

**EVALUATION OF DFID-UNICEF  
PROGRAMME OF COOPERATION  
TO STRENGTHEN UNICEF  
PROGRAMMING AS IT APPLIES  
TO HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE,  
2000-2005**

**Phase I: 2000 to April 2002 and  
Phase II: May 2002 to end 2005**



**EVALUATION  
REPORT**

**EVALUATION OF DFID-UNICEF  
PROGRAMME OF COOPERATION  
TO STRENGTHEN UNICEF  
PROGRAMMING AS IT APPLIES  
TO HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE,  
2000-2005**

**Phase I: 2000 to April 2002 and  
Phase II: May 2002 to end 2005**

**Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation to Strengthen UNICEF Programming as it Applies to Humanitarian Response, 2000-2005**

© United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), New York, 2005

UNICEF

3 UN Plaza, NY, NY 10017

July 2005

This evaluation was undertaken by a team of consultants from Valid International and included Maggie Brown, Team Leader, along with João Neves, Peta, Sandison, Margie Buchanan-Smith, and Peter Wilesexternal. The evaluators were supported by a team from UNICEF including Afshan Khan and Melissa Fernandez of EMOPS, Simon Lawry-White of the Evaluation Office, Isabelle Crowley of the Programme Funding Office as well as by Philip Ryland-Jones of DFID.

The purpose of the report is to assess the situation, facilitate the exchange of knowledge and perspectives among UNICEF staff and to propose measures to address the concerns raised. The contents of this report do not necessarily reflect the policies or the views of UNICEF.

The text has not been edited to official publication standards and UNICEF accepts no responsibility for errors.

The designations in this publication do not imply an opinion on legal status of any country or territory, or of its authorities, or the delimitation of frontiers.

For further information, please contact:

Evaluation Office

UNICEF, 3 United Nations Plaza

New York, NY 10017, USA

Tel. (1 212) 824-6567, Fax (1 212) 824-6492

## **PREFACE**

Over last decade, increasing natural disasters and protracted complex emergencies have posed major challenges for UNICEF's work and increased pressure for the organisation to deliver quality humanitarian assistance to a growing number of affected people.

The Martigny consultations in September 1998 on strengthening UNICEF's emergency response led to the establishment of UNICEF's Core Corporate Commitments for emergency response in May 2000. In support of UNICEF efforts to improve its capacity, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) decided to support the 2000-2004 Programme of Cooperation with UNICEF.

The Programme of Cooperation was set up in two phases – Phase I from 2000-2002 and Phase II from 2002-2004. Phase I of the partnership sought international resolutions on children in crisis situations to UNICEF emergency response. Phase II aimed to improve the capacity of UNICEF to respond effectively, reliably and in a timely manner to the needs of children and women in unstable situations.

This evaluation assessed both phases of the Programme of Cooperation. The results will inform future DFID-UNICEF cooperation, particularly in the humanitarian field, and the development of the 2006-2009 DFID-UNICEF Institutional Strategy. The partnership has enabled UNICEF to make important advances in building capacity to respond effectively to humanitarian crises, particularly in Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia. The evaluation finds that continued DFID support in strategic management, advocacy and financial support will be essential for ensuring the sustainability of UNICEF's capacity building efforts.

The Evaluation Office commissioned the present evaluation in collaboration with the Office of Emergency Operations (EMOPS). An independent team of consultants from Valid International undertook the evaluation under the overall management of the Evaluation Office. The evaluation was guided by an Evaluation Management Team including representatives of EMOPS, the Programme Funding Office and the Evaluation Office, and staff from DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department in London. Simon Lawry-White, Senior Evaluation Officer, managed the evaluation process.

UNICEF is grateful for the generous support of the United Kingdom's DFID, a key stakeholder and participant in the evaluation process. Special thanks to UNICEF staff at all levels across the organization and to our partners who gave generous amounts of time and energy to the evaluation process.

Jean Serge Quesnel  
Director  
Evaluation Office  
UNICEF



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Glossary of Acronyms</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>Résumé Analytique</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>Resumen Ejecutivo</b> .....	<b>27</b>
<b>1. Purpose and methodology of the evaluation</b> .....	<b>43</b>
1.1 Purpose of the Evaluation at this time .....	43
1.2 Evaluation objectives .....	43
1.3 Methodology .....	43
1.4 Focus within the evaluation .....	45
1.5 Management of the evaluation and reference groups .....	45
1.6 Milestones .....	45
1.7 Structure of the Report .....	46
<b>2. Programme of Cooperation</b> .....	<b>47</b>
2.1 Background and description of the Programme of Cooperation .....	47
2.2 Guiding principles and priorities in Phase II .....	48
2.3 Funding for Phases I and II.....	48
2.4 Programme Monitoring and Review .....	49
2.5 Partnership between DFID and UNICEF .....	49
2.6 Key terms and concepts used in the CB Programme.....	49
2.7 Design and management of the Capacity Building Programme.....	50
2.8 Financial overview of budget and expenditures .....	51
2.9 Selection of goals .....	51
2.10 Conclusions/recommendations on the design and management of the CB Programme.....	53
<b>3. Organisational capacity assessment framework</b> .....	<b>55</b>
3.1 External context: humanitarian trends .....	55
3.1.1 The humanitarian caseload .....	55
3.1.2 The political context.....	56
3.1.3 The international humanitarian system .....	57
3.1.4 UNICEF within the UN System.....	57
3.1.5 Implications of the external environment for UNICEF .....	59
a) Skills, systems and resources.....	59
b) UN Reform agenda .....	60
c) Advocacy on funding and humanitarian principles.....	60
d) Possible growth areas in programming.....	60
3.2 Internal context: organizational motivation and resources, systems, processes .....	61
3.2.1 Mission and organisational motivation .....	61
3.2.2 Mandate and priorities.....	61
3.2.3 Leadership.....	61
3.2.4 Funding.....	62
3.2.5 Organisational culture and humanitarian response.....	62
3.2.6 Individual incentives/rewards .....	63
3.2.7 Structure, resources, systems and processes .....	63
3.2.8 Conclusions/recommendations on organisational capacity: motivation, resources, structure.....	67
3.3 Effectiveness against the programme goals .....	68
3.3.1 Goal 1: Preparedness Planning and Response .....	68
a) Conclusions/recommendations on Goal 1: Preparedness and Response: tools, policies, monitoring and evaluation.....	73

b)	Conclusions/recommendations on Goal 1: Enhancing Preparedness through the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans.....	74
c)	Conclusions/recommendations on Goal 1: Preparedness and Response: Emergency Preparedness Planning.....	77
d)	Conclusions/recommendations on Goal 1: The Impact on UNICEF’s Performance in Emergency Response.....	78
e)	Conclusions/recommendations Goal 1: Preparedness and Response: Response performance .....	83
f)	Conclusions/recommendations Goal 1: Partners and Partnerships in the field .....	83
g)	Conclusions/recommendations Goal 1: Preparedness and Response: Partnership.....	84
h)	Conclusions/recommendations Goal 1: Coordination and Coherence .....	85
3.3.2	Goal 2: Operational readiness .....	87
a)	Conclusions/recommendations Goal 2: Operational readiness .....	92
3.3.3	Goal 3: Human Resources.....	93
a)	Conclusions/recommendations Goal 3: Human Resources.....	100
3.3.4	Goal 4: Learning Strategy .....	101
a)	Conclusions/recommendations Goal 4: Learning Strategy .....	103
3.3.5	Goal 5: Protection of staff and assets .....	104
a)	Conclusions/recommendations Goal 5: protection of staff and assets.....	107
3.3.6	Goals 6, 7 and 8: Children Affected by Armed Conflict .....	108
a)	Conclusions/recommendations Goals 6, 7 and 8: Children and Armed Conflict.....	116
3.4	Approach to gender integration.....	117
3.4.1	Evidence of gender integration .....	118
3.4.2	Constraints to gender integration.....	119
3.4.3	Conclusions: Gender integration.....	119
3.5	The DFID-UNICEF partnership .....	120
3.5.1	Conclusions/recommendations on DFID-UNICEF Partnership.....	122
<b>4.</b>	<b>Conclusions.....</b>	<b>125</b>
4.1	Relevance.....	125
4.2	Effectiveness .....	126
4.3	Efficiency .....	128
4.4	Impact.....	129
4.5	Coordination/Coherence .....	130
4.6	Sustainability .....	130
4.7	Cross-cutting issues .....	131
<b>5.</b>	<b>Consolidated recommendations .....</b>	<b>133</b>
<b>6.</b>	<b>References.....</b>	<b>145</b>
<b>Annex 1.</b>	<b>Terms of Reference .....</b>	<b>151</b>
<b>Annex 2.</b>	<b>DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation, Phase II Goals .....</b>	<b>160</b>
<b>Annex 3.</b>	<b>List of persons interviewed .....</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>Annex 4.</b>	<b>Questionnaire for the Senior Management Team to complete .....</b>	<b>171</b>
<b>Annex 5.</b>	<b>Questionnaire for Staff on DFID-UNICEF Capacity Building Programme in Humanitarian Response.....</b>	<b>177</b>
<b>Annex 6.</b>	<b>A geographic profile of the two most deadly natural disasters.....</b>	<b>181</b>

## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CAAC	Children Affected by Armed Conflict
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CAPs	Country Assistance Plans
CB	Capacity Building
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CCC	Core Commitments for Children
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEE/CIS	Central and Eastern Europe / Commonwealth of Independent States
	CERF Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CMT	Country Management Team
CO	Country Office
CP	Child Protection
CPMP	Country Programme Management Plan
CPN	Child Protection Networks
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Re-integration
DFAM	Division of Financial and Administrative Management
DFID	Department for International Development
DHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAPRO	East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO	The European Community Humanitarian Aid Department
EFP	Emergency Focal Point
EMOPS	The Office of Emergency Programmes
EPF	Emergency Programme Fund
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
EPRT	Emergency Preparedness and Response Training
ERT	Emergency Response Team
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
FEWS	Famine Early Warning Systems
FSCO	Field Security Coordinator Officer
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GNP	Gross National Product
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HEWS	Humanitarian Early Warning Service
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centres
HQ	Head Quarters
HR	Human Resources
HRBAP	Human Rights Based Approach to Programming
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IDSC	Inter-Divisional Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations
IECD	Integrated Approach to Early Childhood Development
IMEP	Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization

ISP	Institutional Strategic Partnership
IT	Information Technology
ITD	Information Technology Division
JD	Job Description
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEFF	Multi-Lateral Effectiveness Tool
MENARO	Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MTSP	Medium Term Strategic Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSE	Non-State Entities
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLDS	Organisational Learning and Development Section
OPSCEN	Operations Centre
OR	Other Resources
OSRSG-CAAC	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
P <sup>2</sup> D	Personal and Professional Development
PATH	A Principled Approach to Humanitarian Action Training Programme
PER	Performance Evaluation Report
PPPM	Programme Policy and Procedure Manual
PROMS	Programme Manager System
PSA	Public Service Agreement
RA	Regional Advisor
REA	Regional Emergency Adviser
RO	Regional Office
ROSA	Regional Office South Asia
RR	Regular Resources
RTE	Real-Time Evaluation
SC	Save the Children
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPHERE	Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response
SPO	Senior Programme Officer
SSA	Special Service Agreement
SWG	Standard Working Group
TACRO	The American and Caribbean Regional Office
TFT	Temporary Fixed Term
TOT	Training of Trainers
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSRSG-CAAC	United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
VCA	Vulnerability Capacity Analysis
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminal

WCARO  
WES  
WFP  
WHO

West and Central Africa Regional Office  
Water and Environmental Sanitation  
World Food Programme  
World Health Organization



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation in Capacity Building for Humanitarian Action and Response was launched in early 2000 to support UNICEF's efforts to strengthen its capacity to respond to children in unstable situations. In recognition of the growing number of natural disasters globally and the protracted nature of armed conflicts, UNICEF established new strategies at a key conference in Martigny, Switzerland in 1998 to ensure children's survival, protection and development. The Programme of Cooperation has supported the 'Martigny Agenda' for six years over two Phases (Phase I: 2000 to 2002; Phase II 2002 to 2005). The principal aim of the *Martigny Agenda is for UNICEF to respond in a predictable and efficient manner to children in unstable situations.*

In May 2000, UNICEF established Core Corporate Commitments that were revised in June 2003 as Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies. The CCCs outline the response that all children affected by humanitarian crisis should expect. The CCCs cover a broad range of sectors: health, nutrition, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, protection and education. UNICEF is not expected to provide for all of these sectors itself, but has committed to ensure that such provision is made. The principal strategy of the Martigny Agenda is to *mainstream* humanitarian response as the responsibility of all staff, at all times.

The Programme of Cooperation, known in this report as the CB (Capacity Building) Programme, provided a total of GB£22.2mn (approximately US\$39mn) over the five years. Phase I of the Programme comprised three projects: humanitarian preparedness and response, children and armed conflict and mine action. Phase II covered a broader set of goals, including the continuation of work in humanitarian preparedness and response, operations, human resources, a learning strategy and children affected by armed conflict.

This evaluation comes at the end of Phase II which ran from May 2002 to December 2005. The purpose of the evaluation was to inform the development of UNICEF's Mid Term Strategic Plan 2006-9 on humanitarian action and response as well as decisions on the future of DFID-UNICEF collaboration in the humanitarian arena, including the proposed Institutional Strategy 2006-9 that sets out DFID's support for UNICEF in a broader context. For DFID, the evaluation will also inform its Public Service Agreement on support to humanitarian action.

Evaluation objectives were to provide an overall assessment of the CB Programme, track the changes and current status of UNICEF preparedness and response, provide recommendations on priorities and strategies for future response capacity and CB efforts, draw lessons for partnership in organisational capacity building and on policy and programming for children affected by armed conflict.

Data collection for the evaluation took place between January and May 2005, including visits to UNICEF HQ (New York, Geneva, Copenhagen) and DFID in London, three country case studies (Ethiopia, DRC and Sri Lanka), interviews at HQ and RO levels, questionnaires to Country Management Teams and individuals in countries selected at random. Findings were validated through a joint UNICEF-DFID workshop in Geneva in May 2005. A separate evaluation on the learning strategy (Goal 4 of the Phase II CB Programme) was undertaken simultaneously by a team through Le Group-Conseil Baastel Itée<sup>1</sup>.

In both phases of the CB Programme, there was a focus on building the capacity of the Regional Offices, only established within UNICEF in 1998, to support and oversee humanitarian preparedness and response at country level. In both phases one third of CB Programme funds were allocated to HQ Divisions to focus on policy guidance and strategic direction in humanitarian response, as well as some very practical inputs, in particular the Operations Centre (OPSCEN). Two thirds of the funds were divided between the seven Regional Offices to support the establishment of Regional Emergency Advisers and to mainstream humanitarian response within all programme sectors and operational functions. This approach was adopted to support the current decentralised model in which Country Offices, especially

---

<sup>1</sup> Le Group-Conseil Baastel Itée, Evaluation of UNICEF Learning Strategy to Strengthen Staff Competencies for Humanitarian Response, 2000-2004.

Country Management Teams, have primary responsibility for humanitarian response, with support and oversight from Regional Offices.

UNICEF set out a framework of objectives for the way in which funding was to be applied and invited Regional Offices and HQ Divisions to submit proposals. EMOPS, the Office for Emergencies Operations managed the overall CB Programme. The evaluation has found that this bottom up approach detracted from maintaining a strategic overview of how funding was used. Given that the objectives of the CB Programme were so ambitious – to shift an organisation of some 8,000 staff in 157 offices worldwide towards more predictable humanitarian response – the Programme needed to be very tightly driven at HQ level.

Additionally, for a programme that aimed to change the organisation as a whole, a comprehensive organisational assessment at the early stages would have been advisable but this did not take place. EMOPS also lacked sufficient financial information for strategic management; the fact that budget codes were not established against goals at the beginning of the CB Programme meant that financial information was dispersed and difficult to use as an overview.

The **overall conclusion of the evaluation** is that UNICEF has made important advances in building capacity supported by the CB Programme *and* there are examples of very effective response. However, UNICEF remains some distance from achieving the goal of *reliably* delivering humanitarian response as the rights-based approach and the CCCs require.

UNICEF's role was universally appreciated by other UN agencies, partner NGOs and national governments. Humanitarian response was good in the three country case studies: Sri Lanka, DRC and Ethiopia. In DRC and Sri Lanka, advocacy for children's rights was also strong. However, there are also examples where response has been poor and lives have been put at risk (e.g. Darfur, Liberia). Equally, UNICEF has found it difficult to draw attention to rights violations in some contexts (e.g. Nepal).

## **1. UNICEF's principal achievements in capacity building for humanitarian response.**

**Emergency Preparedness (and Response) Planning (EPRP)** has been rolled out to more than 90% of UNICEF COs over the last five years, an impressive achievement. The EPRP tools have recently been updated and improved to make the process lighter in response to requests from the field. The evaluation concludes that emergency preparedness planning is not sufficient on its own to translate into effective humanitarian action. It needs to be bolstered with other measures including surge capacity from managerial, technical and operations specialists. However, EPRP has been important in changing attitudes towards emergencies being the responsibility of all and in bringing operations and programmes staff together in planning.

The development of the **Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies** has provided a framework to define exactly what services UNICEF aims to guarantee for children as a right in humanitarian response. There was universal agreement by staff that the CCCs are a very useful reference tool, although very few agencies outside UNICEF are yet aware of their existence.

UNICEF has made impressive contributions to **high-level advocacy** in recent years that have created the drive for resolutions in the Security Council and General Assembly on children and armed conflict. This built on UNICEF's earlier seminal work through the Graca Machel study on Children and Armed Conflict. In some countries where children are affected by conflict, UNICEF has driven the agenda for the rights of children in armed conflict, especially notable being the Action Plan for Children in Sri Lanka.

UNICEF has strengthened work in **child protection** over the last five years by increasing the size of the team (although still relatively small) and introducing the 'Protective Environment' as a framework to support greater cohesion in programming and advocacy. Importantly, NGOs consulted are impressed with UNICEF's work in protection and want UNICEF to lead in standards and approaches. UNICEF and partners produced the landmark 'Guidelines on Unaccompanied and Separated Children' during this period.

Important contributions have been made to the **UN Reform agenda** and especially to working groups and task forces. In particular, UNICEF has led the IASC process of rolling out training in sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian contexts. UNICEF has also been a strong and important defender of humanitarian principles within and beyond the UN system.

Enhanced **security management systems** through OPSCEN in New York as a 24 hour a day, 7 day a week centre providing ongoing information to UNICEF at all levels on key events and potential hazards. Considerable investment has gone into the hardware of security, substantially improving MOSS compliance and into staff training. There is a question of whether enough attention is being given to implementation of security accountabilities through the management system. Security management remains an area that must be given continuing priority and resources.

The **Supply Division** has made significant improvements over the period including establishing an Emergencies Coordination Unit in Copenhagen and stockpiling a set of emergency items directly related to the CCCs. This has brought delivery time down to 48 hours from the receipt of an order for items in stock. Regional warehouse hubs were established in Dubai and Johannesburg in 2003 (and later Panama in 2005). Dubai appears to be the most successful in reducing costs and timings in delivery of items.

To bolster specialist capacity in humanitarian response, UNICEF established a five person **Emergency Response Team**. The Team was agreed in principle in 2004 and established in early 2005 and funded under the ECHO capacity building programme<sup>2</sup>. The team has considerable experience that can be called upon to provide overall management and coordination of UNICEF's response. As yet, the Team does not include sector specialists according to the CCCs (including no Protection specialist). The ERT represents recognition that whilst mainstreaming humanitarian response is fundamental as a foundation, mainstreaming does not obviate the need for some specialists to be available at short notice. There are plans to expand the team in the next MTSP period through core funding.

The introduction of **technical capacity at regional level** through the network of Regional Emergency Advisers. The REAs have provided technical support closer to Country Office level and rolled out emergency preparedness and response planning and training to more than 90% of offices. They provide the first wave of surge capacity support to Country Offices in most emergencies and have raised the profile of emergencies within most regions. All but two of these key posts have now been incorporated into core funding to ensure sustainability.

There has been an **increased focus on HR for emergency response** through the creation of the 'Corporate Trigger'<sup>3</sup> for emergencies in August 2004 and through the introduction of the post of Emergency Focal Point in HR Division at HQ level from 2003. The Corporate Trigger has noticeably enhanced priority to staff deployment in emergencies (although it has only been used in Darfur and the tsunami response to date). The post of Emergency Focal Point has developed systems for surge capacity and was pivotal in identifying UNICEF staff for redeployment and external consultants for the tsunami response.

The CB Programme has also placed **increased emphasis on training for emergencies** and has facilitated the roll out of training on Emergency Preparedness and Response and humanitarian issues in emergencies through PATH training. The Learning Strategy Evaluation concluded that EPR Training has contributed significantly to the understanding of country office staff teams about individual roles in emergency response and, as such, has supported mainstreaming. The training has also increased dialogue between programmes and operations staff about emergency response as it is one of the few opportunities for the two principal arms of CO staff to work together. EPR training has been successfully linked to EPR planning as a streamlined process.

---

<sup>2</sup> ECHO has provided complementary funding for capacity building in Emergency Preparedness and Response (supply, distribution and telecommunications) since 2004 and Child Protection in 2005.

<sup>3</sup> The Corporate Trigger is a mechanism to prioritise supply, procurement and delivery; emergency fundraising and deployment of staff for a period of 90 days in the first stages of an emergency.

A network of **peer supporters** has been created to support staff coping with stress in humanitarian crises (although more work needs to be done to increase use and coverage).

The Capacity Building Programme has supported most of the above achievements and linkages.

## **2. Internal constraints on UNICEF's capacity to *reliably* deliver humanitarian response**

**UNICEF's decentralised model places a great deal of emphasis on the Country Office – especially the Country Management Team – to manage emergency response and not all teams are able to fulfil the role effectively (see leadership below). It also makes heavy demands on Regional Offices to exercise an oversight role.** A question for the evaluation was whether a centralised model for emergency response (not for development programmes) may produce a better response overall. The evaluation has concluded that centralisation would require a much larger team than at present and would not be sustainable given the size and duration of emergencies. HQ could only manage the very largest emergencies and it would be difficult to sustain more than one or two countries on the 'global trigger' at any one time.

The evaluation has also concluded that UNICEF's strategy of developing Regional Offices as the base for support, oversight and a back up trigger to Country Offices *is* the most appropriate. However, the Regional Offices face a number of constraints on their capacity to exercise this role. The extent of authority and accountability of the Regional Office remains unclear in practice, even if stated in theory. In addition, the sheer number of countries within each region and growth in humanitarian crises makes it extremely difficult for Regional Advisors in each sector to meet the demand for support to development programmes *and* humanitarian response. There are also issues about independent travel budgets and the quality of the technical skills of some Regional Advisors.

Nevertheless, the role is appropriate and needs to be strengthened. It also needs to be more pro-active and directive in some circumstances. It needs to counterbalance the reluctance of some Country Offices to recognise a looming emergency and to act. Fundamentally, it needs to bolster country level leadership.

**Country level leadership is variable.** This has emerged clearly as one of the principal determinants of an effective humanitarian response. Reliable humanitarian response will require reliable leadership from the Country Management Team, especially the Country Representative, with proven emergency experience. In weak response scenarios, CO level leadership has invariably been a key factor.

**HR planning for emergencies at CO and RO levels is weak and organisation wide systems for surge capacity and mainstreaming have not progressed as fast as needed.** Most Country Offices have not mapped and identified skills strengths and gaps for humanitarian response as part of the EPRP process. When an emergency happens, they have to begin that process or, worse, try to manage with technical teams that do not adequately match the requirements of the CCC sectors. The Human Resources Officer at RO level has also not actively engaged in planning for rapid response. At HQ level, systems based around the recommendations of the Brasilia Conference<sup>4</sup> and follow up analysis (Heffinck, 2004), have been slow to develop.

**Technical capacity in all CCC sectors is not yet guaranteed.** Water and sanitation capacity is particularly weak. Over the last decade, there has been a shift in development programming towards the life-cycle approach and particularly to young child survival. Water and sanitation has been the main casualty of this approach in terms of technical expertise (although nutrition is also weaker than other sectors). Up to very recently there had been *no* permanent posts of water and sanitation regional adviser<sup>5</sup> and a reduced water and sanitation staff overall in comparison with other sectors. Child Protection has also been weak in coverage at all levels. There has not been sufficient technical training through the learning programme in the CCC sectors. While the new Mid Term Strategic Plan for 2006-9 is more

---

<sup>4</sup> Conference on 'Transforming the Human Resources Function in UNICEF' June 2002.

<sup>5</sup> UNICEF has recently established four Regional Adviser posts in Water and Sanitation.

closely aligned between development and emergency contexts, the legacy of this decline must be addressed otherwise UNICEF remains exposed to serious technical capacity gaps in the CCCs.

**Many COs have not maintained EPRPs as operational planning processes.** The evaluation recognises the importance of the EPRP process as a major contribution to enhancing capacity for response. However, to make a difference to the effectiveness of response they must be coherent with the CCCs (not always the case to date), updated as live documents, shared and agreed with partners and made operational by following through on plans (e.g. for procurement, staffing etc).

**Gender integration is not yet effective.** Despite a strong policy commitment to gender integration in humanitarian assistance, this has not been followed through consistently or systematically to programme level. Instead, the record is patchy and inadequate. There is a tendency to equate gender sensitivity with targeting of women and girl children in programming, rather than adopt a truly gendered approach that analyses and addresses issues of gender inequality. Rather than gender integration being everyone's responsibility, the default position seems to be that it is no one's. There is limited support to Country Offices in promoting gender awareness and limited monitoring of the extent to which gender is truly integrated into UNICEF's humanitarian work.

**UNICEF has a central role in developing and implementing a system to monitor and report on six egregious child rights violations in conflict areas, established through Security Council Resolution 1539, April 2004 and a Plan of Action set out by the Secretary General in February 2005<sup>6</sup>.** Systems and tools have not yet been agreed and it is also not clear whether current staffing levels are adequate to fulfil the mandate. The system for monitoring and reporting on child rights is essential to ensure strong advocacy for children in armed conflict and should be addressed as soon as possible.

**Learning and training has been especially weak in the area of child protection.** UNICEF staff's confidence in applying the international legal frameworks, policy approaches and good practice is essential to ensure strong programmes and advocacy for children affected by armed conflict. It is also a prerequisite for effective coordination in the area of child protection. The Child Protection Section is aware that much greater investment needs to be made in this area at all levels (including formal training, mentoring, coaching, dissemination of guidelines and even opportunities within a possible Masters Degree in child protection).

**Finance and administration procedures remain cumbersome and bureaucratic.** Designed for development programmes, finance and administration procedures are difficult to apply in emergency contexts. This causes delays in processing essential functions in emergencies such as purchasing essential items, approving contracts and releasing funds to partners. Although provision has been made for adaptations to some of these systems for emergency response, they are not well known or used by operations staff. Institutional requirements are likely to be put ahead of rapid response requirements where staff lack confidence in adapting systems.

**Organisational culture: too great a focus on excellence, while simpler and faster tools may be more effective in practice.** UNICEF has produced many excellent guidelines, tools and policy papers. There are two issues with producing guidelines of this quality. First they are often complex tools that require determined dissemination and learning programmes to ensure that they are applied effectively in the field, otherwise they remain little known and little used (e.g. tool for Vulnerability Capacity Assessments, the standards in emergency education, the CCCs themselves). The second is that striving for excellence delays publication. Simpler, faster tools and guidelines, fewer and more basic indicators may prove more effective.

**Organisational learning through practice is weak and there is not yet a culture of learning.** Monitoring and evaluation systems are weak in most countries and there is not an established practice of concise and focused lessons learned workshops or after-action-reviews. Overall, there are relatively few

---

<sup>6</sup> The Security Council is expected to approve the Action Plan in the near future

evaluations of CO level performance. UNICEF has not yet consolidated a culture of learning and staff reported feeling guilty about taking time out to learn.

**Strong partners are essential for effective and reliable response but are not always identified at the planning stage.** As UNICEF does not directly implement in emergencies, except where no suitable partners have been identified, it is essential that planning for humanitarian response is done together with partners. In the best-case examples, that planning is ongoing with government and NGO partners, as in Ethiopia, but in many other contexts, potential partners were not aware of the plans. There was also extremely low awareness amongst partners, including UN agencies, of the CCCs that represent UNICEF's commitments to children in emergencies.

**The CCCs and standards for humanitarian response are not well known by UNICEF teams.** An effective and reliable response should be shaped by the framework of the CCCs plus additional internationally accepted standards in each sector. The evaluation found that only just over half of Country Management Teams considered that their staff were familiar with the CCCs. There are probably even greater gaps in knowledge of the interagency humanitarian response standards by sector, even where they are standards that UNICEF has approved such as the Inter Agency Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies and Inter Agency Guidelines for HIV/AIDS in Emergencies. Knowledge of Sphere standards, used by the majority of NGOs in humanitarian response, is even lower and this has serious implications for sector-based coordination.

**Variable capacity in coordination skills.** UNICEF is usually required to lead and coordinate in the technical sectors of the CCCs. NGOs look to UNICEF to provide guidance on technical standards, consolidate assessments identifying gaps in provision, coordination of supplies and advocacy when necessary with the government, donors or other agencies. These are major tasks that require specific coordination skills, as well as strong technical capacity and awareness of the situation on the ground. They also require time investment and should be considered as a fundamental part of the technical role. To be really effective, coordination needs to be funded as a distinct activity. At present, skills and time-investment are variable and do not support reliable performance in coordination.

**Local distribution systems are often weak.** Given that UNICEF usually supplies items to beneficiaries through government and NGO partners in development programmes, UNICEF does not usually have independent logistics capacity. In humanitarian response, however, UNICEF can be called upon to rapidly deliver items. Unless plans are made for this beforehand, including identifying private transporters or alternative systems, this is likely to be slow. It may also be difficult to reach a decision on shifting away from the 'normal' system of warehousing and distribution through government to UNICEF taking on direct responsibility for logistics as well as supply.

**Pre-positioning items in country clearly enhances response but is discouraged.** Pre-positioning of emergency items was regarded as key to effective response in all country case studies. However, the Supply Division discourages pre-positioning because it can be wasteful and expensive to maintain. While the policy is appropriate, local circumstances can mean that pre-positioning would make response vastly more effective and greater flexibility on this issue is required.

**Recommendations of evaluations and reviews** are not always analysed, approved and plans made for implementation. Many of the issues raised in this report had already been raised in previous evaluations.

**Lack of strategic leadership in the capacity building programme** The CB Programme depended largely on funding applications from Divisions and Regional Offices and lacked strategic overview aimed at unblocking the blockages to effective response. Strategic decisions should have been taken at the level of the *Inter Divisional* Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations but that Committee is not yet fulfilling that role. There was also insufficient financial information on the use of the funds for EMOPS to make strategic decisions.

**Inadequate staffing levels in some areas** Technical staffing is inadequate in water and sanitation, protection, gender and security management.

**Lack of confidence in career development systems:** a very low percentage of staff consider that UNICEF's approach to promotion is objective, fair and correct. Promotion on the grounds of merit and competency is essential to ensure the most capable reach senior managerial and leadership positions.

### **3. External constraints on UNICEF's capacity to reliably deliver humanitarian response**

**Growing demand for humanitarian response means UNICEF is called upon for ever greater response capacity. This can lead to over-commitment and a risk of poor performance and motivation.** To reliably provide effective humanitarian response, UNICEF has two options:

- i) Increase its response capacity, which would require more staff and more funding.
- ii) Prioritise specific sectors within the CCCs and negotiate with other agencies to accept sectors that are no longer feasible. In the short term it could be advisable for UNICEF to clearly state that shelter is not one of the CCC sectors and advocate for another UN agency to take responsibility for this area.

**Reliable humanitarian response requires reliable and timely funding.** The evaluation observes the vast differentials in funding per capita of populations affected by humanitarian crises. Clearly, the volume of funding available rapidly to the tsunami response made a significant difference in the capacity to respond. Until more progress is made in the Good Humanitarian Donorship and other funding initiatives, this will continue to be a barrier.

**Funding for capacity building** is not a popular option with donors and it has been difficult to encourage other donors to support UNICEF's efforts.

**The deteriorating security situation** in some contexts, coupled with UN security management procedures, is increasingly reducing UNICEF's access to the affected population.

**The blurring of boundaries between humanitarian action, foreign policy and military intervention,** within the UN and by some of its donor governments, compromises UNICEF's and other UN agencies ability to deliver impartial and rights-based humanitarian assistance.

### **4. Priority recommendations: Unblocking the blockages**

Detailed recommendations are included in the body of the report and all recommendations are consolidated at the end of the report, together with time frames as: i) within Year 1 ii) within the MTSP period 2006-9 and iii) strategic directions for the long term.

What follows is a summary of the priority recommendations directly related to unblocking the blockages and to the future of capacity building for humanitarian preparedness and response.

#### **Enhance Regional Office oversight capacity**

The objective of the recommendation on RO oversight capacity is to reinforce the pro-active and (if necessary) directive elements of RO support where COs do not recognise looming crises or have difficulty in planning an effective response. While some Country Management Teams will provide an effective response without this support, others will not. For that reason, the proposal is that standard operating procedures are introduced to counter balance potential weak leadership on emergency response.

- i) Establish a standard operating procedure that requires ROs to send in a representative of senior level personnel (Regional Emergency Adviser, other individual Regional Advisers or even RD) to COs as they move into a higher state of alert. The first priority should be to establish a 90 day response plan that will cover all aspects of response (leadership/management, funding, surge requirements, supply systems, partnerships, security, additional technical/operations support) and the respective responsibilities of CO and RO. This should happen whether the CO requests support or not to overcome the reluctance of some COs to request back up.
- ii) Ensure that the post of Regional Adviser is considered to be a stepping stone to greater seniority to attract candidates of high technical quality.

- iii) Analyse what has been successful in regional office oversight to date and replicate those characteristics in all ROs

#### **Enhance Country Office level leadership**

Reliable response to emergencies will require reliable and quality leadership on humanitarian response, especially at CO level. Leadership should be enhanced in three ways:

- i) By including significant humanitarian experience and demonstrated performance as selection criteria for the appointment of the Country Management Team (Country Office Representatives, Senior Programme Officers and Senior Operations Officers)
- ii) Through the Learning Programme for Leadership and Management, that should include modelling for effective leadership, coaching and mentoring for leaders and analysis of leadership in After Action Reviews. After Action Reviews should reflect on the influence of training on leadership in actual humanitarian response.
- iii) Building in standard operating procedures to address leadership issues in emergency response (Enhancing Regional Office Oversight Capacity above).

#### **Strengthen coordination capacity**

UNICEF is increasingly called upon to coordinate in emergencies, especially in the CCC sectors. This is an extremely important role but requires a high level of technical skill and should not be considered as an add-on to Programme Officer posts. There is also a need for donors to accept that additional funding will be required for effective coordination.

Enhancing coordination capacities will include training for coordination, inclusion of coordination capacities in competency profiles/job descriptions, using standards (e.g. Sphere) as a tool, ensuring that posts attract technically competent personnel and additional funding for the coordination function.

#### **Enhance Surge Capacity with a focus on CO and RO levels**

The principal focus in enhancing surge requirements in the next period will be at RO and CO levels, although HQ needs to complete systems already begun. Mainstreaming responsibility for emergency response should continue to be the major strategy but must be enhanced by specialists. One of the principal objectives of the following recommendations is to ensure adequate coverage in the CCC sectors in all countries. Procedures should work as follows:

- i) COs conduct a detailed mapping of skills and gaps as part of the EPRP process on an annual basis. While this should already happen as part of EPRPs, it is not sufficiently reliable to date. Mapping should relate specifically to the CCC sectors, as well as operational functions. The HR mapping should be shared with Regional Offices to maintain a regional overview of likely skills gaps and relate needs to the Regional Redeployment Register.
- ii) At RO level, a Regional Roster for Redeployment should be established as redeployment is the principal surge mechanism in UNICEF, especially for the early phase. National staff should be included in the register. Staff willing to be part of the Regional Roster for Redeployment should be prioritised for learning opportunities and recognised in the Performance Evaluation Report.
- iii) UNICEF should continue strengthen Standby arrangements including providing training on UNICEF commitments, standards and procedures to staff on key standby registers.

#### **Advocate for greater reliability and equity in funding for humanitarian response**

Reliable response requires reliable funding. This is essentially an advocacy issue and one which should be addressed by UNICEF through the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative and direct negotiations with donors. Demonstrating the difference to children's lives between well funded response (e.g. in the tsunami) and poorly funded responses (e.g. chronic emergencies such as DRC) could support the debate.

### **Enhanced supply and logistics functions, especially at CO level**

To ensure that the right items are in the right place at the right time, Country Offices need to invest more time in planning for supply and logistics within the EPRP process, with the support of the Regional Adviser, Supply. UNICEF does not have independent capacity in logistics, usually relying on government facilities and private suppliers. Often in an emergency UNICEF will need to establish independent systems for a period of time. The assessment should include agreements with potential suppliers and with transporters, as well as how warehousing would be managed and make a case for pre-positioning if necessary. The Supply Division should review the list of standard emergency items against the CCCs and in conjunction with field personnel based on recent emergency experience.

### **Ensure that procedures for Finance and Administration support effective humanitarian response**

At present, there are different views within UNICEF about whether the major issue for effective finance and administration within emergencies concerns over-bureaucratic procedures or whether the blockage is that CO level staff are not aware/sufficiently confident in adapting systems. DFAM should be accountable for clarifying this issue. Over the next 18 months-2 years, DFAM should aggressively disseminate financial procedures (through Regional Finance Advisers) and conduct a field-based review at the end of that period. The review should clarify this issue and recommend appropriate action.

### **Enhancing child protection capacity at all levels in programming and advocacy**

To strengthen UNICEF's capacity in further policy development, coordination of CP agencies and enhanced CP practice in programming and advocacy, UNICEF should:

- i) Increase the HQ staff team to address current policy gaps (including policy development in child protection in natural disasters).
- ii) Roll out the new training package (to be developed this year) and back it with follow up, mentoring and coaching of staff.
- iii) Regional Advisers in Child Protection should provide greater support to COs in dissemination and debate on key guidelines/policies, assessment of the factors that promote/detract from CO level advocacy for children's rights, analyse what has worked across countries in developing Child Protection Networks.
- iv) Seek resources to augment the number of highly qualified staff for field and regional level *coordination* in the child protection sector.

### **Roll out the systems for Monitoring and Reporting of Child Rights Violations in Armed Conflict**

Complete the indicators and data collection tools and roll out the Monitoring and Reporting system for violations of children's rights as soon as possible. Complete mapping of Child Protection Networks and assess what will be required to ensure effective functioning of CPNs at CO level, not underestimating the size of this task. Review staffing levels overall in relation to capacity to comply with the mandate (Inter Divisional Working Group on Monitoring and Reporting).

### **Reinforce partnerships for humanitarian response**

Continue to explore innovative mechanisms for partnership with local and international NGOs for emergencies (such as the developing partnership with Oxfam GB in water and sanitation). Initiate open discussions with NGOs on capacity, oversight and support needs at the outset of any form of partnership, contractual or otherwise. Actively disseminate the CCCs to partners so that they understand the parameters of UNICEF's humanitarian response commitments.

### **In the face of increased demand for humanitarian response, either increase resources or reduce commitments**

UNICEF's commitments to the CCC sectors are extremely ambitious. As demand for response continues to grow, it will become increasingly difficult for UNICEF to achieve reliable coverage, especially as Regular Resources are not growing in the same proportions as Other Resources. UNICEF should take a strategic decision on the best of two options:

- i) to lobby for greater resources to achieve CCC commitments
- ii) to reduce commitments in CCC sectors. Either way, UNICEF should clarify with humanitarian actors that shelter is not one of the CCC sectors and advocate for another UN agency to take this responsibility.

### **Operationalise and update EPRPs and roll out the Early Warning-Early Action system**

To ensure that UNICEF is adequately prepared for emergencies at CO level the EPRP process should continue to improve, with the support of Regional Emergency Advisers. This should include: enhanced Regional Office oversight functions, outsourcing facilitation of EPRPs, tailoring EPRPs to the level of risk, enhanced assessment of HR and logistics requirements and conducting EPRPs in two phases, engaging partners in phase II. The evaluation endorses the roll out of the Early Warning-Early Action system that helps to define accountabilities in response and links response to alert levels.

### **Enhance technical capacity in the CCC sectors**

Technical capacity in each of the CCC sectors is essential for reliable response. This should include:

- i) Actively disseminate understanding of the CCCs and of appropriate humanitarian standards by sector during visits of *all* Regional Advisors (not just Regional Emergency Advisors).
- ii) Addressing skills in the CCC sectors within the Learning Programme (below)
- iii) Matching RO and CO technical capacity to the CCCs by ensuring that each sector is supported by an Advisor or Programme Officer with relevant skills/experience. Mapping technical capacity in the CCCs at CO level on an annual basis and feed this information into the RO to coordinate plans for Regional Redeployment.
- iv) Enhancing technical capacity through strategic partnerships in the CCC sectors.

### **Enhance learning programme**

There are plans to develop new programmes at three levels: Basic, Programme Excellence and Leadership and Management. The Evaluation endorses the importance of these programmes, includes proposals of themes to cover in each level and proposes outsourcing some of the training. Sector based learning in relation the CCCs should be enhanced as part of this programme. To promote take-up and demand for learning programme, staff should be informed that each post carries 5% of staff time for learning and 2% of total staff costs. Learning should be valued within staff performance evaluations and taken into consideration in promotion. Preference in access to learning opportunities should be given to staff on the Regional Redeployment Register.

### **Strengthen Gender Integration**

The Gender Mainstreaming Unit should be strengthened with a staff member dedicated to humanitarian work. Fundamentally gender integration must be understood as much more than a focus on targeting children and women towards greater assessment and awareness of underlying gender inequalities. The analysis of sexual abuse and exploitation and gender based violence should be deepened and related to gender inequalities and structural issues within society. Humanitarian tools, including the CCCs, should be revisited for gender integration. UNICEF could collaborate with other UN agencies in *training/learning* on gender integration (e.g. UNFPA and UNHCR).

### **Ensure that UNICEF has sufficient access to populations in insecure contexts**

Work vigorously within the UN system at both NY and CO levels for more sophisticated and sensitive UN security management systems

### **Focus on field-friendly tools, 'good-enough' guidelines and light lesson learned systems**

Support the planned development of simplified tools, e.g. worked examples of Vulnerability Capacity Analysis and a small number of readily collectable indicators on early warning. Hold one-day workshops on monitoring and evaluation and lightweight After Action Reviews.

### **Develop a long term vision for UNICEF's role within the UN Reform Process**

This should include an analysis of how planned activities in capacity building are influenced by the UN Reform process and which aspects can be done in collaboration with other agencies.

## 5. Future capacity building

### ***Enhance strategic management of CB Programmes***

UNICEF should strengthen centralised strategic leadership for future capacity building for humanitarian response. EMOPS should seek to actively engage other Divisions ideally through the Inter Divisional Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations, alternatively the Global Management Team. The post of Capacity Building Programme Manager should be upgraded and financial information should be prepared against programme goals to facilitate strategic management. Preparedness and response goals should be separated from child protection.

### ***DFID should continue to support UNICEF's capacity building for humanitarian preparedness and response***

Given i) the scale and importance of UNICEF's role in humanitarian response and in the UN Reform process and ii) the fact that UNICEF has made improvements but to make sustainable changes in an organisation the size of UNICEF takes considerable time, the evaluation recommends that DFID continues to support and enhance UNICEF's capacity building efforts in the medium term. Further capacity building support should be earmarked or ring-fenced within an ISP.

Future capacity building should be considered in a holistic way, of which DFID, ECHO, UNICEF and hopefully other donors, are co-funding. Given DFID's experience in capacity building with UNICEF and other large agencies, DFID could support UNICEF in monitoring the effect and impact of the whole programme (not just inputs funded by DFID). DFID could also support UNICEF in developing a tool to monitor effects organisation-wide.

Funding should continued to be applied strategically to make 'catalytic' gains, especially (but not exclusively) in relation to the oversight role of the Regional Offices. This could include, for example: (a) continuing to support the further development of EPRPs and the Early Warning Early Action system; (b) travel budgets to all Regional Advisers, not just REAs, with a view to dissemination of policy directions; (c) support to developing the Regional Office redeployment system; (d) support to developing strong EPRPs including finance, supply and HR; (e) roll out of guidance by DFAM; and (f) the follow up analysis to determine whether greater dissemination has led to improved performance or whether procedures should be changed. Funding should continue to support elements of the Learning Programme but also thinking strategically such as outsourcing training to specialist organisations already supported by DFID such as RedR/IHE.

All elements of the recommendations should be considered in relation to the direction taken by the UN Reform Programme, including the role of each agency in coordination. In terms of child protection, there are excellent opportunities for DFID to continue to build on policy development in the gaps already identified through considering funding a post at HQ level. DFID could consider supporting an MA course in child protection (as recommended by the inter agency group on child protection) and funding part of the development of Child Protection Networks to fulfil the mandate on monitoring and reporting.

### ***DFID should also consider supporting UNICEF in advocacy and debate on two aspects of humanitarian response:***

1. Monitoring the impact on children of vastly different funding levels to different emergencies.
2. Lobbying donors for more recognition of the fundamental importance of coordination in humanitarian response and the fact that this can be a role on its own. The aim would be to sensitise donors to accepting inclusion of posts in sector coordination within programme proposals for humanitarian response.



## RESUME ANALYTIQUE

Le Programme de coopération conjoint 2002-2005 entre le DFID (Département pour le développement international, Royaume-Uni) et l'UNICEF pour développer les capacités d'action et d'intervention humanitaires a été lancé au début de l'année 2000 en appui des efforts déployés par l'UNICEF pour renforcer sa capacité d'action au bénéfice des enfants en situation d'instabilité. Prenant acte du fait que le nombre de catastrophes naturelles va croissant dans le monde et que les conflits armés se prolongent, l'UNICEF a mis au point de nouvelles stratégies à la faveur d'une grande consultation organisée à Martigny (Suisse) en 1998, et dont l'objectif était d'assurer la survie, la protection et le développement des enfants. Le Programme de coopération a soutenu « le programme de Martigny » pendant six ans, au cours de deux phases (phase I : 2000 à 2002; phase II : 2002 à 2005). L'objectif principal du programme de Martigny était de permettre à l'UNICEF de réagir de façon prévisible et efficace aux enfants en situation d'instabilité.

En mai 2000, l'UNICEF mettait au point ses « *Engagements institutionnels essentiels* », révisés en juin 2003 pour devenir les *Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d'urgence*. Ces Principaux engagements énumèrent les mesures auxquelles tous les enfants touchés par les crises humanitaires devraient pouvoir bénéficier. Les Principaux engagements couvrent une vaste gamme de secteurs : santé, nutrition, eau et assainissement, VIH/sida, protection et éducation. On n'attend pas de l'UNICEF qu'il pourvoie à tous ces secteurs à lui seul, mais il s'est engagé à s'assurer que cela sera fait. La principale stratégie du programme de Martigny est d'*intégrer* les mesures humanitaires dans le courant dominant et d'en faire une responsabilité de tout le personnel à tout instant.

Le Programme de coopération, appelé dans ce rapport *Programme de développement des capacités*, a permis de dégager un total de 22,2 millions de livres sterling (environ 39 millions de dollars américains) sur les cinq ans. La phase I du programme comprenait trois projets : préparation et réaction humanitaire aux situations d'urgence, enfants touchés par les conflits armés et action contre les mines. La phase II englobait tout un ensemble d'objectifs, notamment la poursuite des travaux sur la préparation et l'intervention humanitaire, les opérations, les ressources humaines, la stratégie d'apprentissage et les enfants touchés par les conflits armés.

Cette évaluation se situe à la fin de la phase II, qui s'est déroulée de mai 2002 à décembre 2005. L'objectif de l'évaluation était d'apporter des éléments d'information pour l'élaboration du Plan stratégique à moyen terme de l'UNICEF (2006-2009) quant à son action et ses interventions humanitaires; il s'agissait par ailleurs d'éclairer les décisions portant sur l'avenir de la coopération entre le DFID et l'UNICEF sur la scène humanitaire, et entre autres la stratégie institutionnelle proposée pour 2006-2009, qui situe le soutien accordé par le DFID à l'UNICEF dans un contexte plus large. Pour le DFID, l'évaluation va également fournir des éléments d'information sur le soutien qu'il apporte à l'action humanitaire dans le cadre de l'entente de service public.

Les objectifs de l'évaluation étaient les suivants : fournir un bilan global du Programme de développement des capacités, repérer les changements intervenus dans l'état de préparation et de réaction de l'UNICEF, faire état de sa situation actuelle, fournir des recommandations sur les priorités et les stratégies qui doivent prévaloir en prévision des efforts à déployer pour améliorer et renforcer ses capacités de réaction, tirer des leçons quant aux partenariats qui doivent intervenir pour renforcer ses capacités d'organisation et à ceux qui devront porter sur les politiques et les programmations adoptées en faveur des enfants touchés par les conflits armés.

La collecte de données pour cette évaluation a été réalisée entre janvier et mai 2005, avec des visites effectuées auprès des bureaux principaux de l'UNICEF à New York, Genève et Copenhague et du siège du DFID à Londres, des études de cas portant sur trois pays différents (l'Éthiopie, la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et le Sri Lanka), des entretiens aux niveaux du Siège et des bureaux régionaux de l'UNICEF, des questionnaires adressés à des équipes de gestion et à des individus de pays choisis au hasard. Les constatations effectuées ont été validées à la faveur d'un atelier conjoint entre l'UNICEF et le DFID qui s'est tenu en mai 2005 à Genève. Une évaluation séparée portant sur la

stratégie d'apprentissage (Objectif n° 4, Phase II du Programme de renforcement des capacités) a été entreprise simultanément par une équipe du Groupe-conseil baastel Itée<sup>7</sup>.

Les deux phases du Programme de renforcement des capacités ont mis l'accent sur le renforcement des capacités des bureaux régionaux, qui n'ont été institués par l'UNICEF qu'en 1998 afin de soutenir et de superviser l'état de préparation et de réaction au niveau national. Dans les deux phases, le tiers des fonds dont disposait le Programme a été alloué aux Divisions du Siège et affecté à l'encadrement des politiques et à la direction stratégique des mesures humanitaires, avec également quelques contributions d'ordre très pratique comme en particulier le Centre des Opérations (OPSCEN). Les deux tiers des fonds ont été répartis entre les sept bureaux régionaux pour soutenir la création de postes de conseillers régionaux pour les urgences et intégrer la réaction humanitaire à tous les secteurs et fonctions opérationnelles des programmes. Cette approche a été adoptée pour soutenir le modèle actuel de décentralisation dans lequel les bureaux nationaux, et surtout leurs équipes de gestion, sont responsables au premier chef de la réaction humanitaire, avec le soutien et sous la supervision des bureaux régionaux.

L'UNICEF a établi un cadre d'objectifs pour la façon dont le financement devait être utilisé et invité les bureaux régionaux et les Divisions du Siège à soumettre des propositions. EMOPS, le Bureau des programmes d'urgence, a géré l'ensemble du Programme de renforcement des capacités. L'évaluation a trouvé que cette approche « de bas en haut » nuisait au maintien d'une vue d'ensemble de la manière dont les fonds étaient utilisés. Compte tenu du caractère si ambitieux du Programme de renforcement des capacités (réorienter une organisation de 8 000 personnes avec 157 bureaux dans le monde entier afin de rendre ses mesures humanitaires plus prévisibles), il fallait que le Programme fût placé sous l'étroit pilotage du Siège.

De surcroît, pour un programme destiné à changer l'organisation dans son ensemble, un bilan organisationnel exhaustif aux premiers stades aurait été utile, mais il n'en a pas été ainsi. Il manquait également au Bureau des programmes d'urgence suffisamment de renseignements financiers pour qu'il procède à une gestion stratégique; du fait que les codes du budget n'ont pas été institués avec des objectifs en vue au début du Programme de renforcement des capacités, les renseignements financiers étaient dispersés et difficiles à utiliser dans une perspective d'ensemble.

La **conclusion générale de l'évaluation** est que l'UNICEF a connu des avancées importantes dans le renforcement des capacités soutenu par le Programme, *et* qu'il y a eu des exemples de réactions très efficaces. Toutefois, l'UNICEF demeure assez loin du but : la *fiabilité* de son action humanitaire, ainsi que le demandent l'approche fondée sur les droits et les Principaux engagements.

Le rôle de l'UNICEF a été unanimement apprécié par les autres institutions des Nations Unies, les ONG partenaires et les gouvernements nationaux. La réaction humanitaire a été bonne dans les trois études de cas nationales : Sri Lanka, RDC et Éthiopie. En RDC et au Sri Lanka, le plaidoyer en faveur des droits des enfants a été lui aussi fort. Il y a toutefois eu des exemples de mauvaises mesures avec mise en danger de vies humaines (p. ex. au Darfour et au Libéria). De même, l'UNICEF a trouvé difficile, dans certains contextes, d'attirer l'attention sur les violations des droits fondamentaux (p. ex. au Népal).

## **1. Les succès principaux de l'UNICEF dans le renforcement des capacités pour la réaction humanitaire**

**La planification de l'état de préparation et de la réaction aux situations d'urgences (EPR)** s'est étendue à plus de 90 % des bureaux nationaux de l'UNICEF ces cinq dernières années, ce qui est un succès impressionnant. Les outils de l'EPR ont récemment été remis à jour et améliorés de manière à alléger le processus de réaction aux demandes sur le terrain. L'évaluation conclut que la préparation aux situations d'urgence ne suffit pas à elle seule pour qu'une action humanitaire efficace en résulte. Elle doit être appuyée par d'autres facteurs, dont la capacité d'intervention immédiate de spécialistes de la gestion

---

<sup>7</sup> Le Groupe-conseil baastel Itée, *Évaluation de la stratégie d'apprentissage de l'UNICEF pour renforcer les compétences du personnel de l'UNICEF en matière de réaction humanitaire*, 2000-2004.

et des opérations et d'experts techniques. Toutefois, l'EPR a eu une grande utilité en changeant les attitudes vis-à-vis des urgences, devenues désormais la responsabilité de tous, et en rassemblant le personnel des opérations et celui des programmes à la faveur du processus de planification.

L'élaboration des **Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d'urgence** a fourni un cadre de référence pour définir quels étaient exactement les services que l'UNICEF cherchait à garantir pour les enfants en tant que droits qui relèvent de la réaction humanitaire. Le personnel dans son ensemble a convenu que les Principaux engagements étaient un outil de référence très utile, bien que très peu d'institutions en dehors de l'UNICEF soient encore au courant de leur existence.

L'UNICEF a apporté ces dernières années une contribution de première importance au **plaidoyer de haut niveau**, et cela a constitué le moteur des résolutions prises par le Conseil de sécurité et l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU sur les enfants et les conflits armés. Les travaux précurseurs de l'UNICEF présentés dans l'étude de Graca Machel sur les enfants et les conflits armés ont ainsi été mis à profit. Dans certains pays où les enfants sont affectés par les conflits, l'UNICEF a été à l'origine du train de mesures adoptées pour protéger les droits des enfants dans les conflits armés, dont le Plan d'action pour les enfants au Sri Lanka n'a pas été des moindres.

L'UNICEF a renforcé les travaux entrepris ces cinq dernières années dans le secteur de **la protection de l'enfance** en étoffant les effectifs de l'équipe (qui est encore relativement modeste) et en introduisant le concept d'« environnement protecteur » comme cadre de soutien à une plus grande cohésion dans la programmation et le plaidoyer. Il est important de noter que les ONG consultées sont impressionnées par le travail accompli par l'UNICEF dans le secteur de la protection de l'enfance et souhaitent que l'UNICEF assume le leadership des normes et des méthodes utilisées. L'UNICEF et ses partenaires ont produit pendant cette période un document qui a fait date : les « Principes directeurs sur les enfants non accompagnés et séparés ».

Des contributions importantes ont été apportées au **Programme de réforme de l'ONU**, et surtout aux groupes de travail et d'intervention qui en traitent. En particulier, l'UNICEF a piloté au nom du Comité permanent interorganisations le processus de généralisation d'une formation sur l'exploitation et les violences sexuelles dans les contextes humanitaires. L'UNICEF a aussi été un défenseur puissant et important des principes humanitaires au sein du système des Nations Unies et à l'extérieur.

Le Centre des Opérations de New York (OPSCEN) a permis d'améliorer les **systèmes de gestion de la sécurité** en offrant 24 heures par jour, 7 jours par semaine à l'UNICEF un service d'information continu à tous les niveaux sur les grands événements et les dangers possibles. Des investissements considérables ont été consentis pour la sécurité, améliorant de façon substantielle la conformité avec les normes opérationnelles minimum de sécurité (« MOSS »), et pour la formation du personnel. La question se pose de savoir si, pour la sécurité, une attention suffisante a été accordée à l'application du principe de responsabilisation par le recours au système de gestion. La gestion de la sécurité demeure un secteur auquel on doit continuer à donner la priorité et à affecter des ressources.

La **Division des approvisionnements** a réalisé des améliorations significatives pendant cette période, en mettant par exemple sur pied à Copenhague une Unité de coordination pour les urgences et en stockant tout un ensemble de marchandises urgentes en rapport direct avec les Principaux engagements, ce qui a réduit les délais de livraison de ces articles à 48 heures à compter de la réception des commandes. Des complexes d'entrepôt régionaux ont été mis en place à Dubai et à Johannesburg en 2003 (puis à Panama en 2005). Dubai semble avoir le mieux réussi à réduire les coûts et les délais de livraison.

Pour stimuler les capacités de spécialisation dans la réaction humanitaire, l'UNICEF a mis sur pied une **équipe de réaction aux urgences** de cinq personnes. L'accord de principe en avait été donné en 2004, et cette structure a été mise en place au début de 2005 avec des fonds reçus du Programme de

développement des capacités du Service d'aide humanitaire de la Commission européenne (ECHO)<sup>8</sup>. On peut faire appel à cette équipe et à son expérience considérable pour assurer la gestion et la coordination générales de la réaction de l'UNICEF. À ce jour, cette équipe ne comprend pas d'experts sectoriels comme le recommandent les Principaux engagements (pas de spécialiste de la protection, par exemple). L'équipe de réaction aux urgences témoigne du fait que, bien que l'intégration de la réaction humanitaire au courant dominant soit un élément fondamental, cette intégration n'empêche pas que l'on puisse avoir besoin de spécialistes dans de brefs délais. Il est question d'étoffer cette équipe dans la prochaine période du Plan stratégique à moyen terme avec des fonds prélevés sur le financement de base de l'UNICEF.

La création d'une **capacité technique au niveau régional** grâce au réseau de Conseillers régionaux pour les urgences a permis de fournir un soutien technique plus proche du niveau national et a généralisé la planification et la formation liées à la préparation et à la réaction aux urgences à plus de 90 % des bureaux. C'est de ces Conseillers régionaux que provient la première vague de soutien accordé aux bureaux nationaux pour des interventions immédiates dans la plupart des urgences, et ce sont eux qui ont fait ressortir l'importance des urgences dans la plupart des régions. Seuls deux de ces postes clés n'ont pas été incorporés au financement de base de façon à assurer leur durabilité.

**Un accent supplémentaire a été mis sur les ressources humaines pour la réaction aux situations d'urgence** par l'établissement du « Déclencheur institutionnel »<sup>9</sup> pour les urgences en août 2004 et depuis 2003 par la création du poste de Personne-ressource pour les urgences dans la Division des ressources humaines au Siège. Le système du Déclencheur institutionnel a nettement donné la priorité au déploiement du personnel dans les situations d'urgence (bien qu'à ce jour il n'ait été utilisé qu'au Darfour et dans la réaction au tsunami). Le poste de Personne-ressource pour les urgences a permis d'élaborer des systèmes destinés à développer les capacités d'intervention immédiate et a joué un rôle décisif dans l'identification des membres du personnel de l'UNICEF qui devaient être redéployés, et le choix des consultants externes dans la réaction au tsunami.

Le Programme de développement des capacités a également accordé **une importance croissante à la formation pour les urgences**. Il a facilité la généralisation de la formation relative aux questions humanitaires et à la préparation et la réaction aux situations d'urgence en adoptant une approche PATH (dite « à principes ») pour cette formation. L'évaluation de la stratégie d'apprentissage a conclu que la formation à l'EPR avait contribué de façon significative à la compréhension par le personnel des bureaux nationaux des rôles que jouaient les divers individus engagés dans la réaction humanitaire et, à ce titre, a favorisé son intégration. La formation a également intensifié le dialogue entre le personnel des programmes et celui des opérations sur la réaction aux urgences, car c'est là une des rares occasions qu'ont les deux branches principales du personnel des bureaux nationaux de travailler ensemble. La formation à l'EPR a été combinée avec succès à la planification de l'EPR en tant que processus intégré.

Un réseau d'**entraide** a été créé pour aider le personnel à contrôler le stress dans les crises humanitaires (bien qu'il faille travailler encore pour accroître l'utilisation et la diffusion de cette ressource).

Le Programme de développement des capacités appuie la plupart de ces réalisations et facilite les liens.

## **2. Contraintes internes qui pèsent sur la capacité qu'a l'UNICEF d'avoir une réaction humanitaire fiable**

**Le modèle décentralisé de l'UNICEF met fortement l'accent sur les bureaux nationaux, et surtout sur leurs équipes de gestion, pour gérer les mesures d'urgence, et toutes les équipes ne sont pas**

---

<sup>8</sup> ECHO offre un financement supplémentaire au développement des capacités dans la préparation et la réaction aux urgences (approvisionnement, distribution et télécommunications) depuis 2004, et dans la protection de l'enfance depuis 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Le Déclencheur institutionnel est un mécanisme destiné à mettre par ordre de priorité les achats, approvisionnements et livraisons ainsi que les collectes urgentes de fonds et le déploiement du personnel sur une période de 90 jours suivant la déclaration d'une urgence.

**en mesure de jouer ce rôle de façon efficace (voir « leadership » ci-dessous). Il fait également peser le travail de supervision sur les bureaux régionaux.** Une question posée pour l'évaluation était de savoir si un modèle centralisé pour la réaction aux urgences (mais pas pour les programmes de développement) pouvait produire dans l'ensemble une meilleure réaction. L'évaluation a conclu qu'une centralisation demanderait une équipe bien plus nombreuse, et que cet effort ne pourrait être soutenu compte tenu de la taille et de la durée des urgences. Le Siège ne pourrait gérer que les urgences les plus importantes, et il lui serait difficile de mener de front plus d'un ou deux pays au titre d'un « déclencheur mondial ».

L'évaluation a également conclu que la stratégie de l'UNICEF consistant à développer les bureaux régionaux comme bases de soutien et de supervision et comme déclencheurs d'appoint pour les bureaux nationaux est vraiment la mieux adaptée. Toutefois, il pèse sur les bureaux régionaux un certain nombre de contraintes qui entravent leur capacité à jouer ce rôle. En pratique, le degré d'autorité et de responsabilité du bureau régional demeure flou, même si la théorie en a été énoncée. De plus, le nombre même de pays de chaque région et l'amplification des crises humanitaires rendent extrêmement difficile pour les Conseillers régionaux de chaque secteur de répondre aux demandes de soutien à *la fois* pour les programmes de développement et pour la réaction humanitaire. Des problèmes se posent également au niveau des budgets de déplacements autonomes et du niveau de compétence technique de certains Conseillers régionaux.

Toutefois, ce rôle convient et doit être renforcé. Il doit aussi être proactif et, dans certaines circonstances, directif. Il doit contrebalancer la réticence qu'ont certains bureaux nationaux à reconnaître une urgence imminente et à passer à l'action. Fondamentalement, il doit renforcer le leadership au niveau du pays.

**Le leadership varie selon les pays.** Le leadership au niveau du pays a été clairement souligné comme un des déterminants principaux d'une réaction humanitaire efficace. Une réaction humanitaire fiable demandera un leadership fiable de l'équipe nationale de gestion, et spécialement du Représentant national de l'UNICEF, ainsi qu'une expérience éprouvée des situations d'urgence. Dans les cas où la réaction a été insuffisante, le leadership exercé par le bureau national a invariablement été un facteur décisif.

**La planification des ressources humaines pour les urgences aux niveaux du pays et de la région est faible, et les systèmes de capacité d'intervention immédiate et d'intégration en vigueur dans toute l'organisation n'ont pas progressé aussi vite qu'il le fallait.** La plupart des bureaux nationaux n'ont pas délimité et identifié au titre du processus de l'EPR les points forts et les lacunes des compétences qui sont mises à l'épreuve dans la réaction humanitaire. Lorsqu'une urgence éclate, ils doivent mettre ce processus en marche ou, pire encore, essayer de s'accommoder d'équipes techniques qui ne répondent pas comme il le faut aux compétences exigées dans les divers secteurs relevant des Principaux engagements. L'agent chargé des ressources humaines au niveau régional ne s'est pas non plus activement engagé dans la planification de secours rapides. Au niveau du Siège, les systèmes inspirés des recommandations de la Conférence de Brasilia<sup>10</sup> et des travaux d'analyse qui se sont ensuivis (Heffinck, 2004) ont été lents à se mettre en place.

**Les capacités techniques ne sont pas encore garanties dans tous les secteurs couverts par les Principaux engagements.** Les capacités qui doivent être mises à contribution dans les questions d'eau et d'assainissement sont particulièrement faibles. Au cours de la dernière décennie, une réorientation de la programmation pour le développement a mis l'accent sur une approche fondée sur le cycle de la vie, et en particulier la survie des enfants. Ce sont surtout l'eau et l'assainissement qui ont fait les frais de cette approche en termes de compétences techniques (bien que les compétences en nutrition soient elles aussi plus faibles que dans d'autres secteurs). Jusqu'à une époque très récente, il n'existait *pas* de poste permanent de Conseiller régional en eau et assainissement<sup>11</sup>, et le personnel de ce secteur est réduit par rapport aux autres. La protection de l'enfance a connu une couverture faible à tous les niveaux. Le programme d'apprentissage n'a pas offert de formation technique suffisante dans tous les secteurs

<sup>10</sup> Conférence : « Transformer la fonction de ressources humaines à l'UNICEF », juin 2002.

<sup>11</sup> L'UNICEF a récemment créé quatre postes de Conseillers régionaux en eau et assainissement.

couverts par les Principaux engagements. Bien que le Plan stratégique à moyen terme pour 2006-2009 soit plus étroitement aligné à la fois sur le contexte du développement et sur celui des urgences, on doit remédier aux conséquences de ce déclin, sans quoi l'UNICEF demeurera exposé à des lacunes techniques sévères dans l'application des Principaux engagements.

**De nombreux bureaux nationaux n'ont pas maintenu la préparation et la réaction aux situations d'urgence comme un processus de planification opérationnelle.** L'évaluation reconnaît l'importance du processus de préparation et de réaction aux situations d'urgence comme contribution essentielle à l'amélioration des capacités de réaction. Toutefois, pour améliorer radicalement l'efficacité de la réaction, ce processus doit présenter une cohérence avec les Principaux engagements (ce qui n'a pas toujours été le cas), sa documentation doit être constamment réactualisée, il doit être porté à la connaissance et soumis à l'accord des partenaires, et opérationnalisé par l'exécution des divers plans adoptés (p. ex. plans d'approvisionnement, de recrutement, etc.).

**L'intégration des questions sexospécifiques dans le courant dominant n'est pas encore réussie.** Malgré un fort engagement politique en ce sens dans l'aide humanitaire, le suivi d'exécution ne s'est pas effectué de façon stable ou systématique au niveau des programmes, et les résultats obtenus sont inégaux et insuffisants. La tendance existe d'interpréter la sensibilité aux questions sexospécifiques comme un ciblage des femmes et des filles dans la programmation plutôt que d'adopter une approche vraiment axée sur ces questions et qui se traduit par l'analyse et le traitement des problèmes relatifs à l'inégalité des sexes. Plutôt qu'une situation où l'intégration des questions sexospécifiques relève de la responsabilité de tous, la position par défaut semble être que ce problème ne relève de la responsabilité de personne. Il n'y a que peu de soutien apporté aux bureaux nationaux pour favoriser la sensibilisation aux questions sexospécifiques, et peu de vérifications sur le degré d'intégration de la question des sexes au travail humanitaire de l'UNICEF.

**L'UNICEF joue un rôle central dans l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre d'un système de suivi et de rapports sur six violations flagrantes des droits des enfants intervenues dans des zones de conflits, ainsi qu'en atteste la Résolution 1539 du Conseil de sécurité (avril 2004) et un Plan d'action énoncé par le Secrétaire général en février 2005<sup>12</sup>.** Les systèmes et les outils n'en ont pas encore été convenus, et on n'est pas non plus certain que les niveaux d'effectifs soient suffisants pour s'acquitter de cette mission. Le système de suivi et de rapports sur les droits des enfants est essentiel si l'on veut garantir un plaidoyer fort en faveur des enfants dans les conflits armés et il conviendrait d'aborder cette question aussitôt que possible.

**L'apprentissage et la formation ont été particulièrement insuffisants dans le secteur de la protection de l'enfance.** La confiance avec laquelle le personnel de l'UNICEF applique les cadres de référence juridiques internationaux, les approches politiques et les bonnes pratiques est essentielle pour assurer des programmes et un plaidoyer forts en faveur des enfants touchés par les conflits armés. C'est également une condition requise pour qu'existe une coordination efficace dans le secteur de la protection de l'enfance. La Section de la protection de l'enfance est consciente que des investissements bien plus importants doivent être consentis dans ce secteur à tous les niveaux (formation formelle, encadrement, diffusion de principes directeurs, et même ouverture de possibilités avec la création d'une éventuelle maîtrise en protection de l'enfance).

**Les procédures financières et administratives demeurent encombrantes et bureaucratiques.** Conçues pour les programmes de développement, les procédures financières et administratives sont difficiles à appliquer dans les contextes d'urgence. Cela cause des retards dans la mise en œuvre de certaines fonctions propres aux urgences, comme par exemple l'achat de marchandises essentielles, l'approbation des contrats et le déblocage des fonds pour les partenaires. Bien que des dispositions aient été prises pour adapter certains de ces systèmes à la réaction aux situations d'urgence, ils ne sont pas bien connus ou utilisés par le personnel des opérations. Les exigences institutionnelles ont toutes les chances de passer avant celles de la réaction rapide lorsque le personnel n'a pas la confiance nécessaire pour adapter les systèmes existants aux situations d'urgence.

---

<sup>12</sup> Le Conseil de sécurité devrait approuver le Plan d'action très prochainement.

**La culture institutionnelle : on insiste trop sur l'excellence, alors qu'en pratique des outils plus simples et plus rapides pourraient être plus efficaces.** L'UNICEF a produit nombre de lignes directrices, d'outils et de documents de politique excellents. Il y a deux problèmes qui résultent de la production de lignes directrices de cette qualité. D'abord, ce sont souvent des outils complexes qui demandent une diffusion volontariste et des programmes d'apprentissage pour s'assurer qu'ils sont appliqués avec efficacité sur le terrain ou alors ils demeurent peu connus et peu utilisés (p. ex. les outils pour les évaluations des capacités en matière de vulnérabilité, les normes appliquées dans l'éducation en situation d'urgence, les Principaux engagements proprement dits). Le second problème est que la recherche de l'excellence retarde la publication de l'information. Des outils et directives plus simples et plus rapides, des indicateurs en moins grand nombre et plus essentiels, pourraient s'avérer plus efficaces.

**L'apprentissage institutionnel par la pratique est faible et il n'existe pas encore de culture de l'apprentissage.** Les systèmes de suivi et d'évaluation sont faibles dans la plupart des pays, et il n'existe pas de pratique établie d'ateliers sur des enseignements concis et ciblés ou d'exams a posteriori. Généralement parlant, il existe relativement peu d'évaluations de rendement au niveau des bureaux nationaux. L'UNICEF n'a pas encore intégré une culture de l'apprentissage et les rapports du personnel font état du sentiment de culpabilité qu'il éprouve à se mettre en arrêt de travail pour s'adonner à des apprentissages.

**Des partenaires forts sont essentiels pour obtenir une réaction efficace et fiable, mais ne sont pas toujours identifiés au stade de la planification.** Comme l'UNICEF, lors des urgences, n'est pas directement engagé dans le processus de mise en œuvre, il est essentiel, sauf si aucun partenaire adéquat n'a été identifié, que la planification de la réaction humanitaire se fasse avec la collaboration de partenaires. Dans les meilleurs cas, cette planification se fait avec les partenaires du gouvernement et des ONG, comme c'est le cas en Éthiopie, mais dans de nombreux autres contextes les partenaires potentiels n'avaient aucune connaissance des plans adoptés. Il y avait également entre les partenaires, y compris les institutions des Nations Unies, une connaissance extrêmement diffuse des Principaux engagements, qui pourtant représentent l'engagement de l'UNICEF vis-à-vis des enfants lors des urgences.

**Les Principaux engagements et les normes de la réaction humanitaire ne sont pas bien connus des équipes de l'UNICEF.** Une réaction efficace et fiable devrait se modeler sur le cadre de référence que représentent les Principaux engagements, avec en plus des normes supplémentaires acceptées au niveau international dans chaque secteur. L'évaluation a trouvé que seule un peu plus de la moitié des équipes nationales de gestion considéraient que leur personnel connaissait les Principaux engagements. Les lacunes sont probablement encore plus importantes dans la connaissance des normes de réaction humanitaire interorganismes par secteur, même lorsque ce sont des normes que l'UNICEF a approuvées, comme par exemple les normes minimales interorganismes pour l'éducation dans les situations d'urgence et les principes directeurs interorganismes pour le VIH/sida dans les situations d'urgence. La connaissance des normes Sphere, utilisées par la majorité des ONG dans la réaction humanitaire, est même encore moins répandue, et cela a des implications sérieuses pour la coordination sectorielle.

**Une capacité variable dans les compétences de coordination.** On demande habituellement de l'UNICEF qu'il exerce un rôle de direction et de coordination dans les secteurs techniques des Principaux engagements. Les ONG s'en remettent à l'UNICEF pour élaborer des principes directeurs sur les normes techniques et consolider les évaluations identifiant les lacunes dans l'octroi et la coordination des approvisionnements, et le plaidoyer avec le gouvernement, les donateurs ou d'autres institutions quand cela s'impose. Ce sont des tâches d'importance qui demandent des talents de coordination spécifiques ainsi qu'une forte capacité technique et une connaissance de la situation sur le terrain. Elles demandent également un investissement de temps et devraient être considérées comme une partie fondamentale du rôle technique. Pour être vraiment efficace, la coordination doit être financée comme une activité séparée. À l'heure actuelle, les capacités et l'investissement de temps sont variables et n'interviennent pas en appui d'une performance fiable dans la coordination.

**Les systèmes de distribution locaux sont souvent faibles.** Compte tenu du fait que l'UNICEF fournit habituellement des marchandises aux bénéficiaires par l'intermédiaire de partenaires gouvernementaux ou d'ONG dans les programmes de développement, il ne dispose pas habituellement d'une capacité logistique autonome. Toutefois, dans la réaction humanitaire, il y a lieu de s'en remettre à l'UNICEF pour livrer des biens rapidement. À moins que des plans ne soient élaborés dans ce sens au préalable, en identifiant en particulier les transporteurs privés ou les systèmes de rechange, ce processus sera vraisemblablement lent. Il peut aussi être difficile de prendre une décision sur le passage du système « normal » d'entreposage et de distribution par l'intermédiaire du gouvernement à la responsabilité directe de l'UNICEF dans la logistique et les approvisionnements.

**Mettre des biens en dépôt dans le pays améliore clairement la réaction aux urgences, mais cela n'est pas encouragé.** La mise en dépôt préalable de biens et de marchandises pour les urgences était considérée comme la clé d'une réaction efficace dans toutes les études de cas nationales. Toutefois, la Division des approvisionnements décourage les mises en dépôt préalables parce que cela peut être source de gaspillage et difficile à maintenir. Bien que cette politique soit justifiée, les circonstances locales peuvent signifier que la mise en dépôt préalable rendra la réaction aux urgences bien plus efficace, et une souplesse plus grande est donc requise sur cette question.

**Les recommandations des évaluations et des examens** ne sont pas toujours analysées et approuvées, ni des plans élaborés dans un souci d'exécution. Beaucoup des questions soulevées dans ce rapport avaient déjà été soulevées dans des évaluations antérieures.

**Manque de leadership stratégique dans le Programme de développement des capacités.** Le Programme de développement des capacités dépendait largement des demandes de financement émanant des Divisions et des Bureaux régionaux, et il lui manquait une vue d'ensemble stratégique pour débloquer ce qui bloquait une réaction efficace. Les décisions stratégiques auraient dû être prises au niveau du Comité permanent *interdivisions* sur les enfants dans les situations instables, mais ce Comité ne joue pas encore ce rôle. Par ailleurs, il n'y avait pas suffisamment d'informations financières sur l'utilisation des fonds pour que le Bureau des programmes d'urgence puisse prendre les décisions stratégiques.

**Des effectifs insuffisants dans certains secteurs.** Les effectifs en personnel sont insuffisants dans les secteurs de l'eau et de l'assainissement, de la protection, de l'égalité des sexes et de la gestion de la sécurité.

**Un manque de confiance dans les systèmes de développement professionnel.** Un très petit nombre d'employés considère que les méthodes d'avancement professionnel en vigueur à l'UNICEF sont objectives, justes et correctes. L'avancement fondé sur le mérite et la compétence est essentiel pour s'assurer que les plus capables atteignent des postes de gestion et de direction élevés.

### **3. Les contraintes externes qui pèsent sur la capacité qu'a l'UNICEF d'apporter une aide humanitaire en toute fiabilité**

**La demande croissante en matière d'action humanitaire veut dire qu'on fait appel à l'UNICEF pour déployer une capacité de réaction toujours plus grande. Cela peut conduire à un engagement trop ambitieux, et l'on risque de mauvaises performances et une perte de motivation.** Pour produire une réaction humanitaire qui soit fiable, l'UNICEF a deux possibilités :

- i) accroître sa capacité de réaction, ce qui demanderait davantage de personnel et de financement;
- ii) classer par ordre prioritaire certains secteurs spécifiques au sein des Principaux engagements et obtenir d'autres institutions qu'elles se chargent de secteurs dont l'UNICEF ne peut plus se charger. À court terme, il pourrait être souhaitable que l'UNICEF déclare clairement que l'hébergement n'est pas un des secteurs relevant des Principaux engagements, et plaide pour qu'une autre institution des Nations Unies endosse la responsabilité de ce secteur.

**Une réaction humanitaire fiable demande un financement fiable et en temps opportun.** L'évaluation observe les vastes inégalités de financement par tête des populations frappées par les crises

humanitaires. Il est clair que le volume de financement qui a été rapidement disponible au titre de la réaction au tsunami a fait une différence significative pour ce qui est de la capacité de réaction de l'UNICEF. Tant que l'on n'aura pas progressé dans le cadre de l'Initiative des principes et bonnes pratiques de l'action humanitaire (Good Humanitarian Donorship) et d'autres initiatives de financement, cette inégalité continuera à être un obstacle.

**Le financement du développement des capacités** n'est pas une option très prisée des donateurs, et il a été difficile d'encourager des donateurs supplémentaires à soutenir les efforts de l'UNICEF dans ce domaine.

**La détérioration de la sécurité** dans certains contextes, alliée aux procédures de gestion de la sécurité au sein de l'ONU, réduit de plus en plus l'accès de l'UNICEF aux populations touchées.

**Des limites qui s'estompent entre l'action humanitaire, la politique étrangère et l'intervention militaire**, tant au sein des Nations Unies qu'auprès de certains de leurs gouvernements donateurs, compromettent la capacité qu'ont l'UNICEF et d'autres institutions de fournir une aide humanitaire impartiale et fondée sur les droits de la personne.

#### **4. Recommandations prioritaires : débloquer les blocages**

Des recommandations détaillées sont comprises dans le corps de ce rapport, avec une énumération complète à la fin, en parallèle avec des échéances du type : i) d'ici à la fin de la première année, ii) au cours de la période 2006-2009 du Plan stratégique à moyen terme, et iii) le long terme et ses directions stratégiques.

Ce qui suit est une liste sommaire des recommandations prioritaires directement liées au déblocage des blocages et au développement futur des capacités de préparation et de réaction humanitaires.

##### **Améliorer la capacité de supervision des bureaux régionaux**

L'objectif de la recommandation sur la capacité de supervision des bureaux régionaux est de renforcer les éléments proactifs et (si nécessaire) directifs du soutien des bureaux régionaux lorsque les bureaux nationaux ne reconnaissent pas une crise imminente ou ont des difficultés à préparer une réaction efficace. Certaines équipes de gestion nationales produiront une réaction efficace sans ce soutien, mais d'autres ne le feront pas. Pour cette raison, il a été proposé que des procédures de fonctionnement standard soient introduites pour contrebalancer une faiblesse potentielle du leadership dans la réaction aux urgences.

- i) Instituer une procédure de fonctionnement standard au terme de laquelle les bureaux régionaux seront tenus d'envoyer un employé de haut rang (Conseiller régional pour les urgences ou autre Conseiller régional ou même Directeur régional) aux bureaux nationaux si le niveau d'alerte augmente. La première priorité devrait être de mettre en place un plan de 90 jours qui couvrira tous les aspects de la réaction aux urgences (leadership/gestion, financement, conditions d'une action immédiate, systèmes d'approvisionnement, partenariats, sécurité, soutien technique et opérationnel supplémentaire) et les responsabilités respectives des bureaux national et régional. Cela devrait se produire, que le bureau national demande un soutien ou non, de manière à surmonter la réticence qu'ont certains bureaux nationaux à demander de l'aide.
- ii) S'assurer que le poste de Conseiller régional est considéré comme un moyen d'accéder à une situation plus élevée, de façon à attirer des candidats d'un haut niveau technique.
- iii) Analyser ce qui, à ce jour, a réussi dans la supervision des bureaux régionaux, et reproduire ces caractéristiques dans tous les bureaux régionaux.

##### **Améliorer le leadership des bureaux nationaux**

Une réaction fiable aux situations d'urgence demandera pour la réaction humanitaire un leadership fiable et de qualité, surtout au niveau du bureau national. Le leadership pourrait être amélioré de trois manières :

- i) en faisant figurer une expérience humanitaire substantielle et une expérience éprouvée au nombre des critères de nomination des membres de l'équipe de gestion nationale (Représentants du bureau national, Agents supérieurs de programmes et d'opérations)

- ii) par le biais du Programme d'apprentissage du leadership et de la gestion, qui devrait comprendre l'élaboration d'un modèle de leadership efficace, l'encadrement des chefs et l'analyse du leadership dans les examens a posteriori des actions entreprises. Les examens a posteriori des actions entreprises devraient se traduire par l'influence que l'apprentissage exerce sur le leadership dans la réaction humanitaire elle-même.
- iii) incorporer des procédures de fonctionnement standard pour aborder les questions de leadership dans la réaction humanitaire (voir ci-dessus : « Améliorer la capacité de supervision des bureaux régionaux »).

#### **Renforcer la capacité de coordination**

On fait de plus en plus appel à l'UNICEF pour accomplir un travail de coordination pendant les urgences, et particulièrement dans les secteurs relevant des Principaux engagements. C'est là un rôle extrêmement important, mais qui requiert un niveau élevé de compétence technique et ne devrait donc pas être considéré comme un supplément aux attributions normales des agents de programmes. Le besoin se fait par ailleurs sentir de faire accepter par les donateurs qu'un financement supplémentaire s'imposera pour que s'effectue une coordination efficace.

Pour améliorer les capacités de coordination, il faudra former le personnel, faire figurer les capacités de coordination dans les profils de compétences ou descriptions de postes, utiliser les normes (Sphere, par exemple) comme outil, s'assurer que les postes attirent un personnel techniquement compétent et obtiennent un financement supplémentaire pour la fonction de coordination.

#### **Améliorer la capacité d'intervention immédiate en mettant l'accent sur les niveaux national et régional**

L'amélioration de la capacité d'intervention immédiate lors de la période qui s'annonce portera principalement sur les niveaux national et régional, bien que le Siège doive mener à terme les systèmes actuellement en vigueur. La responsabilité de l'intégration de la réaction aux situations d'urgence devrait continuer à constituer la stratégie la plus importante, mais elle doit être améliorée par des spécialistes. Un des objectifs principaux des recommandations qui suivent est de s'assurer que les divers secteurs des Principaux engagements bénéficient d'une diffusion suffisante dans tous les pays. Les procédures devraient fonctionner comme suit :

- i) Les bureaux nationaux dressent sur une base annuelle la carte détaillée des compétences et des lacunes au titre du processus de préparation et de réaction aux situations d'urgence. Bien que ceci doive déjà être fait au titre de ce processus, la fiabilité n'en est pas à ce jour suffisante. Cette carte devrait être spécifiquement liée aux secteurs couverts par les Principaux engagements ainsi qu'aux fonctions opérationnelles. La carte des ressources humaines devrait être communiquée aux bureaux régionaux afin que ceux-ci puissent maintenir une vue d'ensemble régionale des lacunes probables dans les compétences à leur disposition et relier les besoins qui se révèlent au Registre de redéploiement régional.
- ii) Au niveau du bureau régional, on devrait mettre en place une liste de redéploiement régionale, car le redéploiement est le mécanisme principal d'intervention immédiate à l'UNICEF, surtout dans la phase initiale d'une urgence. Le personnel national devrait figurer dans ce registre. Les employés désireux d'être inscrits sur la liste de redéploiement régionale devraient avoir la priorité quant aux possibilités d'apprentissage offertes, et les rapports d'évaluation du personnel devraient en prendre acte.
- iii) L'UNICEF devrait continuer à renforcer les dispositions de réserve, notamment en fournissant au personnel des registres de réserve principaux une formation sur les engagements, les normes et les procédures de l'UNICEF.

#### **Plaider pour une fiabilité et une équité plus grandes dans le financement de la réaction humanitaire**

Une réaction fiable demande un financement fiable. C'est principalement une question de plaider, que l'UNICEF devrait aborder par l'Initiative des principes et bonnes pratiques de l'action humanitaire (Good Humanitarian Donorship), tout en dirigeant les négociations en cours avec les donateurs. Ce débat pourrait être étayé par une démonstration de la différence apportée à la vie des enfants selon qu'il s'agit

d'une réaction bien financée (p. ex. le tsunami) ou d'interventions mal financées (p. ex. les urgences chroniques comme en RDC).

### **Améliorer les fonctions d'approvisionnement et de logistique, surtout au niveau des bureaux nationaux**

Pour s'assurer que les bonnes marchandises se trouvent au bon endroit et au bon moment, les bureaux nationaux doivent investir davantage de temps dans la planification de l'approvisionnement et de la logistique au sein du processus de préparation et de réaction aux situations d'urgence, avec le soutien du Conseiller régional pour les approvisionnements. L'UNICEF ne dispose pas d'une capacité logistique autonome, et s'en remet habituellement aux équipements du gouvernement et à des fournisseurs privés. Lors d'une urgence, l'UNICEF aura souvent besoin de mettre en place des systèmes autonomes pendant une certaine période. L'état des lieux devrait prendre en compte les accords avec les fournisseurs potentiels et avec les transporteurs et indiquer comment s'opérerait la gestion de l'entreposage, et si nécessaire préparer le terrain à un repositionnement. La Division des approvisionnements devrait examiner la liste des marchandises d'urgence standard en fonction des Principaux engagements et en conjonction avec le personnel sur le terrain, sur la base des dernières expériences acquises en matière d'urgence.

### **S'assurer que les procédures financières et administratives contribuent au soutien d'une réaction humanitaire efficace**

À l'heure actuelle, on se demande à l'UNICEF si le problème principal qui freine l'efficacité des finances et de l'administration dans les situations d'urgence a trait à des procédures par trop bureaucratiques, ou si le blocage est causé par le personnel des bureaux nationaux qui ne sait pas suffisamment adapter les systèmes ou ne s'en sent pas capable. La Division de la gestion financière et administrative (DGFA) devrait se voir attribuer la responsabilité de clarifier cette question. Au cours des 18 mois/2 ans à venir, la DGFA devrait se livrer à une diffusion énergique des procédures financières (par l'intermédiaire des Conseillers régionaux pour les finances), avec un examen de terrain à la fin de cette période. Cet examen devrait clarifier cette question et recommander les mesures qui s'imposent.

### **Améliorer la capacité de protection de l'enfance à tous les niveaux de la programmation et du plaidoyer**

Pour renforcer ses capacités dans la poursuite de l'élaboration des politiques et dans la coordination des institutions participant à la protection de l'enfance, et pour améliorer sa pratique de la programmation et du plaidoyer dans ce domaine, l'UNICEF devrait :

- i) renforcer l'équipe du Siège pour combler les lacunes actuelles en matière de politiques (y compris l'élaboration de politiques de protection de l'enfance au cours des catastrophes naturelles);
- ii) déployer la nouvelle trousse de formation (qui sera élaborée cette année) en l'appuyant par un encadrement du personnel ;
- iii) demander aux Conseillers régionaux pour la protection de l'enfance de mieux soutenir les bureaux nationaux dans la diffusion des informations et le débat portant sur les principes directeurs et politiques fondamentaux, dans l'évaluation des facteurs qui favorisent ou découragent le plaidoyer des droits de l'enfant auquel se livrent les bureaux nationaux, et dans l'analyse de ce qui dans certains pays a bien marché pour l'élaboration des réseaux de protection de l'enfance;
- iv) chercher les ressources destinées à augmenter le nombre d'employés hautement qualifiés pour coordonner sur le terrain et au niveau régional le secteur de la protection de l'enfance.

### **Déployer les systèmes de suivi des violations des droits de l'enfant lors des conflits armés et d'établissement des rapports y afférents**

Mettre la touche finale aux indicateurs et aux outils de collecte des données et déployer le système de suivi et d'établissement de rapports pour les violations des droits de l'enfant aussitôt que possible. Achever de dresser la carte des réseaux de protection de l'enfance et évaluer ce qui sera requis pour garantir un fonctionnement efficace de ces réseaux au niveau des bureaux nationaux, sans sous-estimer la dimension de la tâche. Passer en revue les effectifs généraux en relation avec la capacité de s'acquitter de la mission fixée (Groupe de travail interdivisionnel sur le suivi et les rapports).

### **Renforcer les partenariats pour la réaction humanitaire**

Continuer à explorer avec des ONG locales et internationales des mécanismes novateurs de partenariats possibles sur les urgences (comme par exemple le partenariat qui est en train de se développer avec Oxfam GB pour les questions d'eau et d'assainissement). Initier des discussions ouvertes avec les ONG sur la capacité, la supervision et le soutien requis au début de toute forme de partenariat, contractuel ou autre. Diffuser activement les Principaux engagements auprès des partenaires de façon à ce qu'ils comprennent les paramètres qui définissent les engagements de l'UNICEF dans sa réaction humanitaire.

### **Face à l'accroissement de la demande dans le domaine de la réaction humanitaire, accroître les ressources ou réduire les engagements**

Les engagements de l'UNICEF dans les secteurs des Principaux engagements sont extrêmement ambitieux. Au fur et à mesure de l'accroissement de la demande, il sera de plus en plus difficile à l'UNICEF de couvrir le terrain, d'autant que les Ressources ordinaires ne s'accroissent pas au même rythme que les Autres Ressources. L'UNICEF devrait prendre une décision stratégique quant à la meilleure des deux options suivantes :

- i) faire pression pour obtenir davantage de ressources pour pouvoir réaliser les Principaux engagements;
- ii) réduire les engagements qui sont les siens dans les secteurs des Principaux engagements.

Quelle que soit la solution adoptée, l'UNICEF devrait clarifier avec les autres intervenants du secteur humanitaire que l'hébergement n'est pas un des secteurs relevant des Principaux engagements, et plaider pour qu'une autre institution des Nations Unies se charge de cette responsabilité.

### **Opérationnaliser et actualiser les Plans de préparation et de réaction aux situations d'urgence et déployer le système d'alerte et d'action rapide**

Pour s'assurer que l'UNICEF est préparé comme il convient aux urgences au niveau des bureaux nationaux, le processus de préparation et de réaction aux situations d'urgence devrait continuer à s'améliorer, avec le soutien des Conseillers régionaux pour les urgences. Il s'agit en particulier de l'amélioration des fonctions de supervision des bureaux régionaux, d'une animation externe des Plans de préparation et de réaction aux situations d'urgence, de l'adaptation de ces Plans au niveau du risque encouru, de l'amélioration de l'évaluation des besoins en ressources humaines et en logistique, et de la conduite de ces Plans en deux phases, avec l'intervention de partenaires à la phase II. L'évaluation cautionne le déploiement du système d'alerte et d'action rapide, qui aide dans la réaction humanitaire à définir les responsabilités et relie cette réaction aux divers niveaux d'alerte.

### **Améliorer les capacités techniques dans les secteurs relevant des Principaux engagements**

Pour obtenir une réaction fiable, il est essentiel de faire preuve de capacité technique dans chacun des secteurs relevant des Principaux engagements, c'est-à-dire qu'il faudrait entre autres :

- i) encourager activement la compréhension des Principaux engagements et des normes humanitaires appropriées par secteur au cours des visites de *tous* les Conseillers régionaux (et pas uniquement de ceux qui sont chargés des urgences);
- ii) aborder la question des compétences dans les secteurs des Principaux engagements au sein du programme d'apprentissage (voir ci-dessous);
- iii) mettre en parallèle la capacité technique des bureaux régionaux et nationaux avec les Principaux engagements en s'assurant que chaque secteur reçoit le soutien d'un Conseiller ou d'un agent de programme qui a les compétences ou l'expérience requises. Dresser la carte des capacités techniques pour traiter des Principaux engagements au niveau du bureau national sur une base annuelle et transmettre ces informations aux bureaux régionaux pour coordonner les plans de redéploiement régional;
- iv) améliorer les capacités techniques en concluant des partenariats stratégiques dans les secteurs relevant des Principaux engagements.

### **Améliorer le programme d'apprentissage**

Il existe des plans d'élaboration de nouveaux programmes à trois niveaux : au niveau de base, à celui de l'excellence des programmes et à celui du leadership et de la gestion. L'évaluation cautionne l'importance de ces programmes, y propose des thèmes à couvrir à chaque niveau, et propose également d'avoir recours à des services extérieurs pour faire assurer certains aspects de la formation. L'amélioration de l'apprentissage à base sectorielle sur les Principaux engagements devrait figurer dans ce programme. Pour promouvoir l'adoption et la demande d'un programme d'apprentissage, on devrait informer le personnel que chaque poste comporte 5 % de temps d'apprentissage, ce qui représente 2 % des frais de personnel dans leur ensemble. L'apprentissage devrait avoir un poids dans les évaluations des performances du personnel, et être pris en compte pour les promotions. La priorité d'accès aux possibilités d'apprentissage devrait être accordée au personnel figurant au registre de redéploiement régional.

### **Renforcer l'intégration des questions sexospécifiques dans le courant dominant**

L'unité chargée de l'intégration des questions sexospécifiques devrait être renforcée par un membre du personnel qui se consacre au travail humanitaire. À la base, l'intégration de la dimension sexe doit être comprise comme étant beaucoup plus qu'un ciblage des enfants et des femmes pour obtenir une meilleure évaluation et une meilleure connaissance des inégalités sous-jacentes qui affectent les sexes. L'analyse de l'exploitation et des sévices sexuels devrait être approfondie et reliée aux inégalités qui affectent les sexes et aux problèmes structurels au sein de la société. Les outils humanitaires, dont font partie les Principaux engagements, devraient être réexaminés dans une perspective d'intégration des questions sexospécifiques. L'UNICEF devrait collaborer avec d'autres institutions des Nations Unies (p. ex. le FNUAP et le HCR) dans la formation et l'apprentissage portant sur l'intégration des questions sexospécifiques.

### **S'assurer que l'UNICEF dispose d'un accès suffisant aux populations en situation d'insécurité**

Œuvrer vigoureusement au sein du système des Nations Unies, au niveau du Siège comme à celui des bureaux nationaux, en vue de raffiner et de rendre plus sensibles les systèmes de gestion de la sécurité de l'ONU.

### **Se concentrer sur des outils conviviaux pour le personnel sur le terrain, des principes directeurs « acceptables » et des systèmes permettant sans lourdeur excessive de tirer les enseignements qui s'imposent**

Soutenir l'élaboration d'outils simplifiés, p. ex. des exemples éprouvés d'analyse de capacités sur la vulnérabilité, et un petit nombre d'indicateurs faciles à recueillir sur l'alerte rapide. Organiser des ateliers d'une journée pour le suivi et évaluation et pour de brefs examens a posteriori des actions entreprises.

### **Élaborer une vision à long terme du rôle de l'UNICEF au sein du processus de réforme des Nations Unies**

Cela devrait comprendre une analyse de la manière dont les activités prévues pour le développement des capacités sont influencées par le processus de réforme des Nations Unies et des aspects qui pourraient être couverts en collaboration avec d'autres institutions.

## **5. Développement futur des capacités**

### **Améliorer la gestion stratégique des programmes de développement des capacités**

L'UNICEF devrait renforcer le leadership stratégique centralisé pour le développement futur des capacités de réaction humanitaire. Le Bureau des Programmes d'urgence devrait activement chercher à y associer d'autres Divisions, dans l'idéal par le biais du Comité permanent interdivisions sur les enfants en situation instable ou, à défaut, de l'équipe mondiale de gestion. Le poste de Directeur du programme de développement des capacités devrait être réévalué, et les données financières devraient être mises en parallèle avec les objectifs des programmes pour faciliter le processus de gestion stratégique. Les objectifs liés à l'état de préparation et de réaction devraient être séparés de ceux de la protection de l'enfance.

***Le DFID devrait continuer à soutenir le développement des capacités de l'UNICEF pour améliorer son état de préparation et de réaction humanitaire***

Compte tenu : i) de l'échelle et de l'importance du rôle de l'UNICEF dans la réaction humanitaire et dans le processus de réforme des Nations Unies, et ii) du fait que l'UNICEF s'est amélioré mais que se livrer à des changements dans une organisation de la taille de l'UNICEF prend un temps considérable, l'évaluation recommande que le DFID continue dans le moyen terme à soutenir et à améliorer les efforts fournis par l'UNICEF pour développer les capacités. Un soutien supplémentaire du développement des capacités devrait être identifié et circonscrit au sein d'un Document de stratégie institutionnelle.

Le développement futur des capacités devrait être considéré de façon holistique, avec le co-financement du DFID, d'ECHO, de l'UNICEF et autant que possible d'autres bailleurs de fonds. Compte tenu de l'expérience du DFID dans le développement des capacités au sein de l'UNICEF et d'autres grandes institutions, le DFID pourrait soutenir l'UNICEF dans le suivi des effets et de l'impact du programme tout entier (et pas seulement des ressources financées par le DFID). Le DFID pourrait aussi soutenir l'UNICEF dans l'élaboration d'un outil destiné à assurer le suivi des effets obtenus dans l'organisation tout entière.

Le financement devrait continuer à être appliqué de façon stratégique en vue de gains « catalytiques », surtout (mais pas seulement) en relation avec le rôle de supervision des bureaux régionaux. Ceci pourrait par exemple se traduire par : (a) un soutien continu à l'élaboration future des Plans de préparation et de réaction aux situations d'urgence et du Système d'alerte et d'action rapides; (b) des budgets de déplacements affectés à tous les Conseillers régionaux, et pas seulement les Conseillers régionaux pour les urgences, dans le but de diffuser les principes directeurs relatifs aux politiques adoptées; (c) un soutien au développement du système de redéploiement des bureaux régionaux; (d) un soutien à l'élaboration de Plans de préparation et de réaction aux situations d'urgence forts qui incluent les finances, l'approvisionnement et les ressources humaines; (e) l'analyse de suivi qui s'impose pour déterminer si une diffusion plus grande a conduit à une amélioration des performances ou si les procédures devraient être changées. Le financement devrait continuer à soutenir les éléments du programme d'apprentissage, mais aussi suivre une pensée stratégique, par exemple en faisant appel pour la formation à des sources extérieures spécialisées et recevant déjà le soutien du DFID, comme RedR/IHE.

Tous les éléments de ces recommandations devraient être examinés en relation avec la direction prise par le Programme de réforme des Nations Unies, y compris le rôle de chaque institution dans la coordination. En ce qui concerne la protection de l'enfance, il existe pour le DFID d'excellentes occasions de continuer à se fonder sur l'élaboration des politiques pour combler les lacunes déjà identifiées en envisageant le financement d'un poste au niveau du Siège. Le DFID devrait envisager de soutenir la création d'un cours de maîtrise en protection de l'enfance (comme le recommande le Groupe interinstitutions sur la protection de l'enfance) et de financer une partie de l'élaboration des réseaux de protection de l'enfance pour permettre l'accomplissement de la mission de suivi et d'établissement de rapports.

***Le DFID devrait aussi envisager de soutenir l'UNICEF dans le plaidoyer et le débat sur deux aspects de la réaction humanitaire***

1. Assurer le suivi de l'impact sur les enfants de niveaux de financement radicalement différents pour des urgences différentes.
2. Faire pression auprès des bailleurs de fonds pour qu'ils reconnaissent davantage l'importance fondamentale de la coordination de la réaction humanitaire et le fait que cela puisse constituer une fonction à part entière. L'objectif serait de sensibiliser les bailleurs de fonds au fait qu'ils doivent accepter la nécessité de faire figurer aux propositions de programmes portant sur la réaction humanitaire des postes de coordination sectorielle.

## RESUMEN EJECUTIVO

El Programa de Cooperación para el Fortalecimiento de la Capacidad para la Acción y la Respuesta Humanitarias del Departamento para el Desarrollo Internacional (DFID) y de UNICEF, se puso en marcha a principios de 2000 para apoyar los esfuerzos de UNICEF dirigidos a reforzar su capacidad para responder a las necesidades de la infancia en situaciones inestables. Consciente del creciente número de casos de desastres naturales a nivel mundial y de la persistente naturaleza de los conflictos armados, UNICEF, en una importante conferencia celebrada en 1998 en Martigny (Suiza), estableció nuevas estrategias para garantizar la supervivencia, protección y desarrollo del niño. El programa de cooperación ha apoyado al Programa de Martigny durante seis años a lo largo de dos fases (Fase I: de 2000 a 2002; Fase II: de 2002 a 2005). El principal objetivo del *Programa de Martigny* es que UNICEF responda de una forma predecible y eficiente a las necesidades de los niños en situaciones inestables.

En mayo de 2000, UNICEF estableció los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos, que fueron revisados en julio 2003, siendo rebautizados como Compromisos Básicos para la Infancia en Situaciones de Emergencia. Los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos exponen, a grandes rasgos, la respuesta que todos los niños afectados por crisis humanitarias debieran esperar. Los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos abarcan una amplia gama de sectores: la salud, la nutrición, el agua y saneamiento, el VIH/SIDA, la protección y la educación. No se espera que UNICEF se ocupe de todos estos sectores por sí solo, pero que asuma el compromiso de asegurar que otros lo harán. La principal estrategia del Programa de Martigny es “transversalizar” la respuesta humanitaria de tal suerte que se constituya en una responsabilidad de todo el personal, en todo momento.

El Programa de Cooperación, que en el presente informe se denominará el Programa, aportó un total de 22,2 millones de libras esterlinas (aproximadamente 39 millones de dólares de los EEUU) a lo largo de cinco años. La Fase I del Programa incluyó tres proyectos: preparación y respuesta humanitaria, niños y conflictos armados y actividades relacionadas con las minas. La Fase II incluyó un conjunto de objetivos más amplios, en particular la continuación del trabajo en materia de preparación y respuesta humanitaria, operaciones, recursos humanos, estrategia de aprendizaje y niños afectados por conflictos armados. Esta evaluación se sitúa al final de la Fase II, que transcurrió entre mayo de 2002 y diciembre de 2005. El propósito de la evaluación es informar sobre el desarrollo del Programa Estratégico de Mediano Plazo 2006-09 de UNICEF en materia de acción y respuesta humanitaria, así como tomar decisiones sobre la colaboración entre el DFID y UNICEF en la esfera humanitaria, en particular la propuesta Estrategia Institucional 2006-2009, que sitúa el apoyo que presta el DFID a UNICEF en un contexto más amplio. Para el DFID, la evaluación influirá también en el Acuerdo de Servicios Públicos sobre apoyo a actividades humanitarias.

Los objetivos de la evaluación fueron, ofrecer una valoración global del Programa, hacer un seguimiento de los cambios y situación actual de UNICEF en materia de preparación y respuesta, ofrecer recomendaciones sobre prioridades y estrategias en materia de capacidad de respuesta y fortalecimiento de la capacidad en el futuro, y extraer lecciones con miras a alianzas en materia de fortalecimiento de la capacidad organizativa y sobre políticas y programación favorables a los niños afectados por conflictos armados.

La recopilación de datos, en el marco de esta evaluación, se realizó entre enero y mayo de 2005, e incluyó visitas a las sedes de UNICEF (Nueva York, Ginebra y Copenhague) y al DFID en Londres; tres estudios de caso nacionales (Etiopía, la República Democrática del Congo y Sri Lanka); entrevistas a nivel de la Sede y las oficinas regionales; y cuestionarios enviados a los equipos de gerencia en los países y a personas individuales en países elegidos al azar. Las conclusiones fueron validadas en un curso práctico conjunto entre UNICEF y el DFID celebrado en Ginebra en mayo de 2005. Un equipo, conformado por Baastel Consulting<sup>13</sup> emprendió, simultáneamente, una evaluación independiente de la estrategia de aprendizaje (Objetivo 4 de la Fase II del Programa).

---

<sup>13</sup> Grupo Asesor Baastel Itée, *Evaluation of UNICEF Learning Strategy to Strengthen Staff Competencies for Humanitarian Response, 2000-2004*.

En ambas fases, el Programa, se focalizó en el desarrollo de capacidades de las Oficinas Regionales —cuya creación en el seno de UNICEF se remonta tan sólo a 1998— para apoyar y supervisar la preparación y respuesta humanitaria en las oficinas de país. En ambas fases, se asignó un tercio de los fondos del Programa a las Divisiones de la Sede para que éstas se centren en acciones en materia de orientación sobre políticas y en la dirección estratégica de la respuesta humanitaria; asimismo para algunos insumos de carácter muy práctico, en particular para el Centro de Operaciones (OPSCEN). Dos tercios de los fondos se dividieron entre las siete Oficinas Regionales para apoyar la creación de puestos para asesores regionales sobre emergencias y para “transversalizar” la respuesta humanitaria en todos los sectores y funciones operativas de los programas. Se adoptó este enfoque para apoyar el actual modelo descentralizado en el que las oficinas nacionales, especialmente el Equipo de Gerencia en el País, tienen la responsabilidad básica de la respuesta humanitaria, con el apoyo y la supervisión de las Oficinas Regionales.

UNICEF estableció un marco de objetivos para guiar la modalidad de utilización de los fondos e invitó a las Oficinas Regionales y a las Divisiones de la Sede a presentar propuestas. La Oficina de Programas de Emergencia (EMOPS) fue responsable, a nivel global, del Programa. La evaluación encontró sin embargo que el enfoque de “abajo hacia arriba” utilizado, afectó la mantención de una visión estratégica a la hora de supervisar la utilización de los fondos. Dado que los objetivos del Programa eran tan ambiciosos —hacer que una organización de alrededor de 8.000 funcionarios en 157 oficinas distribuidas por todo el mundo efectuase un cambio de rumbo favorable a una respuesta humanitaria más predecible—, el Programa debió haber sido manejado estrictamente, a nivel de la Sede. Adicionalmente, en el marco de un programa que se proponía cambiar la organización en su conjunto, hubiera sido aconsejable realizar, en las primeras etapas, una evaluación organizacional a nivel global; sin embargo esto no ocurrió. EMOPS careció también de información financiera suficiente para realizar una gestión estratégica; el hecho de que los códigos presupuestarios no fueron alineados con los objetivos del Programa en su etapa inicial, se tradujo en una dispersión de la información financiera que complicó su utilización para obtener una visión de conjunto.

La **conclusión general de la evaluación** es que UNICEF ha realizado importantes avances en materia de fortalecimiento de la capacidad con el apoyo del Programa y que existen casos de respuestas muy eficaces. No obstante, a UNICEF aún le queda un trecho por recorrer para alcanzar el objetivo de proveer una respuesta humanitaria *de forma fiable*, tal como exigen tanto el enfoque basado en los derechos humanos como los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos.

El papel de UNICEF fue universalmente apreciado por el resto de los organismos de las Naciones Unidas, las ONG socias y los gobiernos nacionales. En tres estudios de caso nacionales, Sri Lanka, la República Democrática del Congo y Etiopía, la respuesta humanitaria fue buena. En la República Democrática del Congo y Sri Lanka, la abogacía en favor de los derechos de la infancia fue también enérgica. No obstante, existen también ejemplos en los que la respuesta ha sido débil y en donde se pusieron en peligro vidas (por ejemplo, Darfur, Liberia). UNICEF también tuvo dificultades para atraer la atención de la comunidad internacional, en algunos contextos (por ejemplo, en Nepal), sobre violaciones de derechos humanos.

## 1. Principales logros de UNICEF en materia de fortalecimiento de la capacidad para la respuesta humanitaria

**La Planificación de la preparación (y la respuesta) en situaciones de emergencia** se ha desplegado paulatinamente en más del 90% de las Oficinas de UNICEF en los Países durante los últimos cinco años; esto constituye un impresionante logro. Respondiendo a las peticiones de las oficinas de país y con la finalidad de hacer que los procesos sean menos complejos, los instrumentos de planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia, fueron recientemente actualizados y mejorados. La evaluación concluye, sin embargo, que la planificación de la preparación para situaciones de emergencia, por sí sola, no es suficiente para traducirse en una actividad humanitaria eficiente. La planificación requiere ser reforzada con otras medidas como acciones orientadas a avanzar la capacidad de reacción de especialistas en gestión, técnicos y de operaciones. No obstante, la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia ha sido importante para cambiar actitudes en relación con situaciones de emergencia, haciendo que sean vistas como responsabilidad de todos; y para hacer que el personal de las operaciones y los programas planifiquen de manera conjunta.

La elaboración de los Compromisos Básicos para la Infancia en Situaciones de Emergencia ha permitido disponer de un referente para que UNICEF defina en qué servicios, en el marco de su respuesta humanitaria, se propone asegurar los derechos de la infancia. Hubo consenso general entre el personal en que los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos son una herramienta de referencia muy útil; sin embargo, muy pocas son las agencias aparte de UNICEF que tienen noción de su existencia. UNICEF ha realizado, en años recientes, contribuciones impresionantes en materia de **abogacía al más alto nivel**; estos aportes desencadenaron la dinámica que permitió la aprobación, en el Consejo de Seguridad y en la Asamblea General, de resoluciones sobre la infancia y los conflictos armados. Todo lo anterior se basó en importantes acciones previas realizadas por UNICEF por ejemplo, el estudio de Graça Machel sobre los niños y los conflictos armados. En algunos países en los que los niños se ven afectados por conflictos, UNICEF ha dirigido la agenda en favor de los derechos de infancia en conflictos armados; merece especial mención en este sentido, el Plan de Acción en favor de la Infancia de Sri Lanka.

UNICEF ha reforzado, en los últimos cinco años, su trabajo en el área sobre **protección de infancia** mediante el incremento del tamaño del equipo (aún relativamente pequeño) e introduciendo el "entorno protector" como marco en el que apoyar una mayor cohesión entre la programación y la abogacía. Es importante señalar que las ONG consultadas están impresionadas con el trabajo desarrollado por UNICEF en el área de protección y quieren que UNICEF asuma el liderazgo en materia de estándares y de enfoques. UNICEF y las organizaciones socias elaboraron durante este período las históricas "Directrices sobre Niños No Acompañados y Separados".

Importantes contribuciones fueron hechas al Programa de Reforma de las Naciones Unidas, especialmente a los grupos de trabajo y equipos de tareas. En concreto, UNICEF dirigió el proceso por el que el Comité Permanente entre Organismos introdujo, progresivamente, la capacitación sobre explotación y abusos sexuales en contextos humanitarios. UNICEF también ha sido un enérgico e importante defensor de los principios humanitarios tanto dentro como fuera del sistema de las Naciones Unidas.

Se han reforzado los **sistemas de gestión de la seguridad** a través del Centro de Operaciones en Nueva York, un centro que trabaja 24 horas al día, siete días la semana, proporcionando a UNICEF información continua, a todos los niveles, sobre acontecimientos clave y peligros potenciales. Se ha efectuado una considerable inversión en materia de seguridad, mejorando de forma sustancial el cumplimiento de las normas básicas operativas en materia seguridad; y mediante la capacitación del personal. Se está planteando la cuestión de si se está prestando suficiente atención a la aplicación de las responsabilidades en materia de seguridad en el sistema de gestión. La gestión de la seguridad sigue siendo una esfera a la que es preciso continuar brindando tanto prioridad como recursos.

La **División de Suministros** ha realizado mejoras importantes durante el período, destacan en particular, la creación de una Unidad de Coordinación de Servicios de Emergencia en Copenhague y el

almacenamiento de un stock de material de emergencia directamente relacionado con los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos. Ello ha reducido el tiempo de entrega de artículos en existencia, a 48 horas desde la recepción de un pedido. En 2003 se crearon en Dubai y Johannesburgo (y, posteriormente, en 2005, en Panamá) centros regionales de almacenaje. Dubai parece ser que el centro que con más éxito está reduciendo costos y tiempos de entrega.

Para reforzar la capacidad especializada en materia de respuesta humanitaria, UNICEF creó un **Equipo de Intervención en Emergencias**, compuesto por cinco personas. El acuerdo para la conformación del equipo data de 2004 aún cuando éste fue efectivamente creado a principios de 2005 con fondos del Programa de Fortalecimiento de Capacidad de la Oficina Humanitaria de la Comunidad Europea<sup>14</sup>. El equipo tiene considerable experiencia y podría ser convocado para responsabilizarse de la gestión y coordinación global de la respuesta de UNICEF. Por el momento, el equipo no cuenta con especialistas en los sectores de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos (incluyendo un especialista en protección). El Equipo de Respuesta en Emergencias es un reconocimiento de que, la “transversalización” de la respuesta humanitaria, si bien constituye una base fundamental, no obvia la necesidad de contar con algunos especialistas disponibles y prestos para intervenir. Está previsto ampliar, con cargo a fondos ordinarios, el equipo en el próximo período del PEMP.

La incorporación de **capacidad técnica a nivel regional** por medio de la red de Asesores Regionales sobre Emergencias. Dichos asesores han provisto apoyo técnico estrecho a nivel de las Oficinas del País y han introducido progresivamente la planificación y capacitación en materia de preparación y respuesta para situaciones emergencia en más del 90% de las oficinas. Los asesores regionales constituyen la primera señal de apoyo en materia de capacidad de reacción de las Oficinas de País en la mayoría de las emergencias y han elevado el perfil de las emergencias dentro de la mayor parte de las regiones. Todos estos puestos clave, con excepción de dos, han sido ahora incluidos en los fondos ordinarios para garantizar su sostenibilidad.

Se ha prestado **mayor atención a los recursos humanos para la respuesta a situaciones de emergencia** mediante la creación, en agosto 2004, del "desencadenante colectivo" para las emergencias y a través de la introducción del puesto de Coordinador para Situaciones de Emergencia en la División de Recursos Humanos de la Sede, a partir de 2003. El *desencadenante colectivo* ha reforzado, de forma palpable, la prioridad otorgada al despliegue de personal para situaciones de emergencia (aunque hasta la fecha sólo se ha utilizado en la respuesta a la crisis de Darfur y en el *tsunami*). El puesto de Coordinador para Situaciones de Emergencia ha permitido el desarrollo de sistemas para agilizar la capacidad de reacción y fue fundamental en la respuesta al *tsunami* para decidir qué personal de UNICEF debía ser reubicado y para situar consultores externos.

El Programa ha puesto también **un énfasis creciente en la capacitación para situaciones emergencia** y ha facilitado la gradual provisión de capacitación sobre preparación y respuesta para situaciones de emergencia y cuestiones humanitarias en emergencias mediante la capacitación sobre Enfoque de la Acción Humanitaria basado en los Principios (PATH). La Evaluación de la Estrategia en materia de Aprendizaje llegó a la conclusión de que la capacitación en preparación y respuesta para emergencias ha contribuido, de forma importante, a que los equipos de las Oficinas en los Países comprendan el papel que cada individuo desempeña, en la respuesta a una emergencia; en ese sentido, ha apoyado a la “transversalización” de la respuesta. La capacitación también ha mejorado el diálogo entre el personal de los programas y de las operaciones sobre la respuesta a situaciones de emergencia, ya que la capacitación es una de las escasas oportunidades para que el personal perteneciente a las dos principales secciones de las Oficinas en los Países (programas y operaciones) trabaje conjuntamente. La capacitación sobre preparación y respuesta para situaciones emergencia ha conseguido ser vinculada con éxito, mediante un proceso racionalizado, a la planificación de la preparación y respuesta para situaciones de emergencia.

---

<sup>14</sup> La Oficina Humanitaria de la Comunidad Europea ha ofrecido financiación adicional para el fortalecimiento de la capacidad en materia de preparación y respuesta en situaciones de emergencia (suministro, distribución y telecomunicaciones) desde 2004 y protección a la infancia en 2005.

Se ha creado una red de **pares** para brindar apoyo al personal que atraviesa por situaciones de estrés en crisis humanitarias (aunque debe hacerse más para aumentar su utilización y la cobertura). El Programa ha apoyado la mayoría de los logros y vinculaciones señalados anteriormente.

## **2. Limitaciones internas relativas a la capacidad de UNICEF para proveer respuesta humanitaria, de forma fiable.**

**El modelo descentralizado de UNICEF hace un enorme hincapié en la Oficina del País, especialmente en el Equipo de Gestión en el País, para gestionar la respuesta de emergencia; sin embargo, no todos los equipos son capaces de desempeñar dicha función eficazmente (véase más adelante la parte dedicada al liderazgo). También impone una fuerte presión sobre las Oficinas Regionales, para que ejerzan una función de supervisión.** Una pregunta planteada en el marco de la evaluación fue si un modelo centralizado de respuesta de emergencia (exceptuando a los programas de desarrollo) puede traducirse en una mejor respuesta global. La evaluación ha llegado a la conclusión de que la centralización exigiría un equipo mucho más numeroso que el actual y que no sería sostenible dado el tamaño y la duración de las emergencias. La Sede sólo podría gestionar las situaciones de emergencia a gran escala y sería difícil mantener a más de uno o dos países en el "desencadenante mundial" simultáneamente.

La evaluación también ha llegado a la conclusión de que la estrategia de UNICEF de tener a las Oficinas Regionales como base desde donde ofrecer apoyo y supervisión y desencadenar respaldo a las Oficinas en los Países, es la más apropiada. No obstante, las Oficinas Regionales se enfrentan a diversos problemas que limitan su capacidad para ejercer esta función. El grado de autoridad y de responsabilidad de la Oficina Regional sigue sin estar claro en la práctica, a pesar de que existen enunciados en la teoría. Adicionalmente, el elevado número de países en cada región y el crecimiento de las crisis humanitarias, hacen que sea extremadamente difícil para los Asesores Regionales, en cada sector, hacer frente a la demanda de apoyo a los programas de desarrollo y a la respuesta humanitaria. Los presupuestos independientes de viajes y la calidad de los conocimientos técnicos de algunos Asesores Regionales también plantean algunos problemas.

No obstante, la función es adecuada y debe reforzarse para que sea más proactiva y orientada a asumir liderazgo en algunas circunstancias. La función debiera contrapesar la renuencia de algunas Oficinas en los Países a reconocer una situación de emergencia en ciernes y a actuar. Fundamentalmente, debe fomentar el liderazgo a nivel nacional.

**El liderazgo a nivel nacional es variable.** Se ha visto cada vez más claramente que este es uno de los principales determinantes de una respuesta humanitaria eficaz. Una respuesta humanitaria fiable exigirá un liderazgo fiable del Equipo de Gestión en el País, especialmente del Representante, quien deberá tener probada experiencia en situaciones emergencia. En situaciones en que la respuesta ha sido deficiente, el nivel de liderazgo de las Oficinas en los Países ha sido invariablemente un factor clave.

**La planificación de los recursos humanos para situaciones de emergencia, a nivel de las Oficinas en los Países y las Oficinas Regionales, es deficiente; asimismo, los sistemas de toda la organización en materia de capacidad de respuesta y "transversalización", no han progresado con la velocidad necesaria.** La mayoría de las Oficinas en los Países no ha realizado organigramas ni identificado puntos fuertes y débiles así como brechas en relación con los conocimientos en lo que respecta a la respuesta humanitaria, como parte del proceso de planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia. Cuando estalla una emergencia, tienen que iniciar ese proceso o, lo que es peor, manejarlo con equipos técnicos que no se ajustan adecuadamente a las necesidades de los sectores relativos a los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos. El funcionario de recursos humanos de las Oficinas Regionales no se ha involucrado, activamente, en la planificación de una rápida respuesta. A nivel de la Sede, los sistemas basados en las recomendaciones de la Conferencia de Brasilia<sup>15</sup> y el análisis del seguimiento (Heffinck, 2004), se han desarrollado con lentitud.

---

<sup>15</sup> Conferencia sobre 'Transformación de la función de los Recursos Humanos en UNICEF', junio de 2002.

**La capacidad técnica en todos los sectores relativos a los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos todavía no está garantizada.** La capacidad en materia de agua y saneamiento es especialmente débil. A lo largo del último decenio, ha habido un giro en la programación para el desarrollo en favor del enfoque de todo el ciclo de vida y especialmente de la supervivencia de los niños en la primera infancia. El agua y el saneamiento han sido la principal víctima de este enfoque, en términos de capacidad técnica (aún cuando la nutrición es el más deficiente entre los sectores). Hasta hace muy poco no existían puestos permanentes de asesor regional<sup>16</sup> en materia de agua y saneamiento y el personal dedicado a agua y saneamiento era reducido en comparación con otros sectores. La protección al niño ha tenido también, una cobertura pobre en todos los niveles. No ha habido la debida capacitación técnica, a través del Programa de Aprendizaje, en los sectores relativos a los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos. El nuevo PEMP 2006-2009 presenta un mejor balance entre los contextos relativos al desarrollo y de las emergencias; sin embargo, debe hacerse frente al legado que dejó el desbalance anterior; de lo contrario, UNICEF seguirá enfrentando serias brechas en materia de capacidad técnica en relación con los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos.

**Muchas Oficinas en los Países no han mantenido la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia como procesos de planificación operacional.** La evaluación reconoce la importancia del proceso de planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia como una contribución fundamental a la mejora de la capacidad de respuesta. No obstante, para introducir un cambio cualitativo en la efectividad de la respuesta, estos procesos deben ser coherentes con los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos (lo que no ha sido siempre el caso hasta la fecha); asimismo, deben ser actualizados como documentos vivos, compartirse y acordarse con los asociados, ponerse en funcionamiento y llevarse adelante según lo previsto (por ejemplo, para las adquisiciones, la dotación de personal, etc.).

**La “transversalización” del género no es todavía efectiva.** A pesar del fuerte compromiso en materia de políticas para la “transversalización” del género en la asistencia humanitaria, ello todavía no se ha aplicado de forma coherente y sistemática a nivel de los programas. Por el contrario, las actuaciones han sido irregulares e inadecuadas. Hay una tendencia a establecer una ecuación entre la concienciación en materia género y la priorización de mujeres y niños en la programación, en vez de adoptar un enfoque que incorpore verdaderamente las cuestiones de género y analice y aborde las cuestiones de desigualdad de género. En vez de que la “transversalización” del género sea responsabilidad de todos, la posición, por defecto, es que no es responsabilidad de nadie. Las Oficinas en los Países cuentan con apoyo limitado para la promover la concienciación en materia de género. El seguimiento para determinar la medida en que el género está siendo verdaderamente “transversalizado” en el trabajo humanitario de UNICEF es también insuficiente.

**UNICEF tiene una función central en el desarrollo y aplicación de un sistema para dar seguimiento a seis graves violaciones de los derechos del niño en zonas de conflicto e informar acerca de ellas, establecido mediante resolución 1539 (2004) del Consejo de Seguridad, aprobada en abril de 2004, y de un plan de acción establecido por el Secretario General en febrero de 2005.**<sup>17</sup> Todavía no se han convenido los sistemas e instrumentos y tampoco está claro si los actuales niveles de dotación de personal son suficientes para hacer frente al mandato. El sistema para dar seguimiento e informar sobre los derechos del niño es esencial para garantizar una enérgica abogacía en favor de los niños en conflictos armados; por lo tanto, debería ser abordado tan pronto como sea posible.

**El aprendizaje y la capacitación han sido especialmente débiles en el área de protección del niño.** La confianza que el personal de UNICEF demuestre al aplicar los marcos jurídicos internacionales, enfoques políticos y buenas prácticas, es esencial para garantizar que los programas y la abogacía en favor de los niños afectados por conflictos armados, serán enérgicos. Asimismo, constituye un requisito previo para una coordinación eficaz en el área de protección del niño. La Sección de Protección del Niño es consciente de que debe realizarse una mayor inversión en esta área a todos los niveles (en particular

<sup>16</sup> UNICEF has recently established four Regional Adviser posts in Water and Sanitation.

<sup>17</sup> The Security Council is expected to approve the Action Plan in the near future

en la capacitación formal, la tutoría, la preparación personalizada, la difusión de lineamientos e incluso, oportunidades en el marco de una posible Maestría (master) sobre Protección Infantil).

**Los procedimientos financieros y administrativos siguen siendo engorrosos y burocráticos.** En tanto los procedimientos financieros y administrativos han sido diseñados para programas de desarrollo, son difíciles de aplicar en contextos de emergencia. Ello origina retrasos en el procesamiento de funciones esenciales en emergencias, como la compra de artículos esenciales, la aprobación de contratos y la entrega de fondos a los copartícipes. Aunque se han realizado ciertas adaptaciones a algunos de estos sistemas de respuesta de emergencia, esto todavía no es bien conocido o utilizado por el personal de operaciones. Lo más probable es que los requisitos institucionales se pondrán por delante de las necesidades de respuesta rápida, en aquellos casos en que el personal no se sienta con la seguridad para adaptar los sistemas.

**Cultura organizativa: excesiva prioridad a la excelencia, a pesar de que instrumentos más sencillos y rápidos pueden ser más efectivos en la práctica.** UNICEF ha producido una gran variedad de lineamientos, herramientas y documentos de políticas de excelente calidad. La producción de lineamientos de este nivel de calidad presenta dos problemas. En primer lugar, a menudo son instrumentos complejos, que exigen programas de difusión y de aprendizaje decididos si se quiere garantizar que se aplicarán eficazmente sobre el terreno; de lo contrario se conocen y se usan poco (por ejemplo, el instrumento de Evaluaciones de la Capacidad en materia de Vulnerabilidad, las normas sobre educación en materia de emergencias, y los propios Compromisos Institucionales Básicos). El segundo problema radica en que la búsqueda de la excelencia atrasa la publicación. Instrumentos y lineamientos más sencillos y rápidos e indicadores menos numerosos y menos complejos pueden resultar más eficaces.

**El aprendizaje organizacional mediante la práctica es débil y no existe todavía una cultura del aprendizaje.** Los sistemas de seguimiento y evaluación son endebles en la mayoría de los países y no existe una práctica establecida de talleres, concisos y focalizados, sobre lecciones aprendidas o de revisiones posteriores a la aplicación de medidas. En conjunto, hay relativamente pocas evaluaciones del nivel de desempeño de las Oficinas en los Países. UNICEF todavía no ha consolidado una cultura orientada al aprendizaje y el personal informó tener sentimientos de culpa si dedica tiempo al aprendizaje.

**Los socios estratégicos son fundamentales para una respuesta eficaz y fiable, pero no siempre son identificados en la etapa de planificación.** Como UNICEF no siempre se ve involucrado en la implementación de los programas de emergencia, excepto cuando no se encuentran socios viables, es esencial que la planificación de la respuesta humanitaria se haga conjuntamente con los socios. En los ejemplos más favorables, como en Etiopía, la planificación es continua y se realiza con el gobierno y las ONG asociadas; sin embargo, en muchos otros contextos, los socios potenciales no estaban al tanto de los planes. Existía también una extremadamente baja concienciación entre los socios, inclusive entre los organismos de las Naciones Unidas, sobre los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos que representan los compromisos de UNICEF con los niños en situaciones de emergencia.

**Los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos y las normas de respuesta humanitaria no son bien conocidos por los equipos de UNICEF.** Una respuesta efectiva y fiable debería ser aquella que viniese enmarcada en los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos con un añadido de elementos aceptados internacionalmente en cada sector. La evaluación puso de manifiesto que sólo algo más de la mitad de los equipos de gestión en los países afirmó que su personal estaba familiarizado con los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos. Existen probablemente brechas incluso mayores de conocimiento sobre las normas de respuesta humanitaria Inter Agenciales por sectores, incluso en los casos en los que existen normas aprobadas por UNICEF, como las Normas Mínimas Inter Agenciales sobre Educación en Situaciones de Emergencia y las Directrices Inter Agenciales sobre VIH/SIDA en Emergencias. El conocimiento de los estándares sobre esferas, que son ampliamente utilizadas por la mayoría de las ONG en la respuesta humanitaria, es incluso menor, y ello tiene serias repercusiones en la coordinación basada en sectores.

**Capacidad variable en materia de conocimientos sobre coordinación.** A menudo, UNICEF es requerido para liderar y coordinar los sectores técnicos de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos. Las ONG esperan que UNICEF asesore en materia de estándares técnicos, consolide las evaluaciones que señalen desfases en la entrega, y coordine los suministros y la labor de abogacía con el gobierno, los donantes u otros organismos cuando sea necesario. Se trata de tareas mayores que exigen conocimientos específicos de coordinación, así como una capacidad técnica fuerte y conocimiento de la situación sobre el terreno. También requieren inversión de tiempo y de que estas tareas sean consideradas como una parte fundamental de la función técnica. Para ser realmente efectiva, la coordinación debe financiarse como una actividad independiente. En la actualidad, los conocimientos y la inversión de tiempo son variables y no apoyan un desempeño fiable en materia de coordinación.

**Los sistemas de distribución en el nivel local son a menudo débiles.** Dado que UNICEF generalmente realiza el suministro a beneficiarios a través de los gobiernos y las ONG asociadas en el marco de los programas de desarrollo, frecuentemente carece de capacidad logística independiente. En la respuesta humanitaria no obstante, UNICEF podría ser llamado para realizar suministros con rapidez. A menos que se hagan planes al respecto de antemano, incluso identificando a transportistas privados o sistemas alternativos, es probable que el proceso sea lento. Puede ser también difícil llegar a una decisión en lo relativo a abandonar el criterio de sistema "ordinario" de almacenaje y distribución a través de los gobiernos y adoptar otro en el que UNICEF asuma la responsabilidad directa tanto de la logística como del suministro.

**La preubicación de suministros en los países mejora claramente la respuesta, sin embargo esta estrategia, suele ser desalentada.** En todos los estudios de caso nacionales, la preubicación de material de emergencia fue evaluada como fundamental para una respuesta eficaz. No obstante, la División de Suministros desaconseja la preubicación bajo el argumento de que puede ser no sólo un derroche sino también costosa en términos de mantenimiento. Aunque la política es correcta, se requiere mayor flexibilidad ya que puede darse el caso de que las circunstancias locales indiquen que la preubicación haría la respuesta mucho más efectiva.

**Las recomendaciones derivadas de evaluaciones y revisiones** no siempre se analizan y aprueban, así como tampoco se realizan planes para su aplicación. Varios de los hallazgos incluidos en el presente informe, habían sido ya planteados en anteriores evaluaciones.

**Falta de liderazgo estratégico en el Programa.** El Programa dependió, largamente, de las solicitudes de financiación de las Divisiones y de las Oficinas Regionales y careció de una perspectiva estratégica dirigida a eliminar los obstáculos que impedían una respuesta eficaz. Deberían haberse adoptado decisiones estratégicas a nivel del Comité Permanente Interdivisiones sobre Niños en Situaciones Inestables, pero dicho comité todavía no está desempeñando una función estratégica. La información financiera sobre el uso de los fondos era insuficiente como para permitir que la Oficina de Programas de Emergencia adoptase decisiones estratégicas.

**Niveles de dotación de personal insuficientes en algunas esferas.** La dotación de personal técnico es insuficiente en las esferas, agua y saneamiento, protección, género y la gestión de la seguridad (protección).

**Falta de confianza en los sistemas de ascensos del personal:** el porcentaje del personal que considera que el enfoque de UNICEF en materia de ascensos es objetivo, justo y correcto, es muy reducido. El ascenso basado en los méritos y la capacidad es esencial para garantizar que los más capaces llegarán a puestos superiores de gestión y dirección.

### **3. Limitaciones externas que influyen en la capacidad de UNICEF para proveer una respuesta humanitaria fiable**

**La creciente demanda en materia de respuesta humanitaria se ha traducido en una mayor presión sobre UNICEF para que disponga de una mayor capacidad de respuesta. Ello puede conllevar a la**

### **adopción de compromisos excesivos y al riesgo de un débil desempeño y limitada motivación.**

Para ofrecer de forma fiable una respuesta humanitaria efectiva, UNICEF tiene dos opciones:

- i) Incrementar su capacidad de respuesta, lo que exigiría más personal y más financiación.
- ii) Establecer prioridades en el marco de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos y con base en ello, negociar con otros organismos para que asuman sectores que UNICEF no considere viables. A corto plazo sería aconsejable que UNICEF declare, sin ambages, que la vivienda ya no es uno de los sectores de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos y que promueva que otro organismo de las Naciones Unidas asuma responsabilidad en esa esfera.

**Una respuesta humanitaria fiable exige financiación fiable y oportuna.** La evaluación observa la existencia de amplias diferencias en cuanto a financiación *per cápita* de las poblaciones afectadas por las crisis humanitarias. Está claro que el volumen de financiación del que se dispuso rápidamente en la respuesta al *tsunami* hizo que la capacidad de respuesta fuera cualitativamente diferente. Hasta que se hagan más progresos en relación con la Buena Donación Humanitaria y otras iniciativas en materia de financiación, el tema fondos continuará siendo un obstáculo.

**La financiación para el fortalecimiento de la capacidad** no es una opción frecuente entre los donantes y ha sido difícil animar a otros donantes a que apoyen las actividades de UNICEF, en esta materia.

**La situación de seguridad en actual proceso de deterioro** en algunos contextos, combinada con los procedimientos en materia de seguridad en las Naciones Unidas, está reduciendo cada vez más el acceso de UNICEF a la población afectada.

**El desdibujamiento de los límites entre la actividad humanitaria, la política exterior y la intervención militar** dentro de las Naciones Unidas y a cargo de algunos de sus gobiernos donantes, pone en peligro la capacidad de UNICEF y de otros organismos de las Naciones Unidas para la entrega de asistencia humanitaria imparcial y basada en derechos.

## **4. Recomendaciones prioritarias: despejar los bloqueos**

En el grueso del informe se incluyen recomendaciones detalladas, y todas las recomendaciones se consolidan al final del informe, ligadas a calendarios como: i) en el Año 1; ii) en el período del PEMP 2006-2009, y iii) recomendaciones estratégicas a largo plazo.

A continuación figura un resumen de las recomendaciones humanitarias relacionadas directamente con la solución de los bloqueos y con el futuro en materia de fortalecimiento de la capacidad para la preparación y la respuesta humanitarias.

### **Fortalecer la capacidad de supervisión de las Oficinas Regionales**

El objetivo de esta recomendación se orienta a reforzar la proactividad y la dirección de la acción y (en caso necesario) la normatividad del apoyo de las Oficinas Regionales en casos en los que las Oficinas en los Países no reconozcan situaciones de crisis que están a la vista o cuando tienen problemas para planificar una respuesta eficaz. Aunque algunos equipos de gestión en los países ofrecerán una respuesta efectiva sin este apoyo, otros no lo harán. Por esta razón, la propuesta es que se introduzcan procedimientos operativos estandarizados para contrarrestar la posible falta de liderazgo en materia de respuesta a situaciones de emergencia.

- i) Establecer un procedimiento operativo estandarizado que exija que las Oficinas Regionales envíen a un representante del personal de nivel superior (un Asesor Regional sobre Emergencias, otros asesores regionales a título individual o incluso al Director Regional) a las Oficinas en los Países en el momento en que estos pasan a un nivel superior de alerta. La primera prioridad debería ser establecer un plan de respuesta de 90 días que cubra todos aspectos de la respuesta (liderazgo/gestión, financiación, requisitos en materia de reacción, sistemas de suministro, alianzas, seguridad, y apoyo técnico/operativo adicional) y determinar las responsabilidades de las Oficinas en los Países y de las Oficinas Regionales, respectivamente.

Ello debería suceder tanto si las Oficinas en los Países piden apoyo como si no, para superar la renuencia de algunas Oficinas en los Países a hacerlo.

- ii) Velar por que el puesto de Asesor Regional sea considerado como un paso intermedio hacia puestos de nivel superior a fin de atraer candidatos de alta calificación técnica.
- iii) Analizar cuáles han sido los éxitos en materia de supervisión de las oficinas regionales y replicar esas características en todas las Oficinas Regionales.

### ***Mejorar el liderazgo a nivel de la Oficina para el País***

Una respuesta fiable a las emergencias requiere de un liderazgo también fiable y de calidad en materia de respuesta humanitaria, especialmente a nivel de las Oficinas en los Países. El liderazgo tendría que mejorarse de tres maneras:

- i) Incluyendo dentro de los criterios de selección para el nombramiento del Equipo de Gestión en el País (representantes de la Oficina en el País, funcionarios superiores del programa y funcionarios superiores de operaciones) los siguientes, entre otros, experiencia humanitaria relevante y desempeño demostrado.
- ii) Mediante el Programa de Aprendizaje para el Liderazgo y la Gestión, el cual debería incluir el establecimiento de modelos de liderazgo, tutoría y mentoría eficaces para dirigentes y análisis de liderazgo en las Revisiones posteriores a la adopción de medidas. Las Revisiones posteriores a la adopción de medidas tendrían que reflejar la influencia que la capacitación en liderazgo tiene en la respuesta humanitaria, en la práctica.
- iii) La evolución de los procedimientos operativos estandarizados de tal forma que permitan afrontar problemas de liderazgo en la respuesta en casos de la emergencia (mejora de la capacidad de supervisión de la Oficina Regional, supra).

### ***Refuerzo de la capacidad de coordinación***

UNICEF se ve obligado, cada vez más, a coordinar en emergencias, especialmente en los sectores relativos a los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos. Se trata de una función extremadamente importante, pero que exige un alto nivel de conocimientos técnicos y que no debería considerarse algo accesorio a los puestos de Oficial de Programas. Es necesario también que los donantes acepten que se necesitará financiación adicional para una coordinación eficaz.

La mejora de las capacidades en materia de coordinación incluirá capacitación para coordinación, la inclusión de capacidades de coordinación en los perfiles de competencia/descripciones del puesto, la utilización de instrumentos normativos (por ejemplo, Sphere); asegurar que los puestos atraigan a personal competente desde el punto de vista técnico, y garantizar financiación adicional para la función de coordinación.

### ***Mejora de la capacidad de reacción focalizando a las Oficinas en los Países y a las Oficinas Regionales***

Aún cuando la Sede debe completar los sistemas ya iniciados, la prioridad en cuanto a mejora de los requisitos en materia de capacidad de reacción, será puesta a nivel de las Oficinas Regionales y las Oficinas en los Países en el próximo período. La “transversalización” de la responsabilidad en materia de respuesta de emergencia debería continuar siendo la principal estrategia, aún cuando reforzada con especialistas. Uno de los principales objetivos de las siguientes recomendaciones es garantizar una adecuada cobertura en los sectores relativos a los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos en todos los países. Los procedimientos deberían funcionar de la siguiente manera:

- i) Las Oficinas en los Países levantan, anualmente, un mapa detallado de las habilidades y de las brechas, como parte del proceso de planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia. Si bien esto estaría ya sucediendo como parte de la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia, no evidencia ser aún suficientemente fiable. El levantamiento de mapas debería vincularse específicamente a los sectores de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos, así como a las funciones operativas. El levantamiento de mapas sobre recursos humanos debería compartirse con las Oficinas Regionales para mantener

una perspectiva regional de las probables brechas de conocimientos y vincular las necesidades al Registro de Redistribución Regional.

- ii) A nivel de las Oficinas Regionales, debería crearse un Registro (roster) Regional de Redistribución de personal, ya que la redistribución es el principal mecanismo de reacción en UNICEF, especialmente en las fases tempranas de la emergencia. El Registro debería incluir también personal nacional. El personal que desee formar parte del Registro Regional de Redistribución debería recibir prioridad para acceder a oportunidades de aprendizaje y esta voluntad debiera reflejarse positivamente en su Evaluación sobre su actuación profesional.
- iii) UNICEF debería continuar reforzando los acuerdos sobre personal en espera, ofreciendo capacitación sobre compromisos, normativas y procedimientos de UNICEF, de manera particular, a aquellas personas que figuren en los principales registros de personal en espera.

#### ***Abogar por una mayor fiabilidad y equidad en la financiación relativa a la respuesta humanitaria***

Una respuesta fiable exige una financiación también fiable. Este es un tema que es materia de abogacía y que debería ser abordado por UNICEF a través de la iniciativa Buena Donación Humanitaria y mediante negociaciones directas con los donantes. Demostrar la diferencia que para la vida de los niños implica una respuesta bien financiada (por ejemplo, en el *tsunami*) y las respuestas con financiación escasa (por ejemplo, las emergencias crónicas como la de la República Democrática del Congo) podría servir de apoyo en el debate.

#### ***Mejores funciones en materia de suministro y logística, especialmente a nivel de las Oficinas en los Países***

Para asegurar que el material adecuado se encuentra en el lugar apropiado en el momento oportuno, las Oficinas Nacionales requieren invertir más tiempo en la planificación del suministro y la logística en el contexto del proceso relativo a la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia, con el apoyo del Asesor Regional sobre suministros. UNICEF carece de capacidad logística independiente y depende, en general, de las instalaciones gubernamentales y de los proveedores privados. A menudo y en el marco de una emergencia, UNICEF necesitará establecer sistemas independientes de suministros al menos durante cierto período. El análisis respecto de estos sistemas independientes, debería incluir tanto acuerdos con posibles proveedores y con transportistas, como aspectos relativos a la gestión del almacenaje; asimismo, una justificación de las preubicaciones en caso necesario. La División de Suministros debería examinar la lista estándar de artículos de emergencia cotejándola con los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos y en coordinación con personal sobre terreno, sobre la base de la reciente experiencia obtenida en emergencias.

#### ***Velar por que los procedimientos financieros y administrativos apoyen una respuesta humanitaria efectiva***

En la actualidad, existen diferentes opiniones dentro de UNICEF sobre si el principal problema de cara a una gestión financiera y una administración eficaces en las emergencias lo constituyen los procedimientos excesivamente burocráticos o si el bloqueo estriba en que el personal a nivel de las Oficinas en los Países no conoce los sistemas de adaptación o no se siente seguro sobre ellos. La División de Gestión Financiera y Administrativa debería responsabilizarse de aclarar esta cuestión. Durante los próximos 18 a 24 meses, la División de Gestión Financiera y Administrativa debería difundir con ahínco procedimientos financieros (por conducto de los asesores financieros regionales) y realizar una revisión, basada en el terreno, al final de ese período. La revisión tendría que aclarar esta cuestión y recomendar medidas.

#### ***Mejorar la capacidad de protección del niño a todos los niveles en la programación y abogacía***

Para reforzar la capacidad de UNICEF en lo relativo a mejorar políticas, así como en la coordinación de los organismos del programa para el país y la práctica del programa para el país en materia de programación y abogacía, UNICEF debería:

- i) Aumentar el equipo de personal en la Sede para hacer frente a las actuales brechas en materia de políticas (incluyendo el desarrollo de políticas sobre la protección del niño en desastres naturales).

- ii) Introducir progresivamente el nuevo paquete de capacitación (que se elaborará este año) y complementarlo con seguimiento, mentorías y tutoría del personal.
- iii) Los Asesores Regionales sobre protección infantil deberían ofrecer mayor apoyo a las Oficinas en los Países para la difusión y el debate sobre directrices/ políticas, para la evaluación de los factores que alientan/disuaden a las Oficinas en los Países a asumir la abogacía por los derechos de la infancia, y para analizar qué es lo que ha funcionado en los países mediante la creación de redes de protección infantil.
- iv) Buscar recursos para contar con más personal altamente cualificado para la *coordinación* a nivel del terreno y regional en el sector de la protección infantil.

***Desplegar progresivamente los sistemas de seguimiento y denuncia de violaciones de los derechos del niño en conflictos armados***

Ultimar, tan pronto sea posible, los indicadores y los instrumentos de recopilación de datos y desplegar el sistema de seguimiento y denuncia de violaciones de los derechos del niño. Finalizar los mapas de redes de protección de la infancia y evaluar qué se necesitará para garantizar el funcionamiento efectivo de las redes de protección de la infancia a nivel de las Oficinas en los Países, sin subestimar la magnitud de esta tarea. Revisar los niveles globales de dotación del personal en relación con la capacidad para cumplir el mandato (Grupo de Trabajo Interdivisiones sobre Seguimiento y Presentación de Informes).

***Reforzar las alianzas para la respuesta humanitaria***

Continuar estudiando mecanismos innovadores de alianzas con ONG locales e internacionales para situaciones de emergencia (como la alianza que se está consolidando con Oxfam Reino Unido en materia de agua y saneamiento). Iniciar debates abiertos con ONG sobre necesidades en materia de capacidad, supervisión y necesidades de apoyo al inicio de cualquier acuerdo de cooperación, contractual o de otro tipo. Difundir activamente los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos entre los socios, de forma que puedan entender los parámetros que articulan los compromisos de la respuesta humanitaria de UNICEF.

***A la vista de la creciente demanda de respuesta humanitaria, o bien aumentar recursos o bien reducir los compromisos***

La adhesión de UNICEF a los sectores que conforman los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos es extremadamente ambiciosa. En la medida en que la demanda de respuesta continúe creciendo, será cada vez más difícil que UNICEF logre una cobertura fiable, especialmente teniendo en cuenta que los recursos ordinarios no están creciendo en la misma proporción que otros recursos. UNICEF debería adoptar una decisión estratégica sobre la mejor entre las dos opciones siguientes:

- i) buscar nuevos recursos para hacer realidad su adhesión a los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos
- ii) reducir su compromiso con sectores relativos a los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos. En cualquiera de los dos casos, UNICEF debería aclarar con los agentes humanitarios que la vivienda no es uno de los sectores de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos y abogar por que otro organismo de las Naciones Unidas asuma esa responsabilidad.

***Hacer operativa y actualizar la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencias y desplegar el sistema de Alerta Temprana-Medidas Inmediatas***

Para garantizar que UNICEF está debidamente preparado para las emergencias a nivel de las Oficinas en los Países, debería continuar mejorando el proceso relativo a la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia, con el apoyo de los Asesores Regionales sobre emergencias. Ello debería incluir: una mejora de las funciones de supervisión de la Oficina Regional, tercerizar la facilitación de la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencias, adaptar, a nivel de riesgo, la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencias, valorar mejor las necesidades de recursos humanos y logísticos al realizar la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia en dos fases, involucrando a los socios en la Fase II. La evaluación respalda el despliegue progresivo del sistema de Alerta Temprana-Medidas Inmediatas, que ayuda a definir las responsabilidades en materia de respuesta y vincula la respuesta a los niveles de alerta.

### **Mejorar la capacidad técnica en relación con los sectores de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos**

La capacidad técnica en cada uno de los sectores relativos a los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos es esencial para una respuesta fiable. Ello debería suponer:

- i) Difundir activamente los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos y las normativas humanitarias adecuadas por sectores durante las visitas de *todos* los asesores regionales (y no sólo de los Asesores Regionales sobre emergencias).
- ii) Abordar las habilidades relativas a los sectores de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos en el marco del programa de aprendizaje (ver más adelante).
- iii) Igualar la capacidad técnica de las Oficinas Regionales y las Oficinas en los Países en relación con los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos garantizando que cada sector cuente con el apoyo de un asesor u oficial de programas con la experiencia/conocimientos pertinentes. Realizar un mapeo anual de la capacidad técnica en relación con los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos a nivel de las Oficinas en los Países y ofrecer esta información a las Oficinas Regionales para coordinar planes de redistribución regional.
- iv) Mejorar la capacidad técnica mediante alianzas estratégicas en relación con los sectores de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos.

### **Mejora del programa de aprendizaje**

Existen planes para desarrollar programas a tres niveles: básico, excelencia en materia de programas, y dirección y gestión. La evaluación respalda la importancia de estos programas, incluye propuestas de temas que deben abarcarse en cada nivel y propone la tercerización de una parte de la capacitación. Como parte de este programa, debería mejorarse el aprendizaje basado en sectores de los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos. Para promover el enrolamiento y la demanda en relación con el programa de aprendizaje, debería informarse al personal de que cada puesto conlleva un 5% del tiempo del personal para aprendizaje y un 2% de los gastos totales de personal. El aprendizaje debería valorarse en las evaluaciones de la actuación profesional y tenerse en cuenta a la hora de decidir los ascensos. La preferencia en el acceso a oportunidades de aprendizaje debería darse al personal inscrito en el Registro de Redistribución Regional.

### **Refuerzo de la “transversalización” del género**

La Unidad de “Transversalización” de Género debería reforzarse con un funcionario dedicado a tareas humanitarias. Fundamentalmente, la “transversalización” del género debe trascender la atención prioritaria a la infancia y la mujer abarcando una evaluación y concienciación sobre las razones que subyacen a las desigualdades de género. Debería profundizarse el análisis sobre el abuso y la explotación sexuales y de la violencia basada en el género, y vincular este análisis con las desigualdades de género y los problemas estructurales en la sociedad. Los instrumentos humanitarios, en particular los Compromisos Institucionales Básicos, deberían revisarse en relación con la integración del género. UNICEF podría colaborar con otros organismos de las Naciones Unidas en actividades de capacitación/aprendizaje sobre integración de las cuestiones de género (por ejemplo, el FNUAP y el ACNUR).

### **Velar por que UNICEF tenga suficiente acceso a poblaciones en contextos inseguros**

Trabajar con energía en el sistema de las Naciones Unidas tanto a nivel de la Sede en Nueva York como de las Oficinas en los Países en favor de sistemas de gestión de la seguridad en las Naciones Unidas que sean más sofisticados y sensibles.

### **Centrarse en instrumentos de campo amigables, en lineamientos que sean “suficientemente buenos” y en sistemas sencillos de lecciones aprendidas**

Apoyar el desarrollo planificado de instrumentos simplificados, por ejemplo, de casos bien trabajados de Análisis de la Capacidad en materia de Vulnerabilidad y un número reducido de indicadores sobre alerta temprana, que puedan recolectarse rápidamente. Celebrar seminarios, de un día de duración, sobre seguimiento y evaluación, y Revisiones posteriores a la Adopción de Medidas de carácter ligero.

## ***Desarrollar una visión de largo plazo de la función de UNICEF en el proceso de reforma de las Naciones Unidas***

Ello debería incluir un análisis de cómo las actividades previstas en materia de fortalecimiento de la capacidad se ven influidas por el proceso de reforma de las Naciones Unidas y qué aspectos pueden llevarse a cabo en cooperación con otros organismos.

### **5. Fortalecimiento de la capacidad a futuro**

#### ***Mejorar la gestión estratégica del Programa.***

UNICEF debería reforzar el liderazgo estratégico, a nivel centralizado, para el fortalecimiento de la capacidad futura en relación con la respuesta humanitaria. EMOPS debería procurar implicar activamente a otras Divisiones, a ser posible por conducto del Comité Permanente Interdivisiones sobre la Infancia en Situaciones Inestables o, como otra opción, del Equipo de Gestión Mundial. El puesto de director del Programa debería elevarse de categoría y, para facilitar la gestión estratégica, también sería conveniente preparar la información financiera cotejándola con los objetivos del programa. Los objetivos relativos a la preparación y la respuesta deberían separarse de los que hacen referencia a la protección del niño.

#### ***El DFID debería continuar apoyando el fortalecimiento de la capacidad de UNICEF para la preparación y la respuesta humanitarias***

Teniendo en cuenta i) la escala y la importancia de la función de UNICEF en la respuesta humanitaria y en el proceso de reforma de las Naciones Unidas y ii) el hecho de que UNICEF ha conseguido avances —a pesar que realizar cambios sostenibles en una organización del tamaño de UNICEF lleva bastante tiempo—, la evaluación recomienda que el DFID continúe apoyando y reforzando las actividades de fortalecimiento de la capacidad de UNICEF a mediano plazo. El apoyo futuro, en materia de fortalecimiento, debería enmarcarse en un Plan Estratégico Integrado o circunscribirse a él.

El fortalecimiento de la capacidad futura debería considerarse de una forma integral u “holística”, como una modalidad que el DFID, la Oficina Humanitaria de la Comunidad Europea, UNICEF y, es de esperar, otros donantes, están financiando conjuntamente. Dada la experiencia del DFID en materia de fortalecimiento de la capacidad, junto con UNICEF y otros organismos de gran tamaño, el Departamento podría apoyar a UNICEF a dar seguimiento a los efectos y al impacto de la totalidad del programa (no sólo de los insumos financiados por el DFID). El DFID podría también apoyar a UNICEF a desarrollar un instrumento para dar seguimiento a los efectos, a nivel de toda la organización.

Debería seguirse aplicando la financiación estratégicamente a fin de lograr avances “catalizadores”, especialmente (aunque no exclusivamente) en relación con la función de supervisión de las Oficinas Regionales. Ello podría incluir, por ejemplo: a) que se continuase apoyando la mejora de la planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencia y del sistema de Alerta Temprana/Medidas Inmediatas; b) que se asigne presupuesto para viajes a todos los Asesores Regionales, y no sólo a los Asesores Regionales sobre Emergencias, con miras a difundir las directrices en materia de políticas; c) que se apoye la elaboración del sistema de redistribución de personal de las Oficinas Regionales; d) que se asista en el desarrollo de una planificación de la preparación y la respuesta en situaciones de emergencias fuerte, que incluya fondos, suministros y recursos humanos; e) que la División de Gestión Financiera y Administrativa distribuya y difunda lineamientos guía; y f) que el análisis del seguimiento ex post determine si una mayor difusión se ha traducido en un mejor desempeño o si los procedimientos deberían modificarse. La financiación debería continuar dando apoyo a elementos del Programa de Aprendizaje, pero incluyendo un pensamiento estratégico; por ejemplo, la tercerización de la capacitación a favor de las organizaciones especializadas que ya cuentan con apoyo del DFID, como RedR/ International Health Exchange.

Los elementos que contienen las recomendaciones debieran ser considerados en relación con la dirección que muestra el Programa de Reforma de las Naciones Unidas, en particular la función de cada organismo en materia de coordinación. En lo que respecta a la protección del niño, el DFID cuenta con excelentes oportunidades de seguir mejorando el desarrollo de las políticas en las brechas anteriormente señaladas, examinando la posibilidad de financiar un puesto a nivel de la Sede. El DFID podría sopesar

la posibilidad de apoyar un master sobre Protección del Niño (tal como recomendó el Grupo Ínter organismos sobre Protección del Niño) y financiar parcialmente el desarrollo de Redes de Protección de la Infancia para cumplir con el mandato sobre seguimiento y presentación de informes.

***El DFID debería considerar la posibilidad de apoyar a UNICEF en materia de abogacía y debate y en relación con dos aspectos de la respuesta humanitaria:***

- i) El seguimiento del impacto que producen en el niño los muy dispares niveles de financiación con que se abordan las distintas situaciones de emergencia.
- ii) Abogacía ante los donantes para un mayor reconocimiento de la importancia fundamental que tiene la coordinación en la respuesta humanitaria y del hecho de que ello puede constituir una función en sí misma. El objetivo sería concienciar a los donantes para que acepten la inclusión de puestos de coordinación de sectores en las propuestas de los programas de respuesta humanitaria.



# 1. Purpose and methodology of the evaluation

## 1.1 Purpose of the Evaluation at this time

The evaluation was intended to feed into the *design* of UNICEF's 2006-9 Mid Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) but as it has taken place approximately two months later than originally planned and the MTSP is in the process of finalisation, it will instead feed into the 2006/7 Management Plans and budget process. The conclusions and recommendations have been tailored to be relevant and appropriate in relation to the MTSP 2006-9. The evaluation will also contribute to:

- Decision-making on the future of DFID-UNICEF cooperation, particularly in the humanitarian field
- The development of the DFID-UNICEF Institutional Strategy 2006-9
- The wider ISP evaluation process (beginning in June 2005)
- Lessons on organisational capacity building partnerships for DFID and UNICEF
- An assessment of the extent to which DFID's investment has contributed to its Public Service Agreement to enhance capacity in humanitarian response

## 1.2 Evaluation objectives

The objectives of the evaluation were to

- Provide an *overall assessment* of the CB Programme;
- *Track changes* and current status of UNICEF humanitarian preparedness and response capacity<sup>18</sup>;
- Provide *recommendations on priorities and strategies* for future CB efforts (with reference to the external context);
- Draw lessons for future strategies and *partnerships for organisational capacity building*
- Draw lessons on policy and programming for humanitarian response to *children affected by armed conflict*
- Provide an assessment of the extent to which DFID's investment has contributed to achieving its *Public Service Agreement*. See Terms of Reference, Annex 1.

## 1.3 Methodology

The evaluation is based on two principal tracks:


- An organisational capacity analysis to identify opportunities, blockages and gaps in the external and internal environment i.e. UNICEF as a whole organisation, that may affect the capacity to deliver timely and effective humanitarian action
- An analysis of the attainment of the specific goals of Phase II of the CB Programme (annex 2)

This approach has allowed the evaluation to go beyond the direct goals of the programme and look more broadly at the humanitarian response systems and processes of the organisation within its external context, based on the organisational capacity framework (below). The framework was designed for this evaluation, adapted from a model designed by the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa (IDRC, 2002).

---

<sup>18</sup> Humanitarian preparedness and response is understood to include advocacy response.

**Figure 1: Organisational Capacity Framework**



Given that a full organisational assessment was not undertaken before the CB Programme began, there is no recorded baseline with which to compare progress. Nevertheless, the organisational analysis has been worthwhile as it has led the evaluation team to identify linkages between components of the organisation that would not have been possible through an analysis of the goals alone.

To collect and analyse information, the evaluation used the following methodologies:

- **Key informant interviews** including over 350 informants (annex 3): staff members in HQ (New York, Geneva, Copenhagen), Regional Offices (WCARO and ESARO, plus the Regional Emergency Officer from ROSA) and external interviews with UN Agencies, NGOs and donors.
- **Country case studies** in Ethiopia (slow onset), Democratic Republic of Congo (complex emergency) and Sri Lanka (tsunami and complex emergency). Teams of two consultants (three to Sri Lanka) visited for a period of 10 days each, including zonal office visits and meetings with partners and other UN Agencies. The country case studies were based on sets of questions organised around the goals of the DFID programme and achievement of the CCCs. The case studies did not aim to assess the impact of UNICEF interventions but rather the capacity of UNICEF to perform in emergencies.
- **Two questionnaires on humanitarian preparedness and response:**
  - **Country Management Team (CMT Questionnaire)** to analyse issues of preparedness and humanitarian response at Country Office level (17 responses out of 50). Copy of the questionnaire in annex 4. The country offices were randomly selected but included countries from all regions. The questionnaire was drawn up with reference to UNICEF's draft indicators for preparedness. Although the questionnaire did not generate the planned number of responses, there were responses from all regions.
  - **Individual questionnaires** distributed through those 50 Country Offices to analyse views on preparedness and humanitarian response (103 responses)

- **Regional questionnaires by sector/operations** directed to ESARO, WCARO and ROSA, plus selected REAs (17 responses)
- **Analysis of 27 Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans**
- **Advocacy questionnaires directed to Child Protection Officers** (6 responses)
- **Key document analysis:** list supplied by UNICEF, plus numerous additional documents identified by the evaluation team included in the references
- **Human resources analysis** of:
  - 150 job descriptions from 10 countries over a period of 10 years (majority last five years) to assess whether humanitarian response has been included
  - 40 CVs on the global roster aimed at assessing the extent of emergency experience.
- **Meetings with DFID** in London, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Kinshasa and Colombo

The evaluation of Goal 4 of the Programme, the Learning Strategy, was carried out by a separate evaluation team, Le Group-Conseil Baastel Itée. This was an integral part of the whole evaluation and the Learning Evaluation report should be read as a complement to the current evaluation (Baastel, 2005). A summary of the Baastel Team conclusions and inter-relationships with the conclusions from the Valid Team are presented in this report.

An inception report was submitted in early March 2005 but no significant changes were made to the objectives of the evaluation or the methodology.

## 1.4 Focus within the evaluation

The evaluation team were asked to place special emphasis on three of the eight goals of the CB Programme: a) Goal 1: emergency preparedness and response b) Goal 3: human resources: right people, place, time and c) Goal 7: advocacy for children affected by armed conflict. Gender issues are important to UNICEF as a fundamental part of the Human Rights Based Approach to Programming and were analysed in relation to the humanitarian work of the organisation as a whole and in terms of investment through the CB Programme.

Although UNICEF's mandate is based on the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the fundamental principles of the CRC include child participation, children and women's views were not collected or analysed in the evaluation as the focus was at organisational level rather than field/beneficiary level. This was agreed in the Terms of Reference.

## 1.5 Management of the evaluation and reference groups

The evaluation was managed by a UNICEF/DFID team. The Evaluation Management Team sought opinions from internal reference groups as appropriate. Two documents were distributed to reference groups: the inception paper (March 2005) and a brief paper on how the evaluation intended to analyse advocacy issues (March 2005). A workshop in Geneva on 26-27<sup>th</sup> May with 30 senior UNICEF participants from HQ, ROs and COs together with 4 DFID representatives validated findings and discussed possible future directions. Their views are recorded in a separate report (Valid, 2005).

## 1.6 Milestones

Milestones for the evaluation were established as follows:

- |   |                         |
|---|-------------------------|
| • Inception Report                      | 4 <sup>th</sup> March   |
| • Preliminary paper for Geneva workshop | 20 <sup>th</sup> May    |
| • Geneva workshop                       | 26/27 <sup>th</sup> May |
| • Workshop report                       | Available from UNICEF   |
| • Draft report                          | 20 <sup>th</sup> June   |
| • Final report                          | 15 <sup>th</sup> July   |

## 1.7 Structure of the Report

The report is structured as follows:

- Programme of Cooperation: Description and Analysis
- Findings:
  - Effectiveness Against Goals of the Programme
  - Gender Mainstreaming
  - DFID-UNICEF Partnership
- Conclusions
  - Relevance
  - Effectiveness
  - Efficiency
  - Impact
  - Coordination/coherence
  - Sustainability
  - Cross cutting issues
- Recommendations

## 2. Programme of Cooperation

### 2.1 Background and description of the Programme of Cooperation

The Programme of Cooperation was launched to support UNICEF's plans to enhance responsiveness to children in unstable situations. These plans had been developed at a key conference in Martigny, Switzerland in September 1998 in recognition that the increasing number of economic crises, natural disasters and complex emergencies required new strategies to ensure children's survival, protection and development. The conference aimed to identify issues and constraints on UNICEF to respond in a *predictable and efficient manner* and ensure that UNICEF was ready at all times to assume a coordinating role for sectoral support. The conference, now known as Martigny I, also identified the elements of a set of Core Corporate Commitments for children and women in unstable situations.

In May 1999, a proposal was submitted to DFID for *Phase I of the Programme of Cooperation* to implement some components of the Martigny plans (DFID-UNICEF 2000b). One of the principal strategies in the proposal was to *mainstream* response into the responsibilities of all staff. The proposals also aimed to promote robust advocacy on behalf of children in view of complex political contexts. The Programme comprised three projects: humanitarian preparedness and response, children and armed conflict and mine action. The proposal represented a combination of UNICEF and DFID priorities; while UNICEF wanted to focus on humanitarian preparedness and response, together with issues of children and armed conflict, the aspect of mine action was largely a DFID priority that UNICEF was encouraged to include. The three projects were supported by DFID at a total of GBP 10 million over two years.

During Phase I the initial set of 'Core Corporate Commitments' (known as CCCs) were presented to UNICEF's Executive Board in May 2000 and were later refined through a second Martigny conference in June 2003. The current Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies were approved by the Executive Board in June 2004.

UNICEF conducted a review of the results of Phase I of the Programme of Cooperation before submitting a proposal for Phase II (UNICEF, EMOPS, 2001). The review found positive progress in organisational culture towards a greater recognition of the importance of UNICEF's mandate in relation to children affected by armed conflict and to the CCCs, as well as a growing understanding of humanitarian principles. Systematic policy guidance on children affected by armed conflict was being accumulated, greater coherence in advocacy was identified and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning process had been firmly established and was being rolled out. In terms of security, the operating centre (OPSCEN) was functioning 7 days a week, 24 hours a day and strong progress had been made on installing global communications systems at field level.

Weaknesses identified in Phase I focused around the lack of a holistic perspective. The Programme aimed to enhance capacity across the whole organisation but lacked a *coherent* capacity building strategy. More specifically, there was an artificial split between the project's different objectives. In addition, the programme as a whole had aimed to build capacity within partners before UNICEF had managed to enhance internal capacity. Crucially, the review considered that progress was slow on strengthening the Regional Office oversight role and clarifying accountabilities.

In recognition of the weaknesses identified, *Phase II of the Programme of Cooperation* aimed to take a broader approach addressing more programme and operational aspects simultaneously. The Programme aimed to clarify roles between HQ, RO and CO levels and to include most Divisions, while providing a particular focus on three critical support functions: HR management, learning and security. A specific objective was to address issues of sustainability by incorporating posts funded by DFID into core UNICEF funding during the life of the programme.

## 2.2 Guiding principles and priorities in Phase II

Phase II specified that UNICEF's humanitarian work should continue to be guided by the CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child), CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women) and international standards for humanitarian assistance. Gender awareness and partnership would be strengthened and the Country Office (CO) level should be the focus of performance. The Programme also aimed to enhance UNICEF's capacity to deliver on the CCCs and to be consistent with the priorities of the Medium Term Strategic Plan for the period 2002-2005. The goal of mainstreaming was maintained.

Eight goals were established for this single programme in Phase II, reflecting the notion that it was an integrated whole, rather than separate projects as in Phase I. The oversight role and responsibility of Regional Offices was emphasised in the proposal. The eight goals (annex 2) addressed the following:

Goal 1: Preparedness and response	Goal 5: Security of staff and assets
Goal 2: Operations	Goal 6: Knowledge base for CAAC <sup>19</sup>
Goal 3: Human resources	Goal 7: Advocacy for CAAC
Goal 4: Learning strategy	Goal 8: Policy and guidelines CAAC

## 2.3 Funding for Phases I and II

Table 1 below sets out the capacity building programmes of Phases I and II (shaded) totalling GB£22.2 plus two additional grants provided to UNICEF for capacity building in the humanitarian arena:

- i) An additional GBP 2.63million for operations (principally telecommunications and supplies).
- ii) An additional GBP1.5 million for mine action from 2003-2005.

These two additional sums are not directly the subject of this evaluation although they impact on the overall effectiveness of the programme and will be mentioned.

*Table 1: Distribution of DFID funding in capacity building support to UNICEF 2000-2005*

CB Programme	Funding in GBP	Time period
Ph I: 3 projects	10 million	Jan 2000 to April 2002
Ph II: 8 goals	10 million plus 2.2 mn	May 2002 to Dec 2005
DFID 2: Operations	2.63mn	March 2000 to March 2005
Mine Action	1.5mn	2003-2005
Total	26.33mn	2000-2005

In both phases of the Programme of Cooperation, known as the Capacity Building Programme and for the remainder of this report referenced as the *CB Programme*, Regional Offices were allocated two thirds of the funding, HQ one third of the funding. Country Offices (with a few exceptions) did not receive funding directly (although they benefited indirectly through ROs).

In Phase I, UNICEF planned to focus approximately 50% of HQ funding on human resource systems, 14% for training and 36% for programming and advocacy. Phase II budget allocations at HQ level also emphasised HR and programming/advocacy for children affected by armed conflict: the Division of Human Resources at HQ level was allocated US\$3.5mn (36% of HQ funding), a Working Group on Children Affected by Armed Conflict managed by EMOPS, US\$2.7mn (28% of HQ funding) and EMOPS US\$1.3mn (13% of HQ funding). For reasons discussed in Section 2.8, it has not been possible to assess whether spending mirrored these budget allocations.

<sup>19</sup> Children Affected by Armed Conflict

The Regional Office funding allocations in Phase I varied considerably from 31% of the total regional budget to WCARO to 8% each to ROSA, TACRO and CEE/CIS. In Phase II regional differentials narrowed slightly as below and ESARO received the largest allocation of the original budget. The principal reason for the differences in budget allocation was that funds were distributed internally based on proposals from the regions. Regional Offices that presented the most effective proposals received the largest budget allocations.

<b>Budget allocations by Region in each Phase</b>		
	<b>Phase I</b>	<b>Phase II</b>
WCARO	31%	18%
ESARO	25%	22%
EAPRO	11%	13%
MENA	9%	9%
ROSA	8%	13%
TACRO	8%	8%
CEE/CIS	8%	18%

Regions placed varying emphasis on each of the eight goals of the CB Programme Phase II. While WCARO invested most of the funding in hardware, training and posts in security, ESARO invested in emergency preparedness and response planning and training.

## **2.4 Programme Monitoring and Review**

The CB Programme was monitored through a bi-annual report from each Division and Regional Office, annual review meetings together with DFID and annual joint monitoring visits to selected country offices<sup>20</sup>. There was also a detailed and strategic review of Phase I in 2002. The CB Programme was highly results focused in the regular reviews. Results defined in the Phase II logframe were not formally changed throughout the Programme although there was some re-allocation of funds within Goals in Phase II according to changed priorities. Changes were relatively minor and maintained the same overall objectives.

## **2.5 Partnership between DFID and UNICEF**

The partnership for the CB Programme has consisted of funding, in-kind contributions of assistance with procurement and supply of consultants to support surge requirements (both on a small scale), staff time in joint meetings and monitoring visits and technical inputs on protection and human rights issues. There has been no collaboration on DFID specialist areas such as conflict analysis and no joint advocacy/lobbying. Issues of the partnership will be addressed in greater depth in Section 3.4.3.

The CB Programme has been complemented since January 2005 by a second capacity building programme for humanitarian response funded by ECHO. The ECHO funded programme covers two principal areas: i) enhancing preparedness and response (supply, distribution and telecommunications equipment) and ii) child protection. The funding is annual within a multi year framework. For the preparedness and response proposal specific countries of focus have been defined<sup>21</sup>, while child protection will focus on WCARO, TACRO and EAPRO.

## **2.6 Key terms and concepts used in the CB Programme**

Two terms used as a conceptual basis for CB Programme were mainstreaming and capacity building. These terms were clarified with the proposal for Phase II as follows:

<sup>20</sup> Madagascar, Kenya, Tanzania June 2000; E Timor, Indonesia and Bangkok, February 2001; Guinea-Conakry November 2002 and Nepal June 2004.

<sup>21</sup> Haiti, Colombia, Laos, Pacific Islands, Sudan, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Uganda, Nepal, Afghanistan, Turkey and Kyrgyzstan.

### *'Capacity building'*

The proposal states that a good capacity building strategy should have a clear analysis of:

- linkages between the goals and the organisation's mandate
- mission, functions and capacities to be strengthened (including at which levels of the organisation)
- factors that are constraining capacity
- how the capacities are linked at different levels of the organisation and
- a rationale as to the choice of priority actions.

This conceptual framework aimed to shift the whole organisation. Recognising that this was a highly ambitious goal, the proposal noted that results should be defined modestly.

### *'Mainstreaming'*

The term mainstreaming was discussed throughout the Martigny process. The aim was to integrate humanitarian action into all key processes: *programme process* (annual planning processes, early warning, reinforcing the oversight function of ROs); *human resources* (career development, succession planning, rapid staff deployment); *learning* (training plans, EPR training, humanitarian concepts into regular meetings); *security* (staff safety into management plans, security in CAP appeals); *policy and advocacy* (advocacy strategies, policy papers/guidelines).

The evaluation assesses the extent to which mainstreaming was effective in all these aspects through the analysis of the Goals.

## **2.7 Design and management of the Capacity Building Programme**

The Capacity Building Programme was extremely ambitious. It aimed to facilitate significant changes in an organisation with a total budget of approximately US\$1.6 billion per annum, 157 offices and a staff of 8,000 with a capacity building budget of approximately US\$8.5 million p.a. It also aimed to achieve changes within five years.

To make these changes the CB Programme was premised on two principal strategies: i) the role of the Regional Office (RO) in providing oversight and roll out of capacity building to Country Office (CO) level and ii) mainstreaming responsibility for humanitarian response throughout the organisation. The view of the Evaluation Team is that these two premises were and remain appropriate. The RO role is pivotal in an organisation the size of UNICEF and in the best case examples can make a real difference to CO level capacity (see Section 3.2.7). In terms of mainstreaming (see Section 2.6), the concept as it is defined above in integrating humanitarian response into processes was also appropriate. Equally, the interpretation that humanitarian response is the responsibility of all is appropriate but only as a foundation. It does not obviate the need for specialists to provide speed and direction to the response effort. However, to restate, these fundamental aspects of the design of the CB Programme were appropriate. The challenge is to build increasingly sophisticated analysis, prioritisation and more effective implementation around these fundamental premises.

To achieve significant changes in a very large organisation in a relatively short period of five years requires strong strategic drive and direction. A weakness in the CB Programme was a lack of strategic direction in the implementation phase. This was largely due to:

- The lack of a holistic organisational assessment undertaken in the design stages of the CB Programme. Such an analysis would have aimed to identify strengths, constraints and bottlenecks in humanitarian preparedness and response capacity and provided the information for strategic decision-making on the direction of CB Programme priority inputs.
- The bottom-up planning process that allocated funding on the basis of annual proposals by Divisions and ROs. Although this approach ensured that the detail of capacity building was planned close to the point of implementation, it should have been coupled with greater analysis and comparisons of capacity building requirements by different countries/regions at HQ level.

- The lack of consolidated financial information by region, by goal and by activity. This information was not available (see Section 2.8) and constrained strategic analysis and prioritisation.
- The lack of a strong inter-Divisional body with the capacity to make strategic decisions about shifting the whole organisation in terms of humanitarian response capacity. The CB Programme aimed to address aspects of the work of various Divisions (Division of Human Resources, Division of Financial and Administrative Management, Programme Division) but the body responsible for bringing Divisions together to address issues of humanitarian response to children (Inter Divisional Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations) does not yet adequately provide strategic direction in this area. A strategic overview was left largely to EMOPS but EMOPS does not have authority over other Divisions making it difficult to drive some of the agreed CB Programme goals.

In the absence of prioritisation, funding was spread relatively thinly across the organisation. However, it could equally be argued that mainstreaming required the broad dispersal of funds across all Divisions and to all regions. The dispersal of funding across Divisions and Regions is not seen as a design fault however greater analysis in the future could improve prioritisation and funding distribution.

These are not new issues for UNICEF. There is already a strong level of awareness within the Evaluation Office and EMOPS of the need for a regular strategic overview based on an organisational framework, such as in figure 1 above. EMOPS and the Evaluation Office aim to develop a tool that will help to highlight capacity blockages and gaps on an ongoing basis and provide information for decision-making. It is worthy of note here that UNICEF has already developed a set of draft indicators to identify what constitutes adequate preparedness at Country Office level and some of these indicators have been incorporated into the new early warning-early action system. Consolidating this and other data should help to map capacity building requirements globally.

## 2.8 Financial overview of budget and expenditures

There are two issues in relation to the budget and expenditure within the CB Programme that have had an impact on the overview of the Programme and information for management. First, the proposal for Phase II was for a total of \$25mn of which DFID agreed to fund \$14mn (58% of the total). The budget allocations were never revised in relation to the lower funding available and decisions about funding allocations were made ad hoc rather than being based on strategic priorities at the beginning of the Programme. As a result of the reduced funding, goals on gender mainstreaming were dropped.

In addition, there were no common budget codes established at the beginning of the CB Programme to provide information on how the CB Programme was progressing in activities/expenditure within broad goals. For example, consolidating spending on training/learning compared to hardware inputs for security. For the same reason, it has not been possible for the current Evaluation Team to analyse expenditure against the Programme Goals. While UNICEF has been completely transparent in providing information on *all* expenditures at RO level, they are extremely detailed and not collated in a way that is comparable between regions.

It should be noted, however, that within the ECHO Capacity Building Programme, a coding system has been established to facilitate financial reporting against objectives and aggregate reporting against goals. One further point is that while it was not possible to assess expenditure against goals, it was also not possible to assess the value of the contributions in additional funding from UNICEF's own resources made by COs and ROs to the goals of the CB Programme, although the Learning Strategy Evaluation demonstrates that this was the case (Baastel, 2005).

## 2.9 Selection of goals

The CB Programme brought together four elements within the goals:

- Emergency preparedness and response
- Operations (including HR systems and security)

- Learning Strategy
- Children affected by armed conflict

This set of goals brought together Operations with Programmes and was appropriate, especially in a context of mainstreaming. The major gap identified was in building capacity for sector level humanitarian response and coordination in relation to the CCCs (the first version of the CCCs was drawn up in May 2000 pre-dating Phase II of the CB Programme). Sector level capacity was covered to some extent by the Learning Strategy but was relatively limited and not closely tied to the CCCs.

#### *Management of Child Protection Goals*

The goals for children affected by armed conflict were implemented through EMOPS by a Working Group on Children Affected by Armed Conflict comprising Programme Officers responsible for mine action, sexual exploitation and abuse and advocacy. However, most of the thinking on children affected by armed conflict and linkages to external CAAC working groups is undertaken through the Child Protection Section of the Programme Division. This led to diffusion in efforts in the area of CAAC and contributed to the fact that the Child Protection Section only received 3% of HQ funding in 2004. The ECHO funded work on child protection that began in January 2005 is being managed through the Child Protection Section of the Programme Division and leadership through the CP Section would be the most effective direction for any further work in this area.

#### *How far can achievements be attributed to the CB Programme?*

The CB Programme has both catalysed and facilitated UNICEF to implement the Martigny agenda and develop mainstreaming across Divisions and in rolling out the agenda to COs. The Programme provided financial backing to shift the organisation towards these goals. Most of the achievements cited in the Executive Summary are directly or indirectly attributable to the CB Programme. Some examples are:

- The roll out of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning and ongoing technical support to COs in humanitarian preparedness and response could not have been achieved without the crucial Regional Emergency Adviser posts, all of which were initially funded by the CB Programme<sup>22</sup>.
- Likewise the roll out of EPRT, PATH (Principled Approach to Humanitarian Action) and other training was supported by DFID, as was the training for Peer Supporters.
- The CB Programme has funded the Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy post that has been responsible for driving the UNICEF child protection agenda within the Security Council and has made ongoing contributions to IASC working groups.
- The work of the IASC Task Force on Protection from Sexual Abuse was supported by the CB Programme and has led to the roll out of training in sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian contexts.
- The Emergency Focal Point in the Division of Human Resources was supported by the CB Programme and was pivotal in identifying staff for surge requirements in the tsunami response as well as continuing to work on longer-term systems for improved human resource mobilisation for emergencies.

Some achievements that can be attributed to the DFID 2 Programme to support operations include the following.

- Support to telecommunications and technological upgrades within the Operations Centre (OPSCEN) in New York that provides 24 hour information to UNICEF on key events and potential hazards.
- Enhancements in the Supply Division, especially in relation to the establishment of regional supply hubs can also be attributed to DFID 2
- The roll out of enhanced IT and vehicle reinforcement for MOSS (Minimum Operating Security Standards) compliance.

---

<sup>22</sup> All but two are now included in the UNICEF Support Budget.

## **2.10 Conclusions/recommendations on the design and management of the CB Programme**

The CB Programme was based on demand-driven planning through proposals submitted by Regional Offices and Programme Divisions. This ensured that the detail of the CB Programme was closely linked to requirements of ROs and HQ Divisions but it lacked overall strategic planning from HQ level. In the absence of a strategic overview and of financial reporting against goals, it was difficult to prioritise interventions. UNICEF's capacity building for humanitarian response in the future should be driven by EMOPS, in conjunction with other Divisions and in collaboration with ROs.

### **Recommendations**

1. UNICEF should revive the Inter Divisional Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations to track and strategically manage capacity building across the organisation. Ideally the Committee comprising Divisional Directors should meet periodically and at least once a year together with invited Regional Directors. EMOPS should play a secretarial role to the Committee, providing information for decision-making. If the IDSC option is not feasible, strategic direction should be managed through the Global Management Team.
2. EMOPS should track UNICEF's organisation-wide capacity in humanitarian response based on:
  - The demand for humanitarian response: frequency of emergencies, type of emergency, size of population affected, child development indicators.
  - Capacity of the CO and ROs in relation to the organisational tool (to be developed), including an analysis of capacity across the CCC sectors
  - Capacity of governments and NGOs to provide effective humanitarian response
3. UNICEF should define budget codes for humanitarian capacity building that will allow tracking across programme objectives and regions and will distinguish contributions from donors/UNICEF's own funds.
4. Upgrade the post of Capacity Building Programme Manager to provide analysis and information for decision making to EMOPS.
5. Any future goals in humanitarian preparedness and response should be separated from those related to child protection. Goals related to children in armed conflict should be managed by the Child Protection Section in the Programme Division.



### **3. Organisational capacity assessment framework**

#### **3.1 External context: humanitarian trends**

##### **3.1.1 The humanitarian caseload**

The caseload and demand for humanitarian action has clearly increased over the last five years and this upwards trend is likely to continue for the next five to ten years. The number of natural disasters has risen from an average of 428 p.a. between 1994 and 1998 to an average of 707 p.a. from 1999 to 2003 (IFRC, 2004). Drought and famine have been the most deadly natural disasters. Evidence of, and forecasts for climate change warn of an increase in extreme weather events, particularly storms and flooding<sup>23</sup>. There is already evidence of a doubling of flood-related disasters in the last decade (Hoyois and Guha-Sapir, 2004).

Major armed conflicts have reduced in number from 31 in 1990 to 19 in 2003 (SIPRI, 2004). However, many of these are protracted: an estimated 14% of the population of developing countries (excluding India and China) now live in countries experiencing protracted crises (Randel et al, 2004). Research suggests that half of all armed conflicts that have ended will re-emerge within 10 years (SIDA, 2003). The transitional phase associated with conflict resolution can last for some years and is usually associated with continuing humanitarian needs. Thus, there can be no complacency about this conflict-related caseload; it may well continue to rise. Most of these conflicts are now intra-state and are often associated with poverty and inequality. A recent study concludes that high rates of mortality in conflict-related crises are more to do with the pre-existing fragility of the affected population than the intensity of the conflict itself (Guha-Sapir and Gijssbert van Panhuis, 2003).

There is a geographic pattern to these trends. More than 90% of people affected by natural disasters live in Asia (IFRC, 2004). As Annex 5 shows, the Asian continent has the highest incidence of floods in the world although Africa has the highest incidence of drought. However, a striking feature of these two (and other) natural disasters is the much higher numbers of people affected per disaster in Asia than anywhere else in the world – often almost double.

Meanwhile, the majority of conflict-related emergencies have occurred in Africa, although Asia comes a close second. Between 1990 and 1993 there were 18 conflicts in Africa; over the same time period there were 16 in Asia (SIPRI, 2004). The coincidence of natural disaster with conflict/ political instability is now a common phenomenon with more than 140 examples in the last 5 years (Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos, 2004).

Meanwhile, the HIV/ AIDS pandemic has reached emergency proportions, especially in southern Africa. During 2004, it is estimated that 2.3 million adults and children died of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa, dwarfing the number of deaths caused by any other form of disaster (UNAIDS, 2004). Not only is this an emergency in its own right but HIV/AIDS infection rates can soar during emergencies, particularly conflict emergencies associated with population movement and sexual abuse.

An as yet unknown threat is the predicted rise in epidemics and newly-emerging infections. WHO warns that globalization, climate change, the growth of mega cities and the huge increase in international travel could all contribute to a rapid increase in infections and epidemics. One of the most serious threats is pandemic influenza, regarded as 'one of the most significant global public health emergencies' by experts (WHO, 2005:3). Global preparedness measures involving national governments and the WHO have been underway since 2004.

Children are disproportionately affected in humanitarian crises, particularly in some of the poorest countries in the world where they account for a high percentage of the population. They are amongst the

---

<sup>23</sup> See UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

most vulnerable to natural disasters. They are often targeted in armed conflicts as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants has weakened in recent decades. Indeed, the vast majority of armed conflicts use child combatants (under 18 years of age) and in more than half of the states at war in 2003 there were reports of child combatants under 15 years of age (JMJ International, 2005; Project Ploughshares, 2004). Girls and boys are recruited (some by abduction) and used as sex slaves or domestic servants as well as combatants.

Children make up more than half of the world's 50 million internally displaced populations (OCHA, 2005). Displaced children face malnutrition, disease, lack of adequate shelter, physical and sexual violence, lack of access to education and psychological stress. Children affected by conflict and displacement can also face separation from families.

The HIV/AIDS crisis is also disproportionately affecting children and young people and girls, in particular. More than half of new infections are in young people under 25 years (UNAIDS, 2004). Girls and young women 15-24 years in sub-Saharan Africa are three times more likely to be infected than boys/young men (ibid). The number of new infections continues to rise: there were more than 3 million new infections in sub-Saharan Africa in 2004 (ibid). Children are impoverished in families living with AIDS and some 14 million globally have been orphaned. They are more likely to drop out of school and can become child heads of families. All humanitarian contexts, including natural disasters, give rise to child protection issues.

### **3.1.2 The political context**

The blurring of boundaries between humanitarian action, foreign policy and military intervention has been a recurring theme over the last ten years. Within the UN, this is evident in the move towards greater integration of the UN's humanitarian, political and development agencies during the 1990s in terms of a convergence of goals and of management structures, for example in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone. By the end of the 1990s, this 'integration model' for the UN was more or less accepted and appears to be here to stay for at least the immediate future (Macrae and Harmer, 2004).

More recently, the global war on terror post 9/11 has heralded a new era of political pressure on international humanitarianism and greater influence of the US on the UN. This was never more evident than in the tragic bombing of the UN in Baghdad which raised serious concerns about how the UN is perceived: by Al Qaeda 'as an instrument of a US-led Judeo-Christian crusade against Islam' (Jones, 2004:25). Meanwhile some western governments, most notably the US, have started to channel large amounts of humanitarian assistance through its military in certain conflict situations where its own army is engaged, for example in Afghanistan. This further blurs the distinction between humanitarian assistance based on need and humanitarian assistance designed to meet political and military objectives, and it compromises the independent and neutral status to which humanitarian agencies aspire in order to negotiate access to affected populations in areas of conflict.

The challenges of working in protracted crises are forecast by many to increase rather than recede in the post 9/11 context (see Section 3.3.5). Protracted crises and failed states are attracting greater attention, for reasons of security associated with the global war on terror (Jones, 2004).

This has all had a knock-on effect on UN security with much tighter rules and therefore more restricted access to areas of conflict. Meanwhile, NGOs operate under less stringent security management and are accessing many such areas, posing a particular challenge for UN coordination and leadership of international humanitarian action.

The changing political context poses a real challenge for humanitarian principles. Whilst the distinctiveness of humanitarian aid is increasingly acknowledged, this distinctiveness is eroded where humanitarian assistance becomes closely linked to military intervention and foreign policy as described above (Macrae and Harmer, 2004). This has fuelled an active debate about the relevance of, and promotion of humanitarian principles, thrown into particularly sharp focus by the Iraq war.

The implications of humanitarian principles (especially neutrality and independence) are challenging for agencies like UNICEF which a) straddle both development and humanitarian assistance, and b) work closely with governments, including western donor governments and governments of recipient countries. Although striving to meet humanitarian principles and with a record of defending them, UNICEF (like many other UN agencies) is unable to operate independently of either sets of government. An example of this dilemma for UNICEF in relation to DFID is the specific objective in DFID-UNICEF's Institutional Strategic Partnership (ISP) (DFID, 2000) which encourages "UNICEF and other UN agencies to avoid collaborating with the regime in Burma, except where necessary to tackle health issues with regional or cross-border implications". Although relating to UNICEF's development work, this objective could be seen as threatening UNICEF's independence and impartiality in humanitarian assistance.

### **3.1.3 The international humanitarian system**

Demands for improved performance by agencies doing humanitarian work and thus higher quality interventions have increased in the last decade, since the much-criticised and highly publicised international response to the Rwanda crisis in 1994. Initiatives to set minimum standards and to strengthen the accountability of the system have proliferated. Poor performance is now much less likely to escape the notice and scrutiny of funders, evaluators and peer agencies.

There has also been a tenfold increase in the number of actors involved in humanitarian response since the end of the Cold War (Kent, 2004). Pressures to coordinate have become correspondingly stronger, especially in high profile and well-resourced emergencies like the Kosovo crisis and the tsunami. UNICEF's (and other UN agencies') role is to support governments to coordinate. The extent of UNICEF's intervention depends on government capacity, the political context and type of emergency. For example in countries with strong states (e.g. some Asian countries vulnerable to natural disaster), national and local government may play the key coordinating role with UN agencies in support. In countries with weak states or where government is party to the conflict (e.g. in a number of African countries) the UN is expected to play a much fuller coordination role which includes negotiating humanitarian access as well as technical and programme coordination.

Yet there are particular challenges to the UN in being accepted as coordinator by other humanitarian agencies a) if its humanitarian response is seen to be tainted/ too close to political interests (including host governments) b) if it is seen as a funding competitor (Kent, 2004) or c) it is not seen to have sufficient technical competence within the sector in question.

### **3.1.4 UNICEF within the UN System**

#### **UNICEF's humanitarian role**

As the UN agency with the most extensive global coverage, a high profile and very broad mandate, UNICEF is expected to play a central role in responding to humanitarian emergencies. Indeed, it can become 'agency of last resort', expected to fill gaps left by weak capacity or the absence of other UN agencies. Its strong development presence means that it usually has an operational track-record before an emergency happens, and it is therefore expected to scale-up or adapt its operations to meet humanitarian needs.

UNICEF is a particularly significant player in protracted crises within the UN system. For example, it requested about a fifth of total resources for the CAP in Sudan, Somalia, Caucasus and Burundi (Randel et al, 2004). It also has a key role to play in transitional contexts. Many of the interventions identified by the Working Group on Transition Issues appear to fall within UNICEF's mandate, including DDRR of child combatants, mine awareness and child protection.

## UN Reform

On the humanitarian side, UN Reform is driven by concerns about poor performance, inadequate strategic planning and weak coordination within the UN system. Reforming the mechanisms for UN humanitarian action go back to the early 1990s with the establishment of DHA, the IASC and the CAP. This pre-dates the UN Secretary General's 1997 reform package. More recent initiatives that are part of the current UN Reform process for humanitarian action include the review of the IASC, UNDG and ECHA's work on transitional and post-conflict situations and the current Humanitarian Response Review.

The wider UN reform package promotes greater UN cohesiveness between the UN's political, peacekeeping and humanitarian actors in line with the integrationist agenda mentioned above. This is demonstrated at field level through the organisation of the UNCT. But at times this conflicts with gains of earlier UN reforms on humanitarian action, for example the role of humanitarian advocacy which may sometimes mean taking on political actors and processes, promoting humanitarian principles and indicating the limits of an integrationist approach. This is further evidence of the current and anticipated challenge to humanitarian principles.

Some of the most obvious progress in UN reform is around coordination of humanitarian action. The IASC is credited with progress on a number of initiatives that have promoted field level coordination amongst UN agencies and some major INGOs, for example the CAP/ CHAP process and the HC system, thus allocating clearer responsibility within humanitarian programming. But progress in addressing some of the underlying structural problems such as mandate gaps and overlap and capacity gaps is much weaker. According to Jones and Stoddard (2003), hard issues and trade-offs are not yet being dealt with. The lack of synchronisation between UN agencies is a particular issue: whilst some UN agencies organise themselves in relation to target group (UNICEF and UNHCR), others operate in terms of sector (WFP and WHO). These issues are beyond the scope of this evaluation but are ever-more pressing to be addressed, not least to relieve some of the demands currently placed on UNICEF in terms of humanitarian response.

UNICEF has been an active participant in UN reform of humanitarian action. It is credited with playing a) a consistent leadership role, b) a principled role, standing up for humanitarian principles and promoting a rights-based approach to programming, c) a substantive role including leading or co-leading many inter-agency initiatives, for example on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and chairing the UNDG/ ECHA Working Group on Transitions. Playing such a key role was a strategic choice and decision of the Head of EMOPS from the late 1990s. He is seen as a driving force behind the IASC, as commended by Jones and Stoddard (2003:30): 'clearly, UNICEF stands out in terms of the level of corporate support that it has provided to the IASC over the years. This comes in the form of the decision to appoint their director of emergency operations as IASC focal point; from his deep, personal involvement in every aspect of the IASC's work; from their decision to second a senior staff member to the IASC Secretariat; and from the participation of UNICEF staff both at headquarters and the field in all sorts of IASC activities. UNICEF has continued to provide exemplary support, for example in the level of engagement in the SWGs on CAP and particularly on Contingency Planning'.

Engagement in UN reform on the humanitarian side has clearly been a priority for UNICEF's chief executive: 'of all the agency principals she is the most consistent in her attendance of the IASC and ECHA meetings' (UNICEF, 2004a:13), although its record is not so strong on the development side. UNICEF's evaluation of its contribution to UN Reform also indicates a general consensus amongst UNICEF staff that its active role in UN reform and especially in humanitarian coordination is seen as integral to its mandate and has benefited the organization.

But there are some caveats. UNICEF is sometimes perceived by other UN agencies as promoting its own identity to the detriment of the broader system. And there is a concern that UNICEF's commitment to concepts and principles at a policy/ inter-agency level (for example on rights-based programming and child protection) are not always translated into effective practical implementation in the field, or sufficiently forceful advocacy. Some see UNICEF's engagement in inter-agency processes driven by a small group

of very committed coordinators, but without the full understanding and support of the whole organisation (UNICEF, 2004a).

## Donors and funding

Much has been written about the competitive aid environment that UN agencies face (for example, Kent, 2004). This is seen to contribute to the unpredictability of funding, characterised by earmarking, short and unpredictable funding cycles and donor decisions based more on domestic and international policy priorities than humanitarian need (Smillie and Minear, 2003). It also tends to encourage competitive rather than collaborative behaviour between UN agencies.

There is a perceived shift in donor funding towards an increasing influence of donor governments over UN agencies and increased earmarking of funds, although the overall share of humanitarian aid resources channelled through UN agencies does not appear to be declining (Macrae et al, 2002). However, the mechanisms for channelling humanitarian assistance to UN agencies do seem to be changing. There is a move towards a greater pooling of donor funds for UN agencies engaged in humanitarian response, particularly at country level through the HC but also at a more centralised level. Although this is supposed to result in the more strategic allocation of funds and greater coherence within the UN, there are concerns within UNICEF about possible delays in disbursement.

Despite the apparent commitment to impartiality, the humanitarian aid system is still far from being needs driven. Humanitarian assistance per capita of the affected population varies enormously. For example, an appeal in 2003 for Chechnya successfully raised \$40 per affected person. An appeal for flood relief in Mozambique in the same year was less successful, raising only \$0.40 per affected person. Meanwhile current pledges for the tsunami response amount to around \$1000 per affected person (Maxwell and Clay, 2005). These unpredictable and variable levels of humanitarian assistance funding are a fundamental challenge to implementing a rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance.

The CERF is an attempt to make funding more predictable, but has not been wholly successful because of a reluctance to use the fund as it is a loan to be repaid rather than a grant. However, there seems to be growing support for this to change.

Although there is usually an unequal power relationship between donor and recipient agency (including UN agencies), with donors demanding higher levels of accountability, the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative is an opportunity to redress the balance. It is an opportunity for UN agencies to engage with and to influence donors, not least in terms of advocacy and holding donors to account, for example in respecting humanitarian principles and becoming more needs-based, on more multi-year funding agreements and unearmarked funding at programmatic, country and regional levels. But it should also be noted that progress in implementing the GHD is slow to date (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2004).

### 3.1.5 Implications of the external environment for UNICEF

The implications of these trends can be divided into four sets of recommendations.

#### a) Skills, systems and resources

To respond to all phases and types of emergencies, UNICEF will need to:

1. Given that the humanitarian caseload will continue to rise over the next 5-10 years, UNICEF should *either* i) increase its overall resource base *or* prioritise specific humanitarian sectors as it seems unlikely that UNICEF can continue to try to meet *all* the CCC sectors in *all* humanitarian crises in a context of growth in demand. Debate whether increased funding or prioritising sectors is the most feasible option for UNICEF in the IDSC or GMT. Specifically, UNICEF should state clearly that shelter is not one of the CCC sectors and advocate for another UN agency to take responsibility for this area.

2. Strengthen its ability to monitor and analyse the external environment, perhaps even forecasting different scenarios. This should include political analysis to inform the defence of humanitarian principles. UNICEF could do this in two complementary ways. It should develop its internal capacity which may mean adding an extra staff member to the Policy and Advocacy Unit of EMOPS. It should also strengthen its links to academic institutions such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London and/ or the Center for International Cooperation (CIC) in New York, for example by commissioning annual or more frequent 'seminars' with such humanitarian experts, dedicated to understanding the implications of their analysis of humanitarian trends for UNICEF. This process could involve other UN agencies as part of the UN reform process.
3. Further enhance skills to work in protracted crises and transitional contexts – usually the most challenging in terms of political analysis, humanitarian dilemmas and issues of neutrality (in spite of these being unattractive postings). This should be tracked through the Learning Programme
4. Strengthen *rapid* response capacity as sudden onset disasters continue to grow. Enhanced early warning-early action systems should facilitate more effective rapid response
5. Strengthen skills in sector based coordination as the number of humanitarian actors continues to increase and look towards UNICEF for coherence and cohesion. This will be addressed in the learning programme.
6. Reinforce skills in advocacy for humanitarian principles and against the violation of children's rights (especially in armed conflict) at CO and global level.

#### **b) UN Reform agenda**

7. ***Driving the UN Reform agenda, rather than being driven by it.*** UNICEF should invest in developing a long-term vision for UNICEF's role within the UN Reform process. This should include documenting practical minimal requirements for engagement in joint programming at CO level and clarifying operational requirements under different scenarios (as recommended by Mendelsohn et al, 2004). This should also include analysis of how planning/activities in capacity building are influenced by the UN Reform process and which aspects can and should be done together with other UN agencies.

#### **c) Advocacy on funding and humanitarian principles**

8. As a leading proponent of a rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance, UNICEF should advocate for greater impartiality and reliability in the allocation of international humanitarian aid. Documented analysis on how differential allocations in humanitarian assistance affect the rights-based agenda for children could be used by both UNICEF and DFID within the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.
9. UNICEF should continue to build on its track record in promoting humanitarian principles, within the UN system and with donor and recipient governments, in a political context where the pressure to compromise humanitarian principles may increase. This requires sustained investment in UNICEF's policy and advocacy unit at HQ level, and strengthening its advocacy capacity in countries where humanitarian principles are most threatened.

#### **d) Possible growth areas in programming**

10. Given the forecast that around half of post-conflict states are likely to return to war within 10 years and that children and adolescents are likely to engage in those conflicts, UNICEF could consider stepping up activities to engage children, adolescents and women in peace-building<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> Children's engagement in peace consolidation and peacebuilding is endorsed in Security Council Resolution 1314 of August 2000, The Secretary-General's call in his report on children and armed conflict (A/5/163-S/2000/712).

11. Engage in disaster reduction and vulnerability analysis and activities through UNICEF development programmes.

## **3.2 Internal context: organizational motivation and resources, systems, processes**

### **3.2.1 Mission and organisational motivation**

UNICEF has strong organisational motivation towards enhancing effectiveness in humanitarian preparedness and response as evidenced by the organisational mandate, HQ leadership and increased funding for humanitarian response. Additionally staff responding to this evaluation showed a high degree of interest in gaining further experience in emergencies. Factors working against organisational motivation are inconsistencies in the degree of leadership/accountability at Regional and Country Office levels and weak linkages between the staff development system, promotion opportunities and emergency performance.

### **3.2.2 Mandate and priorities**

UNICEF is *mandated* to respond to all children in unstable situations, based principally on the Convention of the Rights of the Child and on a mission statement drawn up in 1996 (still current) that reaffirmed UNICEF's responsibility to children in emergencies in two clauses. UNICEF's Medium Term Strategic Plan is a good representation of organisational priorities. Humanitarian response was integrated into the MTSP for the period 2002-2005 but was not comprehensive or entirely clear. This has been strengthened in the new MTSP for 2006-2009. More work has gone into aligning humanitarian response with the new Focus Areas and the Core Commitments for Children have been integrated into the monitoring system.

### **3.2.3 Leadership**

The Executive Director's *leadership* over the period 1995-2005 also showed considerable drive towards enhancing effectiveness in emergency response and drove the 'Martigny Agenda' including mainstreaming humanitarian response into becoming 'everybody's business'. Many long-serving staff members referred to a 'sea change' in perceptions on emergencies over the last decade as the responsibility of all staff. Within the Valid individual questionnaire responses, 77% of respondents agreed that mainstreaming is the best way to increase UNICEF's response capacity. Nevertheless, many staff expressed the view during this evaluation that mainstreaming is not yet complete, either in terms of systems and processes or in terms of the level of acceptance of programme/operational staff.

Leadership at Regional and Country Office level towards enhancing capacity in humanitarian response has been more variable (UNICEF, Evaluation Office, 2002). Country level leadership, especially through the Country Representative and Senior Programme Officer were considered amongst the most important factors in determining the speed and effectiveness of humanitarian response (Valid surveys and ranking exercises). To ensure *reliable* response to emergencies will require *reliable and quality leadership* on humanitarian response.

Some of the characteristics of effective leadership for humanitarian response were identified with senior staff at CO level in Sri Lanka following the tsunami response, as follows:

- Strong personal commitment to UNICEF's mandate on humanitarian assistance and specifically its mandate on children in humanitarian emergencies
- A willingness to take action and to take risks to meet the needs of children and women affected by unstable situations
- A willingness to back staff within the CO team who take risks to advocate for children. The importance of taking risks needs to be recognised, valued and rewarded within UNICEF's culture.

---

Women's engagement in peace-building was strongly endorsed through the Security Council 1325 on women, peace and security.

- An ability to be strategic and to see the big picture *as well as* understand the reality of the field and be able to relate to the needs of the field
- Strong experience and confidence about effective action in humanitarian response
- An ability to inspire staff

Most of these factors have already been identified by UNICEF. They are set out in competencies on the Learning Web and are used within the Management and Leadership training programmes aimed at Country Representatives, Senior Programme Officers and Senior Operations Officers. The report returns to these points in the discussion of Goal 4: Learning Strategy.

### 3.2.4 Funding

UNICEF funding for humanitarian response is growing in total volume and as a proportion of all spending. The Terms of Reference for the evaluation cite that some 40% of all funding is currently spent on emergency response and the total spending on emergencies more than doubled between 1998 and 2003. A narrower analysis of earmarked resources for emergencies shows an increase in spending from US\$253mn in 2002 to US\$359mn in 2004 and an increase from 20 to 22% of total spending over the same period (UNICEF, MTSP, 2005:85).

However, the *proportion* of regular resources (un-earmarked funding) to total income has progressively deteriorated, 'causing the largest gap ever in 2004' when just 40% of total income was from RR and 60% was earmarked (MTSP 2006-2009). The risk in decreasing RR is that core posts, not directly attached to projects, become more difficult to fund and this can lead to short-term contracting and a lack of continuity. It works against developing sustainable capacity for humanitarian response.

### 3.2.5 Organisational culture and humanitarian response

There are various aspects of organisational culture that impact on humanitarian response and effectiveness. While this is an extremely difficult area to measure, the evaluation found some trends.

- There is a culture of reference to the difficulties in the implementation of decisions/plans as a result of decentralisation. This perception can be used to justify gaps in accountability and lack of decision making. For example, although the Regional Office is collectively responsible for *oversight* in humanitarian response, it can be difficult for the RO team to fulfil that role in a culture that views decision-making authority for humanitarian response as being principally based at country level.
- UNICEF produces excellent analysis in many different areas but there is not always follow up and implementation of the conclusions, especially from a holistic and strategic perspective as noted earlier in this report in relation to the current programme. Another example was the lack of follow up to the Brasilia Conference on human resources in 2002.
- UNICEF tends towards producing excellent guidelines, systems and processes when a focus on implementation would be more useful and 'good enough' guidelines would be faster and more effective in practice.
- Another aspect of guidelines is that there seems to have been an over-emphasis on producing quality guidelines and much less emphasis on dissemination. The evaluation found many examples of staff not being aware of the organisation's own guidelines.
- There is a culture of risk aversion, especially within systems/bureaucracy and advocacy. Anxiety over maintaining systems and procedures and the possible impact of audit reinforces the extent of risk aversion. Anxiety over risking relations with governments in countries of operation is a major influencing factor in weak advocacy. Risk aversion can work against effective humanitarian response.
- Over-work. Many staff members referred to a culture in which regularly working excessive hours and most weekends is the accepted norm. This is linked to difficulties in prioritisation.

### 3.2.6 Individual incentives/rewards

The evaluation found that 87% of respondents in the individual questionnaire expressed an interest in increasing their experience in emergency work and that the proportion was higher amongst national staff. 86% of staff also considered that experience in emergencies is valued within UNICEF and can further career prospects.

However, the Global Staff Association argues that there is still some way to go yet to achieve a meritocracy within UNICEF where promotion is reliably based on effective performance and there are robust career development opportunities. A survey undertaken in 1994 through a management study by Booz-Allen and Hamilton Consultants (Booz-Allen and Hamilton, 1994) was repeated in 2004 showing small improvements in some areas but that considerable work is still to be done in career development and performance management. Only 17.5% of 1,138 respondents in 2004 agreed that UNICEF's career development systems are clear and fair (compared to 13% in 1994) and 15% agreed that UNICEF's approach to promotion is objective, fair and correct (same figure in 1994). There was a greater improvement in opportunities for women: 68% of respondents considered that women have equal opportunities compared to 61% in 1994. There was a notable negative shift, however, in attitudes towards the compensation package. In 1994, 53% agreed that it was equitable, fair and competitive, down to 41% in 2004.

To bolster career development, UNICEF introduced a system known as P<sup>2</sup>D (personal and professional development) in 2003. The system aims to support personal and professional development through training sessions and exercises in self awareness (of capacities and opportunities), guided individual action and development coaching. P<sup>2</sup>D champions have also been trained to support colleagues. Comments on the system by evaluation respondents referred to the usefulness of self-awareness exercises but staff criticise the fact that it is too individually focused and not yet sufficiently linked to institutional career development paths.

To enhance motivation to work effectively in humanitarian response, including in the difficult contexts described above, is part of the broader package of career development and compensation package issues. These issues were recognised in a major human resource planning in Brasilia in June 2002 but have not been adequately followed through. It is encouraging that plans for further investment in career paths, staff development and performance management feature strongly in the new MTSP. It is essential that these plans are actually implemented in practice, and the Evaluation Team proposes that closer linkages are also made with the need for surge capacity for humanitarian response, discussed further in relation to Goal 3.

### 3.2.7 Structure, resources, systems and processes

*Structure: decentralisation and accountabilities*

UNICEF has three levels of organisation: Headquarters, Regional Office, Country Office (plus zonal or sub offices at country level). There was a consensus throughout the organisation that the organisation is highly decentralised with the major decisions on humanitarian operations being taken at CO level. The mid level, Regional Offices, was only established in 1998, prior to that COs reported directly to HQ. Regional Directors are line managers of Country Representatives and Regional Advisers can use that line of authority if they are concerned about the quality of work at CO level.

There are three key questions about decentralisation for this evaluation: a) how does the current structure function and is it effective and cohesive in terms of responsibilities and accountabilities? b) is centralisation or decentralisation more effective in humanitarian response and c) what is an appropriate structure and procedures for *reliable and effective* humanitarian response in the future?

*How does the current structure function in terms of responsibilities and accountabilities? Is it effective and cohesive?*

At present, responsibilities and accountabilities for humanitarian response are set out between the accountabilities paper of 1998 (UNICEF, Executive Board, 1998) and the CCCs. There has been further analysis since that time, including clarification of roles and accountabilities in emergencies.

The CO is responsible for the overall response<sup>25</sup>, ROs for programme oversight, guidance and support<sup>26</sup> and HQ for identifying situations to be treated as a priority, activating the global trigger and other support functions<sup>27</sup>. Where the Country Programme's annual RR allotment is \$2 million or more, the Country Representative is authorised to re-programme up to \$200,000 of supplies and funds to an emergency response and where it is less than \$2 million, up to \$150,000 can be re-programmed. Country Representatives are expected to agree these sums with government but they do not require authorisation by the Regional Office. This is a relatively small sum and signifies that the CO must engage the RO and EMOPS for most emergency response as 'pitch documents' for funding require their authorisation.

However, the extent to which COs seek the support of ROs and HQ in planning and implementing humanitarian response depends largely on the approach of the Country Management Team. In the best case scenario, the CMT is able to share decision-making with ROs and HQ and does not feel threatened or stigmatised by requesting support. However, in the absence of confident and experienced CO level leadership, coupled with situations in which staff are tired and stressed, COs may neither recognise the impending crisis nor request support in a timely way (Liberia, Nepal and Darfur). The Darfur evaluation noted that 'UNICEF's decentralised structure did not simplify its handling of the Darfur crisis. Despite the RO having direct supervisory responsibility over the CO, and NY EMOPS's role in emergency situations, neither the RO nor NYHQ felt empowered to engage with and challenge the CO in its management of the crisis' (UNICEF-DFID,2005).

Communication and cohesion in approach between CO-RO-HQ was considered to be weak in Darfur and Liberia at least in the early phase of the crisis. Some of the same issues were also observed in Nepal. There was a reluctance to request support from the RO and HQ and this was associated with a slow reaction to the situation. In the case of an impending crisis, the oversight role and back-up trigger from ROs can be pivotal. However, 'there remains a tension in the organisation as to what this oversight function really means' (DFID-UNICEF, 2003). Regional Offices vary in the extent to which they have been able to develop and interpret the oversight role. ESARO (East and Southern Africa Regional Office) has worked hard to develop a proactive oversight role, including quality control, technical support and representation. This has included taking an interventionist approach with some countries (examples being Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Uganda) when the RO team has observed an impending emergency and considered that the CO required additional support and guidance/oversight. ESARO estimated that some 24% of all Regional Adviser/Officer visits to countries in 2004 related to emergency technical support or oversight.

ESARO has gained considerable respect from COs in the region, demonstrated by the results of a Client Satisfaction Survey in January 2005 with responses from 20 of 21 countries in the region. The results showed that COs are satisfied with most areas of RO work and that emergency was considered as good, ranked second out of 19 core areas. Importantly, the Ethiopia CO ranked the participation of most personnel in an EPRP process (with the support of the RO) as being the most important factor in timely

---

<sup>25</sup> Contingency and preparedness planning, MOSS compliance, rapid assessment, preparing supply plans within 24 hours, preparing a human resource plan, identifying financial requirements, preparing an appeal document and plan of action, communications, monitoring actions and identifying learning needs.

<sup>26</sup> Providing a 'back-up' trigger, setting a human resource deployment plan within 24 hours and RO staff available within 48 hours, IT and telecommunications assistance, preparing regional stockpiles for rapid deployment, approving the appeal and funding requests, providing stress management and supporting learning needs.

<sup>27</sup> Identifying options for financial resources, identifying staff from other locations or standby arrangements, designating a crisis manager at HQ, preparing global supply standby arrangements or stockpiles, providing IT and Telecommunications standards and technical framework, liaising with other UN agencies, provide security tracking, providing programme guidance and support, initiating contact with the international media and donors, providing policy support.

and effective response. This result does not correspond with overall results from the broader CMT survey and reflects the importance of ESARO's contribution in Ethiopia.

Other positive comments about RO support in general to emergency response during the evaluation were that regional offices have a closer understanding of the country context than HQ. COs also recognised that they have greater distance from day to day realities and can provide a fresh perspective on issues. In some cases, they can effectively back advocacy for issues as Regional Directors or Regional Advisers can sometimes more easily broach sensitive issues with governments than staff based in country. Finally most COs considered that the role of ROs had strengthened over time.

In spite of these positive factors, Regional Offices, (including ESARO in some aspects), face constraints in this crucial oversight role.

1. The demand on Regional Offices is extremely high and will increase as the humanitarian caseload grows. All regions (except ROSA) cover twenty or more countries<sup>28</sup>. WCARO (West Africa) observed that of 24 countries in the region, 8 were in a high state of requirement for support in 2005, 7 medium and 9 in a state of low support requirement.
2. Inevitably, Regional Advisers, including the Regional Emergency Adviser, are over-stretched. While ROs consider that review of EPR plans is their responsibility as part of oversight, they observe that the volume of work makes effective review impossible. Most Advisers that responded to questionnaires had not reviewed any EPR plans; some had reviewed a sample, while one respondent had reviewed almost all. Most had provided timely support to humanitarian response by telephone but less support to preparedness planning.
3. Not all Regional Advisers fully embrace their responsibilities in humanitarian preparedness and response. In some cases, there is a tendency to default to the Regional Emergency Adviser over emergency issues.
4. Where the Regional Director is at the same grading level (D2) as Country Representatives, especially in very large countries (such as in ROSA), it is more difficult for the RD to command sufficient authority to fulfil an oversight role.
5. Regional Advisers have no direct managerial authority over sector-based humanitarian issues at country level. However, if they are concerned about performance, they can call on the authority of the RD to challenge the CO staff. One Regional Office respondent observed that using the authority of the RD can be an uncomfortable and difficult process.
6. Most Regional Advisers do not have an independent travel budget (unless it is linked to project funding) so cannot independently visit countries. They have to wait to be asked and funded by Country Offices. (This has not applied to Regional *Emergency* Advisers who have DFID funding for travel).
7. To be effective in an oversight capacity, the Regional Advisers must be highly technically skilled and earn the respect of Country Office programme managers. If they do not command respect of the CO, their advice will not be sought. A further difficulty is that not all Regional Advisers have emergency experience and are not necessarily familiar with the latest developments in humanitarian response within their own field. For example, not all RAs were familiar with the emergency standards/ guidelines in their own sectors.
8. The Regional Offices (at least those reviewed within the evaluation) have not been sufficiently engaged in a *systematic and planned* form of addressing human resource surge requirements. Only 5 in 18 country offices in the Country Management Team surveys had worked on a human resource plan with the RO.

To conclude, a lack of cohesion between the three levels has been associated with poor response. The RO can play an important role in oversight if good working relations have been developed over time and if

---

<sup>28</sup> The breakdown of countries by regional office is: CEE/CIS, 20 countries; East Asia and the Pacific, 27 countries; East and Southern Africa, 22 countries; Latin America and the Caribbean, 34 countries; Mid East and North Africa, 20 countries; South Asia (including the sub continent of India), 8 countries; West and Central Africa, 25 countries. ROSA covers only 8 countries due to the total size of population within those countries.

the CO has confidence in the capacity of the RO Advisers. The RO can mitigate problems of the reluctance of COs to act if they have confidence in taking a pro-active stance.

*Is centralisation or decentralisation more effective in humanitarian response?*

Centralisation would require developing a much larger team at HQ level and managing emergencies from that level. The approach could still build on existing CO level teams but would remove the accountability for management of the response from the CO level. This could undermine the authority of the Country Management Team but, more importantly, would not be sustainable given the number and duration of emergencies. In the tsunami, a joint approach was adopted with daily conference calls engaging all three levels. However, even this approach is not feasible, except for very large scale emergencies. Equally, in terms of the global trigger, it is unlikely that UNICEF could manage more than one or two emergencies on the global trigger at any one time.

A second model would be to further develop the oversight role of the Regional Office and encourage a more pro-active, directive role when required, as ESARO has demonstrated. The aim would be to bolster leadership and management at CO level when required, given the fact that leadership is a key factor in response capacity. Within this evaluation, the key factors in timely and effective response have been identified as leadership together with adequate funding early in the response, effective partners and effective operations (see Goal 1). These were more important than a centralised or decentralised structure. The issue of structure arises principally when leadership through the Country Management Team is weak and the RO and HQ have not taken action. At that point the question is of how to reinforce leadership at the earliest possible stage in order to recognise and trigger a response when necessary and how to manage the response if the CMT is not able to do so.

*What would be the most appropriate structure and procedures for effective humanitarian response in the future?*

The Evaluation Team considers that the current structure is appropriate for humanitarian response but that the authority of the RO should be enhanced to ensure *reliable* response. This could be done by establishing a standard operating procedure that automatically triggers the engagement of the regional office once a country moves into a high state of alert based on the early-warning/early-action system (this was a recommendation in the Liberia evaluation). The procedure would remove the element of Country Management Team decision on whether or not to invoke support. The approach would depend on the Regional Director and Regional Advisers having a good knowledge of the prevailing situation, preferably through country visits, and making consistently good use of UNICEF intelligence through OPSCEN and the CO. This would address an issue identified in Darfur that the Regional Office did not have a sufficiently close knowledge of the situation until a visit in December 2003, more than six months after the number of IDPs and refugees had been swelling to unprecedented proportions from March/April 2003.

The second element of enhancing authority and oversight capacity of ROs would be to learn and replicate lessons on the most effective practices of ROs. These ideas are further elaborated in the recommendations below.

*Infrastructure*

UNICEF has an impressive infrastructure to serve humanitarian response having some 8,000 staff members in 157 offices in countries and territories around the globe. Given the fact that all staff and offices are mandated to respond to humanitarian crises in their geographical area and that the CCCs cover such a wide range of sectors, UNICEF is one of the agencies with the widest coverage globally if not *the* widest coverage. Country office presence compares with other key humanitarian agencies as follows:

Figure no. 2: Country office presence by other agencies providing humanitarian response<sup>29</sup>

<b>UN AGENCIES</b>	<b>RED CROSS</b>	<b>SELECTED NGOs</b>
UNICEF 157	IFRC + Nat Red Cross 150	SC Alliance 111
UNHCR 116	ICRC 80	Oxfam 100
WFP 80		WVI 96
		MSF 80

In addition, given that UNICEF has a presence before, during and after the humanitarian crisis, UNICEF can take a longer term view of humanitarian response and ensure that emergency actions are based within a longer term context and that underlying vulnerabilities are assessed and understood. A specific advantage of the long-term in Ethiopia was that development stocks can be drawn on for the first phase of emergency response. This is not the case with all humanitarian responses agencies. The downside of the development to emergency perspective is that it can mean a slower response than an exclusively emergency agency as staff are not used to working to very short planning horizons (considered below in mainstreaming).

### **3.2.8 Conclusions/recommendations on organisational capacity: motivation, resources, structure**

The following recommendations aim to address issues of regional office oversight capacity and early support to Country Management Teams. They also address the problems identified of the falling proportion of non-earmarked funding. Issues identified of individual motivation through career development are addressed under Goal 3.

#### **Recommendations**

##### ***Reinforce the oversight role of the RO***

1. Adopt the Liberia Evaluation recommendation of establishing a standard operating procedure that triggers the engagement of the RO (most often the REA, but possibly the RD or other RAs) as a country moves into a high state of alert. This should entail a joint planning session to establish a 90-day response plan that includes analysis of emergency financial support, capacity in all CCC sectors and surge requirements, partnerships, security, supply plans and additional technical/operations support. It should also analyse possible support requirements in emergency management. Clearly the level of support required will depend on capacity in country.
2. The standard operating procedure to launch RO support in the planning process should be linked to the regional human resources roster for emergencies (see Section 3.3.3 a)
3. Identify the characteristics that promote the oversight function of Regional Offices, drawing on existing models, and replicate those characteristics across all ROs. This should include *all* Regional Advisers taking responsibility for building humanitarian response capacity, not just the Regional Emergency Advisers. Promoting the oversight function will require some analysis of the resource requirements of ROs, such as independent travel budgets for all RAs so that visits are not dependent on invitations from COs.
4. Ensure that the post of Regional Adviser is considered to be a stepping stone to greater seniority to attract candidates of high technical quality.
5. Discuss the importance of RR funding to the sustainability and effectiveness of humanitarian response within the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.

<sup>29</sup> All country office information from agency websites.

### 3.3 Effectiveness against the programme goals

This section asks the question of how effective UNICEF has been in implementing the objectives and goals of the CB Programme, what constraints and bottlenecks have limited achievement and whether they were achieved within the time scale expected. It is written according to the eight goals.

#### 3.3.1 Goal 1: Preparedness Planning and Response

**To enhance UNICEF capacities for preparedness planning and response in emergencies as an integral part of country programme process and ensure that child rights are central to humanitarian efforts**

##### *The Relevance of Goal One Strategies*

The analysis of the external context has shown that UNICEF's goal of enhancing its emergency capacity is relevant to the ever-increasing demand on the agency to respond to emergencies. How relevant were the principal strategies of the CB Programme in relation to UNICEF's strengths and weaknesses in 2000, to its internal policies and priorities, the types of emergency and the evolving interagency context?

##### *Relevance to UNICEF's Capacity Building needs:*

No formal assessment of UNICEF's preparedness and response capacity was carried out prior to the design of the CB Programme. As a result, there is no coherent baseline against which to compare the relevance (or impact) of the CB Programme. Both Martigny I and the first DFID proposal emphasise contextual, rather than internal capacity factors as the primary drivers for increasing UNICEF's emergency capacity: A desk review of UNICEF's humanitarian capacity (Freedman 2001) and the first CB Programme review mission (DFID-UNICEF 2000a) nonetheless serve as a useful baseline reference. Identified weaknesses include the need to strengthen information management, monitoring and evaluation, vulnerability and early warning analysis and interagency coordination. They relate strongly to many of the strategies subsequently adopted in the CB Programme.

##### *Relevance to UNICEF's culture, policy and priorities:*

The relevance of Goal 1's approach as "an integral part of country programme process" relates in part to a pragmatic use of UNICEF's limited resources: it minimises the need for additional resources. It also optimises UNICEF's in-country presence, building its emergency capacity on established partnerships, analysis and understanding of the country and population. The CO-centred approach is also relevant to the types of emergency in most regions: half of EAPRO's, a quarter of WCARO's and nearly all of ROSA's emergencies are ongoing (chronic-complex or recurring-natural) implying the need to implement through an ongoing, rather than short-term structure. Further, an integrated approach potentially increases the timeliness of UNICEF's response as well as programme staff's accountability to the long term impact and sustainability of emergency interventions.

Several of the objectives are relevant to UNICEF's child-rights centred approach, linked to knowledge of the situation of children through enhanced monitoring and evaluation, vulnerability capacity analysis (VCA) and rapid assessment.

Of concern is the extent to which the integrated approach took account of UNICEF's governance and management structure and designed strategies to address "a growing suspicion among staff members that the decentralised structure did not serve emergency response as effectively as it had served the administration of development programmes" undermining decision-making and over-burdening the role of the Country Representative (Freedman 2001). Additionally, an emphasis on the country teams' capacity (i.e. mainstreaming) and on preparedness in particular, appears to have under-estimated the importance of emergency expertise as a component of enhanced response capacity.

### *Relevance to the Interagency Context:*

As discussed in Section 3.1.4, UNICEF has played a strong role, particularly at a global level, within the evolving interagency context. Other interagency issues of considerable relevance to UNICEF's emergency response, such as NGO partnerships and field coordination skills, were, however, paid less attention, a weakness that is discussed further with respect to UNICEF's present effectiveness.

### *Relevance to the Demand:*

The importance given to preparedness in the CB Programme was highly relevant and in keeping with an increasing recognition in the sector of the potential merits of contingency planning and early warning. Equally relevant, yet largely excluded from the CB Programme, would have been objectives aimed at increasing UNICEF's technical capacity in key sectors, particularly water and environmental sanitation (WES) which was not included in the CB Programme grant.

Strategies, notably the CCCs, emphasised response in the first few weeks of an emergency. Given the prevalence of chronic, often slow-onset emergencies and protracted periods of uncertain transition to stability, greater attention could have been paid to enhancing performance in the grey area between emergencies and UNICEF's long term programmes, in particular to the coherence between the CCCs, the MTSP and the planning frameworks of the UN family such as the CCA and UNDAF.

Overall, the design of Goal 1 was highly relevant to UNICEF's mission and management structure as well as to an increasing recognition of the need for preparedness. It was less relevant to the demands of an interagency context, and to UNICEF's response capacity.

The following sections discuss the effectiveness of the chosen strategies as well as the impact of those omitted.

### *The Effectiveness of the Strategies*

Integrated preparedness planning formed a major plank of both Phase I and II of the CB Programme. Phase II aimed to integrate vulnerability analysis, early warning and preparedness into all country programmes' key planning and management processes, as well as into a UN system-wide framework. Monitoring and evaluation was to be strengthened, and learning enhanced through real-time evaluations. As a prerequisite, guidelines had to be developed and rolled out to the COs.

### *Developing the Tools and Policy*

A lot has been done. Since 2000 key outputs include an updated version of the CCCs; the development of sectoral guidelines covering some sixteen programme areas<sup>30</sup> ("Technical Notes: Special Considerations for Programming in Unstable Situations"), the development and subsequent revisions of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRP) and the ongoing development of training materials on monitoring and evaluation and real time evaluation methodology and pilots. In addition, emergency related tools such as the Vulnerability Capacity Analysis have been included in the Programme Policy and Procedure Manual (PPPM) and initial work carried out on rapid assessment checklists. UNICEF has played a strong role through the IASC in interagency contingency planning and preparedness guidance as well as early warning mechanisms such as the recently introduced Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWS). At the time of writing, an updated version of UNICEF's Emergency Field Handbook is available in draft and a new intranet-based early warning mechanism is to be tested in 54 countries<sup>31</sup>.

The quality of the guidelines is often extremely high. Yet frustration has been expressed by both UNICEF and DFID at the relatively slow progress. Planned guidelines on early warning for UNICEF and the UNCT have not been completed, nor have indicators of preparedness. Rapid assessment tools have been long

---

<sup>30</sup> Health, nutrition, education, separated children, IDPs, landmine awareness, gender, early childhood development, adolescents, sexual violence, child soldiers, children in detention, psychosocial needs, impact of sanctions, water, sanitation, shelter

<sup>31</sup> Some of these outputs were not part of the Programme of Cooperation funding

awaited and although initial checklists are included in the draft Field Handbook, a complete tool remains only in draft.

Delays have largely been the result of limited allocated capacity in HQ. They are also linked to UNICEF's commitment to the production of quality, highly comprehensive tools - laudable in itself. Some however, of those interviewed, view this as an example of an organisational culture that prioritises perfection over a "good enough" approach, an echo perhaps of the risk-averse culture discussed in Section 3.2.5. At any rate, it slows productivity and potentially results in tools that are so comprehensive as to be redundant in the time-poor context of emergencies.

*Progress on integrating the new guidance into country programme planning and practice*  
The critical issue is whether the tools and mechanisms are being used in the field.

#### *Vulnerability Capacity Analysis (VCA)*

VCA assesses the likely impact of an emergency on communities through linking potential hazards to an analysis of a community's vulnerability and coping capacities. It is now part of the PPPM and as such is an integral component of regular and emergency programmes and expected to feature as a component of UNICEF's situation analyses or SitAns. Evidence, however, of the systematic use of VCA is scant.

An examination of selected SitAns and Annual Reports often shows an impressive use of data, causal analysis and understanding of the population's vulnerability to present threats. Yet none includes an analysis of potential hazards or the likely impact of additional threats on vulnerable groups. Whilst the analysis of duty bearer capacity was usually strong (because of the links with government and partnerships), it was weak on community coping strategies and on ways of strengthening them in emergencies. This weakness is inconsistent with UNICEF's commitment to gender based programming, HRBAP and a child-rights centred approach particularly. The data is also not sufficiently accessible for an emergency context when information must be rapid, tabular and short on narrative.

CCAs are progressively replacing UNICEF's SitAns. Concerns have been expressed that the CCAs are less thorough than SitAns which does not bode well for improving VCA within UNICEF or the UNCT.

VCA is not easy to do, particularly in an emergency, and should be a component of the contingency planning process and training. It may suggest the need for a highly simplified process. A positive development is the inclusion of a vulnerability (though not capacity) analysis in the new EPRP template. UNICEF Sri Lanka was one of the few agencies to carry out an assessment (with UNHCR) of IDP concerns in February 2005<sup>32</sup>, quoting Principle 28 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which recognizes the right of IDPs to fully participate in the planning and management of their return, relocation and reintegration. Although by no means a VCA, it does demonstrate the potential and UNICEF's commitment towards greater consultation. More often though, the kind of detailed awareness required of community preferences and behaviour may only be available from partners who are working directly with beneficiaries. Limited awareness and use of VCA within UNICEF weakens the CO's ability to support partners to contribute or carry out VCAs themselves.

The simpler approach of the new EPRP may be the most realistic for the time being. Embedding VCA in regular programmes is evidently taking time; it is too ambitious to expect it to be fully used in emergencies. An actual worked example of a full VCA would be useful for COs along with some facilitated sessions in better-resourced COs to support the development of simplified tools.

#### *Early Warning*

There are no completed UNICEF guidelines for early warning. To an extent, the changing context of increased interagency collaboration has made UNICEF-specific early warning tools redundant, given that joint early warning systems are increasingly encouraged. UNICEF has contributed strongly to the IASC's work on early warning and contingency planning and progress has been impressive, at least at HQ level.

---

<sup>32</sup> 'Concerns and Preferences of Tsunami Affected IDPs in Ampara, Galle and Jaffna Districts'

However, the survey results showed that field staff's understanding of early warning is weak and the use of systematic tools or systems limited: Country Management Team responses showed a greater likelihood of using systems and data bases from external sources, such as FEWS, and some referred to OPSCEN. But over a third relied on interagency meetings and ad hoc communications between agencies. Some COs emphasise support to government early warning; UNICEF's long-term commitment to early warning and support to the government has paid dividends in its Ethiopia response. 41% of individuals who responded stated that they did not use any systems at all. Those that did were mostly using sector indicators (malnutrition, mortality rates etc), followed by media sources.

DRC relies principally on interagency coordination meetings, TACRO uses OPSCEN analysis, RO country profiles and other sources to provide COs with weekly and monthly analyses of security and vulnerability. ROSA accesses a variety of regional early warning sources. ESARO has piloted the use of sentinel sites for early warning in five of six countries in southern Africa and supported nutritional surveillance monitoring for the southern Africa countries. Sri Lanka uses meteorological data as well as UN security information and information fed to Colombo by its zonal offices. There was very little evidence of clear early warning roles and accountabilities in CO documents such as workplans. Only 15% of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRP) examined for the evaluation referred to concrete early warning systems or indicators.

The picture is one of fairly ad hoc and unsystematic early warning. A further challenge for UNICEF is to ensure that early warning information translates into action. In Kosovo, UNICEF initiated its planning process in mid-April 1999 but did not start to operationalise the concept until 10 days before the return of the refugees on 12 June (UNICEF 2001a). As noted by one respondent, the preparedness process "must acknowledge the limited precision of risk/threat analysis, and not spend excessive time over it", moving quickly to do-able actions by all key agencies and individuals.

UNICEF's pilot Early Warning intranet site intends to mitigate the risk of inaction by any one decision-maker by optimising practical planning steps including operations and by involving a number of stakeholders in activating an alert. OPSCEN, the ERT, Geographical Desks and the RO form an Early Warning Task Force each of which are accountable for reacting to increasing threat. A high alert automatically leads to a warning email and links to immediate mandatory action. As well as the CO, OPSCEN can also issue an alert. This early action also provides early warning information from a number of sources. It is too early to say, but the combination of interagency efforts such as HEWS and UNICEF's new accountability-based mechanism may lead to significant improvements.

An enduring challenge for UNICEF relates to the recognition that a situation is shifting into heightened levels of threat – an essential pre-requisite of the new intranet system. This is a real challenge, particularly in slow-onset and chronic emergencies. Bold indicators, such as event monitoring (flooding, locust movements etc) and rapid onset in general can be easier to recognise. A progressively deteriorating situation common to complex emergencies (Darfur) and drought (Southern Africa) demands detailed monitoring of key indicators over time, as well as an understanding of when the approach must shift gear. This is far less obvious. Staff inexperienced in emergencies may struggle with when "extraordinary action – beyond routine programmes and systems – is required to ensure the basic rights/survival and well-being of children and women".<sup>33</sup> Recognising when the CCCs become the operating framework requires careful monitoring of selected indicators such as displacement, political developments, conflict patterns, malnutrition and morbidity data set against an analysis of the population's vulnerability and coping strategies.

UNICEF is well-placed to do this, given its access to baseline data derived from detailed situation analysis and MICS. It is however an imprecise science that must be combined with judgement calls made by experienced emergency staff. In this context, enhanced and systematic accountabilities should help staff in HQ and the RO support the CO to make sense of early warning information. At the same time, if, as the evidence suggests, early warning monitoring is weak, the foundation of the system will remain fragile. Notwithstanding the increasing emphasis on interagency early warning systems, UNICEF

---

<sup>33</sup> EMOPS Board Paper 1996

staff clearly need greater support to develop simple internal systems. Early warning monitoring needs to be light (so that it gets done) but systematic and intelligent – its value lies not in the collection of vast amounts of data, but in making sense of what the data means and what UNICEF should do as a result. The same can be said of monitoring.

*Strengthened monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms:*

Overall, M&E remains weak. Extensive, quality materials have been produced<sup>34</sup> and various training strategies implemented. A Training of Trainers (ToT) for M&E officers was carried out in 2003 and consultants selected to work as on-the-job M&E coaches. Yet evidence of effective monitoring systems in the COs is limited and the demand for the coaching negligible.

An analysis of workplans and some CPMPs shows a positive inclusion of monitoring in workplans, particularly in education (e.g. drop out rates), some in protection (e.g. under-age recruitment) and nutrition (e.g. growth monitoring) but very limited evidence of systematic systems. Evaluations and internal reviews repeatedly refer to poor systems, limited UNICEF field presence and a tendency to emphasise activities and outputs, rather than impact and outcome.

In 2003, UNICEF stated that “In M&E in crisis and unstable contexts, there is little to suggest that the situation at CO level has changed since Martigny” (UNICEF Evaluation Office, 2003). In Liberia (UNICEF Evaluation Office 2004a), Somalia and Burundi (ECHO, 2004a) monitoring was criticised for being weak. In Darfur in 2005, “Effective monitoring tools were available but staff on the ground either did not know of their existence and/or did not use them” (UNICEF-DFID, 2005). By contrast, Sri Lanka, previously assessed as weak on M&E, is strengthening its commitment to monitoring and most of the workplans contain concrete plans to establish or maintain systems.

“Another key reason for the lack of results-oriented monitoring obviously lies in the lack of regular field presence or even visits by concerned UNICEF staff ... UNICEF therefore relies essentially on the monitoring capacity of its implementing partners –often government services” (ECHO 2004a). Security restrictions on UN staff’s access to the field have increased UNICEF’s dependence on partners for information. Yet UNICEF staff and partners alike observed that UNICEF’s monitoring often focuses on accountability for resources and outputs, rather than impact and the systematic collection of quality and timely information. Coherence between UNICEF’s information needs and systems and those of partners is reportedly often weak; UNICEF cannot impose but it can collaborate and influence. Without having got its own house in order, the efficiencies of shared monitoring will remain elusive.

UNICEF’s Evaluation Office commissioned a review of the quality of evaluations supported by UNICEF COs in 2003. It found that while 1 in 5 evaluations could be considered excellent, one-third of evaluations are of poor quality. COs do not regularly carry out reviews or commission evaluations. The development of a real-time evaluation (RTE) and its piloting in Liberia is a positive development. The absence of an RTE in the recent Tsunami is unfortunate; if a well-resourced high-priority emergency does not prioritise evaluation, it suggests a risk of fading momentum.

UNICEF has rightly pointed out that the good performance of UNICEF COs in countless small emergencies is not reflected in this evaluation. However the absence of reviews of such responses means that no evidence is available to support the assertion – which is not to say it is untrue. If numerous examples of good practice go unrecorded, they are also not contributing to UNICEF’s institutional learning, accountability and – importantly – staff motivation.

UNICEF’s capacity to use lessons learned from previous or other experiences appears variable. The response to the Sri Lanka Tsunami and on-going conflict appears to have taken on the recommendations from the DFID/ SIDA/ UNICEF review of CAAC programming carried out in 2002 (Joint DFID/SIDA/UNICEF Review, 2002) and built the present response on lessons learned from programming

---

<sup>34</sup> UNICEF Monitoring and Evaluation Training Modules. Includes M&E in Crisis and Unstable Contexts (work in progress)

in a protracted conflict situation e.g. child protection. The ability of the RO to disseminate lessons from and between regions is also viewed as valuable, though still limited.

Collecting and sharing timely information on the situation of children and women is an essential role for UNICEF, all the more so in emergencies. Although it is by no means alone in facing difficulties in M&E, persistent weaknesses in M&E pose a serious challenge to its mandate, coordination and advocacy objectives. Why have efforts not so far paid off? The problems rest with three principal challenges:

1. The conceptual framework of M&E takes most people time to grasp; the logic and the language can appear alien and opaque: it will take time to become integrated
2. UNICEF lacks the capacity to fully support staff to learn and then implement simple, feasible systems
3. The lack of awareness and prioritisation of M&E by key CO managers, the SPOs and Representatives
4. Relatedly, the lack of demand for M&E in the ROs, HQ and from donors. At present it remains, in practice, optional.

Neither HQ or the ROs have the capacity for oversight that could generate the “need” and therefore the motivation in COs. Additionally, current tools may be aiming too high – field users do not find the time to read them, never mind establish related systems. M&E Officers, where they exist, are often relatively junior staff diverted to other tasks including routine report-writing. They lack the authority and time to work with colleagues on M&E.

UNICEF has already initiated a number of strategies designed to address M&E weaknesses. The new MTSP highlights M&E, plans a global IMEP and organisational standards for M&E and includes targets such as 75% of offices must respond to evaluation findings, plans for additional training including rapid assessment and the inclusion of M&E in the EPRPs.

There are presently plans in EMOPs to “translate” existing policy and practice guidelines into accessible field versions, an encouraging development. Staff interviewed valued the Technical Notes and the old Field Handbook for their practical orientation and accessibility; the new version is also extremely promising: a how-to approach, brief and relevant. UNICEF has also developed different HIV/AIDS training modules, designed for different users, differentiating between the needs of, for example the Representative and SPO as opposed to Programme Officers, a sensible and promising development.

The exceptional funding of the Tsunami response offers opportunities to resource typically under-funded areas such as monitoring and evaluation. Tsunami-affected COs could increase their M&E staffing and pilot monitoring systems under each of the CCCs. Pilots could test the validity of absolute minimum monitoring systems against in depth systems implemented at the same time for comparison. Each sector could for example develop mechanisms and indicators at two levels; testing whether a rough and ready version (perhaps concentrating on only two indicators per outcome) delivered adequate feedback on programme effectiveness, in comparison to a more technically comprehensive version.

#### **a) Conclusions/recommendations on Goal 1: Preparedness and Response: tools, policies, monitoring and evaluation**

Overall, the Programme of Cooperation has supported the development of an impressive array of guidelines and associated capacity building, particularly in preparedness. The challenge remains to ensure that tools are tailored to the time-poor realities of the field and combined with adequate management processes to ensure that they are used. At present, none of the intended mechanisms are operational at an organisation-wide level. Staff need more support to understand and apply the tools for early warning, M&E and VCA with clearer accountabilities established for all levels, starting with senior managers.

### **Recommendations:**

1. Support and resource the planned development of simplified tools, including worked examples of VCA in practice, for field use
2. Make more use of end-of-mission field staff to develop tools
3. Ensure that the EPRP process includes the development of a small number of readily collectable indicators on early warning and ensure that SPOs include early warning monitoring in their workplans as well as routine use of the new pilot early action intranet system.
4. Increase the accountability of RO and HQ with oversight functions to demand improved monitoring and evaluation data in Annual Reports and Sitreps
5. Tailor M&E training to different posts, following the model developed for HIV/AIDS modules. One day workshops for example could be designed, as a priority, for all Representatives and SPOs to promote understanding and generate demand
6. Elevate the status of M&E through greater investment and specific senior accountabilities reflected in the workplans of SPOs, Country Representatives and RO Advisors
7. Lightweight reviews should be routinely implemented for all responses. Small responses should capture the lessons learned through an internal rapid review such as an After Action Review
8. The practice of requesting Representatives to write up brief lessons learned following a posting should be reinstated. The same should be done for SPOs and senior emergency personnel (e.g. the REAs)
9. Use the opportunities offered by well-resourced emergencies such as the Tsunami response to test the effectiveness of minimum monitoring systems alongside in depth systems and promote best practice elsewhere

### **b) Conclusions/recommendations on Goal 1: Enhancing Preparedness through the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans**

Of all the time spent on approaches to capacity building by HQ and the ROs, the EPRP has taken the lion's share. Over the years, coverage has steadily increased and at present, some 90% of COs have participated in some form of EPRP. This is a considerable achievement.

#### *How Prepared are the COs?*

UNICEF is currently developing indicators to measure CO preparedness. They cover the EPRP, early warning mechanisms, clear coordination roles, minimum operational readiness, concrete actions established for response (vis à vis CCCs, rapid assessment, coordination, operations), rapid assessment capacity in the CO, security management and compliance, human resource surge planning, supply plans, awareness of CCCs, EPRP, PATH, Basic Security Training, EPRT, integration of minimum preparedness activities into Annual Work Plans (AWPs) and RO oversight of CO threat assessment. The CB Programme Phase II logframe also includes indicators such as integration of key processes in AWP and Country Programme Management Plans (CPMPs).

An analysis of 27 EPRPs indicates that the quality of the process and product is fairly high with respect to the intended framework. Emergency scenarios are often thorough and the majority had established some sort of standing readiness, at least on paper. However, only 20% of the EPRPs had detailed partners and fewer were thinking of new partners to, for example, cover the CCCs. Very few of the plans were coherent with the CCCs (tending to retain an MTSP framework) and indeed awareness of the CCCs remains low. Only 56% of CMT survey responses thought that all staff were aware of them. Individual responses indicated that even where staff said they knew the CCCs, over a fifth evidently did not understand what they were at all, a finding corroborated in the field visits. EPRPs were also weak on references to Sphere (Sphere Project, 2004), concrete early warning systems or indicators. Plans are often vague regarding mechanisms for rapid assessment (only 1 included key assessment criteria for the sectors). M&E planning is weak.

The EPRP sections on planned actions per key post are one of the more thorough aspects. The majority had detailed internal management lines, though were weaker on specific reporting arrangements. Only 2

EPRPs assessed human resource surge needs; most plans were based on the existing team with broad references to possible help from RO & HQ. Some EPRPs demonstrated real difficulties in understanding what an emergency is (for example including road accidents as high risk scenarios). A pattern emerges of the most operational-looking plans being those done by countries already in some state of emergency indicating limitations to the process for inexperienced staff, further discussed below.

Survey responses suggest that many COs think they are reasonably prepared with the exception of M&E and partnerships. 71% had identified partners but only 24% had established concrete agreements. Only 33% of the survey respondents had established an HR surge plan and only a third had M&E capacity for all sectors. A little over half had established coordination responsibilities within the UNCT.

Most of the concrete examples of activated preparedness relate to the establishment of stocks (a third had established contingency stocks for up to a month) and, less often, advanced implementation such as the preparation of education materials, new sub offices and better communications. Understandably, given the cost, these latter often take place only in higher risk countries. Indeed, allocating resources to preparedness is difficult; at present there is no global mechanism in place through which COs can redirect funds to contingency planning. Recourse is often made to EPF loans.

Although 50% of the Country Management Team responses stated that preparedness activities were included in workplans, interviews and reviews suggest otherwise. Neither HQ nor the ROs have the capacity to provide oversight or monitor how “real” the plans are. An examination of preparedness planning in 7 CPMPs for 2005 showed mixed results. Ethiopia and DRC’s CPMP showed emergency work as strongly integrated into the whole programme. Other countries, with less risk of emergency, sometimes referenced preparedness but without concrete resource allocation. Operations, for example, had no accountabilities for emergency preparedness. Concrete resource allocation to early warning and preparedness, as opposed to response, was limited in DRC as it was in Sri Lanka. Ethiopia’s annual workplans (AWPs) contain regular references to preparedness activities and some early warning plans. Conversely, of the 15 AWP’s viewed from Sri Lanka this year, only one contains any reference at all to early warning, contingency planning or preparedness. The responsibility for this apparently rests with one person, the Planning & M&E Officer.

Under the current EPRP process, UNICEF does not distinguish between *mitigation* and *preparedness*. (UNICEF 2004b). This has also been a criticism of the CCCs. In Bukavu for example, the office was aware that its main emphasis tended to be on preparing for the potentially massive humanitarian needs looming from a flawed DDR process, rather than focusing on advocacy, lobbying government and the UN Mission to improve the process. The constraint of course is not UNICEF’s alone; most of all it derives from lack of donor interest and funding, an issue for consideration by DFID.

Overall, the commitment to ensuring that COs have undertaken EPRPs has been impressive and one of the most notable innovations to regular country programme approaches. The evaluation’s main concerns relate to whether the EPRPs are really operational - or just paper exercises - and a lack of RO oversight, quality control and follow up. Are the obvious weaknesses or omissions in some EPRPs ever raised? Comparisons between old and new tend not to demonstrate improvements. There are long gaps between updates in many COs, although Ethiopia is an example of a recently updated EPRP. Examples from Darfur, Liberia and elsewhere demonstrate that some EPRPs were not “living” documents.

Is it realistic to expect ROs to monitor the workplans or the CPMPs – an indicator selected for the CB Programme logframe? Perhaps not, at least not the CPMPs which are long and require a close reading. Workplans are brief though. Nonetheless, ROs mostly lack the capacity to read them. Notwithstanding the significant lack of oversight that this implies, efforts could be made to monitor, at the very least, the SPO workplans, given their responsibilities for overall programme management.

### *The Impact of Preparedness on Response*

UNICEF reports mention some 11 countries that assessed their response as improved as a result of the EPRP or contingency planning (UNICEF Evaluation Office, 2003)<sup>35</sup>. Little is said about why, perhaps again reflecting UNICEF's difficulties with attribution and systematic lesson-learning. The Batticaloa scenario planning foresaw the split in the LTTE and supported its readiness for the crisis. ECHO compliments UNICEF on its preparedness in Somalia and Burundi (ECHO 2004a); the CB Guinea Field Review also notes that EPRP was helpful and owned by the team (DFID-UNICEF, 2002a). Overall, there are indications that the *process* of the EPRP has been helpful, mostly in terms of increasing the staff's awareness of emergencies, the CCCs and their likely roles. Iraq's EPRP and contingency planning process (though felt to be over-long) was nonetheless regarded as a model process that significantly impacted on UNICEF's response, benefiting from pre-established partnerships, pre-positioned stocks, sub-regional planning and the process of training and involving national staff, enabling UNICEF to work throughout the war. Other COs commented (e.g. Haiti and Sri Lanka) that they did not return to the plan, yet the process nonetheless improved the response.

Survey results were extremely positive about the EPRP process: 86% of senior management teams viewed it as an effective way of preparing and increasing capacity; as did 76% of individual staff. The existence of contingency stocks created as a result of preparedness is most often mentioned as a key benefit of preparedness. Existing stocks greatly facilitated UNICEF's speed in Sri Lanka's Tsunami response as did UNICEF's detailed knowledge of the government stocks, established during preparedness.

At the same time, evidence from recent responses (e.g. Liberia, Nepal and Darfur) demonstrate that having done an EPRP does not mean that the CO *is* prepared, or *reliably* translates into a good response. ROs identify a number of persistent factors hampering implementation of preparedness activities: competing priorities at CO level, lack of prioritisation within identified preparedness activities, challenges in covering the supply component of preparedness (discussed further under Goal 2), the labour intensive nature of preparedness activities, the degree of commitment of the Representative and lack of clarity about what level of preparedness is expected. The success of the Iraq preparedness, though unusual in terms of its long lead time and resources, was attributed to the positive presence of many of the above issues, identifying leadership, commitment and a clear framework (around the CCCs) as amongst the key ingredients of success.

A key issue is the relevance of the preparedness. COs such as Gujarat and Ukraine completed or updated their EPRPs just before the crisis; HQ support to Haiti was extremely timely and greatly facilitated the transition from planning to concrete action. The difficulty demonstrated by some COs in understanding and certainly prioritising apparently remote scenarios further suggests that the closer the preparedness experience is to the crisis, the greater the impact. This is consistent with evidence suggesting that adults engage in learning in a highly purposive manner, emphasising links to what they need to know (e.g. Brookfield). Similarly, offices in a constant state of emergency such as DRC expressed frustration at the organisational demand for complicated preparedness – their needs relate to funding, contingency stocks and timely supplies for an ongoing minimum response, not more plans.

The EPRPs do not include partners. This is partly the result of a perceived need within UNICEF to first embed the process internally. It may also relate to a tendency to regard NGOs as sub-contractors rather than partners, a fact noted in the Mid-Programme review in 2003 as well as a cultural tendency to over-emphasise UNICEF's own plans and capacity without due consideration of the implementing reality of an emergency, heavily dependent on the capacity of other agencies often independent of any contractual obligations. In the context of increasing interagency preparedness, the CHAP and an operational environment that sees UNICEF implementing largely through partners, this is a significant weakness. Some COs have involved partners and even led interagency planning (Burundi, Iraq), but this is rare.

---

<sup>35</sup> El Salvador, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Haiti, Honduras, India, Kenya, Malawi, Panama, Vietnam, as well as Iraq and surrounding countries.

Despite the value of the EPRP, there are signs that UNICEF has adopted a box-ticking approach (focusing on ensuring that as many COs have been through an EPRP as possible) rather than on the impact and need. The risk of an emergency occurring almost anywhere and the value of ensuring that any CO can respond at least to a small emergency is fully recognised. However, given limited resources, a tailored approach with different degrees of operational expectation according to the level of risk would be more efficient and relevant. Low risk countries could carry out simple awareness-raising EPRPs of no more than one or two days. Countries with signs of increasing risk would then engage in a more imminent-action detailed format. COs that are able to engage in meaningful interagency preparedness planning could carry out a short internal version first, to clarify its objectives, and then develop it in an interagency context.

This would of course demand far better early warning monitoring, to ensure that increasing risk was identified in time. However, the extremely demanding nature of the weeklong EPRP versions has been a heavy burden on HQ and subsequently the ROs (as well as the participating COs). A reduced process could free up the ROs to pay greater attention to oversight, timely support and monitoring, all essential activities that are currently under-resourced.

Interviews have also noted the limitations of a mainstreamed approach, impacting primarily on the shift from preparedness to response. The EPRP has undoubtedly succeeded in raising staff awareness of the shared responsibility for emergencies. A hypothetical exercise can prime a team for what to expect, but cannot prepare them fully for the reality of scarce data, volatile contexts and rapid decision-making and increased risk of error. Particularly in large emergencies, UNICEF's capacity building approach with government partners may also face a radical shift into an operational context dominated by new and multiple partners with a tenuous link to UNICEF's planning and no formal recognition of its authority.

This is not only psychologically difficult to adapt to, but often demands different competencies, refocused technical skills, aptitudes and techniques (e.g. rapid assessment rather than a MICS, partner coordination rather than capacity building, setting up temporary schools rather than supporting the Ministry of Education and so on). Crisis simulation exercises have been run by UNICEF, aimed at addressing concrete aptitudes. It will be extremely important for UNICEF to monitor whether simulation enhances the number of staff who tend to thrive in new circumstances, and reduces those that become traumatised or paralysed to act.

Although staff value the EPRP – seen in Ethiopia as one of the most important contributions to enhanced response – that may be why survey results suggested it was not as important as a number of other factors. Funding, effective partners, CO leadership and operations are viewed as key determinants of effective response.

The new EPRP format proposes a simplified process and addresses several of the weaknesses outlined above, such as clearer links to the CCCs, resource mobilisation, detailed operational plans and greater emphasis on coordination and partners, including the identification of partners to meet the CCCs. Additionally, the shift towards using a ToT approach in each country (Ethiopia now has 14 ToTs) is a positive development which should reduce the burden on ROs. However, there is evidence that without external/RO facilitation, the process may not happen or be incomplete. Hence, the effectiveness of these decentralised EPRPs still needs monitoring, again implicating RO resources.

### **c) Conclusions/recommendations on Goal 1: Preparedness and Response: Emergency Preparedness Planning**

The rollout of preparedness planning has been impressive and appropriate. The process itself has been highly valued and, in some offices, has improved UNICEF's response capacity. However, the impact on genuine operational readiness is variable, an understanding of the CCCs patchy and the implementation of concrete actions limited. The one-size fits all approach has over-burdened the ROs and participants; follow-up and oversight is weak. Preparedness by COs is undoubtedly an important strategy, but a plan does not reliably translate into a good response. Neither can the process entirely offset a lack of actual

emergency experience in a response team. There may have been an over-reliance on its potential. Mainstreaming is insufficient on its own and needs to be backed up from specialists and investment in CO technical response capacity. More attention is needed to tailor the EPRPs to the CO context: to its level of risk, interagency role and its existing and potential emergency partners.

*Recommendations:*

1. ROs could experiment with out-sourcing the facilitation of EPRPs to reduce the burden on REAs and free up their time for oversight and timely updates
2. Tailor the EPRPs to the level of risk, as well as existing experience, in the CO
3. Assessments of a CO's response capacity should not over-estimate the impact of an EPRP, particularly in teams without significant in-country emergency experience. Complementary planning for specialist staff should be an automatic component of the preparedness plans
4. ROs should emphasise the updating and reworking of plans whenever monitoring indicates a potential emergency (slow onset). Planning can then be closely tied to imminent needs
5. EPRPs should be done in two phases: one internal process to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clear within the team, a second, fuller process with other UN agencies, government and NGO partners
6. Scenario planning during preparedness should identify strategies for mitigation, as well as response
7. Accountabilities and planned activities for preparedness should automatically be part of senior managers' workplans and monitored by the ROs

#### **d) Conclusions/recommendations on Goal 1: The Impact on UNICEF's Performance in Emergency Response**

Again, the picture is mixed. The three countries visited by the evaluation were, overall, considered effective (DRC and Ethiopia) or very effective (Sri Lanka). Evaluations and interviews elsewhere suggest a patchier performance overall.

External agencies and partners in DRC viewed UNICEF as a key and effective humanitarian actor, citing a can-do approach, timely and collaborative support for supplies and sustained capacity (albeit still too limited), particularly in a context in which many NGOs have lost their emergency expertise and downsized their programmes.

UNICEF made a significant contribution to the joint efforts of the Government, UN agencies, NGOs and donors that worked together to avoid a major famine in Ethiopia in 2003. Its current drive to address and mobilise around recurring malnutrition is also valued.

UNICEF was quick to respond to the tsunami in Sri Lanka with effective interventions, in line with the CCCs. UNICEF quickly re-established basic health services post-tsunami, helping to prevent the spread of communicable disease. Micronutrients (especially Vitamin A) were quickly delivered and the facilities provided for an effective cold-chain. Breastfeeding was promoted despite imports of milk powder. Post tsunami UNICEF has played a valuable role in supporting nutritional surveillance and subsequent advocacy. The Back to School campaign in Sri Lanka was very quickly rolled out both in the immediate and intermediate phases.

Coordination in water and sanitation was viewed as positive initially but, following the departure of the surge provided by HQ, lacked technical expertise and was weaker in terms of hygiene promotion.

Within the first week, UNICEF and partners in child protection were communicating messages about the care of separated children according to the Inter Agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (ICRC, 2004), preventing the early adoption of children and ensuring that separated children remained within communities and were not placed in institutions.

In Iraq, UNICEF was one of the few agencies able to work throughout the war variously supplying water, parts for sewerage systems, restoring cold chains for vaccines, and supplying educational materials to some 4.5 million children, amongst other actions.

In Liberia, UNICEF contributed strongly to chlorination campaigns and Back to School. Although achieving significant coverage eventually, the measles vaccination campaign was extremely late and there were weaknesses in programme communications (in WES, health and nutrition), coverage and monitoring as well as HIV/AIDS.

UNICEF was strongly criticised for its Darfur response (including by DFID), particularly in WES (and to a lesser extent, nutrition) for which its technical response and competence to lead was called into question. Staff had limited awareness of the CCCs, were unprepared and failed to collaborate effectively with the NGOs. "If UNICEF wants to continue to lead sector coordination, there is a clear need to strengthen internal sector capacity, in terms of monitoring and evaluation, sector analysis, contingency planning and hygiene promotion" (UNICEF-DFID, 2005).

The survey asked respondents to state how effective they thought UNICEF was in a number of areas and sectors as well as phases and types of emergency. Overall, individuals thought the most effective sectors were Nutrition, WES and Education – 59%, 58% and 53% respectively and the least effective were HIV/AIDS, Coordination and HR. They were optimistic about improvement over the last 5 years – all had improved except HR.

CMTs were also optimistic about UNICEF's performance. 100% thought that health and nutrition were effective, 69% Education. Less thought that UNICEF was effective in WES (38%), Child Protection (38%) and HIV/AIDS (20%). Around a quarter of the CMTs assessed both WES and HIV/AIDS as not effective. However, senior managers were more optimistic about improvements over the last 5 years. Although 43% thought WES had *not* improved, 100% thought child protection had improved, 93% health and nutrition, 87% Education, and 71% HIV/AIDS.

With the exception perhaps of HIV/AIDS, this optimism is not entirely reflected elsewhere. UNICEF has invested in HIV/AIDS through active contribution to the development of IASC guidelines, producing its own rapid assessment checklists and included HIV/AIDS as one of the CCC focus areas in response. Generally, though, a repeated theme in the evaluation has been a perceived loss of UNICEF's technical capacity, particularly in the WES sector, but also in health and nutrition. Even in programmes with good technical performance such as the Somalia WES programme, UNICEF's capacity is often stretched and thinly spread (ECHO 2004a).

Poor performance in WES was identified prior to or early in the CB Programme - in Kenya and Madagascar (DFID-UNICEF 2000a) and more recently in Darfur (UNICEF-DFID, 2005) and Liberia where nutrition was also assessed as relatively weak (UNICEF Evaluation Office 2004a). Even in DRC and Sri Lanka where UNICEF's overall performance is good, UNICEF has had limited capacity in the WES sector. In Ethiopia, WES capacity was much greater due to the seriousness of the issue ongoing in Ethiopia.

*Effectiveness in different phases and types of emergency:*

On balance, most CMTs thought that UNICEF responded better in slow onset emergencies, both complex and natural. The main reasons given were that UNICEF's procedures and supplies were very slow and not able to respond to rapid onset - slow onset gave the CO time to get ready. By contrast, those who thought UNICEF was better in rapid onset generally cited clearer emergency triggers/indicators (compared to slow onset where COs could fail to recognise a progressively deteriorating situation moving into emergency) and the CNN factor/organisational prioritisation of the emergency.

In addition to the above reasons which largely chimed with the Country Management Team responses, individuals cited reluctance on the part of staff and senior managers to initiate a response leading to slow action in rapid onset (concealed when the onset is slow as there is more time for the managers to accept an emergency or be subject to pressure from the RO or HQ) and fear of upsetting relations with government or shifting from government as the usual partner.

Although the results were broadly spread, questionnaires and field visits (DRC and Sri Lanka) tended to assess UNICEF's response capacity as marginally better in the earlier phases of an emergency, despite the limitations related to the provision of timely resources and bureaucratic procedures. This was largely related to concerns about the transition phase, citing loss of momentum and organisational priority, drop off in funds, sustainability issues, falling between the CAP and RR and OR and a loss of staff capacity as the TFTs leave.


Guidelines for transition in UNICEF relate mostly to countries demonstrating significant stabilisation such as a steadily increasing GNP and decreasing child mortality. In these contexts, UNICEF will redefine its role towards advocacy and reduce operations. Less clear to staff are the transitions from predominantly short-term life-saving approaches in crisis to longer-term programmes that nonetheless take place in unstable contexts. The weak links between programming approach in the CCCs and the MTSP has not helped. The new MTSP has made linkages with the CCCs clearer and included them in the monitoring system. This is an important step. It will not solve the real challenges involved in recognising when and how programmes can increasingly prioritise longer-term approaches, capacity building, participation and sustainability. This is particularly challenging in protracted emergencies which are neither one nor other.

The evidence is unclear with respect to whether UNICEF responds better to different sizes of emergency. Other factors, such as whether it is an organisational priority, is well-funded and benefits from strong leadership appear to affect performance more than scale. The lack of secondary data on performance in small emergencies prevents a systematic comparison.

*What impact has the CB Programme had on UNICEF's response performance?*

As discussed above, there does appear to be a link between the emergency preparedness efforts supported by the Programme and UNICEF's performance. What other factors affect performance and has the Programme affected them?

Interviews and evaluations tend to concur with the findings of the staff survey which prioritises factors affecting performance in the following way:



Effective partners, quick funding, good operations and CO leadership are key. Evaluations and interviews also attribute good performance to coordination (Sri Lanka), collaborative open attitudes (DRC), continuous and close support to the government (Ethiopia) and innovations in the field (e.g. a rapid disbursement assessment fund in DRC implemented between UNICEF, OCHA and DFID).

The findings suggest that weak performance relates primarily to:

- Weak technical capacity in UNICEF teams – an absence of strong skills in all the CCCs
- Weak coordination and facilitation skills
- Weak leadership and an unwillingness to adapt the ongoing programme to emergencies

- Limited capacity and spreading capacity too thinly – taking on key coordination roles without the ability to deliver
- Poor information collection and management

Several of the above are discussed elsewhere in this report. Of note, here is the lack of investment in technical capacity, coordination and facilitation skills and resources.

There appears to have been a remarkable degree of inattention to UNICEF's technical capacity in recent years. WES did not benefit from the bolstering of RO capacity achieved under the CB Programme. DRC, a country with acute needs in the sector, has no WES advisor in the CO; they are not alone.

Initial findings of the Humanitarian Response Review identifies a clear gap overall in preparedness and in the sectors of protection, shelter, water supply and sanitation. "UNICEF has appropriately emphasised preparedness but WES has not been invested in and shelter falls outside the CCCs" (IASC 2005). Despite the status of water and sanitation as a key MDG and its recognised importance as a major risk in emergencies "funding figures also show a notably lower level of spending on CCCs in nutrition (ranging between 2 percent in 1998 and 0.1 percent in 2002) and water, environment and sanitation (WES, ranging between 8 percent in 1998 and 2 percent in 2002)" (UNICEF Evaluation Office, 2003).

Why is unclear. According to the mid-term review of the MTSP, the "IECD has not received thematic contributions and the initial emphasis of UNICEF communication possibly created an erroneous impression that the organization was placing less importance on actions in child health, nutrition and WES". WES is one of the CCCs. The CCCs are viewed as a welcome and accessible clarification of UNICEF's emergency commitments. At the same time, staff point out that many COs do not have the technical expertise in all the CCCs sectors, a severe handicap in the event of an emergency.

The new MTSP incorporates WES, health and nutrition into the *Young Child Survival and Development* Focus Area. The programme content of the CCCs is one of this goal's four key results areas. In addition, WES is designated as another key result area, focusing on 60 priority countries. This implies that most of the emergency-prone COs will have to increase their WES capacity. If the same confusion (and selectivity) that arose in the previous MTSP does not occur, most COs should, in theory, increase their technical capacity in all CCC sectors. UNICEF cannot commit itself to the CCCs and a leading role in WES, education and nutrition without the technical capacity to give this role credibility and substance.

There is an urgent need for UNICEF to reinstate and enhance its technical capacity in all the CCC sectors. Efforts are currently being made, further discussed in Goal 3 to enhance UNICEF's surge capacity. UNICEF is also in discussion with Oxfam GB on ways to improve UNICEF's WES capacity, including in coordination. This is likely to include sharing and in some cases providing staff, mentoring and real-time training as well as working together to develop UNICEF's Watsan kit for emergencies.

These efforts are extremely welcome. Further work is needed internally to develop UNICEF's technical capacity without recourse to external agencies if it is to reliably perform in emergencies. Mainstreaming is one strategy; surge and specialist capacity is another.

#### *Mainstreaming Emergency Response*

As discussed, mainstreaming preparedness has had some success. It has, however, been more problematic in the transition to and implementation of response. The Kosovo evaluation notes mainstreaming "is far from having been achieved" (UNICEF 2001a). In Darfur, the evaluation questions whether an emphasis on the country team's response was at the expense of the emergency response and notes that despite UNICEF's long-term presence in Sudan and in Darfur, little relevant baseline data on Darfur was available at the onset of the crisis, indicating limited integration of existing and emergency programming.

Field visits and interviews noted a surprising lack of integration of emergencies into the work of CO and RO Advisors. There is still a tendency – in practice though not in theory - to view emergencies as the responsibility of the emergency specialists in the team, or of the emergency focal point. This is due to a

combination of a lack of emergency experience, technical skills and work overload amongst regional advisors. However, ESARO and Ethiopia demonstrated that when leadership is given to Programme Advisors can and do take on responsibilities for emergencies within their overall work.

Mainstreaming cannot be effective without the technical capacity demanded by UNICEF's commitment to the CCCs. Country programmes may successfully take ownership of emergencies, staff may find themselves the designated focal point for a particular sector, but cannot be expected to respond effectively in sectors outside their technical domain. The CCCs are also not explicitly linked to Sphere (Sphere Project 2004) and give little guidance on coordination and partnerships, discussed below. Mainstreaming should be one component of UNICEF's approach to increasing its emergency capacity, but must be complemented with other strategies, particularly concerning surge capacity in human resources discussed in Sections 3.3.3. Mainstreaming is also dependent on adequate support from the Regional Offices.

#### *The Role of the Regional Office in Preparedness and Response*

As noted, the CB Programme has contributed to a considerable increase in the capacity of the ROs. Their role in preparedness capacity building has been pivotal and, as demonstrated by ESARO, the provision of support and (though less often) dissemination of lessons learned in the region is highly valued. ROs have played a strong role in the testing of new capacity building initiatives such as the EPRP (ESARO) and the Health and Nutrition training programme (ESARO and EAPRO). ROs have also been instrumental in promoting new developments in the EPRP, including a greater emphasis on the interagency context. Three challenges persist: gaps in technical sector posts, general over-loading of existing RO capacity and weak mainstreaming in RO teams (as discussed in Section 3.2.7).

No Regional Office has a permanent post in WES although some (including ESARO for example), have consultants covering this role<sup>36</sup>. ROSA and MENA also have no Nutrition Advisors. If, as we have seen, many COs lack the same sectoral specialists, the result is a major gap in UNICEF's response capacity. Further, many of the Regional Advisors (RAs) lack emergency experience and find it difficult to support inexperienced staff as a result. Staff in active emergency country offices may have far greater emergency experience than the advisors and are unlikely to request (or accept) advice.

Weak mainstreaming in some ROs exacerbates these technical gaps. Whilst TACRO and ESARO report far greater sharing of the emergency caseload by all the Regional Advisors, other regions such as EAPRO and WCARO have struggled to move on from a model in which RAs (and Regional Directors) concentrate on regular programmes whilst the (solitary) Regional Emergencies Advisor (REAs) deal with anything related to emergencies. Several of those interviewed found that COs would take sectoral support needs to the REA, or even to headquarters, rather than to the relevant sectoral advisor. The centralised management of the Tsunami response from headquarters apparently bypassed many of the RAs calling their emergency role into question. Despite clear accountabilities (for example in the CCCs), ROs in many cases interpret their role as one of support, rather than direction or oversight.

With the exception of MENARO for the Iraq response and one-off plans (such as the Cote d'Ivoire sub-regional plan in WCARO), UNICEF has not been able to develop multi-country EPRPs nor indeed carried out RO EPRPs. This has recently been addressed: RO management plans must now include an EPRP.

As seen above, the sheer geographical scale of each region means that REAs are forced to prioritise heavily and be reactive rather than strategic. They lack the capacity to provide sufficient oversight and quality control. Limited absorption of key office planning documents and workplans indicate somewhat alarming weaknesses in the management function of the ROs and their ability to ensure quality control and support for key activities such as monitoring and early warning.

---

<sup>36</sup> UNICEF has recently created 4 Regional Adviser posts in WES: WCARO, ESARO, ROSA and EAPRO. These posts are currently donor funded.

### **e) Conclusions/recommendations Goal 1: Preparedness and Response: Response performance**

Overall, the picture of UNICEF's response performance is mixed. Strong performance is supported by preparedness, improved operations, access to corporate guidance (such as the CCCs and technical guidelines) and, in some cases, support by the ROs and HQ - all areas supported by the CB Programme. Slow progress in key areas such as M&E and early warning may yet bear fruit and at any rate are ambitious capacity building objectives that will take time to embed in an organisation of UNICEF's size and structure.

At the same time, leadership, technical and coordination capacity, partner's capacity and established emergency experience within the country teams prevail as key performance determinants. They have received little or no support from the CB Programme and remain unacceptably weak in several cases. The findings suggest that UNICEF's technical capacity has, if anything, been eroded, particularly in WES and to an extent in Health and Nutrition. Despite improvements in some sectors, UNICEF does not have adequate capacity in either the ROs or COs to support its commitments to the CCCs and its role as a lead agency in those sectors. Considerable investment in sectoral emergency skills, coordination and UNICEF's role with respect to partners is needed. There are positive signs that UNICEF is seeking to address these weaknesses, increasing the status and integration of the CCCs within the new MTSP. The limitations of mainstreaming must also be taken into account, such that response strategies include complementary approaches such as forms of surge capacity and specialist training on the job, further discussed under Goal 3: Human Resources below. Ensuring adequate capacity in the ROs for training and support as well as addressing governance issues related to RO oversight is an essential component of any new strategies, without which the gains will be minimal.

#### *Recommendations:*

1. Match RO and CO technical capacity to the CCCs by ensuring that each sector is supported by an Advisor or Programme Officer with relevant skills and experience
2. ROs must monitor the programme plans of all at-risk countries to ensure that all CCC sectors are being implemented under the MTSP
3. The technical capacity in COs for all CCCs should be mapped on an annual basis: EPRPs of both ROs and COs must include surge plans to cover any gaps, activated on the basis of changes to a country's alert/risk level
4. Preparedness and response planning should be cautious about the potential of mainstreaming and include a raft of complementary strategies including surge and secondments
5. The forthcoming RO EPRPs should ensure clarity of roles and the integration of emergency responsibilities for all Advisors
6. For ROs with limited emergency experience, actively pursue secondments to emergencies for limited periods
7. Current efforts to engage in partnerships with international NGOs to increase technical capacity should continue
8. UNICEF should invest in its own technical capacity by i) disseminating the CCCs to staff during visits of Regional Advisors in each sector ii) disseminating standards in humanitarian response (e.g. Sphere, Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies) to CO level staff iii) increasing its training/learning in the CCC sectors.

### **f) Conclusions/recommendations Goal 1: Partners and Partnerships in the field**

The availability of good partners is consistently a major factor in UNICEF's response. This is a matter only marginally under UNICEF's control. Limited NGO presence can, as in Darfur, represent a major operating constraint (UNICEF-DFID, 2005). Does UNICEF maximise the opportunities it does have to work with and influence partner capacity in emergencies, as it tries to do in development?

In the field visits, the perceptions of UNICEF from partners were generally positive (regarding collaboration, provision of supplies and willingness to engage in DRC and Sri Lanka). Expectations of

activities such as providing a bridge to government (in DRC), advocacy, information provision, capacity building-technical support and strategic thinking were less often met.

UNICEF normally seeks to continue its partnership with government and act in a capacity building role in emergencies. This has been a central part of UNICEF's role in Ethiopia. This was possible in Sri Lanka and appropriate, though it sometimes hampered progress due to limited government capacity (for example in Vavuniya where many government posts are not filled). Following the immediate Tsunami response, UNICEF has, unusually and constructively, worked to increase the government's human resources in the health sector.

Often, particularly in the context of a failed State and in situations where government is party to the conflict, UNICEF may suddenly need to shift from existing relationships and expand its partnership base, usually to (new) NGOs. A failure to do so can severely compromise UNICEF's humanitarian principles and response, an issue identified in Nepal (DFID-UNICEF, 2004). A human rights approach to programming often calls for the involvement of NGOs or CBOs. These organizations are often in a unique position to facilitate the participation of children and women in programmes.

In medium and large emergencies, UNICEF may only be a minor partner, especially to larger NGOs who may nonetheless be an essential lead partner for UNICEF's CCCs. According to interviews at both HQ and field level, some of the major NGOs do not seek funds from UNICEF because its procedures are complex and slow, and do not cover essential costs. UNICEF rightly seeks to ensure that its partners are not solely dependent upon its funds, but UNICEF's concentration on the funding of materials associated with tangible output (water points, therapeutic supplementary feeding items) and unwillingness to fund elements such as international salaries etc leads it into competition from other NGO donors for the most "attractive" components of a programme, a competition that UNICEF will lose if other donors are willing to fund more flexibly.

As discussed, EPRPs show limited attention to concrete partnership agreements with NGOs, perhaps failing to understand the new demands these partnerships will bring. In countries unaccustomed to emergencies, staff understandably find it difficult to envisage an operating context dominated by NGOs. At any rate, international NGO presence in relatively stable countries may be extremely limited.

UNICEF has been accused of treating NGOs as little more than contractors, although little evidence of this was found in the three field visits. Quality control is a challenge. The CB Programme's field review in East Timor commented that programme staff were unclear regarding their responsibilities and role "where a partner organisation is behaving (albeit with good intentions) either illegally or not in the best interests of children" (DFID-UNICEF 2002b). As well as technical expertise, such a role demands good monitoring of partners, which according to most partners encountered in the field tends to focus on finances and outputs, rather than programme impact and joint learning.

UNICEF staff also need to nuance their approaches to partners. Inexperienced partners for example may demand closer monitoring and capacity building. Stronger NGOs welcome UNICEF's efforts to collaborate and share challenges, rather than patronise or direct. This requires better knowledge of partner capacity and relationship building prior to an emergency, or at the onset as a priority. This is a considerable transition for non-emergency staff and needs supporting. The initial role HQ played in WES coordination in Sri Lanka set the scene for UNICEF's role later, despite its relatively weak in-country technical capacity.

## **g) Conclusions/recommendations Goal 1: Preparedness and Response: Partnership**

There is an increasing commitment at a senior level in UNICEF to developing genuine partnerships that emphasise collaboration and recognise the value of a composite of skills and approaches. A recently updated executive directive (UNICEF 2005a) refers to monitoring and evaluation of partners in terms of programme quality as well as a narrower definition of accountability. The new MTSP contains repeated references to partnership and views enhanced partnership as a strategy for the future. It is hoped that

some of the practical changes required, as well as attitudinal, to make partner arrangements into partnerships will follow.

*Recommendations:*

1. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, explore simpler mechanisms for partner accountability
2. Continue to explore innovative mechanisms for partnership with local and international NGOs
3. Proactively establish relationships with potential emergency partners even if there is no current contractual agreement with UNICEF as a routine component of contingency planning, particularly as indications of risk increase and the presence of NGOs rises. As part of this, actively disseminate the CCCs to partners so that they understand the parameters of UNICEF's response.
4. Develop joint monitoring mechanisms with partners to facilitate both oversight and improved programme performance
5. Initiate open discussions with NGOs on capacity, oversight and support needs at the outset of any form of partnership, contractual or otherwise

## **h) Conclusions/recommendations Goal 1: Coordination and Coherence**

The CCCs require COs to “ensure capacity where needed to assume a coordinating role” in WES, Education, Child Protection, Health and Nutrition. Whether UNICEF does or not is also dependent on the capacity of the government to coordinate and the presence of other UN agencies, the approach of the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA's specific role. Nonetheless, UNICEF frequently coordinates education and WES and is often required to play a leading role in child protection.

As discussed in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.3.6, UNICEF has played a strong role within global inter-agency fora. Its role in sectoral coordination is less consistent, ranging from “the best UN coordinating agency” (Sri Lanka) excellent regional coordination (Iraq) to accusations of incompetence (Darfur).

Partners were positive about UNICEF's coordination role in Sri Lanka. In DRC, the local authorities led the technical sectors in the East, but UNICEF was regarded as a strong coordinating contributor and supporter. In Bukavu UNICEF is also partner in some way to nearly all the humanitarian agencies. Although appreciated, in both Goma and Bukavu, UNICEF's role was seen more as a funder and supplier than a strategic leader in any sector. UNICEF's RO played a strong regional coordination role in Iraq though there was “insufficient clarity on UNICEF leadership role vis-à-vis other UN agencies and unclear coordination mechanisms at UNICEF sub-regional level once the conflict started”. (UNICEF 2003c). In Ethiopia, UNICEF has played a key role in supporting and strengthening the government's coordination function, as well as collaborating with OCHA and fully participating in the UNCT.

UNICEF's main weaknesses with respect to coordination again derive from limited technical capacity. According to evaluations, the effect is exacerbated by a tendency to take on coordination roles anyway, stretching its capacity and falling short of the demands of the role. This was an issue raised in evaluations on Iraq and affected countries, Liberia, Darfur Kenya and Madagascar. UNICEF staff themselves are unconvinced: 77% of the survey responses did not think that UNICEF was effective in coordination.

Time and again, UNICEF staff referred to individuals as the key variable determining coordination effectiveness. Coordination is a demanding role: to do it well requires time, leadership, facilitation, technical and even data management skills. This is a tall order and one to which UNICEF (like many other agencies) gives little support. Success appears to depend on the presence of gifted individuals with strong facilitation and management skills.

Despite the CCC commitment, there appears to be a degree of confusion about the extent to which UNICEF's key role should be coordination or that of an implementer, directly or indirectly through partners. Guidelines, such as those for preparedness, VCA, M&E tend to emphasise UNICEF's own role rather than its role as a facilitator; it is not always clear how to link the two.

UNICEF does not have a mandate to coordinate the NGOs; only a national government can officially direct the activities of a response. At the same time, governments may not have the capacity, or desire to play this role and UN agencies typically step into the breach either directly or in the form of support to the government. Some NGOs ignore coordination mechanisms. Most, particularly experienced, NGOs welcome and indeed demand coordination. Nonetheless, the absence of a formal UN mandate to coordinate means that the authority to coordinate is largely earned through the quality of the “service”. If coordination is badly managed, information poor and apparently flowing in one direction (from the NGOs to the coordinator), the added value of attending and contributing to coordination meetings begins to be questioned. The ability to provide and consolidate information, generate consensus on standards and approach, avoid gaps and duplication, identify and advocate for additional capacity and, if possible, provide technical support, is an essential role that can make or break a response.

In insecure contexts, the restricted access of UN staff to the field and a reduced operational role has further raised the bar for coordination standards. It can be the main role and expectations are naturally raised.

The new Emergency Field Handbook contains a chapter dedicated to coordination, an excellent, brief and practical guide for staff. This is an essential step. What is needed now is more resources. Donors expect coordination but are not always willing to fund it. UNICEF can not only advocate for the need for dedicated resources, but recognise that it is an essential role in its own right, and not simply something that can be done as part of an already over-stretched job. In large emergencies, the role would typically demand at least two coordinators per sector– one emphasising field presence to provide the technical support, monitoring and quality control and another in town, to lead coordination meetings and manage the data. Programme proposals should contain the same format of objectives, results and budgets for coordination that any other programme activity would automatically draft, whether in the CAP or elsewhere. It would raise UNICEF’s accountability for the role but also that of the donors.

Consensus on standards in the humanitarian sector remains a challenge. Sphere<sup>37</sup> in the sectors it covers (water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security, nutrition and food aid; shelter, settlement and non food items and health services) represents the closest to consensus available. UNICEF has endorsed Sphere but, it would appear, not officially. Other key standards are the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies (INEE, 2004), endorsed by UNICEF. Although no standards exist in child protection, key guidelines, endorsed by inter-agency groups are extremely useful tools to guide collaborative work with partners, particularly the inter agency Guidelines on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (ICRC,2004), IASC Guidelines on HIV and Conflict (IASC, 2003) and IASC Guidelines on Gender Mainstreaming.

Sphere has been used as a reference tool for the EPRP and its standards are strongly reflected in several of UNICEF’s technical documents (draft rapid assessment checklists, Technical Notes and the new Handbook). The lack of acknowledgement or even reference to Sphere in most other UNICEF documents is mystifying. The use of Sphere and Education standards (together with broadly accepted protection guidelines) will greatly facilitate UNICEF’s coordination role. UNICEF staff unfamiliar with Sphere will be talking the same language as the NGOs in many sectors – welcome – but without realising it. Where standards and indicators have been drawn from Sphere, the documents should say so.

**Recommendations:**

1. Coordination skills and the clarification of roles within the UN family should be a major component of EPRP training and planning
2. Programme Officer job descriptions should include coordination competencies
3. Recognise Sphere as an essential coordination tool and acknowledge it in key technical documents
4. UNICEF should explicitly reference Sphere in its guidelines to ensure coherence and a common language and understanding with the NGOs

---

<sup>37</sup> The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response

5. If existing or surge capacity is not available for a CCC, UNICEF should decline to lead the sector to avoid poor performance and damage to its credibility
6. Coordination should be resourced as a specific function with a dedicated budget. In contexts in which UNICEF is required to play a major coordinating role, budgets should be established for specialist coordinators matched to associated competencies such as leadership, facilitation and coordination skills.

### 3.3.2 Goal 2: Operational readiness

**To improve UNICEF management of, and operational readiness in financial, supply, logistics, telecommunications, external communications and stress management/counselling elements of humanitarian response in emergencies**

The CB Programme aimed to: **improve UNICEF management and operational readiness in financial, supply, logistics, telecommunications and communication elements of humanitarian response in emergencies.**

- i) establishing and maintaining a **regional oversight capacity** to ensure essential operations and systems support in emergencies, in line with minimum operating standards and guidelines
- ii) further development and implementation of **operational standards and procedures** for management of funds, supply, logistics, telecommunications and stress management/counselling in emergencies

#### *Overview points*

The implementation of Goal 2 depends largely on UNICEF's capacity to establish a regional oversight capacity. However, as a result of the factors set out in Section 3.2.6 of this report, support and encouragement from ROs is strong but *oversight* is weak.

The effectiveness of operations can be a determining factor in the effectiveness of humanitarian response. In a ranking exercise on the factors affecting the speed and quality of response effective operations was rated as *the* most important factor by ESARO.

#### *Finance and Administration*

Finance and Administration was rated as having improved over the last five years by 72% of respondents within the individual questionnaire and 11 of 14 CMT responses. However, only 24% of individual respondents and five of fifteen Country Management Team respondents considered UNICEF to be *effective* in terms of finance and administration in relation to the CCCs; most rated UNICEF as *adequate*.

Staff members in country case studies commented that programmes and operations tend to work at 'two different speeds'. While programmes are trying to respond rapidly in emergencies, operations are often held back by complex procedures and bureaucracy even when operations staff recognise the urgency of the response. A comment in the individual survey sums this up: '*Generally unless there are proactive people in the right place at the right time with the authority to act/spend, UNICEF is predominantly staffed by people who are more likely to put institutional requirements ahead of rapid response requirements*'.

There is little doubt that there are problems in applying financial and administrative controls and that the level of bureaucracy slows response (see evaluations of Liberia, UNICEF Evaluation Office 2004a and Iraq, UNICEF, 2004b). A principal issue is the tension in priorities. DFAM is concerned that emergency contexts are a very high-risk environment for financial losses due to errors or fraud. This concern is quite reasonable in a context in which donors and the public are asking the UN for ever-greater accountability.

However, UNICEF's corporate responsibility should be to deliver timely and effective humanitarian response. Financial and administrative controls should be adjusted to facilitate that process. *Not* to deliver timely and effective humanitarian response is an even greater risk to the organisation's reputation and to the lives of the children and women affected by disaster. In a human rights based approach to programming, humanitarian response must be paramount.

The main issues raised in relation to finance and administration concerned:

- The CAG (cash advance to government) system that releases funds to partners based on submission of invoices. It tends to be bureaucratic and difficult to release funds and partners are often left waiting for lengthy periods even after they have submitted full invoices as requested.
- Procedures for cash accounting for 'where there are no banks' are also difficult and slow. The Ethiopia CO had developed adaptations of the system to facilitate response with the agreement of DFAM but this is more difficult in a fast onset context.
- Waiting for Contract Review Committees to review purchasing or contracts for transporters, for example.
- PROMS<sup>38</sup> currently requires several time-consuming steps to complete a transaction. Welcome news however, is that PROMS is continuing to be simplified based on recommendations from Regional Operations Officers and Field Reference Groups.
- Joint detailed planning on financial and administrative procedures as part of the EPRP process has also been weak and should be strengthened using DFAM and other guidelines (the cash management Financial Circular, Emergency Handbook, PPP training CD, DFAM intranet website).

UNICEF's systems and control mechanisms were devised for '*steady state development programming... aspects of which are not appropriate to emergency situations*' (evaluation of Iraq response). They require adjustment to emergency contexts, but still aiming to maintain effective controls. Some guidelines on greater flexibility have already been agreed and documented. For example, contract review committees can be held after the event if the CMT agrees and documents the reasons. It is also not absolutely prohibited for SSAs to use PROMs (as is the common perception) provided that would speed the response. If there is sufficient confidence in the capacity of partners and strong programme relations, they are not obliged to produce all original invoices. The latter is a CMT/Finance/Programming decision. However, most key personnel are not aware of flexibility in procedures before the emergency event. Even if they were aware, risk aversion and concern about audits would probably still make them reluctant to side-step complex bureaucracy. They would also regard avoidance as an exception, not as an institutional rule.

It is essential that DFAM transmit a clear message that corporate responsibility is towards effective humanitarian response. The Real Time evaluation of Liberia's response recommended that DFAM should '*complete and aggressively promote to COs in emergencies, simple guidance and tools on defining and assessing financial controls in a crisis, as well as on how to provide timely cash disbursements while maintaining financial controls in a context of failed banking systems*' (UNICEF, Evaluation Office, 2004a). Aggressive dissemination over a period of a year or more would clarify whether the major issue is that CO staff are not sufficiently clear about procedures to ensure that they are flexible and responsive in emergencies or whether the issue remains the procedures themselves, coupled with risk aversion.

### *Supply*

All Country Management Team survey respondents and 77% of individual respondents rated Supply as having improved in the last five years and this was backed by comments in interviews at all levels. This was partly due to support from DFID under this CB Programme and to the additional funding for operations. Improvements were driven by placing a strong leader in the Directorship post to identify blockages and implement change. Also significant was a DFID funded study on Supply (TASK, 2002) that analysed how to reinforce supply through regional hubs. This has resulted in:

- A faster response time *for items in stock* from 72 hours to 48 hours
- The establishment of regional supply hubs in Dubai, Johannesburg and Panama, managed by the centre in Copenhagen. The hubs have increased warehouse capacity; supply capacity overall has doubled since 1999. Early findings suggest that Dubai is the most cost-effective and efficient of the hubs but the Supply Division intends to do more analysis in the coming years. The regional hubs have also increased the safety levels of emergency stocks and are used as a base for the supply function for development programmes as well as emergencies.

---

<sup>38</sup> The field based system that brings programmes together with financial inputs

- An expanded network of supply options using the hubs as a base for procurement.
- Establishment of emergency stocks linked to the CCCs.
- Establishment of an Emergency Coordination Unit that covers both supply and logistics for emergencies.
- Improved dialogue with CO based supply personnel and CO has real-time access to information on stocks and progress of purchase orders.
- Guidelines on policies and procedures for in country logistics (UNICEF, Supply Division, 2005).
- The expansion of the option of shipping directly from suppliers to the destination.

Pre-positioning of supplies in-country in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, DRC was considered to have been extremely effective for the speed and efficiency of response. In Ethiopia pre-positioned supplies related to ongoing development programmes with the government. In Somalia, DRC and Sri Lanka the CO had small stocks of emergency supplies. In both Sri Lanka and Somalia in-country supplies were extremely important in the rapid response to the tsunami.

Maintaining large stocks at country level is discouraged by the Supply Division to avoid wastage. Supply Division's position is that pre-positioning *regionally* through the various hubs is the preferred option but that COs should also establish which items are available locally and establish LTAs (long term agreements) with local suppliers. The Evaluation Team are in agreement with the Supply Division in principle but there are some exceptions and the decisive factors should be based on a good logistics assessment as part of the EPRP process. If the CO can make a good case for pre-positioning items at CO (or even zonal) level, especially if they are required in the first 6-8 weeks of a fast onset emergency, exceptions should be allowed. Again, RO level oversight is important in this context.

Issues of the cultural appropriateness of specific items should be considered as part of this assessment. Respondents in the evaluation observe that pre-positioning at CO or RO level is more likely to ensure that items are culturally appropriate than importing from Copenhagen where they have to be generic.

Some Regional Offices play an important role in coordinating the supply function within the region. In ESARO, the Supply Officer coordinates supplies for the region, including DRC (that is part of WCARO region). ESARO undertakes cross-border procurement and provides oversight of emergency procurement, including significant amounts of anti retrovirals.

In a sample of 18 purchase orders from the three case study countries in 2004 and 2005 of items that were *not* in Copenhagen stock, the evaluation found that:

- 11 of the purchase orders were sent to suppliers within a week and all remaining items except one were submitted within 28 days.
- From order to delivery in country, 9 of the items were delivered within a month (including 6 within 14 days) and the remainder within 3 months
- All orders appeared to be clear and detailed

Seven of the items were ordered by Sri Lanka for the tsunami response and under the global trigger. Of those one item was *delivered* in 3 days and another in 8 days, following the order and the remainder in periods from 2 weeks to just over 2 months. This appears to be a reasonable response for supply from a distance but the staff team in Sri Lanka recognised that local purchase could have been faster and that more emphasis may need to be placed on local procurement in an emergency. Local purchasing has further advantages in that it boosts the local economy. It is notable, however, that the items in stock in Copenhagen and the hubs as part of emergency supplies related to the CCCs arrived within days of the tsunami and were extremely efficient.

UNICEF regulations on local procurement provide for COs to opt for local or offshore procurement up to a ceiling of USD 50,000 (which can be increased in emergencies). However, quality conditions of the items and suppliers have to be met and this is sometimes not possible to achieve locally. COs are not authorised to procure vaccines and pharmaceuticals in this way.

While performance in supply has improved considerably, there remain outstanding issues on both Supply from Copenhagen and the hubs, local purchasing and local distribution. From lessons learned in the case studies and through Supply staff, the following are the main issues identified that require further improvement:

- The list of items included in emergency stocks in Copenhagen and in the hubs was originally established through a consultative process with HQ Divisions and the CO staff, taking the CCCs into consideration. It should now be revised to the new CCCs and include some additional items found to be important in the tsunami response: family kits for emergency shelter, tents, kits for separated children. In the tsunami, those items that were in stock arrived very quickly and efficiently but items that had not been included in the list arrived after three months and too late to be useful (family kits and family tents).
- There has not been sufficient emphasis on translating standing readiness in supplies within the Emergency Preparedness Plans at country level into *how* those supplies will be obtained or existing stocks replenished at short notice.
- While supply to fast onset emergencies has improved, the case studies revealed questions about the speed of supply to chronic emergencies. The DRC country team sent a staff member to Copenhagen at one point to lobby and unblock supply orders as they were not being addressed with sufficient speed. Equally Operation Lifeline Sudan, a chronic emergency, complained about lead times from the submission of the order to supply.
- Although one of the responsibilities of the Regional Offices is to facilitate the transfer of stockpiles *between* country offices, this rarely happens in practice and may not be an efficient solution because of local transport costs.
- UNICEF does not have independent logistics capacity in most Country Offices. The organisation usually relies on government logistics systems or contracts private companies. UNICEF good practice is that all countries should have a logistics assessment in place and this may involve a contract with one or more transporters. The assessment should also address a shift in warehousing from 'normal' systems to taking directly responsibility for logistics. To conduct these assessments in the context of an emergency is extremely time-consuming and can cause serious delays to humanitarian response. All the more so as in difficult contexts such as Darfur, there may be only very few and highly expensive private contractors available and warehousing could be difficult to identify/establish. In general, distribution systems in country were considered to be inadequate.
- Orders submitted from CO level to Copenhagen are not always sufficiently clear and detailed. Capacity to prepare clear and detailed orders depends on the sector-specific technical skills of programme personnel, together with supply personnel. Critiques were raised in the Darfur evaluation (UNICEF-DFID, 2005) over an order for drilling rigs that was considerably slowed by lack of clarity.
- The speed of response would be faster if supply colleagues were consulted at the very beginning of the programming process and if programme colleagues were more knowledgeable about UNICEF's rules and regulations.

One RO recommended that further work should be done at country and regional levels on identifying best practices to include: supply planning, supplier registration and evaluation, procurement and warehouse/inventory management systems. This should be followed by a roll out to implement those systems at country level.

The current ECHO grant for 2005 covers pre-positioning of life-saving supplies and pharmaceuticals, development of a Supply Tool Box to support decision-making at RO and CO level, computerised warehouse management and distribution system, development of a manual and tools on cold chain management, procurement of VSAT kits, stockpiling of telecommunications equipment and further development of the office in a box. The total cost of the programme is Euros 8,096,600 of which ECHO's contribution is Euros 5.4mn over one year.

#### *Telecommunications*

In the evaluation questionnaire, 83% of individual responses considered that IT and Telecommunications had improved over the last five years, while 11 out of 14 country office respondents also considered that it

had improved in that period. The presence of a Regional Telecommunications Adviser has been crucial in making this happen. Many of these posts were funded by DFID II in support to Operations and four have subsequently been absorbed into core funding.

Major achievements are: emergency telecommunications assessments at CO level with the support of ROs, investment in posts for IT and Telecommunications, investment in equipment and training and development of updated standards and technical guidance on standard costing of equipment.

Areas still to be addressed are the further roll out of training of individual staff members on the use of equipment as there appears to have been considerable investment in installing equipment and training drivers but less investment in training other staff members. This should be enhanced when the formal training package by ITD is ready in July 2005. The training package is expected to provide greater consistency in approach.

#### *Communication*

Communications includes both communication with the media and programme level communication with communities and other stakeholders. There was a consensus amongst members of the UN family within country case studies that UNICEF is extremely effective in communication, much more so than other UN agencies. The Communications staff have a tightly-knit team internationally, are able to prepare consistent messages and have a great deal of confidence in each other. The fact that the team of Communications Officers at regional level meet on an annual basis and talk informally throughout the year helps to enhance mutual confidence. Not surprisingly, communications and fundraising scored very highly in the surveys for improvements in the last five years and very highly for the Country Management Team group in terms of effectiveness against the CCCs (less so for the individual responses).

#### *Stress Management and Counselling*

Stress management and counselling was included as an RO oversight responsibility within Goal 2. For UNICEF stress counselling has entailed a two-track strategy of rolling out a peer support programme through training, combined with professional support for stress counselling.

Achievements include the development of guidance and tools on stress management and training 143 staff members in Peer Support and Stress Management, with an almost equal distribution between men and women (Baastel, 2005). Those trained are not evenly distributed between regions and training largely depended on the interest of the RO and COs. The region with the highest coverage of Peer Support training is CEE/CIS, but on the whole, coverage is not yet sufficient to make a difference in emergencies.

An internal survey (with 2,027 responses) on the causes of stress is highly significant as the factors that were most frequently cited as causes of stress all relate to the working environment rather than external context. The major issues were i) workload and ability to achieve goals and objectives ii) working hours in UNICEF and iii) feeling undervalued and/or unable to contribute to decision making. Very few staff members had made use of peer support (10%) or a staff counsellor working for the UN or another agency (7%) while the majority gained support from friends or relatives outside UNICEF (62%). However, significant numbers considered that stress management workshops, pre and post deployment briefings and social activities organised by the UNICEF office would be useful.

Within the country case studies, Sri Lanka made the greatest references to stress counselling post tsunami. Staff commented that peer support was useful and that individual professional counselling requires a considerable time commitment on the part of the counsellor and counselled. Critiques were made of an inter-agency UN team that came to provide counselling in Iraq following the bombing of the UN building, but lacked the sensitivity to provide sufficient time and privacy for staff to feel it was useful. To reduce work related stress will require a package of management measures aimed at recognising and valuing quality work, developing greater confidence in the performance evaluation review and promotion system and careful monitoring of working excessive hours, especially in emergencies. The peer support system was valued but needs to be expanded and should aim at providing space for staff to unburden themselves as well as identifying staff members who are not recovering following stressful events.

Professional counselling may be required through private counsellors for staff under severe levels of stress.

## **a) Conclusions/recommendations Goal 2: Operational readiness**

There were various comments from CO staff that UNICEF is an organisation working at two different speeds (between programmes and operations) and that operations are held back from effective and rapid response by complex bureaucracy and procedures. This point has been raised through various evaluations and should be addressed in the context of UNICEF's overall approach to the primacy of humanitarian response.

### *Effectiveness of operations.*

i) Supply Division has made a considerable effort in the last five years and has made impressive improvements. We include some recommendations to reinforce the effectiveness of Supply  
ii) Finance and Administration continues to experience bureaucratic blockages and we have made recommendations based on systems and the primacy of humanitarian response  
iii) IT and Telecommunications and Communications are recognised for their effectiveness. The Evaluation Team welcomes the work to simplify procedures in PROMS.  
iv) Stress Counselling is valued but does not have adequate coverage and there needs to be clear linkages with other HR systems, given that most stress is work related.

### *Recommendations*

1. Finance and Administration:
  - a. DFAM should *aggressively* disseminate financial and administrative procedures in emergencies to COs (through Regional Financial Advisers) to ensure full confidence with systems before an emergency occurs. A field-based review should be instituted after approximately 18 months-2 years to clarify the question of whether a) the systems are adequate to emergencies once they are fully understood or b) the systems themselves should be adapted for emergencies.
  - b. In the course of dissemination, DFAM should be responsible for ensuring that *all staff* understand UNICEF's corporate position on accountability in emergencies. It should be clearly stated that UNICEF's corporate goal is effective humanitarian response and that staff will be supported for adapting systems, provided every effort is made to ensure checks and balances are in place.
  - c. Within the EPRP process, more time should be spent on how DFAM procedures for emergencies would be applied by both Programmes and Operations.
  - d. COs should improve partner organisational assessment to enhance mutual confidence and reduce bureaucracy in collaboration. As noted above, there is flexibility in procedures that can be decided by the CMT/Finance/Programmes at CO level.
2. Supply:
  - a. Increase the amount of time spent by CO Supply Officers on EPRP with the support of Regional Advisers, Supply. Standing readiness should be backed by clear plans for supply of all items required under CCC sectors, including estimates of lead times. All COs should be clear which CCC items are available locally and should make Long Term Agreements with suppliers.
  - b. As part of the supply assessment under EPRP if pre-positioning of specific stocks in specified zones is considered essential for effective standing readiness, COs can make the case to the Emergency Coordination Unit of Supply Division.
  - c. COs with the support of Regional Advisers, Supply, should ensure that sufficient focus is placed on logistics and distribution capacity in country as part of the analysis of standing readiness. This could be bolstered by an assessment of private contractors and warehousing options at the time of the EPRP.
  - d. CO level plans for standing readiness should be shared with partners to enhance inter-agency coordination on the types of stocks held.

- e. The Supply Division in consultation with the field should update the list of emergency items in stock to the new CCCs. This should include items considered essential through lessons learned in the tsunami response and other recent large emergencies.
  - f. Re-evaluate the relative performance of each of the regional hubs within a year.
3. IT and Telecommunications:
    - a. Ensure that there is equal emphasis on training to use equipment as on installation and maintenance of hardware.
  4. Stress management and counselling:
    - a. Focus future efforts at stress relief through reinforcing HR systems for the recognition of good performance and transparent systems for promotion and career planning.
    - b. Continue Peer Support Training with a view to recognising those colleagues that are not recovering after a stressful event and providing support in referral to professional counselling.

### 3.3.3 Goal 3: Human Resources

#### To improve the availability of appropriate staff at the appropriate time for all emergencies

There were three objectives within the goal:

1. Develop human resource capacities by **integrating humanitarian response related functions into organisational job and competency profiles** for recruitment and use the profiles for learning/development activities
2. Enhance **systems for identification and rapid deployment of staff** and external expertise to and from emergencies?
3. Establish and maintain an **effective succession planning** system for staff deployment in emergencies

#### *Effectiveness in relation to the objectives*

Overall progress towards the targets has been slower than planned and this is reflected in the responses from Country Management Teams and individual respondents in the questionnaires. HR was considered within both surveys to be the area that had least improved in the last five years. Frustration was expressed regularly during country case studies. However, this point should be nuanced by the fact that HR tends to be the most difficult area for all humanitarian agencies.

Having observed that HR remains a challenge, there was also strong recognition at all levels of the organisation of the important and dynamic role played by the Emergencies Focal Point in HR (initially funded by the DFID Programme and later absorbed by UNICEF) in actively supporting countries in surge requirements and in focusing on system development for emergencies. Clearly the existence of the role, together with the redeployment of HR personnel from Regional Offices, was effective in supporting the tsunami response. Further headline factor in HR is that the global trigger has been effective in getting staff rapidly redeployed to emergency contexts in Darfur and the tsunami response (although questions have been asked about the impact on 'sending' country programmes and there are still gaps in water and sanitation personnel in Darfur).

#### *Integration of humanitarian response functions into job and competency profiles*

Integrating humanitarian response skills, knowledge and experience into competency profiles was one of the objectives of the CB Programme. Competency profiles should be used to guide recruitment through defining the kinds of skills and experience that suitable candidates should possess and to support staff performance evaluation and development plans. This process has begun but is not yet sufficiently detailed to guide the recruitment process towards candidates with strong humanitarian experience.

The CB Programme also intended to ensure the integration of humanitarian response into job descriptions outlining the responsibilities of each post as a way of reinforcing mainstreaming. An analysis of 150 job descriptions from 1999 to 2005 including management, programmes and operations posts,

showed that only 36 referred to responsibilities in humanitarian response in some form and of those, 15 were specialist posts in emergencies. Job descriptions are drawn up at CO level but draw on generic job descriptions.

Of the *generic* job descriptions, only two, Country Representative and Emergencies Officer, referred to humanitarian responsibilities. The key posts of Senior Programme Officer and Senior Operations Officer did not include humanitarian responsibilities. This was reflected in the job descriptions in practice: all Country Representative job descriptions referred to humanitarian responsibilities. Within sectors, child protection posts referred to humanitarian responsibilities more than any other while the only operations posts that referred to humanitarian responsibilities were Chief of Field Operations and Supply. Comparing different years, there was no evidence of an increasing importance to highlighting humanitarian responsibilities in recent years i.e. since the CB Programme.

Although job descriptions are often not used as a management tool, they are indicative of the importance placed on mainstreaming responsibility for humanitarian response and should include key responsibilities for humanitarian action as outlined in the conclusions to this section.

Four systems have been defined for identification and rapid redeployment of staff:

- Internal redeployment
- Global web roster for external personnel/consultants
- Standby arrangements with partners
- Emergency Response Team

A comprehensive human resource plan for surge requirements should be addressed within the EPRP process but as Section 3.3.1 b notes, this has been extremely weak. In a sample of 27 plans, only two had seriously addressed surge planning. It was not possible to analyse global data on each of the above systems as they are currently not collated in that way but the evaluation has analysed the systems within the country case studies for Sri Lanka and Ethiopia. The same information was not available in DRC as the HR post is vacant.

#### *Internal redeployment of UNICEF staff*

This is the preferred option for rapid redeployment as staff are familiar with culture, procedures and systems, especially with the PROMS programme management system. In addition, the experience in the tsunami response in Sri Lanka showed that UNICEF personnel arrived fastest. Of 64 surge personnel from December 2004 to mid April 2005, 36 (56%) were UNICEF personnel from ROSA (South Asia), NYHQ and from other regions. Of six people who arrived within 48 hours of the tsunami, five were UNICEF staff members<sup>39</sup>. This trend continued in January when the largest group was UNICEF personnel.

Staff members were rapidly identified through people already known to the Sri Lanka office and staff mobilised by the Emergency Focal Point in New York following the launch of the global trigger. The process worked well and there were no complaints made in Sri Lanka about the speed or effectiveness of HR deployment.

*Table no. Surge staff redeployed to the tsunami response in Sri Lanka*

<b>Source of staff</b>	<b>Number</b>
UNICEF staff	
Other regions	10
Countries in Region	8
HQ – NY	6
ROSA	6
National Committees	4

<sup>39</sup> 3 from ROSA, 1 from New York, and one from Nepal.

HQ – Geneva	1
HQ – Copenhagen	1
Subtotal UNICEF redeployment	36
External personnel	
SSA (consultant - Short Services Agreement)	23
Standby DFID	2
Others	2
Standby Government of Ireland	1
Subtotal external personnel	28
Total	64

In terms of sectors of surge staff, the majority were in communications and logistics/supplies, followed by protection and WES (i.e. Communications 14, Logistics/supplies 9, Protection 8, WES 8, Emergencies 6, HR 5, Education 4, Operations 3, IT Telecoms 3, Finance/funding 2, Mine Action 1, and ECD 1).

The reason for such large numbers of staff deployed into communications was to meet the very high demands for information from the press, donors and others. Rapidly building capacity in communications also left programme staff free to pursue their work; prior to the redeployment of communications personnel, the Protection Officer was spending some four hours a day on the phone to the press following the tsunami.

Rapid redeployment of UNICEF personnel is particularly important for the core functions that are extremely difficult for external personnel to fulfil. These include budgeting, planning, supply, communications, security, IT, telecommunications and logistics.

However, rapid redeployment of UNICEF staff tends to be used in fast onset emergencies and especially when there is a global commitment to surge and Country Representatives are obliged to release their staff. For both Ethiopia and DRC it was much less useful as a system. DRC had only benefited from one redeployed staff member and Ethiopia referred mainly to *internal* redeployment within the country and to temporary external contractors (as well as support from ESARO, the regional office for East and Southern Africa).

Although it is the preferred option for rapid staff deployment, it tends to be organised in an ad hoc way. There is currently no organisation-wide system for establishing registers at RO level for staff redeployment (recommended by a study on HR for emergencies, Heffinck, 2004). This idea was backed by the HR function in ESARO that argued that closer planning for rapid redeployment across the region had potential to improve rapid response. ESARO has begun working in this direction.

*Global web roster of qualified, competent external personnel*

A global roster has been established and is managed by the Emergency Focal Point (EFP) at HQ level, in conjunction with the HR Division personnel at RO level. The roster is accessible to all COs through the intranet and is currently in the process of being brought together into a broader talent pool that will include both UNICEF staff and external consultants within one programme so that searches can easily be made for both (SAP HR system).

The web roster is made up of external consultants (over 1000) and includes brief information on backgrounds and CVs. It serves both development programmes and emergencies. In an analysis of 40 CVs selected at random from the roster, the evaluation found that only half had humanitarian response experience. Of the 20, years of field-based experience in emergency contexts was broken down as follows:

6 months-2 years experience	12 consultants on roster
3-4 years experience	5 consultants
5 -6 years	3 consultants
Over 6 years	1

This is a relatively low level of field-based experience to provide a significant technical lead on sectors in emergencies. As part of the current process of re-vamping the global roster, one goal is to ensure that new candidates entered meet minimum requirements including field-based emergency experience.

Comparing the consultants' professional training and experience with the CCC sectors, there was a strong focus on health with Health :13, Protection: 3, WES: 2, Nutrition: 2 and Education: 1.

For the web roster to be really useful in humanitarian response, it should aim to encourage consultants with experience in the CCC sectors to register. One proposal from a country case study office is that UNICEF should maintain a relatively small register of technical specialists covering all the CCC sectors. Technical specialists should be selected based on proven effectiveness in the field and especially those with direct UNICEF experience. Some could be identified through consultants who have worked with UNICEF on SSA (Special Service Agreement) contracts. Incentives could be provided to exceptional candidates such as subsidised places on selected training courses, inclusion in key UNICEF meetings and perhaps asking the consultants to provide modules of training/learning in their own field.

In practice all COs, ROs, and Divisions at HQ have their own informal lists of names of people they know and trust. They are more likely to turn to their own lists first. As a step towards making the web roster more effective, the Emergency Focal Point in DHR at HQ is trying to decentralise responsibility for the roster and ensure that ROs screen the names on the roster to encourage confidence.

In the tsunami response in Sri Lanka, 23 externals were rapidly employed on short contracts, some of whom were already in country and known to UNICEF, others were identified by the Emergency Focal Point (partly from the global web roster). In Ethiopia, most surge requirements have been met by temporary staff on short contracts, of whom most were identified through the RO or CO level rosters. Since 2001, 90 temporary staff have been employed in Ethiopia for emergency surge requirements. These break down to approximately one third international and two thirds national staff. Of the international staff, half were identified through the regional consultant roster in ESARO and one third through the CO level roster. The global roster was not significant. For national staff, almost two thirds were identified through the national roster. While international staff have been approximately even in terms of gender, there is a strong bias towards men within the national staff group (9 women and 52 men).

In addition, a further 26 staff members have been employed on TFT contracts specified for emergencies since 2001, some of whom transited from temporary SSA contracts to TFT contracts.

In Ethiopia, staff were contracted rapidly by using the Short Service Agreement system for a period up to 6 months and ensuring that anyone who would be needed for an additional period was converted to a Temporary Fixed Term contract during that space of time. While this process is discouraged as TFT contracts should be the first point of call according to procedures, it is a pragmatic and speedy alternative to emergency contracting. In Ethiopia, an analysis of 73 SSA contracts showed that 50 were finalised within 5 days and 18 within 10 days.

#### *Standby Arrangements with partners*

Standby arrangements are agreements with agencies for the rapid deployment of experienced humanitarian personnel. These include arrangements with NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council and RedR; UN Volunteers and government agencies like Swedish Rescue Services Agency and DFID (the last being an ad hoc agreement). Standby is useful to UNICEF in supplying small numbers of technical experts. In 2004 (before the tsunami), there were 8 staff under standby arrangements globally, compared to almost three times that number in internal redeployment. The significance of standby arrangements is the strategic injection of highly qualified technical skills into a situation for a fixed period. These usually cover *sector specific* skills e.g. water and sanitation or protection, as opposed to generic humanitarian management skills. The Standby arrangements are currently managed by EMOPS, Geneva rather than the HR Division in New York.

In the tsunami response in Sri Lanka, 4 in 64 surge personnel were identified through standby arrangements, two being from DFID and providing surge capacity in water and sanitation in the transition phase. Ethiopia did not refer to personnel supplied through standby arrangements.

#### *Emergency Response Team (ERT)*

The ERT was established in late 2004, following a consultant report on systems for rapid HR deployment recommending re-establishment of a small specialist team (Heffinck, 2004). The team currently comprises 2 senior humanitarian managers at P5 level and 3 staff P4/3 level available for rapid deployment to establish the parameters of a humanitarian response, identify gaps and organise sector based coordination. Plans within the MTSP are for the team to expand in the period 2006-9 and, according to the MTSP, core funding has already been allocated. The team was used in the tsunami response and was reported to be effective but time constraints have prevented the evaluation team from further analysing ERT effectiveness.

#### *Succession planning*

Effective succession planning is fundamental on two levels:

1. For managers/leaders and senior programme staff whose role is crucial in driving humanitarian response. UNICEF analysis shows that some 33% of senior managers will be leaving within five years through retirement and by choice making succession planning essential. Succession planning has been in place since January 2003 for the level of Representative (P4-D2), Regional Directors and Deputy Regional Director (D1/D2) and Directors and Deputy Regional Directors (D1/D2). Since January 2004 a system has also been in place for all Programme Coordinators.
2. To cover staff redeployed in emergency response, especially if that redeployment is for up to three months. This is essential to ensure that managers are willing to release staff for redeployment. There are a number of possibilities to cover these posts including retired UNICEF personnel, UNVs, temporary staff, temporary upgrading of more junior posts etc. Guidelines have been issued on succession planning/practice in emergencies but they do not appear to be well used and dissemination of the guidelines should be more pro-active<sup>40</sup>.

For long term succession planning, the two principal strategies are: a) the creation of a talent pool to identify and encourage staff with potential for promotion and b) the learning programme for leaders and managers (see Goal 4). The talent pool will bring together internal staff and external candidates in one place and should help to systematise the identification of candidates for succession. The system is in the process of 'going live' on the intranet so it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the approach. The learning programme is already in place and reports from country case studies have been very positive about learning for leadership.

#### *Corporate trigger*

The corporate trigger has been used twice since it was established in 2004 and has shown that obliging Country Representatives to release staff can help to rapidly expand the size of the team. In Sri Lanka, the success of the rapid redeployment of UNICEF staff was certainly attributed in part to the global trigger (also to the fact that it was a 'popular' response) and the same conclusion was reached in Darfur which is clearly not a popular response. In Darfur, the corporate trigger was used in May 2004 and staffing rapidly increased from 6 national and 1 international staff member in February 2004 to 71 staff including 37 internationals by September 2004. Prior to the use of the corporate trigger, HR had been a major bottleneck to response. There are ongoing problems in relation to sector specialists, especially in water and sanitation, but there is no doubt that the overall situation was relieved by the use of the corporate trigger. However, it should be noted that it would be difficult to use the corporate trigger for more than one or two major emergencies simultaneously.

One possible option for UNICEF working towards enhancing effectiveness in HR surge would be to establish a *regional* trigger, mirroring the corporate trigger. The Evaluation Team is *not recommending*

---

<sup>40</sup> Staffing of UNICEF Offices in Duty Stations under Complex Emergencies, Administrative Instructions: CF/AI/1993-007 of July 1, 1993. Emergency Response – Loans of Staff, Administrative Instructions CF/AI/2001-004 of 2 February 2001.

this course of action on the basis that the greater challenge is to make regional office planning, oversight and support work effectively as described in Section 3.2.8 rather than create an additional layer of procedures.

*The impact of mainstreaming as a strategy on HR for humanitarian response*

Mainstreaming is increasingly regarded as the foundation on which an effective response is built, to be augmented by specialist emergency support in the case of a larger scale humanitarian crisis. As the Emergencies Focal Point for HR pointed out, the Staff Management Plan should allow for considering i) current staff capacity in the office – functional areas and operations ii) scale and scope of potential emergencies facing the office including cross-border effect from or support to neighbouring countries and iii) additional staff required to meet these projected challenges to the office to deliver.

The experience of Sri Lanka shows that surge support provided to a strong country team with solid experience in humanitarian response and strong leadership strengthens the overall response capacity. However, providing surge support where UNICEF has a very limited presence can improve the response but it is still likely to be less than fully effective, such as in Darfur. Essentially overall capacity amongst staff teams must be strengthened to provide the whole response in small emergencies and to work effectively alongside specialist humanitarian support in a large crisis.

*How relevant is the human resources strategy?*

The HR strategy was defined through a conference in Brasilia in June 2002 (UNICEF, DHR, 2002). It appears to have the right approach through a holistic approach including a corporate plan for succession planning, mechanisms for rapid deployment, a tripartite approach to career development (individual, supervisor and organisation), results based performance management and staff well being measures. However, UNICEF has been slow to implement various aspects of the plan and in recognition of the ongoing difficulties in achieving the target of right people, place and time for humanitarian response, a further consultancy was commissioned to analyse rapid response (Heffinck, 2004). This resulted in a full analysis including systems used by other UN agencies and the Red Cross and an historical analysis of former systems within UNICEF. Crucially, Heffinck identified the linkages between early warning/early action and HR. He also observed that UNICEF prefers internal candidates for *core functions* that require knowledge of UNICEF systems (especially operations) while non core functions can be filled by external personnel. The report includes a flow chart for HR deployment in emergencies together with a draft action plan for implementation of the recommendations. It appears that the report was not finalised or formally approved, although some of the recommendation have been implemented: establishment of a small Emergency Response Team and revamping of roster systems (in process). Systems for standby coordination have been defined and outlined in the Emergencies Handbook.

The Valid Team has found that the Heffinck report chimes closely with evaluation findings at all levels (HQ, RO and CO) and that the information presented above backs Heffinck's recommendations with the caveats that: a) further *field level* consultation on implementation of the recommendations is necessary and b) a greater focus on the role of *national staff* would represent a more sustainable strategy. In addition, Heffinck did not recognise the strategic potential of referring high performers employed on short contracts (Special Service Agreements, known as SSA) for humanitarian response to the global roster for external personnel.

*Are the CCCs relevant to the HR function?*

One point that should be included in the CCCs (phase beyond initial response) is to analyse the group of staff that have been drafted in for surge capacity and plan for their: i) continued deployment or ii) end of contract in relation to ongoing requirements. At that stage two specific points should be addressed: i) in the case of deployment, the impact on the sending country office and whether the redeployment can be continued and ii) the *type* of contract should be considered for external personnel – staff drafted in rapidly as SSAs can be converted to TFTs if necessary.

*Factors that promote or limit effectiveness in HR for humanitarian response*

The factors that appear to have the greatest impact on HR capacity for humanitarian response are:

- The degree of preparedness of the office Staff Management Plan in relation to the contingency plans and scenarios for humanitarian crises. Teams need to analyse existing leadership, technical and operational strengths and weaknesses within the team and plan for which surge capacity would be required in the event of a humanitarian crisis.
- The rapid redeployment of UNICEF personnel and willingness of Country Representatives to allow them to go (this needs to happen outside the global trigger)
- Rapid funding of the response to be able to contract additional personnel if necessary
- Confidence from CO level in the global web roster being a credible source of personnel
- The degree of dynamism and determination of HR personnel at CO and RO levels in identifying potential internal and external candidates for surge
- The extent of willingness and interest of staff in redeployment (that can depend on career prospects)
- The extent of CO, RO and HQ personal networks of internal and external candidates and how far all three levels work effectively together
- The extent to which standby arrangements have been maintained updated and are pursued early in a response or during an 'amber' phase

#### *UNICEF structures and HR processes – the roles of HQ and ROs*

The role of ROs in HR tends to be responsive to immediate needs rather than proactively engaged in preparedness. The HR functions in ROs do not review Emergency Preparedness Plans or Staff Management Plans, nor have they created a standing arrangement with COs for redeployment of specific staff in emergencies. However, there is great potential to make linkages between redeployment, learning and preparedness to enhance the preferred system of internal redeployment.

A Regional Roster for Redeployment could be established and managed at RO level. This would systematise work already done in identifying staff for redeployment at short notice. The aim would be to identify staff who could be available for redeployment for up to 3 months. Managers would have to agree in advance the burden spread evenly across COs. All CCC sectors and operations functions would need to be represented. Incentives to register would be priority places on the learning programme and recognition in promotion/career development terms. Managers would also need to be recognised in the Performance Evaluation Review.

The system would be linked to early warning-early action and to the Staff Management Plan or Emergency Preparedness Plan. The Heffinck report recommended this type of system in spite of the fact that it had been tried previously within UNICEF. It had previously faltered because managers refused to let staff go. However, in the current context in which all managers could face an emergency and require surge support, they are more likely to recognise the need. In addition, redeployment could be an obligation for all managers, provided no single staff team was overburdened. To be successful, a backfill plan would also be required.

#### *National and international staff for humanitarian response*

There remains a strong focus on international staff for humanitarian response and especially for surge capacity. However, the evaluation questionnaire demonstrates that national staff are interested in gaining more experience in humanitarian response and link response experience to promotion potential. A greater emphasis on national staff redeployment both within and between countries could help to build a stronger and more sustainable response capacity. National staff would need to have gained strong experience within their own country before being included in redeployment.

Another perspective is that of developing firmer relations with national level disaster management institutions and supporting their capacity. UNICEF invested in national disaster response capacity following the super cyclone in Orissa, India and it has paid off as the State authorities have demonstrated improved capacity to respond. Indeed, across India, the experience of emergency response is leading to enhanced State capacity to manage national disasters as well as support neighbouring countries, as occurred in the tsunami response.

### *Learning lessons in HR deployment*

The Evaluation Team has found that human resources functions have been slow to incorporate changes based on lessons learned through evaluations and reviews. The Iraq Lessons Learned exercise in 2003 (UNICEF, 2003c) pointed out many lessons for HR but some key recommendations remain outstanding and will be repeated in the present evaluation (Regional Office surge capacity systems, reinforced analysis of staffing needs and gaps as part of EPRPs). The Darfur Evaluation (UNICEF-DFID, 2005) also referred to the fact that many of that team's findings on HR had already been stated in previous reviews and evaluations, particularly Heffinck (Heffinck, 2004). The Tsunami Lessons Learned exercise will be finalised in November 2005 and includes HR. It is essential that lessons learned in the pivotal area of HR are incorporated into plans and implemented *at all levels*.

On a different note, future analysis of effective HR practice should be facilitated by the further development of the HR Information System so that recruitment, redeployment and standby arrangements can be more readily analysed as part of After-Action-Reviews.

### **a) Conclusions/recommendations Goal 3: Human Resources**

While the work of the Emergencies Focal Point was recognised for rapid response in the tsunami and the global trigger has been effective at rapid staff redeployment and contracting, *systems* have not progressed sufficiently to produce a *reliable* response in HR. The basis of an effective response is the foundation of the existing country team and emergency preparedness planning, including HR planning. This area has been weak to date and there has been very limited linkage between CO and RO levels in planning and preparedness.

When surge is required, the favoured methodology in the first phase is internal redeployment, initially from the RO and then from COs. Redeployment is especially preferred for operations staff as they are already familiar with UNICEF systems. National staff are willing to be redeployed and see emergencies as a possible path to promotion. The engagement of HR personnel at RO level could be much greater in relation to systems for regional redeployment.

Staff employed on short service agreements are essential for response capacity, especially in the CCC sectors (as opposed to operations). Potential strong candidates on SSAs should be identified for inclusion on the web roster, as they will have gained UNICEF experience. Standby arrangements produce relatively few temporary staff but they tend to be highly skilled in specific programme sectors. The early experience of the ERT has been successful and plans have been included in the MTSP to expand the team. Succession planning needs to be expanded, especially in relation to backfilling redeployed staff and to include RAs (already under discussion).

On mainstreaming, there has been very limited progress on integrating humanitarian response into job and competency profiles. In addition, there are multiple rosters of external personnel and limited confidence in the names on global roster. Based on a sample, the web roster does not include representation of skills in *all* the CCC sectors i.e. health was strongly represented but the other sectors had very low representation. There have been no clear linkages established between surge capacity and learning e.g. giving priority places on learning programmes to staff willing to participate in surge rosters.

Evaluation findings resonate with an earlier report on HR for emergencies (Heffinck, 2004). The recommendations below build on and are complementary to those of Heffinck.

#### **Recommendations**

- 1. EMOPS and DHR should analyse and reach a common understanding on norms for the use of surge capacity in the context of mainstreaming.** This should include adopting a Standing Operating Procedure for management support from the Regional Office as a country moves into a high state of alert, aimed at supporting the preparation of a 90-day plan (see Section 3.2.8). Norms should clarify: i) that it is quite acceptable to draw on additional support in emergencies as not all offices will have sufficient technical capacity or emergency experience and

ii) that redeployment should be used principally for immediate response as it is the fastest and for core operations functions and as part of HR planning. UNICEF staff redeployed to an emergency should not exceed a 3 month stay and if it appears that support in that post will be required for longer, COs should plan to recruit for the post, drawing on approved candidates from the global web roster. Standby arrangements would usually be used in technical sectors and in the first phase.

2. **Mainstreaming is fundamental as the foundation of response but COs must be prepared to bolster capacity in areas where they are weak on technical skills/emergency experience.** COs must map strengths and weaknesses within the existing team in leadership, CCC technical capacities and operational functions on an annual basis. These plans should be shared with RO level and collated for countries across the region to match surge planning to probable requirements in the region.
3. HR personnel at RO level should work together with REAs to invite applications from CO level staff to participate in a **regional pool of staff for redeployment in emergencies**. This should include: a) an even spread of staff across CCC sectors b) an even spread of all operations areas c) an even spread by the CO, taking into consideration the size of the office and d) *national* as well as international staff. Staff should commit to redeployment for a period of up to 3 months and be on the register for a period of two years. As an incentive, staff should be clear that they will be prioritised for learning opportunities and will be recognised in the PER process. Managers and Country Representatives should also be recognised within the PER process for agreeing to staff participation in the regional pool. Consider piloting this process in one region in the first instance.
4. **Backfilling plans** should be made by COs at the time of registering staff in the redeployment pool, including funding a backup post. Arrangements for funding the redeployed and backfilled posts should be agreed by all COs in the region, coordinated by the RO.
5. Complete the integration of humanitarian experience, knowledge and skills into **competency profiles** for all key posts including operations. The following aspects should be referenced in competency profiles and job descriptions as appropriate: i) the mainstreaming policy and the fact that all staff are responsible for humanitarian response and may be called upon to move at short notice to an emergency zone ii) responsibilities for participation in and updating of emergency preparedness planning iii) experience in emergencies is essential for senior posts iv) the CCCs as a framework for response v) responsibilities for humanitarian coordination by sector and vi) knowledge of humanitarian law. For CMT posts, detailed criteria should be included for experience and proven capacity in emergencies.
6. Countries that receive surge staff should establish a fast mechanism for their **performance evaluation**. Formats already exist on the intranet for brief performance evaluations of SSAs and TFT staff. For UNICEF personnel this should be part of PER records with a view to promotion and for external personnel it should be part of assessment for inclusion on the web roster.
7. In **lessons learned processes and after-action-reviews**, include an analysis of what has been effective in HR.
8. Although **standby arrangements** provide relatively few staff, they are usually of high calibre and efforts should be made to reinforce and further develop arrangements. Ideally the actual personnel nominated on standby should have access to UNICEF training before redeployment, including the focus on HRBAP, CCCs, UNICEF procedures, sector based coordination and standards to be used in response.

### 3.3.4 Goal 4: Learning Strategy

**To improve staff competencies for advocacy, programmatic and operational support in emergencies, reflecting the human rights based approach to programming and the normative framework of UNICEF**

The goal had the following objectives:

- To systematically provide all UNICEF staff with access to a **wide range of learning opportunities** to enhance their knowledge and skills for emergency preparedness and response,

including humanitarian policies and principles, other programmatic and operational areas, and management of assessment, monitoring and evaluation.

- Ensure **regional implementation and oversight** of strategies for systematic skills and knowledge development in emergency preparedness and response

The Learning Strategy was evaluated by a separate evaluation team under Baastel, a Canadian consulting group (Baastel, 2005). Key findings of the Baastel team are:

- The learning strategy has focused on direct training and aimed as much at changing attitudes as on learning new skills. Methodologies have included direct learning in workshops and ToTs, web based and distance learning, on-the-job training, lessons learned and establishing learning plans. ToT training has had considerable wastage as many trainees do not go on to train others. This is partly because the wrong people are often nominated to attend ToTs.
- The two major interventions have been Emergency Preparedness and Response Training (EPRT) and a Principled Approach to Humanitarian Action (PATH), both offered on virtually a global basis, although the roll out of EPRT has been much more extensive. Of the staff members trained included on Baastel's database, 995 had been trained in EPRT while only 238 trained in PATH. In addition training courses have been held in Health and Nutrition, Education in Emergencies, HIV/AIDS in emergencies, Mine Action, Child Protection, Monitoring and Evaluation, Communications and Stress Management.
- On the job training was found to be the most effective. This agreed with Valid's finding through the individual survey that found learning on the job with support from colleagues to be the highest rated methodology.
- Taking time out for learning and training leaves staff feeling guilty – there is not yet a learning culture within UNICEF.
- The vast roll out of Emergency Preparedness and Response Training has succeeded in bringing operations and programme together and increasing the sense of joint responsibility for response. Training materials were high quality, practical and interactive.
- Investment in learning/training in child protection has been relatively low compared to other areas and needs to be vastly increased.
- Mine action training, closely linked to a broader strategy for mine action, has been particularly strategic and successful.
- There has been a reluctance to use the placement scheme for on-the-job training in emergencies as managers find it difficult to cover the costs of Daily Subsistence Allowance payable to staff that are travelling and are resistant to letting them go.

Key recommendations are:

- Direct training is still the most effective way to train most UNICEF staff and UNICEF/DFID should continue to allocate funds to training. This should include establishing a small training unit in each RO in the long term. A core group of trainers should substitute ToT training to reduce wastage.
- Establish a core team of external trainers with a long term institutional or contractual relationship with UNICEF including understanding internal systems and programmes. Ideally an internal UNICEF staff trainer could work with an external trainer as co-facilitators in training programmes.
- On the job training (staff exchanges, mentoring, coaching) should be encouraged by addressing specific constraints by region/CO. Country Representatives should be recognised in PER for being willing to foster staff exchanges.
- Lessons learned: pro-actively circulate evaluations, continue with 'hot off the press' briefs from lessons learned, promote communities of practice.
- Institutionalise learning plans with each staff member having learning goals for the year, including emergency learning needs
- Support inter-agency training in EPRT, PATH, Child Protection, HIV/AIDS, Monitoring and Evaluation training in emergency contexts
- Foster leadership through learning, training and incentives in HR policies and practices
- Ensure that Country Representatives and SPOs attend EPRT and PATH training

## a) Conclusions/recommendations Goal 4: Learning Strategy

The Valid Team generally agrees with conclusions by the Baastel Team but has the following additional observations on learning for humanitarian response.

- UNICEF has organised learning on a 'just in case' basis. **It may be appropriate to begin to consider augmenting current learning with 'just in time' reinforcement learning** on the job. This would entail drawing on learning resources as the need arises. For example, rapid updates for UNICEF and partners on lessons learned from other emergencies in a specific sector or facilitation of after-action-reviews. Thinking in this area could be further developed with other UN agencies and possibly with specialist training/learning agencies such as RedR/IHE or ALNAP.
- **Learning has not been linked to surge capacity** for humanitarian response. Priority places to access learning opportunities could be offered to staff willing to be part of surge capacity. These considerations and proposals have been considered above in Goal 3: Human Resources.
- **Learning has not been linked to the CCC sectors nor to specific response requirements.** There have been no courses in WES (water and sanitation) although this was included in the CB Programme, very limited (but high quality) training in health and nutrition and no training in coordination skills in humanitarian response.
- **Learning for successful gender integration has been limited.** There is a need to step up the monitoring, learning and training for gender integration.
- **Overall learning and training opportunities have been relatively limited in UNICEF** and staff in country case studies observed that partners were more likely to get learning opportunities than UNICEF staff. In the individual survey, of 78 comments to an open question on the three most important factors that could help UNICEF to improve emergency preparedness and response capacity, 40 referred to further training and learning in emergency preparedness and response.
- Learning and training in the more **complex aspects of humanitarian response** (humanitarian dilemmas, international human rights law, child protection policies and practice) has been relatively low compared to EPRT training. Some respondents considered that UNICEF does not attach sufficient importance to the PATH programme. The PATH e-learning course may help to reinforce this learning although Baastel observed that computer based learning is not the most effective as staff find it difficult to liberate time for learning.
- **The vision for learning in the new MTSP** is a very positive one: that all staff individually and in teams and with encouragement and support from supervisors will have equitable access to the learning opportunities required to achieve UNICEF's strategic goals. This includes adopting the UN Learning Principles of minimum 5% of staff time and 2% of total staff costs to learning. Learning will also be linked to performance management, leadership development and succession planning. Three comprehensive and interlinked learning programmes are being established:
  - Basic learning programme aimed at core competencies for all staff, including programmes and operations.
  - Programme excellence learning with a mix of core, functional and technical competencies for programme and operations staff.
  - Leadership and Management learning programme aimed at senior managers and leaders and at building talent pools for succession management.
- OLDS has developed a 'learning road map' for staff to plan and map their own learning needs in relation to career paths.

### Recommendations

1. Include the following areas in the forthcoming learning programmes at each level:
  - Basic learning programme i) awareness raising of the CCCs ii) standards in use for humanitarian response ii) systems for admin/finance in emergencies
  - Programme Excellence Learning Programme for programme and operations sectors. i) a strong focus on PATH type training that deals with humanitarian dilemmas and human rights ii) Standards for humanitarian response iii) coordination – what it means in practice<sup>41</sup> iv)

<sup>41</sup> A module on coordination in emergencies will be designed in August 2005

- advocacy techniques, especially for children affected by armed conflict v) working with NSEs. vi) mainstreaming issues of child protection vii) gender mainstreaming viii) operations in emergencies ix) partnership in emergencies
  - Leadership and Management Learning Programme. These courses are crucial to effective humanitarian response, given the importance of CO level leadership. They should include modelling good leadership and follow up coaching and mentoring for actual and potential leaders. In After-Action-Reviews, managers should reflect on whether leadership training had any impact on their capacity to lead in humanitarian response and feed this back to OLDS.
2. Increase sector based learning opportunities within the CCCs.
  3. Link the learning programme to surge capacity and the Regional redeployment pool by prioritising learning places for staff registered for redeployment.
  4. Consider outsourcing training programmes, especially to organisations that specialise in humanitarian training such as RedR that could develop bespoke training aimed at UNICEF, leaving REAs and other staff more time to focus on strategy.
  5. Conduct brief after-action-reviews or lessons learned exercises after emergency response to document what was most/least effective in the spirit of learning for the future. This should include small emergencies that do not require surge capacity
  6. Inform staff of the UN principles of 5% of staff time for learning and 2% of total staff costs so that they can relate this to their own learning planning using learning road maps.

### 3.3.5 Goal 5: Protection of staff and assets

#### To increase UNICEF capacity to protect staff and assets in emergencies

The objectives of Goal 5 were:

- To establish **systems for reliable staff security planning and support** at all levels during sudden –onset emergencies, including SOPs.
- To **enhance the capacity of UNICEF country offices to monitor trends** and review security conditions for crisis management and readiness in chronic and incipient emergency areas.

In UNICEF’s CCCs the relevant guiding principle states, “Our response will recognise the priority of humanitarian action while assuring safe access to affected populations and safety and security of staff and assets”. Within the CB Programme security was not a major focus in Phase I and given limited coverage in the review of Phase I.

#### *Context*

UNICEF’s management of staff and asset security takes place within the shared UN security system run by UNDSS (formerly UNSECOORD). In December 2001, the UN General Assembly established new mechanisms for accountability and responsibility for security management within the UN system (Res 56/255). In August 2002 the UN Secretary-General produced the report ‘Inter-organisational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system’ and the UN’s Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) were developed. The atrocity of the August 2003 bombing of the Canal Hotel UN headquarters in Baghdad further raised the profile and importance of staff security for all UN agencies, particularly those working on the ground in complex emergencies.

The Secretary-General defined the goal of the UN security management system as enabling “*the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the safety and security of staff as a high priority*” (UN GA, 2002a). UNICEF’s security policy (UNICEF 2003a) which came into force in January 2003 fully supports that statement.

General Assembly resolution 59/276 of January 2005 re-emphasised the importance of an effective and unified security management system within the UN. This resolution allowed for the establishment of a Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and continued the system of cost-sharing for security management between the UN agencies.

### *Findings*

Assessment by internal and external informants, as well as reporting on issues such as MOSS compliance indicate that UNICEF's security management capacity and standards of security management have significantly improved since 2002. In the Valid Country Management Team survey 93% of respondents felt that there had been improvement in the area of security management since 1999. Individual staff responses were a little less positive but still 78% agreed that security management had improved. In this positive context, female staff members were generally more positive than their male counterparts in their responses on security. Insecurity placing staff at risk was ranked as being the most important factor to be taken into account when deciding to launch an emergency response.

The proportion of offices reaching MOSS compliance has increased during the period of the CB Programme. In December 2003 47% (59 out of 124) of country offices were 100% compliant. By March 2005 56% (70 countries out of 125) were 100% compliant. These figures demonstrate progress, but also show that there is some way to go in meeting UN security standards.<sup>i</sup> 10 of the 55 non-compliant countries as at March 2005 were at Phase 3 or 4 security status, but none at Phase 5. (UNICEF EMOPS 2003; UNICEF 2005b)

The Learning Review (Baastel 2005) found that the security CD-ROM was one of the biggest learning success stories of the DFID CB Programme. Because of its mandatory nature the course has achieved nearly 100% coverage. The Learning Review also found that most staff felt that the EPRT training had increased their capacity to apply security guidelines. The Valid Country Management Team survey found that two thirds of respondents felt that UNICEF adequately achieves the operational commitments of the security CCC and one third think it is effective.

There appears to be mixed information on whether there is a positive trend in security issues affecting UNICEF. The Learning Review notes that UNICEF security section attributes some changes since the institution of the mandatory security CD training including a 50% decrease in armed car-jackings and 90% decrease in petty theft over a two-year period. However, the 2004 Audit report notes a slight overall increase in security incidents between 2003 and 2004 and including a rise in house break-ins, street robberies and sexual assault. The 2004 Audit report asked for more consistent reporting on security incidents.

On the ground, the Valid team found a mixed picture in terms of security management. In Ethiopia, staff discipline in relation to security procedures appeared to be good. In Sri Lanka and DRC some security behaviour was lax in areas such as radio checks.

While the evaluation finds that UNICEF's security management has significantly improved since 1999, its management of security and accountabilities appears weaker than might seem at first sight. The overall accountabilities within the UN system are clear. The generic UN MOSS (UN, 2004) stresses the importance of responsibility and accountability of senior managers in the field and at agency headquarters. Within the UN system, country representatives of agencies are accountable to the Secretary-General through their executive heads, under the overall guidance of the UN Security Coordinator for all matters related to security of their personnel at the duty station (UN GA 2002b).

The UNICEF Security Policy (UNICEF 2003a) states that the Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Directors of UNICEF have the overall responsibility for the safety and security of UNICEF staff. This responsibility is, however, also shared by all Divisional and Regional Directors, and UNICEF representatives, who are accountable for the staff they supervise.

However an analysis of a range of management job descriptions shows that there is a lack of both consistency and priority in the statements of responsibility for security issues. Those job descriptions that do have specific responsibilities for security in job descriptions usually place it low in the list of priorities. Job descriptions for posts such as Regional Operations Officer, Emergency Project Officer, Human Resources Officer and Senior Operations Officer have no specific responsibilities for security.<sup>ii</sup>

This lack of joined-up accountabilities and mainstreaming of security issues is also reflected in the need for better integration and coordination between staff in programmes and operations to ensure better mutual understanding and joined-up planning (UNICEF Menaro 2003).

The UN Secretary General has stated that *"it shall be the duty of each agency of the UN system to incorporate security responsibilities into the job descriptions of every staff member in the field who has a security mandate. The performance appraisal of each individual shall include an evaluation of how well they are performing these functions"* (UN GA, 2002b). The UN framework of accountability for security management (*ibid*) notes that agencies should develop incentives for staff to encourage motivation in this area. However, UNICEF does not yet have an established performance review system, so making it difficult for this recommendation to be fully implemented.

There is evidence that security management in relation to national staff can be a weak area. Although limited in percentage terms, in the Valid staff survey, noticeably more national staff were negative about UNICEF's progress in security management. UN national staff were put in remote areas with inadequate communications equipment (Darfur Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation Interim Report, Feb 2005 ) An Iraq lessons learned review found that more comprehensive consultation is needed with national staff in preparedness planning, with a focus on ensuring necessary safety and security for national staff and assets prior to as well as following evacuation of international staff.

Overall, it is not possible to say whether there has been a general improvement in the quality of analysis of security contexts made by UNICEF Country Offices. As with security management in general, this analysis takes place within the UNCTs' work on scenarios and contingency planning within CAP, CCA and UNDAF processes. However, for UNICEF the development of OPSCEN has been important in providing a reliable and constantly available source of contextual information and analysis, feeding into and backstopping analysis being done at the country and regional levels. OPSCEN has already provided valuable support to staff members posted in dangerous countries (e.g. in both Somalia and Burundi), either by ensuring permanent contact (this rather low-visibility, psychological support can be crucial to combat field stress) or by organising rapid evacuation (ECHO 2004b). An OPSCEN user survey found that its roles were generally very important stressing OPSCEN's monitoring of emergency and security situations, 24-hour operational support, and support of regional and country offices during emergencies. Respondents found OPSCEN's services to be reliable, relevant, and professional and stressed the importance of their 24/7 availability.

The Valid team found that UNICEF is seen as a good and engaged security player in the UN system, both centrally and in the field. The Valid Country Management Team and staff surveys indicate that staff and management feel that UN security management guidelines and procedures enable UNICEF to manage the security of its staff.

Security regulations have been a constraint on UNICEF achieving its humanitarian goals. Out of 125 countries in which UNICEF has offices, a quarter (30) were at UN security phase 3 or above in March 2005 (UNICEF, 2005b), of which 3 countries, or parts of countries, were at Phase 5. In Haiti there was thought to be an irreconcilable contradiction between UN security restrictions and the demand for humanitarian action (Gruloos, 2004). The implementation of UN security regulations are seen by some UNICEF staff as highly risk averse and lacking in sophistication and nuancing. In Darfur UN access was sometimes limited by lack of UNDSS FSCOs (Darfur Inter-Agency Evaluation Interim Report, Feb 2005). However, UNICEF has been able to maintain field programmes in very challenging complex emergencies for many years in contexts such as Somalia (UNICEF, Somalia 2002).

UNICEF's improvement in its standards of security management no doubt partly stemmed from the UN system's reaction to post 9/11 security issues and UNICEF's budgetary allocation of US\$14m allocated for security in 2004 – 2005. However, the improvements are also attributable to investment by UNICEF from the DFID Programme funds and the so-called DFID II funds, including support for the development of OPSCEN, staffing, upgrading vehicles and telecommunications equipment to meet MOSS requirements.

There is a concern that UNICEF's draft MTSP 2006 – 2009 contains only passing reference to security management.

### **a) Conclusions/recommendations Goal 5: protection of staff and assets**

UNICEF has made progress in the area of staff and asset security. The DFID CB Programme has made a demonstrable impact. However, in an increasingly challenging global security environment, there is no room for complacency and security management remains an area that must be given continuing priority and resources.

These findings raise the question of whether enough attention is being given to implementation of accountabilities through UNICEF's management system. It also possible that technical compliance with MOSS requirements and the Learning CD-ROM, the 'tick box' approach, is being taken as an end in itself and not always followed through into implementation and continuing staff awareness.

#### **Recommendations**

1. There should be a thorough, across-the-board review of security management responsibilities to ensure that there is a robust and coherent accountability system which is supported by active supervision and monitoring at all levels through the system, with job descriptions being updated as necessary.
2. The consistency and reliability of UNICEF's security management should be improved by:
  - Continued investment in both hardware and training, particularly aiming to ensure that security awareness remains high and regulations are implemented.
  - Continue to increase the rate of country office MOSS compliance to a target level in terms of percentage of offices agreed with UNDSS (probably about 90%)
  - Reflection of the importance of security in the MTSP.
  - Strengthen both support and oversight functions by ensuring that all ROs have Regional Security Officers that can provide support and guidance to Regional Directors and Country Representatives.
  - Strengthen UNICEF's management culture to ensure that performance standards are maintained. Management up to Executive Board level should receive security reports that report on MOSS compliance and the trends in security incidents.
  - Review and where necessary clarify security management guidelines for COs in relation to national staff.
3. UNICEF should continue to work vigorously within the UN system at both New York and country team level for more sophisticated and sensitive UN security management systems that can be more responsive to the access needs of agencies such as UNICEF while continuing to give the highest priority to the security of staff and assets. UNICEF should work with DFID on this issue through their respective channels and modalities. This work should include:
  - The development of improved and more sensitive risk assessment tools systems.
  - The development of agreed differentiated levels of agency security needs according to mandate and operational presence on the ground.
4. Within country and partnership contexts continue to support and strengthen UN/NGO collaboration and coherence on security issues by encouraging increased contact and understanding on security within UNCT/NGO forums and in bilateral operations relations with partner NGOs.

### 3.3.6 Goals 6, 7 and 8: Children Affected by Armed Conflict

Three goals of the CB Programme Phase II were dedicated to enhancing response to Children Affected by Armed Conflict. They were inter-related as follows:

**Goal 6:** To improve UNICEF's **knowledge base on the situation of children affected by armed conflict** with particular attention to the differential impact of armed conflict on girls and women. This entailed establishing systems for monitoring and reporting on CAAC issues and developing common methodologies for research and knowledge sharing systems with partners.

**Goal 7:** To enhance UNICEF capacity to **advocate** for the promotion and protection of the rights of children affected by armed conflict. Advocacy strategies should be developed on priority CAAC issues such as HIV/AIDS, mine action, small arms, internally displaced children, gender dimensions of children affected by armed conflict and capacity augmented in the field to use the legal protection framework and with partners in inter-governmental fora.

**Goal 8:** To increase UNICEF capacity to develop coordinated **policy and programme guidance** to protect children affected by armed conflict with a consistent gender perspective in all policy and programming. The goal entailed systematising lessons learned, disseminating policies on CAAC issues and common approaches to CAAC with external partners.

Although child protection is broader than children in armed conflict, the CB Programme focused on CAAC. For that reason, while reference is made below to the need to further develop child protection in *disasters*, this has not been the focus of the analysis.

As noted in Section 2.5, since January 2005, UNICEF has received ECHO support for child protection. Although the ECHO Project is entirely separate from the CB Programme, a number of references to this work follow as it is part of UNICEF's broader drive towards building capacity in child protection. The ECHO project is initially funded for one year within a three framework and is valued at 2mn Euros for 2005. It includes four principal results/activities: i) a modular training package for child protection in emergencies ii) updating and developing a tool for application of the Cape Town principles on DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) with children iii) developing a policy on psychosocial support and iv) developing tools to support separated children under five.

#### *UNICEF and the child protection context*

Before analysing progress on the specific goals of the CB Programme, it is important to put UNICEF's work in child protection into the broader context of trends and developments in child protection, especially for children affected by armed conflict.

Child protection in humanitarian response (both armed conflict and disasters) is the CCC sector in which partners, especially NGOs, are in greatest need of UNICEF to play a strong role in developing, disseminating and coordinating policies and approaches as it remains a field in development and global expertise is limited.

A recent UNICEF consultation (UNICEF, Child Protection Section, 2005) with child protection staff and partner agencies identified the following areas that are currently weak on policy development:

- Sexual abuse and exploitation (confusion between the SG Bulletin/Code of Conduct and programmatic response to SGBV);
- Psychosocial support
- HIV/AIDS (especially protection for orphaned and vulnerable children and prevention of HIV in adolescents in conflict)
- Child trafficking (cross border implications)
- Access (negotiating access for children and civilians)
- Peace building with children and adolescents
- Controlling small arms.

Further research requirements were identified in relation to a number of emerging issues (e.g. children born of rape, collecting testimonies from survivors of abuse). These are essential areas in which UNICEF needs to lead and coordinate inter-agency debate and policy development over the next two to three years, possibly in conjunction with academic institutions. One further area, not identified here but that should be addressed, is child protection in natural disasters.

While the above policy areas are outstanding, the child protection field globally is recognised to have produced some of the most far reaching international legislation<sup>42</sup> and UN Resolutions<sup>43</sup> in recent years in the protection of children affected by armed conflict, especially in relation the recruitment and use of children by armed groups/armed forces. However, there is a long way to go in translating these into effective practice on the ground. To promote implementation the UN Secretary General's Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict has termed this the 'era of application' and has set up a four point plan<sup>44</sup> in which UNICEF is the key implementation agency, especially for monitoring and reporting and developing civil society networks, given that it has the greatest coverage as well as the mandate for child protection.

In 2004, the Security Council consolidated the drive for monitoring and reporting on child rights violations in armed conflict through Resolution 1539. The Resolution requests the UNSRSG/CAAC (together with UNICEF) to urgently devise an action plan for monitoring and reporting violations of children's rights in armed conflict<sup>45</sup>. This was followed by a Plan of Action set out by the Secretary General in February 2005 that the Security Council is expected to approve in the near future. Six core violations have been defined: killing or maiming of children, recruiting or using child soldiers, attacks against schools or hospitals, rape and other grave sexual violence against children, abduction of children, and denial of humanitarian access for children (UNSRSG/CAAC, 2004). UNICEF will have the principal implementing role in this plan. There is already considerable work taking place in this area but efforts remain piecemeal, too broad in focus and too slow to effectively address urgent protection concerns (OIOS, 2004). UNICEF is aware of these critiques and has recently convened inter-Divisional meetings to move forward on establishing the system. Monitoring and reporting is further discussed below in Goal 6.

#### *Partnerships in child protection and UNICEF's coordination role*

UNICEF has used a highly collaborative approach with child protection agencies in the development of policies, frameworks and systems in all aspects of child protection in emergencies. UNICEF's role is highly valued by partners in this sector, especially at HQ level. Key agencies (e.g. Save the Children) are strongly in favour of UNICEF having adequate resources to continue this work at HQ level but also take it more effectively to the field.

In common with Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 of this report, sector-based coordination is a highly demanding role that requires strong skills and experience in order to command the respect of other agencies. It also requires a considerable time investment and it is often difficult for Programme Officers to fulfil this role as well as managing programmes. Effective coordination requires cannot be achieved without funding for this role.

#### *UNICEF staffing for child protection*

Of serious concern is that UNICEF is understaffed in child protection at all three levels. At HQ level, one staff member has been driving policies, tools and frameworks for child protection in emergencies. For the above policy gaps (see Section 3.3.6) to be addressed, together with partners, it is essential that UNICEF expands its HQ team. At RO level, more staff are needed to support the dissemination and debate of

---

<sup>42</sup> July 1998, Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court; June 1999 the International Labour Organization, prohibited the recruitment of children under 18 years as part of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention and in May 2000 the UN adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child that established 18 years as the minimum age for participation in armed conflict.

<sup>43</sup> SCR, 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001) and 1460 (2003) all related to aspects of child protection in armed conflict.

<sup>44</sup> i) mainstreaming CAAC in UN institutions ii) monitoring/reporting compliance iii) developing civil society networks to support monitoring and reporting and iv) advocacy and dissemination of the norms on CAAC.

<sup>45</sup> 6 egregious violations have been defined.

policies and to share good practice between regions. The Child Protection Section hopes that a network of 7 additional Officers at RO level could help to identify regional networks, consultants and academics and that this network could in turn, strengthen child protection delivery in each region.

At field level, the staffing base has increased since child protection became a priority in the MTSP 2002-2005 and it now stands at 69 international professionals and 53 national officers, an increase of 18 international and 14 national posts since 2000 (UNICEF, Child Protection Section, 2004). However, in mid 2005 23 field-based P3 posts remained vacant because there was no secure funding to cover the posts (UNICEF, Child Protection Section, 2005). There are already insufficient child protection staff at all levels and the mandate to develop monitoring and reporting systems, including developing/strengthening child protection networks, will exacerbate this situation. CPNs are likely to fall to Child Protection sections even if overall responsibility for monitoring and reporting rests with the SPO.

#### *Funding for child protection*

Although child protection is increasingly recognised as a crucial sector in humanitarian response, it is still relatively under-funded by donors. From 2002 to 2005 protection/human rights/rule of law has consistently been in the lowest five sectors in terms of the percentage of the total across all CAP appeals to be funded. One of the issues in donor funding is that child protection is heavily staff dependent, more so than other sectors. Donors are often reluctant to fund programmes based primarily on funding staff.

#### *Progress against the Goals*

UNICEF's progress has been slower than hoped and some of the goals planned for the DFID funded CB Programme are currently being implemented with ECHO support (pilot studies and developing indicators/systems for monitoring and reporting on child rights violations and a KAP study on UNICEF staff awareness of child protection concepts, the legal framework and programming approaches). One reason for the delay in progress is that the Child Protection section has received very limited funding, only 3% of the HQ funding in 2004 from the CB Programme. Although the Child Protection section submitted proposals to EMOPS and received some programme funding, EMOPS was reluctant to fund additional posts from the CB Programme in view of DFID-UNICEF's aim to work towards sustainability. Given that Child Protection's principal requirement was for additional staff, there was relatively limited support to this Section.

### **Goal 6: Knowledge base on Children Affected by Armed Conflict**

Reinforcing UNICEF's knowledge base on children in emergencies requires effective situation analysis and rapid assessments, monitoring and reporting systems on children's rights and strong networks/partnerships to share information and research. All of these elements work together to provide a strong foundation for advocacy.

Effective situation analysis on the impact of armed conflict (and of natural disasters) on children is essential to programme design and advocacy. However, a number of factors limit analysis: i) UNICEF often has limited physical access to geographical areas in conflict, especially those controlled by NSEs. Within the cases studies, this was the case in DRC and Ethiopia and had been noted in the Nepal review. Issues of access can be mitigated by strong partnerships with NGOs but in countries with few NGOs, such as Ethiopia, lack of access can result in serious gaps in information. ii) Lack of emphasis on protection issues at CO or RO level is a further cause of poor information in some contexts. iii) The level of staff experience and confidence in knowing how to identify and address sensitive issues with government, non state entities and local communities (including children) can also be a limiting factor. The Child Protection Section at HQ is aware that the quality of CO level situation analyses must improve to facilitate programming and advocacy.

On the more specific area of monitoring and reporting systems on child rights violations (Section 3.3.6), UNICEF organisation-wide will be responsible for establishing and maintaining systems as the issues go beyond those addressed by the Child Protection Section (e.g. including monitoring access to vaccination sites). However, Child Protection Officers will be extremely important especially in establishing the Child Protection Networks (CPNs) that are essential for the system to function and in monitoring on some of the

violations. At HQ, an inter-Divisional working group is establishing the systems while at CO level systems are likely to engage Monitoring and Evaluation Officers and other Programme Officers, managed by SPOs. Once fully developed, the aim is to use standardized methodologies to document and verify child rights violations and use the information as evidence for advocacy with key decision-making bodies, especially the Security Council.

UNICEF will work together with NGOs and UN agencies (including UN Peacekeeping Operations) in the collection and analysis of data. CPNs), formal or informal groupings of NGOs and other child protection bodies (in some cases including government agencies) at country level, are expected to be the primary source of data gathering and UNICEF is mandated to establish CPNs where they do not exist. The scale of this task should not be under-estimated given that there are at least 19 countries/territories across the globe in ongoing conflict plus additional areas in fragile peace that may also require the implementation of this system. Implementation itself is extremely complex as it requires a high level of political sensitivity and strong capacity to negotiate and dialogue with government and non state entities while not risking children or staff.

As part of developing systems for collecting and collating data on CAAC issues, UNICEF undertook a pilot study on CAAC in Colombia, Sri Lanka and Angola and recently funded a workshop to analyse systems together with the Social Science Research Council. This work has not yet been completed due to contracting difficulties<sup>46</sup>; however, joint analyses with partners on data collection systems have raised a number of issues that will need to be considered in the monitoring and reporting systems:

- How can UNICEF field staff and partners balance collecting data for advocacy and maintaining relations with governments and NSEs in order to continue to implement programmes?
- Should forms be highly technical and aimed at robust monitoring systems or much simpler so that local NGOs and associations could participate more effectively in data collection?
- How can systems ensure that the ethics of data collection are adequately respected?
- How can UNICEF and partners verify the quality of the data?
- Should monitoring cover trends rather than individual cases?
- How can UNICEF engage partners in the process of data collection in cases where the organisation cannot contribute to partner costs?

UNICEF produced a draft paper in 2004 that addressed these questions and outlined systems for monitoring and reporting, drawing on ad hoc experience to date, the UN SRSG-CAAC's work, Watchlist (Action Plan)<sup>47</sup> and others in this area. Within the country case studies, both Sri Lanka and DRC had undertaken work in monitoring rights violations. Sri Lanka has strong experience of working at community level and collecting family reports of child recruitment and other violations while in DRC UNICEF-funded NGO partners are required to produce information on violations through regular programme reports. Much additional information is collected in DRC through the DPKO. UNICEF DRC has devised its own set of forms and through triangulation of information considers that it is possible to produce 'a reasonably clear picture.

The major challenges to UNICEF in enhancing the knowledge base on CAAC is to a) establish standardised systems or approaches to monitoring and reporting and b) scale up current ad hoc efforts in this area, including establishing CPNs. It is questionable whether current staffing levels are adequate for this work. In relation to more generalised deepening of the knowledge base of children in humanitarian crises, including natural disasters, UNICEF will need to increase skill levels in conducting situation analyses. To move forward on these areas will require technical support from Regional Advisers in Child Protection to roll out the system.

---

<sup>46</sup> The Social Science Research Council is a US organisation and could not be funded by ECHO.

<sup>47</sup> Watchlist is Watchlist is a network of local, regional and international non-governmental organizations working to protect the security and rights of children in armed conflicts. UNICEF supports Watchlist although as a UN agency it is not on the Steering Committee. The Watchlist monitors the impact of armed conflict on children, compiles reports about children, including adolescents, and influences programs and policies to improve their lives. In October 2004, Watchlist drew up an Action Plan for monitoring, reporting and response of children's rights violations.

## Goal 7: Advocacy on Children Affected by Armed Conflict

There were three elements to enhance advocacy capacity: *advocacy strategies*, developing capacity and confidence within staff teams to use the *international legal frameworks* and development of *partnerships* for advocacy for CAAC.

### *Advocacy strategies*

Although there is a great deal of advocacy happening constantly at all levels of the organisation, there are no global written advocacy strategies to guide CO level — with the exception of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 that includes advocacy targets. The new Advocacy Toolkit for Children in Armed Conflict (released in March 2005 and still in draft) aims to support developing RO and CO level strategies in a context of global level messages. The toolkit defines advocacy as ‘*the promotion of a message or series of messages in order to bring about change*’. It includes a number of good practice examples of advocacy for CAAC and notes that advocacy should have time-bound goals (e.g. 12-24 months) and be directed at key audiences. It also bases advocacy within the UNICEF protective environment approach<sup>48</sup> which some respondents find very helpful as a framework for protection. The toolkit notes that Country Representatives are primarily responsible for coordinating an advocacy strategy supported by the Child Protection Officer, Senior Programme Officer and Communications Officer. It includes generic messages for interpretation at CO level and, if adequately disseminated, should be helpful at CO level in developing strategies.

Some COs do have written plans for advocacy, integrated into programme planning documents: Annual Work Plan, Programme Plan of Operations and Country Programme Action Plan. They specify advocacy objectives relevant to the specific issues of the CO such as inclusion of ROMA IDP children in education, youth participation in HIV/AIDS (Macedonia); formerly abducted children, night commuters, gender dimensions of conflict (Uganda). In Pakistan, a Communication and Advocacy Plan will be designed to support the implementation of the overall Child Protection Strategy by the end of 2005.

In general, Country Offices reported consistency in messages across different levels of UNICEF but questions were raised about the level of cohesion in advocacy itself and comments were made that more systematic training on advocacy techniques at senior management level could help to enhance consistency and strengthen advocacy.

### *Advocacy capacity: Knowledge, attitudes and confidence in applying the legal frameworks*

The CB Programme planned to include a KAP survey on the knowledge of international legal frameworks and child protection approaches but this was not completed as part of the current Programme (has been re-planned for the ECHO project). As such, it has been difficult to fully assess CO and RO level awareness and confidence with applying legal frameworks. However, within the country case studies knowledge and confidence in applying frameworks and approaches was strong within senior child protection staff in Sri Lanka and DRC but much less so in Ethiopia. Lack of confidence in applying frameworks was a particular critique in Nepal and Darfur.

The principal questions are whether protection teams have had sufficient training and learning opportunities, as well as mentoring and practice examples in applying frameworks from more senior staff and the Regional Office. As the Learning Strategy evaluation pointed out, training in child protection has been weak and coverage relatively low (see Section 3.3.4). Five out of six CO teams in the advocacy questionnaire reported that key staff had received some training in the international legal frameworks and four reported having received training in advocacy techniques. However, *international* staff are more likely to have had learning opportunities on the legal frameworks than national staff and training in advocacy techniques can be as limited as a component in Country Representative learning programmes.

Where the RO/CO relationship works well and there is a technically strong Regional Protection Adviser, they can play a vital role in enhancing advocacy capacity through technical support/training and, occasionally, in addressing sensitive issues directly at CO level that would be difficult for in-country teams to broach. In ESARO the Regional Protection Officers have provided a great deal of technical support to

---

<sup>48</sup> See Landgren, 2005.

developing CO level staff confidence to advocate for children's rights in the context of demobilisation, in working with NSEs, in relation to child IDPs and HIV/AIDS in conflict. However, much less support has been provided to issues of disasters and advocacy for protection. In Ethiopia, for example, the government is resistant to addressing child protection issues in relation to resettlement or food insecurity and both CO and RO accept that advocacy capacity in child protection is weak. An exception is in relation to a participatory model engaging children and adolescents in advocacy in relation to HIV/AIDS that could be a model for replication through the Regional Office.

In Sri Lanka, confidence and capacity for advocacy is very strong from Country Representative through to Child Protection Officers and team, based on technical knowledge and a long experience of child protection in emergencies. In that case, support has not been sought from the Regional Office and the CP Officer mentors and supports national officers within the team to develop the confidence in both quiet advocacy through negotiation address and more public campaigning. In DRC, the Regional Emergency Officer with a strong protection background has provided considerable technical support to the DDR process including drawing attention to children's rights within the process.

### *Partnerships*

At HQ level, UNICEF has strong partnerships in advocacy for children affected by armed conflict. The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (an informal network of child rights/child protection agencies) and Save the Children UK at HQ characterised collaboration as 'excellent' and appreciates UNICEF's lead in this area. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers also referred to the importance of UNICEF's work in this area and the fact that UNICEF has been a dedicated and strong partner.

At CO level, teams reported a wide range of partnerships including the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, child protection INGOs, inter agency platforms to address specific issues such as street children, UN thematic groups, IASC in country, government agencies. Some also mentioned donors as a partner in advocacy. In general, the effectiveness of networks at CO level depends on the dynamism and determination of the CP Officer to coordinate, in the same way as any other sector.

### *How effectively has UNICEF advocated for children's rights in emergencies, including influencing global policy in humanitarian response?*

UNICEF has undertaken a great deal of work in developing inter-agency networks and advocating for policies supporting child rights in the humanitarian arena. Principal examples are:

1. Strong engagement at HQ level with the Security Council and UN General Assembly, especially from the time of the Machel Report in 1996 (Machel, 1996) to the present time. UNICEF's engagement has made strong contributions towards the raft of international legislation and Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflict.
2. Development of the Cape Town Principles for CAAC and current plans to update the Principles.
3. UNICEF supported the development of the IASC Guidelines on HIV and Conflict (2003) on IASC Guidelines on Gender Mainstreaming.
4. Development of the Protective Environment framework that has helped to place a conceptual framework around CP and children affected by armed conflict.
5. Introduction of Codes of Conduct and training to address sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian staff. In addition, UNICEF's robust leadership led to the Secretary General's Zero Tolerance approach and to the steadfast adherence to age 18 as the minimum age for sexual relations even where the local age of consent is lower.
6. Development of the Inter Agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (ICRC, 2004). UNICEF also played a leading role in rapidly applying the guidelines in the tsunami response.
7. Development of a training package for peacekeepers with Save the Children. UNICEF has also been very active in the roll out of training.

8. UNICEF has played (and continues to play) a key role in the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and List Watch that are beginning to have a positive impact on reducing government use of children in armed conflict (although much less so with non state entities).
9. UNICEF is playing a leading role in developing DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) policies through an inter-agency Working Group that has produced a draft policy paper directed towards redressing and preventing the violation of children's rights within armed conflict. The paper also considers promoting child-specific approaches with reintegration as the focus, ensuring consistent support through long-term funding and the non-conferral of legitimacy of child recruitment as a result of child DDR.
10. The ethics and approaches to children's engagement in truth and justice commissions has been clarified through UNICEF's work in developing a policy paper on the area (UNICEF, Sierra Leone, 2001).
11. The Innocenti Centre has researched international criminal justice and children and is seeking funding to publish the paper.

Finally, UNICEF has produced work on the impact on children of sanctions and of small arms.

In addition, there are many examples of advocacy at RO and CO levels such as the strong and vocal advocacy for children's rights in Sri Lanka, especially in relation to the Action Plan for Children to (*inter alia*) protect children from recruitment and support the release of children from the NSEs. A national campaign in Burundi to address sexual and gender-based violence has resulted in more rape cases being reported to the judiciary and an increase in rates of conviction. A great deal of advocacy work has been undertaken with the government in Uganda on IDPs, children associated with fighting forces, formerly abducted children, night commuters and gender dimensions of conflict. In Haiti UNICEF has worked with UNDP and the UN Mission for Haiti Child Protection Adviser on CAAC. In Macedonia, the CO has addressed issues of IDP children, HIV/AIDS, juvenile justice and trafficking. The CO in Pakistan is developing a Communication and Advocacy Plan to reinforce child protection that will be in place by the end of 2005.

ROs in East and Southern Africa and West Africa have been active in developing coalitions around issues of DDR, landmines, IDPs, HIV/AIDS and others. They also provide technical support to advocacy and in W. Africa have intervened directly in sensitive issues with government and NSEs.

However, there are also examples of where issues of child rights violations have not been adequately recognised or addressed such as issues of protection in the Northern Caucasus; Broughton, 2003; issues of the growing impact of the conflict on child rights violations in Nepal (DFID-UNICEF, 2004; sexual and gender based violence, in Darfur, (UNICEF-DFID, 2005) and relatively weak analysis on child protection in the case study in Ethiopia.

*What are the key factors that are facilitating or limiting strong advocacy at CO, RO, and HQ levels?*

Based on the advocacy questionnaires and discussions with staff and partners at all levels, strong advocacy depends on:

- Technical knowledge and confidence in applying the legal frameworks
- Support from HQ and the Regional Office in the form of consultations/meetings/ workshops to align thinking and plans
- Established monitoring and reporting systems on child rights violations as a basis of information on which build advocacy
- Strong coalitions and alliances around issues
- Willingness of the CMT to take risks and challenge governments *and* NSEs and to support staff in agreed advocacy methodologies/targets whatever the potential consequences
- A strong commitment to the human rights based approach to programming, especially within the CMT
- Effective diplomatic and negotiation skills: knowing how to address issues in the most effective way

- Time and attention to bringing the government on board in many contexts
- Support from the Regional Office or HQ to address sensitive issues at CO level that may be more difficult for the CO staff to broach
- Strong cohesion of messages and strategies between all levels

Conversely, advocacy is limited by:

- A reluctance to risk relations with the government or with NSEs. This can be a difficult balancing act between maintaining a presence in some parts (or the whole) of the country with having strong advocacy to highlight violations of children's right. One strategy that UNICEF is using is trying to increase field presence so that the existence of eyes and ears itself discourages violations (e.g. Northern Uganda where four new zonal offices have opened and in Sri Lanka where there is a large team engaged in child protection).
- Weak technical capacity at RO level, reducing the support to COs
- Lack of a *comprehensive* assessment of the violation of children's rights due to: a) lack of access b) uneven geographical focus within a country c) low technical capacity d) lack of prioritisation of child protection issues overall e) low staffing levels
- Focusing on service delivery in an emergency and not having the time and space to understand the broader issues that require advocacy
- Fear for the safety of staff or children themselves if sensitive issues are addressed (an example was that in post tsunami Banda Aceh, staff felt that advocacy for the increased protection of IDP children from sexual exploitation represented a security threat to staff working in the camps).
- Lack of technical knowledge of child rights and child protection
- Priority given to UNICEF 'traditional' programmes (education, health) and underestimation of the importance of protection issues as a key component of UNICEF's work
- Lack of commitment to child rights and advocacy by the Country Management Team
- Relatively low investment in child rights/child protection by the organisation as a whole compared to other sectors (as evidenced by low staffing levels)

In the future, CO/RO level assessments against these factors may be helpful to draw up plans to build on factors promoting effective advocacy and reduce the impact of factors limiting advocacy.

### **Goal 8: Coordinated policy and programme guidance**

Goal 8 had three elements: systematisation of lessons learned, engagement of partners in policy/programme guidance and dissemination of policy guidelines, all with consistent integration of gender issues.

#### *Systematisation of lessons learned and engagement of partners*

UNICEF has led a great deal of inter agency work at global and regional levels in recent years in developing guidelines, policies and lessons learned in children affected by armed conflict, as above. In addition to those mentioned in paragraph xx, UNICEF has consolidated field-based lessons learned on CAAC through the inter agency paper: *Growing the Sheltering Tree* (2002). Partners were brought together by UNICEF to discuss and systematise lessons learned and develop clearer policy perspectives on children associated with armed forces through the meeting that generated the Cape Town Principles in xx. A recent meeting to address perspectives on psychosocial interventions sponsored by UNICEF is helping to solidify lessons learned in that area.

Regional meetings have also been sponsored by UNICEF such as a major Great Lakes Cross Border Meeting on CAAC in February 2005 and a meeting in West Africa to consider children's role in peace-building. The Regional Advisers Child Protection also convene a number of ongoing networks and coalitions on children's issues.

Encouragingly, all of the guidelines on child protection were developed in conjunction with partners, increasing the sense of joint ownership. This is particularly important as it is easier to use the tools for a rapid joint response when they have strong legitimacy from the inclusive way in which they were developed. For example, the joint guidelines on unaccompanied and separated children were considered

by UNICEF and Save the Children to be a 'huge achievement' (ICRC, 2004) and were used immediately following the tsunami by a consortium of agencies to release briefings on how to address child separation.

While a great deal of progress has been made in partnerships in child protection at HQ and RO levels, at CO level inter-agency collaboration and coordination is more variable and depends to a large extent on the confidence of Child Protection Programme Officers (as is the case with the coordination function in other sectors). Regional Protection Officers could support CO Child Protection Officers to further develop inter agency coordination and partnerships where they are weak.

#### *Dissemination of policy guidance and learning*

Another major concern is the weak dissemination of policy guidance and frameworks in all aspects of child protection in emergencies. In addition, many of the staff at field level need much greater technical support and much more investment is required in learning opportunities for child protection staff (see Goal 4: Learning Strategy). Various alternatives are under consideration by UNICEF and partners, including the development of an interagency masters degree in child protection, modular training on child protection (being developed with support from ECHO), reinforced staff training at the point of induction, placement of a learning officer for child protection in OLDS and on-the-job learning through exchange visits, mentoring and coaching (UNICEF, Child Protection Section, 2005).

While a great deal of positive work has been achieved in developing policies and lessons learned, dissemination to the field has been weak. Field level respondents during the case studies found it difficult to cite most of the policy guidelines mentioned in paragraphs xx and the debate tends to remain within a relatively closed circle of UNICEF and NGO HQ/RO personnel.

Given that the guidelines were developed with partners, much dissemination could usefully be done together with partners at field level. Regional Protection Officers could support Protection Officers at CO level to bring partners together for discussions of key guidelines and how they apply to the specific country context. They could also be introduced into existing partner meetings. Include the following areas in the forthcoming learning.

### **a) Conclusions/recommendations Goals 6, 7 and 8: Children and Armed Conflict**

Child protection (and more specifically children affected by armed conflict) is the CCC sector in which partners most need policy guidance and coordination from UNICEF as it is still a field in development and global expertise is limited. Partners in child protection recognise the impressive achievements in the international legal frameworks and UN/Security Council Resolutions in recent years at global level and in policy frameworks but much more work needs to be done on disseminating the frameworks to field level and further building capacity for advocacy at CO level.

Demands are growing on UNICEF and the recent mandate to implement systems for monitoring and reporting on child rights will further increase the workload. It is not clear whether UNICEF has sufficient human resources at present to fulfil the mandate in the aspects that pertain to child protection. Progress under the CB Programme was not as great as was hoped, partly because the CP Section in Programmes received very little funding.

#### **Recommendations**

The overall goal in child protection should be to translate the impressive work at global level into changes for children at CO level through programmes and advocacy.

1. The Evaluation Team recognises the demand by child protection NGOs and UN agencies for UNICEF to provide excellence in coordination in child protection at all levels. As observed in paragraphs xx, coordination should be resourced as a specific function with a dedicated budget and staff should be highly qualified to ensure credibility with other agencies. UNICEF should review staffing and funding requirements for effective and reliable coordination in child protection.

2. Training and learning in child protection (international legal frameworks, policies, good practice models) is essential to ensure staff have the confidence for strong advocacy. The Evaluation Team welcomes the upcoming plans to roll out modular training and recommends that it is backed with follow up, mentoring and coaching from senior Protection Programme Officers and Regional Protection Advisers. UNICEF could consider outsourcing the roll out of training to a specialist training agency held on retainer for this purpose.
3. In close collaboration with key child protection INGOs and the UNICEF internal working group, UNICEF should **finalise and roll out systems for monitoring and reporting of child rights violations as quickly as possible**, drawing on the vast amount of preparatory work already in existence. This should include an assessment of staffing and funding requirements for roll out to review capacity to fulfil the mandate. The Inter Divisional Working Group on Monitoring and Reporting should drive this process.
4. Regional Advisers in Child Protection should reinforce their role in oversight/quality control especially in relation to: i) dissemination of key policies/guidelines as a matter of course during visits to COs i.e. leading discussions of policies/guidelines in relation to the local context ii) supporting countries to conduct an assessment against the factors that promote/detract from effective advocacy and in developing an action plan to support more effective advocacy in the future. This should be done in conjunction with Communication Officers and drawing on the Advocacy Toolkit iii) developing coordination skills at CO level and promoting strong partnerships for child protection, including advocacy iv) analysing what has worked/not worked in various countries in developing Child Protection Networks and sharing these lessons with COs, especially those that will be rolling out the monitoring and reporting system.
5. The Evaluation Team endorses UNICEF's efforts to augment the Head Office team to address the policy gaps (to include child protection in natural disasters).

### 3.4 Approach to gender integration

Key UNICEF documents (UNICEF Evaluation Office, 2002) recognise that while advocacy has been strong at HQ level and with the Security Council and UN General Assembly, capacity is weaker in the field.

Goals 6 and 8 of the DFID-UNICEF CB Programme specifically mention 'the differential impact of armed conflict on girls and women' and 'a consistent gender perspective in all policy and programming'. The most relevant benchmark for assessing UNICEF performance in this respect is the 1999 IASC 'Policy Statement for the Integration of a Gender Perspective in Humanitarian Assistance', which UNICEF played a key role in drafting. This policy states a commitment to the principles embodied in international human rights instruments and a commitment to gender mainstreaming through various specified actions.

Whilst UNICEF's commitment to gender mainstreaming is clear, what is less clear is its relationship to women as a target group and hence its engagement with women's rights. There is an ambiguity in UNICEF's mandate and how it is interpreted. Does UNICEF's commitment just relate to women in their role as carers of children, or does it go beyond this to an engagement with women in their own right? There is reported to be a variety of views on this at the level of UNICEF's Board. The consequence is a lack of clarity at a programming level with varying interpretations of how engaged UNICEF should be in promoting women's, in addition to children's rights. Nevertheless, CEDAW is supposed to be central to UNICEF's work and one of the four pillars of the CRC concerns non-discrimination, including discrimination against girls.

UNICEF's approach to integrating a gender perspective into its humanitarian work is through:

- ensuring that all its policy and programme guidance documents are gendered and promote a gender perspective
- training, both dedicated gender awareness training and including gender awareness as a component in other trainings

- the work of the Gender Mainstreaming Unit in HQ in New York, not least to support (i) and (ii) above
- by appointing 'gender focal points' in different departments and country offices

### 3.4.1 Evidence of gender integration

The extent to which UNICEF's policy documents on humanitarian assistance are gender-sensitive and promote a gendered approach varies. Some, such as the 'Technical Notes' and the 'Programme Policies and Procedures Manual' do adopt a truly gendered perspective. Others, such as the CCCs, talk a lot about targeting women and children but are less explicit about a gender analysis, for example in terms of how assessments are done and data disaggregated, and in understanding the particular vulnerability of girl children and women. But it would not take much to improve the document; only small adjustments are required.

At the programme level, there are reports of very variable performance. This evaluation is not in a position to provide a thorough assessment of gender integration in UNICEF's humanitarian programming, partly because a selective case study approach was the most feasible way of conducting the evaluation, and partly because of limited monitoring of gender integration in humanitarian assistance. But it has picked up a lack of consistency. For example, in the Sri Lanka Country Office a gender perspective appears quite strong, in both UNICEF's development work *and* its humanitarian work. This is particularly evident in its focus on domestic violence in its long-term work, and the attention it paid to SGBV after the tsunami. However, in 2002 a Joint DFID/ SIDA/ UNICEF Review (Joint DFID et al, 2002) identified inadequacies in how UNICEF had integrated gender into its CAAC programming in Sierra Leone. Whilst it targeted women, it did not really address gender inequalities and a gender analysis of the programme was missing. UNICEF Sri Lanka's commitment to integrating gender is evident. It had planned a gender audit of all its programmes in 2005 although this has been postponed because of the tsunami response.

Meanwhile, the evaluation of UNICEF's response to the Darfur crisis was critical of its lack of gender sensitivity, for example in its water and sanitation work, in its sports and recreational kits but also in its failure to highlight and address SGBV (UNICEF-DFID, 2005).

The country case study visits do not reveal a high investment in promoting gender integration, for example in training of staff. However, a key determining factor of the extent to which gender is truly integrated is reported to be the commitment of leadership at the Country Office level. Thus, it depends very much on the commitment of individuals at senior management level. This is not a very reassuring comment on gender integration throughout the agency.

Where UNICEF does have a more impressive record is in its inter-agency work and the leadership it has provided. For example, UNICEF co-chaired the Gender Working Group of the IASC at the time the policy statement on gender integration was drafted in 1999, and it took the lead in assessing the gender sensitivity of the CAPs and preparing a gender checklist for future CAPs in the last couple of years.

UNICEF's leadership within the UN system on SGBV is most strongly praised. It co-chaired the Sexual Abuse Task Force and has been credited with really making progress on this issue. UNICEF also raised SGBV as a concern immediately after the tsunami. UNICEF's commitment to addressing SGBV is an opportunity to promote gender awareness within the organisation. But the extent to which this has happened appears limited. A number of interviewees reported that there is a tendency for UNICEF staff to regard SGBV as a specific emergency-related problem rather than relating it to more structural and deep-seated issues of gender inequality. There is also a danger that SGBV is seen as 'the' gender issue in humanitarian emergencies when in reality there are many issues of gender discrimination and vulnerability that must be taken into account.

Within UNCTs, there is a reported tendency for issues of women's rights and gender to be seen as the domain of UNIFEM or UNFPA rather than everyone's concern. Yet neither of these agencies has a strong operational capacity and this can lead to a situation where women's rights focus narrowly on reproductive health.

### 3.4.2 Constraints to gender integration

Whilst UNICEF has a strong policy commitment to gender integration in humanitarian assistance, this does not seem to be followed through very systematically or consistently to programme level. The Gender Mainstreaming Unit has only two staff members. As a result, they have 'decentralised' gender mainstreaming to EMOPS and to the focal points, but the focal point system does not seem to be working. Not all departments or Country Offices have a focal point and no Regional Offices have a gender focal person. The responsibility of the focal person is also unclear. Rather than providing expertise and support to integrate gender, the focal points seem to play more of a 'post-box role' as the people to whom all communications on gender issues are sent. There does not even appear to be a mechanism for bringing them together on a periodic basis.

Other constraints identified in interviews are:

- high staff turnover at field level which is a constraint to really investing in, and making a difference to programming
- not pitching gender training at a sufficiently senior level given the importance of leadership on this issue

Finally, it is noted that investment in gender integration that was planned for Phase II of the DFID/ UNICEF capacity-building programme was cut when the DFID budget was cut. This seems to have happened without much comment from within UNICEF or from DFID, despite gender awareness being one of the guiding principles of Phase II. Given UNICEF's patchy record in gender integration, this was an unfortunate decision.

### 3.4.3 Conclusions: Gender integration

The evidence suggests that gender integration into humanitarian work has not been very successful within UNICEF. In practice there appears to be a tendency to equate gender sensitivity with targeting women and girl children in programming, but a truly gendered approach would analyse and address issues of gender inequality. As Carol Bellamy highlighted in her farewell speech, more attention should be paid to men and boys and their *relationship* to women and girls than is currently the case.

More fundamentally, rather than gender integration being everyone's responsibility, the default position seems to be that it is no one's responsibility. There is no real accountability for gender integration, there is limited support to programmes at Country Office level, and there is limited monitoring of the extent to which gender is truly integrated into UNICEF's humanitarian work. Leadership at an inter-agency level is not matched in terms of intra-agency leadership and performance. As a result, UNICEF's record in integrating gender appears to be patchy and inadequate.

#### Recommendations

1. UNICEF needs to invest much more in gender integration to make it happen consistently. It should strengthen the gender mainstreaming unit, with at least one staff member dedicated to humanitarian work. It should have much greater gender expertise at RO level – ideally as a dedicated gender adviser – that can support and monitor gender integration at CO level.
2. UNICEF could also make greater use of the expertise of other UN agencies such as UNIFEM, UNFPA and UNHCR, in terms of training in gender awareness and gender analysis at Country Office level, to better inform UNICEF's own programming.
3. Some of UNICEF's emergency policy documents should be revisited for their encouragement of gender integration. For example, the focus in the CCCs could be expanded from a focus on targeting children and women to greater assessment and awareness of underlying gender inequalities.
4. UNICEF has played a leading role in finding ways of combating sexual exploitation and abuse and raising awareness of SGBV, within the international humanitarian sector, within the UN, and at country level. The next step is to deepen the analysis of SGBV and relate it more to gender

inequalities and structural issues within society, and to connect it more to UNICEF's long-term development work so it is not just seen as an emergency issue.

### 3.5 The DFID-UNICEF partnership

#### *The DFID Context*

In both development and humanitarian work, DFID is seen as a leading donor in terms of amounts of aid and levels of engagement. The UK Secretary of State for International Development has been pushing energetically for reforms to the humanitarian system with proposals for more coherence through pooled funding and benchmarks for humanitarian response. In 2005 DFID is developing a disaster risk reduction strategy. The Department is also a committed participant in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.

For DFID the UNICEF CB Programme is a contribution to the achievement of its overall objectives contained in its Public Service Agreement (PSA) 2003 – 2006 (DFID, 2002) with the UK Treasury. The relevant PSA objective is to “*increase the impact of key multilateral agencies in reducing poverty and effective response to conflict and humanitarian crises*”. Within that objective DFID will work with others:

- To strengthen and improve the institutional effectiveness of multilateral agencies.
- To strengthen and improve the international system's response to humanitarian disasters and complex emergencies.

The 2003-2006 PSA is now superseded by a 2005-2008 version, but there are no significant changes in the sections relevant to this Programme.

#### *Findings*

The CB Programme has been highly relevant for the humanitarian priorities of both DFID and UNICEF. For DFID, the Programme clearly aligns closely with and contributes to the PSA objectives referred to above. This contribution to the PSA cannot be quantified but in qualitative terms is assessed by the overall findings of this evaluation.

The relationship between DFID and UNICEF within this Programme has been characterised as one of 'tough love' with constructive openness, frankness and trust, most openly demonstrated by the Secretary of State's letters to the Executive Director about UNICEF's performance in specific responses (for example Darfur). On UNICEF's side, this degree of robust engagement has been accepted, at times welcomed, even if there have been times when DFID was thought by some to be intruding into the minutiae of operations.

UNICEF has a variety of relationships with DFID at different levels and in different forums, not least the UK government's seat on UNICEF's Executive Board. On the whole, UNICEF feels that its relationships with DFID are constructive and can and have been used for advocacy and policy discussions. It remains an open question whether UNICEF could have specifically used its relationship within the CB Programme to further its advocacy objectives.

Both DFID and UNICEF generally share the view that the management of the programme has been satisfactory in terms of planning, reporting and conducting review meetings and visits. For DFID the field visits have been particularly important as reality checks. However, some within DFID feel that the impact of the Programme in terms of UNICEF's performance in some major emergencies, such as Darfur, has been very limited and feel that that the Programme should have been more tightly focused and monitored around outcomes. This approach would be in some tension with GHD principles and DFID's overall approach to move away from programme funding to institutional support funding that is not tightly earmarked.

One of the intentions of the CB Programme was to encourage innovation. It is felt within UNICEF that this has happened because of the nature of the funding, allowing, for example, regions to experiment with different approaches to the EPRT.

Until the agreement with ECHO, it had not been possible to persuade other donors to follow DFID's line in supporting UNICEF capacity building in spite of efforts being made on this front by both UNICEF and DFID.

DFID tools, such as the ISP and the MEFF (multi-lateral effectiveness tool), have been largely developed without consultation with the agencies and DFID does not appear to have used the opportunity of its partnerships with humanitarian agencies to bring the stakeholders together to share lessons learned.

#### *Relationship to the DFID UNICEF Institutional Strategic Partnership (ISP)*

DFID has Institutional Strategic Partnerships (ISPs) with a wide range of multilateral development and humanitarian agencies including UNICEF. The CB Programme started before UNICEF's ISP and has run in parallel to it. The Programme has been handled by CHAD within DFID and the ISP by the department handling relationships with UN agencies.

In terms of the nature of the two funding relationships, there are many similarities. Both aim to provide relatively unearmarked and stable support to UNICEF for its core business over a number of years with broad objectives, light reporting and monitoring through joint field visits. The main difference is that the ISP document, which is public, contains an overall institutional analysis of UNICEF's strengths and weaknesses.

In response to pressure from the UK government's Treasury and National Audit Office, DFID has been under pressure to demonstrate better the value and impact of its various ISPs. As a result, the MEFF has been developed as a way of measuring institutional capacity at headquarters level and changes over time. The MEFF has been applied to UNICEF's development side, but not to its humanitarian side, although, of course many organisational issues rated in the MEFF are relevant to the management of UNICEF's humanitarian activities.

In the past DFID has not developed strong coherence between humanitarian and conflict work and development work and to engage its field offices in multi-lateral relationships that are centrally managed. This has been the result of often weak connections between CHAD and the rest of DFID and the fact that, traditionally, DFID country or regional offices have mainly focused on bilateral development programmes. DFID's Country Assistance Plans (CAPs) have in the past sometimes lacked analysis of humanitarian and conflict issues. The CAP for Ethiopia (DFID 2003) had a one-line reference to DFID's response to humanitarian needs (both food and non-food). However, in 2005 DFID is developing a humanitarian strategy paper for Ethiopia. In the DRC DFID's country assistance programme was disconnected from humanitarian needs. CHAD now aims to ensure that appropriate conflict and humanitarian input is being provided for DFID CAPs that are due for renewal.

Globally the guidelines for DFID CAPs now require an analysis of humanitarian and conflict issues. Coupled with continuing decentralisation of DFID, this should provide increased opportunities for UNICEF and other agencies to engage with DFID at field level on broader issues, future analysis and strategies. Increasing internal coherence between the development and humanitarian parts of DFID is demonstrated by the fact that DFID has developed a virtual team to coordinate and create coherence in its relations with UNICEF.

In practice DFID's relationships with UNICEF at country level have been variable, as one might expect. In the countries visited for this evaluation, relationships were generally good and in Sri Lanka, DFID was highly supportive of UNICEF's work, especially in the tsunami response. In Ethiopia, partly because of DFID's decentralisation, there was a sense that a broader renewal of the relationship beyond discussions about programme funding would be useful. It should be noted that DFID's trend towards broader and pooled funding streams means that there will be a shift away from the high transaction costs of project funding.

#### *Looking to the Future*

There are a number of factors that will influence the development of any future CB Programme. DFID is reviewing the ways in which it interacts with and supports multilateral aid agencies in the context of a rising aid budget and energetic international development and humanitarian policies and trend to more

unearmarked funding, but tight levels of administrative costs and human resources. The trend is towards a 'light touch' approach in programming relationships, aiming to do more with less. This could mean that DFID will be less able to engage at the level it has done in the past and that tools such as the MEFF which have risks of being over-simplistic will be used.

As a result, there is continuing debate and work within DFID about how to handle its partnerships with multi-lateral agencies and the ISP model is no longer seen as the main/only model, partly because it is seen as too labour intensive. A decision will need to be made about any future CB Programme's relationship with the next UNICEF ISP that is due to start in 2006. Should it be integrated into the next ISP or remain as parallel but separate programme? An independent review of the current ISP is being undertaken in mid-2005. Part of the brief of that review will be to take into account the findings of this evaluation. A future ISP will be aligned with UNICEF's new MTSP 2006 – 2009.

There are strong reasons for integrating the capacity building programme into a future ISP. It fits with the philosophy of mainstreaming emergency response work, with integration and alignment with the MTSP. It would push both DFID and UNICEF to be more joined-up internally. The closer linking of UNICEF's humanitarian and development sides appears crucial, particularly in transitional situations hovering between emergency, rehabilitation and development that are likely to continue and possibly increase. However, there is a significant risk that integrating the capacity building component into the ISP could result in it getting it lost and that the dedicated DFID resources from CHAD will get reduced or be lost.

This discussion is also influenced by consideration of whether the capacity building inputs are seen as one-off, that is to say, once a certain level of capacity has been reached the programme can be wound up, or whether, given rapidly changing external contexts and the need for maintenance and renewal, it should continue as part of DFID's overall support to UNICEF. Finally, there is the question of the content of any future capacity building programme as discussed above.

### 3.5.1 Conclusions/recommendations on DFID-UNICEF Partnership

The programme has been highly relevant to both UNICEF's and DFID's humanitarian aims and priorities. The relationship between UNICEF and DFID has been engaged, open, frank and, at times, challenging and characterized by a good degree of trust. DFID's concern remains that evidence from Darfur, Nepal and Liberia shows that UNICEF still has a long way to go before it has *reliable* and strong humanitarian response capacity.

#### Recommendations

In relation to the management of future cooperation:

1. Given i) the scale and importance of UNICEF's role in humanitarian response and in the UN Reform process **and** ii) the fact that UNICEF has made improvements but to shift an organisation the size of UNICEF takes considerable time, the evaluation **recommends that DFID continues to support and enhance UNICEF's capacity building efforts in the medium term (more details in Section 4.1).**
2. If a future humanitarian response capacity building programme is to be incorporated within a new ISP, **money earmarked for this area should be ring-fenced**, by classifying it as thematic funding rather than regular resource funding.
3. DFID should consult with UNICEF about any possible changes in the way that it channels its support to UNICEF.
4. **Accountability within the Programme should be strengthened** by reporting against strategic objectives, as described in paragraph xx.
5. Linked to point II), **consideration should be given to upgrading the Programme focal point** within EMOPS to work proactively on monitoring, evaluation and learning work within the partnership.

6. There should be **concerted effort by DFID and UNICEF to bring other donors into the next capacity building initiative**. Given the relative lack of success thus far (except for ECHO) this might need to be done as a collective UN agency initiative and within the GHD framework.<sup>49</sup> DFID and the multilateral humanitarian agencies with which it has partnerships might benefit from joint discussion with other donors on lessons learned from humanitarian capacity building funding. This should include a discussion of funding for the **coordination function**, given its demonstrated importance in other sections of this report.
7. **DFID should continue to draw on UNICEF's humanitarian expertise** and experience when formulating relevant policy and when developing its Country Assistance Programme documents.
8. Both UNICEF and DFID should **explore opportunities through the CB Programme to collaborate on humanitarian advocacy initiatives** at international and country level. Advocacy initiatives should take into account UNICEF's need to preserve its humanitarian independence and impartiality, yet recognising the potential influence of donor governments in many country contexts where humanitarian principles or access are not being respected by the host government.

---

<sup>49</sup> Possibly including the ICRC and IFRC.



## 4. Conclusions

### 4.1 Relevance

#### *Relevance in relation to the humanitarian context*

The focus of the CB Programme was highly relevant to UNICEF's mission and mainstreaming approach. Fundamentally, it was highly relevant in the context of growing demand for UNICEF's humanitarian response.

#### *Focus and design of the Programme*

The key strategy of mainstreaming was relevant although it is important to consider mainstreaming as a foundation on which to build specialist support as necessary. The design of the CB Programme was also relevant in view of the extensive coverage of UNICEF offices and the fact that UNICEF is present before, during and after emergencies. The integrated approach also emphasizes a timely response.

A number of caveats to the design of the CB Programme have been identified:

1. The CB Programme was premised on the assumption that it is possible to enhance CO level capacity by reinforcing HQ capacity in policy guidance and Regional Office capacity in rolling out support and oversight. The aspect of HQ development of policies and guidelines has undoubtedly been effective but dissemination to CO level has been less so. More importantly RO capacity in *oversight* is weak. If future capacity building continues to invest at HQ and RO levels, there must be greater efforts to reinforce the management and oversight capacity of ROs.
2. Within the Learning Strategy, there was not sufficient focus on developing capacity within the technical sectors of the CCCs. The CB Programme appears to have under-estimated the importance of emergency expertise and experience to effective response.
3. While the EPRP roll out was extremely impressive in covering 90% of countries, it could have been more focused on high-risk countries linked to early warning.
4. In the design of Goal 1 and particularly within the CCC approach, there has been a greater emphasis on the first stage of fast onset emergencies while greater attention could be paid to chronic and slow onset emergencies.
5. The CB Programme was not designed in the context of growing collaboration between UN agencies and UN Reform.
6. Addressing gender issues was extremely weak in the CB Programme as specific activities and objectives were dropped when the budget was reduced for Phase II.

#### *Strategic management of the CB Programme*

Issues arising in relation to the management of the CB Programme are:

1. Funds were allocated on the basis of proposals from Divisions and ROs but not sufficiently balanced by a strategic overview at HQ.
2. EMOPS did not have access to summary financial reports based around the goals of the CB Programme to enable them to make strategic decisions about progress.
3. There was no organisational assessment before the CB Programme began although it aimed to make changes across the organisation.

#### *Future of DFID's engagement in the Capacity Building Programme*

To date, the CB Programme has been regarded as a DFID-UNICEF Programme. In the future, UNICEF should view capacity building for humanitarian response as a holistic concept, of which part is funded by DFID, part by ECHO, part by UNICEF (and hopefully part by other contributors).

The Capacity Building Programme as a whole should focus on implementing the recommendations of this evaluation (as well as other aspects that UNICEF identify as not being fully addressed here). Within this changed conception, DFID could play an important role in helping UNICEF to monitor CB ongoing. Continued engagement at this level could be helpful to both partners, *in spite of the fact that DFID is*

*trying to reduce transaction costs and 'do more with less'.* The justification for this is that DFID has a good strategic vision of capacity building and similar programmes with other large agencies, together with the experience of supporting UNICEF over the last five years. This could include supporting UNICEF's efforts to develop a monitoring tool for capacity analysis organisation-wide.)

In more practical terms, the Evaluation Team proposes that DFID maintain the same level of support to UNICEF and also maintain the following criteria in possible future CB support.

1. A conservative approach to funding posts (with the exception of the sector of child protection, explained below and gender integration). Strategic posts supported to date that have been included in the 2006/7 Support Budget should also be considered for funding.
2. Funding should continued to be applied strategically to make 'catalytic' gains, especially (but not exclusively) in relation to oversight role of the Regional Offices. This could include, for example: a) continuing to support the further development of EPRPs and the Early Warning- Early Action system b) travel budgets to all Regional Advisers, not just REAs, with a view to dissemination of policy directions c) support to developing the Regional Office redeployment system d) support to developing strong EPRPs including finance, supply and HR e) roll out of guidance by DFAM and f) the follow up analysis to determine whether greater dissemination has led to improved performance or whether procedures should be changed.
3. Funding should continue to support elements of the Learning Programme but also thinking strategically such as outsourcing training to specialist organisations already supported by DFID such as RedR/IHE.
4. Consider all elements of the recommendations in relation to the direction taken by the UN Reform Programme, including the role of each agency in coordination. This could mean engaging other UN actors in some aspects of CB for humanitarian response, perhaps drawing on DFID ISPs and capacity building programmes with other agencies.

In terms of child protection, there are excellent opportunities for DFID to continue to build on policy development in the gaps already identified through considering funding a post at HQ level. DFID could consider supporting an MA course in child protection (as recommended by the inter agency group on child protection) and funding part of the development of Child Protection Networks to fulfil the mandate on monitoring and reporting.

DFID should also consider supporting UNICEF in addressing two specific funding aspects of humanitarian support overall:

1. Monitoring the impact on children of vastly different funding levels to different emergencies
2. Lobbying all donors for more recognition of the fundamental importance of coordination in humanitarian response and the fact that this can be a role on its own. The aim would be to sensitise donors to accepting inclusion of posts in sector coordination within programme proposals for humanitarian response.

## **4.2 Effectiveness**

*How prepared is UNICEF globally for humanitarian response? Do programme and operations functions adequately guide UNICEF's response in different types of emergencies (rapid/slow onset, natural disaster, complex emergencies)?*

In relation to effectiveness in different types of emergency and in different phases, there is no consensus within the organisation (some thought response was better in fast onset and others in slow). Comparisons across different types of emergency in the case studies (Ethiopia, slow onset; DRC, complex emergency and Sri Lanka, fast onset and complex emergency) did not lead to conclusions on this issue. Factors that influence the effectiveness of response appear to relate more to strong leadership, speed of funding, effective partners, effective operations and rapid assessment capacity.

### **Preparedness planning**

The roll out of preparedness planning has been impressive and appropriate. The process itself has been highly valued and, at least in some offices, improved UNICEF response capacity. However, the impact on genuine operational readiness is variable, an understanding of the CCCs is patchy and the implementation of concrete actions limited. The one-size-fits-all approach has overburdened the ROs and participants; follow up and oversight is weak. Preparedness by CO is undoubtedly an important strategy but the plan does not reliably translate into a good response. Neither can the process entirely offset a lack of actual emergency experience in a response team. There may have been an over-reliance on its potential. It is insufficient on its own and needs to be matched by back-up from specialists and investment in office technical response capacity. More attention is needed to tailoring the EPRPs to the country office context: to its level of risk, interagency role and to its existing and potential emergency partners.

### **Operations Support**

Overall CO level staff respondents considered the organisation to function at two different speeds in emergencies. While Programmes usually try to react quickly and effectively, Operations are often risk-averse and procedures are not tailored for emergency response. Concerns are that emergencies are high-risk contexts in terms financial losses due to errors or fraud. However the evaluation team considers that the corporate focus must be clearly on effective and timely humanitarian response to children and women and adjusting systems towards that end.

Closer team work between Programmes and Operations would help to make response faster and more effective. Dissemination of rules and procedures should be much more active to both groups.

In relation to the *supply* function, considerable progress has been made and the function is much more effective now than before the programme began, especially in fast onset emergencies. There remain areas to improve, especially in expanding the list of items pre positioned in Copenhagen against the CCCs and improving local purchasing and distribution. The Copenhagen supply function appears to be less effective in chronic emergencies than in fast onsets.

### **Staffing and Surge Mechanisms**

Although the surge response to the tsunami worked well, it was based on the individual efforts of the Emergencies Focal Point and HR staff at RO and CO levels. Systems were not the key to effectiveness and have not progressed sufficiently to produce a reliable response. There has been limited progress in mainstreaming humanitarian responsibilities into competency profiles and job descriptions. The global web roster does not command sufficient confidence on the quality of candidates to be effective. There is a clear preference for redeployment of UNICEF staff, already familiar with systems, and this should form the basis of surge capacity. Although it is very new, early signs are encouraging on the ERT's capacity to coordinate and manage response, especially in fast onset contexts. National staff are interested in gaining more experience in emergencies and should be considered as a resource. Much more work is required in this area, at HQ level and especially at RO level to establish regional deployment registers linked to learning opportunities and promotion prospects. COs should do more work to identify skills strengths and gaps in EPRP process.

### **Learning**

The roll out of emergency preparedness training has brought operations and programme staff together and led to a greater sense of confidence on what to do in humanitarian response. The roll out of PATH training has also been effective in bolstering confidence. Technical training was considered expensive and for health/nutrition was suspended. The fact that Regional Emergency Advisers were themselves responsible for facilitation of many courses limited time available for strategic thinking and CO level oversight. There has been no significant difference in learning for different typologies of emergencies. ToT training was seen as less effective than planned as many trainers did not provide ongoing training. Preference was expressed for leaning on the job with support from more experienced staff. Learning was not linked to surge capacity during the life of the CB Programme.

### **Stress Counselling**

According to an internal survey, the main source of stress is work related and should be dealt with through organisational culture, management and HR policies. In practice this means, for example, shifting towards becoming an organisation that values learning, rather than leaving staff feeling guilty for taking time out; changing the assumption that over-work is an acceptable norm; embracing prioritisation and not a can-do-all position. The network of peer supporters is valued but needs to be expanded to fulfil the role of identifying staff who are not recovering from exceptionally stressful incidents.

### **Safety and Security**

For IT and Telecommunications, there has been considerable investment in hardware and MOSS compliance has increased. The DFID funding has had a demonstrable impact. While 59 of 124 countries were 100% MOSS compliant in 2003, this had risen to 70 by 2005. Equipment is highly expensive and will require further investment. There has been less focus on training to ensure that staff knows how to apply equipment. 10 of the 55 non compliant countries (in March 2005) were at Phase 3 or 4 security status, none were at Phase 5. Questions were raised about accountabilities for security through the management system and whether the tick box approach to the security CD-ROM is sufficient for staff awareness.

### **Gender Mainstreaming**

Gender mainstreaming has been weak within the CB Programme, partly due to over-stretched human resources. However, gender based violence has been addressed strongly and effectively, particularly at HQ level and in some instances in the field.

## **4.3 Efficiency**

*Where have the results of the CB Programme given the greatest value for money?*

It has not been possible to assess where the CB Programme has given the greatest value for money in view of the fact that the financial data has not been collated against goals or programme objectives. However, it is possible to note that ESARO received the largest amount of funds amongst Regional Offices and has made the greatest progress in terms of Emergency Preparedness and Response training and planning.

*How has the CB Programme affected the efficiency of UNICEF's humanitarian response (with a focus on preparedness and supply)?*

1. **Emergency Preparedness Planning** has increased efficiency where offices have identified local suppliers for key items before the event e.g. water treatment in Sri Lanka
2. **Mainstreaming** is an efficient way of enhancing emergency capacity without significantly increasing costs, particularly in the preparedness phase. Most respondents commented that the EPRP process is too long and cumbersome. However the recently revised format is much simpler and should be a more efficient process. As recommended above, an EPRP process tailored to the risk level of each country would further reduce the resources allocated without reducing the efficacy.
3. In terms of **supply**, the speed of delivery of items on the emergency list has increased. It is difficult to distinguish between the supply hubs at the present time as they have not yet been evaluated but the Supply Division observes that Dubai is the most efficient in speed and cost. In addition, the cost of some items has been reduced by purchasing in the first few days of a rapid onset response, before prices rise due to demand.
4. Approaches to **enhancing capacity** have opted for the cheapest approach (i.e. through existing resources such as the development of guidelines through HQ staff). Consultants have also been used which on balance is probably cheaper than increasing staff numbers. However, REA time invested in training may be better used in strategic thinking and oversight functions. For that reason, the evaluation supports outsourcing of most training.
5. The key posts of **REA** were an efficient investment as they have played catalytic roles.

## 4.4 Impact

*What changes are observable in UNICEF performance in humanitarian response, including advocacy?  
What can be attributed to the Programme of Cooperation?*

### *Humanitarian response*

Overall, the picture of UNICEF's response performance is mixed. Strong performance is supported by preparedness, improved operations, access to corporate guidance (such as the CCCs and technical guidelines) and, in some cases, support by the ROs and HQ - all areas supported by the CB Programme. Slow progress in key areas such as M&E and early warning may yet bear fruit and at any rate are ambitious capacity building objectives that will take time to embed in an organisation of UNICEF's size and structure.

At the same time, leadership, technical and coordination capacity, partner's capacity and established emergency experience within the country teams prevail as key performance determinants. They have received little or no support from the CB PROGRAMME and remain unacceptably weak in several cases. The findings suggest that UNICEF's technical capacity has, if anything, been eroded, particularly in WES and to an extent in Health and Nutrition. Despite improvements in some sectors, UNICEF does not have adequate capacity in either the ROs or COs to support its commitments to the CCCs and its role as a lead agency in those sectors. Some of the limitations of mainstreaming with respect to generating a reliable, quality response capacity should be carefully assessed. Considerable investment in sectoral emergency skills, coordination and UNICEF's role with respect to partners is needed. There are positive signs that UNICEF is seeking to address these weaknesses. Ensuring adequate capacity in the ROs for training and support as well as addressing governance issues related to RO oversight is an essential component of any new strategies, without which the gains will be minimal.

### *Advocacy*

1. There has been effective advocacy and investment in policy frameworks for children affected by armed conflict. This has contributed to a series of legal instruments and resolutions in the Security Council. The Policy and Advocacy post was funded under this CB Programme.
2. At CO level, there has been effective advocacy for the release of children by armed actors in Sri Lanka and DRC particularly. In DRC the work was supported by the Regional Adviser in Children and Armed Conflict in ESARO (funded under DFID).

In terms of *operations*, the evaluation found:

1. Faster supply times, especially for pre-positioned items in Copenhagen/hubs on the CCC list. This was partly attributable to DFID, especially in view of the consultancy funded by DFID to analyse the feasibility of hubs.
2. Enhanced security of staff and assets through investment in hardware and the OPSCEN centre. This is largely attributable to DFID's investment. The OPSCEN has also helped with speed of response by warning also contributes to 'watching the world' and early warning.
3. Rapid surge capacity in the tsunami due to the efforts of individuals rather than a systemic approach.

### *Are any negative effects on UNICEF performance identifiable?*

The emphasis on security of staff without adequate analysis of the consequences in programme terms has distanced staff from the field in some contexts.

### *Are there any spin-off benefits beyond UNICEF?*

1. In child protection, UNICEF has led inclusive debates on CP issues and facilitated the Inter Agency Guidelines on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (ICRC, 2004), the training package for peacekeepers and training to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation in humanitarian contexts. These have been important in developing thinking and approaches in these areas beyond UNICEF. The inclusive approach and joint ownership has been fundamental.

2. UNICEF has been a leader in positioning education as a key element of humanitarian response. Acceptance on this position is growing amongst humanitarian actors.

*Has the CB Programme had any effects on DFID, especially in terms of policy/approach to CAAC or protection of civilians?*

Neither DFID nor UNICEF has referred to any effect on DFID as a result of the CB Programme.

## 4.5 Coordination/Coherence

*How well has the Programme of Cooperation contributed to coordination within interagency systems (including UN HQ and UNCTs and IASC)? How far has UNICEF contributed to policy coherence in humanitarian response and advocacy?*

UNICEF has made major contributions to coordination and policy development at global level. The organisation is recognised as being one of the most important UN agencies in terms of the investment of time and energy into IASC processes, including policy development. Within the UN Reform of humanitarian action, UNICEF has played a leadership role, consistently defending humanitarian principles within the UN system.

At CO level, coordination is a demanding role and one to which UNICEF (like many other agencies) gives limited support. UNICEF's coordination capacity is variable and strongly linked to whether it has the technical expertise to lead a sector. Success depends on the presence of gifted individuals with strong facilitation and management skills.

UNICEF's authority to coordinate is largely earned through the quality of the "service". Reduced operationality through restricted access to the field in insecure contexts has further raised the bar for UNICEF, increasing the pressure to deliver on this essential role. More resources for coordination are needed. Collaboration with the NGOs, increased coherence with Sphere and the Standards for Education in Emergencies together with the clarification of roles within the UN family should be a major component of EPRP training and planning.

In terms of advocacy, UNICEF has worked effectively with the Office of the UN SRSG-CAAC and has contributed to raising the profile of children affected by armed conflict.

Advocacy at country level has also been more variable and depends on a number of factors *inter alia* technical capacity/knowledge of the international legal frameworks, systems for monitoring and reporting of CR violations and support from all levels of the organisation to address issues of rights violations even when advocacy would potentially disrupt relations with government or NSEs etc. (see Goal 7).

## 4.6 Sustainability

*What lasting changes have been achieved in UNICEF humanitarian response capacity?*

Before analysing the sustainability of changes to date, there is a fundamental issue in relation to the question of sustainability *per se*. Taking into consideration the external environment, UNICEF will be expected to increase its capacity to respond in view of growing demand. At the same time, Regular Resources are stagnant as a proportion of total funding and it is RR that provide the backbone to the organisation, not dependent on short term project funding. The philosophy of capacity building to date has been to identify weaknesses, fix them and aim for withdrawal of support. However, it may be that more sustained support to core functions will be required in a context of growing humanitarian demand. To attract more sustained support, UNICEF's performance must be demonstrably improving. The perspective should be that UNICEF has an ongoing internal capacity building programme for humanitarian action and response, of which the organisation will aim to secure external funding for part of the work.

In terms of lasting changes, UNICEF has achieved the following.

1. The integrated approach adopted by UNICEF that is probably the most sustainable way of increasing capacity.
2. A major contribution to sustainability was the number of key posts that were incorporated into core funding. This was an expectation of DFID funding. The CB Programme funded 45 posts in 2003 but this was down to 8 in 2005. 11 key posts have been introduced into the Support Budget, including all REAs with the exception of EAPRO and ROSA.

*What changes must be further sustained and with what level of effort? (in order of importance)*

1. It is essential to maintain or expand the capacity of the ROs. At present, capacity is still insufficient to even maintain and build upon the progress so far. Reduced capacity in the future would seriously undermine development and possibly negate the gains.
2. A second major change concerns accountabilities. There must be firm efforts to strengthen the authority of the RO and specifically in oversight capacity. If future capacity building continues to have a strategic focus on the RO, this shift is essential.
3. One profound further change is the focus on the end result as opposed to the means to an end. Specifically, the focus in humanitarian capacity building must be on impact in the CCC sectors and for populations on the ground rather than on tools, policies and systems.
4. Enhanced technical capacity in the CCC sectors, especially WES and nutrition is essential.
5. The role of national staff in humanitarian response must be strengthened to ensure sustainability. They hold the institutional memory of humanitarian response in previous emergencies and are often first on the ground in an emergency. They expressed interest in developing capacity for response and they should have an opportunity to participate in regional registers for redeployment. National staff with prior emergency experience should be included in first phase redeployment and those with more limited experience could participate in second phase redeployment.
6. The organisation must generate and foster a perception that promotion will require emergency experience and demonstrated performance. This is not the case at present. There is a perception for international staff that exposure in New York is the decisive factor.

*What changes are in course and need further attention and among these which are the most critical and will have greatest impact? (in order of importance)*

1. UNICEF must analyse how it will be able to fulfil its mandate in monitoring and reporting on core child rights violations. This will require adequate staff coverage and further learning/training.
2. Roll out of the new modular training in child protection (under development) is essential for staff to have the confidence required for monitoring and reporting on child rights violations and for advocacy in general.
3. Rolling out the Early Warning/Early Action System is on course for the coming year or more. It will make an important contribution to capacity as the system includes addressing accountabilities.
4. DFAM's plans within the MTSP to address issues of finance and administration systems in emergencies are essential. Specifically DFAM plans to address financial and administrative needs for different emergency scenarios and ensuring that plans are put in place for alternative financial/administrative management during emergencies.
5. Recommendations from humanitarian evaluations must be reviewed and accepted or rejected. A staff member must be nominated to follow through on recommendations that are accepted. We are aware that this has been recognised and is in course.

## **4.7 Cross-cutting issues**

*How well has the implementation of the CB Programme respected the **principles** outlined in the Phase II proposal – gender dimensions, promoting partnership of women and children, strengthening collaboration and partnerships and focusing on CO performance – and how relevant and useful were these principles?*

### *Gender*

There has been limited focus on gender within the CB Programme, partly because the budget was cut and the gender objectives fell out. The overall comment is that gender analysis within UNICEF tends to focus on targeting women and girls in programming. However, a truly gendered approach would lead staff towards analysis of gender inequalities in all contexts.

### *Partnership of women and children*

The area in which women and children's perspectives could most easily be introduced would be through Vulnerability and Capacity Analyses. There has not been a strong emphasis on capacity building in VCA; it should be reinforced in the future.

### *Partnerships*

The CB Programme did not have a strong emphasis on enhancing capacity to develop and manage partnerships for effective response. The Evaluation Team welcome plans in the MTSP to address issues of strengthening strategic partnerships. It is essential that partnerships aimed at addressing weaknesses in specific sectors (especially in WES) are reinforced as they are fundamental to effective response.

### *Focus on CO level performance*

The focus on CO level performance varied by Regional Office. ESARO made a considerable effort to focus at CO level and made a vast number of CO visits to support capacity. ESARO also collected opinions from COs on RO performance through a customer satisfaction survey. Other regions do not appear to have had the same strength of focus.

### *How well has UNICEF humanitarian response been mainstreamed and what effect has that had on preparedness and response?*

Mainstreaming has had some success but is not complete. Although there is broad and sustainable acceptance of mainstreaming as a concept, there is still a tendency in practice to view emergencies as the responsibility of the emergency specialists in the team. Mainstreaming humanitarian capacity into planning procedures, HR and into all sectors requires ongoing work. Mainstreaming must be regarded as the foundation on which effective response is built, possibly requiring surge capacity because of the size of the emergency outstrips the capacity of the CO or because technical capacity in the CCC sectors is not available.

## 5. Consolidated recommendations

The recommendations throughout the report are brought together in this section and structured according to the **Organizational Capacity Framework** with a view to 'unblocking the blockages'. While recommendations are *prioritised* in the Executive Summary and in Section 2.10 on Futures, in this section we have classified recommendations according to timescale for implementation as:

- Within Year 1
- Within the MTSP period of 2009
- Strategic change to be debated for the long term

All recommendations are to UNICEF except where specifically stated.

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
<b>3.1</b>	<b>External context: humanitarian trends, political context, UN reform</b>	
<b>3.1.5</b>	<b>Skills, systems and resources</b>	
1	Given that the humanitarian caseload will continue to rise over the next 5-10 years, UNICEF should <b>either i) increase its overall resource base or ii) prioritise specific humanitarian sectors</b> as it seems unlikely that UNICEF can continue to try to meet <i>all</i> the CCC sectors in <i>all</i> humanitarian crises in a context of growth in demand. Debate whether increased funding or prioritising sectors is the most feasible option for UNICEF in the IDSC or GMT. Specifically, UNICEF should state clearly that shelter is not one of the CCC sectors and advocate for another UN agency to take responsibility for this area.	MTSP period
2	Strengthen UNICEF's ability to <b>monitor and analyse the external environment</b> , perhaps even forecasting different scenarios. This should include political analysis to inform the defence of humanitarian principles. UNICEF could do this in two complementary ways. It should develop its internal capacity which may mean adding an extra staff member to the Policy and Advocacy Unit of EMOPS. It should also strengthen its links to academic institutions such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London and/or the Center for International Cooperation (CIC) in New York, for example by commissioning annual or more frequent 'seminars' with such humanitarian experts, dedicated to understanding the implications of their analysis of humanitarian trends for UNICEF. This process could involve other UN agencies as part of the UN reform process.	Within Year 1
3	Further <b>enhance skills to work in protracted crises and transitional contexts</b> – usually the most challenging in terms of political analysis, humanitarian dilemmas and issues of neutrality (in spite of these being unattractive postings). This should be tracked through the Learning Programme.	MTSP period
4	<b>Strengthen rapid response capacity</b> as sudden onset disasters continue to grow. Enhanced early warning-early action systems should facilitate more effective rapid response	MTSP period
5	Strengthen <b>skills in sector based coordination</b> as the number of humanitarian actors continues to increase and look towards UNICEF for coherence and cohesion.	MTSP period
6	Reinforce <b>skills in advocacy for humanitarian principles</b> and against the violation of children's rights (especially in armed conflict) at CO and global level (Recommendations within Child Protection)	MTSP period
<b>b. UN Reform Agenda</b>		
7	UNICEF should <b>invest in developing a long-term vision for UNICEF's role within the UN Reform process</b> . This should include documenting practical minimal requirements for engagement in joint programming at CO level and clarifying operational requirements under different scenarios (as recommended by Mendelsohn et al, 2004). This should also include analysis of how	MTSP period

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
	planning/activities in capacity building are influenced by the UN Reform process and which aspects can and should be done together with other UN agencies.	
<b>c. Advocacy on funding and humanitarian principles</b>		
8	As a leading proponent of a rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance, UNICEF should <b>advocate for greater impartiality and reliability in the allocation of international humanitarian aid</b> . Documented analysis on how differential allocations in humanitarian assistance affect the rights-based agenda for children could be used by both UNICEF and DFID within the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.	Strategic
9	UNICEF should continue to <b>build on its track record in promoting humanitarian principles</b> , within the UN system and with donor and recipient governments, in a political context where the pressure to compromise humanitarian principles may increase. This requires sustained investment in UNICEF's policy and advocacy unit at HQ level, and strengthening its advocacy capacity in countries where humanitarian principles are most threatened.	MTSP period
<b>d. Possible growth areas in programming</b>		
10	Given the forecast that around half of post-conflict states are likely to return to war within 10 years and that children and adolescents are likely to engage in those conflicts, UNICEF could consider <b>stepping up activities to engage children, adolescents and women in peace-building</b> .	Strategic
11	Engage in <b>disaster reduction and vulnerability analysis</b> and activities through UNICEF development programmes.	Strategic
<b>3.2</b>	<b>Internal context: organizational motivation and resources, systems, processes</b>	
<b>3.2.8</b>	<b>Decentralization and the oversight of the Regional Office</b>	
12	Adopt the Liberia Evaluation recommendation of establishing a <b>standard operating procedure that triggers the engagement of the RO (most often the REA, but possibly the RD or other RAs) as a country moves into a high state of alert</b> . This should entail a joint planning session to establish a 90 day response plan that includes analysis of emergency financial support, capacity in all CCC sectors and surge requirements, partnerships, security, supply plans and additional technical/operations support. It should also analyse possible support requirements in emergency management. Clearly the level of support required will depend on capacity in country.	Within Year 1
13	The <b>standard operating procedure</b> to launch RO support in the planning process <b>should be linked to the regional human resources roster for emergencies</b> .	Within Year 1
15	<b>Identify the characteristics that promote the oversight function of Regional Offices, drawing on existing models, and replicate those characteristics across all ROs</b> . This should include <i>all</i> Regional Advisers taking responsibility for building humanitarian response capacity, not just the Regional Emergency Advisers. Promoting the oversight function will require some analysis of the resource requirements of ROs, such as independent travel budgets for all RAs so that visits are not dependent on invitations from COs.	Short term
16	Ensure that the <b>post of Regional Adviser is considered to be a stepping stone to greater seniority</b> to attract candidates of high technical quality.	MTSP
17	<b>Discuss the importance of RR funding</b> to the sustainability and effectiveness of humanitarian response within the <b>Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative</b> .	MTSP period

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
<b>3.3</b>	<b>Internal systems and processes: preparedness response</b>	
<b>3.3.1 a</b>	<b>Tools, policies, monitoring and evaluation</b>	
18	Support and resource the <b>planned development of simplified tools</b> , including worked examples of VCA in practice, for field use	Within Year 1
19	Make more use of <b>end-of-mission field staff to develop tools</b>	Within Year 1
20	Ensure that the EPRP process includes the development of a <b>small number of readily collectable indicators on early warning</b> and ensure that SPOs include early warning monitoring in their workplans as well as routine use of the new pilot early action intranet system.	Within Year 1
21	Increase the accountability of RO and HQ with oversight functions to <b>demand improved monitoring and evaluation data in Annual Reports and Sitreps</b>	MTSP period
22	Tailor M&E training to different posts, following the model developed for HIV/AIDS modules. One day workshops for example could be designed, as a priority, for all Representatives and SPOs to promote understanding and generate demand	MTSP period
23	Elevate the status of M&E through greater investment and specific senior accountabilities reflected in the workplans of SPOs, Country Representatives and RO Advisors	MTSP period
24	Lightweight reviews should be routinely implemented for all responses. Small responses should capture the lessons learned through an internal rapid review such as an After Action Review	MTSP period
25	The practice of requesting Representatives to write up brief lessons learned following a posting should be reinstated. The same should be done for SPOs and senior emergency personnel (e.g. the REAs)	MTSP period
26	Use the opportunities offered by well-resourced emergencies such as the Tsunami response to test the effectiveness of minimum monitoring systems alongside in depth systems and promote best practice elsewhere	Within Year 1/ Ongoing
<b>3.3.1 b</b>	<b>Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning</b>	
27	ROs could experiment with out-sourcing the facilitation of EPRPs to reduce the burden on REAs and free up their time for oversight and timely updates	Within Year 1
28	Tailor the EPRPs to the level of risk, as well as existing experience, in the CO	Within Year 1
29	Assessments of a CO's response capacity should not over-estimate the impact of an EPRP, particularly in teams without significant in-country emergency experience. Complementary planning for specialist staff should be an automatic component of the preparedness plans	Within Year 1
30	ROs should emphasise the updating and reworking of plans whenever monitoring indicates a potential emergency (slow onset). Planning can then be closely tied to imminent needs	Within Year 1
31	EPRPs should be done in two phases: one internal process to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clear within the team, a second, fuller process with other UN agencies, government and NGO partners	Within Year 1
32	Scenario planning during preparedness should identify strategies for mitigation, as well as response	Within Year 1
33	Accountabilities and planned activities for preparedness should automatically be part of senior managers' workplans and monitored by the ROs.	Within Year 1
<b>3.3.1 c</b>	<b>Response Performance</b>	
34	Match RO and CO technical capacity to the CCCs by ensuring that each sector is supported by an Advisor or Programme Officer with relevant skills and experience	MTSP period
35	ROs must monitor the programme plans of all at-risk countries to ensure that all CCC sectors are being implemented under the MTSP	MTSP period

<b>Rec. No.</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Phase</b>
36	The technical capacity in COs for all CCCs should be mapped on an annual basis: EPRPs of both ROs and COs must include surge plans to cover any gaps, activated on the basis of changes to a country's alert/risk level	MTSP period
37	Preparedness and response planning should be cautious about the potential of mainstreaming and include a raft of complementary strategies including surge and secondments	MTSP period
38	The forthcoming RO EPRPs should ensure clarity of roles and the integration of emergency responsibilities for all Advisors	Within Year 1
39	For ROs with limited emergency experience, actively pursue secondments to emergencies for limited periods	MTSP period
40	Current efforts to engage in partnerships with international NGOs to increase technical capacity should continue	Strategic
41	UNICEF should invest in its own technical capacity by i) disseminating the CCCs to staff during visits of Regional Advisors in each sector ii) disseminating standards in humanitarian response (e.g. Sphere, Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies) to CO level staff iii) increasing its training/learning in the CCC sectors.	MTSP period
<b>3.3.1 d</b>	<b>Partnership</b>	
42	As discussed in recommendation 241:l:d, explore simpler mechanisms for partner accountability	Within Year 1
43	Continue to explore innovative mechanisms for partnership with local and international NGOs	Strategic
44	Proactively establish relationships with potential emergency partners even if there is no current contractual agreement with UNICEF as a routine component of contingency planning, particularly as indications of risk increase and the presence of NGOs rises. As part of this, actively disseminate the CCCs to partners so that they understand the parameters of UNICEF's response.	MTSP period
45	Develop joint monitoring mechanisms with partners to facilitate both oversight and improved programme performance	MTSP period
46	Initiate open discussions with NGOs on capacity, oversight and support needs at the outset of any form of partnership, contractual or otherwise.	Within Year 1
<b>3.3.1 e</b>	<b>Coordination</b>	
47	Coordination skills and the clarification of roles within the UN family should be a major component of EPRP training and planning.	MTSP period
48	Programme Officer job descriptions should include coordination competencies	MTSP period
49	Recognise Sphere as an essential coordination tool and acknowledge it in key technical documents	MTSP period
50	UNICEF should explicitly reference Sphere in its guidelines to ensure coherence and a common language and understanding with the NGOs	MTSP period
51	If existing or surge capacity is not available for a CCC, UNICEF should decline to lead the sector to avoid poor performance and damage to its credibility	Year 1/ Immediate
52	Coordination should be resourced as a specific function with a dedicated budget. In contexts in which UNICEF is required to play a major coordinating role, budgets should be established for specialist coordinators matched to associated competencies such as leadership, facilitation and coordination skills.	Within Year 1

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
<b>3.3.2</b>	<b>Internal systems and processes: operational readiness</b>	
<b>3.3.2 a</b>	<b>Finance and Administration</b>	
53	DFAM should <i>aggressively</i> disseminate financial and administrative procedures in emergencies to COs (through Regional Financial Advisers) to ensure full confidence with systems before an emergency occurs. A field-based review should be instituted after approximately 18 months-2 years to clarify the question of whether a) the systems are adequate to emergencies once they are fully understood <b>or</b> b) the systems themselves should be adapted for emergencies.	Immediately and up to 2 years
54	In the course of dissemination, DFAM should be responsible for ensuring that <i>all staff</i> understand UNICEF's corporate position on accountability in emergencies. It should be clearly stated that UNICEF's corporate goal is effective humanitarian response and that staff will be supported for adapting systems, provided every effort is made to ensure checks and balances are in place.	Within Year 1
55	Within the EPRP process, more time should be spent on how DFAM procedures for emergencies would be applied by both Programmes and Operations.	Within Year 1 and ongoing
56	COs should improve partner organisational assessment to enhance mutual confidence and reduce bureaucracy in collaboration. As noted above, there is flexibility in procedures that can be decided by the CMT/Finance/Programmes at CO level.	Within Year 1 and ongoing
<b>3.3.2 b</b>	<b>Supply</b>	
57	Increase the amount of time spent by CO Supply Officers on EPRP with the support of Regional Advisers, Supply. Standing readiness should be backed by clear plans for supply of all items required under CCC sectors, including estimates of lead times. All COs should be clear which CCC items are available locally and should make Long Term Agreements with suppliers.	Within Year 1 and ongoing
58	As part of the supply assessment under EPRP if pre-positioning of specific stocks in specified zones is considered essential for effective standing readiness, COs can make the case to the Emergency Coordination Unit of Supply Division.	Within Year 1 and ongoing
59	COs with the support of Regional Advisers, Supply, should ensure that sufficient focus is placed on logistics and distribution capacity in country as part of the analysis of standing readiness. This could be bolstered by an assessment of private contractors and warehousing options at the time of the EPRP.	Within Year 1 and ongoing
60	CO level plans for standing readiness should be shared with partners to enhance inter-agency coordination on the types of stocks held.	Within Year 1 and ongoing
61	The Supply Division in consultation with the field should update the list of emergency items in stock to the new CCCs. This should include items considered essential through lessons learned in the tsunami response and other recent large emergencies.	MTSP
62	Re-evaluate the relative performance of each of the regional hubs within a year.	With Year 1
<b>3.3.2 c</b>	<b>IT and Telecommunications</b>	
63	Ensure that there is equal emphasis on training to use equipment as on installation and maintenance of hardware.	MTSP

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
<b>3.3.2 d</b>	<b>Stress management and counselling:</b>	
64	Focus future efforts at stress relief through reinforcing HR systems for the recognition of good performance and transparent systems for promotion and career planning.	MTSP
65	Continue Peer Support Training with a view to recognising those colleagues that are not recovering after a stressful event and providing support in referral to professional counselling.	MTSP
<b>3.3.3</b>	<b>Internal systems and processes: human resources</b>	
66	<b>EMOPS and DHR should analyse and reach a common understanding on norms for the use of surge capacity in the context of mainstreaming.</b> This should include adopting a Standing Operating Procedure for management support from the Regional Office as a country moves into a high state of alert, aimed at supporting the preparation of a 90-day plan. Norms should clarify: i) that it is quite acceptable to draw on additional support in emergencies as not all offices will have sufficient technical capacity or emergency experience and ii) that redeployment should be used principally for immediate response as it is the fastest and for core operations functions and as part of HR planning. UNICEF staff redeployed to an emergency should not exceed a 3 month stay and if it appears that support in that post will be required for longer, COs should plan to recruit for the post, drawing on approved candidates from the global web roster. Standby arrangements would usually be used in technical sectors and in the first phase.	MTSP
67	Mainstreaming is fundamental as the foundation of response but COs must be prepared to bolster capacity in areas where they are weak on technical skills/emergency experience. <b>COs must map strengths and weaknesses within the existing team in leadership, CCC technical capacities and operational functions on an annual basis.</b> These plans should be shared with RO level and collated for countries across the region to match surge planning to probable requirements in the region.	MTSP
68	HR personnel at RO level should work together with REAs to invite applications from CO level staff to participate in a <b>regional pool of staff for redeployment in emergencies.</b> This should include: a) an even spread of staff across CCC sectors b) an even spread of all operations areas c) an even spread by the CO, taking into consideration the size of the office and d) <i>national</i> as well as international staff. Staff should commit to redeployment for a period of up to 3 months and be on the register for a period of two years. As an incentive, staff should be clear that they will be prioritised for learning opportunities and will be recognised in the PER process. Managers and Country Representatives should also be recognised within the PER process for agreeing to staff participation in the regional pool. Consider piloting this process in one region in the first instance.	Beginning Year 1
69	<b>Backfilling plans</b> should be made by COs at the time of registering staff in the redeployment pool, including funding a backup post. Arrangements for funding the redeployed and backfilled posts should be agreed by all COs in the region, coordinated by the RO.	MTSP

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
70	Complete the integration of humanitarian experience, knowledge and skills into <b>competency profiles</b> for all key posts including operations. The following aspects should be referenced in competency profiles and job descriptions as appropriate: i) the mainstreaming policy and the fact that all staff are responsible for humanitarian response and may be called upon to move at short notice to an emergency zone ii) responsibilities for participation in and updating of emergency preparedness planning iii) experience in emergencies is essential for senior posts iv) the CCCs as a framework for response v) responsibilities for humanitarian coordination by sector and vi) knowledge of humanitarian law. For CMT posts, detailed criteria should be included for experience and proven capacity in emergencies.	Year 1
71	Countries that receive surge staff should establish a fast mechanism for their <b>performance evaluation</b> . Formats already exist on the intranet for brief performance evaluations of SSAs and TFT staff. For UNICEF personnel this should be part of PER records with a view to promotion and for external personnel it should be part of assessment for inclusion on the web roster.	Year 1
72	In <b>lessons learned processes and after-action-reviews</b> , include an analysis of what has been effective in HR.	MTSP
73	Although <b>standby arrangements</b> provide relatively few staff, they are usually of high calibre and efforts should be made to reinforce and further develop arrangements. Ideally the actual personnel nominated on standby should have access to UNICEF training before redeployment, including the focus on HRBAP, CCCs, UNICEF procedures, sector based coordination and standards to be used in response.	MTSP
<b>3.3.4</b>	<b>Internal systems and processes: learning strategy (to be considered in conjunction with Baastel Evaluation)</b>	
74	Include the following areas in the forthcoming learning programmes at each level: <b>Basic learning programme</b> i) awareness raising of the CCCs ii) standards in use for humanitarian response ii) systems for admin/finance in emergencies <b>Programme Excellence Learning Programme for programme and operations sectors.</b> i) a strong focus on PATH type training that deals with humanitarian dilemmas and human rights ii) Standards for humanitarian response iii) coordination – what it means in practice <sup>50</sup> iv) advocacy techniques, especially for children affected by armed conflict v) working with NSEs. vi) mainstreaming issues of child protection vii) gender mainstreaming viii) operations in emergencies ix) partnership in emergencies <b>Leadership and Management Learning Programme.</b> These courses are crucial to effective humanitarian response, given the importance of CO level leadership. They should include modelling good leadership and follow up coaching and mentoring for actual and potential leaders. In After-Action-Reviews, managers should reflect on whether leadership training had any impact on their capacity to lead in humanitarian response and feed this back to OLDS.	MTSP
75	<b>Increase sector based learning opportunities related to the the CCCs.</b>	MTSP
76	<b>Link the learning programme to surge capacity</b> and the Regional redeployment pool by prioritising learning places for staff registered for redeployment.	Year 1

<sup>50</sup> A module on coordination in emergencies will be designed in August 2005

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
77	<b>Consider outsourcing training programmes</b> , especially to organisations that specialise in humanitarian training such as RedR that could develop bespoke training aimed at UNICEF, leaving REAs and other staff more time to focus on strategy.	Year 1
78	Conduct brief <b>after-action-reviews or lessons learned exercises</b> after emergency response to document what was most/least effective in the spirit of learning for the future. This should include small emergencies that do not require surge capacity.	MTSP
79	<b>Inform staff of the UN principles of 5% of staff time for learning and 2% of total staff costs</b> so that they can relate this to their own learning planning using learning road maps.	Year 1
<b>3.3.5</b>	<b>Internal systems and processes: protection of staff and assets</b>	
80	There should be a thorough, across-the-board <b>review of security management responsibilities</b> to ensure that there is a robust and coherent accountability system which is supported by active supervision and monitoring at all levels through the system, with job descriptions being updated as necessary.	Within Year 1
81	The consistency and reliability of UNICEF's security management should be improved by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Continued investment in both hardware and training</b>, particularly aiming to ensure that security awareness remains high and regulations are implemented.</li> <li>• Continue to <b>increase the rate of country office MOSS compliance</b> to a target level in terms of percentage of offices agreed with UNDSS (probably about 90%)</li> <li>• Reflection of the <b>importance of security in the MTSP</b></li> <li>• Strengthen both support and oversight functions by ensuring that <b>all ROs have Regional Security Officers</b> that can provide support and guidance to RDs and CRs</li> <li>• <b>Strengthen UNICEF's management culture</b> to ensure that performance standards are maintained. Management of up to Executive Board level should receive security reports that report on MOSS compliance and the trends in security incidents</li> <li>• Review and where necessary <b>clarify security management guidelines</b> for COs in relation to national staff.</li> </ul>	Year 1 and continuing
82	UNICEF should continue to work vigorously within the UN system at both New York and country team level for <b>more sophisticated and sensitive UN security management systems that can be more responsive to the access needs of agencies</b> such as UNICEF while continuing to give the highest priority to the security of staff and assets. UNICEF should work with DFID on this issue through their respective channels and modalities. This work should include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The development of improved and more sensitive risk assessment tools systems.</li> <li>• The development of agreed differentiated levels of agency security needs according to mandate and operational presence on the ground.</li> </ul>	Strategic
83	Within country and partnership contexts continue to <b>support and strengthen UN/NGO collaboration and coherence on security issues</b> by encouraging increased contact and understanding on security within UNCT/NGO forums and in bilateral operations relations with partner NGOs.	Strategic

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
<b>3.3.6</b>	<b>Children affected by armed conflict (child protection and advocacy)</b>	
84	The Evaluation Team recognises the demand by child protection NGOs and UN agencies for UNICEF to provide excellence in coordination in child protection at all levels. <b>Coordination should be resourced as a specific function with a dedicated budget and staff should be highly qualified</b> to ensure credibility with other agencies. UNICEF should review staffing and funding requirements for effective and reliable coordination in child protection.	From Year 1
85	Training and learning in child protection (international legal frameworks, policies, good practice models) is essential to ensure staff have the confidence for strong advocacy. The Evaluation Team welcomes the upcoming plans to roll out modular training and recommends that it is <b>backed with follow up, mentoring and coaching from senior Protection Programme Officers and Regional Protection Advisers</b> . UNICEF could consider outsourcing the roll out of training to a specialist training agency held on retainer for this purpose.	From Year 1
86	In close collaboration with key child protection INGOs and the UNICEF internal working group, UNICEF should <b>finalise and roll out systems for monitoring and reporting of child rights violations as quickly as possible</b> , drawing on the vast amount of preparatory work already in existence. This should include an assessment of staffing and funding requirements for roll out to review capacity to fulfil the mandate. The Inter Divisional Working Group on Monitoring and Reporting should drive this process.	Year 1
87	<b>Regional Advisers in Child Protection should reinforce their role in oversight/quality control</b> especially in relation to: i) dissemination of key policies/guidelines as a matter of course during visits to COs i.e. leading discussions of policies/guidelines in relation to the local context ii) supporting countries to conduct an assessment against the factors that promote/detract from effective advocacy and in developing an action plan to support more effective advocacy in the future. This should be done in conjunction with Communication Officers and drawing on the Advocacy Toolkit iii) developing coordination skills at CO level and promoting strong partnerships for child protection, including advocacy iv) analysing what has worked/not worked in various countries in developing Child Protection Networks and sharing these lessons with COs, especially those that will be rolling out the monitoring and reporting system.	Within Year 1 and ongoing
88	The Evaluation Team endorses UNICEF's efforts to <b>augment the Head Office team to address the policy gaps</b> (to include child protection in natural disasters).	MTSP
<b>3.4</b>	<b>Internal systems and processes: gender integration</b>	
<b>3.4.3</b>	<b>Gender Integration</b>	
89	UNICEF needs to <b>invest much more in gender integration</b> to make it happen consistently. It should strengthen the gender mainstreaming unit, with at least one staff member dedicated to humanitarian work. It should have much greater gender expertise at RO level – ideally as a dedicated gender adviser – that can support and monitor gender integration at CO level.	Year 1
90	UNICEF could also <b>make greater use of the expertise of other UN agencies</b> such as UNIFEM, UNFPA and UNHCR, in terms of training in gender awareness and gender analysis at Country Office level, to better inform UNICEF's own programming.	MTSP
91	Some of UNICEF's <b>emergency policy documents should be revisited</b> for their encouragement of gender integration. For example, the focus in the CCCs could be expanded from a focus on targeting children and women to greater assessment and awareness of underlying gender inequalities.	Year 1

Rec. No.	Recommendation	Phase
92	UNICEF has played a leading role in finding ways of combating sexual exploitation and abuse and raising awareness of SGBV, within the international humanitarian sector, within the UN, and at country level. The next step is to <b>deepen the analysis of SGBV and relate it more to gender inequalities and structural issues within society</b> , and to connect it more to UNICEF's long-term development work so it is not just seen as an emergency issue.	MTSP
<b>2.</b>	<b>Programme of Cooperation</b>	
<b>2.5</b>	<b>Partnership between DFID and UNICEF</b>	
93	Given (i) the scale and importance of UNICEF's role in humanitarian response and in the UN Reform process and (ii) the fact that UNICEF has made improvements but to shift an organisation the size of UNICEF takes considerable time, the evaluation <b>recommends that DFID continues to support and enhance UNICEF's capacity building efforts in the medium term.</b>	Beginning Year 1
94	If a future humanitarian response capacity building programme is to be incorporated within a new ISP, <b>money earmarked for this area should be ring-fenced</b> , by classifying it as thematic funding rather than regular resource funding.	Year 1 and continuing
95	<b>DFID should consult with UNICEF about any possible changes</b> in the way that it channels its support to UNICEF.	Year 1 and continuing
96	<b>Accountability within the Programme should be strengthened</b> by reporting against strategic objectives.	Year 1
97	Linked to point II), <b>consideration should be given to upgrading the Programme focal point</b> within EMOPS to work proactively on monitoring, evaluation and learning work within the partnership.	Year 1
98	There should be <b>concerted effort by DFID and UNICEF to bring other donors into the next capacity building initiative.</b> Given the relative lack of success thus far (except for ECHO) this might need to be done as a collective UN agency initiative and within the GHD framework (possibly including ICRC and IFRC). DFID and the multilateral humanitarian agencies with which it has partnerships might benefit from joint discussion with other donors on lessons learned from humanitarian capacity building funding. This should include a discussion of funding for the <b>coordination function</b> , given its demonstrated importance in other sections of this report.	MTSP
99	<b>DFID should continue to draw on UNICEF's humanitarian expertise</b> and experience when formulating relevant policy and when developing its Country Assistance Programme documents.	Continual
100	Both UNICEF and DFID should <b>explore opportunities through the CB Programme to collaborate on humanitarian advocacy initiatives</b> at international and country level. Advocacy initiatives should take into account UNICEF's need to preserve its humanitarian independence and impartiality, yet recognising the potential influence of donor governments in many country contexts where humanitarian principles or access are not being respected by the host government.	Strategic
<b>2.</b>	<b>Programme of Cooperation: future of capacity building</b>	
	This section should be reviewed in relation to the priority issues identified for debate between UNICEF and DFID on possible content of future support. A summary of this is also included in the Executive Summary. What follows relates specifically to the strategic management of future capacity building, as opposed to the content.	

<b>Rec. No.</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Phase</b>
<b>2.10</b>	<b>Design and strategic management of capacity building</b>	
101	UNICEF should <b>revive the Inter Divisional Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations</b> to track and strategically manage capacity building across the organisation. Ideally the Committee comprising Divisional Directors should meet periodically and at least once a year together with invited Regional Directors. EMOPS should play a secretarial role to the Committee, providing information for decision-making. If the IDSC option is not feasible, strategic direction should be managed through the Global Management Team.	Medium Term
<b>Rec. No.</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Phase</b>
102	EMOPS should <b>track UNICEF's organisation-wide capacity in humanitarian response</b> based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The demand for humanitarian response: frequency of emergencies, type of emergency, size of population affected, child development indicators.</li> <li>• Capacity of the CO and ROs in relation to the organisational tool (to be developed), including an analysis of capacity across the CCC sectors</li> </ul> Capacity of governments and NGOs to provide effective humanitarian response	Year 1
103	UNICEF should <b>define budget codes</b> for humanitarian capacity building that will allow tracking across programme objectives and regions and will distinguish contributions from donors/UNICEF's own funds. 41: III	Year 1
104	<b>Upgrade the post of Capacity Building Programme Manager</b> to provide analysis and information for decision making to EMOPS.	Year 1
105	Any future goals in <b>humanitarian preparedness and response should be separated from those related to child protection</b> . Goals related to children in armed conflict should be managed by the Child Protection Section in the Programme Division.	Year 1



## 6. References

1. Baastel (2005) Evaluation of UNICEF learning strategy to strengthen staff competencies for humanitarian response 2000-2004 – draft final report. May 2005, BAASTEL, Quebec
2. Booz-Allen and Hamilton (1994) Positioning UNICEF for the twenty-first century: the impact of management excellent, 1995-1998, New York, UNICEF
3. Brookfield, Stephen D. () Understanding and Facilitating Adult Learning A Comprehensive Analysis of Principles and Effective Practices, Published by Jossey Bass, San Francisco
4. Buchanan-Smith, M., and Christoplos, I. (2004) Natural Disasters in Complex Political Emergencies. Report on a DFID funded seminar hosted by the British Red Cross Society, BRCS, London
5. DFID (2000a) DFID-UNICEF Institutional Strategy Paper, DFID, London
6. DFID (2000b). Working in Partnership with the United National Children’s Fund (UNICEF). November 2000
7. DFID (2002a) DFID Public Service Agreement 2003 – 2006 and Technical Note
8. DFID (2002c). DFID Public Service Agreement 2003 – 2006 and Technical Note
9. DFID (2002d). DFID Service Delivery Agreements 2003 – 2006
10. DFID (2005a). DFID Public Service Agreement 2005 – 2008 and Technical Note
11. DFID (2005b). The MEFF Methodology: A Review of DFID’s Multilateral Effectiveness Framework. Internal review by Alison Scott. 16 March 2005
12. DFID (2005c) DFID’s Assessment of Multilateral Organisational Effectiveness: An Overview of Results. Alison Scott. 6 May 2005
13. DfID-UNICEF (2000a) Review Mission: 1 – 11 June, 2000. Progress in Implementation of Capacity Building Projects in Eastern and Southern Africa, UNICEF, New York
14. DFID-UNICEF (2000b) DFID/UNICEF Programme Of Cooperation (1999-2002), UNICEF, New York.
15. DFID-UNICEF (2000c). Capacity Building Projects Progress Report 2: July 2000
16. DFID-UNICEF (2000d). Capacity Building Projects Progress Report October 2000
17. DFID-UNICEF (2001a) Capacity Building Projects: Briefing Notes – Joint Annual Review July 2001, Kathmandu – Nepal
18. DFID-UNICEF (2002a) Report of the DFID/UNICEF Joint Field Review with a Special Focus on Preparedness Planning: Guinea-Conakry, West Africa 4-8 November 2002
19. DFID-UNICEF (2002b) PROGRAMME OF CO-OPERATION 1999 – 2002 Project 2: Strengthening Humanitarian Response Hugh Goyder East Timor Field Visit Report Jan/Feb 2002

20. DFID-UNICEF (2003) Report of the Mid Programme Review held during the periods 6-9 October in London and Geneva and 20-23 October 2003 in New York, UNICEF, New York.
21. DFID-UNICEF (2004) Report of DFID/UNICEF Joint Field Review with a Special Focus on Emergency Preparedness Planning and Children Affected by Armed Conflict: Nepal, 20-30 June 2004
22. ECHO (2004a) Evaluation of ECHO's Cooperation with UNICEF and UNICEF Activities Funded by ECHO, UNICEF, New York
23. ECHO (2004b) Report on Security of Humanitarian Personnel – Standards and Practices for the Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Advocacy for Humanitarian Space
24. Freedman, J. (2001) Desk Review on UNICEF Humanitarian Response Capacity, UNICEF, New York
25. Gruloos, F. (2004) Lessons learned from the Haiti emergency, UNICEF, New York.
26. Guha-Sapir, D., and Gijsbert van Panhuis, W. (2003) The importance of conflict-related mortality in civilian populations, Research Letter, The Lancet, vol 361, June, pp. 2126-2128
27. Harmer, A., and Cotterrell, OL, (2004), From Stockholm to Ottawa: A progress review of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, HPG Briefing Paper No. 18:, ODI, October, London
28. Heffinck, P (2004) Rapid Deployment of Human Resources for Emergencies, Unpublished internal paper, UNICEF, July, New York
29. Hoyois, P., and Guha-Sapir, D. (2004) Disasters caused by flood. Preliminary data for a 30 year assessment of their occurrence and human impact, first stage data analysis produced for an international Health and Flood Risk workshop organised by the Tyndall Centre for Climate Research, University of East Anglia, July 2004
30. IASC (2001) Inter Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance, IASC.
31. IASC (2002a) Growing the Sheltering Tree, UNICEF, New York.
32. IASC (2002b) Recommendations to the IASC-Working Group from the IASC Working Group Staff Security Task Force. Final. 18 January 2002
33. IASC (2003) Inter-Agency Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Geneva
34. IASC (2005) Meeting of the IASC Reference Group on the Humanitarian Response Review, 19 May 2005. Summary Note, Geneva
35. ICRC (2004) Inter-Agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children, ICRC, Geneva
36. IDRC (2002) Organizational Assessment: A Framework for Improving Performance, IDRC and Inter American Development Bank, Ottawa
37. IFRC (2004) World Disasters Report. Focus on ethics in aid, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva

38. INEE (2004) Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies, UNESCO, Paris
39. JMJ International (2005) Global Evaluation. Children Affected by Armed Conflict, Displacement or Disaster (CACD), Save the Children Norway, April, Oslo
40. Joint DFID/ SIDA/ UNICEF Review (2002) Children Affected by Armed Conflict
41. Programme in Sri Lanka, May/June
42. Jones, B. and Stoddard, A., (2003) External Review of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, CIC, December, New York
43. Jones, B. (2004), The changing role of the UN in protracted crises, HPG Briefing Paper No. 17 ODI, July, London
44. Kent, R. (2004), The United Nations' Humanitarian Pillar: Re-focusing the UN's Disaster and Emergency Roles and Responsibilities, Disasters 28 (2):216-233
45. Landgren, K. (2005) The Protective Environment: Development Support for Child Protection, Human Rights Quarterly, 27, 214-248
46. Machel, G (1996) The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, UNICEF, New York
47. Macrae, J., and Harmer, A. (2004) Beyond the continuum: an overview of the changing role of aid policy in protracted crises, in Harmer and Macrae (eds). ODI, July, London
48. Macrae, J., Collinson, S., Buchanan-Smith, M., Reindorp, N., Schmidt, A., Mowjee, T., and Harmer, A. (2002) Uncertain power: the changing role of official donors in humanitarian action, HPG Report No. 12, ODI, December, London
49. Maxwell, S., and Clay, E. (2005) The Asian Tsunami: Economic impacts and implications for aid and aid architecture, ODI Opinions, ODI, January, London
50. Mendelsohn, S., Stoddard, A., Mackenzie, A. (2004) UNICEF's Contribution to UN Reform and its Impact on UNICEF, UNICEF, September, New York
51. Morris, N. Gaouette, M. 2004. Maintaining a UN humanitarian presence in periods of high insecurity: learning from others. OCHA / ECHA
52. OCHA (2005) Forced Displacement, [www.ocha.org](http://www.ocha.org).
53. OIOS (2004) OIOS Comprehensive Assessment of the UN System Response to Children Affected by Armed Conflict, Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN, New York
54. People in Aid. 2003. Code of Good Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel
55. Project Ploughshares (2004) Armed Conflicts Report, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Canada
56. Randel, J., with Cordeiro, M., and Mowjee, T., (2004) Financing countries in protracted humanitarian crisis: an overview of new instruments and existing aid flows, in Harmer and Macrae (eds), ODI: July, London
57. SIDA (2003) Reconciliation: Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation,

58. SIDA, Stockholm
59. SIPRI (2004) SIPRI Yearbook 2004. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: OUP. Oxford
60. Smillie, I., and Minear, L. (2003) The Quality of Money: Donor Behaviour in Humanitarian Financing, Humanitarianism and War Project, Tufts University: Boston
61. Sphere Project (2004) Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, Oxfam Publishing, Oxford
62. Task (2002) Consultancy Services in Supply & Logistics, Contract No. LTA-42101056, Final Report, 31 December 2002, TASK/UNICEF
63. UN (2004) Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) Policy Document. 1 July 2004, UN, New York
64. UN Board of Auditors. Management Letter on the Audit of the Office of Emergency Programmes. 27 January 2005
65. UN Ethiopia. Minimum Operating Security Standards for Ethiopia. Draft 10/11/03
66. UN GA (2002a) Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel – Report of the Secretary-General. A/57/300. 15 August 2002
67. UN GA (2002b) Inter-organisational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system. Report by the Secretary-General. A/57/365. 28 August 2002, UN, New York
68. UNAIDS (2004) AIDS Epidemic Update, UNAIDS, December 2004, [www.unaids.org](http://www.unaids.org)
69. UNICEF (2000a) ESARO Region Multi-country 2000/800 UNICEF's Education Response to Emergencies in Four African Countries, UNICEF, New York
70. UNICEF (2000b). First Global Meeting Of Emergencies Capacity Building Focal Points. 27 – 29 September, 2000
71. UNICEF (2000c) Mozambique 2000/001 Mozambique Flood Relief. UNICEF 2000
72. UNICEF (2001a) Kosovo 2001/800 Evaluation of UNICEF's Emergency Preparedness and Response in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency. UNICEF EO 2001, New York
73. UNICEF (2002) Summary Report on Staff/ Office Safety & Security in UNICEF Field Offices Office of Internal Audit. Audit Report 2002/16. August 2002
74. UNICEF (2002a) Project Bulletins - August 2001 to April 2002, UNICEF, New York
75. UNICEF (2002b) ANNUAL REVIEW 17 –18 APRIL 2002
76. UNICEF (2002c) Phase II First Interim Progress Report New York October 2002
77. UNICEF (2002d) Capacity building for UNICEF humanitarian response in review. An internal review of the DfID-UNICEF programme of cooperation to strengthen UNICEF programming as it applies to humanitarian assistance, Phase I, 2000-April 2002

78. UNICEF (2002e) Capacity Building SHURA. Annual Meeting of Emergency Focal Points. March 2002
79. UNICEF (2003a) UNICEF Security Policy, UNICEF, New York.
80. UNICEF (2003b) Basic Security in the Field – Staff Safety, Health and Welfare. CD-ROM
81. UNICEF (2003c) UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response in the Iraq Crisis. Results of the Iraq Sub-regional Lessons Learned Workshop Istanbul, 2–3 October, 2003, UNICEF, New York
82. UNICEF (2003d) MENARO. UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response in Iraq. Results of the Iraq Sub-Regional Lessons Learned Workshop. UNICEF October 2003.
83. UNICEF (2003e) Progress Report. Questionnaire September 2004 WCARO
84. UNICEF (2004a) Assessment of UNICEF's Contribution to UN Reform and its Impact on UNICEF in the Humanitarian Sector, UNICEF, New York
85. UNICEF (2004b) Iraq 2004/800 Evaluation of UNICEF Emergency Preparedness and Early Response in Iraq, September 2001 – June 2003, UNICEF 2004, New York
86. UNICEF (2005a) Executive Directive 2005 008
87. UNICEF (2005b) Moss Compliance Worldwide – current as at 16 March 2005, UNICEF, New York
88. UNICEF, Child Protection Section (2004) unpublished internal paper for ECHO
89. UNICEF, Child Protection Section (2005) Strengthening UNICEF Response to Child Protection in Emergencies, Report of a Consultation, Child Protection Section, Programme Division, UNICEF, New York.
90. UNICEF, DHR (2002) Transforming the Human Resources Function in UNICEF, Brasilia, June.
91. UNICEF, EMOPS (2001) A Global Proposal to Strengthen UNICEF Programming as it Applies to Humanitarian Respose, Phase II, New York)
92. UNICEF, EMOPS (2003) Annual Report. 31 December 2003
93. UNICEF, Evaluation Office (2002) Capacity Building for UNICEF Humanitarian Response in Review, Evaluation Office, UNICEF New York
94. UNICEF, Evaluation Office (2003) Where Are We Now? A Review Of UNICEF Humanitarian Response Capacity. Background Paper to Martigny II, UNICEF's Humanitarian Response to Children and Women in Crisis, Evaluation Office. UNICEF May 2003, New York
95. UNICEF, Evaluation Office (2004a) Liberia 2004/800 Pilot Real-time Evaluation of
96. UNICEF Support in Liberia May 2003-March 2004, UNICEF, New York
97. UNICEF, Evaluation Office (2004b) Contribution to UN Reform and its Impact on UNICEF, UNICEF, New York
98. UNICEF, Evaluation Office (2004c) Strengthening Management in UNICEF, UNICEF, New York.

99. UNICEF, Executive Board (1998) The Organization of the UN Children's Fund, Paper presented to the Executive Board, 1-5 June, New York
100. UNICEF, GMT (2003) Minutes of GMT Meeting 11 and 13 September 2003, New York
101. UNICEF, MENARO (2003) UNICEF Preparedness and early response in Iraq. Results of the Iraq sub-regional lessons learned workshop October 2003, UNICEF, New York
102. UNICEF, MTSP (2005) Medium Term Strategic Plan, 2006-2009 (draft), May, UNICEF, New York
103. UNICEF, Sierra Leone (2001) Children and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone: Recommendations for policies and procedures for involving children in the TRC, UNICEF, Freetown.
104. UNICEF, Somalia (2002) Country Programme Evaluation – final report. October 2002, UNICEF, New York
105. UNICEF, Supply Division (2005) In Country Logistics Guidelines, Supply Directives – Policies and Procedures, CF/SD/2005/004, UNICEF, New York.
106. UNICEF-DFID (2005) Joint Unicef-DFID Evaluation of UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response to the Darfur Emergency. Final Report February 2005, UNICEF, New York
107. United Nations (2004b) A more secure world: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
108. UNSRSG/CAAC (2004) Monitoring and Reporting White Paper, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, New York
109. Valid (2005) Report of Workshop on Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Capacity Building Programme for Humanitarian Response, Geneva 26-27 May.
110. Van Brabant, K. (2000) Operation Security Management in Violent Environments. ODI
111. Van Brabant, K. (2001) Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security – a review of aid agency practices and a guide for management. ODI. Humanitarian Policy Group Report 9. March 2001
112. WatchList (2004) An Action Plan for Monitoring, Reporting and Response,
113. WHO (2005) Influenza pandemic preparedness and response. Report by the Secretariat, Executive Board 115<sup>th</sup> Session, January.

## **Annex 1. Terms of Reference**

**Second invitation submitted for bidding.**

**Terms of Reference for the  
Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation to Strengthen UNICEF Programming as it  
Applies to Humanitarian Response, 2000-2005**

### **BACKGROUND**

The DFID-UNICEF programme of cooperation was launched against a general backdrop of increasing natural disasters and protracted complex emergencies which posed major challenges for UNICEF's work and increased pressure for the organisation to deliver quality humanitarian assistance to a growing number of affected people. Between 1998 and 2003, UNICEF's spending on emergencies more than doubled and now stands at some 40% of programme expenditure.

In September 1998, a meeting of UNICEF representatives from emergency countries was held in Martigny, Switzerland. The meeting produced a set of recommendations to improve UNICEF responsiveness to children in unstable situations, within the context of a mainstreamed programme approach. It was agreed that the organisation should enhance its capacity to predict and effectively respond to a changing global environment, marked by increased frequency and intensity of civil strife, armed conflict and natural disasters. In May 2000, UNICEF presented to its Executive Board a paper that was based on discussions at Martigny and that laid out a minimum set of 'Core Corporate Commitments' (CCCs) in regard to the organisation's initial response to protection and care of children and women in unstable situations. These CCCs comprise commitments in the areas of rapid assessment, coordination, programmes and operations. In June 2003, UNICEF held a follow up internal consultation, called Martigny II, to review and further define its efforts to strengthen humanitarian response capacity as well as to update the CCCs in light of the UNICEF Medium Term Strategic Plan 2002-2005 and the Millennium Declaration. In 2004 a refined set of Core Commitments for Children were issued and presented to the Executive Board in June 2004.

Much of the momentum in implementing the recommendations of Martigny I was created as a result of the support provided by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) under a three year programme of cooperation that began implementation in January 2000 with a grant of GBP 10 million. This programme was designed to help enhance UNICEF's capacity to ensure a coordinated programmatic and operational response for children in unstable environments through the implementation of 3 inter-connected projects:

- (1) children affected by armed conflict;
- (2) UNICEF's humanitarian response in crisis situations; and
- (3) the impact of landmines on children and women.

Operational initiatives (e.g. telecommunications, supplies) were subsequently given increased attention through a subsequent grant of GBP 2.63 million from DFID under what was called DFID II.

Following reviews of Phase I, a Phase II programme of cooperation was agreed for an additional GBP 10 million for a three year period (May 2002 to April 2005, with a recent extension to the end of 2005 and additional pro rata funding of GBP 2.2 million) with a focus on the development and implementation of policy, improved operational systems (e.g., security, human resources, telecommunications, etc.); the development and mainstreaming of an emergency preparedness planning framework; and increased understanding and awareness throughout the organization on the impact of armed conflict on children. The strategy for achieving the project goals aimed at ensuring coherence with corporate priorities and organisational principles. It emphasised integration of new functions and tools into the organisation's existing processes and structure, in essence 'mainstreaming' efforts to strengthen UNICEF humanitarian action and response.

The articulation of goals and objectives under the Programme of Cooperation evolved from Phase I to Phase II, with both organisations seeing the evolution as a refinement of focus.

The Programme of Cooperation was incorporated into the first DFID-UNICEF Institutional Strategy Paper (ISP), agreed in 2000.

**Note that the evaluation covered in this TORs will be supplemented by a separate “Evaluation of UNICEF learning strategy to strengthen staff competencies for humanitarian response 2000-2004”, which will provide in-depth analysis of Goal 4 of the Programme of Cooperation.**

## **PURPOSE**

For both DFID and UNICEF, the evaluation will provide a basis for decision-making on the future of DFID-UNICEF cooperation, particularly in the humanitarian field. For UNICEF, the evaluation will be used to shape future efforts to strengthen humanitarian action, specifically feeding into the 2006-2009 Medium Term Strategic Plan and the 2006-2007 management plans and budget process. Both organisations view the evaluation as an important input to the wider ISP evaluation process in 2005 and inform development of the 2006-2009 DFID-UNICEF Institutional Strategy, as well as inform its decision-making about future support for UNICEF’s humanitarian response capacity building. Finally, the evaluation will provide lessons on organisational capacity building partnerships for DFID and UNICEF.

## **OBJECTIVE**

The objectives of the evaluation are:

- To provide an overall assessment of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation, Phases I & II;
- To track the resulting changes in, and current status of, UNICEF humanitarian preparedness and response capacity<sup>51</sup>;
- To provide recommendations on priorities and strategies for future efforts to strengthen UNICEF humanitarian preparedness and response, with careful attention to the evolving external context;
- To draw lessons for future strategies and partnerships for organisational capacity building in relation to UNICEF in particular, and more broadly, where there are generic lessons emerging;
- To draw lessons on policy and programming for humanitarian response to Children Affected by Armed Conflict, where possible;
- To provide an assessment of the extent to which DFID’s investment has contributed to achieving its Public Service Agreement objective to increase the impact of key multilateral agencies in effective response to conflict and humanitarian crises.

## **SCOPE/FOCUS**

The evaluation will be underpinned by the use of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance; addressing issues of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact/coverage, sustainability, coordination and coherence. The emphasis and limitations in addressing these are defined by the following key considerations and subsequent outline of evaluation questions.

### **Organisational scope**

The primary focus of the evaluation will be on the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation and its effects on UNICEF humanitarian response capacity across all levels of the organisation – headquarters (including offices in New York, Geneva and Copenhagen), seven regional offices (ROs) and country offices (COs). The evaluation will address the issue of ‘mainstreaming’ of humanitarian response within UNICEF overall advocacy, programming and operations, including any spin-off effects on the wider organisational capacity.

In examining these effects, the evaluation will extend to examining the nature and quality of the partnership between UNICEF and DFID, including the role of DFID-CHAD in supporting, influencing and reviewing the programme of cooperation. The evaluation will also put the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation in the wider context of DFID-UNICEF Institutional Strategic Partnership.

---

<sup>51</sup> Humanitarian preparedness and response is understood to include for advocacy response.

The evaluation will also assess the potential impact of the Programme of Cooperation on wider interagency systems (including UN HQ and UN country teams, IASC and networks with NGOs), both in terms of policy and operational preparedness and response, though this facet of the assessment will rely on the desk review of existing evaluations.

### **Focus within the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation,**

The evaluation will examine all of the eight goals specified in Phase II (see Appendix A), with particular focus on the following goals where results are considered potentially more problematic and/or more difficult to assess:

- Goal 1 on preparedness planning, as this has been conceived as a critical element bringing together efforts under other goals into actual preparedness.
- Goal 3 on the “the availability of appropriate staff at the appropriate time for all emergencies”, including supporting human resource systems, as both organisations share concerns over progress and results.
- Goal 7 on the “capacity to advocate for the promotion and protection of the rights of children affected by armed conflict”, given the difficulty of assessing results.

Goal 4 on strengthening staff competencies will receive least attention due to the fact that a separate evaluation of this goal is to be completed in February 2005. The evaluation covered in this TORs will refer to that process, and take note of its findings.

Phase I goals and objectives, and the evolution of Phase II, will be looked at most closely in relation to the relevance criteria. The evaluation will draw on previous reviews of Phase I.

Within the context of evaluating UNICEF's overall performance against each of the identified goals, in some areas it will be important to distinguish results the different programme sectors – i.e. Health and Nutrition, Water-Sanitation-Hygiene, Child Protection, Education, HIV/AIDS.

### **Limitations**

Assessment vis-à-vis all criteria will be limited by the absence of or gaps in baseline measures on capacities and performance in the different functional areas.

The evaluation will necessarily **focus more on effectiveness** (i.e. results at the level of UNICEF performance in humanitarian response) rather than the impact of UNICEF response on the lives of children and women. However, the evaluation will attempt to draw on indications of impact though this will largely be done through secondary data from previous reviews, or collected as available in the context of country case studies.

Assessment of **efficiency** of the Programme of Cooperation will be limited. Macro level cost analysis will assess DFID-UNICEF investment against results in terms of change in UNICEF and potential impact for children's and women's rights in emergencies.

### **Evaluation Questions**

The following evaluation questions form the basis for a discussion with the Evaluation Team to establish clear priorities.

**Relevance** -- How relevant was the focus and design<sup>52</sup> of the UNICEF-DFID Programme of Cooperation – broad goals, objectives, actual activities selected and strategies -- in view of:

- the demands for and level of UNICEF engagement in humanitarian response – including number, size and different types of emergency contexts -- initially and as these have evolved?
- the interagency context as it has evolved?
- the status of UNICEF humanitarian response capacity and priority capacity constraints/gaps at the time and as they have evolved?

---

<sup>52</sup> Consider also the underlying concepts of capacity building, preparedness planning, human resource mobilisation, how they were established; how relevant they were they; and how they changed over time?

- UNICEF organisational priorities, policies and structure at the time, and as these have evolved<sup>53</sup>?
- DFID priorities and policies as they have evolved?

How must efforts to strengthen UNICEF humanitarian preparedness and response evolve in the future to remain relevant?

**Effectiveness** – How prepared is UNICEF globally for humanitarian response, taking into consideration preparedness planning, operations support, staffing and both internal and external surge mechanisms, competencies, safety and security? How well developed are UNICEF knowledge base, humanitarian policy and advocacy functions, and programming guidance materials for key issues affecting children in armed conflict. Do these functions adequately guide UNICEF humanitarian action and response and how well do they serve for humanitarian emergencies of different types (rapid/slow onset, natural disaster/complex emergency, size) and for different phases of response (i.e. early response vs. transition)?

**Efficiency** – Where have results of the Programme of Cooperation given the greatest value for money? How has the Programme of Cooperation affected the efficiency of UNICEF humanitarian response, focusing specifically on the Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning and the supply functions (especially regional hubs)?

**Impact** -- What changes are observable in **UNICEF performance** in humanitarian response (including advocacy) and what can be attributed to the Programme of Cooperation? How has UNICEF responded in recent emergencies including both performance of the supporting functions addressed in the Programme of Cooperation and actual humanitarian response (based on a review of existing evaluations and selected country cases)? Are any negative effects on UNICEF performance identifiable? Are there any spin-off effects **beyond UNICEF**? Has the project had any **effects on DFID**, especially in terms of change in policy or approach to Children Affected by Armed Conflict or protection of civilians?

**Coordination/ Coherence** -- How well has the Programme of Cooperation contributed to coordination within interagency systems (including UN HQ and UN country teams, and the IASC) including to policy coherence in humanitarian response and advocacy?

**Sustainability** -- What lasting changes have been achieved in UNICEF humanitarian response capacity? What changes must be further sustained and with what level of effort? What changes are in course and need further attention, and among these which are most critical and which will have greatest impact?

**Cross-cutting** – How well has the implementation of the Programme of Cooperation respected the **principles** outlined in the original proposal (Phase II) – addressing gender dimensions, promoting participation of women and children, strengthening collaboration and partnerships and focusing on CO performance – and how relevant and useful were these principles?

How well has UNICEF humanitarian response been **mainstreamed**, and what effect has that had on preparedness and response?

How has UNICEF humanitarian response capacity and performance, and the effects of the DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation differed across **different types of emergencies** – rapid/slow onset, natural disaster/complex emergency, size of CO – and for **different phases of humanitarian response** – early response, transition?

How did the nature of the UNICEF-DFID **partnership** within the framework of the Programme of Cooperation influence all of the above, including:

- How well suited was the partnership to the organisations respective structures and to the Programme of Cooperation goals and strategies? )
- How efficient and effective were management approaches and structures, considering both UNICEF and DFID roles in this?

- How sustainable is such a partnership for both organisations, particularly for DFID in light of the direction of the ISP?
- How well did the partnership contribute to learning for UNICEF and DFID? Consider learning from the process, learning from others, response to lessons learned.
- How did the nature of the partnership contribute to innovation? Did the Programme of Cooperation facilitate innovation and how?
- Has the DFID and UNICEF experience with the Programme of Cooperation affected their approaches to institutional partnerships and what lessons can be drawn?

### **Focus on preparedness planning**

- How **relevant** has the approach to preparedness planning been vis-à-vis UNICEF policies, priorities and organisational context, the evolving interagency context and the demands for humanitarian response, i.e. the trends in emergencies? In particular look at links to HRBAP and humanitarian principles, protection issues, and early warning.
- How **efficient** was the approach used to introduce preparedness planning? Are there major inefficiencies or questionable areas, what are the factors at play and/or requiring further investigation?
- How **effective** has preparedness planning been? How well has preparedness planning – CO, RO, HQ -- contributed to actual preparedness and response? How effective have different elements of the preparedness planning process been, especially threat analysis and its links to early warning, and planning assumptions? What are the key factors facilitating and/or limiting effectiveness -- consider management of the process, mainstreaming among others?
- **Sustainability -- How** well is preparedness integrated in programme and management planning at different levels of the organisation? What is the nature and level of resources required to sustain the Emergency Preparedness and Planning Process as established to date?

### **Human resources – right people in the right place at the right time**

- How **relevant** is the human resources strategy for UNICEF humanitarian response and in particular the UNICEF Core Commitments for Children?
- What are the key factors that have promoted or limited **effectiveness**? How has mainstreaming of the humanitarian response focus affected results? How do UNICEF structures and HR processes help or hinder UNICEF humanitarian response, including respective roles of HQ and ROs? Has UNICEF achieved an appropriate balance in the use of international and national staff? How well have lessons on emergency deployments been identified and learned by the human resources function?

### **Advocacy**

- How **effective** have been efforts to build a UNICEF advocacy capacity? How well equipped are staff at different levels of the organisation, but especially at CO level, to advocate effectively for child rights in emergencies? How effective have been efforts to change staff attitudes and knowledge vis-à-vis UNICEF advocacy role? What are the key factors that are facilitating or limiting strong advocacy at CO, RO and headquarters level?
- How effectively has UNICEF advocated for children's rights in emergencies – in global and regional fora, and at country level – vis-à-vis the international community and national actors including government and Non-State Entities? What effect if any has UNICEF advocacy had in influencing global policy in humanitarian response?

### **PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY**

It is important that the evaluation process contribute to developing a common widely shared analysis within UNICEF of the organisations humanitarian response capacity and the priority issues to be addressed. Similarly, the process should build ownership of recommendations.

The evaluation methodology will be developed with the involvement of the Evaluation Team and will include:

- Desk review (see Annex B: Preliminary outline of data available);

- Key informant and focus group interviews (face-to-face, telephone and conference calling, with video as necessary/feasible):
  - Headquarters staff involved in DFID Phase I/II and in humanitarian response in general (UNICEF and DFID)
  - UNICEF Headquarters staff/ex-staff covering key 'mainstream' functions over the period under study – strategic planning, programme guidance, etc.
  - Selected UNICEF RO staff – Regional Directors, senior emergency, planning, and sectoral officers/advisors,
  - Selected UNICEF CO Representatives, Senior Programme Officers, Operations Officers, Emergency Project Officers
  - External key informants to be determined
- CO survey on preparedness planning and actual preparedness;
- A consultation with a selection of staff from different levels of the organisation for validation of findings and participatory analysis of implications and possible response;
- Possible piggy-backing on planned workshops/meetings with field staff participation for additional consultations or focus groups (e.g. sectoral networks or networks around supporting functions);
- 3-4 country case studies with field visits (e.g. 10-days per country) with each case entailing further documentary review as well as key informant interviews with UNICEF and DFID staff and selected external key informants; and
- E-mail exchange with a reference group at key stages, including to refine TORs, to validate findings and conclusions, and to comment on final draft.

The process will include the following key stages and milestones:

- *Preparation (February 2005) -- including* finalisation of TORs based on discussion with stakeholders; designing methodology, planning travel timetable and respective team responsibilities (cross-checked with Evaluation Management Team); development and testing of tools with input of reference group and/or ad hoc groups focused around specific technical issues and desk review at HQ level with production of a first outline of emerging issues on this basis;
- *Data collection and analysis (March – April 2005) – including* further documentary review, interviews, county cases and culminating in a consultation workshop to validate findings/conclusions and involve key stakeholders in analysis of possible recommendations with the production of workshop report.
- *Finalisation and reporting (1 May- 15 June 2005) – including* production of drafts of the main report, for at least one review by the DFID and UNICEF reference groups (see below), as well as for a subsequent review at more senior levels of the organisations; production of briefing materials to be defined at mid-stage, and a possible extended executive summary for senior managers as well as briefings and facilitated working sessions on specific issues or with selected audiences.
- *Dissemination (post 15 June 2005) – to be determined early May – depending on* Evaluation Team members availability and DFID-UNICEF dissemination strategy, the Evaluation Team or some members may be engaged to develop further briefing materials or by-products of the main report.

## **ACCOUNTABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE**

### **The Evaluation Team**

Under the guidance of the UNICEF Evaluation Office and DFID-UNICEF Evaluation Management Team (see below), the Evaluation Team will be responsible for:

- Further developing methodology design;
- Implementing the evaluation with adequate attention to process issues, especially ownership of common analysis and recommendations;
- Development and testing of data collection tools, including questionnaires and interview guides;
- Development of any databases needed for processing quantitative and qualitative data;
- Systematic and rigorous implementation of data collection methods planned;

- Data processing;
- Design and facilitation of the consultation workshop and any additional validation workshops or meetings;
- Quantitative and qualitative analysis;
- Preparation of draft and final reports.

### **UNICEF Evaluation Office**

UNICEF Evaluation Office will be the contracting office and will assure day to day support to and liaison with the Evaluation Team and with the Evaluation Management Team. Specific responsibilities will include:

- Facilitating the selection process;
- Contracting the evaluation team;
- Facilitating discussion and finalisation of TORs with key stakeholders;
- First review and coordination of additional input from the reference group and other ad hoc groups decided by the Evaluation Management Team to provide technical input on data collection design and tools;
- Facilitating access to UNICEF information sources including documentation and monitoring data as well as key informants and interviewees;
- Liaison with DFID focal point to ensure the same access within DFID;
- Facilitating consultation with a UNICEF reference group and other ad hoc groups or individuals defined by the DFID-UNICEF Evaluation Management Team and consolidation of their comments.

### **DFID-UNICEF Evaluation Management Team**

The team will be comprised of representatives from UNICEF (Division of Emergency Programmes, Programme Funding Office and the Evaluation Office) and DFID-CHAD. Accountabilities include:

- Approval on key aspects of evaluation design and process and adjustments to TORs;
- Ensuring the evaluation process involves key stakeholders adequately to ensure ownership of analysis and recommendations;
- Decisions on intermediate products to refer to Reference Group and/or other ad hoc groups or individuals for review;
- Coordination and consolidation of Reference Group comments on key products (one focal point for each organisation to be identified)
- Decision on a post-evaluation dissemination strategy (prior to full completion of the report);
- Approval of the final report in terms of meeting TORs.

### **UNICEF Reference Group:**

The accountabilities include the review and critique key intermediate products. Members would include: current UNICEF HQ and RO Emergency Capacity Building focal points, selected past focal points and other key actors.

### **DFID Reference Group.**

The accountabilities include the review and critique key intermediate products. Members to be defined.

## **PRODUCTS, ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

### **Products**

Intermediate products are as indicated above under stages and milestones:

- Outline of emerging issues based on a preliminary desk review during the preparatory phase. Expected length 10 pages.
- Report of the consultation workshop. Expected length 20-30 pages.
- Draft evaluation reports (following the same criteria as the eventual final report described below).
- Presentation material deriving from the report for senior level briefings, to be defined.

The final product is a report presenting findings and conclusions vis-à-vis evaluation questions detailed above, proposing recommendations on how to strengthen UNICEF humanitarian response capacity, and where possible presenting lessons learned. The report must meet the UNICEF Evaluation Report

Standards, UNICEF Style Guide and further UNICEF Evaluation Office specifications on formatting to be provided.

All products should be provided in Microsoft Word 97. The final report should also be provided in hard-copy (1 copy). Any survey data will be provided in Microsoft Office compatible format. All electronic files will be submitted at the completion of the contract on a CD.

#### Contract Period

1 February – 30 June 2005.

#### Working Arrangements

The Evaluation Team will be expected to provide its own office space and working equipment. At certain stages, it may be expedient for some members of the Evaluation Team to spend some time in UNICEF or DFID offices, for which space will be provided.

#### Reporting/supervision

The team will work under the day-to-day supervision of Kate Alley, UNICEF Evaluation Office.

#### Payment

Payment will be lump sum, made in stages with allotments corresponding to the completion of key intermediate phases and products. Dates and sums will be negotiated with the consultant.

### **EVALUATION TEAM REQUIREMENTS**

The evaluation will be carried out by an external team. The following competencies are required within the team:

- Significant evaluation experience in the humanitarian emergency sector, complex emergencies and natural disaster;
- Significant experience in carrying out major evaluations of institutional performance, ideally with organisations working in the humanitarian sector;
- Strong knowledge of humanitarian protection issues, human rights based approach to programming in emergencies and humanitarian principles;
- Strong knowledge/experience of gender issues in humanitarian emergencies;
- Facilitation skills, particularly design and facilitation for consultations;
- Strong quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis skills;
- Excellent written and verbal communication skills in English.

In addition, it is an advantage if the team includes members with:

- Knowledge of/experience with UNICEF;
- Significant experience managing large humanitarian response programmes, especially with programming in the sectors of health, nutrition, water and environmental sanitation, child protection, education and/or HIV/AIDS.

The team will be comprised of at least 3 and not more than 6 persons.

### **SELECTION PROCESS & TIMING**

The selection process will include a number of stages of review of submissions culminating in the selection of 2 to 3 short-listed teams who will be invited to present their proposal to a Review Panel. The Review Panel is scheduled to take place by 8-9 December and Teams to be invited will receive notice by close-of-business 1 December.

### **SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS**

All teams applying must provide in electronic format (Microsoft Word):

- A **technical proposal** including:

- a brief (MAXIMUM ten page) proposal for how the evaluation could be implemented to address the evaluation purpose, objectives and questions outlined above, including some discussion of relevant evaluation frameworks and performance benchmarks, how the methodologies will be brought to bear to meet the objectives, distribution of labour within the team, a work calendar and key assumptions that shape the proposed design;
  - curriculum vitae for each team member (MAXIMUM four pages each) demonstrating relevant qualifications and experience;
- Two **examples of relevant evaluation** work – one for the Team Leader and one for one other evaluator in the team – for which the Team Leader/Member was responsible for the final product.
  - A **budget submission** including a breakdown of person days and daily fees for team members. Travel costs should not be included. These will be agreed with the evaluation team during negotiations based on the work calendar and location of country cases and will be included in the lump sum contract.
  - **Full contact details of at least two references** from among recent employers/clients for each team member.

Proposals will be assessed for the quality of proposals and adequacy of teams against the requirements outlined above, and balancing this against costs, taking into account the assumptions identified in the technical proposal.

The Team must be working under the umbrella of an established institution and able to provide a certificate of incorporation for that institution.

**Deadline for submissions is 26 November, 5:00 pm local time in New York.**

Please send submissions electronically to:  
 Kate Alley, Evaluation Office, UNICEF  
[ktalley@unicef.org](mailto:ktalley@unicef.org).

***UNICEF Evaluation Office  
 12<sup>th</sup> November 2004***

## **Annex 2. Annex 2: DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation, Phase II Goals**

These goals were intended: “to address a) the overall challenge of improving UNICEF’s programmatic and operational response for children in unstable environments and b) within that context, enhancing the effectiveness of UNICEF programmes and advocacy to address the situation of Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC).

1. To enhance UNICEF capacities for preparedness planning and response to emergencies, as an integral part of the country programming process, and ensure that child rights are central to humanitarian efforts
2. To improve UNICEF management of, and operational readiness in financial, supply, logistics, telecommunications and communication elements of humanitarian response in emergencies.
3. To improve the availability of appropriate staff at the appropriate time for all emergencies.
4. To improve staff competencies for advocacy, programmatic and operational support in emergencies, reflecting the human rights based approach to programming and the normative framework of UNICEF.
5. To increase UNICEF capacity to protect staff and assets in emergencies.
6. To improve UNICEF’s knowledge base on the situation of children affected by armed conflict with particular attention to the differential impact of armed conflict on girls and women.
7. To enhance UNICEF capacity to advocate for the promotion and protection of the rights of children affected by armed conflict.
8. To increase UNICEF capacity to develop co-ordinated policy and programme guidance to protect children affected by armed conflict with a consistent gender perspective in all policy and programming.”

## Annex 3. List of persons interviewed

### UNICEF New York Headquarters

#### *Office of the Executive Director*

Carol Bellamy	Executive Director
Rima Salah	Deputy Executive Director, Office of Executive Director
Hannan Sulieman	Executive Officer, Office of the Executive Director

#### *Programme Funding Office*

Gary Stahl	Deputy Director, Programme Funding Office
Isabel Crowley	Senior Fundraising Officer, Programme Funding Office
Nalinee Nippita	Fundraising Officer, Strategic Inform. and Analysis Unit

#### *Division of Policy and Planning*

Saad Houry	Director, Division of Policy and Planning
Samuel Momanyi	Programme Officer, Division of Policy and Planning
Richard Morgan	Chief, Strategic Planning and Programme Guidance, DPP
Detlef Palm	Senior Policy Officer, Processes and Quality Assurance
Liz Gibbons	Head of Global Policy Section,
Noreen Khan	Gender Mainstreaming Unit

#### *Programme Division*

Joe Judd	Director, Programme Division
Pilar Aguilar	Project Officer, Education Section
Manuel Fontaine	Senior Adviser, Children in Armed Conflict, Child Protection Section
Henk Van Norden	Senior Adviser, Water Environment and Sanitation
Mark Henderson	Senior Adviser, Water Environment and Sanitation
Vanessa Tobin	Chief, Water Environment and Sanitation, Programme Division
Massimo Zuca	Consultant, HIV in Emergencies
Pamela Shifman	Adviser, Sexual and Gender Based Violence, Child Protection
Kayode Oyegbite	Senior Programme and Planning Officer, Health Section

#### *Emergency Operations*

Dan Toole	Director, EMOPS
Afshan Khan	Deputy Director, EMOPS
Isabelle Roy	Project Officer, Emergency Operations
Melissa Fernandez	Project Officer, Emergency Operations
Bill Gent	UNICEF Security Coordinator
Hazel de Wet	Project Officer, Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy
Jean Luc Bories	Project Officer, Emergency Operations
Pernille Ironside	Consultant, Emergency Operations
Julianna Lindsey	Programme Officer, Humanitarian Response Unit
Philip Gerry Dyer	Senior Project Officer, Emergency Operations
Enrico Leonardi	Executive Officer, Emergency Operations
Chris Maxfield	Deputy Security Coordinator and OPSCEN Manager
Julien Temple	Project Office, Landmine Awareness
Gianluca Buono	Project Office, Landmine Awareness

#### *Information Technology Department*

Laila Ismail Khan	Deputy Director, Information Technology Department
Stephen Fazio	Chief, Global Telecommunications Officer
Mark Beatty	Chief, Systems Integration and ProMS

*Office for Internal Audit*  
Stephen Adkisson

Deputy Director, Internal Audit

*Evaluation Office*  
Jean Quesnel  
Simon Lawry-White  
Lucien Back  
Kate Alley  
Joaquin Gonzelez-Aleman

Director  
Senior Programme Officer  
Senior Programme Officer  
Programme Officer,  
Project Officer

*Office of Public Partnerships*  
Peter Crowley

Chief, Office of Public Partnerships

*Division of Human Resources*  
Rohini de Silva  
Anders Pettersson  
Penelope Curling  
Jenni Wolfson

Deputy Director, Division of Human Resources  
Emergency Focal Point/HR  
Stress Counsellor, Division of Human Resources  
Training Officer (Emergencies)

*Division of Communications*  
Sharad Sapra  
Alfred Ironside  
Nora Godwin

Director, Division of Communication  
Chief, Media Section, Division of Communication  
Deputy Director, Division of Communications

*Additional Unicef Personnel*  
Agostino Paganini

Chairperson, Global Staff Association

#### **OTHER UN AGENCIES – New York**

Susanna Frueh  
Bradley Foerster  
Debbie Saidy  
Kevin Kennedy

OCHA, Chief, Evaluation and Studies Unit  
United Nations Development Group (UN Reform)  
World Food Programme  
Director, Coordination and Response Division, OCHA

#### **GENEVA**

Philip O'Brien  
Hans Holsen  
Everett Ressler  
Olivier Degreef  
Fred Spielberg  
Maria Calivis  
Angela Raven-Roberts  
Fabio Sabatini  
Christian Skoog  
Quoc Dang N'Guyen

Regional Director, Europe  
Deputy Regional Director, Europe  
Senior Programme Officer, Focal Point for Preparedness  
Senior Programme Officer  
Project Officer, EMOPS  
Regional Director, CEE/CIS  
Project Officer  
Regional Programme Officer, Policy and Planning  
Programme Officer, Office of Emergency Programmes  
Office of Emergency Programmes

#### **OTHER UN AGENCIES – Geneva**

*WHO*  
David Nabarro  
Rob Holden  
Tanja Sleenwenhoek

Representative of DG for Health Action in Crises  
Operations Manager, Health Action in Crises  
Interagency Affairs, Dept for Health Action in Crises

Kirsi Madi  
Rashid Khalikov

IASC  
Deputy Director, OCHA, Geneva UNHCR

**OTHER AGENCIES - Geneva***ICRC*

Thomas Gurtner  
Robert Mardini

Head Economic Security Unit, Assistance Division  
Deputy Head, Water and Habitat Unit

**SPHERE PROJECT**

Jean McCluskey  
Veronica Foubert

Acting Sphere Project Manager  
Sphere Project Officer

**COPENHAGEN***Supply Division*

Alan Court  
Shamsul Farooq  
Soren Winther Hansen  
Ole Boye  
Mikko Lainejoki  
Mortaga Abdel Latif (Magi)  
Tanny Noorlander  
Maria Elena Solano

Director (interviewed in New York)  
Deputy Director  
Chief Warehouse and Logistics  
Logistics Officer Emergency  
Chief Contracting Centre  
Supply Planning Officer  
Emergency Coordinator  
Human Resources Officer

**DFID**

Karen McGeough

Team Leader, Institutional Relations, United Nations  
Commonwealth Division

Nick Weatherill  
Nick Harvey  
Bill Kilby

Acting Humanitarian Adviser, West Africa  
Humanitarian Adviser, Sudan  
Great Lakes and Horn Department, DRC Programme  
Manager

Simon Mansfield

Africa Division, CHAD

*Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department*

Michael Mosselmans  
Philip Ryland-Jones  
Anissa Toscano  
Nigel Adams  
David Horobin  
Julian Neale  
Sarah Maguire

Head of CHAD  
Global Policy and Institutions Team  
Operations Team Adviser  
Asst. Team Manager, Humanitarian Programmes Team  
Head of CHAD Operations Team  
CHAD OT (procurement, supplies, logistics)  
Human Rights Consultant

**SENEGAL – WCARO***UNICEF*

Ezio Murzi  
Theophane Nikyema  
Adriana Zarrelli  
Andrew Brooks  
Abdoulaye Sadio  
Pierre Ferry  
Evelyne Pressoir  
Staneala Beckley  
Marcel Ouattara  
Victor Aguayo  
Karimou Andele  
Nisha Bakker  
Avril Slade

Regional Director  
Deputy Regional Director  
Regional Emergency Adviser  
Programme Officer Emergency  
Regional Monitoring & Evaluation Officer  
Regional Child Protection Officer  
Regional Adviser Early Childhood & Development  
Regional Adviser Education  
Regional Project Officer Life Skills Education  
Regional Adviser Nutrition  
Regional Project Officer Measles  
Assistant Programme Officer  
Regional Adviser Human Resources

Liselotte Woltmann  
Paul Farrell  
Deborah Dishman

Regional Adviser Operations  
Regional Security Officer  
Regional Adviser Supply

*External*

Ute Kollies  
Francois Landiech  
Olivia Hantz  
Jack Higgins  
François Batalingaya  
Michel Anglade  
Herve Ludovic de Lys

Deputy Head of Office, OCHA  
Humanit. Affairs Officer, OCHA Regional office Dakar  
Contingency Planning, WFP Regional Office  
Regional Programme Adviser, WFP  
Sub Regional Relief Coordinator, World Vision  
Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, OXFAM  
Senior Humanitarian Advisor UNOWA

**KENYA - ESARO**

*UNICEF*

Per Engebak  
Ayalew Abai  
Jacqueline Aligula  
Karen Allen  
David Alnwick  
Ben Akpera  
Tanya Chapuisat  
Robert Davis  
Neil Ford  
Asfer Haregot  
Veronica Luard  
Changu Mannahoko sp?  
Sasa Medehtu sp?  
Margie de Monchy  
Thomas Mongare  
Susan Ngongi  
Sarah Norton-Stael  
Joselito Nuguio  
Fred Ogwal-Oyee  
Ian Rowe

Regional Director  
Deputy Regional Director  
Emergency Assistant  
Regional Programme Planning Officer  
Regional HIV/AIDS Advisor  
Regional Human Resources Officer  
Communication Officer  
Regional EPI Advisor  
Regional Programme Communication Advisor  
Regional Education Officer  
Regional Human Resources Officer  
Regional Education Advisor  
Regional Nutrition Advisor  
Regional Advisor Child Protection  
Assistant IT Officer  
Emergency Officer  
Regional Child Protection Officer  
Regional Supply Officer  
Regional Programme Officer  
Consultant, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation in SALW's  
IT Officer  
Regional OVC Officer  
Regional Emergency Advisor

Alex van Eijk  
Doug Webb  
Geoff Wiffin

*UNICEF Somalia Support Centre*  
Siddharth Chatterjee  
Robert McCarthy

Senior Programme Officer  
Emergency Officer

**Other UN agencies**

Hodan Addou

Regional Peace & Security Advisor, UNIFEM Eastern and Southern Africa

Pierre Gelas

Regional Disaster Response Advisor, OCHA Regional Support Office for Central and East Africa

Valerie Julliard

Head of Office, OCHA Regional Support Office for Central and East Africa

Kenneth Westgate

Regional Disaster Reduction Advisor for Africa, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

**Other Agencies**

George Fenton

Johan Heffinck  
Liz Walker

Associate Director, Supply-Chain Management, Humanitarian & Emergency Affairs, World Vision International  
Senior Expert, Sector Policies, ECHO  
Regional Public Health Advisor, Oxfam GB, Horn, East & Central Africa

**ROSA – In Sri-Lanka**

Luc Chauvin

Regional Planning Officer (Emergency)

**DRC**

*UNICEF Kinshasa:*

Hervé Périès  
Chrystian Solofo'Dimby  
Sandra Lattouf  
Anthony Bloomberg  
Stéphane Pichette  
Christina Torsein  
Mahoko Kamatsuchi  
Etleva Muhedini  
Corneille Mbala  
Bauma Modeste  
Oumarou Dia  
Jennifer Lee  
Gilbert Nanema  
Mohamed Fall  
Jean-Pierre Kabutako  
Patricia Hiddleston

Senior Programme Officer  
Planning Officer  
Project Officer Nutrition  
Representant  
Child Protection Officer  
Child Protection Officer  
Nutrition Programme Officer  
Operations Officer Goma  
Assistant Administration Officer  
Assistant Supply Officer  
Senior Operations Officer  
Finance Officer  
IT Officer  
Education Officer  
Acting Assistant Project Officer  
Project Officer CEDC

*External Kinshasa:*

Jahal de Meritens  
Ros Cooper  
Alyoscia D'Onofrio  
Farida Chapman  
Moumini Ouedraogo  
Luc Lompo  
Junior Elota  
Moges Alemu

Head of OCHA  
Human Development Adviser (DFID)  
National Director IRC  
NGO Group Coordinator IRC  
Charge de Programme, Programme Alimentaire Mondial (WFP)  
Coordonnateur des Opérations agricoles d'urgence (FAO)  
Consultour Chargé de Survi et Evuluation (FAO)  
Supply and Logistics Officer

*UNICEF Goma:*

Luciano Galestini  
Katya Marino  
Celestin Bibimbu  
Blossom Ratnam  
Bernard Kutambala  
Bavon Mwabilwa

Emergency Officer  
Project Officer Education  
Assistant Communication Officer  
Logistics Officer  
Child Protection Officer  
Chargé de file vulnerable + HIV/AIDS

*External Goma :*

Penninah Mathenge  
Fred Meylan  
Myriam Abord Hugon  
Patrick Lavand'Homme  
James Bot  
Vincent Koch

Health Programme Manager SC-UK Goma  
Head of Mission Solidarités Goma  
Former Head of Mission Solidarités Goma  
Head of OCHA North Kivu  
Country Programme Manager OXFAM GB  
Programme Coordinator for Eastern DRC OXFAM GB

*UNICEF Bukavu*

Matteo Frontini

UNICEF Head of Office Bukavu

*External Bukavu:*

Timothy Reid  
Pascal Duvlet  
Gang Karume  
Jean-Charles Dupin  
Marian Matshikiza

Bukavu DDR/DDRRR Team Leader MONUC  
Provincial Coordinator Bukavu IRC  
Emergency Coordinator RRF IRC Bukavu  
Senior Humanitarian Affairs OCHA Uvira  
Programme Manager South Kivu SC-UK

**ETHIOPIA**

*UNICEF Addis Ababa*

Bjorn Ljungqvist  
Beyene Arega  
Fay King Chung  
Jon Cunliffe  
Yeshitla Dibaba  
Therese Dooley  
John Flanagan  
Orlaith Gallagher  
Bruno Maes  
Mazen O. Manna  
Abebe Haile Mariam  
Rory Nefdt  
Fikre Negussie  
Sophia Nesri  
Stefano Pizzi  
Marc Rubin  
Hans Spruijt  
Dereje Tadesse

Representative  
Supply Officer  
Acting Chief Education Officer  
Regional Project Officer, Gambella and Benismanuel  
Asst. Administration Officer  
Project Officer, Water and Environmental Sanitation  
OIC Operations; Supplies and Logistics Officer  
Mine Risk Education Officer  
Senior Programme Officer  
Finance Officer  
Project Officer Health  
Project Officer, Malaria / IMCI and Emergency Health  
Early Warning Project Officer  
Emergency Reports Officer  
Project Officer, Emergency  
Head, Emergency / Early Warning & Disaster Preparedness  
Chief, Water & Environmental Sanitation  
Logistics Officer

**Other UN agencies**

Deborah Hicks  
Angelo Boccaccini

Emergency Officer, WFP  
Security Assistant, UNSECOORD

**Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia**

Fisseha Aberra Head, Multilateral Cooperation Department, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development  
Dr Shamsudin Abdullahi Expert, Disease Prevention and Control Department and Coordinator of Emergency Response, Ministry of Health  
Dr Girma Azene Head of Planning and Programme Department, Ministry of Health  
Berhane Gizaw Head of Food Security Coordination Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  
Tamena Gossa Ministry of Water Resources  
H. E. Simon Mechale Commissioner, DPPC

**DFID**

Melkamnesh Alemu

Food Security Advisor, DFID Ethiopia

**Other Agencies**

Marco Bruderemann

Head of Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross

*Unicef Awassa*  
Dr Tirsit Assefa  
Adane Bekele  
Enanu Haileluel  
Mehari Redda  
Balma Yahaya  
Mesfin Tekle  
Demeke Fiessa

Assistant Project Officer, Health & Nutrition  
Assistant Project Officer, Water & Environmental Sanitation  
Assistant Project Officer, HIV/AIDS  
Assistant Project Officer, Early Warning / DP  
Area Project Officer, SNNPR  
Assistant Project Officer, Woliya  
Assistant Project Officer, Gamo Gofa

### **Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Regional State Government**

H. E Hailemariam Desalegne  
Dr Sitota Abagare  
Ambachew Deresse

President, State of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples  
Environmental Health & Health Education Team Leader  
Team Leader, Development Cooperation, Bureau of Finance and  
Economic Development

Alemu Foche  
Zelege Gobe  
Erssido Lendebo  
Meskele Lera  
Redwan Hussein Rameto  
Jemal Rashid  
Mesfin Tekleab

Head, Disasters Prevention and Preparedness Bureau  
Deputy Head, Health Bureau  
Head of Secretariat, HIV/AIDS Prevention & Control Office  
Head, Diseases Prevention and Control Department  
Head of Education Bureau  
Vice Head, Water Resources Development Bureau  
Programme Officer, HIV/AIDS Prevention & Control Office

### **Soddo Zone**

Haile-giorgis Abate  
Nega Angore  
Samuel Chaka  
Bizuneh Gmedhia  
Tesfan Legesa  
Azmach Zergere

Health Service and training coordinator, Zone Health Desk  
Head Rural Development Coordination Desk  
Head Water Desk  
Head DPPD  
World Vision Sodo  
Zonal HAPCO expert

### **Arba Minch Zone**

Samuel Attaye  
Elias Endalu  
Sedikor Semie  
Wubayehu Tizazu  
AwlacheWkibebe Tschay

Head Health Desk  
Food Security Coordinator, Rural Development Department  
Head Education Desk  
Head Water Department  
DPPD staff

### **SRI LANKA**

*UNICEF Colombo*  
Ted Chaiban  
Yasmin Ali Haque  
Jennifer Taylor  
Chamila Ariyaratne  
Nimal Weerasinghe  
Zacky Salie  
Nishanatha Jayaseeleeva  
Darrel Mullen  
Mark Okingo  
Samuel Sawa  
Bo Viktor Nylund  
Patricia Purves  
Sofia Pehrsson  
Aberra Bekele  
D.P. Adikari  
Abhayan Jung Rana

Representative  
Programme Coordinator  
Operations Officer  
Senior Secretary  
Programme Officer  
Assistant Administration and Finance Officer  
Telecommunication Assistant  
Senior IT Assistant  
Supply Officer  
Logistics Officer  
Head, Child Protection Section  
Protection Officer  
Protection Officer  
Head, Early Childhood Development  
Programme Officer, Nutrition  
Programme Officer, Child Development

Shalini Fernando	Project Assistant, Early Childhood, Acting HRD Team Leader
AbhiPushpa Jayakody	Chief, Learning Years and Adolescence
Padmini Ranaweera	Education Programme Officer
Geoffrey Keele	Communication Officer
Gabriela Elroy	Head of Zone Officer, Trincomalee
Dorothee Klaus	Planning Officer
Hideaki Matsuoka	Assist. Prog. Officer, Early Childhood (Water/Sanitation)
Eric Debert	Project Officer, Protection – Mine Action
Kristen Ormston	Education Programme Officer
Malathi de Alwis	Visiting consultant, SGBV

*UNICEF Vavuniya*

Tor Emaus	Head of Zone Office, Vavuniya
Insaf Nizam	Assistant Project Officer
L A Ranjitraj	Assistant Child Protection Officer
Radika Sivakumaran	Programme Assistant
Vedasto Nsanzugwanko	Child Protection Officer, Mannar
Melania Cacho	Child Protection Officer, Mannar
S. Ravindran	Assistant Child Protection Officer
S S M Hakeem	Project Assistant
Dilky Nonis	Operations Assistant
I A Hameed	Head of Galle Office

*UNICEF Batticaloa*

Andrea Jones	Head of Office Batticaloa
S. Jude Suthagar	Operations Assistant Batticaloa
Patrick Halton	Reintegration Manager
Subajini Mahalingam	Assistant Child Protection Officer
Alles Douglas Jayasekaran	Assistant Project Officer, Early Childhood Development
C. C. Dilrukhi	Administrative Assistant

**Government of Sri Lanka**

Athula Kahandaliyanage	Director-General of Health Services
Manil Fernando	Deputy Director-General of Health Services, Public Health
Vineetha Karunaratne	Director, Maternal and Child Health, Ministry of Health
G. Colombaja	Director MRI, Ministry of Health
Laxman Perera	Director Planning, Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply
Lal Premanath	Proj. Director, National Water Supply and Drainage Board
VRA Oswald	Zonal Director of Education, Vavuniya South
R Ragupathy	DDI, Zonal Education Office, Vavuniya North
K. Sathiyasrelan	Assist. Director Educat. (Non formal Education) Vavuniya
M Pavalakanthan	Zonal Director of Education, Batticaloa
Dr (Mrs) P Pasupthyrajah	Acting Deputy Director of Health Services, Vavuniya
J. Kenady	Child Rights Protection Officer, D.S. Office, Vavuniya
Padmini Pevemalotha	Police Women & Children's Desk, Vavuniya
Mr Muthalee	Technical Officer, Project Officer, Pradesha Saba, Ariyampathy, Batticaloa District
C. Punniyamoorthy	Additional Government Agent, Batticaloa District
<b>DFID</b>	
Anthea Mulakala	Reconciliation and Development Adviser
Philip Upson	Humanitarian Advisor
Kristen Ormston	Deputy Programme Manager

**Other UN Agencies and Red Cross**

**UNOCHA**

Valentin Gatzinski

Head of Office

**UNHCR**Annika Sandlund  
Savithri Weragoda  
Piboonsak SrisombatProtection Officer  
Senior Protection Assistant  
Protection Officer**UNDP**A. Sujieva  
T. AbarajithaProgramme Assistant Vavuniya  
Programme Officer**ILO**CLR Joseph  
Gowrie PonniahField Prog. Assistant, Voc Training & Skills Dev Children  
Proj. Coordinator, Voc.Training &Skills Dev for Children**UNSECOORD**

Indra Karki

Field Security Coordination Officer, Malawi

**UNFPA**

Lubna Baqi

Representative, Sri Lanka

**ICRC**

Isabelle Bermijn

Protection Coordinator

**NGOs**Abdul Manaf  
V Jeyarajasingam  
Lara Perera  
SM Galagada  
S. T. Muurthy  
S. Sasikaran  
K. Thevaratah  
J. Sicagnonomoorthy  
V. Rameshnonthan  
Enamul Hoque  
J.A. Abdul Manaf  
Gosia RushDirector General, SHADE  
Deputy Field Director, World University Service of Canada  
Coordination of Humanitarian Agencies  
Chairman HELPERS  
District Director of TRO Vavuniya  
Partnership Management Officer, Save The Children  
District Director of TRO Batticaloa  
Administrative Officer of TRO Batticaloa  
CAW Coordinator of TRO Batticaloa  
Technical Team Leader, Water & Sanitation, Oxfam  
Director-General, SHADE, Vavuniya  
UR Team Leader/ Child Protection Adviser, Save the Children,  
Vavuniya

Amutha C.

UR Social Worker/ Project Management Officer, Save the  
Children, Vavuniya, VavuniyaMs Kothai Ponnuthurai  
Sarala EmmanuelAssistant Director, ESCO, Batticaloa  
Coordinator, Women's Coalition for Disaster Management,  
Batticaloa, Suriya Women's Development Centre

## TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS

### UNICEF:

Edilberto Loaiza	Programme Officer Statistics & Monitoring DPP/SI
Hamish Young	Senior Programme Officer, Tanzania
Ivan Yerovi	Regional Emergency Advisor, TACRO
Jan van Manen	Senior Programme Officer, Nepal
Reiko Nishijima	Regional Planning Officer, EAPRO
Tamar Renaud	HIV/AIDS Officer
Leila Pakkala	UNICEF Country Representative, Mozambique
Eric Laroche	Deputy Director, EMOPS
Terry Brown	Comptroller
Geeta Narayan	Previously EMOPS
Nils Kastberg	former Head of EMOPS, Regional Director TACRO
Quoc Dhang	Emergency Officer, UNICEF Geneva

### EXTERNAL:

Carlo Scaramella	Early Warning and Emergency Preparedness, WFP
Andy Bastable	Public Health Engineering Coordinator, Oxfam GB
Beth Verhey	Child Protection Consultant
Sarah Uppard	Child Protection Advisor, Save the Children UK
Yoshimi Muto	Human Resources Officer, World Bank [Former Emergency Focal Point, DHR UNICEF]
Tonderai Chikuhwa	Office of Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict
Iain Levine	Human Rights Watch
Mukesh Kapila	WHO, former Head of CHAD, DFID
Ms Constanza Adinolfi	Head of Humanitarian Response Review team



**5. Early Warning:**

- What EW activities such as a risk/threat analysis have taken place with the UNCT and RO in the last year?
- What national and/or global/interagency early warning systems, analysis or tools is the CO using (e.g. early warning data bases, VCA)?

**6. Are the tools equally useful to predict or monitor the onset of all of the following types of emergency?**

- A slow onset natural disaster (e.g. drought): Drop down  
 A slow onset complex emergency (e.g. armed conflict): Drop down  
 A fast onset emergency (e.g. floods, earthquake): Drop down

**7. Level of Preparedness:** which of the following preparedness activities or systems are in place in the CO (usually but not necessarily identified in the EPRP)?

Activity or System	In place in the CO
• Partners identified for each of the CCC sectors	• Drop down
• Collaborative agreements established with partners for each CCC	• Drop down
• Lead agency for coordination in each sector identified with UNCT	Drop down
• Human resource plan with RO for additional emergency capacity	Drop down
• Expected response level in numbers of beneficiaries for each CCC	Drop down
• MOSS compliance	Drop down
• Rapid Assessment Capacity (experience or training)	Drop down
• Monitoring and evaluation capacity for emergencies in all sectors	Drop down
• A plan that identifies supplies needed and their source (in-country, regional, stocks, Copenhagen) required to meet the CCCs	Drop down
• Expected speed of response in terms of days within which the CO will be able to provide humanitarian assistance (give number of days)	• Number of days
• Expected response level in terms of number of beneficiaries	• Number of beneficiaries
• The minimum period of first response based on in-country supplies (in number of days)	• Drop down

**Please describe:**

- Any rapid assessment planning that has taken place with partners (NGOs, government, UNCT)?
- If a rapid assessment has taken place, which UNICEF staff participated (posts)?

**8. Do you think the EPRP is:**

- An effective process for mainstreaming emergency capacity Drop down
- Adequately linked to key policies (such as HRBAP, humanitarian principles, CCCs)? Drop down
- Helpful in developing a country team that can respond well to emergencies? Drop down
- An efficient (and cost effective) process? Drop down
- Coherent with interagency preparedness planning and analysis? Drop down

Comments:

9. What are the advantages and disadvantages of “mainstreaming” (i.e. ensuring UNICEF’s emergency response through increasing the preparedness and response capacity of the country team) as opposed to relying principally on specialist emergency staff to provide emergency response?

Advantages 1) 2) 3)  
Disadvantages 1) 2) 3)

10. Please give concrete examples of the application of preparedness planning and early warning in the event of an emergency?

11. Is there any difference in the effectiveness of UNICEF’s response capacity in the above categories of slow onset (natural), slow onset (complex) and fast onset? Drop down

If ‘yes’, why is there a difference?

12. Is there any difference in UNICEF’s effectiveness in different phases of an emergency? Please rank the following four phases (1 = least effective, 4 = most effective)<sup>54</sup>.

- First 6-8 weeks Drop down
- Beyond initial response Drop down
- Transition phase to Rehabilitation Drop down
- Rehabilitation phase and transition to development Drop down

13. How important are each of the following factors to the speed and effectiveness of UNICEF’s emergency response?

Please rank the 12 factors below in order of importance, 1 being the most important and 12 being less important. PLEASE USE EACH NUMBER ONLY ONCE.

- |   |           |
|---|-----------|
| Most of the office team has participated in an emergency preparedness and response planning process | Drop down |
| Effective Early Warning Mechanisms and Vulnerability Capacity Assessment                            | Drop down |
| In-country UNICEF Rapid Assessment capacity   | Drop down |
| Country level senior management leadership on the response  | Drop down |
| Regional Office leadership on the response  | Drop down |
| Headquarters leadership to the response   | Drop down |
| Emergency capacity in programme sectors is already available in the office                          | Drop down |
| Bringing in additional emergency capacity in programme sectors quickly                              | Drop down |
| Operations (supplies, logistics, IT, communications) works quickly & effectively                    | Drop down |
| Effective Partners available to work closely with UNICEF  | Drop down |
| Speedy availability of adequate funding   | Drop down |
| Inter-agency emergency preparedness or Contingency planning process                                 | Drop down |

<sup>54</sup> It is recognised that these categories are simplistic and do not represent the non-linear reality of relief, rehabilitation and development. They are intended as a rough assessment of key phases only

**Other factors (please also state the importance)**

**14. The Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) outline the nature of UNICEF’s emergency response.**

- **Are all CO staff fully conversant with the CCCs?** Drop down
- **How useful are they to staff to help design UNICEF’s response?** Drop down

**Please list a maximum of three strengths and three weaknesses of the CCCs below:**

*Strengths:*

*Weaknesses:*

**15. Overall, how effective is UNICEF in the following programme sectors and operational areas in relation to the CCCs – please mark if it is effective, not effective or adequate. Please also mark the Improved box if you think there has been any improvement over the last 5 years.**

<b>WES</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Child Protection</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Education</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Health &amp; nutr</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Security (staff and assets)</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Fundraising &amp; Comms.</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Human Resources</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>IT/Telecoms</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Supplies/ Logs</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Finance &amp; Admin</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Overall Coordination InterAgency</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Not effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved? <input type="checkbox"/>

**16. How much consideration should be given to the following factors when deciding if and how to launch a UNICEF emergency response?**

- |   |       |                          |      |                          |      |                          |
|---|-------|--------------------------|------|--------------------------|------|--------------------------|
| Risk of jeopardising relations with Government: | A lot | <input type="checkbox"/> | Some | <input type="checkbox"/> | None | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Risk of damage to development programmes:       | A lot | <input type="checkbox"/> | Some | <input type="checkbox"/> | None | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Insecurity placing staff at risk                | A lot | <input type="checkbox"/> | Some | <input type="checkbox"/> | None | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Existing workload and team capacity             | A lot | <input type="checkbox"/> | Some | <input type="checkbox"/> | None | <input type="checkbox"/> |

**17. In your view, the final decision to carry out a rapid assessment (and an emergency response if necessary) should be made by:**

- |   |       |                          |          |                          |
|---|-------|--------------------------|----------|--------------------------|
| The Country Representative:                     | Agree | <input type="checkbox"/> | Disagree | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| The Regional Office (Regional Director or REA): | Agree | <input type="checkbox"/> | Disagree | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| EMOPS at HQ:                                    | Agree | <input type="checkbox"/> | Disagree | <input type="checkbox"/> |

**Other ideas:**

**18. Do the UNCT/Department of Safety and Security (DSS) security guidelines and procedures (including MOSS) enable UNICEF to manage the security of its staff?  
Drop down**

**If no, please say why and what could be done to improve UNICEF's security management:**

**19. Finally, what are the three most important factors that could help UNICEF to improve its emergency preparedness and response capacity?**

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

**Thanks again for your time**



## Annex 5. Questionnaire for Staff on DFID-UNICEF Capacity Building Programme in Humanitarian Response

The purpose of this brief questionnaire is to analyse individual perceptions of UNICEF’s preparedness and response capacity. It is intended for all staff, regardless of whether you have direct emergency experience or not. It should take no more than 15 minutes to complete. We are grateful for your valuable time.

<b>Region</b>	<b>Country</b>		
National staff member <input type="checkbox"/>	International staff member <input type="checkbox"/>		
Male <input type="checkbox"/>	Female <input type="checkbox"/>		
<b>Number of Years Working for UNICEF</b>	<b>Drop down menu</b>		

---

1. Have you been involved in a UNICEF emergency response in the last 5 years (in either your current or previous location)?

Yes  No

2. Have you received any form of emergencies training (e.g. EPRP, PATH, M&E in emergencies, Rapid Assessments, Programme/Sector training for emergencies etc)?  
Drop down

3. If your answer to question 2 was Yes, please rank the effectiveness of the following as a means to increase your skills and knowledge of emergency response:

- Formal training (e.g. workshops, courses) Drop down
- Learning by doing on-the-job (self-directed) Drop down
- Learning by doing on-the-job through support and advice from colleagues Drop down

4. If you are responsible or involved in early warning for emergencies, what tools or indicators do you use to assess whether an emergency is building and to help you decide whether a response will be necessary? Please list (state none if none used):

5. Are any of the early warning tools you mentioned in question 5 (or others you are aware of) useful to predict or monitor the onset of each of the following types of emergency (i.e. such tools may be more useful in some contexts than others)?

A slow onset natural disaster (e.g. drought):	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>
A slow onset complex emergency (e.g. armed conflict):	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>
A fast onset emergency (e.g. floods, earthquake):	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>

Comments:

6. Drawing on your experience of UNICEF overall, is there any difference in the effectiveness of UNICEF’s response capacity in the above categories of slow onset (natural), slow onset (complex) and fast onset?

Yes  No  If ‘yes’, why is there a difference?

7. Is there any difference in UNICEF’s effectiveness in different phases of an emergency in your country office? Please rank the following four phases (1 = most effective, 4 = least effective)<sup>55</sup>

- First 6-8 weeks Drop down options
- Beyond initial response Drop down options
- Transition phase to Rehabilitation Drop down options
- Rehabilitation phase and transition to development Drop down options

Comments on UNICEF’s effectiveness in different phases:

8. The Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) outline the nature of UNICEF’s emergency response. How useful are they in helping to fine design UNICEF’s response? Please list a maximum of three strengths and three weaknesses below:

*Strengths:*

*Weaknesses:*

9. Overall, how effective is UNICEF is your country programme in the following programme sectors and operational areas in relation to the CCCs – please mark if it is effective, not effective or adequate. Please also mark the Improved box if you think there has been any improvement over the last 5 years.

<b>WES</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>Child Protection</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>Education</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>Health &amp; Nutrition</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>Security (staff/assets)</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>Fundraising &amp; Comms.</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>Human Resources</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>IT/Telecoms</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down
<b>Supplies/ Logs</b>	Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Not Effective <input type="checkbox"/>	Adequate <input type="checkbox"/>	Improved?	Drop down

<sup>55</sup> It is recognised that these categories are simplistic and do not represent the non-linear reality of relief, rehabilitation and development. They are intended as a rough assessment of key phases only

**Finance & Admin**      Effective     Not Effective  Adequate     Improved?    Drop down

**Sectoral Coordination**      Effective     Not Effective  Adequate     Improved?    Drop down

**Other comments on CCCs**

**10. UNICEF has increasingly prioritised emergency preparedness and response and has initiated a range of approaches to increasing its emergency capacity. Please agree or disagree with the following statements:**

*Providing emergency preparedness and response training to all Country staff (“mainstreaming”) is the most effective way to increase UNICEF’s emergency response capacity:*

**Agree**       **Disagree**

*Emergencies require specialist staff because training non-emergency staff is no substitute for specialist emergency experience*

**Agree**       **Disagree**

*Non-emergency personnel did not choose an emergency job; it is more appropriate that they protect their long term programmes and delegate emergency work to specialist staff*

**Agree**       **Disagree**

*Specialist (“surge”) staff are not effective as they do not understand the country/context*

**Agree**       **Disagree**

**11. Please agree or disagree with the following statements:**

***Gaining experience in emergency responses is valued within UNICEF and furthers your career prospect?***

Agree strongly       Agree       Disagree       Don't think it makes a difference

***The Country Office must be willing to delay the implementation of the Country Programme to respond in an emergency***

Agree strongly       Agree       Disagree       Strongly disagree

**12. Do you want to gain or increase your experience in emergency work with UNICEF?**

**Yes**       **No**       **Not sure**

**13. Do UNCT/Department of Safety and Security (DSS) guidelines and procedures (including MOSS) enable UNICEF to manage the security of its staff? If no, please say why and what UNICEF itself could do to improve its staff security management.**

**Yes**       **No**

**Comments:**

**14. What do you think UNICEF does best in its emergency preparedness and response work?**

1.

2.

3.

**15. Finally, what are the three most important factors that could help UNICEF to improve its emergency preparedness and response capacity?**

1.

2.

3.

**Thanks again for your time.**

## Annex 6. A geographic profile of the two most deadly natural disasters

**Summarized Table of Floods sorted by Continent from 1900 to 2005**

	# of Events	Killed	Injured	Homeless	Affected	Total Affected	Damage US (000's)
<b>Africa</b>	467	18,856	22,488	4,418,509	34,435,415	38,876,412	3,379,733
Ave. per event		40	48	9,462	73,738	83,247	7,237
<b>Americas</b>	699	100,089	41,360	3,351,699	48,599,962	51,993,021	54,580,454
Ave. per event		143	59	4,795	69,528	74,382	78,084
<b>Asia</b>	1,078	6,759,640	1,198,245	126,946,795	2,632,022,769	2,760,167,809	165,748,214
Ave. per event		6,271	1,112	117,761	2,441,580	2,560,453	153,755
<b>Europe</b>	361	9,572	21,871	475,931	12,507,456	13,005,258	86,711,344
Ave. per event		27	61	1,318	34,647	36,026	240,198
<b>Oceania</b>	89	360	91	95,000	457,068	552,159	2,151,611
Ave. per event		4	1	1,067	5,136	6,204	24,175

Created on: Jun-11-2005. Data version: v05.06  
 Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, Université catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium"

**Summarized Table of Droughts sorted by Continent from 1900 to 2005**

	# of Events	Killed	Injured	Homeless	Affected	Total Affected	Damage US (000's)
<b>Africa</b>	468	1,046,424	0	48,000	309,027,732	309,075,732	4,472,093
Ave. per event		2,236	0	103	660,316	660,418	9,556
<b>Americas</b>	129	74	0	0	61,964,030	61,964,030	13,727,539
Ave. per event		1	0	0	480,341	480,341	106,415
<b>Asia</b>	168	7,761,408	0	20,000	1,791,071,014	1,791,091,014	12,580,976
Ave. per event		46,199	0	119	10,661,137	10,661,256	74,887
<b>Europe</b>	31	1,200,000	0	0	15,262,575	15,262,575	15,649,736
Ave. per event		38,710	0	0	492,341	492,341	504,830
<b>Oceania</b>	22	688	0	0	8,233,635	8,233,635	11,006,000
Ave. per event		31	0	0	374,256	374,256	500,273

Created on: Jun-11-2005. Data version: v05.06  
 Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, Université catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium

---