


Real-Time Evaluation of UNICEF's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines

UNICEF EVALUATION OFFICE

PRESENTATION AT EXECUTIVE BOARD INFORMAL BRIEFING MEETING

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Typhoon Haiyan: Emergency Response in the Philippines



- Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines on 8 November 2013
- Between 6-8,000 were killed and some 4 million were left homeless
- The short-term needs of the surviving population included: health and physical security, water, sanitation, shelter, schools and food security

Real-Time Evaluation: Purpose and Methods

- This RTE was undertaken 3-4 months after the typhoon hit, during the transition from relief to recovery
- Primarily *formative*, and secondarily *summative*, it assessed UNICEF's response vis-à-vis:
 - I. **UNICEF's own programme**
 - II. **Its organizational processes**
 - III. **UNICEF's contribution to the wider response**
- It employed several methods and took a 'light footprint' approach

UNICEF's Emergency Response

- UNICEF responded quickly, declaring this a Level 3 (L3) emergency
- USD 120 million raised in the first ten weeks allowed UNICEF to scale up its response rapidly and flexibly
- UNICEF's response focused on WASH, immunization, provision of temporary education and psychosocial support
- UNICEF's performance was positive in the initial stages of the response (water supply, back-to-school campaign), but slower outside urban locations and displaced centres

Findings: Programme Conclusions (1)

Preparedness:

- UNICEF was not fully prepared (understandably in view of the scale of the emergency)

'Needs assessment and analysis:

- Initial response analysis based on consultation, plus proxy indicators
- Lack of formal needs assessment process

Strategy and planning:

- UNICEF's SRP was clear, though not harmonized with IASC SRP
- Lacked a true advocacy component

Findings: Programme Conclusions (2)

UNICEF response overall :

- Initial response appropriate and largely successful
- Programme targets reflected requirements in the CCCs, some targets too high/unrealistic (health, nutrition, child protection)
- Performance varied across sectors
- Programme elements not well integrated ('silo' effect)
- Cash transfer programme effective but not properly integrated
- Cross-cutting issues were not well integrated

Findings: Process Conclusions (1)

Communication with communities:

- UNICEF relies too heavily on implementing partners
- Clear feedback and complaints mechanisms should be a minimum requirement

Partnerships:

- Need to broaden partner base
- Performance on concluding PCAs varied across sectors
- Partnership with LGUs was bold and appropriate

Monitoring and reporting:

- Overall practice has been good, but needs some adjustments

Findings: Process Conclusions (2)

L3 processes: CEAP and the SSOPs

- L3 SSOPs and 'no regrets' policy proved their worth, simplifying and accelerating the response
- Some concerns over the integration of surge capacity with existing capacity in country
- Need to better adapt L3 procedures to MIC context

Findings: Coordination Conclusions

UNICEF and the wider system:

- Good overall performance
- Some confusion appear to exist about the 'co-lead' role
- Some work to be done to raise the awareness of government concerning the cluster coordination agenda

Recommendations (1)

R1: Preparedness, re-aligning the response role of UNICEF in relation to government and with other actors

R2: Needs assessment, clarifying UNICEF's role and involvement in the post disaster needs assessment (PDNA) process

R3: Strategy and planning, better harmonisation with the wider United Nations Strategic Response Plan, and the need for a rolling advocacy strategy

R4: Sectoral responses, including the promotion of synergy between sectors and the use of cash transfers

Recommendations (2)

R5: Communication with communities, particularly relating to the need for clearer feedback and complaints mechanisms

R6: Partnerships, including the need to review the use of PCAs or alternatives in crisis-prone contexts

R7: Monitoring and reporting, stressing the need to inform real-time operational decision making through basic output monitoring

R8: L3 procedures, emphasising the need to ensure a better fit between existing capacity and surge deployments and to provide more guidance on the application of L3-related processes in more developed contexts

Recommendations (3)

R9: UNICEF's cluster (co-)lead role, including the need to clarify respective roles with government at national and subnational levels, and review supervision arrangements for cluster staff in country

R10: Management of transitions, including the need to ensure greater continuity of senior management in L3 emergencies, and for a recovery plan to be formulated by the three-month mark