Real-Time Evaluation of UNICEF’s Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines

UNICEF EVALUATION OFFICE
PRESENTATION AT EXECUTIVE BOARD INFORMAL BRIEFING MEETING
JANUARY 13, 2015
Typhoon Haiyan: Emergency Response in the Philippines

- Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines on 8 November 2013
- Between 6-8,000 were killed and some 4 million were left homeless
- The short-term needs of the surviving population included: health and physical security, water, sanitation, shelter, schools and food security
Real-Time Evaluation: Purpose and Methods

- This RTE was undertaken 3-4 months after the typhoon hit, during the transition from relief to recovery.

- Primarily *formative*, and secondarily *summative*, it assessed UNICEF’s response vis-à-vis:
  1. UNICEF’s own programme
  2. Its organizational processes
  3. UNICEF’s contribution to the wider response

- It employed several methods and took a ‘light footprint’ approach.
UNICEF’s Emergency Response

- UNICEF responded quickly, declaring this a Level 3 (L3) emergency
- USD 120 million raised in the first ten weeks allowed UNICEF to scale up its response rapidly and flexibly
- UNICEF’s response focused on WASH, immunization, provision of temporary education and psychosocial support
- UNICEF’s performance was positive in the initial stages of the response (water supply, back-to-school campaign), but slower outside urban locations and displaced centres
Findings: Programme Conclusions (1)

**Preparedness:**
- UNICEF was not fully prepared (understandably in view of the scale of the emergency)

*Needs assessment and analysis:*
- Initial response analysis based on consultation, plus proxy indicators
- Lack of formal needs assessment process

**Strategy and planning:**
- UNICEF’s SRP was clear, though not harmonized with IASC SRP
- Lacked a true advocacy component
Findings: Programme Conclusions (2)

UNICEF response overall:

- Initial response appropriate and largely successful
- Programme targets reflected requirements in the CCCs, some targets too high/unrealistic (health, nutrition, child protection)
- Performance varied across sectors
- Programme elements not well integrated (‘silo’ effect)
- Cash transfer programme effective but not properly integrated
- Cross-cutting issues were not well integrated
Findings: Process Conclusions (1)

Communication with communities:
- UNICEF relies too heavily on implementing partners
- Clear feedback and complaints mechanisms should be a minimum requirement

Partnerships:
- Need to broaden partner base
- Performance on concluding PCAs varied across sectors
- Partnership with LGUs was bold and appropriate

Monitoring and reporting:
- Overall practice has been good, but needs some adjustments
Findings: Process Conclusions (2)

L3 processes: CEAP and the SSOPs

- L3 SSOPs and ‘no regrets’ policy proved their worth, simplifying and accelerating the response
- Some concerns over the integration of surge capacity with existing capacity in country
- Need to better adapt L3 procedures to MIC context
Findings: Coordination Conclusions

UNICEF and the wider system:

- Good overall performance
- Some confusion appear to exist about the ‘co-lead’ role
- Some work to be done to raise the awareness of government concerning the cluster coordination agenda
Recommendations (1)

R1: Preparedness, re-aligning the response role of UNICEF in relation to government and with other actors

R2: Needs assessment, clarifying UNICEF’s role and involvement in the post disaster needs assessment (PDNA) process

R3: Strategy and planning, better harmonisation with the wider United Nations Strategic Response Plan, and the need for a rolling advocacy strategy

R4: Sectoral responses, including the promotion of synergy between sectors and the use of cash transfers
Recommendations (2)

**R5: Communication with communities**, particularly relating to the need for clearer feedback and complaints mechanisms

**R6: Partnerships**, including the need to review the use of PCAs or alternatives in crisis-prone contexts

**R7: Monitoring and reporting**, stressing the need to inform real-time operational decision making through basic output monitoring

**R8: L3 procedures**, emphasising the need to ensure a better fit between existing capacity and surge deployments and to provide more guidance on the application of L3-related processes in more developed contexts
Recommendations (3)

**R9: UNICEF’s cluster (co-)lead role**, including the need to clarify respective roles with government at national and subnational levels, and review supervision arrangements for cluster staff in country.

**R10: Management of transitions**, including the need to ensure greater continuity of senior management in L3 emergencies, and for a recovery plan to be formulated by the three-month mark.