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**DESK REVIEW ON
UNICEF
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE CAPACITY**

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Desk Review on UNICEF Humanitarian Response Capacity

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Abstract

This desk review has reviewed two types of documents. One has included a corpus of 30 evaluations carried out between 1989 and the present. The lessons learned and conclusions from these evaluations provide a chronicle of UNICEF's experience in responding to complex emergencies. Another set of documents includes manuals and official correspondence that lay out policy and programming objectives. These recent statements document how UNICEF has reacted to the lessons and conclusions throughout a decade of evaluations. A comparison between what formal and informal evaluations have said about UNICEF's performance in humanitarian crisis, and how UNICEF has responded, leads to the principal objective of this desk review, i.e. to call attention to present strengths, recent improvements and remaining gaps in UNICEF's humanitarian response.

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Executive Summary

1. The objectives of this desk review have been, firstly, to review the evaluative conclusions and lessons on programmatic and operational strengths and weaknesses in UNICEF's capacity to respond to humanitarian crisis throughout the previous decade. Secondly, the review has sought to summarise the evolution of policy and procedural changes undertaken by the organisation to improve its humanitarian response. Thirdly, through a comparison between the first and second exercises, the desk review was to call attention to how fully UNICEF has drawn on a decade of evaluative conclusions in making changes to policy, programming and operations. The comparison between what formal and informal evaluations have said about UNICEF's performance in humanitarian crises, and how UNICEF has responded with programming and procedural changes, was expected to suggest **“what broad conclusions and lessons can then be drawn on programmatic and operational improvements, strengths and remaining gaps in UNICEF humanitarian response.”**¹

2. A singular theme has emerged from the lessons that this exercise has assembled about improvements, strengths and remaining gaps in UNICEF's humanitarian response. It is that UNICEF's decision to “mainstream programming in unstable situations within the overall context of the Country Programme”² has had far-reaching implications; and that **the organisation has not yet had the time, nor until recently the resources or organisational focus, to fully address some of the implications of its expanded resolve to respond in a more principled and coherent fashion to complex emergencies.**

3. In responding to the mandate to “mainstream”, UNICEF staff are expected to anticipate the possibility of instability and fully incorporate it into their country programming strategy. They are expected to be ready to address the immediate needs of the population in crisis as well as to contribute to the long-term development of a society's capacity to realise human rights. **Yet “mainstreaming” emergency response poses a challenge that is perhaps more complex than envisioned originally.** This is in part because promoting long-term human welfare has typically involved rather different strategies from those that address the immediate needs of a population without clean water, basic health services and sufficient nutrients. Inputs, strategies and objectives in the two cases can differ strikingly.

4. Yet, for UNICEF, the commitment to protection of children's rights and to a human rights-based approach to programming has provided a common language lending coherence to the principles of programming in both stable and unstable or crisis contexts.

¹ Evaluation, Policy and Planning, Terms of Reference: Desk Review of Evaluative Work on UNICEF Humanitarian Response Capacity, 23 June 2000.

² Memo from the Executive Director to Regional Directors and HQ Division Directors, Martigny Follow-up and DfID Funding, 31 August 1999.

This language of human rights has helped bridge the gap, in principle, between the old “regular” and “complex emergency” programming, between long-term development for building social capital and infrastructure and targeting immediate support to life-saving services for vulnerable populations in a crisis.

5. While this coherence between the old “regular” and “emergency” programming is thus achieved conceptually, in terms of over-arching goals and principles, **questions remain as to how a human rights-based approach to programming and humanitarian principles coalesce in practical operational guidance**. The challenge to do so, raised frequently in meetings and forums, is a complex one, not only because the functions that human rights-based programming and humanitarian principles require staff to perform are unfamiliar, but because they would be difficult even if they were familiar. Human rights-based programming and application of humanitarian principles in complex emergencies require a different set of skills and different types of leadership. There are implications for how UNICEF interacts with other agencies, for the kind of information country offices require when designing their programmes and for the level and kinds of expertise required to perform these different activities. And since many of the sites of intervention involve urgent response to survival and protection issues, there is the further issue of juggling long- and short-term response quickly and efficiently. UNICEF has advanced policy statements defining what a human rights-based approach to programming is and the implications it has for programme process. Recent training materials on humanitarian principles have translated the relevance of the commitment to protect child rights, the human rights-based approach to programming and humanitarian principles for programming in unstable contexts.

6. This review’s observations about UNICEF’s strengths or about those areas where improvement may be needed derive from this central issue: **the translation of the principles of human rights-based programming and humanitarian principles into concrete operational guidance within the context of a recent and ambitious policy mandate to integrate regular programmes and complex emergency responses**.

7. This desk review is **organised into seven sections**, each treating a key ingredient in responding to complex emergencies, reviewing the evaluative lessons over a decade, and describing what UNICEF has done and still needs to do to respond to these lessons. Following are some of the key conclusions.

8. One of the most pressing dilemmas UNICEF faces is to arrive at a clear, shared understanding about what exactly are the practices that will link programming strategies and policy norms, i.e. what activities country offices should support in order to most effectively put the principle of promoting the rights of children and women into concrete practice. UNICEF headquarters is at the point of issuing a series of Technical Notes intended to provide more concrete guidance on sector- and issue-specific programme strategies. **The challenge will be to ensure that this guidance integrates the human rights-based approach to programming and humanitarian principles, as well as**

illustrates how programmes can accommodate the variable stability in programme contexts and interventions with longer-term vision designed to contribute to an environment conducive to the respect of human rights.

9. A further area requiring greater clarity on “best practices” is the very complex issue of setting conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is widely agreed that UNICEF should negotiate the conditions of its intervention with local authorities or, as the case may be, with non-state entities. These conditions should include guarantees about non-discriminatory implementation of programmes, staff security and some monitoring of compliance. Now is the time for UNICEF to **replace the present case-by-case approach to setting and enforcing these conditions with well-informed guidelines** for negotiating conditions and for responding to non-compliance.

10. The stakes for promoting inter-agency coordination have risen following the UN reforms begun in 1997 and pressure from donors. UNICEF has played a major role in promoting greater coordination by assuming leadership roles in inter-agency bodies. These efforts have been undertaken in order to establish the organisation’s own niche within the inter-agency context, pushing the cause of child rights further and ensuring effective humanitarian response. UNICEF’s contribution, however, remains at the personal level. It may now be time to constitute a formal body within UNICEF with institutional standing, to identify and take steps toward promoting greater inter-agency coordination. **This will require a clear analysis of the perceived benefits of supporting inter-agency coordination and how the organisation should best balance the various underlying objectives.**

11. With regard to information management for planning, monitoring and evaluation, the review noted a consistency in recommendations throughout the past decade: the availability of information to guide programmes has consistently been problematic. Further analysis suggests two issues: first, the very analytical framework at the basis of assessment, monitoring and evaluation. A reliable framework for analysing the potential for political unrest is essential if country programmes are to confidently conceive of their complex emergency response in the context of a regular programme. The **development of a framework for analysing vulnerability** is occurring throughout headquarters. **The work is urgent, and it would be expedited by bringing together the different strands of effort from different divisions. The second area for further examination is the connection between the programming process and M&E systems, which exist in policy and guidance but remain weak in practice.**

12. In the area of funding, UNICEF has taken sensible measures for making funds available on short notice at the outbreak of complex emergencies. Larger amounts can now be made available and the procedures are less cumbersome. Attention should now be turned to **maintaining funding in what have become known as “forgotten” emergencies**, humanitarian crises where the original outbreak of the crisis has faded from public memory and where the process of rehabilitation has begun.

13. Responding effectively to complex emergencies relies on having essential supplies available. UNICEF has improved the mechanisms for making these supplies available through stockpiling in Copenhagen and, as needed temporarily, in regional or sub-regional locations. It is imperative that UNICEF secures a complete supply chain in each situation and that Supply Division and supply operations at field level are involved in any emergency from the first day and continue to be fully engaged to ensure the rapid availability of appropriate essential supplies. While covering only that part of the supply chain controlled by Supply Division, the planned review of this division's operation does appear important and urgent.

14. UNICEF is keenly aware of the need to make competent professionals rapidly available in crisis situations. Rosters have been developed, training programmes designed and implemented, and NGOs have been identified whose staff can be seconded to UNICEF. Nothing can substitute, however, for the creation of in-house expertise. Borrowing from NGOs does not accomplish this purpose. Training can supplement and sometimes stand in for experience, but it cannot replace it. The rosters have not worked very well. **It is important that these strategies be weighed realistically in terms of how much each can be expected to contribute to resolving human resource gaps.** Engaging more staff members who are willing and committed to making a career of missions in conflict situations may be the only assured tactic for solving UNICEF's staffing issue in the long run.

15. Reference has been made by evaluators, by representatives in the course of their debriefings, and in the context of the few interviews conducted by this desk review, to the lack of clarity in how roles and responsibilities are allocated among divisions at headquarters. Some remedial action would appear necessary. Thorough structural reform is probably not the answer. Instead, UNICEF might consider **investing the existing Inter-Divisional Crisis Preparedness Working Group, or a similar body, with the institutional standing to oversee, refine and shape the synergy among headquarters divisions.**

Introduction

This has been the decade of complex emergencies, and a crucial one for UNICEF. The number and complexity of emergencies have increased, as have their risk to personnel and their demand on programme resources. This is a desk review of how UNICEF has responded to this decade of trials with policy guidance and procedural changes.

1. Background and Context

The term “complex emergency” was coined to distinguish emergencies caused by political conflict from those caused by natural disasters. This review treats political emergencies exclusively and refers to them as complex emergencies throughout. Their singular characteristic is the inability of a nation state to maintain social order and the consequent failure of a public sector to provide basic services. The root causes of political instability and the breakdown of social order are important to identify because these root causes ought, in principle, to serve as the foundation of a strategy for diminishing their consequences and restoring, where possible, a more lasting political order. Three explanations, or root causes, account for much of the turmoil that UNICEF and other international organisations confront.

The end of the Cold War: Most explanations begin with changes set in motion when the Soviet Union ceased being a world power. The two power blocs vied for world influence by providing financial and political support to leaders who served their political purposes. When this contest for influence ended, the withdrawal of support to these leaders created a power vacuum, into which rushed new claimants who competed with or overthrew previous regimes. Whatever political stability had been maintained previously by fiat was replaced with insurrection and disorder.

The failure of foreign aid: Aid had often been the humanitarian guise given to the financial support for strong regimes expressing allegiance to one bloc or another. This too ended when there was no further justification. Declining aid and the declining resources for public sectors contributed to the rising political disorder and resulting conflict. But it is important to recognise that it is not just a matter of declining aid quantities. Aid might have had a humanitarian face, but it did not always serve humanitarian objectives and even more rarely addressed issues of social justice. Foreign aid rarely aimed to promote a more equitable distribution of its benefits, much less introduce measures or values that would lead to a more equitable distribution of a country’s resources.³ In the absence of any deliberate focus on equity and social justice, aid frequently contributed to the concentration of wealth in countries and the creation of elites, with little commitment to a population’s general welfare. Increased inequities

³ Jim Freedman, “The Case for Equity” IN J. Freedman (ed.), *Transforming Development, Foreign Aid for a Changing World* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000).

would have created fragile political environments and would have allowed the increase in poverty levels, even without the withdrawal of financial support as the contest for world influence between superpowers ended.

Barriers to participating in a globalising economy: A leitmotif of aid in this decade has been to put it in the service of trade. The World Bank has urged recipients of its loans, through sometimes-harsh conditions on its disbursements, to reduce their commitment to public welfare and allow resources instead to promote the capacity of national enterprises to compete in the international market place. There is considerable controversy about whether nudging emerging economies in this way toward the international market place has been a good idea. In hindsight, it seems dubious that international trade has been capable of working to the advantage of all trading partners, and not just to the advantage of those with the most clout in the market. The policy of pushing marginal economies toward external trade severely affected their capacity to meet the basic needs of their citizens. Other countries, especially those with weak links to the major trading blocks, found themselves locked out and marginalised from the market place. Declining economic resources added to the increasingly fragile political environment and, as the decade wore on, more and more countries found themselves beset by social despair and the resulting internal political conflict.

The number of countries where the United Nations has recognised “formal complex emergencies” increased from 6 in 1989 to 9 in 1991 to 11 in 1993 and then to 13 in 1995. In 1998, there were 15 so-called formal complex emergencies and, in 1999, there were 17.⁴ The number of formal complex emergencies has risen on average by one per year over 11 years. If one uses a less rigid definition of “formal complex emergencies,” the numbers are much greater. In 1991, UNICEF emergency funds were dispersed to 25 countries. (91: 1) Four years later, a subsequent UNICEF report counted “25 existing complex emergencies, and at least 10 more where the potential for violent political disorder is a strong possibility.”(95b: 3) In January 2000, UNICEF’s Executive Director’s annual report to the Economic and Social Council Executive Board noted that there are “now more than 50 programme countries experiencing some form of crisis and requiring humanitarian and disaster relief assistance.”⁵ The Executive Director has drawn attention to the “unprecedented and ever increasing number of crises and emergencies around the world,” and the need for “more flexible programming and operational procedures that facilitate adequate response.”⁶ This has all transpired as increasing numbers of agencies and NGOs are eager to provide services in complex emergencies, challenging the once-prominent role that UNICEF enjoyed in complex emergency response.

⁴ United Nations Department of Public Information, 1999.

⁵ UNICEF Executive Director, Annual Report to the ECOSOC Executive Board – Progress Report, 31 January 2000.

⁶ Memo from UNICEF Executive Director to Regional Directors and HQ Division Directors, Martigny Follow-up and DfID Funding, 31 August 1999.

Increasing numbers are a serious concern. An equally serious concern has been the failure of international efforts to restore order. Some countries, such as Cambodia and El Salvador, have taken hesitant steps toward achieving political stability. But post-conflict rehabilitation is rare. Nine out of the eleven formal complex emergencies recognised in 1993 continue to appear on the list of formal complex emergencies in 1999.⁷ Old complex emergencies remain as new ones emerge. The phrase “chronic instability” is often used to refer to the persistence of political instability requiring protracted support from UNICEF and other international organisations.

The frequency of conflicts and their protracted nature have tested UNICEF’s capacity to respond. But so has the nature of the conflict, the warfare among rebels or factions or warlords that have created a climate of insecurity. Relief supplies in these crisis environments have been seen to fuel the conflict as much as they reduce them. The failure of traditional response strategies has provided the occasion, indeed the necessity, to rethink what is the most appropriate response under such circumstances. UNICEF, in particular, has sought to address the root causes of the conflict. While continuing to provide relief supplies appropriate to the crisis, UNICEF has incorporated a strategy to redress social justice and violations of human rights by helping to build legal arguments and a moral culture among international humanitarian actors that bring pressure to bear on human rights violators. This pressure has taken a variety of forms, but increasingly UNICEF has recognised that it can no longer respond to a crisis in an impartial or neutral manner. Taking a political stance is inevitable, and defining where and how to exert political pressure, setting political limits to providing humanitarian response, developing the legal instruments to justify these actions and training staff for carrying them out have figured more and more in UNICEF policy.

The decade has witnessed a fundamental shift in UNICEF’s mission. The Convention on Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly in November 1989, became part of UNICEF’s mission statement in 1996. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that the General Assembly mandate a study on the protection of children affected by armed conflict. Graca Machel headed the study and in 1996, the study made a ten-point call for urgent action, including the explicit implementation of international standards, monitoring/reporting violations of child rights, promoting physical and psychological recovery for children, demobilisation of child soldiers, increasing commitment to assist internally-displaced children and ending the scourge of landmines. A Special Representative of the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict was named to keep issues of children high on the peace, development and security agendas. Many of these ten points have figured significantly in guiding UNICEF’s shift toward fully integrating a human rights perspective into its policy and programming initiatives. As UNICEF has moved to fully incorporate its response to complex emergencies within the regular programming, the advocacy of measures to protect children and women from human rights violation and armed conflict has figured in all aspects of UNICEF programming.

⁷ United Nations Department of Public Information, 1999.

2. The Martigny Process

The shift to integrate human rights advocacy into all programmes, emergency and regular, culminated in the Martigny Consultation, a meeting of UNICEF representatives from emergency countries in September 1998. Recommendations emerging from the consultations were aimed at enhancing UNICEF's capacity to better analyse and respond to the needs and rights of children and women caught in situations of political instability.⁸ The Martigny Consultation initiated a period of reflection and rapid change in UNICEF, internally referred to as the Martigny Process.

A conclusion of the Martigny Consultation was that significant capacity needed to be built within UNICEF to respond more flexibly and predictably to situations of sudden crisis and chronic instability. UNICEF was prepared to commit funds from General Resources. A proposal for additional funds was submitted to DfID in May 1999. The funds for enhancing UNICEF capacity covered three projects: (1) to put in practice a strategy for reducing the impact of armed conflict on children; (2) to strengthen UNICEF's humanitarian response in crisis situations within an inter-agency framework; and (3) to put in practice a strategy for diminishing the impact of landmines on children and women.

The first significant output of the follow-up to the Martigny Consultation was a statement of UNICEF's Core Corporate Commitments in Emergencies in January 2000.⁹ An early draft of the Core Corporate Commitment was finalised at the same time that the work plans for implementing the three proposals funded by UNICEF and DfID were accepted, and together these two documents have provided the basis for considering some of the operational implications of outcomes of the process. The Office of Emergency Programmes, EMOPS, called attention to the importance of closer linkages among UNICEF divisions, the roles for each, and the need for innovative inputs from information technology and telecommunications. Two new bodies, the Inter-Divisional Standing Committee for Children in unstable situations and the Inter-Divisional Crisis Preparedness Working Group, were to assume responsibility for monitoring and implementing the programmatic and operational recommendations as they were proposed. Operational initiatives have subsequently been given increased attention. In March 2000, a proposal for \$US4 million was submitted for additional support in order to rapidly increase UNICEF operational systems capacities and to complement the projects that had been initiated under the first DfID grant of £9 million.

The proposals emanating from the projects funded from the UNICEF/DfID proposals and their follow-up were intended to enhance UNICEF programming capacity. The Core Corporate Commitments and other initiatives aimed to improve UNICEF operational response capacity. Proposals for enhancement measures in programming and operations are now combined in work plans monitored by the Inter-Divisional Crisis

⁸ UNICEF, Chronology of Events Regarding the Martigny Process, June 2000.

⁹ UNICEF Executive Board, UNICEF Core Corporate Commitments in Emergencies, May 2000.

Preparedness Working Group. Merging programme and operational initiatives is expected to provide more cohesiveness to the overall direction of policy and procedural changes emanating from the Martigny Consultation and its follow-up.

3. The Desk Review

This desk review examines the extent to which UNICEF's internal reform reflects the concerns about its response to complex emergencies expressed in the record of evaluative exercises over the previous decade.

Two types of documents were reviewed. One included a corpus of 30 evaluations carried out between 1989 and the present (Annex 1). Some of these documents were formal, systematic evaluations that collected and built on data collection, while others were personal reflections and debriefing notes on the occasion of a staff member leaving a post. Still others were debriefing notes following consultations with senior management and country representatives. This corpus included reviews by academics, other agencies or international bodies that addressed UNICEF's performance in one or a number of complex emergencies. It provides a reliable record of what UNICEF has learned from its experiences in complex emergencies over little more than a decade.

Another included how UNICEF responded to these experiences, according to reports to the Executive Board, programming and policy manuals, as well as official correspondence that laid out policy and programming objectives or intentions. As might be expected, the decade of correspondence to and from the Executive Board begins with a gradual evolution as the Executive Board received updates on how UNICEF policy was changing, how its linkages and collaborations with other agencies should change or how it should seek to more firmly embrace the Convention on the Rights of the Child in its programming. But shortly after the first Martigny Consultation in September 1998, the evolution is more akin to a revolution. The Martigny Consultation and its follow-up have produced wide-ranging plans of action, beginning with the original UNICEF/DfID proposals up to the most recent deliberations of the Crisis Preparedness Working Group.

The lessons learned and conclusions from a decade's evaluations provide a chronicle of real experience, while the programme guidance directives and record of procedural changes document how UNICEF's principal planning bodies reacted to them. The juxtaposition of these types of documents charts how the organisation responded, or not, to specific exigencies in complex emergencies. It reveals what UNICEF chose to learn, how it interpreted the lessons provided and what the organisation eventually did about these lessons. Sometimes, the organisational response to these experiences seems uniquely innovative and somewhat beyond what one would have expected an organisation to learn from the lessons. In some cases, UNICEF acted very much as the conclusions suggested and, in others, it responded little, if at all. Setting the policy changes against the backdrop of the evolution of evaluative exercises provokes reflection on how rapidly UNICEF responds and the extent to which its responses correspond to the

constraints as they are described. It also provokes reflection on the quality of the evaluative exercises themselves, how systematic and informed they are, and how useful the evaluative exercises have been in solving real problems.

This report plays the two types of documents against each other, each of the seven sections discussing a separate set of related issues.

Section 1: Humanitarian principles and human rights

Section 2: Inter-agency coordination

Section 3: Information management for planning, monitoring and evaluation

Section 4: Funding

Section 5: Input management

Section 6: Human resources

Section 7: Allocation of roles and responsibilities

Each issue-oriented section begins with a review of the issues themselves, the principal concerns and challenges that represent contemporary concerns. A review of what the evaluative exercises have said on the matter(s) throughout the decade follows in the sub-section, Decade Trends. This sub-section follows the general course of this evolution and may not specifically trace how thinking has changed on each of the issues outlined in the first section. Some of the evaluative exercises repeated the same issues, conclusions and cautions during an eleven-year period, which suggests neglect on UNICEF's part to learn the lessons they sought to convey. Other issues, conclusions and cautions have changed over time as the knowledge of complex emergencies increased or as UNICEF has tried new strategies.

A third sub-section in each of the issue-oriented sections briefly reviews the policy guidance and procedural changes recommended or implemented following the Martigny Consultation. The initiatives are numerous and often overlapping, and this sub-section can only pretend to provide a summary update of how UNICEF is responding to a decade's evaluative conclusions. But when this response, in the form of policy and procedural directives, is considered in light of the evolution of evaluative conclusions, there is a unique opportunity to observe how UNICEF draws on experience. If the initiatives arising out of the Martigny Process respond in an innovative fashion to the evaluators' concerns, the capacity to respond — and indeed the response itself — is a mark of UNICEF's strengths. If not, then presumably there is scope for further work in this area.

A final section relies on the juxtaposition of the types of documents to provide a commentary on where UNICEF's strengths seem to lie and where further follow-up might be required. There are some distinctive strengths. UNICEF has recognised the need to move beyond impartiality and become politically engaged, and has done so by embracing human rights advocacy at many levels. This strength is reinforced by considerable deliberations following the Martigny Consultation. There is scope for further work in some areas. Many evaluators have noted, for example, that UNICEF's emphasis on advocacy and implementing a human rights-based programme entails

making some distinct changes in how it responds to complex emergencies, how it secures funding and makes it more accessible, how it collects and uses information and how effectively it ensures high-calibre staff for its complex emergency programmes.

4. Strengths and Areas Requiring Follow-up — An Analytical Framework

Areas of strength and areas requiring follow-up are identified with reference to specific factors that are regarded as essential in any organisation's capacity to meet specific goals. In the case of UNICEF, these goals include its capacity to respond quickly to complex emergencies, to do so in the context of a regular programme that has the programming and operational resources to mobilise internal resources, to draw effectively on the resources of key partners, and to use these resources in ways that not only meet immediate needs, but that also promote an equitable and just political environment in the medium term. Specific functions need to be performed in order to achieve these goals. In relation to each function, a network of actors can be said to perform well and less well depending on how well the network of actors, i.e. the organisations, function. Some of the essential characteristics for the effective performance by a network of actors make up a framework for analysing UNICEF's performance. This analytical framework for organisational capacity draws on recent work by UNICEF on capacity building for responding to crises.¹⁰

Six characteristics of organisational capacity provide a framework for reviewing strengths and areas for follow-up phrased as questions:

1. Are the roles, which are the responsibilities of different internal divisions and individuals, clearly delineated and complementary? Are the functions required for responding quickly and effectively to crises arising out of political instability clearly delineated in UNICEF?
2. In responding to a complex emergency, do the key actors have the authority to act as necessary? Is the designation of authority clear for the various functions required in UNICEF's response to complex emergencies, i.e. in raising funds, ensuring a trained and competent staff, ensuring that accurate information is obtained and acted upon?
3. Is there a clear organisational mission, which not only articulates an organisational culture but which also articulates a clear relationship between organisational norms and organisational practice, i.e. how an organisation is expected to actualise these norms? Has a clear link been documented between UNICEF's goal to carry out human rights-based programming and the advocacy that workers are expected to practice in the field? Do the functions that workers in the field are expected to perform clearly contribute and correspond to the mission that UNICEF espouses?

¹⁰ UNICEF, Capacity Analysis Framework, draft 2000; and UNICEF, EPP, EMOPS and WCARO, Workshop on Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation of Capacity Building Adapted for Unstable Contexts, 19-23 September 1999.

4. Are policies, programme guidance for applying these policies, and the appropriate procedures in place to facilitate the performance of basic functions? Are there specific organisational protocols in place in UNICEF for mobilising staff and funds quickly to meet the requirements of a range of adequate responses as may be required in different circumstances?
5. Are the necessary resources (human, financial, technological and informational) available to support the needs for the resources that a range of circumstances may require? Specifically regarding information, are the procedures and resources in place to ensure UNICEF is able to acquire and utilise information in ways that provide timely information on which to base crucial programme decisions?
6. Do external relations with partners specifically promote the organisation's capacity to meet its goals? Is there an appropriate balance in UNICEF between its commitment to building a common purpose internally and developing strategic alliances among sister agencies and implementation partners externally?

5. Strengths and Areas Requiring Follow-up — A Summary

These six characteristics provide a framework for offering commentary on UNICEF's areas of strength and areas where there is scope for follow-up, deduced from UNICEF's responses to a decade's evaluative conclusions. The final sub-section in each of the issue-oriented sections draws on this broad analytical framework for making specific observations.

Section 1

Humanitarian Principles and Human Rights

1. The Issues

UNICEF's Mission Statement, adopted by the Executive Board in January 1996, stated that UNICEF is to be "guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and strives to establish those rights as enduring ethical principles and international standards of behaviour towards children."¹¹ It was a landmark decision. At the 1997 first regular session to the Executive Board, UNICEF presented a policy statement that included commitment to promote humanitarian principles,¹² which have since been articulated to include: the humanitarian imperative (access), impartiality, neutrality, accountability, the principle of "do no harm", independence of humanitarian assistance and a broader recognition of protection as a key part of humanitarian assistance. UNICEF has subsequently drawn on Graca Machel's report on the "Impact of Armed Conflict on Children".¹³ The Executive Director has lobbied for a Peace and Security Agenda for Children. These various statements trace a shift in UNICEF toward commitment to the protection of all children's rights, the adoption of a human rights-based programming approach to programming and commitment to a broader principled humanitarian response. This policy shift has been significant in defining the organisation's response to challenges posed by complex emergencies, but it has also posed challenges in programme formulation.

Embracing the protection of children and women as part of promoting children's and women's rights has required UNICEF to take firm ethical stands against the violations that repressive regimes and warring factions perpetrate against innocent civilians. This commitment implies a challenging interpretation of humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. While not taking sides in a conflict, it compels UNICEF to take a stand against human rights violations, and whether defending the right to health or the right to a fair trial, UNICEF must "respond with the appropriate assistance, advocacy and action".¹⁴ This has been a bold initiative, since UNICEF's support of these ethical values implicitly challenges the right of states to exercise a sovereign prerogative in the way they treat their citizens. This UNICEF position has subsequently been articulated by the Secretary General and become known as the Annan Doctrine¹⁵, i.e. the right of international organisations to accord greater priority to the rights of individuals than to the rights of states.

¹¹ UNICEF Executive Board, Children and Women in Emergencies: Strategic Priorities and Operational Concerns for UNICEF, 20-24 January 1997 (E/ICEF/1997/7).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ UNICEF, Briefing Notes on the Graca Machel Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, IN Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF Staff Working Papers, Evaluation, Policy and Planning Series, Number EPP – 99 – 001.

¹⁴ UNICEF, "Humanitarian Principles Training: A Child Rights Protection Approach to Complex Emergencies", 29 October 1999.

¹⁵ Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", *The Economist*, 18 September 1999.

In order to implement its programmes to conform with these ethical values and to ensure the security of its staff, UNICEF has experimented with consent frameworks, ground rules, modalities of conditionality and formulas for compliance — sometimes negotiated with warring factions, sometimes with repressive regimes and sometimes with non-state entities — to establish the basis for humanitarian intervention. First and foremost among the issues raised by the precarious interventions in conflict areas as well as implementing the ethical values in the Convention on the Rights to the Child has been the following:

1. What ways and means should be explored for setting conditions to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, through negotiations with local authorities and in some instances non-state entities, in order to promote the rights of children and women, protect children and women from the effects of armed conflict and safeguard UNICEF staff?

Converting the ethical values and imperatives espoused in UNICEF policy into executable programmes, i.e. things that practitioners do, has posed an equally difficult challenge for UNICEF.

It has always been difficult for UNICEF to find ways to respond to complex emergencies that meet the immediate needs of individuals in circumstances of crisis, and that also meet UNICEF’s own high standards for providing services with enduring and sustainable benefits. UNICEF’s engagement in complex emergencies throughout the decade has raised the dilemma of how to meet the immediate services needs (i.e. clean water for a population in crisis) in a way that builds sustainable physical infrastructure and social capital. Making the delivery of relief supplies contribute to a sustainable development, or at least take into account longer-term and interconnected issues of the complex emergency (i.e. “connectedness” as defined in DAC/OECD¹⁶), supports an eventual transition from response to crisis contexts. However this has been difficult in most cases since the urgent needs in complex emergencies include consumables, like supplementary feeding or vaccines, which make little contribution to longer-term or medium-term rehabilitation. Furthermore, and perhaps even more importantly, the programmes for distributing these inputs have not always met the high standards of achieving sustainability through participation and capacity building. Agencies responding to complex emergencies have had to bridge the gap between relief and development. Closing the gap has been particularly difficult in practice.

As even less tangible ideals — a mandate to protect child rights, human rights based programming and humanitarian principles — guide UNICEF programming, the gap has become potentially larger. What can UNICEF do to actively incorporate the Convention on the Rights of the Child into a country programme in the context of a complex emergency and as the context is transformed by increased or decreased stability?

¹⁶ DAC/OECD, “Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies”, 1999.

What specific skills do programme practitioners bring to their work with national partners in order to protect families caught in local or regional conflicts? What rural and urban programmes in complex emergency countries can be devised to protect families and, even further, to promote the ideals of tolerance and justice?

Translating the principles to which UNICEF has committed into concrete initiatives requires innovation and experimentation. In addition to traditional UNICEF programming in humanitarian crises, advocacy takes on a very important role — advocacy on a wide range of child rights and human rights issues in international forums and with specific national governments, as well as advocacy as part of UNICEF-supported programmes. Yet promoting humanitarian principles and human rights advocacy does not translate straightforwardly into practices that development activists are always comfortable performing. At the same time, a human right-based approach to programming signifies a new way of conceptualising many traditional sector or issue-specific programming strategies. A crucial issue for UNICEF has therefore been to establish best practices for translating humanitarian principles and a human rights-based approach to programming into specific functions and activities. One of the difficulties has been that the range of possible initiatives is large. Identifying those initiatives where UNICEF can build the appropriate capacity, which translate into specific strategies and programmes and will have concrete, measurable outcomes, has been difficult. There are three issues associated with the challenge of putting humanitarian principles and human rights-based approach to programming to work, each associated with different levels of action:

2. What are the most effective strategies for carrying out advocacy campaigns among governments and international bodies to reinforce the legal resources and resolutions relevant to the protection of children and women in armed conflict?

3. What areas of potential accord among sister agencies and NGO partners on principles for programming in complex emergencies are likely to provide a basis for strengthening existing inter-agency bodies and working groups and, at the same time, enjoining such bodies to act on the principles of promoting the rights of children and women (see Section 2)?

4. How is UNICEF to respond to the difficulties of taking action on humanitarian principles and human rights-based programming at the field level in complex emergency countries, within national and regional authorities, neighbourhoods and communities?

The changes involved do not ripple easily through a large organisation. UNICEF has long considered the autonomy accorded to individual country offices to be an asset. In a period of change, however, the independence traditionally accorded country offices in articulating country-level policies has resulted in considerable variation in the extent to which country offices accept these changes. There is bound to be a gap in the extent to

which country offices endorse the ethical values that underpin the Conventions on the Rights of the Child and humanitarian principles and put it into practice. Thus the final issue:

5. How will UNICEF ensure that country offices share the motivation and commitment to carrying out those functions that put humanitarian principles and the human rights-based precepts into practice?

2. Decade Trends

A number of pressures on UNICEF as an organisation in the middle of the decade preceded a bold change in policy direction. This mid-decade change set the stage for the first of the issues above, notably the need to articulate a clear position vis-à-vis the principle of neutrality of humanitarian assistance, which successfully responded to the changing practical realities of humanitarian interventions.

The changing character of humanitarian interventions is discussed in the Introduction. In essence, the contexts for humanitarian intervention are increasingly the result of social and political instability where the danger to civilians is posed by political and military conflict and not natural disasters. The root causes have typically to do with the unrest and social anomie caused by poverty, skewed distribution of wealth, gross inequities, a history of international neglect and the consequent eclipse of a state's capacity to perform conventional public services. Patterns of aggression may be unpredictable. United Nations agencies may find themselves as much the object of aggression as the ethnic groups, political parties and families implicated in the struggle.

The commitment to neutrality vis-à-vis states at the beginning of the decade soon turned to the search for an alternative formulation. Almost all evaluators and observers cautioned UNICEF that neutrality in such circumstances was beyond its grasp.

“Traditionally UNICEF has been able to preserve political neutrality and provide supplies or services to as many parties to a conflict as it can...Historically the organisation has tended to speak with a soft voice or no voice at all on these matters out of fear of offending a national government with which it must work in the future, but there are a number of situations now in which there is either no government at all or the government in power is perpetuating much of the abuse.” (91: 36-37)

This was John Richardson in 1991 expressing the fear that taking a stand on human rights abuses was equivalent to taking sides in a conflict and would put UNICEF in a predicament “that could jeopardise its ability to be an impartial provider of humanitarian assistance.” (91: 37)

Somalia was a case in point. “After four years in a land with no government infrastructure, it has become increasingly difficult to regard Mogadiscio as the capital of Somalia. There are many who do not really even view Somalia as a country anymore.”

(94c: 44). The dilemma was that without some embodiment of local order, maintaining an impartial technically driven programme without a principled stand only fed the energies of war. Far from a condition of effective humanitarian response, this interpretation of neutrality had become a liability and principled engagement had become a condition of success. Part of the problem, an observer of Angola and Bosnia noted:

“is that assistance in war, whatever its form or mode of delivery, can never be neutral. This is especially the case in internal or civil war situations. One side or the other will gain direct or indirect advantage. In both Angola and Bosnia, for example, agreed access has often been secured only on the basis of an exact proportional division of relief aid between combatants. This considerably reduces the efficacy of attempts at objective needs assessment in such situations. Neutrality becomes an attempt to balance the gain that each side obtains from humanitarian assistance. In the final analysis, negotiated access appears to have contributed to the integration of relief aid into the war economies they have come to serve.” (94a: 36)

UNICEF took the lesson to heart. In its lead agency role for Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), in spite of the fact that UNICEF’s authority extended only over the established southern sector, UNICEF successfully defined the human rights environment in which aid was delivered. The assessment of OLS in 1994 took some pains to say what this meant. “This does not mean levelling the amount of resources to create a balance between sides irrespective of needs and conditions. It does mean levelling between sides in the sense of operating a single and impartial framework of rules and obligations. Compliance with these rules and obligations moreover should produce a series of transparent, appropriate and impartial responses.” This was the “ground rule” approach and the report recommended that this approach “as currently existing in the South, should be developed as a framework of a signed OLS agreement between the UN and all warring parties.” (96c: 267)

Taking a principled stand could be controversial, and UNICEF was prepared to accept the controversy. Challenging the international embargo on Haiti in 1992-3, which had been imposed in support of the restoration of the constitutional government, clearly labelled UNICEF as a principled organisation prepared to give greater importance to children and women’s rights than a particular regime that the international community agreed to support. UNICEF had commissioned The Harvard Study to examine the effects of the embargo on children, and the study clearly linked child suffering to sanctions. UNICEF boldly issued the study just as the embargo was reinforced (96a: 19) to make clear what Graca Machel later reported¹⁷, that the measures to enforce compliance with international judgements — in this case sanctions — are sometimes more harmful than the outcomes they are presumed to effect.

The cases of Somalia, Sudan and Haiti are all quite different, and the challenge to find respectable ground between neutrality and principled engagement was met quite differently in each case. The cumulative experiences, however, converged in an

¹⁷ UNICEF, *Children in Armed Conflict*, UNICEF Staff Working Papers, 1999, 252-253.

increasing conviction in UNICEF to approach the incidences of humanitarian crises by taking a clear stand against the human costs arising out of political disasters.

As reflection on Rwanda continued into the latter part of the decade, and the international community came to realise the costs and consequences of neutrality without human rights principles, UNICEF's stand became less controversial. Donors and member states had clearly hidden behind impartiality to avoid taking a principled stand in Rwanda, leaving the consequences for the emergency response agencies. Multi-agency reviews made this clear. "Humanitarian action cannot substitute for political action," noted the Steering Committee for the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, adding that "This is perhaps the most important finding of this evaluation" (96d: 48). The OCHA review of strategic coordination in the Great Lakes similarly focused on how the IASC should work to assure a framework of consent. "How can the authorities in the region be engaged? What can the UN do about donors who simultaneously pursue both humanitarian and non-humanitarian agendas? What should the UN do when the framework for consent collapses?" (98b: 100)

By this time, UNICEF had already firmly made the commitment to ensure that their response to complex emergencies cohered around an engagement with local authorities and agency partners in order to promote the rights of children and women. The Mission Statement adopted by the Executive Board in January 1996 (decision 1996/1) stated that UNICEF policy should be guided by the international standards set in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. A medium-term plan for the period 1996-1999 informed the Executive Board in June 1996 that it had adopted as its three principal strategies: "(a) service delivery; (b) capacity building; and (c) advocacy and social mobilisation."¹⁸ What was perhaps even more telling about this mid-decade planning document was the decision that UNICEF, in meeting its "service delivery" obligations, would serve principally as a "role model and catalyst in a number of critical areas to encourage other partners,"¹⁹ to assume some of the service delivery that UNICEF had heretofore done.

Here was the opportunity for UNICEF to begin putting its ethical values into practice. There had been some experience in the Sudan, albeit only for a restricted area, in establishing a framework for humanitarian action insisting on a formal adherence to humanitarian principles.

The importance of balancing advocacy, service delivery and capacity building strategies was as relevant in complex emergencies as in stable contexts. The unexpectedly protracted nature of complex emergencies forced the issue of how long relief activities could feasibly and sensibly continue, and whether there was not some way to reconcile or integrate relief activities with development ideals. The gulf between feeding, curing and supporting service-providing facilities and institutions loomed ever

¹⁸ This was a slight reformulation of the strategies adopted by Executive Board following the 1994 Multidonor Evaluation, which were service delivery, capacity building, advocacy and empowerment.

¹⁹ Economic and Social Council, "Medium Term Plan for the Period 1996-1999" presented to the Executive Board, 17-21 June 1996.

larger, especially as the facilities and institutions were being destroyed and the feeding and curing needs increased. This posed the theoretical and practical challenge of finding a strategy that bridged the gap between relief and development, which focused relief on meeting specific long-term humanitarian objectives and narrowed the wide ranging development directions to meeting specific, well-articulated needs. The human rights based approach to programming adopted by the organisation accomplished this in principle, if not always in fact. Some evaluators offered the bold, and contrary, suggestion that complex emergencies should be treated as the norm rather than the exception, as permanent²⁰ according to one or chronic (98a: iv) according to another. They warned UNICEF away from favouring advocacy over relief, forcing crises into a transition period before circumstances justified such a move. But UNICEF did the opposite. The organisation's commitment to humanitarian principles and human rights-based programming gave great importance to advocacy as a key strategy. This commitment and the correspondingly strong advocacy role it embraced allowed a greater theoretical coherence between humanitarian response and development. But this did not make it any easier to know what to deliver and what activities to endorse. The commitment to protecting children's and women's rights was compelling, but it would take time to identify strategies for doing this in the best way. Steps were being taken regarding best practices in very specific areas, such as for treating unaccompanied children (94e). Some cautions were also expressed about approaching local authorities and "forcing the issue to the fore too quickly" (97: 8).

Between 1996 and 1999, discussions of best practices for "field action for vulnerable children and women" are found in planning documents and not in evaluative exercises. They are worth mentioning nevertheless because these policy and planning documents are evidence of UNICEF's efforts to come up with real tasks that translate human rights-based programming for the fieldwork of humanitarian response. In 1997, one key policy paper on setting strategic priorities for children and women classified the UNICEF human rights-based response into four phases: pre-emergency, emergency onset, crisis/rehabilitation and recovery. Legal protection for children and curriculum development focusing on child rights are proposed for the first or pre-emergency stage. A combination of child demobilisation, reunification of families, maintenance of basic social services, education during crises and psycho-social support to children exposed to armed conflict, to mention only a few, are proposed for the final three phases.²¹

It is not until three years later that an evaluative exercise report appears for the first time on UNICEF's performance in putting the human rights-based programming and humanitarian principles into practice. An assessment of human rights-based initiatives taken by UNICEF in its response to the Kosovo refugee emergency was generally positive. UNICEF's:

²⁰ Mark Duffield, "Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism, Linking Relief and Development", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol 25, no. 3, reprinted in UNICEF, "Rethinking Strategies and Response to Systemic Crises, An Introductory Reader to Complex Emergencies", 1994.

²¹ UNICEF Economic and Social Council, "Children and Women in Emergencies: Strategic Priorities and Operational Concerns for UNICEF", Executive Board – Plans, Policies and Strategies, 20-24 January 1997.

“experience in dealing with human vulnerability is a welcome balance to the ‘life-saving’ sectors, generally the main priorities of major relief agencies. Advocacy and actual protection for child rights (under the CRC) is evident in particular in the fact that, by and large, education was provided to refugees and gradually to returnees in this emergency”. (00a: 5)

There was an innovation in Albania, the creation of “child-friendly spaces” where children and women in camps and collective centres received a number of integrated services in a secure location. The evaluators regretted that the initiative had not been in place from day one and did not like the way these child-friendly spaces were projected in public information campaigns. The experiment was, nevertheless, useful.

Recent debriefings of representatives have collated their accounts of individual country programme initiatives in response to the UNICEF commitments to promote the realisation of child rights, to human rights-based approach to programming and humanitarian principles. They provide some insight into the final issue raised in part one of this section, the extent to which a range of country offices are motivated by and endorse these commitments. The Uganda representative reported a unique effort to mobilise communities in Northern Uganda to prevent the abduction of children for soldiers and sex slaves by a rebel army operating in the Sudan. The representative from Afghanistan described the difficulty of introducing specific initiatives in a country where the rebel Taliban militia holds power and uses it to reduce the freedom of women and their access to social services. Representatives from Sierra Leone and Liberia reported on demobilisation campaigns and support for orphanages (00b: 11-17). What is apparent is the difficulty in supporting specific programme activities that integrate human rights and humanitarian principles, the complexity of and limited options for protecting children’s rights, the need to work closely with national civil society partners if any specific results are to be achieved, and the need to develop programmes taking into consideration the likely resistance or (in the case of Afghanistan) outright opposition of local authorities to these UNICEF initiatives. In this context, while some country offices have overcome such obstacles and achieved notable results, others have done so to a lesser degree.

3. The Martigny Process

In the various work plans detailing efforts to strengthen UNICEF capacity for humanitarian response, either developed under the current DfID-funded projects or under broader regional and headquarters efforts, the following UNICEF initiatives can be identified as responding to the five key issues highlighted in the introduction of this section.

1. What ways and means should be explored for setting conditions to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, through negotiations with local authorities and in some instances non-state entities, in order to safeguard UNICEF staff, promote

the human rights of children and women, and protect children and women from the effects of armed conflict?

Country-specific policy guidance and a range of tools have been developed to help COs integrate humanitarian principles and protection of children's rights into humanitarian action. These have included guidance on forced relocation in [Kyrgyzstan](#), [on engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo](#), [on transition situations in Haiti and Senegal \(Kazamanze\)](#).

- Programme and policy procedures have explicitly incorporated the provision that “UNICEF may have to work with non-state entities to negotiate access to delivery assistance and to protect children and women in armed conflict situations.”²² Selected field offices and the EMOPS Humanitarian Principles Unit have been working to develop guidance for working with non-state entities, including detailing the issues that UNICEF must consider when formulating a position in different contexts.
- UNICEF has formulated a clear position, vis-à-vis sanctions, that there must be pre-impact assessment, ongoing monitoring and humanitarian exemption for children. EMOPS, EPP and country offices have been involved in examining and/or testing different approaches to monitoring the impact of sanctions on children, though guidelines for country offices have yet to be developed.

2. What are the most effective strategies for carrying out advocacy campaigns among governments and international bodies to reinforce the legal resources and resolutions relevant to the protection of children and women in armed conflict?

UNICEF has contributed to advocacy campaigns on three issues: the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the CRC and further ratification of the Ottawa Treaty.

- Two key resolutions in the Security Council have provided additional legal instruments for protection of children and other civilians affected by armed conflict.
- Packages have been prepared to secure wider ratification of the Ottawa treaty.
- UNICEF has organised regional advocacy meetings around the land mines issue.

²² EMOPS, Work Plan for Headquarters: Cross Sector Activities; see also Memorandum from Bo Victor Nylund, Project Officer to Field Offices, Heads of Sections in PD/EPP and all EMOPS Staff, Working with Non-State Entities, February 2000.

- Inter-agency workshops have been organised to increase the knowledge base of a number of international trainees on the link between international law and humanitarian principles.²³

3. What areas of potential accord among sister agencies and NGO partners on principles for programming in complex emergencies are likely to provide a basis for strengthening existing inter-agency bodies and working groups and, at the same time, enjoining such bodies to act on the principles of promoting the rights of children and women (see Section 2)?

Section 2 is dedicated to a full review of inter-agency coordination. UNICEF's initiatives to promote inter-agency coordination within a framework of support for children's and women rights are therefore reviewed in that section.

4. How is UNICEF to respond to the difficulties of taking action on humanitarian principles and human rights-based approach to programming at the field level in complex emergency countries, within national and regional authorities, neighbourhoods and communities?

A number of diverse initiatives have been undertaken by country offices in response, partly, to guidelines disseminated from headquarters, and in part, in their own attempts to identify areas where programming can put human rights promotion and protection issues into practice. The number and diversity of these makes it impossible to do justice to them all. It is also important to note that this brief summary does not take account of numerous guidelines developed in the Office of Emergency Programmes and Programme Division to assist country offices in this area. The Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning has recently issued a compilation of UNICEF actions on behalf of children as a working paper.²⁴

- During the Kosovo crisis, UNICEF introduced the "child-friendly spaces" concept to provide an integrated set of services for children and mothers in camps and collective centres within a secure location. This model has been applied elsewhere, though its distinctiveness and successes have been challenged. (00a: 25ff)
- A child rights approach to land mines awareness has been prepared and disseminated to country offices. Other mine awareness publications have been disseminated to regional and country offices. As the United Nations focal point for mine awareness education, UNICEF has prepared the International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education to be followed up with training modules for specific countries.

²³ Work Plan for Headquarters: Cross Sector Activities (2); UNICEF Executive Board 2000, UNICEF Core Corporate Commitments in Emergencies, May; Executive Director, Annual Report to the ECOSOC, Executive Board – Progress Reports, 31 January – 4 February 2000.

²⁴ Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning, UNICEF, Actions on Behalf of Children affected by Armed Conflict, Selected Examples, Working Paper of the Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning, August 2000.

- UNICEF has upheld its support for women’s rights in Afghanistan by refusing to provide support to schools that do not include girls, in spite of strong protests against UNICEF policy. UNICEF has attempted to persuade WFP not to fund orphanages in Afghanistan that accept children whose parents are unable to provide for them, insisting that WFP instead urge the government to permit women to work and thereby support their children.
- UNICEF has assisted the media in exposing the conditions in orphanages in Sierra Leone.²⁵ UNICEF has been instrumental in securing an accord between warring factions in Sierra Leone to permit the immunisation of children against polio.²⁶
- Even prior to Martigny, in order to reduce the abduction of children from communities in Northern Uganda, UNICEF headquarters, in collaboration with UNICEF Uganda, has worked with the UN Commission on Human Rights in passing a resolution condemning the abductions.

5. How will UNICEF ensure that country offices share the motivation and commitment to carrying out those functions that put the humanitarian principles and human rights-based approach to programming into practice in complex emergencies?

In addition to the country-specific support on negotiating humanitarian space as mentioned above under issue number one, support to country offices has also entailed development of various analytical tools, such as a protection assessment tool developed for use in Chechnya. Similarly, a range of issue-specific tools, such as guidance on best practice in programming for internally displaced persons and for land mine awareness, are implicitly designed to build the capacity of country offices and their commitment in supporting human rights-based programming. Broader systematic efforts with this objective include:

- Programme Division has led the updating and revision of the core UNICEF Programme Policy and Procedures Manual: Programme Operations and the corresponding training package (still to be finalised) to incorporate, among other policy changes, the human rights-based approach to programming and the “mainstreaming” of programming response in unstable and crisis contexts.²⁷ The

²⁵ Work Plan for Headquarters: Cross-Sector Activities (2); Executive Director, Annual Report to the ECOSOC, Executive Board – Progress Reports, 31 January – 4 February 2000; Programme Policy and Procedure Manual: Programme Operations, Chapter 6: Special Considerations in Programme During Crisis, 2000; UNICEF, First Innocenti Debriefing for Senior Staff in Emergency Countries, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 23-26 May 2000.

²⁶ UNICEF, First Innocenti Debriefing for Senior Staff in Emergency Countries, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 23-26 May 2000; Work Plan for Headquarters: Cross-Sector Activities (2); Executive Director, Annual Report to the ECOSOC, Executive Board – Progress Reports, 31 January – 4 February 2000; Programme Policy and Procedure Manual: Programme Operations, Chapter 6: Special Considerations in Programme During Crisis, 2000.

²⁷ UNICEF, Programme Directive on Revised Programme Policy and Procedures Manual (CF/PD/PRO/200-01).

manual has addressed the latter to the extent that it highlights preparedness planning as a critical part of programme process and points in a final section to the available programme tools, including the humanitarian principles, UNICEF Core Corporate Commitments, funding options, and institutional support to COs internally and through inter-agency agreements.

- UNICEF has developed a training package, “Humanitarian Principles: A Child Rights Approach to Complex Emergencies”, which is intended to familiarise staff with the international legal and ethical standards that should guide UNICEF work, including building their skills through application in cases studies in a range of programme areas (child recruitment, displaced children, gender-based violence, education, humanitarian access, land mines and juvenile justice). The package builds on training materials developed by UNICEF beginning in 1997 under the aegis of the inter-agency “Complex Emergency Training Initiative”. The current UNICEF training package has been used in over 13 full five-day workshops and is the basis for training-of-trainers being carried out through 2000 and 2001 to further institutionalise training in this area.
- A series of Technical Notes is soon to be disseminated (expected for the second quarter of 2001) in order provide programmatic information, guidance and standards for UNICEF staff and others to better design and implement specific interventions to assist children and women in crisis and unstable situations. These Technical Notes cover basic programme processes, as well as traditional sector areas such as WES, health and nutrition and newer areas related to special protection measures in the Convention.
- Training for senior management at country office level has been expanded in two ways: (1) the target audience has been broadened to reach not only new representatives but also senior programme and operations officers; (2) the content of senior management training has been broadened to address more than strategies for sectoral interventions and to enhance leadership in implementing human rights-based programming.
- Support has been given for developing country-specific field-level workshops on gender and humanitarian assistance guidelines.

4. Strengths and Areas for Further Follow-up

Many of the evaluative exercises throughout the decade have urged UNICEF to directly respond to human rights violations by regimes and warring factions. UNICEF has done so, responding in full measure and at many different levels to most of these recommendations. In some instances, UNICEF’s responses have gone well beyond these

recommendations. There can be little question that UNICEF has taken bold initiatives in making the rights of children and women, as well as their protection in armed conflict, the basis of a good portion of what it aims to do.

The two relevant questions, posed in the context of the Introduction's framework for assessing organisation capacity, raises the issue of whether the organisation makes clear what staff members must do to fulfil the organisation's mission.

Is there a clear organisational mission which not only articulates an organisational culture but which also articulates a clear relationship between organisational norms and organisational practice, or how an organisation is expected to put these norms into practice?

Are policies, programme guidance for applying these policies, and the appropriate procedures in place to facilitate the performance of basic functions? Are there specific organisational protocols in place in UNICEF for mobilising staff and funds quickly to meet the requirements of a range of adequate responses as may be required in different circumstances?

These questions raise a central theme in the findings of this desk review. UNICEF's decision to "mainstream programming in unstable situations within the overall context of the Country Programme"²⁸ has far-reaching implications. Mainstreaming means that programming in unstable situations is not to be regarded as either exceptional or parallel, rather an integral part of what country offices are expected to do on a regular basis. In all country offices, staff members are to anticipate the possibility of instability and fully incorporate this possibility into their country programming strategy. They are also expected to implement interventions that anticipate and address the likelihood of instability not only to reduce the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis and address the immediate needs of a population in crisis, but also, simultaneously, to contribute to a population's long-term social welfare. Mainstreaming poses a real challenge, in part because promoting long-term human welfare typically involves rather different strategies from those that address the immediate needs of a population without clean water, basic health services and sufficient nutrients. The long-term development strategies have different social objectives (i.e. building health infrastructure, creating self-sufficiency in water and sanitation services) from those that serve a population in crisis. Inputs, strategies and objectives in the two cases can differ strikingly. What would a programme that fully realises the mainstreaming mandate look like? Is there a special weave of strategies that artfully combines the two approaches and suffices for both?

Commitment to a role in the protection of all children's rights and to a human rights-based approach to programming has provided a common language lending coherence to the principles of programming in both stable and unstable or crisis contexts. It has helped bridge the gap between long-term development for building social capital and infrastructure and targeting immediate support to life-saving services for vulnerable

²⁸ Memo from the Executive Director to Regional Directors and HQ Division Directors, Martigny Follow-up and DfID Funding, 31 August 1999.

populations in a crisis. UNICEF's human rights-based approach to programming focuses long-term programming on building social capital by supporting institutions with the ability to create a more responsive government and a more participatory population. It also serves to guide the organisation in targeting health, nutrition and water-related inputs and special protection interventions during crises and, combined with the humanitarian principles, provides a reference in setting conditions for humanitarian assistance.

While this coherence between the old "regular" and "emergency" programming is thus achieved conceptually, in terms of over-arching goals and principles, questions remain as to how a human rights-based approach to programming and humanitarian principles coalesce in practical operational guidance. The challenge, raised frequently in meetings and forums, is a complex one, not only because the functions required of staff are unfamiliar, but because they are also more complex. Using a human rights-based approach to programming and adhering to humanitarian principles in complex emergencies require a different set of skills and types of leadership. It has implications for how UNICEF interacts with other agencies and for the kind of information that country offices need when designing their programmes. Also, since many of the sites of intervention involve the urgent response to survival and protection issues, they must also do all this faster, working more efficiently and building in new levels of expertise.

In the face of these challenges, it seems that UNICEF's organisational capacity has not yet caught up to the commitments of its freshly expanded mission. One is tempted to ask whether the organisation has fully taken account of what is involved in delivering on its bolder set of promises. Questions are raised at every level of the organisation as to exactly what "best practices" will effectively link programming strategies with policy norms. Advances have been made in UNICEF in defining a human rights-based approach to programming, what it is and the implications for programme process, in Executive Board documents and programme directives²⁹ as well as in the above-mentioned Manual of Programme Policy and Procedures. But while the new Humanitarian Principles Training goes a long way toward translating the relevance of human rights-based approach to programming and humanitarian principles for complex emergencies, including the nexus between these sets of principles, more concrete operational guidance is missing on several levels.

Country office staff need to know best practices for implementing programmes at community, neighbourhood, regional and national levels in water/sanitation, health, nutrition and in support of various special protection rights in the way that UNICEF headquarters expects. The forthcoming Technical Notes are intended to provide more concrete guidance on sector and issue-specific programme strategies. The challenge will be to ensure that these integrate the human rights-based approach to programming and humanitarian principles, as well as illustrate how programmes can accommodate the variable stability in programme contexts and interventions with longer-term vision designed to contribute to an environment conducive to the respect of human rights.

²⁹ UNICEF Executive Directive, Guidelines for Human Rights-Based Programming Approach, 1988 (CF/EXD/1998-004); UNICEF Executive Board, "Programme Cooperation for Children and Women from a Human Rights Perspective", 7-11 June 1999 (E/ICEF/1999/11).

On quite a different level, one of the most difficult areas for establishing best practices is in the negotiation with local authorities on the terms of programme delivery in countries where human rights are violated and/or UN staff are threatened. This is frequently understood in UNICEF as the issue of conditionality, how to establish a framework for a principled approach to programming. In practical terms, it raises the difficult question of whether and how to maintain a presence in a country where universal principles of human rights are violated and still maintain UNICEF's credibility as an organisation serious about its convictions. Of course, a range of views exists within UNICEF and, more broadly, within the UN community on this matter. The harder line urges that UNICEF and other UN agencies should be prepared to withdraw if basic principles are not met, and to regard this withdrawal as one among a range of strategies of engagement. Others argue that withdrawal defeats the purpose of maintaining some kind of presence that can influence internal political decisions, and that maintaining even a minimal presence leaves the way open for dialogue.

UNICEF responds to the challenge of negotiating with local authorities in complex emergency countries as they arise, case by case, informally mobilising other agencies to the extent possible and formulating demands within the constraints of each situation. These responses might well be informed by a detailed review of each case, the established conditions, how they have been monitored and what outcomes were achieved. UNSECOORD has recently assembled a compendium of security crises and their consequences. UNICEF is presently reviewing a "sensitive issues report", which reviews specific instances of the violation of child rights. But there is no single reference or report that reviews accounts of how agreements have or have not been reached with the Taliban on access to country facilities, or how UNICEF Iraq has fared in negotiations with the government to allow support for Community Child Care Units, or how UNICEF in the Baltic Republics has secured government agreements on the protection of children and women. It would be particularly useful to include a review of UNICEF's response to Uganda's decision to grant amnesty to the LRA prisoners in exchange for a halt to abducting children in the northern areas. An overview picture of these initiatives may sharpen UNICEF's mission and assist in refining UNICEF strategy in working with local authorities and non-state entities.

Linking policy norms to programming practices and providing leadership in seeking the compliance of local authorities under situations of crisis are complex demands to make on country office staff. Responses to earlier drafts of this review have been quick to note the difficult challenge these expectations pose for country office staff. One respondent asked frankly: "Despite all the words about policy change to human rights-based programme approach, don't we still rush into an emergency with our 'needs' hat on? We did in Orissa's cyclone at the end of the decade. It was ORS, bleaching powder, gloves and masks for disposal of corpses, first. Of course we got into child protection later, but 'emergency, therefore increased child exploitation,' didn't sound in our heads on Day 1. Only six months after the calamity, did we send in a jurist to look at best practice, and practice that could have been better."³⁰

³⁰ Personal communication.

Another respondent posed a question that captures this section's main theme. "How to arrive at a situation whereby the mind-set and frame of reference of every UNICEF staff member and strategic allies reflects a commitment and passion for human rights."³¹ The dilemma is that country representatives vary considerably and their endorsement of UNICEF policies varies accordingly. How then can UNICEF, through a substantially more concerted effort to provide guidance from headquarters, promote greater uniformity in their level of commitment of country office staff and in their capacity to put UNICEF human rights-based programming into practice?

³¹ Personal communication.

Section 2

Inter-agency Coordination

1. The Issues

Events of the decade have underlined the importance of increasing inter-agency coordination. The outcome of repeated recommendations to do so have also shown how difficult this can be. Responding to complex emergencies is multifaceted, and as such relies on coordination among UN agencies, on diminishing the overlap among agencies in order to avoid the duplication of efforts, and on presenting a common front to governments and agencies in order to lay the human rights foundation on which an humanitarian response should be built. Agencies must be more concerned with designing an integrated programme response and less with enhancing individual agency profiles. There is, however, a crucial caveat. While pursuing inter-agency coordination, UNICEF does not want to lose sight of its commitment to the protection of human rights, the protection of the rights of children and women, and the protection of children, women and the family from the effects of armed conflict. A strategy to reinforce coordination among agency and NGO partners must simultaneously ensure that greater coordination involve greater coherence and resolve to advance UNICEF's core values.

Three principal issues have been identified following a review of the literature:

- 1. What steps can UNICEF take to further the level of coordination and collaboration among agencies and NGO partners in order to expand opportunities to pool resources, better integrate emergency services and enhance donor coherence?**

- 2. How can UNICEF more clearly define its responsibilities in complex emergencies vis-à-vis other agencies and NGOs in ways that give greater coherence and definition to its niche and enhance its comparative advantage?**

- 3. How is UNICEF to ensure that enhanced inter-agency coordination and leadership reflect and endorse the principles of promoting children and women's rights and protecting children and women from the effects of armed conflict?**

2. Decade Trends

A study of strategic coordination in the Great Lakes Region aptly described the background to all three issues.

“UN agencies were not designed to work in close collaboration with one another. The wording of each agency's mandate specifically defines responsibility for what once were nearly unrelated issues: refugees, development, children, etc. The end of the Cold War has brought new and still unresolved challenges to the UN system. The crisis of competition and distrust are but symptoms of the UN agencies' discomfort with having to work in such close

concert with one another. The hard realities of complex emergencies demand that the UN reform itself to conform to these challenges and become what it never has been: a system of agencies that cooperate in pursuit of common goals. Competition must be reduced; trust must be built, shared visions must be forged.” (98b: 105)

Until 1991, the responsibility for coordinating the UN emergency response fell to UNDRO, but UNDRO did not have the official backing to bend the strong wills of the larger agencies who were, themselves, directly involved in relief operations while UNDRO was not. The UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991) authorised specific measures to improve coordination among agencies. One of these was a new coordinating mechanism, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) under the leadership of an Under Secretary General with both administrative and financial powers. There was to be an Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) to coordinate the consolidated appeals, to promote increased coordination and to manage a central emergency revolving fund (CERF) to selectively support coordinated emergency response programmes.³²

Coordinating the Consolidated Appeals was intended to promote overall coordination, and IASC had the prerogative of conducting in-depth studies and setting policy. However, events between 1992 and 1995 overwhelmed the capacity of this new coordination mechanism. Events in Somalia, Angola, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda and the Sudan all presented the UN agencies with the need to perform services previously executed by a public sector that was now in decline. Failed states and, more to the point, failed public sectors obliged UN agencies to provide an integrated set of services as government ministries might do. UN agencies were not accustomed to giving up their own sovereign assistance areas to merge into a single mechanism.

A general view emerged on the experience with inter-agency coordination, such as it was, following the events of the early 1990s and specifically those in Rwanda in 1996. It was that competition and mistrust had substantially compromised the efficiency of operations in Rwanda. This meant that the UN system did not speak to the government with a common voice, thus impairing these discussions. One study recommended establishing:

“a single UN house, abolish the use of UN agency logos in countries affected by complex emergencies...(a mechanism whereby) emergency funds be solicited only through flash appeals or a strengthened Consolidated Appeals (CAP). By IASC consensus and commitment, empower the Emergency Relief Coordinator or country humanitarian coordinators, as appropriate, with a line-item veto for parts

³² Save the Children UK, Position Paper: The United Nations and Humanitarian Assistance, March 1994 IN UNICEF (ed.) Rethinking Strategies and Response to Systemic Crises, An Introductory Reader to Complex Emergencies; John Borton, Recent Trends in the International Relief System, *Disasters*, Volume 17, no 3, 1993; IN UNICEF (ed.) Rethinking Strategies and Response to Systemic Crises, An Introductory Reader to Complex Emergencies.

of agency appeals that do not conform to system-wide, agreed upon strategic objectives.” (98b: 105)

Another evaluation echoed the sentiment that coordination had cost the Rwanda operation cohesion and influence. The conclusion was that:

“At least seven UN agencies and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs were directly involved in the response. Collaboration and coordination among UN agencies were affected by overlapping mandates and regrettable rivalry. Overall coordination was characterised by Study III (there were a total of five volumes in the study) as a “hollow core” with a small, ad hoc, not highly-regarded body with a coordinating mandate only within Rwanda.” (96d: 57)

The one recommendation arising from these studies, and others with only slight variation (see 98c: 3-5), was to submerge the profiles of independent agencies into a single UN profile, to strengthen the coordination leadership of UN/DHA and the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator, and to identify and act on areas of common need and concern for greater collaboration.

The prospects for inter-agency coordination, particularly as it is defined in the first of this section’s issues, have evoked strong sentiments. All of the studies emerging from the Rwanda experience agreed coordination could improve, and had their own long list of recommendations. More than 50 recommendations from these reports urged improved coordination in support of:

- a. a stronger inter-agency coordination mechanism
- b. increased complementarities among the programme responses of the separate agencies
- c. pooling separate resources to provide services in the key areas of funding, certain areas of logistics, security and information management
- d. experiments in pooling administrative resources (staff) and procedures.

Subsequent planning has drawn on many of the ideas provided by this wealth of recommendations.

The events in the Great Lakes Region, Bosnia and elsewhere had posed a challenge to the solidarity among agencies, as it had shown how reluctant agencies would be to collaborate more, and why. Complex emergencies had become big business. The stakes in the emergency response arena had grown. Some agencies saw new niches into which they could expand, particularly the large ones. However, some of these new niches were already occupied by UNICEF. In the melee of complex emergencies, it mattered most who could get there first with the most resources. The press was watching, the world was watching, and all of this translated into operating capital.

These reports reinforced a prevailing UNICEF concern. A 1994 Consultation among Representatives had noted that UNICEF’s “visibility and image in emergencies was slipping either as a result of a greater role for DHA in the coordination and launching of appeals and/or the more active role of UNHCR and the international NGOs in image

building and fundraising.” (94g: 4) UNICEF had seen the need to respond to the changing arena of service providers by more narrowly and visibly defining its niche, to restore its comparative advantage. The recommendations emerging out of this meeting approached the problem from several angles. First was the strong support for DHA coordination and especially for UNICEF’s role in naming a resident coordinator. Second was a decision to take the lead in promoting the adherence to an overarching coordination mechanism by initiating a training programme on inter-agency coordination, the implicit intent of which was to diminish competition by reinforcing the mechanism of coordination. Third was a proposal to strengthen the Consolidated Appeals process. Fourth was a recommendation to more narrowly identify areas of UNICEF speciality in order to conspicuously define its responsibilities.

This fourth recommendation is the subject of this section’s second issue. The central problem of declining comparative advantage, which was the main issue in the Consultation among Representatives in 1994, was restated by an evaluator a year later. “One of the problems UNICEF now has is that the range of areas into which it has moved over the years in emergency work has greatly exceeded organisational experience and expertise. While the other UN organisations that work in emergencies have either more narrowly defined responsibilities (WFP) or more traditionally defined emergency responsibilities (UNHCR), UNICEF has been left with a much broader, and in many ways, vaguer set of responsibilities that are clustered under the designation of non-food aid. In complex emergencies, that designation covers an enormous amount of possible interventions, and in each emergency, UNICEF does something a bit differently than what it has done before.” (95b: 31)

There had been a loss of comparative advantage and a sense had emerged that “UNICEF has become much less effective (since 1991) in emergency work when compared to other UN and non-governmental organisations and thus had lost its competitive edge.” (95b: i). The recommendation was to work on sharpening its image as an emergency response organisation.

UNICEF’s efforts at sharpening its image and more narrowly defining its sectoral specialities at the programme level were well under way by 1998 with the publication of the document, “UNICEF and Humanitarian Crises, An Overview of Operational and Programme Strategies”.³³ A comparison of this document with its baseline predecessor of 1986³⁴ points to a trend of paring down UNICEF’s responsibilities in the range of its crisis response (though not in its advocacy roles) and enhancing its visibility. The determination to more sharply define UNICEF’s programming niche had substantial implications for how UNICEF would approach the issue of inter-agency coordination.

UNICEF’s response to improving coordination had been to contribute to refining the division of labour among agencies by refining its own. It did so by signing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with specific agencies outlining areas of common

³³ EMOPS, UNICEF and Humanitarian Crises, An Overview of Operational and Programme Strategies, 1998.

³⁴ EMOPS, “Assisting in Emergencies”, a resource handbook for UNICEF field staff. 1986.

purpose and separate specialities. An MOU with UNHCR assigned responsibility over internally displaced persons to UNICEF while UNHCR handled cross-border displacement and return. An agreement with WHO specified separate responsibilities in the area of immunisation and control of communicable diseases. An agreement between UNICEF and WFP assigned separate responsibilities in supporting child and mother nutritional needs.³⁵

This dual strategy of refining the niche and enhancing the complementarities of service provision among UN agencies addressed part of the need for greater coordination by keeping the mandates from overlapping. However, the need to more clearly define their separate mandates had, at times, diverted them from planning how to pool the programming skills and other resources needed to increase the efficiency of delivery and improve the overall rationale of their separate programmes. (94g and 00b)

Prior to the Martigny Process, the impetus for promoting a grander scale of coordination on programming and policy issues (coordinating contingency planning, mutual recognition of humanitarian principles) among agencies came largely from outside UNICEF, like OCHA, academics and donors.

DANIDA's review of Danish Humanitarian Assistance focused extensively on coordination among donors, or its inadequacy in each of six cases. The review noted the inadequate technical coordination by UNICEF in the Sudan with the consequence of "missed opportunities and reduced effectiveness. UNICEF has been unable to ensure consistent sectoral coordination nor balanced allocation of humanitarian resources." (00a, Volume 7:57). The report cited inadequate funding as the principle cause in most complex emergencies for inadequate coordination, due at times to inadequate financial support.

It was only toward the end of the decade that UNICEF deliberately linked its commitment to strengthening inter-agency coordination with its commitment to bringing to bear the Convention on Rights of the Child on its programming. The joint study of coordination in the Great Lakes Emergency Operation by three agencies, UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP, sought to "improve interagency coordination of humanitarian assistance appropriate to the changing context and to document lessons for broader application to humanitarian assistance." (98c: 1) The little mention of humanitarian principles is perhaps understandable as this was a shared, not a UNICEF, document. UNICEF may not have been prepared to push its humanitarian objectives in the section on programming. (98c: 8)

Perhaps UNICEF was keenly aware that there were both costs and benefits to strengthening the power of inter-agency collaboration, and hence the importance of the third issue. As DANIDA had said in the frank assessment of its humanitarian assistance (00a: 44), there is always the risk that the interests of the junior players are drowned as more powerful players and their interests dominate. The benefits were numerous,

³⁵ UNICEF. Programme Directive on Revised Programme Policy and Procedure Manual: Programme Operations, Chapter 6: Special Considerations in Programme During Crisis (CF/PD/PRO/200-01).

including better integration of services, greater efficiency in input management through pooling of resources and improved donor coherence. But there was also the threat that a smaller player, like UNICEF, would lose an important measure of organisational autonomy, which was essential if UNICEF was to preserve the public perception of its uniqueness. Its niche became vulnerable when larger organisations expanded into areas of humanitarian response belonging to other agencies. The DANIDA evaluation called this “mandate drift”. UNICEF’s central programming issue since 1996 had been to pursue a policy of promoting and protecting the rights of children, to incorporate the Convention on Rights of the Child increasingly into its programming. Organisational autonomy was essential for UNICEF to ensure that this principle not be pushed aside by mandate drift or submerged under other imperatives as a powerful inter-agency body set its own priorities.

The trend of the decade began with support for the newly created UN/DHA to oversee and integrate UN agencies in complex emergency responses. Events in the early part of the decade, however, introduced a centrifugal tendency among agencies to more definitively stake out their turf in the arena of emergency response. UNICEF followed suit, and UNOCHA’s leadership predictably declined. As the decade closed, the disconnect among agencies took its toll in Afghanistan, the Sudan and Angola. There had been a reluctance, perhaps understandably, to decide between the programming priority of promoting the rights of children and women, and UNICEF’s commitment to bolstering inter-agency coordination. UNICEF’s primary concerns were to improve its comparative advantage in humanitarian crises and promote its corporate commitment to human rights. Promoting inter-agency coordination received UNICEF’s attention on the condition that it did not take away from these primary concerns.

This was to change in 1997 with the Secretary General’s strong appeal for agencies to work more closely together as part of the United Nations reform process. The United Nations Development Assessment Framework (UNDAF), which urged agencies to collaboratively prepare Common Country Assessments (CCAs), made it clear that agency collaboration had become a key feature of UN reform. More recently, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)³⁶ has strongly urged greater collaboration between the Department of Peace Keeping Operation (DPKO) and other agencies in the context of humanitarian crises. Agencies would have to demonstrate how their separate inputs would complement each other in meeting the needs identified in the Common Country Assessments. UNICEF’s original reluctance quickly turned to not only endorsing these measures, but taking the lead in urging other agencies in this direction. While preserving the integrity of its mandate, UNICEF would have to take steps to coordinate its own programmes with those of other agencies, first in regular programmes and eventually in responding to complex emergencies. It was the Martigny process that sought to link its efforts to promoting coordination to its effort to promote the rights of children and women.

³⁶ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operation, 21 August 2000 (A/55/305) and (S/2000/809).

3. The Martigny Process

One of the core criteria for project proposals under DfID's funding of UNICEF's Global Proposal to Strengthen UNICEF's Programming has been that they "reflect adequately the relationship to other stakeholders; how will they collaborate; and who coordinates that coordination? Is UN collaboration/UNDAF an issue that needs to be considered?"³⁷ Both the Martigny follow-up work plans and the Crisis Preparedness Working Group work plans support inter-agency coordination in limited ways. More importantly, however, are the sometimes less-formal efforts UNICEF has taken to promote inter-agency coordination.

1. What steps can UNICEF take to further the level of coordination and collaboration among agencies and NGO partners in order to expand opportunities to better integrate emergency services and enhance donor coherence?

Coordination figures as the second of four core corporate commitments: i.e. "the capacity to assume a coordinating role for sectoral support and to initiate appropriate strategies for initial response in collaboration with United Nations and other partners."³⁸ This overall commitment contains two sub-commitments: one to provide coordination in specific sectors, and the other to endorse overall coordination in UNICEF's relations with other UN agencies and strategic NGO partners.

- UNICEF has committed itself to maintaining capacity for assuming a coordinating role for public health interventions targeting women and children, for nutrition rehabilitation services for children, for child protection and psycho-social support, for support to unaccompanied children and for the provision of educational services.
- UNICEF has proposed to play a major role in (1) mediating between the Special Representative to the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict and the Regional Offices to promote a "clear country mission;"³⁹ and (2) assisting in selecting Humanitarian Coordinators.⁴⁰
- UNICEF has made a concerted effort to be present in discussions and to represent its position in the context of the larger concern to promote inter-agency collaboration without minimising the integrity of its unique mandate. The Executive Director has assumed the leadership of the Inter-agency Standing Committee. The Director, Office of Emergency Programmes participates actively on the Inter-agency Standing Committee Working Group as well as on the Secretary General's Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs.

³⁷ Memo from Carol Bellamy, Executive Director to Regional Directors, HQ Divisional Directors, 31 August 1999.

³⁸ UNICEF Executive Board. 2000. UNICEF Core Corporate Commitments in Emergencies, May.

³⁹ Crisis Preparedness Measures (Programme and Operations) As Part of the Martigny Follow-up Process, May 2000.

⁴⁰ Progress Report 1 for the Implementation of UNICEF/DfID Capacity Building Projects, 29 February 2000.

- The Director, Office of Emergency Programmes, has furthermore intensified contacts among emergency response organisations, and on a case-by-case basis, in Burundi, the Sudan and elsewhere, has taken significant steps to take actions that give priority to the common interests of agencies and large NGOs.

2. How can UNICEF more clearly define its responsibilities in complex emergencies vis-à-vis other agencies and NGOs in ways that give greater coherence and definition to its niche and enhance its comparative advantage?

UNICEF continues to articulate its commitments with other agencies and reduce the overlap among agencies' responsibilities by expanding the number of its memoranda of understanding and agreements.

- MOUs with partner agencies and NGOs have expanded beyond the original agreements with WFP and UNHCR to include WHO, UNFPA and large NGOs such as CARE and ICRC.
- In recognition of the greater role of bilateral agencies such as the SIDA and the Netherlands Ministry for Development Cooperation, UNICEF has concluded agreements with these, and intends to do so with WHO, UNFPA and others. (See Section 6, Human Resources, for a more detailed account of linkages with NGOs.)

3. How is UNICEF to ensure that enhanced inter-agency coordination and leadership reflect and endorse the principles of promoting and protecting children and women's rights, and promoting and protecting children and women from the effects of armed conflict?

UNICEF has made explicit provisions in its work plans to inform, train and advocate with sister agencies and major NGO partners, using inter-agency coordination to further child rights and related issues.

- UNICEF has taken steps to (1) train partners in advocacy and International Humanitarian Law in order to ensure the integration of human rights with their legal foundation and (2) train and advocate with agency partners and NGO partners on children's/women's rights.
- UNICEF has contributed to training teams participating in Common Country Assessments for the United Nations Develop Assessment Framework to ensure the incorporation of indicators and measures that are sensitive to assessing the human rights of children and women. It has also provided training to EFCT, the Emergency Field Coordination Training by providing trainers and input into the curriculum and structure of the courses.

- UNICEF has continued representations on the child rights perspectives in relevant UN bodies, including IASC, IASC-WG and the Security Council as well as in other international forums.⁴¹
- Programme Division, the Programme Funding Office and the Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) have provided input to the development of guidelines on five cross-cutting issues for the 2001 Consolidated Appeal.
- The Office Management Plan for the Office of Emergency Programmes has affirmed its intention to ensure that the interests of women and children are “recognised, reflected and adopted in inter-agency policy and procedures through its spearheading of collaboration with other agencies in numerous formalised forums. This includes inter-agency linkages with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ECHA, the IASC (and its working groups and sub-working groups and task forces), and active participation in the Consolidated Appeal.”⁴²
- UNICEF has also worked closely with the Inter-agency Standing Committee in developing policy guidelines for assistance and protection of person with HIV/AIDS, to reduce the availability of small arms, to provide assistance to landmine victims, to provide rapid educational response in a number of areas and to make public information available to describe the care required for unaccompanied children.⁴³

4. Strengths and Areas for Further Follow-up

External relations play a major role in an organisation’s capacity to achieve its goals. This component is restated here from the analytical framework outlined in the Introduction. This question provides a context for assessing the adequacy of the measures UNICEF has taken to engage other agencies in (1) mutual collaboration and (2) in supporting UNICEF’s mission to promote the rights of children and women and to protect children and women from the effects of armed conflict.

Is there an appropriate balance in UNICEF between its commitment to building a common purpose internally and developing strategic alliances among sister agencies and implementation partners externally?

UNICEF straddles two imperatives that are not always compatible: (1) consolidating resources and support for human rights-based programming strategies within the organisation, and (2) providing resources, leadership and guidance, as well as making the compromises required, to strengthen the creation of an inter-agency body that provides greater unity and integration to UN programming in complex emergency situations.

⁴¹ Crisis Preparedness Measures (Programme and Operations) As Part of the Martigny Follow-up Process, May 2000; Progress Report 1 for the Implementation of UNICEF/DfID Capacity Building Projects, 29 February 2000.

⁴² Office of Emergency Programmes, Office Management Plan 2000-2001, 1999.

⁴³ EMOPS, Work Plan for Headquarters: Cross Sector Activities (2), May 2000.

The Martigny process has ushered in a period of internal consolidation. Like other agencies, UNICEF has been obliged to recognise that the pursuit of a strong comparative advantage and a unique presence among the world's international organisations requires a focused effort within the organisation.

UNICEF has also sought to respond to the pressures that push agencies to increasingly embody a common purpose. Donors exert pressure in many ways to bring greater integration to agencies' activities. Competition from large NGOs means that UN agencies must improve the quality and efficiency of their performance. The increase in private-sector influence in international affairs, particularly in politically vulnerable countries, oblige UN agencies to recognise that acting separately or in competition weakens their stature vis-à-vis corporate bodies. UNICEF has sought to direct the shape of inter-agency collaboration from a position of strength, positioning itself in inter-agency forums so it can provide leadership.

One legacy of the decade has been a lingering reluctance in UNICEF to dilute the integrity of its message in the interest of making it palatable to other partners. It is to be expected that its commitment to promoting inter-agency collaboration has been less focused and less formalised than its efforts to strengthen its mandate internally. How can UNICEF find new ways to increase the compatibility of these two imperatives in order to set forth more formalised initiatives for increasing inter-agency collaboration? There is considerable scope for taking steps in this direction.

One of these would be to recognise explicitly the benefits that enhanced inter-agency collaboration would bring to UNICEF, and to articulate these in planning documents and proposals circulated by the Inter-Divisional Crisis Preparedness Working Group or a similar appropriate body. These would be in addition to the benefits and the objectives that guide the training and advocacy among agencies that UNICEF currently supports. These might include more leverage in dealing with local authorities, limited steps toward joint implementation of key interventions, collaboration in contingency planning and preparedness measures and enhanced staff security.

There may be some advantage in documenting, in a single volume, case-by-case accounts of recent illustrative experiences in inter-agency coordination so that those interested in promoting collaboration can learn from and build on these experiences. These experiences would permit bringing to headquarters' attention, the range of formal and informal collaborations that take place in country offices but may never reach headquarters.

A further step would be to identify a working group with institutional standing within the organisation to respond to and work toward these goals for inter-agency collaboration. Inter-agency relations are assumed to be the responsibility of the Office of Emergency Programmes. This makes this division the ideal location for a formalised body to promote further coordination.

Section 3

Information Management for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

1. The Issue

In the past decade, as UNICEF has had to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances, especially to respond more flexibly and effectively to complex emergencies, the role of accurate information has become more essential. Responding in a flexible and effective manner to specific complex emergencies as well as to global trends relies on a dependable knowledge base. UNICEF has taken important steps toward improving the way information is handled within the agency, and particularly toward ensuring its relevance to fulfilling specific mandates and serving the planning needs for specific programmes. Three issues have been identified:

1. Has UNICEF succeeded in building vulnerability analyses into its regular country planning process and, on the basis of these analyses, undertaken preparedness plans that provide the basis for laying out concrete contingency measures?

2. What progress has UNICEF made in improving its capacity to perform rapid assessments of operational constraints and possibilities at the initial stages of complex emergencies?

3. What steps should UNICEF take to refine monitoring and evaluation in order to ensure that these separate exercises recommended for a programme cycle within an Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan: (1) converge in accumulating pertinent information and (2) are applied to specific programme implementation and policy formulation?

2. Decade Trends

If UNICEF appeared sluggish in the early part of the previous decade in its capacity to respond to global emergencies, this was in part because of the relatively lower priority the agency accorded the management of information. Without exception, assessors and observers complained about the absence of information. Certainly the context of complex emergencies represents a challenge for monitoring and evaluation. As states fail, public service institutions collapse and with them their basic information gathering and records systems. Efforts to fill gaps in information on the situation of women and children are hampered by the sensitivity of information, limited access to populations, and rapid changes in the conditions affecting them. At the same time, the magnitude and speed of programme implementation requires strong programme monitoring systems. The very fluidity of the situation that makes ongoing evaluation important keeps a constant pressure on staff time.

In spite of UNICEF's attempts to compensate for the absence of information with systematic inquiries of its own, such as registrations, surveys or epidemiological studies, assessors often expressed concern that they had very little information for making accurate judgements about the impacts of UNICEF programmes. In some cases, the lack of information led to poor programming judgements.

Somalia showed how difficult it was to come by reliable health information in circumstances where monitoring teams could not move around easily, especially where there were large population movements, making overall regional or national percentages impossible to calculate. UNICEF had commissioned the Centre for Disease Control to review the available studies in Somalia, but since "there was no functioning health care system in Somalia which might have provided information on hospital visits or outpatient services, knowledge of the health status of the Somali population was based on these studies" (94c: 48), and they were not accurate enough to be of much value. The UNICEF Somalia office itself expressed its concern over the lack of information, either for planning or for evaluation purposes and lamented particularly that "little has been done to assess the impact and sustainability of our work in any of the sectors." (94c: 49)⁴⁴

A review of the emergency response in Liberia urged UNICEF to undertake a more systematic approach to gathering data since "the lack of reliable baseline data led to dependence on anecdote and hearsay during the operation." (94b: 69) The recommendation applied to situation data and programme monitoring. The Country Representative had taken the bold steps to gather needed information, including the introduction of a modest community-based measurement framework, which detected needs and monitored impacts to some degree. But the assessor urged UNICEF to introduce assessment approaches systematically at the earliest stage of the complex emergency as a matter of course. The assessor experimented with ways of scoring the efficiency of the supply system as an example of the kind of innovations that UNICEF urgently needed to incorporate information management as an integral feature of its response. This evaluation stands out among many of that period for its systematic use of existing information and for its central message of the need to improve information management. (94b: 74)

A review of UNICEF's treatment of unaccompanied children in Goma following the Great Lakes political emergency similarly urged UNICEF to introduce information gathering systematically and early. (94e: 7) The concepts of a vulnerability analysis or an initial rapid assessment⁴⁵ had not been formalised at the time, but the experiences reported in Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda all showed the importance of doing so. The first two issues identified in this section emphasise this point.

The programme evaluation of Haiti described how the country office made the explicit decision not to embark on larger monitoring exercises and utilised the time of the Monitoring Officer for functions other than managing pertinent information. The

⁴⁴ Reference draws on supporting document, "UNICEF Assistance to Somalia: January – June 1993", p. 47.

⁴⁵ UNICEF Executive Board 2000. UNICEF Core Corporate Commitments in Emergencies, May.

evaluation recognised that the office might have felt too overworked to attend to information, but it also chronicled the consequences.

“UNICEF did not always have the answers it needed during the crisis, to make the decisions it did. This was demonstrated in the early nutrition interventions proposed in 1992 that focused only on food security-related malnutrition, when later analysis clearly demonstrated the significance of exclusive breastfeeding practices and disease as factors in malnutrition. Information gaps have also caused problems in the operational planning for programmes, as revealed by difficulties in targeting the EIP campaigns through schools in 1993 and 1994, when data on schools and their location was very inaccurate.” (96a: 51-52)

The general lesson common to the Somalia, Great Lakes, Liberia and Haiti evaluative exercises is that making too sharp a distinction between pre-programme and post-programme information (planning and programme monitoring) can obscure the fact that information collection activities in all forms converge to serve programme implementation.

In principle, UNICEF has developed an integrated approach to planning, monitoring and evaluation through the Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (IMEP)⁴⁶. The cycle begins with a situation assessment and analysis, including the results of ongoing assessment of the human rights situation of children and women and vulnerability analysis. This is followed by ongoing monitoring (of country context, the situation of women and children, and programmes), programme-level mid-term reviews and thematic evaluations. The cycle is closed by an end-of-cycle review. The IMEP is designed to coordinate data-collection activities across programmes and link data collection to key decision-making events. It is not clear whether this integration is achieved in practice. The third issue identified in this section asks what is being done to provide greater coherence in the monitoring and evaluation cycle.

The joint UNICEF/DfID evaluation of the Kosovo Refugee emergency and its appeal for more pertinent information has urged UNICEF to link monitoring and evaluation activities more closely to programme implementation. The evaluation appealed to UNICEF to introduce real-time evaluations, i.e. assessments conducted as work was ongoing in order to feed lessons directly into the programming activities. (00a: 41) The evaluation acknowledged that the Martigny Consultation and its follow-up had taken steps to link information management and programme implementation, especially to mainstream emergency preparedness within regular programming, but it also noted, “this debate would appear to remain to be unresolved. The quality of UNICEF’s guidance on core UNICEF emergency issues (e.g. capacity building, emergency vulnerability analysis and contingency planning and actual preparedness measures) needs to be improved.” (00a: 36)

⁴⁶ UNICEF Programme and Procedure Manual: Programme Operations, Chapter 5: Monitoring and Evaluation, 1 December 1999.

Throughout the decade, UNICEF has generally appeared slow to respond to the concerns of evaluators on how to improve the management and use of information. UNICEF had been alerted to the paucity of information in Liberia and Somalia in 1994, and yet the issue of improving information management does not figure in the Report of the Representative's Consultations in mid-1994, despite the fact that this report was a landmark document in many other respects. (94g) Nor does it figure in the review of lessons learned in Rwanda (94f), which came out later that same year. A personal assessment of Rwanda in 1997 treats the issue only cursorily (97). All three documents urged greater preparedness, but none seemed concerned about the essential tool for making preparedness a reality, i.e. making systematic accumulation and analysis of information integral to programme management. Managing information remained a specialised function subordinate to the more pressing pragmatic issues of getting on with the work of implementation. The inter-agency evaluation of Rwanda made an issue of the lack of a reliable analysis of the potential for conflict since it was the lack of demonstrable evidence of a coming crisis, sufficiently credible to key states, which contributed to keeping the UN from taking preventive measures. Its recommendation was to establish a unit for strategic analysis of early warning of conflict, including genocide and political assassination directly under the Office of the Secretary (96d: 49-51) drawing on information from agencies, NGOs and UN/DHA.

It is only recently, as the Martigny process has responded to the urgent need for acquiring relevant information to anticipate and plan for complex emergencies, that tools have been developed to help country offices conduct such in-depth analyses as part of their regular planning and evaluation functions.

3. The Martigny Process

The Martigny Consultation and its follow-up have called for a full integration of vulnerability analysis into country programme planning, the integration of operational monitoring with programming needs and a more systematic approach to programme evaluation. The Martigny Consultation documents have given considerable attention to developing instruments for political risk analysis, vulnerability analysis and indicators for early warning.

1. Has UNICEF succeeded in building vulnerability analyses into its regular country planning process and, on the basis of these analyses, undertaken detailed preparedness plans that provide the basis for laying out concrete contingency measures?

The Crisis Preparedness Measures and the Martigny Consultation follow-up work plans give brief descriptions of activities directed at making vulnerability analysis a sufficiently integral part of country programme planning so that, as a matter of course, a country office is not only prepared to respond, but also has the materials on hand to respond to an emergency in a country.

- Headquarters divisions have collaborated in revising the situation analysis process as described in the PPP Manual, incorporating the use of the vulnerability/risk analysis approach for country planning.⁴⁷ In addition, various templates have been drafted to guide vulnerability (early warning) analysis. One of these is found in a draft paper on incorporating vulnerability analysis in UNICEF situation analysis of children and women with checklists for assessing the potential for political instability at household, community, national and regional levels.⁴⁸ An annex to the first progress report on Crisis Preparedness Measures provides another checklist broken down into political, societal, economic, crime and natural disaster indicators.⁴⁹
- Proposals have been made to develop indicators for threat assessments, to develop and promote a standardised field-reporting template for preparedness measures, to extend training on early warning indicators to UNICEF staff working in emergencies, and to develop tools and methodologies to measure the impact of complex emergencies on children.⁵⁰

2. What progress has UNICEF made in improving its capacity to perform rapid assessments of operational constraints and possibilities at the initial stages of complex emergencies?

The first of UNICEF's core corporate commitments is to maintain the capacity to conduct a rapid assessment of a complex emergency, essentially to conduct a review of the situation of children and women in order to ensure an effective UNICEF response.⁵¹

- Rapid assessment procedures have been developed, designed to link programming requirements with specific operational ones. Its purpose is to provide rapid and accurate information regarding security, communications, information technology, supplies, warehousing, office premises, transportation and administration in general in order to respond to a complex emergency.
- The Triplex 2000 Simulation exercise provided an occasion to test some of the measures developed for conducting such an initial rapid assessment.⁵²

3. What steps should UNICEF take to refine monitoring and evaluation schemes in order to ensure that the separate exercises recommended for a programme cycle within an Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan: (1) converge in accumulating pertinent information and (2) are applied to specific programme implementation and policy formulation?

⁴⁷ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures (Programmes and Operations) as part of the Martigny Follow-up Process, May 2000.

⁴⁸ Yumi Bae, (Draft) "Technical Note on Incorporating Vulnerability Analysis in UNICEF Situation Analysis of Children and Women", 10 February 2000.

⁴⁹ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures, First Progress Report, May 2000.

⁵⁰ Work plan for headquarters: Preparedness Measures (2).

⁵¹ UNICEF Executive Board, UNICEF's Core Corporate Commitments in Emergencies, March 2000.

⁵² Triplex 2000 Exercise, UNICEF Final Report and Lessons Learned, 24-29 May 2000.

There has been a broad recognition that monitoring, evaluating and reporting require a more consistent and systematic approach with appropriately adapted sophisticated tools.

- Ongoing, “real-time” monitoring has been recommended as a standard procedure in programme delivery. It was also recommended that these “real-time” teams should include staff from internal audit to help field staff establish protocols for management of staff and finances.⁵³
- M&E policy and procedures at CO level have been updated in Chapter 5 of the new Programme Policy and Procedures Manual: Programme Operations, where emphasis is placed on use of M&E activities for programme improvement and organisational learning, as well as use of the Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan as a key management tool in this process.
- In addition to basic M&E training materials for field programme staff, including modules in the newly revised PPP training package as well as a more in-depth modular package entitled “Managing M&E Activities”, supplementary materials have been developed to cover the special adaptations and tools for M&E in crisis and unstable contexts.
- To respond to the demand in crisis and unstable contexts for broader systemwide evaluation, UNICEF has taken an active role in carrying out a “partial system” evaluation (jointly by UNICEF and three other UN agencies, OCHA, UNHCR and WFP), the experience to be reviewed to build a model TOR for such evaluations.

4. Strengths and Areas for Further Follow-up

Two key features of organisational capacity, drawn from the analytical framework outlined in the Introduction provide a context for assessing the adequacy of the measures UNICEF has taken to meet its information needs. The first asks how well the organisation documents its performance in fulfilling its mission commitments.

Is there a clear organisational mission, which not only articulates an organisational culture, but which also articulates a clear relationship between organisational norms and organisational practice, i.e. how an organisation is expected to actualise these norms? Has a clear link been documented between UNICEF’s goal to carry out human rights-based programming and the advocacy that workers are expected to practice in the field?

The second asks whether the necessary resources are in place to support the acquisition, analysis and use of information for planning, monitoring and evaluation purposes.

⁵³ Programme and Operations in Times of Crisis: Main Issues and Recommendations from UNICEF Experiences in Response to Unstable Situations, 1999.

Are the necessary resources – human, financial, technological and informational – available to support the needs for the resources that a range of circumstances may require? Specifically regarding information, are the procedures and resources in place to ensure UNICEF is able to acquire and utilise information in ways that provide timely information on which to base crucial programme decisions?

UNICEF's responses to the concerns raised throughout the decade, especially recommendations and actions taken in the course of the Martigny process, are significant steps toward building greater capacity for utilising information and applying it to programme implementation. Attention has been given to developing tools for carrying out vulnerability analyses and for conducting rapid assessments during the initial phases of an emergency. The principles of an integrated monitoring and evaluation plan for country offices continue to be refined.

The present attempts at providing guidelines for vulnerability analyses that trigger preparedness planning are helpful, but they are for the most part, long inventories of indicators. These constitute an important step, albeit a small step in the development of an effective system for anticipating political instability and are, probably, a rather long way from providing a framework that really does what UNICEF wants. The most difficult part in using these lists of indicators is in knowing which among these indicators are the most important and what is implied when a change is measured, i.e. what does it mean for programme response and operations.

Several related efforts are under way simultaneously in different divisions. Programme Division is developing a scheme for vulnerability analysis. The Office of Emergency Programmes, with specific guidance from the Crisis Preparedness Working Group, is working on strengthening preparedness planning at both the regional office level and at headquarters. The Operations Centre (OPSCEN) in the Office of Emergency Planning is developing guidelines for anticipating complex emergency situations worldwide. Greater integration of these separate efforts would be particularly valuable. Greater collaboration on moving these efforts forward with the coherent linkages originally intended, and in providing consistent guidance to the field, would be particularly valuable.

Equally valuable would be a general framework for understanding how threats to human rights typically emerge. The Martigny process has begun, however implicitly, to suggest some of the pieces that fit together in the puzzle of such a framework. A society must have the political and financial support to promote social equity and the institutional resources and will to do something about grievous abuses. Where these are absent, the threat emerges, and there are a few telltale signs. Interestingly, these telltale signs have little to do with the prevailing framework of social and economic development that international civil servants and many academics take for granted, i.e. one that urges countries to reinforce the private sector, accumulate capital and ensure that the public sector does not overly restrict the freedom or the resources of individuals to make the private sector work for them. The "development" framework emerging out of the policy

shifts taking place in UNICEF places greater emphasis on a viable legal system, social equity (gender equity, equity among ethnic groups, more equitable distribution of resources), and a financially viable and morally informed public sector with the will to move society toward some idea of increased political and economic participation. Refining such a general framework may be the best way to simplify and eventually elaborate a vulnerability analysis that is useful and straightforward.

It would be difficult for country offices to make use of the vulnerability analyses presently available, much less make them part of their country planning process. The Programme Policy and Procedures Manual (new Book D) asks country offices to undertake vulnerability analysis and preparedness planning as part of the ongoing situation analysis. Greater guidance may be necessary from headquarters, presumably Programme Division, on ways to simplify, adapt and utilise vulnerability analysis and preparedness planning to refine the incorporation of political analysis within the programme planning process. Clearly such work would need to distinguish a situation analysis process with national partners and a more sensitive process of determining likely scenarios that might include political instability and gross human rights violations.

Country offices need guidance, but they also need support in refining and applying such analyses for planning purposes and for integrating the information requirements therein with the full range of information gathering functions, monitoring and evaluation. To make information-gathering useful requires professional expertise and particular skills, and if headquarters is to expect a more sophisticated use of information in programme planning, a greater amount of expertise may be needed at the country and regional office level.

Finally, while there is every reason to believe that human rights-based programming contributes to preventing the abuse of human rights and the afflictions experienced by children and women in armed conflict, the evidence is scant. There is a need to document the relationship between the ideals of UNICEF's mission and its practice, essentially to show how well-programmed activities contribute to objectives and goals. This is especially challenging in new programme areas, including broader human rights advocacy, as well as more specific areas such as the protection of child soldiers and unaccompanied minors. Unlike long-tested WES interventions, the theory behind interventions in these newer areas is often untested, meaning that the frameworks and methods for evaluation must also be worked through. Testing the effectiveness and impact of these programme strategies is critical for the organisation in order to provide coherence and credibility for its mission. This is consistent with the IMEP approach and necessary to give coherence and consistency to the cycle of planning, monitoring and evaluation.

Section 4

Funding

1. The Issues

Funds raised in the Consolidated Appeals are substantial, but they rarely meet requirements. In 1994 and 1995, they amounted to approximately 70 per cent of requirements outlined in Consolidated Appeals and then dropped to an average of 55 per cent for the following three years. The number of crisis countries officially recognised as complex emergencies has meanwhile increased from 11 in 1997, to 15 in 1998, to 17 in 1999 and 2000.

A principal issue is to find more funds, but a significant long-term increase in funding for complex emergencies in an era of declining ODA is unlikely. So the challenge becomes to increase the accessibility and effectiveness of the funds UNICEF does receive and spend. Increasing accessibility means increasing the ease and timeliness for country offices to access various funding sources when Consolidated Appeal funds are not available. Three mechanisms are available for immediate funding: diversions from general programme funds, reprogramming within general programme funds, and access to and use of the Emergency Programme Fund. A fourth mechanism, which will access funds in the first weeks of a complex emergency, is the UN Central Emergency Revolving Fund.⁵⁴ Increasing accessibility also means using the Consolidated Appeals to achieve a greater coherence among donors. These challenges raise the following issues:

1. What further measures can be taken to assist country offices in accessing funds as they are required to meet urgent needs in crisis situations?

2. What additional strategies should be explored for expanding sources of funding for complex emergencies?

3. What measures is UNICEF prepared to take to reinforce the capacity of the Consolidated Appeals to provide greater coherence in meeting the funding objectives of separate donors? And in ensuring these funding objectives, what measures is it prepared to take to bring pressure to bear on governments and warring factions to reduce armed conflict and its consequences?

2. Decade Trends

As long as political crises were treated as variations on natural ones, as they were in the first part of the decade, (92c: 2-4)⁵⁵ they were presumed to be self-limiting. This presumption has governed the types of funding modalities that have characterised

⁵⁴ EMOPS, *Resource Mobilization in Unstable Situations and During Emergencies*, 2000.

⁵⁵ See also Mark Duffield, "Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism", *IDS Bulletin: Linking Relief and Development*, Vol 25, No.3 October 1994; reprinted in UNICEF, "Rethinking Strategies and Response to Systemic Crises", Office of Emergency Programmes for Emergency Training, 1994.

UNICEF's resource mobilisation strategies during the past decade. Although there is now more flexibility than before in the use of country programme funds for complex emergencies, for the most part, complex emergencies are funded out of Consolidated Appeals, which take place at six-month or yearly intervals, and which provide funding for complex emergencies for short periods. There are conspicuous difficulties in relying so largely on the Consolidated Appeals: they take time and complex emergencies require rapid response; they do not provide any guarantee of longer-term funding and do not provide funding to ensure continuity between a crisis stage and a transition or rehabilitative phase — on the contrary, they fund only for limited periods of time. The complex and protracted nature of humanitarian crises has made the Consolidated Appeals increasingly awkward vehicles for mobilising the proper resources. However, the more serious issue is that the Consolidated Appeal brings donors together to offer charity, but not political direction, and as complex emergencies require political pressure, the inability of the Consolidated Appeal to do this is the more conspicuous.

UNICEF's fund-raising ability in the previous decade and up to the early 1990s had been frequently regarded as the most advantageous component of its complex emergency response mechanism. (94b: xvi) Many of the early evaluations gave very little attention to the funding mechanism, suggesting only that there was a need to obtain "better donor response" and to be sure to maintain "systematic and frequent reporting to donors at field and headquarters level". (89: 13) This would change gradually as complex emergencies appeared increasingly difficult to resolve, donor interest in them waned and frustration grew with the Consolidated Appeal process.

The first strain on the system was timing, the subject raised in the first issue. Liberia in 1990 was a case in point. The emergency had begun to affect four countries in the region: Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone in January 1990. But it took 11 months for a formal appeal to be released. Funding from the appeal "did not start to arrive until the end of 1991, almost two full years after the beginning of the emergency." (94b: xviii) The programme was forced to rely on small country programme funds and appeals from the Emergency Reserve (Programme) Fund in New York, though these funds were far from sufficient. The evaluation expressed concern at the:

"uncertainty in relying on emergency funding as a way of supporting programmes intended to continue for the medium term, sometimes forming the basis for a country programme. The Representative under these conditions has to look to the sustainability of his operation. Continued support depends on a steady flow of appeals that, in the Liberian emergency, did not keep pace with the need for funding." (94b: xviii and 28ff)

As the emergency in Liberia entered the second year and the Consolidated Appeals succeeded one another, funding declined. The need, however, did not. Where complex emergencies increased in severity and duration, country programmes without bilateral funding would be perpetually short of resources. They would be short at the beginning of the emergency as the cumbersome process of the Consolidated Appeal took its time, this

would be followed by a brief period of resource flow, and they would soon be short again as the profile of the events that triggered the complex emergency faded from international attention.

There were two avenues of recourse for meeting funding constraints during the initial phase of the sequence of events that appeared to characterise complex emergencies. The first, and most important, was the Emergency Programme Fund, a two-year allocation from regular resources designed to provide cash flow for initial response to complex emergencies while awaiting other resources through Consolidated Appeals. Emergency Programme Fund annual budgets remained at US\$14 million until 1994 when the Executive Board raised the ceiling to US\$30 million. But the process was also slow, and the fund had to be reimbursed. One commentator from Rwanda echoed the often-repeated concern that there are constraints in mobilising sufficient emergency funds in a timely manner. “We must be able to move funds quickly into emergencies. The Emergency Programme Fund is one mechanism that worked better this time. However we need a grant facility linked to our core emergency programmes. We must be able to start-up on day one knowing that the budget is covered without jumping through a thousand hoops at the country level.” (97: 3)

A second avenue of recourse has been the Central Emergency Revolving Fund administered by the Inter-agency Standing Committee. Country offices may receive up to US\$50 million to finance plans to be submitted and funded eventually from the Consolidated Appeals. These funds must be reimbursed and they, too, require time-consuming procedures for application and transfers to country offices. In addition to these reimbursable funds, limited amounts may be either diverted from general programme funds or formally reprogrammed, and the amounts have increased from \$US 50,000 to twice that amount, in the past two years.

Another strain on resource mobilisation comes at the other end of the complex emergency cycle, as the international memory of the original events that provoked the humanitarian crisis fades. The crisis enters what some authors have ventured to call the “twilight zone”, (98a: 37) a time when the crisis continues, when the need especially for non-food aid increases, when the programme enters a rehabilitative or “transition” phase and resources available through the Consolidated Appeals decline. This is a twilight zone both in programming and budgeting. Few donors have a dedicated budget line for rehabilitation; in fact, most donors continue to make a significant and artificial separation between emergency and regular programme funds. There are curious difficulties in ensuring continuity as a country crosses the line from emergency funding to infrastructure rebuilding, creating a lull in external support at a crucial juncture. At worst, a funding crisis emerges. At best, essential services can be discontinued while a country adjusts. There is evidence that services in a number of countries have declined once relief aid ceases⁵⁶ and resources become particularly scarce.

⁵⁶ J. Macrae, A.Zwi and H.. Birungi (1995) “A Healthy Peace?: Rehabilitation and Development of Health Sector in a Post-conflict Situation. The Case of Uganda. London”: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; N. Stockton (1996) “Defensive Development: The Role of the Military in Relief and Development”, *Disasters*, 20 (2).

One evaluator put it this way: “While it has not been thought through, there are those now who believe that some equivalent of general resources should be available for the bigger emergency operations that would relieve offices of the constant need to devote attention to appeals and requesting loans.” (95b: 26) This was John Richardson in 1995. His suggestion has not been fully adopted, as one might expect following the decision to “mainstream programming in unstable situations (i.e. complex emergencies) within the overall context of the Country Programme.”⁵⁷ There is still a divide between emergency and regular programme funds, but there are more linkages between them and they are easier to use.

The divide has been further reduced, and UNICEF’s response to complex emergencies has become more integrated with regular programming, as facilities and human resources throughout the organisation have joined the effort to increase the availability of funding in such instances. Prior to 1997, there were few ways to provide rapid access to funds in such crises.⁵⁸ Since 1997, the number of easily accessible funding sources has increased. Country offices are uniquely placed to interact with donors in the countries where complex emergencies occur, and the Programme Funding Office is better able to help country offices prepare special appeals outside the normal scope of the UN coordination mechanism.⁵⁹

Relying more on the fund-raising resources that serve regular programming in order to respond to complex emergencies is the particular challenge raised in the second issue, since it implicitly means relying less on the Consolidated Appeals. The number of locally accessible sources appears to be increasing. Inter-governmental donors (including the European Commission Humanitarian Office) have local representations whose awareness of local circumstances carry weight in their home offices. In major complex emergencies, the World Bank and regional development banks may also provide funds to UNICEF. Much more of the responsibility for raising funds is devolving upon the country offices. This is both a burden and an opportunity. Country offices share a large load in complex emergency management, but as more funds are raised locally, the opportunities for donors to respond more sensitively and fully to UNICEF requests also expand.⁶⁰

Media plays a significant role. At a meeting of Representatives in 1994, one of the recommendations was that “work with national and international media must be given sufficient priority and Representatives should ensure that the office has adequate capacity and resources for this.” More specifically, “Representatives will provide adequate and timely information on emergency activities to DOI for dissemination to NATCOMS, GCO and others including the Press to enhance the advocacy, exchange of information and fundraising opportunities.” (94g: 16) Strategies for responding adequately to this

⁵⁷ Memo from Executive Director to Regional Directors/HQ Division Directors, 31 August 1999.

⁵⁸ UNICEF, Policy and Procedure Manual, Programme Operations, Book D, 1992.

⁵⁹ UNICEF, Programme Policy and Procedure Manual: Programme Operations, Chapter 6, Programming Tools, 1 December 1999.

⁶⁰ Programme Funding Office, PFO Briefing Notes: Fund Raising in Emergencies – Preparedness and Response, 27 June 2000.

recommendation had finally materialised six years later. A document from the Programme Funding Office now provides country representatives with guidance for meeting their funding needs locally; key players within UNICEF are put at their disposal including the Programme Funding Office, the Private Sector Division, the Geneva Regional Office, and most importantly, the National Committees.⁶¹ The contribution from National Committees increased five-fold between 1997 and 1999; their percentage of total income from donors rose three-fold, from 12 per cent to 36 per cent. Expanding its funding base, particularly among National Committees, will provide UNICEF greater flexibility in responding quickly to crisis situations and permit the organisation to rely less on the Consolidated Appeals process.

Even though income from the Consolidated Appeals has diminished over the past five years, and its amount varies considerably, it remains the primary source of income for responding to complex emergencies. The percentage of total income required for emergency countries coming from the Consolidated Appeals was 86 per cent in 1997, 70 per cent in 1998 and 60 per cent in 1999. A third issue raises the question of what UNICEF can do to more effectively use the Consolidated Appeals process to bring about greater strategic coherence among donors.

The Consolidated Appeal brings funders together to meet complex emergency needs, but it is not regarded as an opportunity to bring concerted pressure to bear on governments and rebels in areas of internal conflict. Funds are raised with little attention to whether their use is explicitly concerned with ending the complex emergencies. The potential leverage that the delivery of aid has in changing the course of complex emergency events may not be considerable, but its disbursement could be linked to political conditions, and in this way, its long-term impact enhanced.

This issue overlaps with issues raised in Section 2 that review UNICEF's contribution to inter-agency coordination. It nevertheless deserves mention here because of the central role by inter-agency bodies in raising funds through the Consolidated Appeals. This inter-agency function has the potential to accomplish more than it does. DANIDA's review of its Humanitarian Assistance regretted that the CAP framework allowed little possibility to achieve "coherence in humanitarian assistance policy between donors." (99b: 44)

"Humanitarian assistance frequently provides necessary social services, but while it must do so, it produces the dilemma that local protagonists can avoid responsibility for and ownership of them. Since such an assumption of responsibility would mark a transition to peace, one of the main purposes of humanitarian assistance is undermined, as in Afghanistan, Angola, and Sudan. There is some evidence that humanitarian aid is still used as a substitute for political action that would address recover and peace issues, in particular in Angola." (99a: 44)

⁶¹ Programme Funding Office, PFO Briefing Notes: Fund Raising in Emergencies – Preparedness and Response, 27 June 2000.

An inter-agency evaluation of emergency response in the Great Lakes Region placed the dilemma in the context of how to engineer a common will among donors to minimise excesses of an unscrupulous government or warring parties. It recognised a hierarchy of power in defining the terms of a framework for consent, i.e. the terms of a humanitarian programme. “Governments and rebel authorities have primary control over this all-important function. Donors and other foreign governments hold secondary responsibility. Humanitarians run a weak and distant third.” (98b: 100) The point is that donors may not have a great deal of influence over a fluid situation of aggression and counter-aggression, but they have a lot more than humanitarian agencies. The Consolidated Appeal is the one instrument that allows humanitarians to consolidate the political power of donors, not just their resources.

These are difficult issues and in some sense internally contradictory. It is not easy to force the hand of donors who support the organisation, much less on sensitive political issues. It is, however, clearly in line with the principled approach to humanitarian response that the Martigny Consultation and its follow-up have clearly articulated. The question is what strategy is best to follow.

3. The Martigny Process

The Martigny process has provided an opportunity to increase the flexibility and capacity of country offices in anticipating and meeting their resource requirements. The recommendations made and actions taken are organised below by the three issues raised at the beginning of the section.

1. What further measures can be taken to assist country offices in accessing funds when they are required to meet urgent needs in crisis situations?

A number of initiatives have been taken at headquarters that aim to provide greater flexibility for country offices in maintaining their resource base for complex emergencies.⁶²

- In collaboration with the Crisis Preparedness Working Group and in response to a call for new guidelines, the Programme Funding Office, the Office of Emergency Programmes and Programme Division have collaborated in revising the procedures for country offices to access the Emergency Programme Funds and have further provided briefing notes guiding country offices on strategies to maximise their use of existing resources.
- One of these measures has been to require fewer signatories for the approval of the Emergency Programme Funds.
- Proposals have been made to ensure rapid issuance of Programme Budget Allocations in order to reimburse the Emergency Programme Funds quicker and easier.

⁶² Office of Emergency Programmes, Office Management Plan 2000-2001, 1999.

- Better coordination between the Programme Funding Office, Programme Division and the Office of Emergency Programmes is expected to help clear Emergency Programme Funds and complete the procedures for Central Emergency Revolving Fund requests.⁶³
- New provisions have been introduced that permit modest diversions from country programme funds (up to a limit of \$US 100,000) as well as a reprogramming of regular programme funds, as necessary, over and above the \$US100,000 ceiling for diversions.
- Headquarters has provided strategies to country offices for maintaining a resource base among a range of donors, traditional and non-traditional sources of funding, and for cultivating the interest of potential donors at the country level. These guidelines recognise that the locus of first contact is at the country level and that, inevitably, greater responsibility is devolving on country representatives themselves for securing funding in complex emergencies.⁶⁴

2. What additional strategies should be explored for expanding sources of funding for complex emergencies?

The Martigny follow-up work plans aim to encourage closer cooperation and dialogue with National Committees through participation in meetings and global National Committee forums.

- The allocation of roles between Geneva Regional Office and the Office of Emergency Programmes regarding liaison with National Committees on a range of matters, including funding and deployment of human resources from National Committees, has been clarified.
- Proposals have been made for the Office of Emergency Programmes to work more closely with Division of Communication and through them, the media, to arrange visits to COs to prepare press releases and respond to media requests.⁶⁵

3. What measures is UNICEF prepared to take to reinforce the capacity of the Consolidated Appeals to provide greater coherence in meeting the funding objectives of separate donors? And in ensuring these funding objectives, what measures is it prepared to take to bring pressure to bear on governments and warring factions to reduce armed conflict and its consequences?

⁶³ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures (Programme and Operations) As part of the Martigny Follow up Process, May 2000.

⁶⁴ Programme Funding Office, Notes on Resource Mobilization, Section 1, Funding Mechanism, 27 June 2000.

⁶⁵ Work Plan for Headquarters, Timely Action and Response (1), 2000.

UNICEF has not directly supported such an objective. It has, however, undertaken to forge closer links with donors by improving the reporting mechanisms and through these links to open dialogue on some critical issues.

- Reporting formats to donors used by the Programme Funding Office have been improved, made more extensive and more regular.
- Appeals have been issued to reduce earmarking funds for specific purposes and to urge that donors give attention to “forgotten” emergencies in humanitarian crises of long duration.
- Revised guidelines have been developed in collaboration with country offices for participation in Consolidated Appeals.
- UNICEF has joined other UN agencies in proactively taking a lead to propose a review of the Consolidated Appeals guidelines to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.⁶⁶

4. Strengths and Areas for Further Follow-up

The analytical framework for assessing organisational capacity, outlined in the introduction, recognises the crucial importance of mobilising resources and making them available. Early in the decade, UNICEF’s capacity to mobilise resources was highly regarded, but the severity and protracted nature of complex emergencies tested the adequacy of its traditional fund-raising practices. Increased competition for scarce resources among a greater number of players, including large NGOs and higher profile UN agencies, placed UNICEF at an even greater disadvantage. However, the recent emphasis on human rights-based programming with its emphasis on protection of women and children has sharpened, and in some large measure, restored UNICEF’s comparative advantage and helped to create a more secure funding base. UNICEF has also taken steps to ensure that country offices have ready access to these funds and can achieve a greater measure of funding self-sufficiency through their own fund-raising initiatives.

A general question drawn from this analytical framework provides a context for assessing the extent to which these initiatives have met UNICEF’s need for improving its resource base and making funds more accessible for urgent needs in humanitarian crises.

Are the necessary resources – human, financial, technological and informational – available to support the needs for the resources that a range of circumstances may require?

⁶⁶ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures (Programme and Operations) As part of the Martigny Follow-up Process, May 2000; Work Plan for Headquarters, Timely Action and Response (1), 2000; Programme and Operations in Times of Crisis: Main Issues and Recommendations from UNICEF Experiences in Response to Unstable Situations, 1999.

The problem of improving country offices' access to short-term funds has largely been solved. Recent funding guidelines for country representatives will increase the number of funding sources available to country offices and will facilitate access to them. They will also provide direction to country offices on resource planning in general. In addition, the efforts to reinforce the links between Geneva and the National Committees are likely to take advantage of the present groundswell of interest among National Committees to help mobilise resources for UNICEF's response in complex emergencies.

It is worth noting that closer ties with donors and more frequent interaction with them means that UNICEF's Programme Funding Office must have access to current information and assessments on rapidly changing humanitarian crises. The Programme Funding Office would benefit from even closer ties with Programme Division and the Office of Emergency Programmes as it continues to build its credibility with donors.

Chronic complex emergencies are a different matter. Because donor interest wanes once the events that provoke a crisis are forgotten, funding is more difficult after the first one or two years, much less five or six, yet this is when diminishing tensions can open the way to introduce rehabilitative programmes. A first step in analysing the case of funding "forgotten" emergencies is to compile the record of funding for such cases (i.e. origin and quantities of funding by countries) to discern the pattern and devise an appropriate strategy.

The Consolidated Appeal process continues to be flawed. Donors have come to expect the Consolidated Appeals even though they may participate only minimally, or they may review the appeals document for information only and decide to fund through other mechanisms. Except for the most powerful donors, most of the smaller donors, agencies and NGOs agree that the Consolidated Appeal process would benefit from reform. One of the objectives of the reform would be to use the appeal process to enhance the resolve of donors to engage in a concerted strategy for bringing pressure to bear on perpetrators of conflict. This notion has been forcefully expressed throughout the decade. If humanitarian programmes and policies are to have the coherence necessary to achieve the results UNICEF expects of them, there must be a mechanism that links the objectives of a complex emergency programme to its funding priorities. Coordination is necessary, not only for imposing limitations to conflict and creating the appropriate safeguards for humanitarian staff to operate without fear, but for applying some of the constraints to keeping the families implicated in armed conflict intact during conflict, and for keeping children and women out of harm's way.

This may not be a propitious time for UNICEF to be making demands on donors. It is, after all, a junior player compared to larger and more influential UN agencies. Nor is there any assurance that UNICEF can secure the requisite accord among agencies, much less donors, to carry out an effective reform of the process. How then, can UNICEF maintain the delicate balance between recognising its dependence on donors and recognising, as well, the value of urging greater coherence among them?

Section 5

Management of Inputs

1. The Issues

There is a short period of time – perhaps only a matter of months – when UNICEF’s capacity to respond to a complex emergency is tested. The organisation must be capable of responding rapidly to provide administrative and programme support for a large number of inputs at a time when the budget of a country programme increases five- or tenfold, when an office is flooded with demands, and supplies arrive accompanied by staff and transport equipment. They all have to be deployed effectively while reputable records are kept, and in these regards, responses to complex emergencies are unlike other administrative situations.

UNICEF has rarely responded rapidly enough in complex emergencies to meet increased demand for supplies and to manage all of the logistics and recordkeeping (e.g., managing supplies, delivering services and handling cash) required for delivering them. Some changes have already been made, while others are ongoing. These changes respond to three issues raised frequently throughout the decade, which are chronicled here along with how UNICEF has responded.

- 1. What measures can be taken to improve the timeliness and reliability of inputs?**
- 2. How can the flexibility of operations be enhanced in the interests of improving the speed and appropriateness of the response to rapid change?**
- 3. How can UNICEF add to what has already been accomplished in utilising electronic data processing to achieve operational flexibility?**

In relation to the first question, this section will focus primarily on supplies. Separate sections are dedicated to two other key inputs: the flow of funding has been dealt with in Section 4 and human resources are dealt with in Section 6.

2. Decade Trends

Reviews of emergency responses in the early 1990s expressed chagrin and sometimes profound concern at the difficulties experienced in establishing an office and management system, and delivering supplies rapidly and intact. The eyes of the world were focused on UNICEF’s performance, straining UNICEF’s long-standing public relations capacity to sustain its good image. As the frequency and severity of the crises increased, what had once been considered assets in meeting country programme needs — a reputed Supply Division and a strong field-based decentralised governance structure (92c: ii) — appeared to serve the organisation less well.

The number and magnitude of the crises, as well as the growing financial obligations to meet them, placed increasing pressure on UNICEF's capacity to provide supplies, services and cash efficiently. In the two previous decades, complex emergencies had claimed 10 per cent of UNICEF's annual expenditures. In 1991, this figure nearly doubled to 19 per cent and rose again to 28 per cent of all expenditures in 1993. (92c: 6 & 94g: 4) This alone would have been a dramatic change for the organisation with significant consequences for managing supplies, logistics and personnel. The increased number of complex emergencies coincided with a reduction in field office supply staff, causing problems in effective response.

At the beginning of the decade, UNICEF's Supply Division kept pace with the rapid increase in spending. It had a good reputation among UNICEF's staff, stocking and distributing some 300 items for humanitarian crises. (91: section 4) Over 80 per cent of the call-forwards sent from Monrovia in 1992 to the Supply Division arrived in slightly over four months. (94b: 71) But the number of items expanded, eventually reaching 2,000 by the end of the decade,⁶⁷ and the resources needed for storing, shipping and processing supplies increased rapidly. Corresponding changes were required in supply systems, and these factors took their toll. By the middle of the decade, one reviewer noted "there is growing concern that UNICPAC [Supply Division] is not as quick or reliable as it was even a few years ago." (95b: 21) Another reviewer pointed to problems with the labelling and airlifting of equipment without packing lists. (94f: 5) There were instances of substandard materials being procured and shipped without attempts to correct the situation. (95a: 8) At the same time, decreased supply capacity in the field was made evident both in delays in sending requisitions to Supply Division and problems with requisitions sent. In some cases, nearly half of all requisitions received from the field had incomplete specifications, requiring follow-up work before any action could be taken.⁶⁸

By the end of the decade, concerns over Supply Division's capacity, as well as weaknesses in the whole supply chain, had increased dramatically. An account of debriefings of senior staff in emergency countries reported a unanimous agreement that UNICEF supply function and Supply Division response needed to be fully reviewed (00b: 10). Many country offices are increasingly seeking to procure locally or offshore to make up for inefficiencies in the supply chain. A review of the Kosovo Refugee Emergency reported, "the emergency supply and logistics chain was neither sufficiently rapid nor reliable for the scale of this emergency." (00a: 7) Concerned by the absence of a system by which headquarters, regional offices or country offices could track the progress of supplies from procurement through shipping and delivery, it recommended that: "a standard supply tracking/monitoring system be established and shared with all UNICEF offices." (00a: 40) The review pointed not only to problems in systems, but also to staff competencies, recommending that "[t]argeted training supported with simulation exercises should be established." In the course of such a simulation exercise a year later, the Triplex 2000 Exercise, reference was again made to supply systems,

⁶⁷ UNICEF, Programme and Operations in Times of Crises, Main Issues and Recommendations from UNICEF Experiences in Response to Unstable Situations, 2000.

⁶⁸ Memo, Stephen Jarrett, Supply Division, 14 December 2000.

specifically the warehouse inventory control systems in-country. (00c: 8) As “regular” practice does not include UNICEF itself managing warehousing, inventory control systems have been left to each CO to establish independently.

Evaluations highlighted their concerns about the supply chain — from the first assessment and planning in the field, to the necessary rapid response from Supply Division, to subsequent effective receipt, distribution and use of supplies back in the field — as needing significant improvement. All these skills need to be available in the first days following a crisis as part of the planning function. Supply management tools were insufficient: systems for global tracking from supply procurement to delivery were required as well as local inventory control systems. Further, on a global level, some mechanism was needed to establish clear priorities between multiple complex emergencies, to distinguish between truly urgent needs and those more aligned to regular inputs. Decentralisation appeared inevitable.

It was frequently noted throughout the decade that carrying out operations effectively in emergencies required a shift in perspective. UNICEF’s Executive Director alluded to it, emphasising that such responses should be “more flexible” to be more effective in sudden changes or crises.⁶⁹ Recommendations along these lines have called for recognition that emergencies are unique, for more basic procedures, and for “operations” to respond more immediately to programming needs.

An early summary of lessons learned from Operation Lifeline Sudan reiterated the need for UNICEF to develop a practical long-term view of emergency management as something distinct from regular management. It was not so much that emergencies needed special skills, rather they needed professionals who are uniquely skilled in the management of inputs. Typically, young or inexperienced or staff were sent to serve in emergencies when staff with greater skill and experience were required. (89: 10)

These two points, paring down operations and linking them more closely to programming, have recurred in various forms. They are the two main features of the second issue. A mid-decade review noted that:

“there is now a group of individuals – in finance and accounting, in information management, in internal audit, in supply, in EMOPS, in personnel, and in various field offices – who have a pretty clear idea of what needs to be done to start making UNICEF more efficient and reliable in emergencies in the operational areas. However, they have not yet been brought together in an effort to solve some of the most basic dilemmas and develop more efficient systems. (95b: 19)

A report on Rwanda in 1997 made the point forcefully. “Part of the massive problem of budget reconciliation in Rwanda was the complexity and inadequacy of our GFSS-system. It takes far too long to transmit essential information back to the office and real reconciliation takes months. All of this is supposed to be solved by the introduction of ProMS, but there will still be a need for a core emergency component of

⁶⁹ Memo from Executive Director to Regional Directors and HQ Division Directors, 31 August 1999.

the programme.” (97: 12) There was nothing new here, but there was something new in the way the report phrased the need for a closer link between programme and operations in emergencies: “Rwanda 96 was proof that contingency planning for ‘operations’ can make a difference – if it is seriously done and if operations staff are included in the first and ongoing discussions of what needs to be done... We need to ensure that our ‘operations staff’ have equal status and equal say in the office.” (97: 2)

The case for a closer link between programmes and operations was made even more forcefully three years later in a summary of issues and recommendations from UNICEF experiences. “Supply delivery should be paired with a solid programme component: basic drugs should be accompanied by training for local health workers in ARI/CDD case management; vaccines should come with information and training in communicable disease surveillance; child feeding with information on the benefits of breastfeeding, etc.”⁷⁰

Administrative changes have been slow in coming partly because streamlining administrative procedures can cause accountability to suffer. A report in 1995 noted the large numbers of discrepancies and inadequacies in control procedures resulting from fielding an operation too rapidly without the proper personnel and systems. And it gravely warned UNICEF of the consequences: “In this era of competition for limited resources where donors are demanding greater effectiveness, transparency and accountability, we need to be much more vigilant in protecting our credibility and fund-raising capabilities.” (95a: 3) The report then chronicled a long list of inadequacies in the Operations Systems in UNICEF Rwanda.

Some changes have nevertheless been made and some have been proposed to simplify operations and adapt them to circumstances. They have required three significant inputs, some of which were initiated prior to the Martigny Consultation. One has been to assign more staff for longer periods of time, better trained in more efficient procedures. (See Section 6.) Another has been the organisational will to do something about improving the management of inputs by, more generally, committing more resources and more credibly to emergency response activities. This entails a change in the process by which input management decisions are made in order to meet the need for a more rapid and relevant response. (See Section 7.) A third has been the development, testing and application of user-friendly information technology capable of bridging the gap between the need to minimise procedures and maximise accountability. This includes not only custom software and interoffice communications, but also involves more sophisticated communication infrastructure and equipment.

Information technology appears frequently in more recent assessments and proposals, less as a problem than as a solution. Its use is the subject of the third issue. Recommendations to use information technology and advanced telecommunications technology throughout the organisation for managing personnel and service delivery data and for developing control and supply monitoring systems began to appear in the middle

⁷⁰ UNICEF, Programme and Operations in Times of Crises, Main Issues and Recommendations from UNICEF Experiences in Response to Unstable Situations, 2000.

of the decade. UNICEF has made noteworthy use of information technology for managing service delivery information in Iraq where government sources are inadequate for internal monitoring in education and health, and most especially in monitoring the spread and effectiveness of community child care centres. (99a: Food and Nutrition: 10)

3. The Martigny Process

The suggestion made in 1995 and cited previously (95b: 19) that “a group of individuals in finance and accounting, in information management, in internal audit in supply, in EMOPS, in personnel and in various field be brought together” (95b: 19) has been put into practice. This is the Inter-Divisional Crisis Preparedness Working Group, comprised of representatives from each New York headquarters division and chaired by EMOPS on behalf of the Deputy Executive Director for Programme. The Crisis Preparedness Working Group has coordinated the preparation of work plans, bringing together proposals and recommendations arising out of the Martigny process and its follow-up deliberations. The initiatives to enhance the timeliness and flexibility of operational responses (supplies, services, staff, cash and travel) are detailed in the efforts of this working group’s summaries and updates.⁷¹

These initiatives are organised below under the section’s three issues.

1. What measures can be taken to improve the timeliness and reliability of inputs?

Supply Division has in the last two years significantly increased a process of decentralisation. Authority for field offices to procure locally has been significantly increased. The Division has also established regional procurement centres to enable rapid solutions closer to problem situations. The Pretoria Centre, for example, has been instrumental in supporting emergency situations in eastern and southern Africa in the last 12 months.

Looking more broadly at the whole supply chain, several proposals have been made, and some actions taken, for more efficient delivery of basic materials required in complex emergencies.

- A proposal has been made to expand capacity for stockpiling essential supplies either in Copenhagen or at the regional level in order to meet urgent needs more quickly. Stockpiling for selected materials is underway in Copenhagen and will be completed within a year.
- A uniform start-up package for emergency response has been designed to indicate which supplies should be stockpiled and readied for delivery. This stockpiling could involve sharing warehouse space with other UN agencies.

⁷¹ Crisis Preparedness Measures (Programme and Operations) As Part of the Martigny Follow-up Process, May 2000; see also Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Note for the Record, 9 August 2000.

- A recommendation has urged Supply Division, together with EMOPS, to make a distinction between routine and emergency supplies in complex emergencies so special attention is given to urgently needed supplies.
- Supply Division has made available on the Intranet the monitoring databases of freight companies contracted by UNICEF so that supplies may be tracked to the port of entry. Similarly, the need has been recognised to create a standard system for tracking and inventory control in-country so that the receipt and distribution of supplies throughout all country offices is uniform. A trial tracking system was to be introduced in 10 countries by February 2001.
- An overall strengthening of supply chain management in complex emergencies is required, by reviewing of procedures and staffing within Supply Division, as well as field capacity in this area, in order to improve efficiency. This also means more country offices will be able to solve supply input requirements through local and regional procurement.

2. How can the flexibility of operations be enhanced in the interests of improving the speed and appropriateness of the response to rapid change?

This has been done by designing and testing innovative ways to set up an office quickly in a new environment.

- An office-in-a-box package has been developed and tested, which provides preconfigured office automation systems (e-mail, word processing and spreadsheet software, a wireless local area network, the transaction processing system for supply, finance and planning functions [ProMS], and the supporting telecommunications systems). It also includes policy, rules, regulations, instructions and procedure documents, as well as various pre-designed forms for stock and personnel.
- A minimum checklist of immediate measures to be taken and skills required for setting up an office has been drafted and circulated among headquarters divisions. The Office of Internal Audit was included in developing this checklist in hopes that it would accompany the initial office set-up to ensure all requirements are met.

3. How can UNICEF add to what has already been accomplished in utilising electronic data processing to achieve operational flexibility?

Expertise in information technology has been applied to improving office systems, staff security and the communication and dissemination of information on human rights-based programming. In addition to the adapted systems established in the office-in-a-box, the following are being pursued:

- There are proposals to stockpile telecommunications equipment (both centrally and locally), and to ensure funding is available from the emergency reserve fund for information technology and telecom technicians as needed.

- A roster of in-house expertise has been assembled among country offices and headquarters divisions to identify expertise when it may be required immediately.
- Methodologies are being explored for applying telecommunications and information technology to carry out global research and training for communications as it applies to acting on child rights during emergencies.
- In the interest of security preparedness, OPSCEN surveillance has been extended to 24 hours per day, and links have been made with other agencies on programming and security that involve sharing telecommunications resources, i.e. linkage with WFP for deep field communications.

4. Strengths and Areas for Further Follow-up

The analytical framework for assessing organisational capacity outlined in the introduction acknowledges the importance of ensuring the necessary provisions and procedures are in place to facilitate the performance of basic functions. A general question drawn from this framework provides a context for summarising how adequately UNICEF has responded to the need for improving the speed and efficiency in managing the material supplies, human resources, services, cash and travel required in complex emergencies.

Are the provisions and procedures in place to facilitate the performance of basic functions? Are there specific organisational protocols in place for mobilising staff and funds quickly to meet the requirements of a range of adequate responses as may be required in different circumstances?

Numerous recommendations throughout the decade have urged UNICEF to improve its capacity to manage and deliver inputs in complex emergency situations. UNICEF has done this in some areas, and in others it has not. Very little has been done about the capacity of Supply Division to efficiently purchase, stockpile and deliver materials; its capacity is now considered to be at a low point. A number of appeals and proposals have urged Supply Division to improve its efficiency, and its proposed review is an urgent matter.

Distributing and tracking supplies once they have arrived in a country is another area of concern. UNICEF's traditional practice of working through local governments to manage and distribute supplies has placed the organisation at a disadvantage in complex emergencies. Local governments cannot assume these functions in a crisis. UNICEF cannot always rely on partner agencies, such as WFP, to assist with the logistics of receiving and transporting large quantities of goods. Nor does UNICEF have the in-house expertise.

Two matters — contracting and shipping supplies, and distributing them in crisis circumstances — remain on the critical list and require urgent attention. While this desk review was unable to examine UNICEF's supply and distribution systems in any depth,

an important question is whether the steps proposed by the Crisis Preparedness Working Group will remedy these situations with the speed required.

By contrast, UNICEF has taken steps to develop systems for setting up an office rapidly, for establishing systems of accountability, staff management and telecommunications. The concepts and techniques, which have emerged out of the Martigny process, have been tested in recent emergency simulations. The outcome of these exercises provide insights into how well UNICEF is meeting the challenge of putting systems in place quickly to manage inputs more efficiently. The Triplex 2000 Exercise assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the office-in-a-box package, which is to be kept ready for immediate use to manage staff and funds in the field, and the overall assessment was positive. It did note, however, that “all initial staff must have UNICEF/ProMS experience.”⁷²

The UNICEF report on the Triplex 2000 Exercise noted an imbalance in the collection of initial information by UNDAC, i.e. between collecting information on logistics and on humanitarian needs. Humanitarian needs were largely ignored, and when it came to the programme-planning stage, the operations section was not included. Upon further analysis, it was agreed that the operational divisions (specifically Supply Division and DFAM as well as field office operations sections) should be included in programme planning activities.⁷³

One general lesson throughout the decade stands out, and it is that planning for delivering humanitarian needs cannot be carried out without an assessment of the resources for doing so. Likewise, providing the logistics and management systems for delivering humanitarian programmes requires the full participation of both programme and operations staff.

This is the critical condition for ensuring that technology is designed and used appropriately. UNICEF indicated its awareness of this issue in the concern it expressed about UNDAC’s neglect of humanitarian needs in the Triplex 2000 exercise. This observation raises the question how UNICEF can explicitly ensure that office procedures not only provide accountability but also facilitate UNICEF’s larger objectives. To invoke Daniel Toole’s observation (97: 2), operations and programme officers are equal partners. UNICEF’s report on the Triplex 2000 Simulation reaffirms the need to close the gap between the two.

⁷² UNICEF Final Report and Lessons Learned, Triplex 2000 Exercise, 20-24 May 2000.

⁷³ UNICEF Final Report and Lessons Learned, Triplex 2000 Exercise, 20-24 May 2000.

Section 6
Human Resources

1. The Issues

Ensuring the availability of capable staff for rapid deployment to complex emergencies has posed a constant challenge to UNICEF throughout the decade. Little attention was given the problem until the Martigny process, when many of the concerns coalesced into specific proposals. In a Note for the Record by the Crisis Preparedness Working on 9 August 2000, nearly three years following the initial Martigny Consultation, many of the previously raised issues were voiced again:

“Staffing has remained an issue of concern for over a decade; COs cannot access the right staff at the right time during emergencies. The DHR-developed roster of internal staff available for deployment to emergencies will contribute to solving this problem, however (a representative of DHR) explained that for an effective deployment of staff, a corporate commitment must be made both for the approval of a deployment roster and the enforcing of the deployment.”⁷⁴

The principal issues in this section describe the problem and explore solutions. They are listed together since, as a whole, they indicate the range of related concerns evoked by attempts to improve the staffing situation. They also make the point that improving the quantity and quality of staff available for complex emergencies is a multifaceted challenge. They are as follows:

1. What further steps should the organisation take to develop an internal roster of UNICEF staff who can be deployed rapidly and who furthermore can be released from their ongoing assignments on a moment’s notice?

2. To what extent should the need for staff be met through the recruitment of new staff in lieu of moving existing staff around?

3. How much attention should be given to developing and supporting training programmes that build expertise in such crucial areas as managing inputs with relevant software, analysing political vulnerability, designing specific programmes for the protection of women and children and building expertise in the application of humanitarian law to conflict situations?

4. To what extent should UNICEF rely on NGO partners to perform UNICEF-funded activities during crises, and what types of agreements best define these outsourcing arrangements?

⁷⁴ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Note for the Record, 9 August 2000.

5. What further steps should be taken to guarantee the security of UNICEF staff and premises and ensure that counselling is available at the regional level to assist in coping with the effects of trauma?

2. Decade Trends

UNICEF's difficulty in providing enough high-calibre staff for complex emergencies was succinctly summarised in 1995. The basic problem, the evaluator said, had remained unchanged for a number of years. Country offices found themselves without staff to run the operational functions of a rapidly growing office, and to a lesser extent, programme functions. Staff members who did have the relevant experience either were not called upon because Human Resources Division lacked a full roster of in-house expertise, or were neither able nor willing to make the commitment. UNICEF resorted to hiring short-term staff from other organisations, or consultants who might have been ready workers, but who knew little about UNICEF procedures. (95b: 11) They came and went quickly on short-term contracts. And more recently, as UNICEF's commitment to advocacy has grown and the uniqueness of the services that UNICEF renders has increased, few outside consultants are likely to have the requisite training. The first four issues are all variations and/or responses to this theme.

Evaluators paid particular attention to fielding competent staff to perform logistic and administrative functions. A 1995 appraisal of the operations systems in Rwanda urged UNICEF to make:

“use of all available capacity and expertise when an emergency strikes and resort to external recruitment only when such expertise is not available inside the organisation. While consultants and other temporary employees played an indispensable role in saving lives they also contributed to the confusion and mess described in this report mainly due to their lack of familiarity with UNICEF rules, regulations, working methods and procedures. The Rwanda experience suggests that care should be taken in future not to place such external personnel in key management or administrative positions without providing them beforehand some basic training in UNICEF working methods and procedures.” (95a: 4)

But UNICEF's Division of Human Resources (previously Division of Personnel) responded they had little recourse. In a review of its response to complex emergencies, the “Division of Personnel reported a major problem with identifying staff. The difficulties identified were that staff were not encouraged to apply for emergency posts because there does not seem to be any advantages in doing so and that there was a lack of data at HQ from the field on the capabilities of national and short term staff which could assist DOP to identify candidates.” (94g: 22) A need was expressed to clarify the conditions of service, perhaps to improve them, with reference to the package of entitlements, even though circumstances were made more difficult because the Division of Personnel had to fund one- or two-year contract positions for countries with very limited short-term funding.

Some viable proposals came out of the recommendations made in 1994. They included a proposal to obtain approval for additional posts to be funded by a \$US1 million reimbursable fund. There was a proposal to draw up different, and presumably more favourable, terms in staff contracts for those serving in complex emergencies. One of the recommendations proposed more subcontracting to NGOs for staff needs since, according to the Division of Personnel, “we can not do everything ourselves,” with the caution that NGOs cannot be easily controlled in emergency situations and they often cost UNICEF their share of media attention. (94g: 23) It was also proposed that a rapid response capability of teams of two or three staff members be established to provide backup to country offices in the event of complex emergencies.

Many of these proposals were stopgap measures, hesitant adaptations to a growing call for responses in increasingly complex emergencies. The internal revolving fund was implemented, but according to the information available, was never utilised. Rapid response teams were developed and deployed, but they performed poorly, (97: 10) and the idea was dropped.

However, thinking would shift about relying on partnerships with NGOs to provide services. Originally, there had been misgivings about the services that NGOs could offer, some of them arising out of the Liberian experience where many of the short-term/NGO staff were difficult to manage and knew little of the UNICEF bureaucracy. (95b: 12; 94b) The experience with NGOs in Rwanda by UNICEF and other UN agencies had been mixed. “A number behaved professionally and compassionately and delivered high-quality care and services. But other NGOs performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner that resulted not only in duplication and wasted resources, but in a few egregious cases, unnecessary loss of life.” (96d: 59). Clearly, contracting out to NGOs was not a panacea for the staffing problem.

UNICEF’s own experiences with NGOs were not all bad. The experience in Haiti had shown how crucial a role NGOs and CBOs in the civil sector might play when the public sector fails and when there are no other options for delivering essential services. (96a: 74ff) UNICEF had established some good relations with NGOs, especially with the Norwegian Refugee Council and the SCF UK, (97: 9) and building on these experiences is the focus of the fourth issue. Both of these relationships were based on written agreements and both accords showed the need to share the spoils of good publicity. Somewhat later in the decade, UNICEF’s assessment of its attempts to improve the psychosocial well-being of children in Iraq under the SCR 986 programme reiterated the value of NGOs in delivering essential services. (99a, chapter on children: 12–16)

In addition to spreading the staffing burden by relying on NGOs, UNICEF also entertained the notion of sharing staff among agencies, to reduce the burden on any one agency for fielding competent, experienced staff. It had been proposed by a joint UNICEF/UNHCR/WFP study of the Great Lakes Operation. The study noted a number of examples where staff, facilities and services were already shared and where such sharing could be expanded. It recommended that the senior management of the three agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP) “should consider the standardisation of incentives

and conditions of service as well as forms and (to the extent possible) content of contracts for staff serving in emergency stations and for contracts with NGO implementing partners.” (98c: 11) This idea has only been partially used.

The fifth issue asks what more UNICEF can do to reduce staff concerns about the risks involved in serving in complex emergency countries. Measures taken to protect staff and help manage stress have increased substantially throughout the decade. In 1994, UNICEF hired its first full-time professional security officer with military background at headquarters in New York. A security information handbook was prepared for staff and trauma counsellors were engaged. (95b: 15) By the end of the decade, staff security had come to receive considerable attention. One representative even reported recently that “a preoccupation with staff security results in a compromised humanitarian programme creating a dilemma – which all participants have had to deal with in their efforts to maximise their humanitarian response.” (00b: 8) This perhaps overstates the case, but it is testimony to the considerable resources UNICEF has committed to safeguarding premises and staff.

Throughout the decade, steps have been taken to develop rosters and facilitate assignments, to provide greater security and to solicit the assistance of partners to do jobs UNICEF could not. In 1999 many of the difficulties remained unresolved. The general observation by the evaluation of UNICEF’s response in Kosovo was that if UNICEF was committed to mainstreaming emergency operations within regular programmes, “every country office should be capable of and required to engage in comprehensive preparedness measures as an integral part of its country programme.” (00a: 36) Preparedness measures referred to included both planning to ensure that sufficient qualified staff could be on board as well as to ensure the protection of staff. More particularly, it was suggested that: “ a roster of experienced emergency staff with appropriate professional and inter-personal skills and understanding of cultural sensitivity should be established” and that measures should be taken to ensure that staff on the roster would be ready to deploy at any time, including ensuring supervisor approval. (00a: 40)

UNICEF staffing in the Balkans in response to the Kosovo crisis (Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Sarajevo) had its bright moments. UNICEF tripled its number of staff in the region between April and August 1999. But an imbalance resulted between programme and operations staff and “this was clearly an impediment to effective programme delivery.” (00a: 31) The turnover was high, nearly 50 per cent of the staff stayed for less than a month. The relocation of staff from the Pristina office to the Skopje office was plagued by complaints about entitlements, and there was insufficient stress management support in Albania. (00a: 31)

Less than six months ago, largely the same concerns were expressed in a report of representatives’ debriefings at Innocenti. The report summarised the views of five senior staff from country offices in Uganda, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Sarajevo and Liberia on the staffing situation.

“The basic staffing dilemma has been the same for more than a decade, yet it remains. All too often in crisis, country offices cannot get the right staff at the right time. It is now well understood by most that if an office has a core group of staff – programme officer, supply officer, operations officer and information officer – then it can function in an emergency... Yet four out of five of the participants cited instances in the past two years in which they had been without either a supply officer or operations officer months... The staffing dilemma has been explained a number of times in previous evaluations and other organisational documents, and requires no further elaboration here.” (00b: 10)

3. The Martigny Process

Mainstreaming emergency programmes has considerable implications for programming modalities, funding strategies, but most of all, for staffing complements. The response from the Martigny Consultation and its follow-up to the issues which have guided this section on staffing are summarised below.

1. What further steps should the organisation take to develop an internal roster of UNICEF staff who can be deployed rapidly and who furthermore can be released from their ongoing assignments on a moment’s notice?

Creating a roster of individuals who can be deployed within 72 hours is one of the steps that has received support and should help make more expertise available. It is a crucial step, since the most reliable source of experienced personnel is within UNICEF. The key to redeploying staff quickly is to have the agreement of supervisors to release personnel in their division at a moment’s notice.

- The Crisis Preparedness Working Group work plan includes provisions for completing the compilation of the roster, for identifying the kind of needs in a new duty station, and for developing a strategy for replacement/deployment “through a consultative process involving concerned staff and supervisors.”⁷⁵

2. To what extent should the need for staff be met through the recruitment of new staff in lieu of moving existing staff around?

Developing a roster would deploy in-house staff as quickly as possible, but these assignments are only temporary, until longer-term staff are identified.

- The Crisis Preparedness Working Group has called attention to the “generalised shortage of staff,”⁷⁶ and noted the need to recruit long-term staff.
- Programme Division, the Office of Emergency Programmes and the Division of Human Resources have worked together to identify the basic needs for staff in a

⁷⁵ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures, May 2000 and Crisis Preparedness Measures Progress Report, May 2000.

⁷⁶ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Note for the Record, 9 August 2000.

complex emergency and to develop core competencies. A number of job descriptions have been prepared with pre-identified the core capacities sought in recruiting staff, including both logistical and programming skills.

3. How much attention should be given to developing and supporting training programmes that build expertise in such crucial areas as managing inputs with relevant software, analysing political vulnerability, designing specific programmes for the protection of women and children and building expertise in the application of humanitarian law to conflict situations?

Training is a strategy that expands the number of existing personnel qualified to serve in crisis situations. To judge by the work plans and other planning documents, this has been UNICEF's strategy of choice for meeting its staffing needs. The following entries are a selection of achievements and proposals listed in the Martigny follow-up and Crisis Preparedness Working Group work plans. There is no intention to assess them here, only provide a sampling of work achieved and in progress.

- Specific training programmes have been developed explicitly to prepare staff who are being mobilised rapidly for deployment on security and related measures.
- Training modules have been developed on special topics, particularly relevant to the initiatives taken in the Martigny process, on international human rights law, internally displaced persons and landmine awareness.⁷⁷ As mentioned in Section 1, a training of regional trainers is being developed for 2000-2001 in the area of human rights and humanitarian principles.
- A general emergency preparedness and response training workshop is being developed by ESARO in coordination with DHR-OLDS and EMOPS and will be refined further for global use and made available to all regional offices in 2001.
- Orientation programmes and workshops have been proposed on the principles of the Martigny process, on Core Corporate Commitments defined in the follow-up to the Martigny Consultation, on the use of communications technology, on carrying out threat and vulnerability assessments and on security preparedness.
- Training programmes have been proposed to ensure that all staff, whether in operations or programme implementation, are familiar with the ProMS input management system.

⁷⁷ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures, May 2000; Crisis Preparedness Measures Progress Report, May 2000; UNICEF, Martigny Follow-up Work Plans; Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Note for the Record, 9 August 2000.

4. To what extent should UNICEF rely on NGO partners to perform UNICEF-funded activities during complex emergencies, and what types of agreements best define these outsourcing arrangements?

Linkages have been established with certain UNICEF's partners to provide people and resources as needed.

- UNICEF has developed Memoranda of Understanding with specific partner agencies and large NGOs, as well as specific arrangements with smaller NGOs, for the provision of services during complex emergencies.
- A stand-by agreement template is available as instances require. Many of these agreements stipulate conditions for sharing staff services, or in the case of specific NGOs, the provision of staff.
- New agreements have been concluded with the Anglican Church, Care International, the Centre of Excellence in Disaster Management, the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System which include the potential for sharing staff and other resources.
- Long-standing agreements with the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Danish Refugee Council have been updated.⁷⁸

5. What further steps should be taken to guarantee the security of UNICEF staff and premises, and ensure that counselling is available at the regional level to cope with the effects of trauma?

Security has been recognised as a staff-protection issue and treated with the same importance as strategies to seek agreements with local authorities to set general ground rules for humanitarian intervention.

- Support has been committed to the UN Security Management Teams at the country level. Crisis leaders are selected at all levels.
- Evacuation plans have been, or are being, prepared for all country offices.
- Individual staff members are given security training and equipped with appropriate telecommunication devices.
- Assistance is provided directly to Staff Associations to sensitise and train staff in security measures.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures (Programme and Operations) As Part of the Martigny Follow-up Process, May 2000; a selection of MOUs and stand-by agreements with NGOs and other partners.

⁷⁹ UNICEF, Programme and Operations in Times of Crises: Main Issues and Recommendations from UNICEF Experiences in Response to Unstable Situations, 1999; Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures (Programme and Operations) As Part of the Martigny Follow-up Process, May 2000.

- OPSCEN surveillance has been extended to 24 hours per day and links have been made with other agencies on programming and security that involve sharing telecommunications resources, i.e. linkage with WFP for deep field communications.
- Repeated mention has been made of the need for stress and trauma counselling and a few proposals have been put forward. In lieu of building in expertise at the regional or country office level, as has been proposed and implemented in the past, country offices will be provided with counselling guidelines and relevant information along with the names of stress management counsellors located in U.S. or Northwest Europe.⁸⁰

4. Strengths and Areas for Further Follow-up

UNICEF continues to experience difficulty in making experienced professionals available in crisis situations.

The analytical framework for assessing organisational capacity, outlined in the Introduction, recognises the importance of ensuring the necessary provisions and procedures are in place to facilitate the performance of basic functions. A general question drawn from this analytical framework provides a context for assessing the extent to which UNICEF, over the decade and subsequently in the actions taken as part of the Martigny process, have responded adequately to this challenge of encouraging highly motivated and skilled individuals to make a career of missions to difficult terrains.

Are the provisions and procedures in place to facilitate the performance of basic functions? Are there specific organisational protocols in place for mobilising staff and funds quickly to meet the requirements of a range of adequate responses as may be required in different circumstances?

Several proposals have been made to solve the problem:

1. Make the best use of in-house staff already skilled in emergency response
2. Recruit new staff committed to serving in complex emergency circumstances
3. Conduct training programmes to prepare existing staff to assume such responsibilities
4. Make greater use of NGOs with good track records
5. Diminish the fears of working in an insecure environment, which may deter staff from serving in complex emergencies.

There has been some progress in each of these. A roster of staff who could potentially be released from their office for temporary service in crisis situations has been developed. A new recruitment policy is expected to propose strategies for making both internal and external candidates available for rapid deployment. The evolution of stand-by agreements, which build on the wealth of experience UNICEF has from working with NGOs, has produced partnership arrangements, which serve both parties. The

⁸⁰ Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures, May 2000; Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Note for the Record, 9 August 2000.

organisation has supported a range of training programmes to increase the capacity of existing staff to work in complex emergencies. An emphasis on security measures has produced results that have been amply described in a variety of documents referred to in this section.

However, difficulties remain. Complaints are frequent about the reliability of the in-house roster and about the incentives and rewards for a staff member to accept an assignment. These suggest close monitoring of the functioning of the roster.

This review had not evaluated the effectiveness of the training programmes, which needs to be done to determine how closely the training programmes are meeting the organisation's real needs, whether the level of expertise within the training section is appropriate for the section's objectives and whether the outcomes match expectations. For example, are training resources sufficient to provide the required upgrade of skills at the regional and country office level on issues that these offices have deemed to have priority? Ultimately a review of the funding base for the training section might be carried out to assess its dependence on temporary supplemental funding and to explore the feasibility of providing permanent funding support for training activities.

While the Memoranda of Understanding with agencies are in place and the templates prepared for outsourcing personnel from NGOs, there may be room for operational guidance to country offices on how and when to use them and what orientation is required for staff members coming from the outside on temporary assignments.

A final step, and one that is likely to improve the impact from this combination of initiatives may involve changing the emphases given among them, i.e. to rosters, recruitment, training and outsourcing. It is important to recognise that developing an internal roster is, at best, a provisional measure, since even if competent staff are identified and even if supervisors are willing to release them, they serve for only a brief period and then return to their home offices. It has been tried and questions continue to be raised about a roster's effectiveness. It is also a moot point whether NGOs can take up the full slack created by an inadequate number of staff available for any given emergency. The drawback in contracting NGOs to perform specific services is no longer their poor behaviour or questionable competence, since the standby agreements with selected NGOs have solved this problem. The drawback is rather that outsourcing does not meet the need for UNICEF to develop its own in-house expertise.

Nothing can substitute for the creation of in-house expertise. Training can supplement and sometimes stand in for experience but cannot replace it. Engaging more staff who are willing and committed to making a career of missions in conflict situations may be the only assured tactic for solving UNICEF's staffing issue in the long run. For this, a decision must be made at a senior level on two matters: 1) what skill requirements are to be augmented and what are the profiles of individuals who can meet these requirements; and 2) how much (not whether) the organisation is prepared to set aside for meeting these requirements.

Section 7

Allocation of Roles and Responsibilities

1. The Issues

A repeated concern throughout a decade of evaluations has been whether the roles and responsibilities among offices (headquarters, regional and country) and among headquarters divisions are clear enough to provide the kind of decision-making required in complex emergencies. One reason for the concern is that responding to complex emergencies for UNICEF has involved making budgetary and management decisions with far-reaching implications, and decision-makers have understandably preferred to make a reasoned rather than a hasty response. This has prolonged headquarters' response in some instances. Another reason, cited with a range of other issues, has been an uncertainty about where responsibilities lie. For example, where do the responsibilities of the Office of Emergency Programmes stop and those of the Programme Division take over on certain issues? Where do the responsibilities of country offices stop and those at the regional office begin, and where do the responsibilities of these two offices cease and those at headquarters take over?

The import of these questions is, of course, heightened when policy shifts occur, as when complex emergency programming is mainstreamed into regular country programmes or when an effort is made to link operations more closely with programming. As suggested by the analytical framework presented in the introduction, a key factor influencing an organisation's capacity to fulfil its mission and goals is the clear and widely accepted understanding of where responsibilities lie. While some roles and responsibilities among divisions and offices have become clearer with these changes, others may have become less so.

The evaluative exercises reviewed in this section suggest that one reason for this uncertainty about roles and responsibilities may have to do with the traditional delegation of autonomy to the field level, i.e. the country offices. The managerial stress arising in complex emergencies, and the increased number and difficulty of decisions such circumstances require, have resulted in country representatives becoming understandably frustrated at the lack of guidance from regional offices and headquarters. At the same time that country representatives are seeking greater guidance from headquarters during complex emergencies, headquarters is relying just as much if not more on country representatives. Difficulties have emerged in finding the right balance between the decision-making expectations at the country office level and the increased need for direction and decision-making at headquarters.

But the search for this balance is made more difficult as country and regional offices, as well as different divisions in headquarters adapt to a new configuration of responsibilities arising out of the policy shifts of the last five years. Calling attention to the issue of clarity in roles and responsibilities has less to do with identifying strengths and weaknesses than with pointing to matters of continuing concern in UNICEF and ones that take on increased importance during a period of organisational change.

1. How clearly is the division of roles and responsibility among headquarters, regional offices and country offices understood and acted upon?

2. How clearly are roles and responsibilities within headquarters divisions understood and acted upon?

2. Decade Trends

A number of reviewers have sought to explain why decision-making in UNICEF often appeared too laborious to meet the needs for rapid and efficient mobilisation required by complex emergencies. They were concerned about the organisation's ambivalence toward assuming a more pro-active stance in complex emergencies. One reviewer noted UNICEF's persistent preference for a reactive posture. (95b: 4) This was particularly evident in Somalia where another evaluation bluntly noted the emergency "revealed the extent to which UNICEF as a bureaucratic organisation is unprepared to respond to crisis. As a management exercise, the Somalia emergency relief operation was a disturbing failure at virtually all levels of the organisation." (94c: 10) Another referred to an institutional avoidance as a sign of a corporate culture that preferred to deny rather than accept the increased incidence, magnitude and duration of complex emergencies. (98a: 22)

Many of the evaluators attributed UNICEF's hesitancy in making critical decisions to one of its guiding principles of governance, decentralisation. The value of a decentralised governance structure had always been taken as a matter of faith. The argument for delegating the formulation of policy and implementation of programmes to country offices was that an appropriate development response must above all be sensitive to its social and political environment. But responding to complex emergencies was slightly different. There was a growing suspicion among staff members that the decentralised structure did not serve emergency response as effectively as it had served the administration of development programmes. Staff members interviewed in 1995 on the subject of decentralisation, expressed some doubts about the value of decentralisation in UNICEF governance structure. UNICEF's "tendency toward decentralisation was still an advantage" reported the interviewer, "when it comes to establishing a presence in various parts of a country in turmoil, although managing and equipping sub-offices of varying size and staff competence has been difficult." (95b: 6)

The concern was expressed in many ways. Frequently, evaluative exercises found that too much responsibility fell upon the country representative. A review of lessons learned in Rwanda observed that the "UNICEF representative can not be solely expected to efficiently make decisions on every critical, sometimes routine programme and operational issue. Having a narrow apex for decision-making puts undue pressure on the rep and does not promote the efficient flow of the programme." The recommendation was to send an experienced senior management to the site of complex emergencies during its initial period. "This may only apply in the initial stages until all systems are in place with clear TORs to alleviate confusion of responsibilities." (94f: 2)

Another reviewer, three years later, reported again from Rwanda that “we are expecting far too much (from the representative) with limited support.” (97:5) Again the recommendation was to revise the functions a representative is expected to perform in complex emergency situations.

A country programme evaluation for Haiti covering the period between 1992 to mid-1996 took a broader view. It was not just a matter of overburdening the representative during complex emergencies, it was a lack of leadership in headquarters that translated into a lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities between headquarters and regional offices. The experience in Haiti revealed it was “not clear where leadership on UNICEF programme planning in politically fragile countries such as Haiti currently lies...According to current discussions, EMOPS is promoting preparedness planning as a regular part of programme planning in vulnerable countries, based on rapid analysis of probable scenarios, including worst case scenarios and the programme options for each. The Latin American desk appears to focus more on transition to democracy based on experiences in their region.” Without clearer direction in Haiti, country offices were unlikely to undertake systematic preparedness planning. “Given the inconsistency of emphasis in headquarters, this is not likely to happen until the CO has reason to call on an already overstretched EMOPS for support, i.e. when crisis has already struck.”(96a: 46)

The evaluation of UNICEF’s response to the refugee emergency in Kosovo implicitly expressed its concern about whether the organisation was making the right decisions, and quickly enough, to meet the needs of complex emergencies by itemising the large number of basic functions which were inadequately performed. They included provision of staff, timely provision of supplies, and preparedness planning. The evaluation observed in conclusion that despite “UNICEF’s declared objective to ‘mainstream’ emergency preparedness and response into its institutional capacities and general programming, this is far from having been achieved.” (00a: 36) Some may respond, with good reason, that the Kosovo emergency came too soon after the introduction of the major institutional changes to which the evaluation refers to be able to judge these changes. And yet, taking decisions to provide staffing, timely supplies and some measure of preparedness were not new commitments and there was little indication of a change in UNICEF’s organisational capacity in doing so.

In a report from a debriefing process at Innocenti, many of the same concerns raised throughout the decade were echoed by country representatives from complex emergency countries. They were concerned by the slow response from headquarters to requests for better staff and for making Supply Division more efficient. What is most striking about the debriefing notes is the request by representatives for guidance on such key issues as how much security is too much, how to obtain better worldwide political intelligence on the conflicts in their countries, how to provide for national staff in complex emergency situations and how best to respond, organisationally, to the fact that most complex emergencies had become regional emergencies and were no longer restricted to single countries. It was a reiteration of the concern, expressed earlier in the

decade by evaluators, of the uncommonly large burden of responsibility shouldered by country representatives in complex emergencies, and of their need to rely increasingly on regional offices and headquarters.

The question that both the Kosovo evaluation and the Innocenti debriefings pose is whether the organisation is structurally prepared for the present transitions in how operations and programming are to be managed. The range and complexity of functions that UNICEF performs is changing rapidly in response to the policy shifts proposed in the Martigny process. It is too early to anticipate how new functions that emerge from this transition period will affect the capacity of different offices and divisions to meet their obligations. But UNICEF enters this period of transition with a legacy of some uncertainty about how its traditional governance structure would adapt to the new and somewhat novel demands imposed by the frequency and magnitude of complex emergencies. It also enters this transition period with a widely acknowledged lack of clarity in the delineation of functions performed by different divisions in headquarters.

3. The Martigny Process

The work plans arising out of the Martigny process have shown sensitivity to their impact on the way roles and responsibilities are allocated and eventually reallocated throughout the organisation. The proposals made and actions taken are divided according to the section's two issues:

1. How clearly is the division of roles and responsibility among headquarters, regional offices and country offices understood and acted upon?

Many of the initiatives to strengthen programme capability have involved revising job descriptions, work plans and action plans for key positions and have resulted in recommendations to allocate responsibilities to regional as opposed to country offices.

- The Office of Emergency Programmes has taken steps to coordinate and ensure priority support to regional and country offices, in particular to revise the guidelines for the establishment of Task Forces to support countries facing crises and to act on requests for support in donor briefings.
- In order to support the fund-raising efforts at the country level, the Programme Funding Office has begun to provide regional offices with donor profiles.
- Programme Division has provided guidelines and direction to regional offices to support their greater participation in carrying out country-level vulnerability analyses.⁸¹
- The Office of Emergency Programmes has been charged with overseeing the collaboration among headquarters, regional offices and country offices to strengthen

⁸¹ UNICEF, Implementation of UNICEF/DfID Capacity Building Projects, Progress Report 1, 1 November 1999 – 29 February 2000.

existing threat assessment/early warning analysis and to provide support in ensuring that the requisite logistics systems and telecommunications capacities are in place.⁸²

2. How clearly are roles and responsibilities within headquarters divisions understood and acted upon?

The active functioning of the Inter-Divisional Working Group on Crisis Preparedness to coordinate planning and development of policy guidance among headquarters division has served to clarify the allocation of roles and responsibilities among headquarters divisions. The following examples are illustrative of these initiatives.

- Annual country programme plans are being integrated into the Consolidated Appeals process through collaboration between the Office of Emergency Programmes and Programme Division.
- The Office of Emergency Programmes, with Programme Division and Supply Division, is devising a rapid education response strategy.
- The Office of Emergency Programmes, Programme Division and the Programme Funding Office have developed new EPF guidelines that increase the flexibility of country offices to respond.⁸³

4. Strengths and Areas for Further Follow-up

Acting quickly and decisively relies on an accepted distribution of roles and responsibilities that legitimate a division of labour as well as the process by which decisions are made. The capacity for doing so is a key concern of the analytical framework for assessing organisational capacity, outlined in the Introduction. Expressing this concern in the question below provides a context for assessing the adequacy of the measures UNICEF has taken to achieve greater clarity in how roles and responsibilities are allocated.

Are the roles and responsibilities of different internal divisions and individuals clearly delineated and complementary? Are the functions required for responding quickly and effectively to crises arising out of political instability clearly delineated in UNICEF?

Coping with complex emergencies, and responding appropriately to the political charged environment in which they occur, have led to significant changes in the role of the country representatives. Decisions taken by representatives reverberate throughout the organisation and potentially throughout the international community. Consequently, there is a need for closer liaison between country offices and headquarters. It is one of a

⁸² Work Plans, Headquarters, Timely Action and Response (1), 2000.

⁸³ Work Plans, Headquarters: Timely Action and Response (1) 2000; and Crisis Preparedness Working Group, Crisis Preparedness Measures, (Programme and Operations, May 2000).

number of reasons why complex emergencies increase the interdependence between country offices and senior management in headquarters. As the stakes rise for responding in principled ways that meet essential needs, the resources that representatives require from headquarters, and the level of performance that headquarters expects from representatives multiply in tandem. One of the structural consequences is the need for regional offices to absorb some of the increased responsibilities borne by the representatives and divisions at headquarters in meeting the challenges of this greater interdependence. Another consequence is the need for representatives to possess different minimum competencies, a broader range of expertise and considerably enhanced leadership capabilities. UNICEF has taken appropriate steps to respond to both areas.

A further consequence is an increased call for guidance, services and inputs from headquarters by country and regional offices. Meeting these increased expectations requires greater efficiency in headquarters and with this, a widely shared agreement among headquarters divisions about what needs are to be met and by whom.

Reference has been made by evaluators, by representatives in the course of their debriefings, and in the context of the few interviews conducted by this desk review, to the lack of clarity in how roles and responsibilities are distributed among divisions at headquarters. The general impression is that a lack of clear complementarity between what different divisions at headquarters do results in overlap among them, duplication of effort and inefficiencies. Overlap may not be an intrinsic liability except when it is not recognised, when different parts of the organisation working on the same problem fail to communicate with each other and bring coherence to the overall effort. In evaluations earlier in the decade, the overlap cited was often between the Office of Emergency Operations and Programme Division in their country-specific field support roles. The distribution of these roles was more recently restructured with the reduction of Geographic Section and decentralisation to Regional Offices. As more current examples, interviewees for this Desk Review cited concern over lack of coherence between various divisions' work in new substantive areas such as child protection and human rights, as well as between various mechanisms, frameworks and tools for vulnerability analysis.

What remedial action should UNICEF take to resolve these inefficiencies and improve the services headquarters is prepared to provide country and regional offices coping with complex emergencies? One response would be to reorganise headquarters following an exhaustive review of the respective functions that divisions perform. Such a review might suggest a merger between Programme Division and the Office of Emergency Programmes as a logical outcome of the decision to mainstream programming for unstable situations. A review might also challenge the conventional and increasingly arbitrary distinction between EPP's jurisdiction over intergovernmental affairs and EMOPS' jurisdiction over inter-agency affairs. Such a review would result in a thorough structural reform.

A second, and more moderate, response would be to regard the overlap among divisions as a source of synergy. But synergy does not always happen spontaneously or productively without leadership. Leadership responsibility would be needed to guide and refine this synergy, to ensure that none of the critical functions are neglected, to make sure that where there are complementarities there is also communication between the divisions to reduce duplication where overlap serves little purpose.

As it happens, this second response has already been implicitly adopted. The number of recommendations and the breadth of proposals arising out of the Martigny process have, themselves, given rise to an inter-divisional coordinating body that appears to have the capacity to provide the needed leadership for guiding and shaping this synergy. This body, the Inter-Divisional Crisis Preparedness Working Group (with input and oversight from the Inter-Divisional Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations) provides a forum for inter-divisional interaction and increases the level of awareness among divisions about their respective responsibilities with regard to specific initiatives. Reports of their deliberations point insightfully and constructively to areas of ambiguity in the way separate divisions fulfil, or do not fulfil, specific roles and responsibilities.

The usefulness of this coordinating body so far suggests that this body might assume an extended leadership role in directing and refining the synergy between the functions that different divisions perform. This would likely mean a change in status from the present provisional standing within the Office of Emergency Programmes and an expanded mandate to bring about a gradual increase in the complementarities among divisions.

Conclusions

This section summarises key areas where need for further effort or follow-up by the organisation have been identified. The section does not present recommendations, just a succinct list of observations in the form of suggestions and, in some cases, questions.

1. Humanitarian principles and human rights

1.1. It is suggested that UNICEF further translate policy norms regarding human rights-based programming and humanitarian principles into concrete operational guidance for best practice in crisis and unstable contexts (i.e. “how to...”), both for the programme process in general as well as for country-level interventions in each programming area.

1.2. It is suggested that UNICEF consolidate its experiences in setting conditions for its involvement in complex emergencies, either translating this into practical guidance or a systematically analysed compendium of cases. This will involve thoroughly reviewing, culling, analysing and extracting lessons learned from the successes and failures in creating humanitarian spaces, protecting humanitarian field workers, drafting conditions for guaranteeing safe access, setting conditions for non-discrimination and monitoring compliance.

1.3. It is suggested that greater support and leadership is required from UNICEF headquarters to achieve more uniform commitment from regional and country offices to put human rights-based programming and humanitarian principles into practice. This will require a realistic examination of current policy development and training strategies, and their expected results.

2. Inter-agency coordination

2.1. It is suggested that UNICEF search for a greater compatibility and balance between efforts to define its own niche within an inter-agency context and efforts to strengthen inter-agency collaboration. Further, efforts to strengthen inter-agency collaboration must weighed both in terms of how they further a child rights agenda and how they help to ensure a more effective humanitarian response in general. It is suggested that, for a more consistent and coherent effort in inter-agency collaboration, the organisation needs a clear analysis of the perceived benefits of supporting inter-agency coordination and how it should best balance the various underlying objectives.

2.2. It is suggested that a case-by-case account of recent illustrative experiences in inter-agency coordination be compiled so that those interested in promoting collaboration can learn from and build on these experiences. This would bring to headquarters’ attention the range of formal and informal collaborations that take place in country offices.

3. *Information management for planning, monitoring and evaluation*

3.1. It is suggested that guidance on preparedness/contingency planning, including vulnerability analysis and early warning monitoring, requires the development of one common clear analytical framework that shows what information is important to gather and what that information means for planning.

3.2. Correspondingly, it is suggested that greater interaction is required among the separate divisions (Programme Division, Office of Emergency Programmes) engaged in refining corresponding tools for vulnerability analysis, preparedness planning, and early warning indicators. Similarly, the corresponding roles in preparedness planning and early warning systems, from headquarters to regional and country offices must be clearly defined as part of a system.

3.3. It is suggested that concrete practical guidance be provided to regional and country offices from headquarters on ways to simplify, adapt and utilise vulnerability analysis and preparedness planning in order to refine its incorporation within the programme planning process.

3.4. As *guidance* on links between the programming process and M&E systems exists, it is suggested that attention must be given to strengthening these links *in practice*.

3.5. As a related concern, given the demands of information management in general in complex emergencies — including vulnerability analysis and M&E — it is suggested that the organisation make a careful review of the skills and expertise required and available in regional and field offices in this area.

3.6. It is suggested that the organisation continue in developing appropriate methods/ approaches for documenting how efforts in new programming areas contribute to our goals/mission; for example, evaluating the effects of peace education or of more general advocacy for human rights.

4. *Funding*

4.1. It is suggested that closer ties be forged between the Programme Funding Office, Programme Division and OPSCEN to ensure that the Programme Funding Office is well-informed on rapidly changing humanitarian crises for its interactions with donors.

4.2. To guide a fund-raising strategy for the still problematic funding of “forgotten” or chronic complex emergencies, it is suggested that an analysis be carried out of funding patterns for such cases, i.e. origin and quantities of funding by countries and related policies in potential donor countries.

4.3. It is suggested that UNICEF consider the possibility of using a reformed Consolidated Appeal Process as an opportunity to link coordination in funding of the humanitarian response to crisis/conflict with coordination of a political response, i.e. engaging donors in strategy to exert pressure on perpetrators of conflict.

5. Management of inputs

5.1. It is suggested that further efforts are necessary to enhance UNICEF's performance in contracting, shipping and distributing supplies. The planned assessment of Supply Division is important, as would be a review of the broader supply chain, especially examining the complementarities and possible gaps between roles of Supply Division and other regional and field offices, and considering alternative supply sources.

5.2. It is suggested that the office-in-a-box concept is a promising response to the demands for greater flexibility and adaptation in UNICEF office systems.

5.3. It is suggested that field-level capacity in basic business processes and use of existing systems must be addressed through a targeted training strategy.

5.4. Close collaboration between programme and operations have been repeatedly recommended to ensure that operational measures correspond to the scope and nature of programming objectives and, conversely, that programming objectives be tailored with operational constraints in mind. It is suggested that attention must be given to identifying constraints to and best practices in establishing good collaboration between programme and operations.

6. Human resources

6.1. In general, as the organisation pursues four key strategies to resolve human resources needs relating to unstable and crisis contexts (deployment of staff internally, arrangements with partner organisations, training and recruitment), it is important to weigh carefully how much each strategy can be expected to contribute. It is suggested that the organisation monitor carefully the reliability and overall capacity of the in-house roster to identify personnel for rapid deployment in complex emergencies. Similarly it is suggested that the overall training strategy, calendar and resource allocation should be reviewed in terms of how much it can be expected to contribute to human resources needs, particularly in vulnerable field offices.

6.2. It is suggested that the organisation explore the longer-term needs for training activities to build key competencies related to response in unstable and crisis contexts. This may include exploring the feasibility of diminishing the dependency of the training section on temporary supplemental funding and of providing permanent "core" funding support for training activities.

6.3. Recognising that recruitment of new personnel must be an integral part of meeting UNICEF's human resource needs for complex emergencies, it is suggested that the Division of Human Resources, in collaboration with senior management, prepare a position paper on what skill requirements are to be augmented, what are the profiles of individuals who can meet these requirements; and how much the organisation is prepared to set aside for meeting these requirements.

7. Allocation of roles and responsibilities

7.1. It is suggested that the organisation continue to define, and redefine as necessary, the expectations placed on country representatives in complex emergencies and provide the necessary training and support as required for them to meet these expectations.

7.2. It is suggested that a unit or group within the organisation be formally invested with the function of providing a forum for monitoring the level of awareness among divisions about their respective roles and responsibilities and of assuming a leadership role in directing and refining the synergy between the functions which different divisions perform. This could, for example, be the Inter-Divisional Crisis Preparedness Working Group (with input and oversight from the Inter-Divisional Standing Committee on Children in Unstable Situations).

Annex I: Evaluative Documents Reviewed

Date	Reference
89	Operation Lifeline Sudan, Workshop on Lessons Learned, Copenhagen, 14-15 December 1989
90	UNICEF Mozambique. 1990. "Institutional Support for Emergency Related Assistance Operations in Mozambique" 14 February
91	Richardson, J. 1991. Assessment of UNICEF Emergency Response, 27 September
92a	Rudolph Schoch et al. December 1992. Evaluation of UNICEF – Case Study of UNICEF Mozambique. Working paper, AIDAB/CIDA/DANIDA/SDC
92b	UNICEF Mozambique, 1992. Avaliacao do Projecto QUARC: Relatorio Final
92c	Schoch, R. and Sheila Dohoo Faure. 1992. Evaluation of UNICEF: Sector Report Emergency Response
94a	Duffield, Mark. 1994. Complex Political Emergencies with Reference to Angola and Bosnia: An Exploratory Report for UNICEF, UNICEF, New York
94b	UNICEF. 1994. The Liberian Emergency – A Multisectoral Evaluation, 1994
94c	J. Richardson. 1994. Review of UNICEF's Emergency Relief Operation in Somalia. 1990-1994 UNICEF
94d	Fritz Lherrison. August 1994. "UNICEF Rwanda Operations – Issues and Concerns – Lessons Learned"
94e	John Williamson. 1994. "Emergency Responses in Goma: Observations, Lessons Learned and Recommendations"
94f	EMOPS "Lessons Learned: UNICEF Rwanda", October 1994 (and Lessons-Learned and Action Taken Thus Far: UNICEF Rwanda, November 1994)
94g	EMOPS. 1994. "Report of Representatives' Consultations. New York, 7-9 March 1994, Recommendations and Highlights of Discussions"
94h	OIA. 1994. Compilation. "Lessons Learned from Emergency Situations and Emergency Training Workshop"
95a	Ayalew Abai. May 1995. "An Appraisal of Operations Systems in UNICEF Rwanda – Report of a Mission" April-May 1995
95b	J. Richardson. 1995. UNICEF Emergency Response Based on Staff Perspectives
95c	EMOPS 1995. "East Africa Emergency Operations Brainstorming: Issues for Discussion"
96a	UNICEF Haiti. 1996. Country Programme Evaluation – 1992 – Mid 1996. Programme Choices In Political Crisis And Transition
96b	1996. Liberia, Lessons Learned, Lessons Forgotten
96c	Duffield, et al. (1996 July) Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, New York
96d	Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience.
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Annex II: Acronyms

ARI/CDD	Acute Respiratory Infection/Communicable Diarrhoeal Disease
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CBO	Community-based organisation
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CO	Country Office
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
DfID	Department for International Development
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DHR	Division of Human Resources
DOI	Department of Information
DOP	Division of Personnel (subsequently became DHR)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
ECHA	Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes
HQ	Headquarters (UNICEF)
IASC	Inter-agency Standing Committee
IASC-WP	Inter-agency Standing Committee Working Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMEP	Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATCOMS	UNICEF National Committees
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
PFO	Programme Funding Office
SCR-UK	Save the Children of the United Kingdom
SIDA	Swedish International Development Assistance
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Action Committee
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
WFP	World Food Programme

Annex III: Interviewees, Participants in Meetings and Commentators

Ayalew Abai	Senior Adviser, Finance, Division of Financial and Administrative Management
Jim Arnold	Project Officer, Telecommunications, Information Technology Division
Ray Baysden	Programme Officer, OPSCEN, Office of Emergency Programmes and Acting Security Coordinator, UNICEF
Ted Chaiban	Regional Adviser, Emergency, UNICEF Nairobi, East and South Africa Regional Office (ESARO)
Christian Clark	Communication Officer, Division of Communication
Isabel Crowley	Programme Funding Officer, Programme Funding Office
Peter Crowley	Deputy Director, Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning
Peter Delahaye	Deputy Director, UNICEF New Delhi, India, Regional Office of South Asia (ROSA)
Shamsul Farooq	Chief, Humanitarian Response Unit, Office of Emergency Programmes
John Flannagan	Logistics Officer, Office of Emergency Programmes
Nils Kastberg	Director, Office of Emergency Programmes
Iain Levine	Chief, Humanitarian Policy Development and Advocacy Unit, Office of Emergency Programmes
Reiko Nishijima	Emergency Planning Officer, UNICEF Nepal, Regional Office of South Asia (ROSA)
Philip O'Brien	Chief, Geographic Section, Programme Division and point person on UNDAF, previous head of OLDS; new Regional Director CEE/CIS
Dan O'Dell	Chief, Asia Desk, Programme Division and focal point on post-Martigny follow-up
Leila Pakkala	Senior Programme Officer, Office of Emergency Programmes
Dan Toole	Chief, Office of the Executive Director, formerly Representative of UNICEF/Rwanda
Ray V. Torres	Assistant to the Deputy Executive Director, Programmes
Jenni Wolfson	Human Resources Officer, Organisational Development and Learning Section, Division of Human Resources and focal point or training on emergencies