Chapter 3

Rites of Passage

Pate's efforts during his first few months in his new position yielded dividends from the US Congress, although not on the scale he and Rajchman had originally hoped. He had asked Secretary of State George Marshall for $100 million. On 15 May 1947, Congress agreed to an appropriation of $350 million for relief in Europe; Herbert Hoover himself had appeared before the House Appropriations Committee to plead for a generous share for Unicef. The amount of $40 million was earmarked, of which $15 million could be taken up immediately, and the rest as and when other governments contributed. Unfortunately, few showed any alacrity to do so. Only the Canadians came forward with a donation of $5 million. Pate was undaunted. He thought that there were plenty of other good fund-raising candidates: in Europe, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden looked hopeful; Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific; and in Latin America, he set his sights on Argentina. Still, Unicef's financial health was hardly robust at the moment when the first cargoes of milk and cod liver oil set off for the Baltic.

During Unicef's first few years of operation, financial crisis constantly threatened. To move ahead with an expanding programme of assistance in countries ever further afield required courage and faith. Pate spent his time with one eye looking over his shoulder to see where the next cargo of supplies was coming from, and the other looking forward to see whether the next move might itself generate some bright and hopeful new source of income. Apart from the US and Canadian contributions, Unicef's other immediate source of funds was the residual assets of UNRRA. As the financial skein of UNRRA's outstanding debts and credits in various currencies was unwound, Unicef became an inheritor. The sums were neither so vast as had been hoped, nor so trifling as had been feared. By October 1947, UNRRA had handed over $6 million; by the end of 1950, $32.3 million, in thirteen different currencies.

Meanwhile, Pate had begun to build on the financial keystone of the US contribution. To release the $25 million left in the US allocation, he set out to stimulate other contributions. This was a dishearteningly slow process. By October 1947, two months short of Unicef's first full year of operation and at roughly the moment when the first cargoes were being unloaded,
only two more governments had made contributions: France had volunteered francs worth $900,000, and Norway some cod liver oil. Another $3.85 million was pledged, mostly from Australia.

Argentina, to Pate's regret, had bowed out. His optimism on that score had been dashed by the rider attached to an offer of $10 million. The money would be only forthcoming if Madame Eva Peron could go on a pilgrimage throughout Latin America as an official Unicef representative, thus satisfying Argentina's 'moral and spiritual aspirations'. The UN had carefully replied that they would be delighted for Madame Peron to undertake such a voyage, but that it would be more advisable for the wife of a Head of State to do so in her national capacity. No more was heard from Buenos Aires about the $10 million.

In the meantime, another UN initiative to raise money on behalf of children was gathering steam. This was the brainchild of Aake Ording, the Norwegian delegate who had tried to find a formula to head off UNRRA's collapse at the Geneva Council meeting of August 1946. Ording had served as Norway's Deputy Foreign Secretary under Trygve Lie, now UN Secretary-General, and was a man of great individuality. Ording had an idea for helping the children of Europe, whom he regarded as abandoned by the UNRRA Council at a critical moment.

A spontaneous voluntary movement had sprung up in the south of Norway to raise money and organize relief for the war-devastated north. If this could happen across the geographic barrier within Norway, why not across borders throughout the world? In December 1946, at the same General Assembly which established Unicef, Ording proposed that the UN endorse the idea of soliciting 'one day's pay' from salaried people everywhere for programmes on behalf of children. The UN would declare the 'day'; voluntary organizations would gather in the proceeds. A joint effort of peoples and governments would give force to the idea of the United Nations, and do much to alleviate the suffering of children.

As with many visionary ideas which defy practical obstacles, the idea of a 'United Nations Appeal for Children' was greeted with considerable scepticism. The UN could not compel member governments to declare a 'one day's pay' donation from people in their own countries; nor did it have at that time any systematic means of collecting donations from individual citizens, except through governments. Collecting and spending were two sides of one coin: if the UN was to invite the voluntary organizations to do the work of collecting the money, it could hardly expect to relieve them of it to spend on schemes outside their control. Nevertheless, the persistence of the Norwegians eventually won qualified approval for the idea. The UN agreed that an Appeal for Children in its name could be a worldwide non-governmental drive for contributions from the general public, taking the form of a 'day' in each country and asking people to levy themselves for one day's pay.
The problem of who would actually disburse the proceeds was solved by agreeing that as much as half the money collected could be used for children's programmes run by national voluntary organizations; and that half, or more, would go to Unicef. This formula was not to the satisfaction of Ludwik Rajchman, who thought Unicef should receive all proceeds. Ording, and all those with experience of the private charitable world, knew very well that this would doom the Appeal in most of the countries where it needed to succeed: in North America and the better-off European countries. In each country, the Appeal would be run by a national committee made up of representatives of organizations such as Save the Children, the Red Cross Society, and other voluntary bodies. Presidents, princes, and priests would be asked to endorse the 'one day's pay' appeal. None of these national figures or bodies would be keen to throw their weight behind a popular drive if their own children were not to benefit. Rajchman's persistent refusal to accept this reality was unhelpful to Ording and dogged the Appeal with an unnecessary problem.

Ording was designated the Appeal's co-ordinator by Trygve Lie, and put his energies into obtaining the endorsements of governments, and of consumers', farmers', and businessmen's organizations. In June 1947 at Maurice Pate's suggestion, he took on Michael Lubbock, an Englishman who had worked for UNRRA in Greece, to build up a European UN Appeal for Children (UNAC) network. By this stage it was clear that the Appeal could not take place successfully without preparation.

Lubbock managed to visit most crowned heads in Europe and interest quite a few of them, as well as recruit a variety of enthusiastic officials and professional people to serve on national UNAC committees. In February 1948, Ording reported to the UN that national committees had been formed in twenty-one countries, and that twenty-three other countries were following suit. In each case, an agreement between the Secretary-General and the country concerned settled the question of who would administer UNAC funds and what proportion would go to Unicef. Meanwhile, an International Advisory Committee had been formed under the chairmanship of Chester Bowles, an American public figure. 1948 was a leap year and Bowles advised the Secretary-General to select 29 February as 'the day' for UNAC throughout the world.

In some countries, UNAC committees observed 'the day' but carried out their fund-raising later. In many European countries, the campaign produced a lot of publicity, which brought home for the first time to officials, voluntary organizations, trade unionists, and all the citizens' groups that participated, what—in its humanitarian guise—the UN was, or could be, about. By the end of 1948, campaigns had been held or launched in forty-five countries and thirty territories, and had altogether raised just short of $30 million. Unicef received just over one-third of the total.

The most lucrative appeals were those in Australia and New Zealand,
which both raised over $2 million; Canada, South Africa and Britain each raised $1.5 million. Iceland was the star; there the appeal raised nearly $500,000, or $4.39 from each person. There was also a warm response in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, where the proceeds went to the International Tuberculosis Campaign. In eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia ran a very successful appeal.

In the US the results of UNAC were disappointing. Under $1 million was raised against a target of $60 million. The appeal dragged its feet because of lack of official enthusiasm, and because of the friction which accompanied its birth and pursued its career. The American voluntary agencies were very jealous of any invasion of their territory, and demanded that their equal partnership with Unicef in UNAC be constantly underlined. Much more energy was spent arguing about who would receive and spend the proceeds than setting up a strong co-operative arrangement for raising them. The creation of a US Committee for Unicef in December 1947 did little to resolve these problems.

This committee came into existence at the instigation of Katherine Lenroot, the Director of the US Children's Bureau and the US delegate to Unicef's Executive Board. She felt that support from a group of influential citizens might bolster US government commitment, and would help push through Congress a sizeable Unicef appropriation. A distinguished slate of Committee members was enlisted with help from the State Department. The chairperson was Mrs Mary Lord, a leader in prominent social circles with an impeccable career in voluntary service. The Committee's first meeting was held on 19 January 1948 in no less a venue than the White House, at the invitation of Mrs Harry Truman.

The contacts the group could command paid off. The *New York Times* ran an editorial on the same day, called 'The Appeal for Children', one of several around this time which lamented the hard-pressed financial fortunes of the United Nations children's fund. But the US Committee for Unicef stood aloof from any kind of fund-raising activity. Mary Lord did not feel the committee could raise funds or get involved in explaining to the American public what UNAC was without antagonizing key supporters of the Unicef appropriation in the US Congress.

The failure in the US was discouraging. In spite of its many successes, the UN decided not to allow UNAC to carry on for another year in its existing form, as Ording had hoped. He made his disappointment and anger public. In December 1948, the General Assembly passed a resolution that UNAC should continue, but that in future all funds raised should go to Unicef. Ording himself was repudiated. The battle had finally gone Rajchman's way.

Alfred Katzin, lately a senior official of UNRRA, took over the Appeal as a personal favour to Trygve Lie and Maurice Pate. He found it difficult to pick up the pieces. Except in a handful of countries, notably Australia
and New Zealand, where the idea of voluntary association in support of UN efforts for children faced little opposition from humanitarian interests. UNAC's productive days were over. During 1949 and 1950, $1.5 million was raised: less than a tenth of the amount raised in 1948.

UNAC left an important legacy, however. It was the first time that the UN appealed for contributions to private citizens as opposed to governments, and this imbued it with some of the aura previously reserved exclusively for charitable and voluntary effort. In many countries United Nations Associations and national committees for Unicef became successor organizations.

With his banker's instinct, Maurice Pate did not allow any expectations from UNAC to get in the way of pursuing other sources of revenue, particularly governments. During Unicef's early years, the outcome of the annual legislative circus on appropriations in Washington effectively meant the difference between the organization's life and death. As each year's discussions on the federal budget began, Pate maintained as much pressure on the US as he was able. He kept closely in touch with Herbert Hoover, and though he was too delicate to ask him to use his senior Republican connections on Unicef's behalf, Hoover did so voluntarily to good effect.

Independently of what could be managed on the various political circuits—and Pate himself spent considerable time in Washington trying to muster support—public pressure could make a difference. At this stage, the US Committee for Unicef was a body designed to act with maximum decorum and was quite unsuited to conducting vigorous popular campaigns. Here, Pate's friend Helenka Pantaleoni stepped into the breach. Through the network of women's and other organizations with which she was active, Pantaleoni managed to arrange that Congressmen were showered with letters of support.

An even more important arena was Washington itself. One of Pate's earliest recruits to Unicef was Betty Jacob, previously a special assistant to the Directors-General of UNRRA and active in relief work during the war. Jacob knew the Washington legislative circuits inside out, and moved around them in a way that quite set the State Department's teeth on edge; they found it impossible to plead that Congress would not support anything more than a modest financial appropriation when Jacob could produce a bevy of legislators to say the opposite.

In 1948, Congress agreed an appropriation for Unicef of $35 million. This compared to $40 million the previous year, but the reduction was more apparent than real. Of the $40 million voted for 1947, it had been stipulated that, beyond an initial $15 million, other governments must provide 'matching' contributions according to a formula of $43 to $57
before more could be released. So far, the response of other governments had not allowed Unicef to take up the entire amount.

In 1948, a more liberal ‘match’ of $28 to $72 from the US was stipulated. In spite of this generous enticement, support from other governments was still slow to pick up. At the end of June 1949, there was $13 million left untouched, which only did not disappear altogether because at the last moment, under more orchestrated pressure, Congress voted that Unicef could draw on it for another year.

Pate was constantly trying to widen the net of donors, not only to take up the money sitting idle in the US treasury, but to internationalize the base of Unicef’s support. Some governments—Australia, Switzerland, and France were the most generous—did begin to give to Unicef as a habit. Others—Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia—gave generous contributions in kind considering that they were among the countries worst hit by war. But for all Pate’s hard work, it took until June 1950 to squeeze out of governments around the globe enough to draw the entire $75 million voted by the US.

Unlike other UN organizations which received their financial allocations from member states on an assessed basis as part of their membership dues, Unicef was conceived from the start as a fund towards which governments and people gave voluntarily. This characteristic was one much valued by Pate. In these first few years, his small band of staff and helpers produced a series of ideas for raising money. One of these has done more than anything else to make Unicef a household name around the world: Unicef greeting cards.

The story of how the greeting cards began is part of Unicef folklore. The first design was a picture of a maypole painted on glass by a seven-year-old Czechoslovakian girl. Dzitka and her classmates were regular drinkers of Unicef milk, and the paintings they produced were a ‘thank-you’, sent off to Unicef’s bureau in Prague by their teacher. From there, the glass picture of children dancing round the maypole went to Vienna, where one of Pate’s bright young women—Grace Holmes Barbey, sent out on an information gathering mission—wrapped it up and took it back to New York. In October 1949, small numbers of a card using Dzitka’s design were produced as a modest fund-raiser.

In spite of Pate’s reservations about attaching Unicef’s name to anything remotely commercial, comments were so favourable that the experiment was repeated the following year. This time, the design was completely pedestrian, a concession to his concern that the project should be purely ‘educational’. The card showed the new UN building in Manhattan and a barge laden with Unicef supplies setting off down the river. However hard he wished it not to make money, the card defeated Pate by raising $4200!
These experiments led to the formal establishment of the Unicef Greeting Card Operation in 1951. Care was taken to avoid tying the cards either in picture or words exclusively to the Christian idea of the Christmas season. The greeting was printed in the official UN languages; everything was done to create as much of an international flavour as possible. Pate's scruples were met by printing on each card that its production and sale were for the benefit of the world's children.

Using the promotional network of the UN family and the many voluntary organizations in the US with which Jacob, Barbey, Pantaleoni, and others had established Unicef connections, 600,000 cards were sold. The designs for the cards were donated by Dagmar Starcke, a Danish artist, establishing a tradition for the future. In the next few years, Raoul Dufy and Henri Matisse donated designs, giving the operation useful publicity. In 1953, the greetings cards started to sell on the other side of the Atlantic and raised nearly $100,000. The sales operation was run by volunteers; their increasing numbers and the increasing sales of cards went hand-in-hand through the 1950s and 1960s with the growth of Unicef's national committees.

If millions of people were introduced to Unicef by cards at Christmas, families in the US began to hear of it at Halloween. On 31 October, as the pumpkin pie bakes in the oven, the custom all over North America is for children to go out and accost people with a threat: 'Trick or Treat'. A cookie or a candy bar is the 'treat' they are looking for; if it is not handed over, due warning has been given that a 'trick'—a prank—may be played. In October 1950, the Reverend Clyde Allison of Bridesburg, Pennsylvania, introduced a 'trick or treat' variation to the members of his Sunday School. Instead of demanding treats for themselves, the children of Bridesburg asked instead for nickels and dimes to send to Unicef.

In subsequent years, other churches and schools took up the idea, fostered originally by Betty Jacob and promoted actively after 1953 by the US Committee for Unicef, by then under the chairmanship of Helenka Pantaleoni. 'Trick or Treat for Unicef' provided a perfect vehicle for educating children in school and at home about children in other lands, how they lived and what their problems were. Many years down the road, with the help of Unicef's Ambassador-at-Large, Danny Kaye, the annual Halloween campaign for Unicef was to play a major part in etching Unicef's name indelibly on the map of popular support.

During the course of 1948 and 1949, Unicef began to take its first, then imperceptible, steps towards metamorphosis into an entirely different kind of organization. Most of these steps took place in Asia.

To begin with, Unicef's programme of assistance to countries in Asia other than China followed quite naturally from its concern for the children of all 'countries victims of aggression'. Japan had, after all, managed for a
while to hold almost universal sway from Korea in the east to Burma in the west. But the emergency circumstances which confronted the children of Asia were so very different from those in Europe that, as was evident from the start, the essentially neat and tidy package—the 'food parcel plus'—that most assistance to Europe represented could not sensibly be copied. In groping around, trying to find out how to do something useful in this vast and heterogeneous chunk of the planet, Unicef began to be reshaped by the responses it produced. The alternative to the 'food parcel plus' in what were then called the underdeveloped regions eventually became the fundamental purpose of Unicef—and the reason why its existence was prolonged, at first temporarily into the early 1950s, and later indefinitely, to the present day. When Unicef first began in 1947 to contemplate assistance for 'the Far East other than China', this course of events was certainly not foreseen.

In the late 1940s, most of Asia was in a state of political and social upheaval. The second World War had permanently damaged the authority of ancient or traditional regimes, as well as that of the colonial powers. New political arrangements were gradually emerging, some accompanied by protracted turmoil. The Philippines gained their long promised independence from the US in 1946. The British extracted themselves from a divided Indian subcontinent the following year, and extended independence to Ceylon and Burma in less agonising circumstances. Fighting broke out against the French in Indo-China in late 1946 after they tried to reassert their control. In Indonesia, the days of the Dutch were numbered. In Korea, rival claims for sovereignty over the peninsula threatened violent confrontation. Everywhere from the plains of the Punjab to the streets of Saigon, the region presented a spectacle of profound uncertainty and teeming confusion.

By any standards, the prospect of running a useful assistance programme with a handful of dollars in an area containing 450 million children was extremely daunting. Under the circumstances there were some in Unicef's ranks who doubted whether the effort was worth making. However, as with China, Pate pushed ahead. Unicef was an international organization, and in his view it should behave like one. Its contribution might make a more measurable and significant difference in a European environment, but that did not justify ignoring others of a more problematic kind.

Superficially, there were some comparisons to be made between postwar Asia and postwar Europe. Many countries occupied by Japan had suffered intense wartime destruction. Manila had received more war damage than any European city except Warsaw. Food production was disrupted, and in many countries virtually nothing was left of pre-war health institutions and training schools. Public health had deteriorated: tuberculosis, insect-borne and venereal disease had increased.

Unquestionably, there was plenty of emergency relief and rehabilitation
work to be done for children, specially in areas still affected by strife. But there was a very significant difference between the temporary nature of emergency needs in most of Europe and the permanent nature of those in most of Asia. Relief was intended to tide people over, and rehabilitation to restore the status quo ante. This, in most of the countries of Asia, was a state of affairs in which millions of mothers and children endured chronic, everyday hunger and ill-health outside the reach of any medical treatment or social service. It was not possible for Unicef to start discussing even an emergency programme for any of these countries without considering the underlying problems which would remain once the emergency was over. Asia defied a definition of the word 'emergency'.

In April 1948, in an attempt to try to establish a suitable policy for assisting in Asia, Unicef invited two authoritative public health figures to undertake a survey of thirteen Asian countries—Dr Thomas Parran, former Surgeon-General of the US Public Health Service, and Dr C. K. Lakshmanan, Director of the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health in Calcutta. They travelled in British North Borneo, Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Indo-China, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, meeting with senior health officials and trying to pinpoint child-health problems to which Unicef's slender resources might be applied. In July, they filed their report.

Their first conclusion was that it would be impossible to attempt any large-scale feeding of hungry children. Hunger, malnutrition, even starvation, were chronic conditions. But the size of the territories involved, the huge populations, the lack of communications and trained administrators—not to mention the political difficulties many new and inexperienced governments were facing—precluded food rationing schemes on any but the most local scale. If not food, then what? The high rate of infant death was striking in almost all the countries they visited. Only one country—Thailand—had a rate lower than 100 per thousand live births. Elsewhere, a rate of 200 was common, and in certain countries there were pockets where 300 was the norm.

Parran and Lakshmanan had everywhere sought to identify the best ways of making a small investment in child health. They began to focus on disease control. In spite of the lack of reliable statistics, the extent of certain diseases particularly affecting mothers and children was well-known. Many were more widespread as a direct result of war and civil disruption. Malaria was the number one killer in most countries: in India alone there were around 100 million cases a year, and two million deaths. Tuberculosis was not far behind: one country had carried out a recent survey which showed that fifty per cent of children at six years old were tuberculin positive. Syphilis was widespread; in places where occupying troops had been present over a long period, the rate among pregnant women was as high as fifty per cent. In Indonesia and Thailand, yaws—a
dreaded and disabling disease which, like syphilis, was caused by treponema or spiral-shaped bacteria and manifested itself in painful lesions—had also reached epidemic proportions. In addition to these diseases, dysentery, intestinal parasites and malnutrition in various degrees of severity were so prevalent as to be the rule rather than the exception among small children.

Parran and Lakshmanan drew up provisional lists of assistance for all the countries they visited. The main emphasis was on laboratory equipment, and drugs and vaccines, for programmes of disease control. They were pinpricks of assistance compared to the scale of the problems. But they were useful pinpricks and essential components in any scheme trying to begin the process of bringing health problems under control.

There were, too, supplies of milk and other protective foods, the backbone of Unicef assistance. While child feeding on any large scale was impracticable, some situations invited the provision of nutritious food rations. Armed conflict was casting up hapless populations of refugees on shores and on frontiers. In the refugee camps of India, Pakistan and Hong Kong, as well as in orphanages and welfare institutes, organized feeding of children in care was not only possible but essential, according to Parran. 'Milk, under such circumstances, is medicine', he reported. 'How precious it is is proved by the willingness of mothers to stand in line, literally for hours, in order to get a small can.'

The main obstacle to better control of infectious disease and improving child health generally was the lack of health and social welfare services, and of people trained to run them. Doctors and nurses were in short supply. Specialists were almost non-existent. There weren't even any para-medical staff capable of performing simple medical and sanitary tasks. In October 1948, Unicef's Board agreed that seventy-three fellowships for overseas training might be granted, with advice from WHO about the selection of candidates and courses.

The results of these fellowships, most of which were in the fields of midwifery, public health nursing, paediatrics and tuberculosis control, taught Unicef an important lesson. Although the fellows marginally improved their performance when they returned home, most of what they had been taught in institutions reflecting the state of the art in Western medicine was inapplicable at home. Recognizing that training the different categories and echelons of personnel needed to run child-health services was ultimately even more essential than sending equipment and supplies, from this point onwards Unicef directed its assistance for professional training to institutions in the part of the world where trainees would later practise. One of its first moves in this direction was to provide $930,000, matched by a similar sum from the Indian government, to set up a regional training centre for maternal and child-health care workers at the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health in Calcutta.

In November 1948, Dr Michael Watt who had just retired as New
Zealand's Director of Health Services, received a letter from Maurice Pate offering him the post of Unicef's Regional Director in South-East Asia. Watt had never heard of Unicef, but adventurously chose to accept. For the next twelve months he flew all over the southern seas and laid the groundwork for what became the largest and most dynamic of Unicef's programme networks. He was present in Colombo in March 1949 for the inaugural shot in the Ceylonese anti-tuberculosis campaign, one of three Asian countries to invite the Scandinavian teams of the ITC to vaccinate their children.

In Djakarta, Watt tried unsuccessfully to persuade the wartime Republican government to accept a consignment of Unicef milk powder from the hands of the Dutch. In Rangoon he visited a large maternity hospital and found it equipped with only two pairs of forceps. In a hospital in Karachi, he was introduced to the first group of young women to abandon purdah to join the nursing course. In the Philippines, where a feeding programme used milk, fish, rice, beans, and shark oil capsules from his own New Zealand, the authorities were sufficiently impressed with results to introduce school meals as a government policy.

Watt decided to set up Unicef's headquarters in Bangkok. Thailand seemed like a rock of stability in a troubled region, and Bangkok's position at the hub of South-East Asia also made it a suitable position for an office whose realm covered millions of square miles and almost as many millions of children. FAO and the UN had made the same decision about the location of their regional offices. Watt hired staff and began to establish the embryonic network of an operation fanning out in an arc from Karachi in the east, through Ceylon, Java, the Philippines, to Korea in the north-west. Gradually, a small band of Unicef representatives were taking up posts in New Delhi, Manila, Djakarta and elsewhere to supervise a steady flow of supplies arriving from all points of the compass.

Watt himself, for health reasons, decided not to stay. His replacement was an ebullient American, Spurgeon Milton Keeny. Sam Keeny, the emperor of Unicef in Asia for the next thirteen years, probably did more than any single person to prove that Unicef's work in countries outside Europe was worthwhile for not some, but all, the world's children.

It had been a British delegate to Unicef's Board, J. A. A. C. Alexander, and his concern for an area of traditional British interest, which had provided the decisive encouragement for Unicef to start seriously considering assistance for Asia. In the case of Latin America, the equivalent push came from the US delegate, Katherine Lenroot, along with allies from the Latin American member States themselves.

Early in 1947, when Maurice Pate and Ludwik Rajchman were concentrating most of their attention on the burning issue of fund-raising, they
both looked upon the countries of Latin America primarily as sources of income, not as potential recipients of Unicef assistance. They were not, after all, countries gravely damaged by war, and some—notably Brazil—had given considerable support to UNRRA.

Very soon after Unicef's creation, a series of meetings took place with the Latin American member countries of the Executive Board to discuss the best way of soliciting funds from the region. The strategy adopted was to recruit distinguished Unicef emissaries to carry out educational and fund-raising missions to the most likely countries. Dr Domingo Ramos of the University of Havana and Dr Howard Kershner, a US philanthropist of international renown, were among the first. Their efforts were rewarded by a resolution passed at the Inter-American Conference on Social Security in Rio de Janeiro in November 1947 which endorsed the governments' support for Unicef and other UN organizations. Except for Uruguay, which gave $1 million in 1948, this resolution did not prompt any immediate, large-scale generosity. President Trujillo of the Dominican Republic handed Pate a cheque for $20,000 during a bizarre visit to the UN. Venezuela, Cuba, Costa Rica and Guatemala provided similar sums the following year. Potentially much larger donors held back, in spite of all Pate's efforts to woo them.

Some of the Latin American countries did not like to be perceived merely as a source of funds. The Brazilian delegate to the Unicef Board, Roberto Oliveira de Campos, was particularly vocal in pointing out that there were many children in the region greatly in need of assistance. To begin with, Unicef resisted the idea of becoming involved. There was a range of other international agencies in a better position to furnish advice on child health or welfare in the region. Especially to begin with, Unicef was stretched to provide a realistic programme for children in war-torn Europe.

But Katherine Lenroot saw the issue in a different light. She regarded Unicef as the international equivalent of the US Children's Bureau of which she was chief; in that capacity, she had considerable experience of children's welfare issues in Latin America, a part of the world quite unfamiliar to both Pate and Rajchman. She had been a US delegate to various Pan-American Child Congresses, and was closely associated with the International American Institute for the Protection of Childhood, based in Montevideo. Its ninth Congress took place in Caracas in January 1948; Dr Martha Eliot, Lenroot's deputy, attended for the Children's Bureau and played a prominent part. A resolution was passed inviting Unicef to pay attention to the needs of children in the Americas, and Lenroot took care to raise the issue in New York.

During 1948 attitudes within Unicef began to change. Campos began to get through to Rajchman and others the very real needs of Latin American children. In the rural areas of some countries, he pointed out, infant death
rates were nearly as high as in parts of Asia: between 100 and 200 per 1000 births. In late summer, rumblings of serious dissatisfaction from Latin American member states began to circulate around the UN about Unicef's refusal to heed their requests. In their view, European recovery meant that their own children's needs were now as, or more, pressing than those in Europe. Anxious to avoid an attack on Unicef in the General Assembly, Rajchman began to elaborate a set of principles to govern some limited assistance to children's programmes in Latin America.

Before any specific requests were entertained, it would be useful to have more information about the specific health and nutrition problems of children in the region. FAO was organizing a conference on nutritional problems in Latin America scheduled for July 1948, so Rajchman invited Dr Reginald Passmore, a lecturer in the departments of Public Health and Social Medicine in Edinburgh University and an ex-member of the Indian Medical Service, to attend the conference on behalf of Unicef.

Passmore used the opportunity to consult other international organizations already active in the Americas and to visit various countries. His report was an important step forward. He witnessed little of the kind of starvation he was used to seeing in Asia, but there was plenty of malnutrition—for which he mainly blamed the lack of milk—and much infant sickness and death from tuberculosis and insect-borne diseases, specially malaria and typhus.

Soon after Passmore's return, Maurice Pate sent a letter to every Latin American UN delegation outlining the kind of programmes Unicef was willing to support: supplementary feeding, anti-tuberculosis and anti-syphilis campaigns, insect control to reduce malaria, milk conservation, and scholarships in social paediatrics.

In March 1949 the Executive Board made a block allocation of $2 million to be spent as and when specific projects came forward. By the end of the year, several were under discussion and the amount was upped to $3.8 million. Dr Leo Eloesser, who had returned from China, was sent off to Latin America to look at the possibilities for disease control and maternal and child-health services. Dr Johannes Holm from Copenhagen was another of several consultants who travelled to various Latin American countries. Close co-operation took place with the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), the international health organization for the Americas affiliated with WHO and headed by Dr Fred Lowe Soper, a veteran of many famous disease control campaigns on the American continent.

Many of the earliest programmes to win Unicef's support were those of the most familiar kind: feeding programmes in schools. Unicef's experience in, and enthusiasm for, putting milk into children's mouths propelled it naturally in this direction. An Institute of Nutrition for Central America and Panama (INCAP) had been recently established in Guatemala City, under the direction of Dr Nevin Scrimshaw of the PASB. Because of
INCAP’s presence, Guatemala City was chosen as the first location of a Unicef office in the region and, in September 1949, Alice Shaffer of the US Children’s Bureau was recruited to serve there as Unicef’s first representative. INCAP, whose governing body consisted of Public Health Ministers of the member countries, was beginning to tackle the shortage of reliable information on the scale of child malnutrition and the dietary practices of poor families. To begin with, Scrimshaw did not welcome Unicef’s dried powdered milk for school lunch programmes. He was a critic of basing a nutrition programme for any length of time on an imported food, and preferred local sources of cheap vegetable protein. Some of the Health Ministers were, however, more enthusiastic and Unicef milk was imported for use in small-scale demonstration projects intended to prove that mass feeding in classrooms and institutions was a sound investment in child health. Scrimshaw simultaneously pursued his quest for a cheap nutritious vegetable-based food which could be locally promoted instead of milk as an antidote to child malnutrition. This initiative was a long time maturing.

The largest proportion of Unicef’s early assistance to Latin American countries was spent on disease control. Early in 1950, two countries—Mexico and Ecuador—played host to the International Tuberculosis Campaign and carried out the first mass tuberculin testing and BCG vaccination in the hemisphere. Other support for disease control included supplies of DDT for use against malaria and other insect-borne disease; and penicillin for the cure of syphilis and yaws in eight countries of the Caribbean, including a mass effort in Haiti during the years when Dr Francois Duvalier became the popular maestro of health and earned the nickname ‘Papa Doc’.

Unicef also provided equipment for maternal and child-health centres, and for laboratories to produce whooping cough and diphtheria vaccine. Over the first year-and-a-half of Unicef assistance in the region, the emphasis was on programmes that could develop rapidly and yield immediate results; Unicef’s own future was too uncertain over the longer term.

Unicef’s engagement in the countries of the eastern Mediterranean region was inspired by very different circumstances. After the second World War, the turmoil in the Middle East which had first been inspired by Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 1930s re-erupted. The pressure to create a homeland for the Jewish people grew to a crescendo, and the UN accepted the idea. When the British mandate in Palestine expired in May 1948, a new state of Israel was declared. The Arab countries refused recognition, and war engulfed the whole area. Hundreds of thousands of people fled their homes.

In August 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte, the special UN mediator in Palestine, made an international appeal for assistance. Unicef, under its mandate for providing help to children irrespective of political considerations,
was able to respond relatively quickly. For many weeks, its food supplies were the mainstay of rations for refugee children; blankets and other essentials were supplied throughout the following eighteen months, along with a daily meal for half a million Palestinian and Israeli mothers and children. Distribution was handled through the Red Cross and the Friends Service Committee. These arrangements were eventually superceded by the creation of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which after 1 May 1950 co-ordinated all UN relief for Palestinian refugees. Unicef contributed over $10.5 million during the crisis period.

The first country in the region to seek Unicef assistance for regular, as opposed to emergency, child health and feeding was Israel. X-ray units, drugs and vaccines were sent, opening a warm relationship between Unicef and Israel which long survived the spirit of Arab/Israeli hostility pervading many other UN fora. By mid-1949, the tentacles of the International Tuberculosis Campaign began to reach other countries, including Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and some of the countries of northern Africa, as well as the Palestinian refugees. Taking a cue from the anti-tuberculosis onslaught, Iraq then sought Unicef's help for an attack on bejel, another treponematosus disease like syphilis and yaws. Thus began Unicef assistance in the eastern Mediterranean region, a programme much more primitive at the end of 1950 then either of those in Asia or Latin America. No programme yet existed in Africa south of the Sahara, a part of the world still almost entirely under the domination of the colonial powers.

In April 1949, Pate recruited a deputy. E. J. R. Heyward was a 34-year-old Tasmanian economist who had come to New York as First Secretary to the Australian mission and represented Australia on Unicef's Board. His first assignment for Unicef was in 1947 when, responding to a complaint from the Greek delegate, Pate asked him to go to Greece and to find out whether Unicef supplies were being used to support the Communist rebellion. This allegation proved to be spurious. Heyward thereafter took an active part in Unicef policy discussions, and his dissections of programmes commanded the attention of both Pate and Rajchman, towards whom the much younger man felt great respect. He also happened to be the delegate of the country which was Unicef's second largest government donor and its largest voluntary donor through UNAC. When the organization grew to a point where Pate felt over-extended, he asked the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs whether Dick Heyward could be loaned temporarily: at this stage, there was still no serious idea that the organization had more than another year or two to live.

Heyward brought to Unicef an intellectual strength never subsequently outmatched and, coupled with an outwardly shy and retiring personality, a bulldog tenacity which was to serve the organization through thick and
thin during the course of nearly thirty-three years. He joined Pate’s staff at a critical period. Over the course of the next few months, the idea of keeping the organization alive and consolidating rather than disbanding its work for children began to gain ground, both among senior staff and certain Board members. Heyward, together with Jack Charnow, Secretary to the Executive Board, were the key members of the team who helped Pate shepherd Unicef through more than eighteen months of dispute and uncertainty.

As the emergency in Europe began to recede, the specific purpose for which a temporary emergency fund for children had been set up under UN auspices no longer existed. By mid-1949, however, Unicef’s programme already extended far beyond the original purpose, both in geographical extent and in character. Inevitably, as it began to face the challenges posed by ‘emergency’ requirements in Asia, children’s health and nutritional needs had been revealed which would persist far beyond the next year or two, and for which some cargoes of food, drugs, and essential supplies were not needed merely as a vital protective stop-gap.

Unicef had followed to the letter a principle laid down for it by the Economic and Social Council in early 1947: ‘Emergency measures shall be so developed and administered as to utilize and strengthen the permanent health and child welfare programmes of the countries receiving assistance’. For countries outside Europe, Unicef had transformed the ‘food parcel plus’ of traditional emergency relief into vaccinations for disease control, midwifery kits and health-centre equipment, milk-drying plants, training fellowships in social paediatrics, and other items—the latest under discussion were plant for Asia’s first penicillin and DDT factories—for which need was most unlikely to disappear. The lack of foreign exchange to purchase such things was not a temporary phenomenon caused by war, but a product of underdevelopment, or poverty, which would stretch into the foreseeable future. Many Unicef people were beginning to feel distinctly unhappy about what would happen to replace their work when the organization closed down.

In June 1949, Maurice Pate proposed to the Executive Board that a study on ‘the continuing needs of children’ be carried out. This study would pave the way for a UN policy about how its assistance could in the future be used to help meet those needs. Ostensibly, this proposal envisaged Unicef’s demise and the assumption of its responsibilities towards children by other, permanently-established parts of the UN system. But it raised the possibility, implicitly if not explicitly, that one way of helping to meet the continuing needs of children was through continuing the life of Unicef. The proposal was a litmus test to find out which countries might seek to prolong Unicef’s life and which would resist such a move.

The answer was immediately forthcoming. Both the US and Canada supported the idea of such a study, but saw its essential purpose as the
establishment of a timetable for the demise of Unicef and an early and orderly transition of its useful functions elsewhere. Switzerland and Australia also supported the idea of the study, but thought it unnecessary at this point to destroy public confidence in Unicef by talking openly of a 'dying organization'. The North Americans strongly disagreed; they wanted there to be no doubt in anyone's mind that Unicef was a temporary organization and that its days were numbered. Theirs was the view that prevailed.

Other UN organizations—notably WHO—were also beginning to call for such a 'study', which had now become a transparent euphemism for organizing the dismemberment of Unicef and dividing the spoils between various inheritors. A working group was set up 'to co-ordinate the work of UN organizations in regard to children'; it included representatives of the United Nations Secretariat, WHO, ILO, FAO, IRO, UNESCO, and Dick Heyward on behalf of Unicef.

He and Charnow began to pull together material from field offices around the world and wage a propaganda campaign on Unicef's behalf. In December 1949, the group produced its results. That children were in need around the world was not in dispute; that all the specialized agencies had a role to play in international assistance on their behalf was equally uncontroversial; but they had failed to reach agreement on where each role began and ended and whether a specific fund for children in some shape or form was needed.

During the course of the next several months, in a series of different UN fora, the number and complexity of various suggestions for assuming the task of helping children was only paralleled by the number and complexity of the dissenting positions against them. If the secretariats of the organizations could not agree—and it was clear that at least between WHO and Unicef there would be no meeting of minds—the government delegates in their various commissions and committees did no better. Inevitably, as time went by the question began to be asked whether it would not be simpler—not to mention more beneficial for children—to leave Unicef to continue doing what it had begun.

Some preparatory moves were made to open the way for such a suggestion to come before UN decision-making bodies. On 2 December 1949—the same day that the inter-agency working group reported on its inconclusive deliberations—the General Assembly passed a resolution congratulating Unicef for 'its great humanitarian effort in Europe and in the Middle East, now being extended to Asia, Latin America, and Africa, in bringing substantial aid of lasting value . . . to millions of mothers and children'. In the way of such resolutions, the wording might sound mild to the point of banality. But to those involved, it was the opening salvo of a counter-attack to rescue Unicef and keep it alive.

The areas of dispute were essentially three. The first area was money. Naturally this issue was most important to the US government which had
played the role of the organization's postwar paymaster, and did not think it could go on persuading Congress to underwrite the children's fund once the emergency in Europe had disappeared. In early 1949, the Congress had stated its unwillingness to appropriate further funds for Unicef until plans for its termination had been formulated. Sadly, many Americans did not feel so deeply concerned about the fate of children in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as they had about those in Europe. The State Department therefore believed that it would be better to legislate for a small, additional sum to be given to the UN Secretariat budget by all member states to offset the cost of a permanent children's section within it. This could be guaranteed to survive the vagaries of government generosity, and its costs would be borne more fairly by other governments: instead of providing half Unicef's total income as it had to date, the US would provide one-quarter according to the standard cost-sharing formula between the nations.

The second issue was territory. WHO, and to a lesser extent FAO and the UN Bureau of Social Affairs, did not and had never appreciated the idea of a separate UN organization for children. The mandate of an organization which existed to help an age-group rather than a professional and governmental sector overlapped with their own. They wanted to be the inheritors of Unicef's programmes; the most they were prepared to concede was that a United Nations fund-raising and supplies organization would be useful. It should, of course, be properly under their 'wing from a technical point of view. Children could be put on posters and their smiles and tears used for UN promotional and publicity purposes; but there should be no separate mechanism for planning programmes on their behalf or safeguarding their special interests.

The third issue at dispute was much more confused. It had to do with the difference between 'technical assistance' and 'material assistance'; between the idea, not quite yet fully formulated, of participating in a country's 'development' and merely offering 'emergency relief'. At this time, the only engines of 'development' yet accorded recognition by the international community were capital investment and technical assistance. Within the new network of international mechanisms, capital investment was the domain of the institutions set up at Bretton Woods, particularly the World Bank. Technical assistance—or advice and scientific know-how in agriculture, health, nutrition, education, employment, or social welfare—was the service the specialized agencies had been set up to provide.

'Material assistance'—donated goods, which Unicef provided by raising funds and buying supplies—was a thoroughly inferior kind of affair. Provided in any circumstances other than the classic emergency, material assistance was seen as a welfare hand-out, the antithesis of the kinds of investment which would enable underdeveloped countries to move ahead. Unicef had begun to prove that this need not be so; and WHO, in
suggesting that Unicef’s expertise in supply procurement should be retained in its truncated offspring, had recognized that equipping a health centre or providing machinery for a penicillin plant did not necessarily mean helpless dependency on the part of the recipients. However, the idea that providing supplies was somehow by definition a nondevelopmental thing to do and that any organization which did this as a primary function did not deserve any permanence or independence greatly complicated the dispute about Unicef’s survival. Unicef was seen as a humanitarian upstart of an organization with milk powder, penicillin and popular appeal but no serious role to play in the business of development. Some people persist in this view to the present day.

Maurice Pate took time to reach a point of inner conviction that Unicef in its existing form ought to continue. In his Hoover days, all the relief organizations he served automatically closed down when the emergency was over: this was almost essential to their ideological purity. In May 1949, when the US Congress had been considering the appropriation, Pate had testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs that Unicef was closely collaborating with WHO and FAO with a view to handing its functions over to them. By January 1950, he had begun to waver. He told Mary Lord, Chairman of the US Committee, that he had reached the conclusion that the UN should embark on a ‘second chapter’ of work for children. He felt that Unicef had given great impetus to governments and individuals everywhere, and that ‘in the world in which we live today I consider it enormously important to keep this kind of spirit highly alive’.

The first indication that sizeable opposition could be marshalled against the firm intention of the US and its supporters—Britain, Canada, South Africa, China (Taiwan), Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries—to bow Unicef off the UN stage came in the spring. The revolt came in the Social Commission of the UN, which recommended that Unicef continue its mission in uninterrupted form. The vote came about because the majority of countries represented in the Social Commission were on the receiving end of Unicef supplies. This development greatly boosted the morale of Unicef’s own people, and hardened the resolve of key supporters—the Australians, French, New Zealanders, and Yugoslavs.

Pate himself now adopted a much less ambiguous position, and began to present the case in Washington and elsewhere of the millions of deprived children and mothers in Asia and Latin America, where work had only just begun in earnest. There were also the thousands of children in countries such as Greece, Lebanon, Jordan, Japan, India, Pakistan, and now in Korea, whose suffering was still a vestige, direct or indirect, of postwar crisis. But his efforts made little impact at the State Department.

The US delegation was helping the UN Secretariat draft yet another compromise formula for submission to the UN General Assembly: it was a variation on the theme of a children’s section within the UN Secretariat,
but essentially no different from the earlier proposal which the Social
Commission had rejected.

Aware that there would be energetic opposition, Pate went to see
Eleanor Roosevelt, the chief US delegate to the UN Committee on Social
and Humanitarian Affairs. To this disappointment, she proved as unmovable
as the rest. A lifelong champion of children’s causes and a keen supporter
both earlier and later in Unicef’s career, she allowed herself to believe that
the children of the world would be best served by Unicef’s demise. She
was persuaded by the State Department that Congress would not be
prepared to vote more funds and wanted a permanent arrangement within
the UN for children. She refused to see that Unicef could ever be anything
but a temporary organization sending emergency relief supplies, and she
felt that its very existence was a hindrance to the establishment of something
better. She did not understand the viewpoint of the underdeveloped
countries about the value they attached to material assistance; nor the
programme formulae that Unicef was developing for its work outside
Europe.

The critical debate on Unicef’s future took place on 6 October 1950 at
Lake Success. Unicef’s leading champion was Professor Ahmed Bokhari, a
well-known figure in the US literary and academic world and Pakistan’s
permanent representative to the UN. Bokhari, who was known for his
eloquence, dismissed totally the proposal presented by the UN Secretary-
General. He described the notion that the ‘emergency’ was over as an
illusion; this was the basis of the case that a separate UN children’s fund
was no longer needed. ‘This illusion conveys the impression that, apart
from possible future emergencies such as the occasional earthquake, all is
well in the world and that the United Nations should concern itself not with
aid to children in 1950 or 1951, but with long-range goals such as aid in the
year 2000.’

‘Pakistan, as well as other countries in Asia’, Bokhari continued, ‘was
shocked to see in pamphlets distributed by Unicef, photographs of emaciated
European children, victims of the war. We received, however, a second
shock on realizing that those European children still appeared to be in a
no-worse state than millions of children living so-called normal lives in the
underdeveloped countries.’ He deplored the cold language of the proposal
under discussion, ‘according to which children suffering from endemic
cholera might well be denied cholera vaccines, unless their illness is the
result of an emergency. Instead, blueprints for the production of vaccines
will be provided to the government concerned, and the United Nations will
wash its hands of the fate of the children pending their local production’.

Bokhari delivered his speech on the first afternoon of the debate. His
appeal, backed by other delegates from the Middle East and Latin America,
turned the tide in Unicef’s favour. After days of debate, no amount of
amendment had made the UN proposal sufficiently palatable to enough of
those present. The donor countries began to desert Mrs Roosevelt's side. After nearly two weeks, the Australian delegation proposed a simple way through the impasse. Unicef in its existing form should be extended for two more years and its life then be reconsidered: the Yugoslavs amended the proposal to add an extra year. The three-year extension was finally agreed by forty-three votes to eight.

On 1 December 1950, this resolution was laid before the full General Assembly. Pate, hopeful that he could still persuade the US delegation not to vote against its adoption, wrote at length to Mrs Roosevelt. She was not present on 1 December; her alternate was instructed to abstain. No one else did so; Unicef had survived intact by what was a near-unanimous vote. To Pate, even one abstention was painful. The US delegate, Edith Sampson, was gracious in defeat: 'This is not the time to emphasize the misunderstandings which characterized so much of the debate on this issue. There are hundreds of millions of children in need, and we cannot forget them'. She went on: 'It is our earnest desire that ways and means will be found to ensure that the economically disinherited children of the world will receive effective United Nations aid over the years to come'.

The debates of 1950 were not the end of the story of Unicef's fight to survive; formally, all that had been won was a three-year stay of execution. But it was in 1950 that the die was cast. This was the debate that marked the watershed between one era and another. From this point onwards Unicef was to direct its full energies to the needs of the children in the underdeveloped world.

The question of Unicef's continuing existence was not finally settled until 5 October 1953, when the General Assembly unanimously agreed to prolong its temporary life indefinitely, or 'without reference to a time limit', dropping the words 'international' and 'emergency' from the name, but retaining the well-known Unicef acronym. During these three years, although the final UN verdict was still a nagging question, a much more real sense of insecurity came from Unicef's poor financial fortunes. The fears expressed in 1950 that international public and private generosity for children would dry up turned out to be fully justified.

In 1952, Unicef reached its financial nadir: only $9.4 million was received from governments worldwide, $6.7 million of which was from the USA. The following year, Helenka Pantaleoni and Betty Jacob kept up public and legislative lobbying campaigns to maintain US generosity at a time when the Eisenhower Administration was facing great Congressional opposition towards aid of all kinds. Unicef's $10 million appropriation was salvaged only after Eisenhower personally endorsed it as 'an integral part of our programme for America's security'. This vocabulary, applied to a fund for children, could only belong to a particular era: McCarthyism.
As the reverberations of the Cold War began to reach an emotional pitch in the US at the turn of the decade, Unicef did not remain untouched. Anti-UN feeling was so strong that no story about it could be reported outside the context which dominated the day-to-day interpretation of current affairs. Under the headline 'Reds Walk Out At UN Group's Child Aid Talks', the *New York Herald Tribune* of 7 March 1950 described how Unicef—'a non-political body that feeds children and mothers on both sides of the iron curtain—was hit by big power politics today when Russia and two satellites walked out'.

Ludwik Rajchman, Chairman of the Board, represented Poland, one of the 'satellites': the other was Czechoslovakia. The problem was the continued seating of the Nationalist delegate of China (Taiwan) instead of the delegate of the People's Republic. The USSR regarded the continued recognition of the Nationalist government by the UN as illegal, and throughout 1950 and beyond it adopted tactics designed to underline its point of view and enjoined its allies to do likewise. It did not exempt the children's fund from these displays. Unicef had worked hard to uphold the principle that there was no such thing as an enemy child. In the climate of the times it was difficult to maintain the position that children were always above politics.

Ludwik Rajchman was in a particularly uncomfortable position. During the 1930s, at the head of the League of Nations mission to China, he had been closely associated with T. V. Soong and other senior officials of the Chiang Kai Shek administration. While in Washington during the war he had worked for his old associates, trying to tie down US commitment to the Nationalist cause. Now, he felt obliged to make a public display of support for their detested opponents, China's new Communist regime. Politics had caught up with Rajchman's commitment to humanitarian affairs. The year of 1950 was the last year of his chairmanship of Unicef's Board. All his experience of focusing on the task in hand and leaving the ideological fight to others was of no avail against the tide of anticommunist feeling.

Rajchman belonged neither on one side of the iron curtain nor on the other. Yet to sustain his position, he had to function on both. Poland was now run by a Communist regime allied to Moscow. He had not lived in Poland for more than twenty years, and was a long-time expatriate whose family now lived in the US. He was not a candidate likely to recommend himself to the new Polish administration as their representative to a UN organization. But he was also a man of international standing who had done much to gain US aid for Poland during the war years, and international assistance in its aftermath. Furthermore, he was still a Pole and a patriot, whatever the ideological orientation of his motherland's latest regime. His own ideological reputation down the years, particularly in his visionary approach to public health, was that of a left-winger, but no-one who knew him well regarded him as a Communist. On the other hand neither friend
nor foe could say for certain where his political sympathies lay. He kept whatever views he had firmly to himself; that however was no longer a protection.

Rajchman managed for a while to walk a tightrope. He was chairman of a UN organization almost entirely dependent on US generosity, while his credentials for any formal involvement at all were provided by a Communist government. During the years of his chairmanship, he played an important—some said too important—role in the management of Unicef: he maintained an office in both New York and in Paris, and worked tirelessly without remuneration.

If Rajchman's style was often impatient and autocratic, Pate was tolerant and humoured his relentless scrutiny. But some other senior Unicef officers and mission chiefs were less ready to stomach Rajchman's proprietary attitude towards every Unicef nook and cranny he chose to enter. The time was coming for Rajchman to recede into the background as a distinguished elder statesman. While this was happening, the tightrope on which he had balanced successfully for so long was beginning to unravel. In 1950, when he found himself obliged to walk out of Unicef Board meetings in support of the USSR position on Nationalist China, it finally gave way.

After this, Rajchman was unable to play any important lobbying role in Unicef's fight for survival. By this stage, whatever he did was open to political interpretation of an unhelpful kind. He did make sure that the report of Unicef's activities during his chairmanship, on which its performance between 1946 and 1950 would be judged, provided a convincing record of achievement. But as far as his own involvement was concerned, the question of whether Unicef's lifespan would be extended was academic. If he had resisted the idea of relinquishing the chairmanship of the Board, the US delegation would have seen that he was voted out. In the current political climate, a chairman from a country with a Western alliance would be more suitable. Early in 1951, Mrs Adelaide Sinclair, the delegate of Canada, was elected the Board's second chairperson.

By this stage, Rajchman was no longer even welcome on US shores. During various US Senate subcommittee hearings targeted at those who were alleged to have 'betrayed' Nationalist forces in China into the hands of the Communists, Rajchman's name came up. His involvement in some of the international discussions surrounding the transformation of old League of Nations departments into new UN agencies was also regarded with suspicion. As the holder of a visa which described him as a delegate of the Polish government, he was branded a *de facto* Communist.

Towards the end of 1950, while visiting New York, he was served with a Congressional subpoena. As the citizen of another country and its diplomatic representative, this was a gross breach of international etiquette. He ignored the subpoena, and flew to France. He was never granted an entry visa again.
Rajchman did not return to Poland. He lived out his retirement close to his old associate Professor Robert Debré and the International Children’s Centre, thus maintaining a link with his cherished Unicef. Maurice Pate kept him in touch with activities throughout the years, and visited him when trips to Europe permitted.

Ludwik Rajchman, a truly extraordinary individual, died in 1965, at the age of eighty-four.

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