due to pastoral migration in search of grazing land. In all pastoral regions, children with their families are migrating in search of water and pasture between the months of February and April (Dyer and Eshahew, 2016). However, the calendar is not flexible to these periods. ABE as a modality is intended to provide education for 8 months of the year, but children are absent during these migration periods while facilitators are absent during the summer months as they seek to upgrade their qualifications. Since the facilitators don’t accompany communities during migration, it further constrains pastoral children’s opportunity for learning.

This lack of timetable and calendar flexibility observed indicates that while ABE modality is culturally and economically relevant in its design, it is not in its application. This is perhaps unsurprising given that responsible officials are often of the view that ABE is a temporary intervention until they alter their highly mobile livelihoods and ‘so no due attention is given’ (MoE, 2016: 23). If unable to resurrect the original principles of ABE and sufficiently monitor its application, the government and UNICEF will face a serious challenge in their approach to pastoralist education going forward.

Recommendation #4:
Conduct an impact evaluation on ABE to guide future programming.

Considering that the situational analysis was intended to provide a snapshot of pastoralist education, and not a robust impact evaluation of the different modalities, an impact is necessary to determine the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and sustainability of the approach. This would allow for reflection on the relevance of UNICEF support to the ABEs within pastoral communities and also identify tangible recommendations for both the government and UNICEF to improve the provision of basic education to pastoralist regions.

Agreement was reached within UNICEF to proceed with this initiative and a TOR for the evaluation was developed and posted. The evaluation is expected to take place within the start of the new school year in September, 2016.

Recommendation #5:
Maintain a dual focus on the aspirations of the most marginalised group- pure-pastoralists.

During the dissemination workshop held after the situational analysis, the SSIE Director was clear that ABEs must be inclusive and focus on the two different strategies facing pastoralist education: 1) provide a route for those who wish to exit pastoralism, and 2) provide education that is relevant, quality and enhances pastoralist livelihoods. While this not only signifies a shift in attitudes from the government away from the bias and derogatory language used in the previous strategy, it also highlights the urgent need to address pure-pastoralist educational needs and aspirations for ABE.

As part of the impact evaluation, research should be conducted around the demand side of education to determine if the ideals of ABE should be resurrected. Based on the information, a decision will then need to be made on whether ABE should be abandoned or enriched as an educational approach for pure-pastoralist communities. The four consultants hired to develop the three-year plan of action also represent an opportunity for maintaining a practical focus on pure-pastoralists within the plan.

Recognising that resource shortages mean a strategy of blanket geographic targeting of interventions is unlikely to bring about the critical mass or resource persons required for communities to build on, narrowing focus around empirically tested interventions is key going forward.
This chapter provides the findings of the evaluation related to the second DE learning objective. It begins by presenting the rational, key challenges and opportunities behind the learning objective and then presents the overall evaluation findings, reflections and recommendations.
4.1. Context

UNICEF ECO decisively streamlined PBEA across the offices’ US $447 million multi-sectoral UNICEF Country Programme (2012-2015). The US $4.7 million PBEA funds were pooled together with the country’s general education section portfolio, i.e. the US $84 million Learning and Development (L&D) Programme. The intent behind this was to build on existing institutional capacities and leverage opportunities to give wider reach to the peacebuilding and conflict sensitive principles of PBEA. Activities contributing towards the five different PBEA outcomes were then integrated, monitored and reported across the five L&D programme output areas (See Figure 4 below). Rather than having a dedicated full time PBEA staff member, PBEA covered portions of salaries from the federal and regional level, and staff dedicated their time to PBEA accordingly.

The Ministry of Education was then the sole implementer of PBEA over the four years with activities aligned to the Annual Work Plans of the MoE and REBs. Programmatic funds were channelled directly to the government through Direct Cash Transfers (DCTs) instead of working through other development agencies. Working through NGOs is significantly limited in Ethiopia due to the 2009 Proclamation to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies (CSP). The comprehensive law governs their registration and regulation and restricts NGOs that receive more than 10% of their financing from foreign sources from engaging in any human rights and advocacy related activities. This management approach was therefore unique to many PBEA programmes around the world and has distinct pros and cons which UNICEF believes can help guide PBEA efforts going forward in the ECO and other countries.

Outcome 5 of PBEA aims to “contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge in policies and programming related to equity in education, social cohesion and peacebuilding.” It is guided by the theory of change that if good quality evidence is systematically generated in the DRSs, then increasingly equity-based policies & programming will reduce marginalisation of selected communities and contribute to increased levels of peace, security and social cohesion and will help to ensure the relevance of UNICEF programming in fragile states and post conflict environments. This learning objective aims to contribute towards this outcome by documenting lessons learned from the streamlining approach taken and improve UNICEF programming around peacebuilding going forward.

13 For more information, see: http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/ethiopia.html
4.2. Key Challenges and Opportunities

**Sensitivities surrounding the issue of conflict.** The regional education authorities operate within sensitive political systems in the target PBEA regions. Sensitivities are heightened when discussing issues of conflict along ethnic lines within regions. While the degree of sensitivity varies from region to region and woreda to woreda, uncovering these issues in the context analysis caused significant and unanticipated delays in planning activities and implementation, and highlighted the need for UNICEF staff to better understand how to manoeuvre within this political environment. It was clear that this issue would continue to remain a road block to future peacebuilding initiatives.

**Difficulty in conceptualising the role of education in peacebuilding.** PBEA brought with it many new concepts and approaches that were new to UNICEF ECO and its government counterparts. Concepts such as social cohesion and resilience and approaches like risk-informed and conflict sensitive programming took time to fully understand. During the initial stages, educational officials even questioned the role of education in peacebuilding, asserting that this issue should be handled by the security department of the government. This was still seen to be an issue during the development of the DE regional profiles. These conceptual issues were more challenging as there was no full time staff in UNICEF ECO with experience in peacebuilding guiding programme implementation. Grasping these concepts and guiding the MoE therefore took significant time and investment in individual capacity development.

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**IMPACT:**
By end of 2015, children’s learning outcomes and equitable completion improved at pre-primary, primary and lower secondary level of education in Ethiopia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
<th>ECD &amp; Early Learning</th>
<th>Access and Equity</th>
<th>Education in Emergencies</th>
<th>Quality Education and Learning</th>
<th>Policy, Planning and Coordination</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equitable enrolment and retention for boys and girls in 11 regions expanded and increased at pre-primary, primary and lower secondary levels of education by 2015.</td>
<td>By 2015, education system is able to expand quality and equitable ECD/early learning services to girls and boys in 7 UNICEF targeted regions.</td>
<td>By 2015, regional capacity to provide equitable access to education to boys and girls at primary and lower secondary level are strengthened in 11 regions.</td>
<td>Education Sector has the capacity to respond to emergency situations in 8 emergency prone regions.</td>
<td>By 2015, UNICEF targeted Woredas in Ethiopia are able to provide improved quality education and learning to boys and girls.</td>
<td>The education system in Ethiopia has an enabling policy and institutional environment in place for enhanced access to quality education.</td>
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**Strategic Result:** Strengthen policies and practices in education for peacebuilding.
PBEA best practices in Ethiopia are far from clear. Through this mainstreaming approach, there has been a myriad of different interventions implemented in the four targeted regions in Ethiopia. However, there was little documentation on programmatic learning, specifically evidence that speaks to what interventions were working, not working and what activities were dropped and why. In some regions, interventions were discontinued, while the same intervention was being scaled up in another region. Yet, there is little dialogue or reporting between the field offices and the UNICEF ECO on why this is happening, e.g. dropping of girl’s scholarships in Somali vs. scaling up of this initiative in Afar.

Lack of clarity over how to take forward PBEA. Across the UNICEF ECO field offices, questions emerged on how best to take forward PBEA beyond 2016. Although integrated across the general L&D programme and mainstreamed within government sector plans, there is a general feeling that without a distinct focus from a new programme, there will be insufficient guidance on how to take forward the risk informed and conflict sensitive principles of PBEA beyond these initial gains.

Opportunities for learning within existing M&E structures. Within the integrated UNICEF/MoE approach taken for PBEA, opportunities for learning existed. Between the UNICEF ECO and the field offices, reports and education section retreats were conducted annually and 1-4 field trips were organised per year. PBEA outputs and activities were streamlined within the AWPs of the MoE and REBs and aligned with an Inter-Ministerial results based monitoring framework and Programme Implementation Manual (PIM) developed by the Ministry of Finance for Economic Development (MoFED) and UN Excom Agencies including UNICEF. Quarterly joint consultative meetings were then held between the Federal MoE, REBs and UNICEF, whereby implementing government partners make presentations highlighting the major achievements against planned targets, challenges encountered, remedial actions taken and ways forward.

Between the REB and the WEOs, the monitoring structure generally consists of: monthly progress meetings at the REB, quarterly reports from the Woredas, bi annual planning sessions with the WEOs (midterm reviews in December and AWP development in June), and joint field visits approximately 4 times a year. At the zonal level, no zonal educational structure exists in Afar and Somali, and while it’s established in Benishangul Gumuz, funding is distributed directly to the DRS Woredas for PBEA, and as a result, dialogue is held mostly with the woreda and regional administrative levels. Between the WEO and schools, monthly updates are provided by school cluster supervisors who manage anywhere between 5-10 schools per cluster. These monthly reports then form the basis of the quarterly reports delivered to the REB.

Within this environment, however haphazard the application was, institutional structures existed that could support learning and programmatic improvement.

New UNICEF and MoE country programmes, an opportunity to consider PBEA lessons. In 2015, UNICEF finished their four year 2012-2015 country programme. In the same year, the MoE completed their five year ESDP IV (2011/2012-2015/2016). Since PBEA was initiated after both these documents were produced, the new country programmes for UNICEF and the MoE provided opportunities to learn from PBEA and further mainstream peacebuilding across these long term strategic documents.

4.3. DE research questions
To ensure that the DE was intentional about where to focus its energy and attention, four evaluation questions were developed to guide learning about the ‘mainstreaming and management lessons learned’.
1. **What are the lessons learned from the mainstreaming approach taken with PBEA?** This sought to allow the UNICEF ECO to learn how to conduct programmes for peacebuilding within the broader systems of UNICEF and the MOE and was seen as crucial in understanding how to improve programming in similar initiatives.

2. **How has UNICEF PBEA team addressed the sensitivities surrounding conflict in Ethiopia?** This remains a potential roadblock going forward and documenting lessons on how PBEA managed these delicate issues will assist field officers to effectively manoeuvre within this environment going forward.

3. **Has UNICEF’s routine, integrated monitoring systems been sufficient for capturing PBEA results?** By determining how successful M&E systems and structures have been in capturing PBEA results and learning, this question sought to improve programme monitoring on complex initiatives.

4. **How best can the UNICEF ECO take forward the lessons learned of PBEA?** This aimed to assist the UNICEF ECO to identify how to scale up PBEA initiatives and take forward educational programmes for peace.

### 4.4. DE Activities

As part of the learning objective, the activities were completed between September 2015 and June of 2016. As an embedded member of the programme, the key functions of DE (observing, sense-making and intervening), were also practiced throughout the DE to create the space to challenge and question learning in a way that didn’t stifle creativity but moved the conversation forward.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviews and discussions with key informants</td>
<td>Interviews and discussions were held throughout the DE with key stakeholders involved in the management of PBEA. Key persons interviewed include the UNICEF Education Specialist Responsible for M&amp;E, the UNICEF PBEA focal point (prior to his retirement in October, 2016), and the UNICEF ESARO PBEA Regional Advisor in Nairobi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of PBEA monitoring instrument</td>
<td>This allowed who? to track more qualitative programmatic achievements in line with the operational matrix developed for PBEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop for refugee education proposal</td>
<td>A one-day workshop was held with PBEA Field Education Officers on lessons learned from PBEA to inform UNICEFs approach to a refugee education proposal development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF Annual Review Meeting, April 2016.</td>
<td>During the annual review, specific sessions were held on 1) guiding the development of the 2015/2016 AWPs by July, 2) identifying the advantages and disadvantages of mainstreaming PBEA 3) recognizing the added value of peacebuilding from traditional UNICEF support, and 4) managing the sensitivities within the team around conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5. Findings, Reflections and Recommendations

The findings presented below ‘mesh’ the DE’s ‘intuition with data’ collected (Gamble, 2008) during DE activities to document the mainstreaming and management lessons learned. Given that the DE was implemented in the final year of the PBEA programme, some recommendations provided were implemented while others provide an opportunity for UNICEF ECO to adapt their strategic focus in future programming related to equity in education, social cohesion and peacebuilding (outcome 5).

Considering the sensitivities around engaging peacebuilding and conflict in Ethiopia, advocating for PBEA at high levels was the crucial first step. UNICEF ECO therefore made a prudent selection of a focal point within the team who had a longstanding and trusting relationship with the MoE, having previously worked in various capacities (including at a director level) across different directorates in the MoE. The UNICEF Education Specialist then led the initial steps to gauge the interest of the Ministry of Education on the subject, discuss the need at the Federal level and achieve buy-in. This included the establishment of a steering committee, engagement through high-level meetings and capacity-building workshops on programme aims and objectives and on new concepts introduced by PBEA, such as conflict sensitive risk informed programming and ‘do no harm principles’.

The peacebuilding steering committee established by the state minister was key in penetrating the sensitivities around addressing peacebuilding within the field of Education in Ethiopia. It was a joint effort from different directorates (Special Services and Inclusive Education, Gender, Curriculum, Teacher Development, Adult Education and Planning). The strong federal leadership created was essential in building an understanding of peacebuilding outside of the peace and security agenda and facilitating programme implementation.

The different perspectives from the varying directorates contributed towards endorsement across different thematic areas. The committee then facilitated regional consultations to formally introduce the PBEA programme to the REB, Bureaus of Finance and Economic Development and other relevant sectors.

Under the guidance of UNICEF, the steering committee completed the context analysis in a participatory manner, which created buy-in from many stakeholders. Although there were misunderstandings experienced in Afar and Somali, the committee played an important role in overcoming misinterpretations and even facilitated the implementation of certain PBEA activities during 2013 while the issue of the context analysis was being resolved, e.g. the construction of ABE Centres. While a significant amount of effort was dedicated towards gaining the final endorsement on the context analysis, once the findings were finally sanctioned in August 2014, the MoE and UNICEF ECO had a better understanding of the purpose of the programme and the role UNICEF could play within this environment.

Ultimately, the strong upstream work conducted by a trusted UNICEF ECO team allowed for the programme to be well initiated across the Ministry as a cross cutting issue. It not only created ownership within the MoE but also opened up space within the
Ministry to discuss issues surrounding PBEA which had previously been closed, i.e. conflict or problems with social cohesion. The result of this upstream work was the mainstreaming of peacebuilding in the MoE’s new 5-year Education Sector Development Plan ESDP V (2015/2016-2019/2020)\textsuperscript{14}.

Recommendation #1:

Building on its success of strengthening relationships at the Federal and Regional level, UNICEF ECO should explore ways to strengthen its focus on peacebuilding within the new ESDP V.

Although peacebuilding is well integrated across the ESDP V, UNICEF ECO field officers are unclear how best to take this forward beyond June 2016. From 2012-2016, PBEA programming was predominantly focused on expanding existing interventions to address conflict drivers for wider penetration and easier scale up. However, the organisation, as part of the 2016-2020 Country Programme, is moving away from support for service delivery and supplies (e.g. construction and learning materials) to more policy and institutional level work. By doing so, UNICEF shifts its focus from some of the activities completed as part of PBEA. The office therefore sought to explore, based on experiences from PBEA, which interventions the UNICEF ECO should focus on.

The focus should be placed on identifying explicit approaches which acknowledge how the intervention/result contributes to peacebuilding. According to the UNICEF ECO Education Section during the annual retreat, UNICEF can strengthen its focus on peacebuilding in the ESDP V around the following key peacebuilding interventions:

1) school disaster risk reduction responses,
2) enriching the curriculum with peacebuilding in collaboration with the University of Bradford\textsuperscript{15},
3) working through Functional Adult Literacy Programmes to enhance parental education and positive discipline,
4) regional and woreda level disaster risk reduction plans,
5) risk informed education sector planning with active participation of stakeholders,
6) improving educational quality in hard to reach pastoral communities, and
7) conduct vulnerability mapping to identify schools affected by conflict and natural disasters\textsuperscript{16}.

Recommendation #2:

Invest more in cross sectoral UNICEF collaboration to tackle the multi-dimensional nature of conflict.

While significant contributions were made towards creating a ‘culture of prevention’ through PBEA initiatives, UNICEF should build upon these experiences and work more at a cross-sectoral level within the UNICEF ECO to reduce the drivers of violent conflict and contribute towards a more peaceful Ethiopian society.

Many UNICEF Education Field Officers spoke to the need of addressing this issue at a cross sectoral level. This could be achieved by: 1) developing a UNICEF ECO strategic note on conflict prevention and response (documenting underlying assumptions and casual logic, and an anticipated timeline of activities); 2) conducting more routine internal conflict assessments at a regional level to inform emergency and long term responses, and 3) introducing conflict sensitive markers and indicators across all programme implementation. Working at this level could align the country programme towards a specific UNICEF ECO vision for addressing issues of conflict and create a wider understanding of each sector’s role in this process, instead of leaving this key issue to the security department of the government.

\textsuperscript{14} For more information, see a summary of how PBEA is well integrated across the ESDP V: http://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/Peacebuilding_in_the_MoE_ESDP_V.PDF

\textsuperscript{15} The University of Bradford have been tasked with revising the curriculum to include peace education. The curriculum revision process is intended to be completed by 2018.

\textsuperscript{16} For more information on these modalities, see the 2016 PBEA Ethiopia Final Report.
Within all the PBEA target regions, there was a lack of explicit focus on conflict. Through PBEA related activities like Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Plans or Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans, the focus fell largely on natural disasters (drought, flood, and environmental degradation) as opposed to man-made struggles. While this focus addresses factors that give rise to conflict, it hasn’t facilitated direct engagement on conflict or more sensitive issues like ethnic tension. The UNICEF field staff struggled to manoeuvre within the existing structures of the REB and WEO to address conflict openly. Many even feared that pushing this agenda would affect their relationship with the REB. Due to this sensitivity and political aversion, there was a reluctance for some to engage in more meaningful action.

Recommendation #3:

Build on existing advocacy efforts and adapt a direct or indirect focus on conflict based on context.

Within the new UNICEF country programme, continuous training, dialogue, negotiation, and advocacy on the role of peacebuilding in education is necessary to ensure that the REB fully understands issues of social cohesion and resilience and are not afraid of these concepts. Although significant investment has already been made in capacity development, further investment is needed to address issues of staff turnover and ensure a focus on conflict is well understood within the regions. In addition, there is a need to maintain a participatory approach in analysing conflicts, as well as consistency in communication and messaging, to ensure analytical findings are not misconstrued. Considering the changing policy environment, continuing these strategies could increase the UNICEF ECO’s ability to engage more directly on the issue and introduce an explicit focus.

In more difficult contexts, sensitivities can be managed more indirectly. For example, in Ethiopia, the conflict analysis became the context analysis, sensitivities around discussing the term ‘conflict’ were addressed by changing or replacing the word with ‘crisis’ or ‘lack of social cohesion’. In doing this, it allowed the UNICEF ECO to participate in dialogue around issues of conflict without creating adverse reactions. This strategy should be continued and determined on a case by case basis considering the sensitivity of the regional context.

Although monitoring and reporting structures existed within the MoE, staff capacity was low, infrastructure was inadequate, reporting was substandard, working conditions were harsh and volatile, and programme monitoring was limited due to transportation and funding issues. As a result, the formal reporting within this structure between the MoE and UNICEF was quarterly, results based and expenditure focused, i.e. making sure that funds were spent based on activities and outputs in the AWP. Reporting was then largely focused on accountability instead of capturing emerging learning and enhancing the potential for programmatic achievement. This was also noted as a challenge in the PBEA evaluable assessment across all 14 PBEA countries.
Furthermore, a number of UNICEF field education staff indicated that they were unaware of the programme’s theory of change (ToC) and expressed frustration at having been excluded from the process of development. For some, the DE field trips conducted in October 2015, were the first time that the UNICEF field office team had seen the programme’s operational matrix, which included the ToC, activities, outputs and outcomes. Indeed, the staff were well aware of the five PBEA outcomes and the conflict drivers identified in the context analysis but the outputs and activities weren’t guided by those identified in the overarching framework. Instead the outcomes were interpreted at the regional level, and activities implemented based on their understanding of how to address the specific conflict drivers. The implicit causal logic was known and the activities were being implemented, but they weren’t sufficiently captured by the monitoring framework or background documents.

In addition, although the integration of systems simplified reporting processes for field offices, it complicated the process for the UNICEF ECO in Addis Ababa because the activities, outputs and outcomes of PBEA were different to the UNICEF L&D framework. Preparing annual reporting for PBEA was therefore challenging because too little qualitative information was produced during the standard quarterly reporting mechanism.

**Recommendation #4:**

**Update operational matrix based on bottom up regional interpretation of key PBEA outputs and activities.**

In order to develop a more appropriate PBEA operational matrix, DE field trips included time specifically dedicated towards documenting activities and outputs versus PBEA financial expenditure to ensure all interventions were documented.\(^{17}\)

**Recommendation #5:**

**Separate M&E systems necessary to track progress towards theories of change and capture emergent learning.**

In conjunction with the UNICEF PBEA focal point, a new quarterly reporting framework was developed in 2015 specifically for PBEA outside the UNICEF L&D framework. Modelled on the new operational framework, the basic tool requested feedback on each activity and provided space for documentation on partnerships, communicational efforts, programme management and key challenges and opportunities. This facilitated easier reporting across the results framework during the final year of implementation.

Going forward, separate M&E systems for peacebuilding initiatives are recommended to be implemented from the outset. Reporting should be conducted separately to capture emergent learning and capture progress towards peacebuilding theories of change. Although this might further complicate reporting for the field office, the framework gives structure and direction to a programme.

**Recommendation #6:**

**Develop programme specific theories of change in close collaboration with field offices and gather more evidence at a local level to validate TOCs.**

During the DE field trips, a sense of frustration and disconnect was witnessed between the field education officers and the contribution they’re making to the PBEA outcomes. Many reflected that the effects of PBEA may not be seen for years and that education’s contribution from the PBEA interventions to the issues of social cohesion and conflict was limited. This lack of collective visioning highlights the need to invest more heavily in the TOC development processes, especially in complex initiatives.

\(^{17}\) To see the PBEA results framework, see the 2016 PBEA Ethiopia Final Report.
UNICEF ECO made a conscious decision to involve local universities and build their capacity through PBEA. This was a good practice in influencing policy and planning. Addis Ababa University (AAU) were seen to have performed highly during the development of the Context Analysis and their capacity for conducting peacebuilding related surveys was increased through their interactions with the regional office and Inter-peace. The AAU’s African Centre for Disaster Risk Management also trained regions on how to prepare DRR plans and therefore built their capacity. In working through these institutions, the knowledge base for peacebuilding and education stays in country and within the government institutions and has greater influence throughout Ethiopia.

Recommendation #8:
Continue conducting research through local universities and research institutions.

Considering the difficulties that were experienced in understanding the concepts introduced from PBEA, establishing research partnerships between international and local universities and research institutes would likely yield swifter results in Ethiopia.
As the PBEA programme is coming to a close, concerns from the UNICEF ECO emerged on how they can take forward this peacebuilding focus. Although PBEA is included in ESDP V, it has to be translated into activities in the AWP on a yearly basis. Without an explicit focus, UNICEF may not have sufficient structure and guidance to continue this type of educational programming for peace. Proposals provide a key avenue to incorporate the lessons learned and continue programming for peacebuilding.

Recommendation #9:
Use DFID’s incoming refugee multi-sectoral programme on self-reliance as an opportunity to incorporate PBEA lessons learned and continue educational programmes for peacebuilding.

In late 2015, DFID engaged UNICEF to submit a proposal for a new £40 million five year programme: ‘Building self-reliance for refugees and vulnerable host communities by improved sustainable basic social service delivery’. The programme aims to contribute to social inclusion and equal access to social basic services by 1) improving delivery of basic social services for refugees and vulnerable host communities, with focus on increased availability of core social services, including health, nutrition, WASH and education; and 2) Addressing issues of violence (legacies and pressures for violence) by strengthening protection mechanisms and services for refugee and vulnerable host communities, specifically children.

A TOC one-day workshop was therefore organised in December 2015 to develop a new programme design for the education section within this new proposal. Since 20 of the 25 refugee camps are located in the Developing Regional States (DRS) where PBEA was in operation, lessons were taken from the context analysis and PBEA programming on how to address factors creating pressures which give rise to inequity, conflict, and emergencies. Five key areas of focus were identified by the team:

1. Develop effective and efficient learning environments for refugee and host communities;
2. Improve competency of male and female teachers in classrooms in refugee and host community settings on assessment for learning;
3. Strengthen Educational oversight systems and coordination mechanisms between refugee camp organizations and government structures;
4. Increase educational access for out of school children; and
5. Increase knowledge on programming for self-reliance within refugee contexts with adequate gender and social inclusion considerations.

Furthermore, a presentation on the proposal was later given at the UNICEF Education Sections annual retreat in April 2016, which afforded an opportunity to reflect on the approach and provide feedback on the programme design, theory of change and links to peacebuilding.
This chapter summarizes the developmental evaluation’s contribution to the programme and highlights evaluation lessons learned and recommendations.
5.1. Overview

Though every organisation is engaged in some degree of learning, they may not recognise it. It may not be systemic, well planned, or based on quality empirical evidence. Yet ‘individual and collective learning is key’ to the evolution and success of an organisation (Easterby-Smith and Araujo, 1999: 136).

UNICEF’s Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy Programme was a pilot initiative. It involved high levels of innovation and uncertainty and tackled socially complex problems. Capturing emergent learning within this environment was beyond routine programme monitoring and evaluation structures as the programme lacked linear progression in terms of the implementing strategies needed to achieve intended outcomes. The developmental evaluation was therefore introduced to inject evaluative thinking and support intentional and adaptive learning within this complex setting.

In Ethiopia, the two learning objectives shaped the direction of learning during the course of the DE, and the findings were used by the team to strengthen implementation and capture the challenges and contributions made through PBEA. In total, 7 key findings were identified which prompted 13 recommendations across the six key DE evaluation questions. Many of the suggestions were taken on board within the limited timeframe of the DE, while others are geared towards enhancing UNICEF programming beyond the end of PBEA. In doing this, the DE contributed towards outcome 5 of PBEA: “the generation and use of evidence and knowledge in policies and programming related to equity in education, social cohesion and peacebuilding.”

5.2. Evaluation Lessons Learned

The main lessons learned from the evaluation approach relate to the timing and practical application of the DE by an external consultant.

Key lessons learned:

• **Conducting a DE towards the end of a programme provides limited time to influence the achievement of results.** The timing of the evaluation, which began one year prior to the end of the PBEA programme had limited opportunity to use the DE feedback loops to directly influence the achievement of PBEA outcomes. The DE process can be lengthy and involves setting learning targets, strategizing and implementing plans to address what has been learned and evaluating feedback to determine whether the proposed changes/modifications are effective. Within the one-year timeframe at the end of a programme, there was limited capacity to influence change.

• **An external consultant conducting the DE requires significant investment early on to generate a comprehensive understanding of the programme.** Considering the evaluator was hired as an external consultant, the evaluator had less insider knowledge of UNICEF or PBEA and therefore had to invest more heavily in building relationships to gain access to important information. This took more time than an internal staff member may have taken. That being said, the developmental evaluator was able to be more objective and maintain a measure of independence on the technical aspects of DE.
5.3. Evaluation Recommendations

The main recommendations from the evaluation relate to the timing of the evaluation within the remaining one-year period left in the PBEA programme.

Key recommendations:

• **A developmental evaluation should be conducted from the start of a programme.** Many activities were closing out within the DE timeframe and initiating a DE at the start of PBEA would have captured additional and more substantial learning that would have had more capacity to influence results. Accompanying the entire PBEA process from the beginning would provide the evaluator with sufficient time to adequately observe PBEA processes, question the design and underlying assumptions, and facilitate more group reflection and input to further influence the achievement of PBEA results.

• **Create clear delineation of roles for the support evaluator.** Due to the retirements of the Chief of Education and the PBEA Focal Point in quick succession, the reporting lines became unclear. In addition, as a result of staff turnover, the DE evaluator eventually assumed the role of PBEA focal point after their retirement. While in some aspects, assuming the role of PBEA focal point assisted in developing more trustworthy relationships, it diluted the role of the evaluator and may have affected the evaluation models ‘fidelity’ towards its purpose (Patton, 2016). Going forward, an agreement should be made between the UNICEF Evaluation office and respective County Offices over the extent of the role of the developmental evaluator. This should balance the need to produce the results required of the DE and the UNICEF Country Offices need to receive the full benefit from the evaluator.
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PBEA DE REGIONAL PROFILES

PROFILE 1 Afar region

Conflict Drivers
- Inequity
- Sparse resources (e.g., water, health, education) – harsh working climate- Afar is the hottest climate in the world.
- Competition over resources from pastoralist clans’ migrations in search of water, grazing land
- Border conflicts

Education
- Very few schools before 1992 – majority uneducated
- Education is not a priority compared to water and grazing land
- Children important to pastoral labour
- Pastoralists feel urban dwellers (originally from outside Afar – ‘Highlanders’) get better quality education
- Mother tongue language only developed in written form
- Girls marginalised and pushed into clan marriages. If girls are educated past 8th grade, then marginalisation decreases due to their empowerment.
- Lack of schools in rural locations

Natural Disasters and Environmental Risks
- Wind
- Lowland – extreme heat
- Drought – must migrate with community to find water
- Flooding along rivers destroying livelihoods and infrastructure.

PBEA Educational Access
- Pastoralist perception of education changing with increased value seen.
- Alternative Basic Education (ABE) centres built, previously fragile and poorly constructed but now, longer lasting construction in line with new ABE design.
- ABE in more rural areas reducing distance/travel
- Back to school campaign initiated increasing value on education. Committees include political cabinet members (Woreda level). Girls’ education a priority in back to school campaign which is creating gender parity improvement
PBEA Values

- Separation of approaches is needed to address tensions, i.e. a shift away from conventional UNICEF approaches to disaster (education in emergency) to more innovative methods specifically addressing conflict and the underlying tensions.

- PBEA values permeate REB and WEO in terms of increased sensitivity to issues of social cohesion and resilience, e.g. construction of ABEs was accomplished using direct contact with the communities, through traditional decision-making entities which has improved community relations and attitudes towards the state.

Emerging Patterns & Trends

- Enhanced women empowerment with increased political representation.

- Women’s interest in completing school even after having children has increased.

- Even in highly mobile communities, there is an increased interest of pastoralist children in attending and completing school.

- Quality of life is improving with increased investment in basic social services visible. This is attracting talented and educated people to the districts often considered too rural.

- Construction of sugar cane factory in Afar over 60,000 hectares has increased employment and investments. However, construction was on former pastoral land, which has created unease among pastoral communities who feel they should have been better compensated. This is perceived to affect social cohesion going forward.

- Ethnic tension exists among pastoralists, non-pastoralists, and Eritrean refugees. Tension also between rural and urban dwellers due to relative deprivation.

- Encouragement for pastoralists to settle around areas offering basic social services but these services are insufficient for pure pastoralists who have large numbers of cattle. Encouraged to focus instead on agro-pastoralism which requires less grazing, but yields some resistance to change.

- Political Exclusion due to some clans feeling excluded from power, including the highlanders who perceive themselves as unequal in Afar.

- Government feels problems are a result of resource and funding shortages, others perceive it as mismanagement.

- Community initiated adult education. In some ABEs. Communities are setting up classes in evenings with a focus on basic literacy and numeracy.

Challenges/ Recommendations

- Educational access and equity for pastoralists who live in rural areas (97% of Afar population lives in rural areas)

- Assurance that children do not have to travel far to get to school
Upper primary and secondary opportunities lacking for children after ABE. ABE offered only up to grade 4.

Poor ABE teacher quality with too few teachers. Difficulty in retaining qualified teachers when factories and other jobs pay more.

Curriculum only taught in Amharic and English. This should be taught in local language which is leading to increased tensions.

Drought is causing psychological and emotional reactions among children and not adequately addressed in schooling.

Government attempts to provide feed for cattle during drought but it is insufficient and unsustainable. Many communities trapped in intergenerational poverty due to subsistence living and recurrent droughts/floods.

ABE School calendar needs increased alignment to pastoralist livelihoods. Currently, they don’t receive the 8 months of education ABE’s are supposed to provide due to migration.

Tutorial classes need to be scaled up to meet the needs of pastoralist children.

Understanding programme took time and management was difficult as there was no specific staff member to head PBEA intervention exclusively at section level with extensive background in peacebuilding.

PBEA programmes need to engage more groups (faith-based, Islamic leaders, civic education groups, etc.)

More technical assistance from REB needed for WEOs to share best practices and move beyond a role of facilitator.

**Conflict Drivers**

- Inequity
- Lack of access to basic services
- Disparities in sharing of limited resources within woredas in the region

**Education**

- Poor access for indigenous communities (communal cultures)
- Lack of mother tongue instruction. Languages only recently developed. Education predominantly in Amharic which is problematic when indigenous and highlanders mix
- High drop-out rates among indigenous communities
- Lack qualified indigenous teachers
- Indigenous communities lack awareness on importance of education
- Indigenous communities lack basic competencies in school readiness (writing, literacy, numeracy, etc.). There is no pre-school. 

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**PROFILE 2**  Benishangul Gumuz region

**Conflict Drivers**

- Inequity
- Lack of access to basic services
- Disparities in sharing of limited resources within woredas in the region

**Education**

- Poor access for indigenous communities (communal cultures)
- Lack of mother tongue instruction. Languages only recently developed. Education predominantly in Amharic which is problematic when indigenous and highlanders mix
- High drop-out rates among indigenous communities
- Lack qualified indigenous teachers
- Indigenous communities lack awareness on importance of education
- Indigenous communities lack basic competencies in school readiness (writing, literacy, numeracy, etc.). There is no pre-school.
 Despite youth demand for jobs, education is not seen by indigenous communities as connected to employment opportunities

**Natural Disasters and Environmental Risks**

- Wind
- Wildfire
- Deforestation

**PBEA Educational Access**

- Go to school campaign is increasing enrolment. PTA, School Management Committees engaged in counting eligible children compared to enrolments
- Language translations for indigenous communities on suitable textbooks and curricula materials
- Gender parity increased to almost 50:50
- REB launched their own programme with UNICEF support to address access and achievement among indigenous students.

**PBEA Values**

- Peacebuilding is multi-sectoral and contribution of education towards developing peace is limited
- Resolving inter/intra ethnic conflict is the purview of the Security and Administrative Office
- Capacity building trainings being conducted (e.g. DRR) are sometimes seen to take away resources that could be put to better use, for example, chairs to address the lack of seating which make learning more difficult and to address the shortage of materials. (There's a lack of understanding in purpose of training).
- Recommendations that PBEA, though mainstreamed, should focus on targeting specific communities. There is a concern that spreading funding might not adequately address social cohesion and resilience in specific schools and communities and just act as another source of funding.
- Social cohesion and resilience better addressed by cross-sectoral entry points and needs more than just education

**Emerging Patterns & Trends**

- Emerging focus on pre-primary and non-formal modalities like Child to Child, Accelerated School Readiness Programme. Also renewed focus on secondary schools which is seriously lacking.
- Education importance increasing among indigenous communities
- Shift to universalizing secondary education as a result of economic advancements and push from government to achieve middle income by 2025.
- Secondary and vocational education used as a conduit to employment
(Profile 2 cont’d)

- Easing of conflict in the region with increased tolerance and awareness of diverse cultures and religions.
- More stability and greater financial resources available
- Improved sharing of resources across woredas but still limited.
- Governmental planning has improved.

Challenges/ Recommendations

- Lack of educational access among indigenous communities due to limited access to decades of marginalisation by previous governments.
- Lack of sufficient education resources
- Geographic scope of PBEA limits efforts (only target woredas included)
- Need for increased school construction with standardized quality
- Lack of attention to student dropouts and causes
- Higher Government officials unhappy with discussing or recognizing conflict explicitly
- Community envy between Kebeles and woredas not engaged in PBEA funding
- School DRR plans developed but no implementation due to lack of governmental ownership
- Some schools unable to recover from natural disasters
- No grass-roots monitoring to assess impact of PBEA specific interventions
- Lack of understanding on which activities are best to bring about peace through education
- Regular evaluation is compromised by insufficient resources
- WEO needs advice on how to engage political leaders to support PBEA values, but constrained by a dislike of discussing such issues
- Financial management problematic at woreda level due to limited capacity
- Federal level delays result in implementation delays at local level
- Need to streamline PBEA efforts into early childhood parental education.

PROFILE 3  Somali region

Conflict Drivers

- Lack of resources
- Lack of infrastructure
- Inequity in access to social services (e.g., water, health, education)
- Lack of social cohesion between and across clans
- Rural woredas at a disadvantage especially those without adequate road infrastructure.
Education
- Inequitable access to education for pastoralists
- Highly mobile pure pastoral communities do not have access to educational opportunities
- Pre-primary children rarely engaged in school
- Lack of pre-primary school disadvantages elementary aged children
- Gender inequality educational access – school distance and safety issues

Natural Disasters and Environmental Risks
- Drought
- Flash flooding
- Poor community preparation for response

PBEA Educational Access
- Creating more equitable access to education for pastoralists
- Work through Kebele (township), community leaders, WEO to construct ABEs in conflict sensitive areas
- Central Management Committees (CMC) are representative of different clans which assist in resolving school conflicts/misunderstandings
- School enrolment increased resulting from ABE which is reducing the travel/distance for children to access school.
- Networking cards enable children to attend other schools during migration. The card contains the history of the child and during migration they are encouraged to attend other ABE centres and present the card for easy integration.
- Girls’ tutorial programme helpful in allowing girls to catch up after their pastoral duties. Financial incentives are given to conduct class on Saturday and Sunday.
- More non-formal early learning programmes like Child to Child programmes increasing access to early education.
- Positioning of schools has resolved some conflicts. In previously conflicting communities, children of different clans are now studying together and interacting in ways not possible before building of schools (ABEs)
- Back to school campaign has been key in increasing educational access by identifying out-of-school children and promoting the importance of education through media.

PBEA Values
- Although PBEA is different from other UNICEF programmes, both the Learning and Development programme and PBEA have shared values
- Non-PBEA funding often spent on similar PBEA activities in conflict areas to address tensions of relative deprivation in non-target woredas e.g. building ABE centres
(Profile 3 cont’d)

- Convergence with other UNICEF sectors has occurred, e.g. WASH facilities constructed in areas in which PBEA is working, thereby providing comprehensive solutions
- Some tensions and conflicts are seen as beyond the scope of PBEA to change within funded period.

Emerging Patterns & Trends

- Gender equity is increasing. More educated women working and girls attending school. Policy to increase to 35:65 ratio of women to men in regional parliament. This increases female role models.
- Conflict remains and can be seasonal due to drought and the subsistence living of pastoralists
- Disasters are often better managed.
- Encouragement for pastoralists and agro pastoralists living near flood zones to settle around areas offering basic social services. Some of the services are deemed insufficient though to encourage settlement.
- In some ABEs, communities are setting up Functional Adult Literacy programmes. In others agricultural training centres are set up beside ABEs to promote further context specific education. Communities are becoming part of their own solution.

Challenges/ Recommendations

- Educational access is challenging due to migration issues for pastoralists
- Lack of focus on pre-primary education
- Schools lack basic resources (books, curriculum, educational materials)
- Inability to track girls who receive educational scholarships due to lack of appropriate monitoring systems at a rural and local level.
- Difficulty to find and retain qualified teachers
- Some communities seen as “too far behind” – excluded from political processes and potential interventions. There is a greater need for focus on the more volatile areas
- Difficulty monitoring PBEA efforts and understanding contexts. More field trips needed and case studies
- Lack of sufficient transportation to more rural areas compromises monitoring efforts
- Capacity building compromised by staff turnovers. The turnover is also challenging to trace and often discovered after it has occurred and so planning for these cases is constrained.
- Limited resource distribution to rural areas
- Greater cross-sector collaboration is needed to increase social cohesion
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