

WORKING PAPER SERIES

**CAPACITY BUILDING FOR
UNICEF HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSE IN REVIEW**

**An internal review of the DfID-UNICEF programme
cooperation to strengthen UNICEF programming as it
applies to humanitarian assistance,
Phase I, 2000-April 2002**

**Evaluation Office, UNICEF
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Capacity Building for Humanitarian Response in Review

Desk Review

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Acronyms

AMP	Annual Management Plan
CAAC	Children Affected by Armed Conflict
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCCs	Core Corporate Commitments
CEE/CIS	Central and Eastern Europe/Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltics (Regional Office)
CO	Country Office
CPMP	Country Programme Management Plan
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DfID	Department for International Development
DHR	Division of Human Resources
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping
EAPRO	East Asia & Pacific Regional Office
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning
ESAR	Eastern and Southern Africa Region
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IT	Information Technology
ITD	Information Technology Division
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MENARO	Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
MISTS	Minimum Security Telecommunications Standards
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MTSP	Medium Term Strategic Plan
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OLDS/DHR	Organisational Learning and Development Section / Division of Human Resources
OPSCEN	Operation Centre
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSRSG/CAC	Office of the Special Representative for the Secretary General / Children and Armed Conflict
PROMS	Programme Management System
RO	Regional Office
ROSA	Regional Office for South Asia
SC	Security Council
SITA	Society of International Airline Telecommunications
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TACRO	the Americas and Caribbean Regional Office
ToT	Training of Trainers
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
VHF	Very High Frequency
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminals
WCARO	West and Central Africa Regional Office

Executive Summary

The purpose of this review is to assess the results and draw lessons from a UNICEF-DfID programme of cooperation to strengthen UNICEF humanitarian response, 2000 to March 2002, and to feed this analysis into the planning of a second phase for this capacity-building effort. The results and recommendations from this review have already fed into the 2002 planning and the overall development of the Phase II proposal, now accepted by DfID.

The review process was designed to address the three key evaluation questions: are we doing the right thing? are we doing it right? and what have been the actual results in terms of changes in UNICEF performance? The review was based on self-assessments carried out by regional offices (ROs) and headquarters divisions involved in Phase I, as well as follow-up interviews and discussions at a meeting of focal points involved in the capacity-building process in March 2002.

At just two years into implementation, it is early by all standards to measure change in organisational capacity at the level of the original project goals. Achievements to date correspond to initial stages in an expected sequence of results that will eventually lead to improved organisational performance in humanitarian action and response.

Thus far, a sense of the coming together of achievements across regions and headquarters is mixed and in some cases weak. This is partly due to the short duration and vast scope of the three projects under Phase I. It is also related to constraints identified, including lack of coherence around a common capacity-building strategy and some degree of disconnect between headquarters and regional activities. The review has highlighted a slow start in the first year, with notable improvements from the second year under all project areas.

Key achievements

Shift in organisational culture — There is a growing cadre of staff well-versed in and committed to our mandate vis-à-vis children affected by armed conflict (CAAC) and the Core Corporate Commitments (CCCs). There is also an increasing understanding by UNICEF headquarters and field staff of the ethical and legal standards that underpin the work of UNICEF in humanitarian action and response. This group extends well beyond those staff directly involved in the emergency capacity-building projects, including increasingly senior management and staff in headquarters and regions.

Systematic policy guidance — A body of case-specific interpretations of policy related to CAAC has been built up, feeding into an increasingly systematic advisory service from headquarters and ROs to Country Offices (COs) on options for advocacy and programme response to difficult issues. (A recent organisational restructuring has led to the further consolidation of this technical focal point function in the Humanitarian Policy Unit in EMOPS.)

Coherence and consistency in advocacy — There is an increasing connection between high-level political advocacy on CAAC, in the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies, and field office positioning and advocacy work with national partners. This has been observed in relation to country specific issues that have come before the Security Council as well as on implementation of SC Resolutions 1261 and 1314, on the humanitarian impact of small arms on children and landmines action, among others.

Preparedness planning process widely introduced — Over 60 country offices have undertaken an initial Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) exercises. "Mainstreaming" of the preparedness planning has been advanced both in the Programme Policy and Procedures Manual (PPPM) and in regional office practice.

Information and communications hub established — The Operations Centre (OPSCEN) services have significantly expanded and it is now established as a reliable 24-hour information and communications hub for the field, as well as a mechanism for monitoring security situations.

Organisation-wide core training — Training packages on humanitarian principles/human rights-based approach to programming, and on emergency preparedness and response (the latter being finalised) have been established as part of UNICEF's core learning strategy.

Physical installations upgraded — Sixty-five field sites are connected to the UNICEF Global Wide Area Network through SITA. Forty-five other country sites have ordered VSAT.

Issues for attention

Integration vs. parallel process — Phase I has to some extent created parallel planning and/or work processes, for example, around emergency telecommunications and CAAC policy development. Parallel approaches could be argued as necessary in the early stages of capacity-building but now have become a threat to sustainability. The focus for 2002 should be on integrating issues on CAAC and humanitarian response into the 'mainstream'. Entry points for integration include: the Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) operational guidelines; the Division of Human Resources visioning and strategy development process; RO/HQ technical networks (e.g. HR, IT, child protection, planning, M&E as well as sectoral networks such as education, health etc.); oversight mechanisms (including annual reports, CO audits, Regional Management Teams mechanisms).

Building RO support and oversight role — On all fronts — CAAC, preparedness planning, security, telecommunications, human resources — the pace and sustainability of strengthening country office capacity will be limited unless regional support and oversight is strengthened. Emphasis needs to be placed on clarifying accountabilities and translating advances in headquarters policy and broad programme guidance into practical tools for RO support to COs.

Consolidate Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning — Without clear definition of what is expected in emergency preparedness and response planning, CO accountabilities will be unclear and capacity-building support to COs will be dispersed. Key elements of a single common UNICEF approach need to be defined, and tools need to be refined and integrated into the PPPM 'tool-kit'. A finalised EPRP integrated into the programme process could be pivotal in focusing capacity building on advocacy, programme and operations facets of humanitarian response.

Coordination of data collection and lessons learned — Regional Offices have carried out data collection and studies on CAAC in a number of countries. UNICEF has also built up a body of programme experience on approaches to mitigate the effects of armed conflict on children. But these two lines of activities have not been consolidated either into guidance on information gaps/methodologies for data collection, or into concrete guidance on psychosocial programmes or programming vis-à-vis child soldiers. Work in both areas needs to be more tightly coordinated at least and accelerated if possible.

Strategies for transition from DfID-funded posts — Posts have been absorbed into support budgets in both headquarters and regions. However, many key posts remain unsupported by core funding. An analysis and strategy is urgently needed to address the future of the posts that are now supported by DfID – options include the integration of some posts into support budgets or setting horizons for winding up activities and absorbing ongoing responsibilities. This transition strategy will, to a large extent, determine the strategies for supporting and strengthening COs capacity in relation to each goal under Phase II.

Strengthening oversight — Global oversight of the capacity-building process has not succeeded in bringing attention to and resolving problem areas. Accountabilities of HQ divisions and ROs for outputs and process need to be clarified. Regional offices and divisions must of course continue to be responsible for activity-level monitoring as well as for sharing progress updates, either through the Crisis Preparedness Working Group and/or the global network of capacity-building focal points. However, monitoring of the overall project needs to be strengthened, focusing in on priority intermediate results and points where RO and division outputs converge, to trigger managers' attention to bottlenecks and problem areas. This points to the need for both a strong coordination/monitoring role and leadership from the Inter-Divisional Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations (IDSC) and Global Management Team (GMT) to periodically review progress and shortcomings and enforce HQ division/RO performance.

Key lessons

Defining scope of capacity-building — As capacity-building with partner organisations is such a core part of the UNICEF mandate, it can become unclear where the boundary lies between internal capacity-building and ongoing business. Defining the scope loosely seems to lead to dispersion of efforts and slower results in terms of organisational performance.

Attention to internal strategy development — The process of formulating an internal capacity-building strategy can be as critical to the results as the actual validity of the strategy itself. Time must be taken to bring key actors on board, building ownership, with careful attention to the different levels of the organisation.

Highlight definition of roles as part of process — In developing a large organisation-wide capacity-building process, it may be difficult to define roles and responsibilities at the outset. For example, until a concept on preparedness planning was clear, it was not possible to define the details on eventual headquarters and RO roles. However, the work of defining which actors are involved in which roles should be a clearly identified milestone early in the capacity-building process.

Résumé

L'objectif de cet examen est d'évaluer les résultats et de tirer les enseignements d'un programme de coopération UNICEF-DfID visant à renforcer l'action de l'UNICEF en matière d'aide humanitaire (2000 à mars 2002), et d'utiliser cette analyse pour planifier la seconde phase de cet effort de renforcement des capacités. Les résultats et les recommandations de cet examen ont déjà été intégrés à la planification pour 2002 et ont servi à formuler l'ensemble de la proposition de la Phase II, désormais acceptée par le DfID.

Le processus d'examen a été conçu pour répondre à trois questions essentielles en matière d'évaluation : notre action est-elle appropriée? est-elle menée de la meilleure façon possible? et quels ont été les résultats concrets observés dans la performance de l'UNICEF? L'examen s'est appuyé sur des auto-évaluations effectuées par les bureaux régionaux et les divisions du siège ayant participé à la Phase I, ainsi que sur des interviews de suivi et les conclusions d'une réunion des agents de coordination ayant pris part au processus de renforcement des capacités tenue en mars 2002.

Deux ans après le démarrage du projet, il est encore trop tôt pour mesurer l'évolution des capacités organisationnelles au niveau des objectifs fixés initialement. Les progrès enregistrés à ce jour correspondent aux premiers stades d'une séquence anticipée de résultats qui permettront à la longue d'améliorer les performances organisationnelles de l'action et des secours humanitaires.

Jusqu'ici, il semble que les résultats obtenus dans les régions et au siège ont été mitigés, et dans certains cas, médiocres. Cela est dû en partie à la courte durée et à la vaste portée des trois projets en Phase I. Il faut aussi mentionner certains obstacles identifiés, notamment le manque de cohérence dans la mise en oeuvre d'une stratégie commune de renforcement des capacités et un certain degré de déconnexion entre les activités du siège et des régions. L'examen a révélé que le projet avait pris un départ assez lent la première année, suivi d'améliorations notables à partir de la deuxième année dans tous les domaines.

Résultats clés

Évolution de la culture organisationnelle — Un nombre croissant de fonctionnaires de l'UNICEF connaissent bien le mandat confié à notre organisation pour aider les enfants touchés par des conflits armés et ses Engagements généraux de base, et se sont engagés à les respecter. Le personnel du siège et les agents de terrain sont aussi mieux informés des normes morales et juridiques qui régissent les activités de l'UNICEF en matière d'aide et de secours humanitaires. Ce groupe ne se limite pas aux personnels participant directement aux projets d'urgence de renforcement des capacités mais comprend notamment un nombre croissant de cadres et de fonctionnaires de haut niveau tant au siège que dans les régions.

Orientation systématique en matière de politiques — Des interprétations individuelles de politiques liées à la question des enfants touchés par des conflits armés ont été compilées pour que le siège et les bureaux régionaux puissent offrir plus systématiquement des services de consultation aux bureaux de pays en matière d'activités de plaidoyer et de programmes à mettre en oeuvre dans des cas difficiles. (Une restructuration organisationnelle récente a permis de regrouper cette fonction technique des agents de coordination au sein du Groupe de la politique humanitaire de l'EMOPS.)

Cohérence et consistance des activités de plaidoyer — Les activités de plaidoyer politique menés à haut niveau en faveur des enfants touchés par les conflits armés, au Conseil de sécurité et par d'autres organes intergouvernementaux, sont plus étroitement liées aux positions adoptées par les bureaux extérieurs et aux activités de plaidoyer entreprises avec des partenaires nationaux. Cela a été constaté dans le cas de problèmes spécifiques à certains pays soumis à l'attention du Conseil de sécurité et dans la mise en oeuvre des résolutions 1261 et 1314 du Conseil relatives à l'impact humanitaire des armes de petit calibre sur les enfants et au déminage, entre autres.

Planification à grande échelle de la capacité d'intervention en cas d'urgence — Plus de 60 bureaux de pays ont mis sur pied des exercices initiaux de Planification de la capacité d'intervention et des mesures à prendre en cas d'urgence (EPRP). L'« intégration » de ce processus a été recommandée à la fois dans le Manuel sur les politiques et les procédures en matière de programmes (PPPM) et par les bureaux régionaux.

Établissement d'un centre d'Informations et de communications — Les services du Centre d'opérations (OPSCEN) ont été notablement étendus. Le Centre offre maintenant une plate-forme centrale fiable d'informations et de communications 24h sur 24 à la disposition des agents de terrain et peut être utilisé comme mécanisme de surveillance de la sécurité.

Formation de base à l'échelle de l'organisation — Des trousseaux pédagogiques sur l'élaboration de programmes tenant compte des principes humanitaires et des droits de l'homme, et sur la capacité d'intervention et les mesures à prendre en cas d'urgence (cette dernière étant en train d'être achevée) ont été préparées dans le cadre de la stratégie de formation de base de l'UNICEF.

Mise à jour des installations matérielles — Soixante-cinq sites extérieurs sont reliés au Réseau mondial des zones de l'UNICEF à travers le SITA. Quarante-cinq autres sites extérieurs ont commandé le VSAT.

Problèmes à considérer

Intégration ou processus parallèles — Dans une certaine mesure, la Phase I a entraîné la création de processus parallèles de planification et/ou de travail, par exemple, dans le domaine des télécommunications d'urgence ou de l'élaboration de politiques en faveur des enfants touchés par des conflits armés. Si ces approches parallèles sont nécessaires aux stades initiaux du renforcement des capacités, elles mettent à présent en danger la

durabilité du projet. En 2002, il faudra s'efforcer d'intégrer les questions liées aux enfants touchés par les conflits armés et à l'aide humanitaire aux activités principales. Les points d'entrée permettant de réaliser cette intégration sont, entre autres : les directives opérationnelles du Plan stratégique à moyen terme (PSMT) ; le processus de visualisation et de développement de stratégies de la Division des ressources humaines ; les réseaux techniques des bureaux régionaux et du siège (par ex. : RH, TI, protection de l'enfant, planning, M&E ainsi que les réseaux de secteurs tels que l'éducation, la santé, etc.) ; les mécanismes de surveillance (y compris les rapports annuels, les audits des bureaux de pays, et les mécanismes des Équipes de direction régionales).

Renforcer le soutien et le rôle de surveillance des bureaux régionaux — Sur tous les fronts — enfants touchés par des conflits armés, planification de la capacité d'intervention en cas d'urgence, sécurité, télécommunications, ressources humaines — la cadence et la durabilité du renforcement des capacités des bureaux de pays seront limitées à moins de renforcer le soutien et la surveillance au niveau régional. Il faut tout particulièrement clarifier les responsabilités et traduire l'évolution des politiques du siège et les orientations générales en matière de programmes en outils pratiques qui permettront aux bureaux régionaux d'appuyer les bureaux de pays.

Consolider la planification de la capacité d'intervention et des mesures à prendre en cas d'urgence — Si l'on ne définit pas clairement ce qui est requis des bureaux de pays en matière de planification de leur capacité d'intervention et des mesures à prendre en cas d'urgence, leurs responsabilités resteront vagues et leurs capacités ne seront pas appuyées d'une manière unifiée. Il faut définir les éléments clés d'une stratégie unique commune de l'UNICEF et les outils nécessaires doivent être perfectionnés et intégrés à la « boîte à outils » du Manuel sur les politiques et les procédures en matière de programmes. Une planification de la capacité d'intervention et des mesures à prendre en cas d'urgence mise au point et intégrée aux processus des programmes pourrait être essentielle pour axer le renforcement des capacités sur les aspects de l'aide humanitaires tels que le plaidoyer, les programmes et les opérations.

Coordination de la collecte de données et des leçons apprises — Les bureaux régionaux ont effectué des collectes de données et des études sur les enfants touchés par des conflits armés dans plusieurs pays. L'UNICEF a aussi compilé une somme d'expériences issues de ses programmes sur les stratégies propres à mitiger les effets des conflits armés sur les jeunes. Mais ces deux séries d'activités n'ont pas été regroupées en directives visant à remédier aux lacunes ou à perfectionner les méthodes de la collecte de données, ou en directives concrètes visant l'élaboration de programmes psychosociaux ou d'initiatives en faveur des enfants soldats. Il faut à tout le moins coordonner plus étroitement les efforts déployés dans ces deux domaines et si possible, les accélérer.

Stratégies de transfert des postes financés par le DfID — Les budgets de soutien du siège et des régions ont servi à subventionner certains postes. Toutefois, un grand nombre de postes clés continuent de dépendre de sources autres que les financements de base. Il faut de toute urgence effectuer une analyse et élaborer une stratégie permettant d'assurer l'avenir des postes actuellement subventionnés par le DfID. On pourrait par exemple les

intégrer aux budgets de soutien ou prévoir la clôture des activités et la prise en charge des responsabilités existantes. Cette stratégie de transfert déterminera dans une large mesure les mesures à prendre pour soutenir et renforcer la capacité des bureaux de pays dans le cadre de chaque objectif prévu en Phase II.

Renforcer la surveillance — Dans l'ensemble, la surveillance du processus de renforcement des capacités n'est pas parvenu à mettre en lumière et à régler les questions qui posent problème. Les responsabilités des divisions du siège et des bureaux régionaux en matière de résultats et de processus doivent être clarifiées. De toute évidence, les bureaux régionaux et les divisions doivent continuer à assurer la surveillance au niveau des activités et de s'informer mutuellement des mises à jour réalisées, soit à travers le Groupe de travail sur les capacités d'intervention en cas de crise et/ou le réseau mondial des agents de coordination du renforcement des capacités. Toutefois, la surveillance du projet global doit être renforcée, en s'attachant notamment aux résultats prioritaires intermédiaires et aux points sur lesquels les résultats des bureaux régionaux et des divisions convergent, pour appeler l'attention des responsables sur les blocages et les questions qui présentent des problèmes. Il est donc impératif que le Comité permanent interdivisions sur les enfants dans des situations instables et l'Équipe d'administration mondiale jouent un rôle important, à la fois en matière de coordination et de surveillance et de leadership, pour évaluer régulièrement les progrès et les lacunes et améliorer la performance des divisions du siège et des bureaux régionaux.

Leçons clés

Définir la portée du renforcement des capacités — Comme le renforcement des capacités avec des organisations partenaires est l'un des volets essentiels du mandat de l'UNICEF, il peut arriver que la frontière soit floue entre les efforts de renforcement des capacités internes et les activités courantes. Le fait de définir de façon vague la portée des projets semble aboutir à la dispersion des efforts et à des résultats plus lents en matière de performance organisationnelle.

Appeler l'attention sur le développement de stratégies internes — Le processus utilisé pour formuler une stratégie de renforcement des capacités interne peut s'avérer aussi essentiel pour obtenir de bons résultats que la validité de la stratégie elle-même. Il faut prendre le temps de convaincre les acteurs clés et de faire participer toutes les parties intéressées, en examinant de près tous les niveaux de l'organisation.

Mettre en avant la définition des rôles dans le cadre du processus — Lorsqu'on élabore un vaste processus de renforcement des capacités à l'échelle de toute l'organisation, il est parfois difficile de définir les rôles et les responsabilités dès le départ. Par exemple, avant que la notion de planification des capacités d'intervention ait été clarifiée, il était impossible d'arrêter les détails des rôles potentiels du siège et des bureaux régionaux. Toutefois, le travail consistant à définir le rôle des différents acteurs devrait être une étape clairement identifiée au commencement du processus de renforcement des capacités.

Resumen ejecutivo

El presente examen tiene por objeto evaluar los resultados y extraer enseñanzas de un programa de cooperación, de 2000 a marzo de 2002, entre el UNICEF y el Departamento del Reino Unido para el Desarrollo Internacional (DDI) encaminado a fortalecer la respuesta humanitaria del UNICEF, e incorporar este análisis a la planificación de una segunda fase de esta actividad de creación de capacidad. Los resultados y recomendaciones de este examen ya forman parte de la planificación para 2002 y de la preparación general de la propuesta para la fase II, que el DDI ha aceptado.

El proceso de examen se concibió para abordar las tres cuestiones fundamentales relativas a la evaluación: ¿hacemos lo que debemos hacer?, ¿lo hacemos bien? y ¿qué resultados concretos se han obtenido por lo que se refiere a modificar el desempeño del UNICEF? El examen se basaba en un ejercicio de autoevaluación llevado a cabo por oficinas regionales y por divisiones de la sede que participaron en la fase I, así como en entrevistas y debates complementarios mantenidos en marzo de 2002 en una reunión de coordinadores que intervinieron en el proceso de creación de capacidad.

Al cabo de sólo dos años de ejecución, es, desde cualquier punto de vista, pronto para medir el grado de modificación de la capacidad de organización en relación con los objetivos originales de los proyectos. Lo alcanzado hasta la fecha constituye la fase inicial de una serie de resultados previstos que culminará con la mejora del desempeño en materia de medidas y respuesta humanitarias por lo que se refiere a la organización.

Hasta la fecha, la sensación de unificación de lo logrado en las distintas regiones y en la sede es desigual y, en algunos casos, escasa. El motivo es, en parte, la poca duración y la amplitud de alcance de los tres proyectos correspondientes a la fase I. También influyen limitaciones identificadas, como por ejemplo la falta de coherencia en relación con una estrategia común de creación de capacidad y cierto grado de discontinuidad entre las actividades de la sede y las actividades regionales. El examen ponía de manifiesto la lentitud con que arrancaron las actividades el primer año, tras lo cual, a partir del segundo año, se registraron mejoras notables en todas las esferas relacionadas con los proyectos.

Principales logros

Modificación de la cultura de organización — Se va ampliando el contingente de personal dotado de conocimientos y compromisos relativos a nuestro mandato centrado en los niños afectados por los conflictos armados y en los compromisos institucionales básicos. El personal de la sede del UNICEF y el personal sobre el terreno también entienden cada vez mejor las normas éticas y jurídicas en las que se asienta la labor del UNICEF en materia de medidas y respuesta humanitarias. Este grupo de personas no está en absoluto limitado al personal que participa directamente en los proyectos de emergencia de creación de capacidad; forma parte del mismo un segmento cada vez mayor del cuerpo directivo y el personal de rango superior de la sede y las oficinas regionales.

Orientación sistemática en materia de políticas — Se ha acumulado un conjunto de interpretaciones de política, inspiradas en casos concretos relacionados con los niños afectados por los conflictos armados, que se incorpora a un servicio cada vez más sistemático de asesoramiento facilitado por la sede y las oficinas regionales a las oficinas de los países con respecto a las opciones de acción en pro de la infancia y de respuesta programática ante cuestiones difíciles. (En virtud de una reciente reestructuración de carácter organizativo se ha consolidado en mayor grado esta función de coordinación técnica en la dependencia de políticas humanitarias de la Oficina de Operaciones de Emergencia.)

Coherencia y consistencia en la defensa de los intereses de la infancia — Cada vez es más estrecha la vinculación entre la defensa política de alto nivel de los intereses de los niños afectados por los conflictos armados, en el marco del Consejo de Seguridad y otros órganos intergubernamentales, y las labores de formulación de posturas y defensa de estos intereses llevadas a cabo por las oficinas sobre el terreno junto con asociados nacionales. Lo señalado se ha observado con respecto a cuestiones relativas a países concretos presentadas ante el Consejo de Seguridad, así como en relación con la aplicación de las resoluciones 1261 y 1314 del Consejo de Seguridad, relativas a las repercusiones humanitarias de las armas pequeñas en los niños y las actividades relacionadas con las minas terrestres, entre otras cuestiones.

Introducción generalizada del proceso de planificación de la preparación — En más de 60 oficinas de países se han llevado a cabo actividades iniciales de planificación de la preparación para casos de emergencia y la respuesta a los desastres. Se ha avanzado en la incorporación normalizada de la planificación de la preparación tanto al Manual de Políticas y Procedimientos de Programas como a la práctica de las oficinas regionales.

Establecimiento de un foco de información y comunicaciones — Se han ampliado notablemente los servicios del Centro de Operaciones, que ahora está en funcionamiento 24 horas al día en calidad de foco de información y comunicaciones en esta esfera digno de confianza y de mecanismo para vigilar las situaciones en lo que respecta a la seguridad.

Capacitación básica en el conjunto de la organización — En el marco de la estrategia básica de aprendizaje del UNICEF se han preparado módulos de capacitación sobre principios humanitarios y sobre mecanismos de programación basados en los derechos humanos, así como en relación con la preparación para casos de emergencia y respuesta a los desastres (este último ya está terminado).

Mejoramiento de las instalaciones físicas — Sesenta y cinco ubicaciones sobre el terreno están conectadas con la red extensa mundial del UNICEF mediante SITA. Otras cuarenta y cinco ubicaciones en países han solicitado VSAT.

Cuestiones a las que se debe prestar atención

Integración frente a proceso paralelo — En cierta medida, la fase I ha generado planificación o procesos de trabajo paralelos, en relación, por ejemplo, con las telecomunicaciones de emergencia y la elaboración de políticas relativas a los niños afectados por los conflictos armados. Cabe sostener que los enfoques paralelos son necesarios en las etapas iniciales de la creación de capacidad, pero actualmente ponen en peligro la sostenibilidad. Las labores de 2002 han de centrarse en la integración normalizada de las cuestiones relativas a los niños afectados por los conflictos armados y la respuesta humanitaria. La integración puede partir de elementos como las directrices operacionales del plan estratégico de mediano plazo, el proceso de concepción de orientaciones futuras y la elaboración de estrategias de la División de Recursos Humanos, las redes técnicas de las oficinas regionales y la sede (como, por ejemplo, las relacionadas con derechos humanos, tecnología de la información, protección del niño, planificación y seguimiento y evaluación, al igual que redes sectoriales como las centradas en la educación, la salud, etc.) y los mecanismos de supervisión (con inclusión de los informes anuales, las comprobaciones de cuentas de las oficinas de los países y los mecanismos de los grupos regionales de gestión).

Fomento de la función de apoyo y supervisión en las oficinas regionales — En todas las esferas (los niños afectados por los conflictos armados, la planificación de la preparación, la seguridad, las telecomunicaciones, los recursos humanos) el ritmo y la sostenibilidad del fortalecimiento de la capacidad de las oficinas de los países se verán limitados si no se fortalece el apoyo y la supervisión de ámbito regional. Hay que hacer hincapié en la delimitación de responsabilidades y en la transformación de los adelantos de política de la sede y la orientación general de los programas en instrumentos prácticos que sirvan a las oficinas regionales para prestar apoyo a las oficinas de los países.

Consolidación de la planificación de la preparación para casos de emergencia y la respuesta a los desastres — A falta de una definición precisa de lo que cabe esperar de la preparación para casos de emergencia y la respuesta a los desastres, la responsabilidad correspondiente a las oficinas del país no estará clara y el apoyo a la creación de capacidad en estas oficinas se diluirá. Deben definirse los elementos fundamentales de un único enfoque común del UNICEF y deben perfeccionarse instrumentos que se incorporarán al “lote de instrumentos” del Manual de Políticas y Procedimientos de Programas. La integración al proceso programático de una planificación ultimada de la preparación para casos de emergencia y la respuesta a los desastres podría ser decisiva para centrar la creación de capacidad en los aspectos de la respuesta humanitaria referentes a la defensa de los intereses de la infancia, los programas y las operaciones.

Coordinación del acopio de datos y de las enseñanzas extraídas — Las oficinas regionales se han ocupado en varios países de acopiar datos y llevar a cabo estudios sobre los niños afectados por los conflictos armados. El UNICEF también ha acumulado abundante experiencia programática en relación con los enfoques orientados a paliar los efectos del conflicto armado en los niños. Sin embargo, no se han unificado estas dos vertientes de actividad, ni en forma de orientación relativa a la falta de información y a la

metodología de acopio de datos, ni en forma de orientación concreta centrada en programas psicosociales o en la programación dirigida a los niños soldados. Como mínimo, hay que coordinar con mayor rigor (y, si es posible, acelerar) la labor en las dos esferas.

Estrategias relativas a la transición de los puestos hasta ahora financiados por el DDI — En la sede y en las regiones varios puestos han quedado absorbidos en los presupuestos de apoyo, pero muchos puestos de importancia siguen sin contar con financiación básica. Hacen falta con carácter urgente un análisis y una estrategia orientados a resolver el futuro de los puestos que actualmente financia el DDI; las opciones consisten en integrar algunos puestos en los presupuestos de apoyo o en fijar plazos para poner fin a actividades y absorber las responsabilidades actuales. En gran medida, esta estrategia de transición determinará las estrategias de apoyo y fortalecimiento de la capacidad de las oficinas de los países en relación con cada objetivo de la fase II.

Fortalecimiento de la supervisión — La supervisión mundial del proceso de creación de capacidad no ha logrado poner de manifiesto o resolver las esferas problemáticas. Ha de aclararse la responsabilidad que corresponde a las divisiones de la sede y a las oficinas regionales en materia de resultados y procesos. Está claro que las oficinas regionales y las divisiones deben seguir encargándose de vigilar las actividades, así como de comunicar información actualizada sobre la marcha de los trabajos, por medio del Grupo de trabajo sobre preparación para casos de crisis o de la red mundial de coordinadores en la esfera de la creación de capacidad. No obstante, debe fortalecerse la vigilancia de los proyectos generales centrándose en los resultados y cuestiones prioritarios intermedios en los que coinciden las conclusiones de las oficinas regionales y las divisiones con vistas a llamar a la atención del personal directivo los estancamientos y las esferas problemáticas. Lo señalado indica la necesidad de que el Comité permanente multidivisional sobre los niños en situaciones inestables y el grupo mundial de gestión examinen periódicamente los avances y las deficiencias y garanticen que las divisiones de la sede y las oficinas regionales cumplen sus funciones.

Enseñanzas más destacadas

Definición del alcance de la creación de capacidad — En vista de la enorme importancia que encierra la creación de capacidad en colaboración con las organizaciones asociadas en el marco del mandato del UNICEF, puede que no quede claro la separación entre creación de capacidad interna y las actividades en curso. Parece que definiendo sin precisión el alcance se diluyen los esfuerzos y los resultados tardan en materializarse por lo que se refiere al desempeño en materia de organización.

Importancia de la preparación de estrategias internas — El proceso de formulación de una estrategia interna de creación de capacidad puede influir en los resultados tanto como la validez en sí de la propia estrategia. Hay que dedicar tiempo a garantizar la participación de los principales agentes y a generar la sensación de pertenencia, prestando especial atención a los distintos niveles de la organización.

Recalcar que la definición de las funciones forma parte del proceso — Al preparar un amplio proceso de creación de capacidad en el ámbito de toda la organización puede que resulte difícil definir al principio las funciones y responsabilidades. Así, por ejemplo, hasta que no estuvo claro el concepto de planificación de la preparación no fue posible definir pormenorizadamente las funciones definitivas de la sede y las oficinas regionales. No obstante, la labor de definición de los agentes a los que corresponde cada función debe ser una importante tarea claramente identificada en las fases iniciales del proceso de creación de capacidad.

Introduction

Purpose of the review

The purpose of this review is to assess the results and draw lessons from two years of a UNICEF-DfID programme of cooperation to strengthen UNICEF humanitarian response and to feed this analysis into the planning of further UNICEF capacity-building efforts. The review process was intended to feed into the planning of the final year of a three-year programme of cooperation, now referred to as Phase I, as well as the development of a proposal for the extension of that programme of cooperation. In the course of finalising this report, a “Global Proposal to Strengthen UNICEF Programming as it applies to Humanitarian Response, Phase II” was approved extending the UNICEF-DfID programme of cooperation for three additional years, beginning 1 May 2002¹. The earlier drafts of sections of this report have already fed into the planning process for both 2002 and the overall Phase II project.

The lessons from the review of the UNICEF-DfID Phase I projects should also feed into the wider process of strengthening UNICEF humanitarian response, referred to as the Martigny Process (see Background below), as well as broader efforts to strengthen UNICEF performance in general.

The review process was designed to address the three key evaluation questions:

- Are we doing the right thing,
- Are we doing it right, and
- What have been the actual results in terms of changes in UNICEF performance?

Methodology

For the purposes of the review as well as the planning of Phase II, the concepts of capacity and capacity-building were defined with reference to increasing convergence in development literature including exchanges between UNICEF and other UN agencies. (See the Box 1 below.) It is important to note that such a definition was not clearly established in the development of Phase I proposals.

With reference to this framework for understanding capacity and capacity building, the three broad evaluation questions mentioned above are translated as follows:

- Did we focus in on building the right capacities and addressing the right capacity constraints?
- Are we managing the process well — prioritising, planning, monitoring and evaluating, managing resources?
- At this early stage in the capacity-building process, what initial signs of increased capacity are there? Is there any evidence of new or stronger functions? Can these be

¹ The proposal originally submitted covered four years. DFID agreed to a three-year extension.

plausibly traced to outputs such as changes in policy, structure and roles, processes, material resources, knowledge and skills, and/or attitudes?

The review is based on a number of inputs:

- A desk review of the progress reports and review meetings in 2000 and 2001;
- A self-assessment process undertaken by the regional offices and headquarters divisions involved in the Phase I projects² (self-assessment guide included in Appendix A);
- Follow-up e-mail queries with ROs and divisions;
- Follow-up interviews with a number of key staff members involved in the capacity-building process at different levels (list of interviewees included in Appendix B);
- Comment on intermediate drafts circulated among emergency capacity-building focal points in ROs and divisions;
- Discussions at the March 2002 Capacity Building "Shura" (list of participants included in Appendix B).

² Headquarters divisions involved in Phase I were Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS), Programme Division (PD), Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning (EPP), Supply Division (SD), Information Technology Division (ITD), Division of Human Resources (DHR), Division of Communications (DOC), and the Innocenti Research Centre in Florence. All seven regional offices were also involved: The Americas and Caribbean Regional Office, TACRO; the Western and Central Africa Regional Office, WCARO; the East and Southern Africa Regional Office, ESARO; the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, MENA; the Regional Office for South Asia, ROSA; the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, EAPRO; and the Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States, CEE/CIS.

Box 1: What is Capacity Building?

(text extracted from Phase II Proposal submitted to DfID)

UNICEF's organisational capacity in the area of humanitarian action is influenced by a number of inter-related elements, including the degree of consistency between stated goals and the organisation's mandate and vision. Capacity to deliver on a specific set of goals also requires that the appropriate actors are involved within the organisation in appropriate, complementary roles to achieve these goals; that a relevant network or organisational structure supports them in this, and that they have access to the necessary resources. It also requires that these actors are motivated in their roles by common supporting values and guided by commonly accepted norms, rules and procedures. Capacity of the organisation will also depend on links to an external network of actors – international and national level allies, donors, sister UN agencies – who share the goals and visions of UNICEF.

A good capacity-building strategy should have a clear analysis of:

- the link between the desired performance goal and the organisation's own mandate and mission;
- the functions or capacities that need to be strengthened to achieve the desired goal;
- the levels of the organisation at which action is needed and involving which actors;
- identification of the specific factors that are constraining or could liberate and strengthen the desired capacities;
- determining how the various capacities are linked at different levels of the organisation and to its broader network of allies; and
- rationales as to the choice of where and with whom to first intervene.

Above all, a capacity-building strategy must have a clear focus on what change it is attempting to bring about in terms of organisational performance and who should ultimately benefit from the changed capacities.

All ROs and divisions involved in the DfID-UNICEF programme of cooperation carried out a self-assessment exercise in August-September 2001 and many emergency focal points contributed actively to the analysis process in interviews, e-mail and meetings. UNICEF Evaluation Office provided guidance for the self-assessment process as well as carried out further data collection and drafted this overview analysis.

This review process is limited in that conclusions on progress and actual changes in capacities are largely based on workplan monitoring documents and self-assessment with internal validation.

Background – UNICEF-DfID Programme of Cooperation

In September 1998, UNICEF held an internal meeting with field, regional and headquarters staff to examine how to strengthen the organisation's analysis of and response to the needs and rights of children and women caught in situations of political instability. This consultation held in Martigny, Switzerland initiated a follow-up process internally referred to as the Martigny Process, which has already led to significant change in UNICEF.

As part of this process, two new bodies were established to assume responsibility for monitoring and implementing the programmatic and operational recommendations as they were proposed. These were: the Inter-Divisional Standing Committee on Children in

Unstable Situations (IDSC), which brings together the heads of all New York divisions and the Deputy Executive Directors for Programme and Strategy and for Operations, and the Crisis Preparedness Working Group, bringing together focal point staff for each division.

To bolster the Martigny Process, UNICEF submitted a proposal for additional funding to DfID in May 1999 to pursue specific capacity-building strategies and activities that could not initially be covered in current budgets. The funds received for enhancing UNICEF capacity – £9 million – covered three projects: (1) to put in practice a strategy for reducing the impact of armed conflict on children; (2) to strengthen UNICEF’s humanitarian response in crisis situations within an inter-agency framework; and (3) to put in practice a strategy for diminishing the impact of landmines on children and women. UNICEF recognised that strengthening of humanitarian response also required changes in operations systems, including innovative inputs from information technology and telecommunications. In March 2000, an additional proposal for US\$ 4 million (known as DfID II) was submitted covering a range of improvements to operations support. (See Appendix C: Project Budgets). The first three projects and DfID II have been managed together under the coordination of EMOPS, with the IDSC providing an oversight role, and three fora serving to coordinate implementation across divisions and ROs: the above-mentioned Crisis Preparedness Working Group, a Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC) Working Group and a global network of emergency focal points with one in each RO.

In practice, the capacity-building focus within the various projects can be characterised roughly as shown in Box 2 below.

<i>Box 2: Characterisation of capacity-building focus</i>	
<u><i>Project</i></u>	<u><i>Broad functions to be strengthened</i></u>
Project 1. CAAC	Generating a knowledge base Policy development Advocacy
Project 2. Humanitarian Response	Programme development — child soldiers, psychosocial Preparedness planning process (integrating programme and operational readiness) Security planning and readiness Telecomm assessment, upgrading and readiness Supply/Logistics planning and readiness Human resources recruitment and deployment
Project 3. Landmines	Advocacy for ratification of Ottawa Treaty Mine awareness programming Victim assistance programming

Findings and Conclusions

The following three parts of this section trace the finding and conclusions with respect to each of the broad evaluations questions posed. The first part examines the results of Phase I projects – how has capacity changed, what achievements appear to have contributed to this and how can other outputs be assessed? The next part examines the relevance of the project objectives – are we doing the right thing and in what direction should we head now? The third part addresses the management of the process – are we doing what we are doing well? Each question points to future directions for strengthening UNICEF humanitarian response, be it further pursuit of the original objectives and/or a new focus in terms of which capacities we try to strengthen or issues for attention in the management of the process. These considerations for the future direction of capacity-building efforts are highlighted in the subsequent sections, "Recommendations" and "Lessons".

Results – How has capacity changed?

At just two years into implementation, it is early by all standards to measure change in organisational capacity at the level of the original project goals. Achievements to date correspond to the beginnings of the expected sequence of results that will eventually lead to changes in the organisation's performance in humanitarian action and response.

Thus far, a sense of the coming together of achievements across regions and headquarters is mixed, and in some cases, weak. This is partly due to the short duration (two years into a project originally designed over three years) but also the vast scope of the three projects under Phase I. It is also related to constraints detailed further below, including lack of coherence around a common capacity-building strategy and some degree of disconnect between headquarters and RO activities. Again, reviews and assessment exercises have highlighted a slow start in the first year, with notable improvements in the second year under all project areas.

More positively, review and assessment exercises consistently highlight a beginning shift in organisational culture. There is a growing cadre of staff both well-versed in and committed to UNICEF's mandate vis-à-vis children affected by armed conflict and the Core Corporate Commitments. This group extends well beyond those staff directly involved in the emergency capacity-building projects. The Phase I projects have helped to strengthen the policy references, guidance and knowledge base reinforcing this expanding group. There is also an increasing understanding by UNICEF headquarters and field staff of the ethical and legal standards that underpin the work of UNICEF in humanitarian action and response. Again, a range of project activities is seen to have contributed to this shift.

Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC)

Under the CAAC Project, progress has been more significant in building policy development and advocacy functions. Efforts to strengthen research and situation monitoring on CAAC (knowledge base) and programme development have been weak.

Data collection and analysis on CAAC

Both advocacy and programme response capacities of UNICEF rely on the organisation having solid information on the situation of children affected by armed conflict. Work in this area requires an initial assessment of what data exists globally on CAAC, both to map out gaps and to assess coverage and quality of data, methods and practical issues. This should then lead to progressive stages of developing methodologies and guidance tools, and to a more systematic effort to direct data collection to fill gaps. Data collection feeds into the development of guidance and tools to strengthen UNICEF CO Situation Analysis.

Progress against the above plan is at its initial stages. UNICEF has a significant experience to contribute in this process and has collaborated at the interagency level with the Office of the Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) for Children and Armed Conflict on the Florence Workshop, “Filling Knowledge Gaps: A Research Agenda on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”, providing inputs on the proposal presented as well as background papers, and continues to support in workshop follow-up. Work has been completed on cataloguing documentation amassed for the Graça Machel Study "The Impact of War on Children" in electronic searchable format, now posted on the UNICEF Intranet. This documentation includes, of course, studies providing data on the situation of children affected by armed conflict. Until recently, headquarters units have been pulled away from further work in this area in favour of other activities, among them the End-Decade monitoring process. Though not funded by the DfID projects, headquarters units have just begun carrying out field visits to three pilot countries -- Angola, Sri Lanka, and Colombia — to begin scoping data available.

In two regions, various country studies and/or synthesis reports have been carried out on CAAC: in MENA, covering Algeria, West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq; and in ROSA covering Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In EAPRO, a regional study on the situation of child soldiers in six countries (Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines) is being finalised. In both South and East Asia regions, the process of carrying out studies was reported by ROs as constructive in terms of building awareness and dialogue within the organisation as well as with counterparts in government and civil society. In South Asia, links have been established with the Oxford University Refugee Studies Centre. Studies on programme experience (see below) have also contributed to some degree on data on CAAC. Launching and bringing country level studies to completion has been slowed by weak understanding of issues related to CAAC at the country office level as well as by the very sensitive nature of data collection in this area. Perversely, some progress on the data collection itself is needed to break these barriers. The progress on building a regional analysis of CAAC, however, has still not come together in a broader global

perspective and research agenda. The lack of headquarters coordination and development of guidance on methodology is pivotal in moving this forward.

Policy development

For both UNICEF and its wider network of partner organisations, many issues related to CAAC represent complex and challenging ground. UNICEF has sought to strengthen policy development in this area.

While not 'measured', there is a sense among relevant headquarters focal points that field offices are beginning to seek help more systematically in the analysis of specific situations and in the formulation of consistent positions and response. At the same time, headquarters has begun to build a bank of case experiences as a reference for each policy area, though work remains to make this available to staff electronically. Recent organisational restructuring has led to the further consolidation of this technical focal point function in the Humanitarian Policy Unit in EMOPS.

Underlying this beginning change is a range of work on specific policies and practical guidance, much of which builds from development of positions in response to concrete country cases.

Headquarters provided technical support to selected Country Offices on issues such as sanctions, IDPs, relations with Non-State Entities (NSEs) and negotiating conditions of humanitarian assistance through various consent frameworks, ground rules, modalities of conditionality and formulas for compliance.

Similarly, operating at an interagency level, UNICEF has provided a lead role in developing guidelines for involving children in a post-conflict truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). UNICEF's Country Office in Sierra Leone, with the support of headquarters, and in collaboration with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and the National Forum of Human Rights, organised a technical meeting in Freetown, at which participants drafted policies, guiding principles and special procedures for children's involvement in truth and justice-seeking mechanisms. This work establishes an historic, international benchmark for practices that promote children's participation and protect children's rights in the truth-seeking and reconciliation process. This expertise is being used to address similar challenges of UNICEF Country Offices in East Timor, Burundi, DRC and Cambodia. Guidelines for COs are also under preparation on Children and the International Criminal Court.

Headquarters units are also pursuing a more systematic integration of gender policy across CAAC issues, targeting both internal guidance, such as the UNICEF guidelines to the field on the Consolidated Appeal Process, as well as in external advocacy positions, for example, on the peace and security agenda with the Security Council and DPKO.

Other issues have been advanced in interagency fora. As follow-up to the recommendations of the Graça Machel study and the Winnipeg declaration, UNICEF is coordinating the development of an interagency strategy in response to HIV/AIDS and its

impact on children in situation of armed conflict under the aegis of the Co-Sponsoring Organisations of UNAIDS. Work is ongoing on the development of a corresponding internal strategy setting out how UNICEF will fulfil its role in this.

Significant work remains in the development of CAAC policy. There are number of underlying constraints. The range of thematic issues under the broad heading of Children Affected by Armed Conflict is diverse. Regional and country offices are calling for specific policy and technical guidance in each of these areas. Such demands are a positive sign but are perhaps more than what small headquarters technical sections can meet in the short term. In addition, ad hoc response to sensitive issues consumes staff time. Continued emphasis on the more systematic building up of a bank of country experiences is critical.

Advocacy

In the area of advocacy, UNICEF has worked to mobilise intergovernmental fora and mechanisms to bring greater awareness and action in support of protecting children's rights even in conflict situations. This requires building up a consistent and coherent advocacy response, with headquarters and regional offices identifying advocacy opportunities in high-level political fora, working with relevant country offices on shaping advocacy messages, and supporting COs to pursue corresponding advocacy and programme options in-country.

Headquarters staff have observed that there is thus far an increasing connection between systematic high-level political advocacy and field office positioning and advocacy work with national partners. This has been observed in relation to country specific issues that have come before the Security Council as well as on implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1261, 1314, and 1379, on the humanitarian impact of small arms on children and landmines action, among others.

A number of activities are seen as contributing to this change, building up field staff awareness and commitment and creating the kind of culture shift mentioned above.

Headquarters has launched a training programme on human rights and humanitarian principles designed to increase staff understanding of and ability to apply humanitarian principles and a human rights-based approach to programming in emergencies. Working from a training package developed prior to Phase I, a training of trainers (ToT) was developed and tested in New York and MENA with 30 trainers now trained. A number of those trained have already begun conducting their own workshops for other UNICEF staff and partners (figures have not yet been tracked). Plans are underway to conduct additional ToT workshops in other regions. Between the 6 workshops conducted previously (prior to Phase I), including one in each of WCAR and ESAR for country office representatives, and the ToTs, this has begun to build a corps of staff able to understand the standards and legal underpinnings of our humanitarian action, including responsibilities for both advocacy and programme response.

At least the one regional office, in South Asia, has taken an active role in compiling and making available to country offices a resource library on CAAC issues. (The soon-to-be-launched Intranet Emergency Learning Web will provide similar resources more systematically to all field staff in the future.)

Headquarters and regional offices are building a wide and increasingly systematic outreach to UNICEF field offices to strengthen advocacy on specific issues. Notably on promoting ratification of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, this has entailed both providing clear policy directives to COs underlining their role and advocacy materials for use with national actors. It is reasonable to expect that this has contributed to progress in this area. To date 18 countries have ratified the Optional Protocol and 100 are signatories.

EMOPS and the Programme Guidance and Quality Assurance unit (previously in Programme Division) have worked to revise guidance to country offices on the CAP process to better integrate attention to CAAC. This also provides a reference for RO support and oversight. Some improvement in the quality of attention to CAAC in the CAPs prepared has been noted, though further work to strengthen this, including a more established system of review by headquarters and RO focal points, is needed.

At the same time, a pivotal headquarters function has been established to identify and prioritise opportunities for advocacy and representation of UNICEF's positions and policies on CAAC in relevant reports to and discussions in the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and its mechanisms, and other relevant inter-governmental fora. Guided by this overview, UNICEF has been able to cover Security Council issues fully and has contributed to debates on thematic issues (protection of civilians, prevention of armed conflict, Brahimi report follow up, children and armed conflict, small arms, women and peace and security) as well as on country-specific issues. This headquarters function both builds on and strengthens Country and Regional Office capacity to engage in Security Council activities that involve UNICEF priorities, to provide input to the Security Council, as well as to enlist support for the practical implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1261, 1314 and 1379 at country level. UNICEF has also tried to influence and has provided input to various reports by the Secretary General, Special Rapporteurs and others. Similarly, UNICEF has provided input to fora such as the annual meeting between UN and regional organisations on collaboration in the area of children and peace building. UNICEF was also able to use its assigned lead role in the preparation for the UN Special Session on Children, to integrate content on CAAC including in the preparation of the End-Decade Review and the Outcome Document.

Both headquarters and ROs have also been active in strengthening networks of allies and experts at different levels. ROs have built up relations with and/or promoted various regional networks including those rallied more generally around CAAC (TACRO) as well as on more specific issues such as child soldiers and the Optional Protocol (MENA, ROSA, EAPRO, TACRO), psychosocial response (EAPRO), cross-border coordination (ESARO) and monitoring the violation of children's rights in conflict situations (through

the NGO Watchlist supported by all ROs and headquarters). ROs have also strengthened ties with regional organisations (Organisation of Africa Unity regarding small arms, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe regarding humanitarian dimensions). UNICEF work in relation to some networks has been focused on strengthening capacities outside of UNICEF, for example the formalisation of a network of psychosocial experts in EAPRO. However, even where external capacity-building has been a focus, these efforts have also been critical in extending UNICEF advocacy efforts, as well as in allowing the organisation to mobilise specialised human resources when and where needed. In the case of UNICEF support to the NGO Watchlist, this has at the same time contributed to strengthening the in-house network across headquarters, ROs and COs and fills a role on monitoring and in particular reporting on child rights violations that UNICEF is more limited in handling directly.

Through a combination of the above-mentioned network building and intergovernmental advocacy, UNICEF has developed a significant leadership capacity in a new area of work: reducing the impact of small arms on children. In the context of preparations for the UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all Its Aspects, UNICEF successfully mobilised a coalition of like-minded advocates, bringing CAAC and small arms NGOs together. Through this coalition and directly, UNICEF has advocated at the above-mentioned UN Conference, in preparations for the UN Special Session on Children and in other fora through input to PrepComs, reports and conference documents, organising side-events, and contributing to various studies. Following from this work, UNICEF has successfully raised funds to develop programmes in four countries. This builds on the organisation's work in peace education, advocacy for child protection and demobilisation of child soldiers, bringing a new targeted area for mitigating the affects of armed conflict on children.

UNICEF has also contributed to building a body of inter-agency training materials that should strengthen knowledge and understanding of humanitarian standards and humanitarian response options to protect children's rights. In collaboration with various other bodies including DPKO, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and Swedish Save the Children, UNICEF developed a training package for peacekeepers on child rights and associated issues, which is now ready for field testing. UNICEF developed jointly with the NRC an IDP training package under the aegis of the IASC intended for staff of all operational agencies. UNICEF also developed with OCHA a compendium of good practice in protection of civilians, "Under the Sheltering tree", developed under the aegis of the IASC Reference group on Human Rights and Humanitarian practice and targeting both UN and NGOs in an effort to reach closer to front-line workers.

Programme development

The effort to strengthen programme development to mitigate the impact of conflict on children was planned with a multi-pronged approach: support to CO programming through a mix of technical support and training, and documentation and analysis of these experiences feeding into the further development of programme guidance. Results are at initial stages. While a body of experience has been built up, development of programme guidance must be pushed further particularly in some areas.

Headquarters issued general guidance in 2000 in the form of the "Technical Notes: Special Considerations for Programming in Unstable Situations" intended to cover the programme areas of the Core Corporate Commitments, providing in each case the general rationale and principles, priorities and a range of more specific technical guidance according to subject.³

Both headquarters functions and ROs have provided support to the development of programmes in child soldier disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (ESARO, TACRO, EAPRO), community-based prevention of recruitment (in Angola, supported by headquarters) and psychosocial programmes (MENA, TACRO). Headquarters and regional offices have also analysed and documented programme experience for lessons learned – EAPRO on mine awareness, ESARO and headquarters on child soldiers.

In addition, in the context of preparing for the 2002 UN Special Session on Children and before that for the 2000 Winnipeg International Conference on War-Affected Children, UNICEF headquarters worked with both regional and country offices to compile an inventory of activities and 'good practices' with regard to the protection of children in armed conflict situations. The 2002 document entitled "UNICEF Activities on Behalf of Children Affected by Armed Conflict" was intended both as an advocacy piece and as a reference for field staff. While not a structured review of programme experience, it begins to trace out the potential range of approaches in different areas of child protection and the process of preparing the document has helped to identify COs and staff working in these areas.

While the above inventory or mapping of CAAC programme experiences has been established, efforts at assessing strategies as a basis for developing more detailed programme guidance still need more attention. Different regions have focused on developing and documenting programme experience on different themes according to their priorities. Yet, efforts in documenting programme experience have not been systematically coordinated or structured according to common research questions. (By contrast, such a process of building up from cases to more systematic guidance has been built into the small arms project mentioned above.) There is a need to better coordinate across regions and speed such a cycle of drawing lessons from case experiences to feed into technical guidance.

This is particularly true in the area of psychosocial response where further development of programme guidance appears to have stalled. In absence of this global guidance, two diverging types of programme response have evolved, which in their extremes take UNICEF in very different, not seemingly complementary directions. The situation has been aggravated by the absence of an established network or systematic means of informal technical exchange and information sharing among programme staff working in

³ Chapters cover health, nutrition, education, separated children, IDPs, landmine awareness, gender, early childhood development, adolescents, sexual violence, child soldiers, children in detention, psychosocial needs, impact of sanctions, water, sanitation, shelter.

this area. (By contrast, building a network for information sharing has been a focus of capacity-building efforts on landmine awareness discussed further below.)

Landmine awareness

The focus of the landmine awareness project targeted both UNICEF internal capacities as well as those of the broader network of allies around landmines awareness. The project focused on strengthening advocacy for ratification of the Ottawa Treaty on the Banning of Antipersonnel Landmines, strengthening mine awareness programming and victim assistance programming.

The advance of this project has been distinctly slower, with no advances on victim assistance. It should be noted that under an agreement with DfID, funding for the Landmines project were reprogrammed into the other two projects, leaving significantly less money for already overly ambitious goals. This was also an area in which capacity-building efforts were starting at the very beginning: UNICEF received a UN General Assembly mandate for mine action in 1998, but had little, even by way of policy, to support fulfilling that mandate. As with many other areas of CAAC, headquarters staff time is divided between two very great needs – the need for ad hoc support to programme development in mine affected countries and the need for longer-term more systematic capacity-building inputs such as the development of policy, guidance and tools.

The first year of the project was dominated by a largely headquarters-driven "project approach" focusing primarily on development of global guidelines and advocacy materials. In the absence of clear programme guidance, and following this initial headquarters lead, some of the country-specific programme response has been off-track; for example, using higher-cost less-effective mass media campaigns as opposed to building on locally appropriate communications mechanisms and messages, targeting mine awareness only to children, and insufficient linkage across programmes.

Headquarters activities have since shifted to a capacity-building approach focusing on establishing more clearly UNICEF's mandate, both in terms of policy statements and awareness, and development of an organisational strategy. The specific achievements include:

- A five-year UN Mine Action Strategy was approved by the IACG to which UNICEF made significant contributions on two of the five components: mine awareness on which UNICEF is the lead agency, and advocacy.
- Following from this, UNICEF is currently finalising an internal policy statement and strategy to set out clearly how the organisation will fulfil its part in the broader UNMAS initiative.
- UNICEF brought a corps of external experts and staff active in developing landmines awareness programmes together to map out a common capacity-building strategy, draw lessons from experience and contribute to common guidance on programming. This has provided UNICEF with a roster of experienced consultants in the area of mine action.

- A headquarters field support function has been established including an additional staff member in the Geneva EMOPS office.

A number of pilot projects in Landmine Awareness were established in different regions. Meanwhile, to support advocacy on ratification of the Ottawa Treaty, regional offices have been active in tracking country position and status vis-à-vis signature of the Ottawa Treaty and all have disseminated advocacy materials to country offices. Some regions also engaged with COs in targeted advocacy efforts with key governments.

There have been some contributions to both analyses of the broader programming context and of programming experience. Regional offices such as CEE/CIS, ROSA and MENA have carried out data gathering on existing policies, experience and expertise on landmines. EAPRO has supported evaluation of landmine awareness programmes in Cambodia. CEE/CIS has undertaken a process of analysis of experience in the region and strategy development through, among others, a workshop process involving senior staff.

Humanitarian response

Under the Humanitarian response project, the more established results are in emergency preparedness planning, provision of information and communication services to the field and telecommunications infrastructure. Changes to policy, procedures and systems have been advanced in other areas of operations, but have yet to be consolidated.

Preparedness planning

The strengthening of preparedness planning in UNICEF is intended to span COs, ROs and headquarters divisions. (The focus was UNICEF preparedness as opposed to strengthening preparedness of national partners.) While it was to be initiated as an intense exercise separate from the programme process, including the development of specific tools and a “how to” guide, it was planned from the outset that preparedness planning must eventually be fully integrated in standard programme preparation and management activities.

Thus far, it is generally agreed that an Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) process is widely established at the country office level and ‘mainstreaming’ of this process has been advanced in both policy and practice. It remains, however, to firmly consolidate a simple and sustainable organisation-wide approach.

In terms of coverage, 62 country offices have initiated EPRP exercises. Phase I reviews have consistently highlighted the catalytic nature of the EPRP exercise in terms of CO emergency response capacity. Preparedness planning clarifies for the office the organisational mandate and Core Corporate Commitments in immediate humanitarian response; establishes the specific roles and responsibilities of staff members; clarifies CO procedures in programmatic and operational areas; ensures necessary resources, and through all this, has contributed to changing attitudes about preparedness and heightened staff motivation in this area. The widely participatory process appears to be important in achieving these results.

Plans are operational in four regional offices and close to half of country offices have initiated the process, particularly those considered most vulnerable or recently having faced natural disaster, as well as some facing long-term complex emergencies. There appears, however, to be a consistent lag between the externally facilitated CO preparedness planning exercises and the actual 'operationalisation' of preparedness plans. The initial preparedness planning exercise is fairly labour-intensive, and generates a number of preparedness activities that the country office must undertake. While this first exercise does appear to create an important basis for subsequent potentially more rapid annual updates, the first list of activities are often not integrated into a country office workplans leaving the preparedness plan non-operational. Key constraints cited include competing priorities, the intensity and/or complexity of the process, and the fact that preparedness planning has not been 'mainstreamed' into regular planning and review exercises.

There is also a concern about focusing CO preparedness planning. The initial preparedness activities identified appear to be insufficiently prioritised. In some cases, the lists have been considered to stray beyond areas of UNICEF's comparative advantage. This suggests that a further review and prioritisation of preparedness plans is needed. This may relate to RO and HQ support and oversight roles. It may also be resolved to some extent by strengthening the establishment of effective collaborative agreements with local partners, national governmental and civil society, as well as international partners, around concrete preparedness activities.

Regions have made significant advances in mainstreaming preparedness planning into the country programming process. Four ROs have focused on integrating preparedness planning at the level of the longer Country Programme cycle planning, either targeting the process leading up to Country Programme Recommendations to the Executive Board or the Mid-term Reviews (CEE/CIS, TACRO, EAPRO, ESARO). At least 47 Country Programmes Recommendations, Country Notes or Mid-term Reviews now include elements of emergency preparedness. Regions have also integrated elements of preparedness planning in annual planning and/or review exercises (ESAR, WCAR, TACRO, CEE/CIS). The importance of annual planning exercises is widely agreed, both to provide up-dated risk and vulnerability analysis and corresponding scenarios, and to allow planning of actual preparedness activities in programme plans of action (PPAs). At least one region (MENA) has planned to integrate preparedness planning as an item for special attention in CO annual reporting.

Emergency preparedness and response is now well established in UNICEF staff policy and procedures references. The latest revision of the organisation's Programme Policy and Procedures Manual (PPPM) has established the EPRP exercise as a mandatory one, linked to the development of the Country Programme Management Plan, the Annual Management Plan and the Annual Management Review. Risk and vulnerability analysis, considered critical components of the EPRP, has been integrated into the PPPM chapter containing programme process tools. This kind of analysis will likely reshape the kind of data collection and/or analysis needed on the crisis.

The EPRP process still needs to be defined more clearly, including providing more detailed guidance and tools, as well as establishing clear standards on what country office preparedness planning and actual preparedness should entail. This will eventually need to take into consideration different typologies of emergencies. Standards are critical both to focus support to country offices and as a reference for oversight mechanisms. A workshop is scheduled for June 2002 to finalise this. The standards will then be integrated in various regional office and headquarters oversight mechanisms. (Country audits, evaluations of country programmes, the proposed 'real-time' evaluations to be developed in Phase II, annual reports, and RO country visits are all possibilities.)

A basis has been laid for integrating preparedness planning in interagency planning efforts. UNICEF collaborated with other UN agencies under an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Working Group to develop a set of guidelines on contingency planning. Interagency contingency planning exercises have been tested in Uzbekistan, Nepal, Zimbabwe and Macedonia. The guidelines have now been adopted by the IASC. It is also unclear how demands for facilitating interagency preparedness planning will be managed. It will be necessary to ensure that UNICEF-specific preparedness planning tools feed smoothly into this interagency process.

Early warning

In the area of early warning, the country level threats analysis developed in the context of EPRP has been compiled into a global matrix. Continually updated, this matrix could provide a useful input to global level early warning analysis, providing a context for analysis of threats. Regional offices have also been active in compiling this data on potential emergencies regionally (ROSA, EAPRO). However, these initiatives have not been coordinated with or linked to other data collection for early warning. The various tools developed and data collected do not appear to feed into a UNICEF system for early warning. While the UN Framework Team⁴ has been working on this issue at an interagency level, the model indicators and/or tools coming from this process have been problematic and appear to offer little to clarify UNICEF's own approach to early warning systems.

Security

At headquarters level, the Humanitarian response project was primarily focused on building up the Operations Centre (OPSCEN) to be an effective information hub for field offices and headquarters as well as information sharing with other agencies. Development of early warning tools was seen as a complement to this.

Prior to Phase I, OPSCEN was a 24-hours/7 days a week communications centre, but services provided were more narrowly defined. OPSCEN has now been established providing a wider range of services including the more basic coordination of requests for

⁴ Framework for Coordination has evolved to act as a mechanism for early warning and *preventive* action among ten UN participating departments, programmes, offices and agencies. It now includes DPA, OCHA, DPKO, UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, FAO and WHO. The Framework Team is composed of senior managers (D1/D2) from each of the participating organizations and helps to facilitate bringing other UN entities into a joint review and analysis process.

information from the field, and satellite communications and teleconferencing services, but also collection and dissemination of emergency-related information to field and headquarters, monitoring of staff security in crisis situations, a repository of emergency-related lessons learned and documents, as well as liaison with other agency headquarters on information sharing. In the 2002-2003 biennium budget, 80 per cent of OPSCEN staff were integrated into UNICEF regular resources.

On other aspects of security, advances on the interagency front outside of the DfID Phase I process have done much to strengthen UNICEF security. Interagency security standards have been established in the Minimum Operating Security Standards, MOSS, and Minimum Security Telecommunications Standards, MISTs. A system of security planning is firmly established at the level of the country team, at least in policy. The General Assembly has recently given the Secretary General a mandate to enhance the UN Security Management System including significant increases to staffing which will bring support to UN country teams, and through them to UNICEF country offices. UNICEF is also participating in the development of an interagency security-training package. These developments set the background for efforts to strengthen UNICEF country office security.

Under the Phase I projects, specific capacity-building efforts were limited and budget allocations beyond OPSCEN were small. UNICEF security guidelines were recently made available to staff on the Intranet. Above all effort was put into carrying out security assessments. Priority COs across regions, as well as every CO in ROSA have had security assessments, helping to clarify related roles and responsibilities in the CO (ROSA). However, the scope of work required in this area is far beyond what could be covered by a small headquarters team. The need for an alternative strategy has become evident in the planning of Phase II.

Telecommunications

With regard to telecommunication readiness at the country office level, significant advances have been made in establishing the policy references as well as in actual telecommunications upgrades. Standards adopted at the interagency level (the Minimum Security Telecommunications Standards, MISTs) have been endorsed internally, integrated into core policy and enhanced with further recommendations. Thus, the minimum capabilities, technical equipment standards and procedures for wireless and emergency telecommunications at the country level are established. Corresponding standardised supply requests and standing agreements with suppliers have been established to facilitate global compliance. Assessments have been undertaken in COs in South Asia, CEE/CIS, WCAR, and ESAR laying the groundwork for future upgrades. To date 65 field sites are connected to the UNICEF Global Wide Area Network through SITA.⁵ Forty-five additional country office sites have ordered VSAT (satellite dish

⁵ SITA is traditionally the provider of connectivity to the world's airports and travel agents, now serving a wider range of clients, including UNICEF and other UN agencies.

communications systems).⁶ Installation is currently under way. In addition, emergency response telecommunications kits, for assessment missions and re-establishing an office are available at headquarters and in one Regional Office (CEE/CIS)⁷.

In three regional offices, dedicated telecommunications officers have been hired to further the work on assessments and training. It is unclear, however, how the strategy for decentralising country office telecommunication assessments and training will progress without specialised regional staff, unless these tasks can be absorbed into regional IT profiles.

Logistics

UNICEF country offices in stable countries do not typically have any logistics management capacity as this is usually undertaken by national partners. In emergencies, where national partners are typically overwhelmed, country offices are expected to take on this function themselves. Under the Humanitarian response project, the emphasis has been on clarifying policy, guidance and tools, and training materials to support country offices in this area as well as building a roster of external expertise to bring into countries for major humanitarian crisis.

A number of the elements below are close to being finalised. A draft Logistics Handbook, including checklists to guide management of the logistics function at country level, has been developed and is in the process of being reviewed. Parts of the draft handbook will feed into a forthcoming Operations Technical Notes⁸. Draft model contracts for standard logistics services frequently contracted out by country offices are with Supply Division for finalisation. A standard inventory control software has been selected for testing in Copenhagen before adapting it for use in the field.

The Afghanistan case has also been used to test and develop a number of tools. A software system to monitor the movement of supplies in-country from points of entry is being tested. A simple matrix for supply pipeline monitoring is being used. Memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with WFP for securing transportation capacity are being tested. UNHCR has given permission to adapt their training materials on logistics. At global level, suppliers have been identified for long-term agreements covering the first of a list of key items (to date, vehicles, tented accommodation and therapeutic milk have been covered).

Among the above, the draft logistics handbook, the software developments and finalisation of model contracts have stalled at a near-final stage for long periods, in at least one case for more than a year. In addition to bringing these to finalisation, there is

⁶ Standards on VSAT technology vary significantly across organisations including PKO and World Bank, depending at least in part when each organisation made its first major investment. UNICEF and UNDP have invested more recently and are using the same standards.

⁷ The CEE/CIS kit is ready for immediate use and allows reestablishment of office telecommunications functions -- PROMS, ccmil, etc -- in the event of an office being destroyed.

⁸ This will be the operations complement to the "Technical Notes: Special Considerations for Programming in Unstable Situations".

still need of a clear logistics policy, establishing the circumstances under which country offices undertake logistics and warehousing and how this should be done in those cases.

Initially in responding to supply/logistics issues, a DfID-funded staff member was placed in EMOPS working with Supply Division. This strategy protected the focus on the Phase I supply-related project objectives. However, in the past many advances have stalled and there was a perception that this is due to competing priorities and/or an initial lack of ownership in Supply Division. It is seen as a very positive change that the division has recently taken on a full-time staff person in New York to liaise on emergency supply/logistics.

External communications

Country offices' external relations, particularly handling of the media, are both more challenging in humanitarian crisis as opposed to stable contexts, and more critical to UNICEF resource mobilisation. A small facet of the Phase I project was directed at establishing guidance, tools and training materials in this area. This has included the development of training materials on communications in emergencies, used to date with over 100 communications officers in four regions (ESARO, WCARO, MENA and TACRO). These materials have been consolidated into a core package on crisis management and crisis communications, tested to date in one region, that is currently in the process of being adapted and mainstreamed as core training for senior staff (representatives, senior programme officer and operations officers). The Division of Communications (DOC) has also developed an emergency communications strategy and circulated this as part of the draft Operations Technical Notes. The strategy clarifies the role of communications officers, regional offices and DOC in emergencies and details how communications fits in emergency preparedness and response. In addition, DOC has developed a database of communications staff with emergency experience and relevant skills.

Human resources

The human resources management facet of phase I was intended to increase UNICEF's capacity to ensure the availability of qualified staff for deployment to situations of instability and crisis. The focus was primarily to increase Division of Human Resources (DHR) staffing to speed recruitment and deployment to emergencies, especially during a breaking crisis. DHR established a full-time Human Resources Officer to manage recruitment for and deployment to emergencies, which has since been integrated into its support budget. As a result, more timely deployments are reported by DHR.

DHR has also brought emergency considerations forward into some of its 'mainstream' DHR projects:

- The DHR policy unit has taken on humanitarian response as one of its foci for policy review and is carrying on an ongoing review of human resources policy to identify constraints and opportunities for attracting and retaining competent staff with emergency experience. In January 2002, a "Compendium of HR policies related to emergencies" was produced and disseminated internally.

- The design and establishment of a web-based roster for global use to register external candidates, retirees, and former staff has included the identification of staff experienced in and available for emergency work. Of about 300 candidates that have been registered in the database, around 50 have been identified for work in emergencies.
- Competency profiles are being developed for key categories of professional staff. The two profiles completed so far -- for Senior Programme Officers and Operations Officers -- have been developed including skills needed for emergency preparedness and response. These profiles are intended for use in the recruitment and design of staff development programmes. This work still needs to be completed for all other remaining job-descriptions and profiles, but has already led to a more accurate matching of staff to emergency postings.

At the same time, regional offices have addressed quite different issues. Two ROs (ROSA and EAPRO) have worked to develop regional rosters of experts in various aspects of psychosocial programming. However, these efforts have not been linked to efforts on building up a global roster. Initiatives to provide stress counselling for staff have been initiated in two regions: ESARO has attempted to identify institutions available to provide stress counselling services, though judged the effort unsuccessful; and CEE/CIS has begun to pilot a staff debriefing programme intended both as a stress release and lessons learning initiative. These efforts, however, have been developed without clear global guidance on strategies and without a clear outline of headquarters, regional and country responsibilities in this area. All of the above efforts are given much greater emphasis and are raised to more systematic global efforts in Phase II.

Integration of emergency preparedness and response

Beyond the more defined EPRP process discussed above, significant progress has been made in integrating emergency preparedness and response in UNICEF programme process, both in policy and procedures and core training of new staff:

- The entire PPPM has been revised from a perspective of integrating considerations specific to humanitarian response.
- A global learning strategy has been developed.
- The current PP training already includes a session on emergencies, as do training for new representatives and Senior Programme Officers and Operations Officers.
- The key points on EPRP and vulnerability analysis will figure in the new version of UNICEF Programme Process Training in progress.

In addition, a new training package on Emergency Preparedness and Response has been developed and tested in three trainings by ESARO, and is being adapted and finalised as a global package in 2002. Only this activity was contemplated and funded in Phase I projects, however, it is important to highlight the convergence of efforts and note that pressures to undertake the other activities stemmed at least in part from the emergency focal points network.

Relevance of design – Are we doing the right thing?

The question of relevance of the projects design requires analysis at different levels. At the level of the global project objectives, there seems little doubt as to their relevance in general. Phase I projects did for the most part focus on strengthening functions that are still considered important to the organisation's performance with respect to children affected by armed conflict, humanitarian response and landmines awareness. Further, performance in each of these areas was in one way or another clearly established within the organisation's mandate. These are capacities that UNICEF should have.

Dispersion of global capacity-building efforts

Within this very broad outline, however, direction was less clear. The various workplans, progress reports and self-assessments from the different ROs and headquarters divisions, demonstrate that the various offices have not been guided by one common framework for understanding organisational capacity and therefore for developing capacity-building strategies.

This is complicated by the vast scope of Phase I capacity-building efforts. The scope was clearly problematic as demonstrated by the high numbers of activities planned that were eventually dropped due to work overload. Management issues did come into play as outlined further below, but the objectives themselves appear to have been too ambitious for a three-year project.

The capacity-building undertaken targeted both internal organisational capacity as well as capacity of the wider networks of which UNICEF is part, both in the CAAC and the Landmines projects. In some areas, this has led to insufficient focus on building the internal UNICEF functions necessary to sustain external capacity-building efforts long-term. The Landmines project was a prime example of this, with pivotal work on defining UNICEF policies only having been advanced more recently.

There has also often been a disconnect or lack of a clear link between HQ and RO activities. This is in part due to the decentralised planning and implementation whereby HQ divisions and ROs have pursued the overall project goals to different degrees. For example, in development of programme guidance in relation to CAAC objectives, regions have pursued the development and study of different programme experiences without these necessarily being connected to a process of developing overall global programme guidance and tools. The definition of complementary headquarters and RO roles and responsibilities on capacity-building efforts has not always been clear. Such a disconnect is particularly significant in capacity-building interventions where change in performance in a given area is likely to require a relatively longer chain of intermediate results and parallel or converging lines of action. Where HQ and RO efforts are diffuse, the necessary convergence of intermediate results may be longer in producing a detectable change in performance.

To some extent, it was to be expected that the capacity-building strategy would be developed and refined in a progressive manner. On the whole, ROs and divisions developed and adjusted their actual work plans consistent with the broad outline of the

global projects. The self-assessments reveal, however, an evolution of the analysis of capacity constraints in the finer points. This evolution follows in part from the results achieved (discussed above); as one capacity constraint is addressed, the next step can be tackled. The evolution stems also from a deepened analysis. The more specific points that suggest directions for the continuing capacity-building efforts are as follows:

Cross-cutting functions

The Regional Office role

Across many project objectives, the critical importance of the regional office role in both support and oversight has emerged. This includes roles vis-à-vis the integration of CAAC issues into country office situation analysis, advocacy and programming; preparedness planning processes; supply/logistics particularly regional stockpiling; security plans; telecommunications particularly assessments, training and oversight. A strategy of building on and building up regional support and oversight roles as a means of strengthening country office capacities has been pursued unevenly across Phase I projects. At this stage, it seems that on all the above-mentioned fronts, both the pace and the sustainability of advances in strengthening country office capacities will be limited, unless the role of regional offices is strengthened. As regional offices already have oversight roles for 'mainstream' programme process, it also seems clear that their role will be pivotal in 'mainstreaming' emergency preparedness and response. UNICEF has experimented with decentralisation of support and oversight roles related to humanitarian response in some areas: ROs have first clearance on Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), the Emergency Programme Funds (EPF) and Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). The results, in terms of quality of attention to this review process, has varied across regions which points to issues of accountabilities.

In strengthening regional support and oversight roles, accountabilities in relation to country emergency preparedness and humanitarian response need to be clarified. This requires distinguishing headquarters, regional and country offices roles as well as the roles of individual positions, particularly within ROs and COs. At the regional level this entails examining Regional Directors, Emergency Focal Points and other advisors respective roles. Balance is needed between integrating responsibilities for humanitarian response into the work of all regional advisors, both in programme and in operations, and the strengthening the role of dedicated emergency focal points. So far regional emergency focal points have demonstrated the value of their particular emergency experience, overview of the issues and the leverage of flexible resources to focus and push capacity-building efforts. The exercise of clarifying RO accountabilities in the area of CAAC and humanitarian response will necessarily be linked to the clarification of global human resources strategy discussed further below. Staffing structures must be consistent with roles and responsibilities.

In addition, the relationship between regional offices and country offices as well as the mechanisms for holding the latter accountable all need to be re-examined. In a number of areas, it has been noted that the culture of decentralisation and independence of COs in UNICEF has been problematic. While this 'independence' is largely seen as positive, it

has been repeatedly observed that country offices that tend to avoid external support from their regional office and headquarters are in fact those that are weak in addressing CAAC issues and/or weak in programme or operations aspects of humanitarian response.

Regional offices also need standard benchmarks and tools to aid in support and oversight roles. Such standards have been established to varying degrees in Phase I as outlined above under "Results". Examples include the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) and Minimum Security Telecommunications Standards (MISTs) established at interagency level. Standards are needed to clearly establish what can be expected of country offices in terms of integrating preparedness planning into their programme and management processes, actual preparedness and quality of humanitarian response (including integration of CAAC). Such standards need to then be integrated into mainstream oversight mechanisms. At regional level this includes, among others, Regional Management Team mechanisms and Annual Reports.

Strengthening the regional office role will also require a greater commonality of focus across all ROs. Over the course of the last two years, ROs and Emergency Focal Points have focused on support and oversight of different issues to different degrees. This diversity has had some noted benefits. ESARO, for example, was able to take the lead on developing a training package that now is being adapted for global use. A wealth of experience can now be compared on mainstreaming the EPRP through different approaches. However, it is important to have a clear picture as to what can realistically be expected as a set of priority issues for regional support and oversight across all regions.

Human resources

Across all three projects, the need for more attention to human resource management has been highlighted consistently. This includes the need for clear direction and strategy for deployment of staff to emergencies, particularly as to which new technical expertise will be built in-house, recruited or sought through temporary arrangements from outside.

Inadequate in-house technical expertise at the country level is clearly identified as a constraint in a number of areas. CAAC programme development is hindered by a lack of more specialised technical expertise in psychosocial and landmine awareness programming at CO level. Identification of emerging child protection issues in rehabilitation and recovery phases of emergencies and related CAAC policy development is hindered by lack of legal expertise at regional and/or country levels. Supply/logistics readiness is ultimately hampered by the need for logistics experts who know UNICEF systems at CO level. Different regions and COs appear to be pursuing different solutions. Yet, there has been no clear proposal for a systematic longer-term solution resolving whether to build expertise or bring in expertise, how to do it and who plays what role in the process. In each case, a global strategy is needed providing guidance on what options will be pursued at different levels of the organisation to cover the various technical and generalist functions related to UNICEF work in humanitarian response.

The continued work on competency profiles is clearly urgent. (This is in process as has been reflected in Phase II objectives.) As follows from the emphasis on clarifying

headquarters, RO and CO roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis humanitarian response, job descriptions or competency profiles must be correspondingly revised for different programme and operations staff at different levels of the organisation. In advancing this work, it will be important to move beyond generic references to humanitarian response, identifying instead the fundamental processes required to ensure humanitarian response and/or key results; for example, ensuring effective emergency preparedness and response planning (EPRP). Eventually these accountabilities will have to be reflected as a matter of course in the Performance Evaluation Reports (PER) of key staff, for example, Country Office Representatives and Senior Programme Officers, and RO advisors.

Continued work on the database roster will be strengthened by the above and is also underlined as an important pursuit both globally and regionally.

Decentralised options for internal deployment are also highlighted as requiring further attention. Most regional offices have begun to explore some form of internal surge capacity, identifying a small corps of staff within the region that can be on call on a rotational basis for quick assignment to country offices. This has proven promising as a means of responding to the huge demands that humanitarian crises places on country office staff, often well beyond the current staff capacities. It also appears more manageable within the Regional Management Team structures. Alternative approaches need to be assessed more systematically with a view to establishing what works, in what conditions and with what limitations. Similarly, the respective roles for headquarters, regional and country offices need to be clarified to ensure the best use of regional surge capacity.

Learning

Across all three Phase I projects numerous training objectives and activities were included and some are directly linked to significant results achieved in relation to advocacy and humanitarian response functions (see above under "Results"). However, the experience of Phase I suggests that a more coordinated and focused effort is needed to actually focus on strengthening the learning functions in the organisation. Analysis suggests that this does not mean more training. In fact, over the course of Phase I, it became clear that more narrow *training* response to staff capacities is problematic. Training workshops only reach a small proportion of our staff, and we are often targeting the same staff with several different training efforts. This is particularly challenging for smaller COs or for staff in pivotal roles. Different regions prioritise training efforts differently. Release of staff for training cannot always be assured. Further, it was repeatedly highlighted that simple mechanisms of intra- and inter-regional exchange would contribute greatly to building not only individual and country office capacity, but also the process of building up from case experiences to organisational learning, and development of policy and programme guidance. In this context, it has become clear that we should be focusing not on 'training', but on 'learning' and that learning strategies should be expanded to include not only training workshops, but *also* distance learning, use of the Internet/Intranet, mentors, twinning, exchanges, etc., and that learning must be rewarded. A supporting measure required is the development of better guidance on how to evaluate training/learning efforts and assess what impact these are having and why.

A number of major constraints that have limited progress towards learning-related objectives of the emergency capacity-building projects in fact affect organisational capacity as a whole and have or are being addressed at this broader level:

- There was initially no global learning strategy, though this has since been established;
- There was no learning needs assessment, something that has been incorporated in DIFD Phase II but will be undertaken broadly as a global exercise going beyond humanitarian response;
- There has been no forum in which the various learning objectives and strategies across the organisation can be coordinated and prioritised. This may now be covered at least in part by the newly formed Programme Learning Task Force.
- Learning objectives are also of course guided by the definition of competency profiles mentioned above.

It is also clear that for the wide-ranging training objectives identified in Phase I, the work required on development and testing of training materials is far beyond the capacity of the Organisational Learning and Development Section (OLDS/DHR) alone, or even combined with other HQ divisions. The efforts of OLDS/DHR must be prioritised in some way. For Phase II this has been done focusing on core global packages – Humanitarian Principles and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Training. The example of ESARO developing the EPR package offers a possible response at least in part to limitations in headquarters’ capacities.

However, more important than expanding the capacity to produce training materials is the need to focus and prioritise learning objectives. The focus on and of training activities has varied fairly significantly across regions during Phase I. It is unclear what factors are governing these differences, be it competing regional priorities, different CO profiles and corresponding learning needs, RO capacity or other. It will be important to establish common priorities across regions in terms of the building blocks staff should master both in general on humanitarian response and as specific to functions and sector/issue areas (e.g. operations, health, monitoring and evaluation). In this, the “learning pyramid”⁹ recently proposed by OLDS/DHR does provide an important reference as to core competencies to be achieved and a global needs assessment planned in the course of Phase II will provide a clear baseline.

Children Affected by Armed Conflict

The scope of issues grouped under the CAAC project is vast and much remains to be done under the original thrust of the project. Addressing the above-mentioned cross-cutting constraints is critical, particularly the accountabilities of regional and country

⁹ The OLDS/DHR learning pyramid outlines and prioritises the core training staff should undertake, building from the broad elements that all staff must master -- programme preparation process and human rights-based approach to programming -- through broad training related to humanitarian response -- humanitarian principles and emergency preparedness and response training -- and eventually through sector and issue-specific training depending on job description -- for example, nutrition and health, child protection, operations.

offices, building technical expertise and strengthening inter- and intra-regional sharing, in particular on data collection on CAAC.

In addition, more consideration needs to be given to situating the efforts around CAAC both in broader humanitarian response and the wider organisational priorities and agenda. A number of headquarters staff share a concern that the structure of the original three projects in Phase I – separating CAAC, Humanitarian response and Landmines awareness – has not been functional and does not facilitate the integration of CAAC issues, including landmines, into country level humanitarian response. The value in grouping a series of capacity-building objectives around the theme of CAAC was to build greater consistency and coherence between high-level advocacy and the advocacy and programme response at field level. The original distinction of the CAAC project has also served to boost capacities vis-à-vis some of the particularly challenging areas, such as child soldiers, psychosocial programming, and HIV/AIDS in conflict, areas in which UNICEF does not have such a long history of programme experience. But the CAAC policy agenda, as it guides both our advocacy and programming actions, must be fully integrated in processes of early warning, vulnerability analysis, preparedness planning, etc., as well as contemplated in supporting operational provisions. This lateral integration across the three original project goals is equally critical in ensuring the consistency of country programme response. The cost of separating the projects may have been to distance CAAC programme response from broader humanitarian response. The same can be said for Landmines awareness. In both cases, attention to mainstreaming into wider child protection and humanitarian response processes and fora within the organisation must be balanced with specific capacity-building strategies where needed.

Progress on the Phase I CAAC objectives still requires continued work to change more general attitudes and understanding of the range of advocacy and programme response options within the country programme approach. There are specific challenges more prevalent in conflict situations; for example, how to manage UNICEF's role in advocacy and protection at country level where state governments or non-state entities who are programme partners are gross violators of human rights. Yet for the most part the country programme process allows for a wide range of advocacy and humanitarian programme response options. Programme policy and procedures have been adjusted to accommodate work with non-state entities on the basis of GA resolution 46/182, and even programme management software (ProMS) has been adapted to accommodate assistance to institutions or non-governmental organisations with which UNICEF is operating. However, staff attitudes, knowledge and understanding of how to use the country programme approach flexibly in fulfilling both advocacy and programming roles remains a constraint to country office capacity. Bringing about change in this area is an extension of the cultural change begun with the introduction a human rights-based approach to programming.

In focusing on CAAC objectives as formulated, there is some concern that systematic attention to natural disaster in broader humanitarian response has been wanting. For example, psychosocial programme response has been associated primarily with CAAC, while the corresponding psychosocial component in natural disasters has not been

adequately developed. Similarly, policy development on sensitive issues has focused on CAAC, while issues such as discrimination in humanitarian response to natural disaster have not been addressed.

Beyond the issue of 'mainstreaming' CAAC objectives, some additional more concrete capacity gaps have been identified. In strengthening the systematic development of policy on difficult CAAC-related issues as they emerge, it has become clear that the process of identifying issues early is weak. Until country offices have fully integrated a broader child rights analysis into their situation assessment and analysis, including issues related to CAAC, they may not identify critical and potentially sensitive child protection issues. In the meantime, a more proactive support role is required either by regional offices or, where necessary, headquarters in identifying issues as they emerge and providing analysis and guidance on programme response and/or advocacy options. The degree to which regional offices currently have the capacity to take on this role varies, and headquarters does not have the capacity to monitor all country situations systematically to identify potentially sensitive issues. This again suggests the importance of regional support roles as well as the originally planned strengthening of situation analysis (knowledge base).

The focus on programme development capacity was originally designed with a more specific focus on child soldiers and psychosocial programming. This focus has been usefully expanded to address HIV/AIDS, IDPs, family tracing and reunification of separated minors, and gender, and will continue in Phase II.

Humanitarian response

Under the Humanitarian response project a wide range of functions were addressed, related to both programme and operations. Assessments suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the connections between these functions. Operational readiness – in security, telecommunications, human resources planning, supply and logistics – need to be more fully integrated in preparedness planning processes and tools. In addition, adjustments are suggested in each area.

Preparedness Planning

There is a need to make EPR more strategic, to bring in considerations on the choice of issues being addressed (are we acting where we should be?), positioning vis-à-vis other actors on those issues, and targeting of the response (are we addressing root causes or just fighting fires? are we tapping into processes or is the response ad hoc?). Recent revisions of guidance on the development of country programme strategy (in the PPPM) have included increased attention to such questions in general. As emergency preparedness is more fully 'mainstreamed' it will be important to consider how focus on strategic choices can best be strengthened.

There is little capacity-building with national partners, be it with government or civil society, to strengthen their preparedness for emergencies. Programmatic efforts in capacity-building around each issue – child health, water and environmental sanitation,

the various areas of child protection – must begin to incorporate considerations as to what national capacities would need to be strengthened in relation to the probable hazards identified through preparedness planning.

Early warning

Building early warning systems (EWS) has been pursued largely from a security perspective. Links to vulnerability analysis in preparedness planning and situation analysis are weak or unclear as is the role of early warning systems in guiding programme content as well as national capacity-building efforts. Different parts of the organisation – OPSCEN, PD, EMOPS and regional offices – still appear to have different understandings of early warning, and of the respective roles of different levels/units within the organisation in this area. There is still neither an analytical framework nor a clearly defined structure of complementary roles and responsibilities that can help the organisation bring together and process the diverse types of information coming in at different levels from different sources. Furthermore, it is unclear whether there are adequate systems by which analysis of information feeds into decision-making for early action. Interagency work on early warning systems continues on similarly diverse fronts and so far is not contributing to help clarify UNICEF's approach to the issue.

Rapid assessment

UNICEF rapid assessment capacity is part of the Core Corporate Commitments (CCCs). Preparedness planning exercises have shown that this is an area where most country offices are very weak. They need technical guidance to help manage emergency assessment as part of situation monitoring as well as practical adaptable data collection tools for different stages of emergencies. ESARO has begun work specifically on identifying core data collection needs across sectors/issues corresponding to SPHERE modules. This work has just recently been reoriented to focus on two tracks addressing immediate emergency assessment within the first 48 hours after a major crisis and broader emergency assessment at a longer delay. Similarly, CEE/CIS has adopted a set of indicators for rapid assessment in the case of natural disaster, adapted from the Turkey country office experience. Tools have also been developed in an M&E training package on various steps in framing information needs for emergency assessment. These pieces can provide a basis for development of global tools but still need to be pulled together as a package. There must also of course be some coherence between rapid assessment capacity, early warning systems at the country office level and ongoing vulnerability analysis.

Operations readiness

The formulation of DfID II (essentially the operations component of Phase I) was widely acknowledged as rushed and flawed. In many cases the activities and outputs were later found to be ill conceived or were in one way or another reprogrammed. With regards to supply readiness, decentralization of some of supply division's functions has been effected over the last few years. To further explore the possibilities of expanded sourcing of supplies in a number of regions/countries, the Supply Division is launching a global survey to take place in 2002 (as has recently been agreed with DfID). In addition, it has become clear that strengthening country office readiness in terms of the field logistics

facet of humanitarian response depends on clarifying roles for providing support and guidance. This entails a clear integration by supply division of support to country offices for in-country logistics and the issuance of policy in this area.

With regards to telecommunications upgrades, it has become clear that the resources required are far more than what small country offices (particularly in more stable contexts) are willing to invest without some kind of policy guidance in the budget process. For this one-time capital cost, sacrifices will need to be made and clear guidance is needed on how country offices are expected to handle this, as well as how financial support for these costs will be prioritised.

Further decentralisation strategies for both telecommunications and security need to be re-evaluated. Additionally, strategies for pushing forward security and telecommunications assessments and training must be supported by a realistic global human resource strategy in each area.

Links to external context

The Phase I projects have been conceived without a very specific reference to the external context (as has Phase II). Expected results relate to some notion of improved performance in humanitarian response (supply) without clear reference to trends external to UNICEF in the number and nature of emergencies (demand). Some assessment will be needed at some stage as to the global trends in this external context and whether plans are consistent.

Management of the process – Are we doing it well?

The three Phase I projects present a unique management context within UNICEF. The projects are planned and managed across seven headquarters divisions and seven regional offices, yet have an internal organisational capacity-building focus. Frameworks for planning efforts of this nature are still fairly experimental and new to UNICEF staff. Many of the key staff involved in implementation of the projects were not in position at the beginning of the project. Existing planning and management mechanisms fit neither the cycle nor the scope of the project. The mechanisms for follow-up to the Martigny Process are focused at headquarters level. Much of this context appears to set the stage for the constraints encountered.

Nonetheless, a distinct improvement from the first to the second year was consistently reported in all management processes investigated. These included clarity and application of programme strategies, prioritising, workplanning, monitoring and evaluation, funding and human resource management.

The following are some of the more significant challenges in managing the capacity-building process.

Ownership and focus

There is wide agreement that the Phase I projects were formulated in a process that did little to create common vision, ownership and buy-in by various regional offices and headquarters divisions. This was even more the case for the fourth project known as DfID II. The relative importance of the DfID-funded projects to the overall office workplans was extremely limited for some divisions. This also affected commitments and priorities. While regional office and division capacity-building strategies and priorities were generally considered clear to the staff directly involved in implementing them, they were less clearly situated in overall regional and divisional workplans and priorities.

Regional and headquarters offices have all faced the challenge of balancing focused capacity-building efforts and the necessary ongoing work to support country offices or carry out advocacy work. In response to the recent crisis in Afghanistan, numerous staff have been pulled away from capacity-building work. While the ongoing work does contribute to strengthening capacities in specific country offices and often responds to pressing and high-profile country situations, significant change in the organisation requires a focus on mechanisms for more systematic response. The distinction between ongoing work and focused capacity-building efforts has been least clear where staff are fully funded by DfID money.

These ownership and focus issues both appear to follow from the lack of a common understanding of capacity-building discussed above.

Information exchange, learning and coordination

Across the Phase I projects, approaches adopted by different regions for the same activity areas have often varied. Yet, it is not clear that different approaches have been justifiable as the most relevant or cost-effective in each context. Headquarters divisions and regions have consistently identified the need for more analysis and learning across regions on best approaches. In 2001, this was translated into the need for dissemination plans “including a timeline for consultations as activities are being developed and initiated” though this appears not to have been undertaken. Information exchange and coordination appears to be important not only as a project management issue but as a process to be strengthened on a long-term basis as part of capacity-building.

It is also clear that the network of headquarters and regional emergency focal points for the Phase I projects has become an important exchange and coordination mechanism that must be supported. The exchange of regional and headquarters perspectives in analysis of capacity constraints, planning and prioritisation has been pivotal to the progress in and refinement of the capacity-building process thus far. The flow of information from headquarters to regional emergency focal points on other organisational initiatives that can affect humanitarian response issues have been important. The potential to formulate common issues related to humanitarian response within this network and then carry messages forward through a combination of regional and global UNICEF fora is recognised by the network and seen as a powerful means of pushing forward change.

This opportunity has not been sufficiently seized, the recent global meeting on Human Resources being one opportunity missed.

Oversight of capacity-building process

Above all, regional offices and headquarters divisions have consistently and strongly identified weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation. Progress reviews were held and there was improvement in this area over the two years of the project, but documentation of reviews was reported as weak. Workplan indicators identified have to some extent provided a measure of progress in implementing activities, but these have remained at the detailed activity level. Few actual monitoring or evaluation activities of specific results were undertaken. Overall reviews of the three projects together were undertaken prior to the self-assessment exercise this year, but these have not been sufficiently structured to allow managers to validate conclusions or concerns about overall progress and changes in capacities. Yet implementation problems have arisen. In several headquarters offices, a number of critical policy and guidance issues seem to have been at least well advanced with draft statements or guidelines, but ultimately stalled just short of being finalised for sometimes as long as a year. This is likely due in part to the relative importance of Phase I projects in the respective office workplans. It appears that problems did not feed into any oversight mechanism for the project as a whole to bring a decision or action on these delays. Clearly, a more realistic framework for monitoring and evaluation is needed with a view to guide managers of the process, both at the regional/division and global levels.

In a number of instances, progress in Phase I is tied into capacity constraints faced by the organisation in general:

- As mentioned above, learning achievements in the Phase I projects were hampered at least initially by the absence of a global learning strategy for the organisation.
- Mainstreaming CAAC issues in the country programme process includes the general challenge of furthering a change in attitudes and understandings among UNICEF staff of how to fit the country office's role as advocate for child rights within the flexible country programme approach.

At the same time, the regional-headquarters network that has been galvanised around the Phase I projects has constructively fed into the wider post-Martigny process through the progressive identification of capacity constraints and gaps. These spin-off effects appear, however, to be ad hoc. A need has been identified for a more systematic mechanism to bring forward issues and constraints beyond the scope of the projects to appropriate decision-making fora. The monitoring of Phase I projects has been integrated into the two monitoring and implementation bodies formed in the Martigny Process – the Crisis Preparedness Working Group and the Inter-divisional Standing Committee (IDSC). However, both fora are headquarters-focused. The IDSC has not been successfully used to bring forward substantive issues or constraints for resolution, and this is unlikely to happen without the monitoring and evaluation framework to trigger attention to problem areas. It appears that use of regional and global oversight mechanisms, such as the Global Management Team and Regional Management Teams may also be important at strategic moments in the capacity-building process.

Links with and integration in the "mainstream"

As mentioned above, management and coordination of the Phase I projects is integrated with the wider Martigny Process mechanisms. This is largely positive. However, the capacity-building strategy articulated in Phase I has not been brought forward into fora bringing together headquarters, region and country staff in each technical area. In each area – for example, telecommunications/IT, learning, human resource management, planning, monitoring and evaluation – the circle has not been systematically drawn connecting headquarters emergency focal points and their headquarters technical colleagues as well as the regional emergency focal points and their regional advisor colleagues in each technical area. The issues related to CAAC and humanitarian response have not systematically been brought forward into their "mainstream" networks. However, highlighting this gap in no way suggests that the emergency focal points network is unimportant or should be let go, as outlined above.

While the projects are part of a wider effort to strengthen humanitarian response, and senior level commitment has been made clear on some points, it remains unclear how phase I goals and objectives fit within other global UNICEF priorities and agenda. The Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) is of critical concern. The perception is widely shared among emergency focal points that the new MTSP does not represent an adequate reference or platform for pushing capacity-building of country offices in relation to CAAC or humanitarian response in general. As such, humanitarian response is seen as out of the 'mainstream' agenda. Work is ongoing to ensure that such issues are brought forward in the operational guidelines to be issued. This is widely seen as pivotal to the future of the capacity-building process.

Use of funding for additional posts

Headquarters divisions and regional offices identified a number of management issues related specifically to the use of additional staff. Not least were delays in staffing, which slowed project implementation in many offices, particularly during the first year.

At the outset of Phase I, a benchmark was set by UNICEF that no more than 50 percent of funds for the projects should be spent on posts. Though not so clearly articulated at the time, this stemmed from the concern that if capacity-building were translated simply into an increase in human resources, actual change in performance might not be sustainable. While this limited the number of new posts created, some regional offices in particular have reported that the lack of human resources has in fact slowed overall implementation rates. The challenge remains on how to successfully link resources spent on posts to concrete sustainable changes to organisational capacity. This is related to the issue of clarity and convergence in overall capacity-building strategy noted above.

Beyond establishing the benchmark, decisions on which newly created post might be integrated into headquarters and RO support budgets were left for future consideration. A number of different situations have evolved:

- While OPSCEN was established with a 24-hour 7-days/week service through DfID funding, the existing UNICEF staff structure could not absorb this new function. The sustainability of the services performed by OPSCEN has already been judged a necessary change and 80 per cent of these posts were absorbed into regular resources in the 2002-2003 biennium. It is fully expected that the remaining 20% will be absorbed in the 2004-2005 biennium.
- Regional emergency focal points are widely agreed to be crucial in advancing the Phase I objectives. Some ROs have absorbed these new posts into their support budget at the expense of other posts.
- Key headquarters functions in policy development, advocacy, and learning are supported by posts that have not yet been absorbed into support budgets. It is not clear what headquarters roles will be needed in these areas after Phase II and how they will be absorbed by the organisation.
- The strategies for building country level security and telecommunications have both been based on an understanding that lack of specialised technical expertise at regional level is a key constraint. Yet the implication -- creating new RO posts for dedicated regional technical experts in each area -- has proven unsustainable even with additional external funding. This strategy is being re-examined.

While the results and achievements outlined in the first part of this section include significant changes that appear sustainable, in some cases the functions that have been strengthened or newly established are beyond the capacity of posts currently covered by support budget. Clearly, in a context of budget cutbacks, it cannot be assumed that the solution is the eventual absorption of all of the new posts. This is clearly a cross-cutting global management issue. Yet, it seems that an overall analysis of this issue and a clear, feasible proposal as to which key functions can be sustained, and how, is missing. As longer-term staffing decisions do have a significant impact on overall strategy for capacity-building, filling this gap would be urgent.

Recommendations

A series of recommendations follow from the above findings and conclusions. Those that address the further pursuit of the original objectives and/or a new focus in terms of which capacities we try to strengthen have for the most part been clearly integrated in the proposal for Phase II. For example, broad recommendations such as the need to limit the scope of capacity-building to focus on UNICEF internal capacity, as well as recommendations regarding the focus on learning and human resource management functions have already been well addressed. Such recommendations will not be spelled out in detail here. The goals and objectives for Phase II are included below in Box 3.

Those recommendations that are less explicit in the Phase II proposal follow below, though for the most part these have been discussed in 2002 planning with the emergency capacity-building focal points.

Box 3: Phase II Proposal -- Goals and Objectives

GOAL 1: To enhance UNICEF capacities for preparedness planning and response to emergencies, as an integral part of the country programming process, and ensure that child rights are central to humanitarian efforts.

OBJECTIVES:

- 1.1 Ensure integration of vulnerability analysis into the country programme planning process.
- 1.2 Strengthen organisational frameworks, tools and mechanisms for early warning, identifying the roles and synergies between headquarters, regional and country offices.
- 1.3 Ensure full integration of systematic preparedness into office management planning at all levels (country, regional, headquarters), in line with established guidance.
- 1.4 Ensure integration of UNICEF preparedness planning into a UN system-wide framework.
- 1.5 To strengthen monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to contribute to improving emergency preparedness and response.

GOAL 2: To improve UNICEF management of, and operational readiness in financial, supply, logistics, telecommunications, external communications and stress management/counselling elements of humanitarian response in emergencies.

OBJECTIVES:

- 2.1 Establish and maintain a regional planning and oversight capacity to ensure essential operations and systems support in emergencies, in line with minimum operating standards and guidelines.
- 2.2 Further develop and ensure implementation of operational standards and procedures for management of funds, supply, logistics telecommunications, external communications and stress management/counselling in emergencies.

GOAL 3: To improve the availability of appropriate staff at the appropriate time for all emergencies.

OBJECTIVES:

- 3.1 Develop human resource capacities by integrating humanitarian response-related functions into organisational job and competency profiles and use the profiles for recruitment and learning/development activities.
- 3.2 Enhance systems for identification and rapid deployment of staff and external expertise to, and from, emergencies.
- 3.3 Establish and maintain an effective succession planning system for staff deployment in emergencies.

GOAL 4: To improve staff competencies for advocacy, programmatic and operational support in emergencies, reflecting the human rights based approach to programming and the normative framework of UNICEF.

OBJECTIVES:

- 4.1 To systematically provide all UNICEF staff with access to a wide range of learning opportunities to enhance their knowledge and skills for emergency preparedness and response, including humanitarian policies and principles, other programmatic and operational areas, and management of assessment, monitoring and evaluation.
- 4.2 Ensure regional implementation and oversight of strategies for systematic skills and knowledge development in emergency preparedness and response.

GOAL 5: To increase UNICEF capacity to protect staff and assets in emergencies.

OBJECTIVES:

- 5.1 Establish systems for reliable staff security planning and support at all levels during sudden-onset emergencies, including standard operating procedures.
- 5.2 Enhance the capacity of UNICEF country offices to monitor trends and review security conditions for crisis management and readiness in chronic and incipient emergency areas.

GOAL 6: To improve UNICEF's knowledge base on the situation of children affected by armed conflict with particular attention to the differential impact of armed conflict on girls and women.

OBJECTIVES:

- 6.1 Build capacity to systematically review and analyse existing information on CAAC issues, including to identify information gaps or areas where information is weak.
- 6.2 Increase data collection and improve monitoring and reporting systems that contribute to fill information gaps or areas where information is weak.
- 6.3 Build partnerships to develop common methodologies of research and knowledge sharing systems to share this information.

GOAL 7: To enhance UNICEF capacity to advocate for the promotion and protection of the rights of children affected by armed conflict.

OBJECTIVES:

- 7.1 Develop advocacy strategies on priority CAAC issues such as HIV/AIDS, mine action, small arms, internally displaced children, gender dimensions of children affected by armed conflict.

- 7.2 Augment capacity in the field to promote and use the legal protection framework as universal standards for the protection of children affected by armed conflict.
- 7.3 Enhance capacity to advocate with partners in inter-governmental fora at international and regional levels such as the Security Council, OSCE and ECOWAS.

GOAL 8: To increase UNICEF capacity to develop co-ordinated policy and programme guidance to protect children affected by armed conflict with a consistent gender perspective in all policy and programming.

OBJECTIVES:

- 8.1 Systematise the gathering, analysis, sharing and use of lessons learned.
- 8.2 Develop and disseminate within the organisation policies on emerging CAAC issues.
- 8.3 Increase capacity to link UNICEF approaches to CAAC work with those of external partners (UN system, governments, NGOs, IGOs, civil society actors, etc.).
- 8.4 Ensure that lessons from the Organisation's emergency capacity-building efforts are distilled and fed into regular planning exercises for projects as well as into wider organisational capacity-building efforts.

- It is important to **build understanding around a common capacity-building strategy**, not only among the network of emergency focal points directly involved in the process, but also in mainstream fora. Establishing a common framework and building a common coherent global assessment of UNICEF capacity will be an important focus for future workplanning and evaluative exercises.
- It is critical to build **ownership** of the humanitarian response capacity-building process and to dispel the image that it is an "EMOPS project". This entails both attention to process on the part of EMOPS in its role coordinating the DfID project, but also to oversight mechanisms discussed further below.
- It is critical to focus on bringing the humanitarian response capacity-building process into the "mainstream". Three points of entry are seen as pivotal:
 - It is essential that CAAC, including landmines awareness, and humanitarian response be **integrated into the MTSP operational guidelines and in promotion of the roll-out**. This entails work of the headquarters units in providing content and lobbying with those involved in the roll-out of the MTSP as well as of the emergency focal points in lobbying the ROs and RMTs.
 - DHR is leading an intensive process to situate the human resource implications of the MTSP, a realignment of its 5-year vision for human resources and a mapping out of corresponding strategies and actions. It is essential **that 'humanitarian response' issues (included those specific to CAAC) be integrated into this global analysis of human resource issues**. Clear formulation of these issues and lobbying for such integration should be an immediate focus of the network of emergency capacity-building focal points.

- Issues related to **CAAC and humanitarian response should be more systematically brought into their "mainstream" technical networks** – for example, child protection, planning, monitoring and evaluation, learning, human resources, supply, IT – most of which hold annual global meetings of headquarters and RO staff as well as maintain other information sharing mechanisms.
- Emphasis must be placed on following through on integration of humanitarian response into the programme process. The broad policies and procedures – what is expected of COs – have been revised. It is necessary to provide more concrete guidance on *how* to do this. This entails **providing or revising tools and examples of good practice to support country offices in integrating both CAAC and humanitarian response considerations at key points in the programme process**. Such key points include, among others, the situation analysis, strategy development and management plans. This will draw from but goes beyond work on the EPRP exercise.
 - Across all project objectives, attention must be given to defining the complementary headquarters and regional roles and responsibilities on capacity-building efforts, and more specifically to **strengthening the regional roles and responsibilities in both support and oversight**. At this stage, it seems that on all fronts, both the pace and the sustainability of advances in strengthening country office capacities will be limited, unless the role of the regional office is strengthened. To strengthen this regional role and responsibilities, accountabilities need to be clarified in relation to each function – integrating issues related to CAAC and broader humanitarian response into the programme process, preparedness planning, supply/logistics, learning, human resources management, etc. – including attention to the relationship between regional and country offices. The mechanisms for holding country offices accountable also need to be re-examined. Strengthening the RO role will also require standard benchmarks and tools to aid in support and oversight roles, as well as a greater commonality of focus among regional offices.
 - **Global coordination and information-sharing must be strengthened**. Sharing of information and experiences **within regions and across regions** must be taken on more systematically and proactively by regional and headquarters emergency capacity-building focal points, each in their respective areas. Facilitation of coordination and information-sharing – either regionally or globally around specific issues -- should become a task in each focal points' workplan with concrete and systematic activities planned. **Organisational learning processes in particular – data collection on CAAC and learning from programme experience in various aspects humanitarian response – must be more actively coordinated**. Headquarters focal points must have a better overview to ensure that activities in the regions, feed into the development of policy and programme guidance globally. This requires that regions and headquarters are informed of each others activities, and that these build together, using common references, tools, analytical frameworks wherever possible.

- An overall analysis and feasible proposal is urgently needed as to **the phasing out of DfID-funded posts**, either through integration into support budgets or setting horizons for winding up activities and absorbing ongoing responsibilities. This is critical to refining strategies for supporting and strengthening country offices' capacity. Where short-term posts are increased, careful attention must be given to focusing terms of reference on concrete sustainable outcomes in terms of organisational capacity.
- **Oversight functions must be strengthened.** This is important for the management of the capacity-building process but it is also a proposed focus of capacity-building, in particular at the regional level.
- As discussed above, **RO oversight mechanisms** will not only allow an assessment of outcomes at the level of a country office humanitarian response capacity but will also serve to 'mainstream' humanitarian response capacities.
- Formulating **clear standards for humanitarian response** is a priority output of the capacity-building process as it both helps to focus support to COs and provides a reference for oversight. Policy and programme guidance are the necessary first reference or standard and where these have not been finalised, this is urgent. Policy and guidance must then feed into a set of simple management indicators. As the EPRP process is simplified and fully integrated into the programme process (along with better CAAC focus), it will be critical to carefully **define a set of simple management indicators to gauge CO preparedness and humanitarian response**. This will strengthen support to and oversight of country office capacity-building in the long-term and will also serve the purposes of monitoring the global capacity-building process.
- To build accountability **a more realistic framework for monitoring and evaluation** is needed with a view to guide managers of the process, both at RO/division and global levels. Commitment to specific outputs on the part of all divisions and regions involved must be ensured at the highest levels and new functions should figure in the next office management plans (OMP). At the same time, monitoring at the global level of the Phase II process must be streamlined. Priority intermediate results must be identified and linked to process indicators and annual review questions to allow effective monitoring of process. A 3-year plan for assessing performance outcomes must also be developed. Together this would be akin to an integrated monitoring and evaluation plan for the Phase II process.
- It is suggested that the **IDSC, GMT and RMTs** all be used at strategic moments in the capacity-building process as fora to resolve constraints internal to the Phase II project and to bring forward issues and constraints beyond the scope of the project. The emergency focal points network will need to coordinate a strategy for preparing for these fora.

Lessons

The above findings and conclusions also suggest a number of broad lessons that can be taken forward into other capacity-building processes within the organisation or outside.

- For a multi-lateral organisation such as UNICEF defining the scope of an internal capacity-building process can be difficult. As capacity-building with partner organisations is such a core part of the UNICEF mandate, it can become unclear where the boundary lies between internal capacity-building and ongoing business. Defining the scope loosely can lead to dispersion of efforts and slower results in terms of organisational performance.
- The process of formulating an internal capacity-building strategy can be as critical to the results as the actual validity of the strategy itself. Time must be taken to bring key actors on board, building ownership, with careful attention to the different levels of the organisation.
- It is widely emphasised in literature on capacity-building, a good strategy requires involving the right actors in any given function and defining clear and complementary roles. In developing a large organisation-wide capacity-building process, it may be difficult to define such roles and responsibilities at the outset. For example, until a concept on preparedness planning was clear, it was not possible to define the details on eventual headquarters and RO roles. However, the work of defining which actors are involved in which roles should be a clearly identified milestone early in the capacity-building process.
- Given the wide scope of the projects and the challenging nature of capacity-building, despite hard work and very significant achievements, staff have not always been able to *see* tangible changes in capacity. This can be discouraging. It is important therefore to pay attention in the design and management of projects to motivation of staff, identifying and highlighting early, real and visible "wins".
- In phase I, results achieved in a number of areas – for example, learning strategies, security, supply/logistics – have drawn heavily on building external contacts with other UN agencies or institutions, pulling in their resources, tools and experiences. This is a positive avenue to be pursued.
- A few functions within the organisation appear to be critical not only as key ingredients in improving organisational performance in the long-term, but also in management of the focused capacity-building process. These include information exchange and coordination (in essence coordination of a learning process), and oversight mechanisms. Specifically with regard to inter/intra-regional learning, two tracks appear to be important: a light simple high-frequency exchange on 'what is going on' to facilitate different offices matching up interests and linking activities, and a much more focused and structured learning cycle for any new area of programming, where some unit coordinates the documentation and analysis of country experiences for distillation into more detailed programme guidance.

- In a focused internal capacity-building process of this nature, where attention is given to organisational performance in a specific context, i.e. emergencies, it is essential to pay attention at the design stage to 'mainstreaming'. This requires identifying the specifics of when, where and how mainstreaming can be pushed. The entry points for mainstreaming that have emerged as important to date include global level strategy development mechanisms (i.e. the MTSP process), internal technical networks (e.g. the child protection network for integrating CAAC issues) and existing oversight mechanisms (annual reports, RMTs, audits, etc.).

Appendix A: Self-Assessment Guide

The following guide was circulated to ROs and headquarters divisions involved in Phase I attached to a letter by the Deputy Executive Director for Programmes and Strategy. The guide outlined a process that proved too complex for some, particularly given the short time allowed for the self-assessment and new proposal development. While the quality of analysis varied across ROs and divisions, it was followed up by email queries and interviews where necessary.

Annex III

Self-Assessment Guide: Review of current DfID/UNICEF Emergency Capacity-building Projects

The following is an outline of the proposed self-assessment process. It is designed to take no more than two days of work by those staff in the RO/Division most closely involved in the planning and implementation of the project.

As agreed at the recent DfID/UNICEF Annual Review Meeting in Kathmandu, this exercise is a necessarily rapid self-assessment as opposed to an in-depth process. It relies heavily on your integrity and rigorous analysis.

The self-assessment is structured around three broad common evaluation questions:

- How appropriate was the design of the Capacity-building project?
- How effectively has the project been managed / implemented?
- What have been the project results and how do these compare with what was planned?

Each of these is specified with further questions or issues to explore. Most importantly, answering each of these questions should contribute to clear recommendations that feed into Project Proposal Requirements as outlined in Annex IV.

Under each of the three broad evaluation questions, indications are given below as to the process by which the questions can be addressed and suggestions as to how the findings can be reported easily, simply and succinctly.

The source of information for almost all points will be your own analysis. In almost all cases we are expecting the self-assessment of RO/Division projects to involve at least 2-3 individuals. For some points indicated below, we also ask that you append to the self-assessment, any studies, activity/ project / programme evaluations or reports that substantiate and/or give depth to your analysis.

The specifics of this self-assessment tool, particularly for the first and third questions mentioned above, draw heavily from concepts of capacity and capacity-building emerging from current literature from systems, institutional and organisational development perspectives. It is increasingly accepted that a capacity-building strategy should be seen as the umbrella *operational strategy* or model for change which could include a wide range of activities: such as advocacy, training, social mobilisation, support in terms of material resources, technology inputs as well as organisational development interventions such as policy development, development of technical guidance etc. A good capacity-building strategy requires a clear analysis of: the purpose for which capacities are needed (for example, protection of children from recruitment in war); which capacities need to be strengthened to achieve that goal and whose capacities specifically; which specific factors are constraining or could liberate and strengthen the desired capacity; how the various capacities are linked at different levels of the organisation or broader network of allies and partners; and where and with whom to first intervene, i.e. a strategic choice of interventions.

Above all, a capacity-building strategy must have a clear focus on who should benefit from the changed capacities, what impact they will have on whom.

Part I. How appropriate was the design of the capacity-building project?

There are several parts to this question. It requires consideration of the following:

- How well does your capacity-building project compare with the characteristics of a good capacity-building strategy?
- How well does your choice of focus – on specific capacities targeted and on specific capacity constraints – correspond to your current assessment of priority issues/problems?
- How realistic were objectives? Can the strategy realistically be expected to bring about the necessary change in the function targeted and then in organisational capacity?

The first question may entail some effort to distil the elements of your project design from perspective of model capacity-building strategies, i.e. to identify which functions or organisational capacities are targeted; the actors whose capacities are to be strengthened and the specific constraints targeted for each function (as should be reflected in the activities). The second and third question will require a comparison of the original project design to a new capacity analysis examining what specific organisational capacities need to be strengthened to achieve the overall project objectives, e.g. analysing again what needs to be done to strengthen UNICEF advocacy and programming on CAAC.

Process:

These questions must be answered with clear reference to the detailed workplans for your RO/Division for each project for years 2000 and 2001. You can use VIPP techniques, using a different colour/shape of VIPP card for each part of steps 1 and 2 below. Alternatively, Steps 1 and 2 can be worked out using a matrix as below.

Clarify and interpret the project in terms of capacity-building objectives:

- List all the functions or capacities targeted by the various objectives -- e.g. planning functions, information dissemination, human resources recruitment. (For each function, give a cross-reference number to the relevant objective in your workplan.)
- For each function, identify the specific constraints targeted, i.e. what weaknesses in the function were the planned activities intended to address.
- Specify wherever possible the actors whose capacities are targeted.
- Note any points of your capacity-building strategy that were ill-defined or unclear in the workplans.

Review strategic choices: This requires the following steps:

- Brainstorm on and list any other specific constraints related to the targeted functions which have not yet been addressed through planned activities. Distinguish those that existed originally at the time of project design and those that emerged as the project evolved.
- Brainstorm on and list any other important functions within or closely related to your purview that negatively influence the broad capacity outcomes of the project. Again, distinguish those that existed originally at the time of project design and those that emerged as the project evolved. Also distinguish any that were addressed in another project by the RO/Division or elsewhere in the organisation.
- Rate the importance of each of the functions and, for each function, the specific constraints. Use a three point rating: 3—critical, among most important, 2 – very important, 1—important, 0—not important. (Note that the rating should cover the functions outlined in Step 1, as well as those listed in the brainstorming mentioned above.)

Note: Where ratings are required, we suggest that each individual staff member formulate their own rating for the point in question (writing these on VIPP cards or other) and that the group then compare individual ratings and discuss the different rationale behind them with a view to them coming up with one common rating.

Conclusions: Discuss the implications of the above, in terms of:

- How your capacity-building strategy can or could have been clarified,
- To what degree it was realistic (how critical were the un-addressed constraints),
- Whether certain key functions or capacities that have been targeted in the first phase of the projects need continued strengthening and, if so, what specific constraints need to be targeted,
- What new functions need to be strengthened and how.

Notes on presentation:

The results of steps 1 and 2 can be presented in the Matrix below. Shading or highlighting can be used to distinguish what was addressed by the original project, what

was not and any constraints that have since emerged. Include the results of your brainstorming (Step 2) in the same table.

Functions	Ref. to obj. # in workplan	Rating of Importance	Constraints addressed	Actors targeted	Rating of Importance

Your conclusions from step 3 can be presented in narrative form.

Part II. How effectively has project implementation been managed?

The self-assessment in terms of management of the implementation process makes reference to a number of expected project management practices (adapted from the Programme Audit Self-Assessment Tool). Each one is translated into specific points relevant to the context of projects managed by ROs/HQ Divisions and capacity-building projects in particular. The latter require emphasis on a strategic overview bringing together a wide range of activities and an iterative planning and review process.

Programme strategies clarity and application

- The strategy as described above was articulated and understood by the core group of staff involved in implementation.
- Strategies are commonly understood by RO/Division staff as relating to functions that fit within RO/Division accountabilities and work plan.

Setting priorities

- Priorities within the capacity-building project were set (in some form of documentation or explicit discussion)
- Capacity-building fit in overall priorities of RO/Division
- Capacity-building priorities were followed
- New capacity-building priorities were decided upon through review of original priorities and workplan (i.e. evolving Capacity-building process)

Workplanning/Project Plans of Action (PPAs)

- Specific workplans related to project were set in first two months of year
- Relevant partners (internal or external) were adequately involved

Programme Reviews

- Periodic analysis of progress and results was carried out (in addition to Kathmandu review)
- Shortcomings and constraints were analysed in such a way as to guide future action (in addition to Kathmandu review)
- Relevant partners were involved (internal and external)
- If held, reviews were documented

Monitoring and Evaluation

- Monitoring and review plans were developed as part of workplans
- Some form of measure of progress was identified for each activity and the project overall
- Planned M&E activities were carried out
- Measures/assessments/evaluations served to guide project management

Human Resources

- Staff and consultants assigned to carry out projects have adequate skills and knowledge in the areas required
- Staff development has been planned for staff members, where necessary to build skills and knowledge
- Adequate numbers of staff were assigned

Funding and Funds Management

- Project has had adequate funding
- Pace of implementation of funds has been as planned

Process:

- 1) Performance vis-à-vis each issue should be rated on a scale of 1 to 6 for each project and for each year, using a scale similar to the Performance Appraisal System (PAS).
Note comments on the process for rating under Part I above.
 - 6 -- In every aspect, continually and substantially exceeded expectations
 - 5 -- In many aspects, exceeded expectations
 - 4 -- Fully met and in some ways exceeded expectations
 - 3 -- Met most expectations, however, there is room for improvement
 - 2 -- To a large extent did not meet expectations
 - 1 -- Did not meet expectations at all
- 2) For any of the issues receiving a rating of three or lower, discuss the underlying factors and propose corrective actions that can be taken.

Notes on presentation:

A simple matrix can be used to present the ranking on each specific issue for each project. A narrative text can be used to summarise the key areas needing attention and the corrective actions agreed upon.

Issues	Rating Project 1		Rating Project 2		Rating Project 3	
	2000	2001	2000	2001	2000	2001
Programme strategies clarity and application						
The strategy as described above was articulated and understood by the core group of staff involved in implementation.						
Strategies are commonly understood by RO/Division staff as relating to functions that fit within RO/Division accountabilities and work plan.						
Etc.						

Part III. How effective has the project been?

This broad evaluation questions is translated into the following more specific questions:

- How does progress compare with the project plans?
- What have been the key constraints?
- What have been the project results?
- How has UNICEF capacity changed?
- What has been the impact on the wider network of actors to which UNICEF contributes?

Process:

Measuring progress vis-à-vis plans: For each planned activity in the Project, identify whether it has been completed, in progress or not undertaken. If an activity has been undertaken, rate the degree to which results to date match with expectations using the same six-point scale as in Part II.

Analysis of constraints: For each activity, discuss and identify what are the key constraints you have faced. Note that some of the constraints faced may have been issues that could have been addressed through design of the capacity-building project (as explored in Part 1) and some may have been internal management issues (as explored in Part II). Where you have managed to respond to constraints, please describe how. Where constraints persist, how will they be handled in the future.

Description of results and their impact on capacity:

- Describe what has been achieved, either in terms of intermediate milestones or outputs¹⁰ of activities?
- Describe in what way outputs have influenced targeted capacities. Try to link your description to the broad categories of results that follow:
- Improved clarity about organisational mandate related to overall objective
- Changed/established roles of different parts of the organisation in relation to overall objective (which roles?)
- Strengthened authority of relevant actors to fulfil their roles and responsibility (whose? which roles and responsibilities?)
- Strengthened or newly developed rules or procedures in support of different actors roles and responsibilities (whose? which roles and responsibilities?)
- Strengthened motivational influences (changes to attitudes/values, incentives, leadership commitment and clarity)
- Strengthened resources necessary for this function (specify financial, material, information, technological, human resources (number, skills/knowledge))
- Strengthened networks within UNICEF (which actors involved? which functions are linked?)
- Strengthened connections between UNICEF and the wider network (specify)
- Describe any capacity outcomes, i.e. any sign of improved performance in specific targeted capacities or in UNICEF's overall capacity in advocacy or programming for CAAC, humanitarian response, or landmines advocacy or programming. What signs indicate a change in these capacities?

Notes on presentation:

Steps 1 to 3(b) can be presented with bullet point text using the same headings for each activity:

- Activity name
- Activity status: completed/ in-progress/ not undertaken
- Rating of activity results
- Constraints
- Description of intermediate results or outputs
- Categorisation of influence on capacity

Activities should be grouped together according to the specific organisational capacity or function they address (e.g. training function, country programme planning function, etc.), whether or not your detailed project Workplan is organised as such.

Step 3(c) can be summarised in narrative text as broader capacity outcomes may be the result of a combination of activities.

¹⁰ See UNICEF definitions in PPTM, also in Annex IV.

Please append any studies, activity / project / programme evaluations or reports that substantiate and/or give depth to your analysis, particularly for Step 3.

Part IV. Overall conclusions & lessons

The self-assessment should conclude with a review of your findings and conclusions from Parts 1 to III. Consider lessons for your own RO/Division and those you feel are of relevance to other parts of the organisation. Please consider the following questions:

- Are there areas where you see greater potential for results than others?
- Are there areas of capacity-building that are difficult to address, yet critical?
- What are the key questions that you as project managers and more broadly as Emergency Capacity-building Focal Points see as needing to be asked at future reviews or more structured evaluations? What issues need continued attention in regular reviews?

Summarise also the main thrust of conclusions as to the direction that your Capacity-building efforts will take, particularly as relevant for the Project Proposal Requirements as outlined in Annex IV.

Process: Open discussion

Presentation: Narrative summary of discussion

Appendix B: Interviewees and Workshop Participants

Interviewees

Polly Brennan
Ted Chaiban
Shamsul Farooq
John Flanagan
Bill Gent
Gareth Jones
Nils Kastberg
Jean-Claude Legrand
Iain Levine
Yoshimi Muto
Viktor Nylund
Francisco Quesney
Everett Ressler
Jenni Wolfson

Workshop participants

Regional participants

Ted Chaiban
Sara Norton-Staal
Nidya Quiroz
Reiko Nishijima
Viktor Nylund
Terry Tanzer
Osvaldo Legon
Jacqueline Peters

Headquarters participants

Jim Arnold
Ole Boye
Polly Brennan
Silvia Danailov
Shamsul Farooq
John Flanagan
Bill Gent
Lynn Henderson
Iain Levine
Chris Maxfield
Nick Morin
Yoshimi Muto
Geeta Narayan

Francisco Quesney
Everett Ressler
Bert Theuermann
Jenni Wolfson
Peter Crowley
Pilar Aguilar
Mark Henderson
Christian Clark
Kate Alley
Fuad Issa
Isabelle Roy
Andre Roberfroid
Lauchlan Munro
Carol Bellamy
Nils Kastberg
Geoff Wiffin